The 2015 Paris Agreement achieved a broad international consensus on a methodology to limit emissions to control climate change. By its terms, the Paris Agreement anticipates individual action by individual nation-states. But underlying this principle stands the fact that climate change need not and should not be addressed only by nation-states. Rather, combatting climate change requires attention at multiple levels – national, state, regional, and local – as well as requiring a public-private partnership to engage businesses in a dedicated effort to achieve meaningful results in abatement. This article examines overlapping competencies within the European Union (“EU”) and considers how various actors within the United States federalist system are engaged in trying to combat climate change. The question regarding overlapping competencies extends beyond the legal delineation of authority. At its core is the question of how to best utilize specific qualities of various constituencies with overlapping competencies to not only harmonize efforts but also to achieve maximum utilization of the efforts of different parties. Climate change is a global problem with globally felt externalities, and it must be addressed globally. It is not one that will self-resolve. Despite extensive technological advances, we cannot artificially create a livable habitat. People are dependent upon the continuing functioning of natural systems and habitats for survival. A coordinated approach to regulation among layers of government is essential to a properly functioning, fully utilized approach to climate change. This article thus addresses issues of European subsidiarity and American federalism in the context of climate change. Part II provides an overview of the basic issues at stake and briefly sketches the effectiveness of international treaties designed to address climate change and other approaches to date. No prior international effort created the cause for optimism that attended the signing of the Paris Agreement. Part III of this article takes a detailed look at issues of subsidiarity and places the discussion in the context of climate change. Part IV examines the issue within the United States, as the federal government’s approaches to climate change have been dramatically revised over the past couple of years.

Climate Change, the Paris agreement and subsidiarity

Coinu, Giovanni
;
2021-01-01

Abstract

The 2015 Paris Agreement achieved a broad international consensus on a methodology to limit emissions to control climate change. By its terms, the Paris Agreement anticipates individual action by individual nation-states. But underlying this principle stands the fact that climate change need not and should not be addressed only by nation-states. Rather, combatting climate change requires attention at multiple levels – national, state, regional, and local – as well as requiring a public-private partnership to engage businesses in a dedicated effort to achieve meaningful results in abatement. This article examines overlapping competencies within the European Union (“EU”) and considers how various actors within the United States federalist system are engaged in trying to combat climate change. The question regarding overlapping competencies extends beyond the legal delineation of authority. At its core is the question of how to best utilize specific qualities of various constituencies with overlapping competencies to not only harmonize efforts but also to achieve maximum utilization of the efforts of different parties. Climate change is a global problem with globally felt externalities, and it must be addressed globally. It is not one that will self-resolve. Despite extensive technological advances, we cannot artificially create a livable habitat. People are dependent upon the continuing functioning of natural systems and habitats for survival. A coordinated approach to regulation among layers of government is essential to a properly functioning, fully utilized approach to climate change. This article thus addresses issues of European subsidiarity and American federalism in the context of climate change. Part II provides an overview of the basic issues at stake and briefly sketches the effectiveness of international treaties designed to address climate change and other approaches to date. No prior international effort created the cause for optimism that attended the signing of the Paris Agreement. Part III of this article takes a detailed look at issues of subsidiarity and places the discussion in the context of climate change. Part IV examines the issue within the United States, as the federal government’s approaches to climate change have been dramatically revised over the past couple of years.
2021
Climate change; Paris agreement; Subsidiarity; Federalism; U.S.; E.U.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11584/279590
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