Problems of time in Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy: Time, spacetime and their elimination

A remarkable character of Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy consists in refusing an easy simplification of the conceptual framework in order to produce more manageable theories. This character explains the attention he constantly gave to the aporetic elements in philosophy. However, the idea that philosophy should be aporetic, rather than systemic, has never been so popular among philosophers of any time. Consequently, a plethora of examples of conceptual reductionism can be found in every philosophical area. One of the most astonishing cases in the modern philosophy of physics is the idea that time and spacetime “disappear” from the fundamental physical reality, i.e., the domain of quantum gravity. Recently, some philosophers argued for the untenability of that "disappearance thesis". My aim is to show that, analyzing Hartmann's categories of space, time, dimension, measure, and magnitude in his Philosophie der Natur (1950), one can recognize the same and even more arguments against any thesis sustaining the elimination of time or spacetime from the fundamental level of reality.