«The difficult phenomenon of nous». Heidegger’s interpretation of the Aristotelian phronesis. This paper aims to clarify the notion of “productive appropriation” of the philosophical tradition as it was proposed by Heidegger. Specifically, the investigation focuses on the highest point of confrontation with Aristotle that Heidegger makes during the first half of the ’20s of the last century. Heidegger reads Aristotle’s texts (i.e. the tenth chapter of the ninth book of the Metaphysics and the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics) in order to deal with an unsolved difficulty within Aristotle’s thought and that, by the very fact that remains unresolved, Heidegger takes as a starting point for his own philosophical work. This is a phenomenological task: to determine the principle (arche) by virtue of which man is able to grasp itself as an agent. This phenomenological problem, according to Heidegger, underlies the discussion of phronesis (the so-called “prudence”) in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, considers phronesis a “dianoetic” or “rational” virtue (unlike techne) because it is the original, simple, non-discursive, “noetic” way in which man grasps itself in its own contingency. In other words, phronesis is something like a human nous of human affairs. The analysis of dianoetic virtues in Nicomachean Ethics must therefore be read as an attempt to determine the nous in an anthropological and not in a theological way, contrary to the way the issue is discussed in the classical books of Metaphysics and De anima, Heidegger’s “productive appropriation” of Aristotle’s thought in the early twenties is therefore an “immanent criticism” which seeks to deconstruct Aristotle’s theology of nous by using some Aristotle’s insights.
«Il difficile fenomeno del nous». La phronesis aristotelica nell’interpretazione di Heidegger
CICCARELLI, PIERPAOLO
2012-01-01
Abstract
«The difficult phenomenon of nous». Heidegger’s interpretation of the Aristotelian phronesis. This paper aims to clarify the notion of “productive appropriation” of the philosophical tradition as it was proposed by Heidegger. Specifically, the investigation focuses on the highest point of confrontation with Aristotle that Heidegger makes during the first half of the ’20s of the last century. Heidegger reads Aristotle’s texts (i.e. the tenth chapter of the ninth book of the Metaphysics and the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics) in order to deal with an unsolved difficulty within Aristotle’s thought and that, by the very fact that remains unresolved, Heidegger takes as a starting point for his own philosophical work. This is a phenomenological task: to determine the principle (arche) by virtue of which man is able to grasp itself as an agent. This phenomenological problem, according to Heidegger, underlies the discussion of phronesis (the so-called “prudence”) in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, considers phronesis a “dianoetic” or “rational” virtue (unlike techne) because it is the original, simple, non-discursive, “noetic” way in which man grasps itself in its own contingency. In other words, phronesis is something like a human nous of human affairs. The analysis of dianoetic virtues in Nicomachean Ethics must therefore be read as an attempt to determine the nous in an anthropological and not in a theological way, contrary to the way the issue is discussed in the classical books of Metaphysics and De anima, Heidegger’s “productive appropriation” of Aristotle’s thought in the early twenties is therefore an “immanent criticism” which seeks to deconstruct Aristotle’s theology of nous by using some Aristotle’s insights.
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