

7 The Caliphate Congress and the Ottoman Sultans

Nicola Melis 0000-0001-7686-6204

In the aftermath of the First World War, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent removal of the caliphate in 1924, pan-Islamists shifted their focus to Cairo and Mecca rather than Jerusalem as potential sites for a revived caliphate. In this historical context, several meetings were convened to discuss the future of Islam. Notably, none of them produced a consensus or resolved the contentious issue of the caliphate.

This [article-chapter](#) revisits the contentious theoretical debates surrounding political and diplomatic efforts related to the caliphate question. It centres primarily on the 1926 Cairo Congress, the only assembly that overtly addressed the caliphate issue. Additionally, this article seeks to delineate the roles played by the last Ottoman claimants to the title, specifically the deposed Mehmed VI Vahideddin (1861–1926), who reigned from 1918 to 1922 as both Ottoman sultan and caliph, and his cousin Abdülmecid Efendi (1868–1944), who held the position of caliph from 1922 to 1924, marking the conclusion of the Ottoman dynasty's caliphate legacy.

Introduction

The debate about the caliphate intensified between the end of the Ottoman sultanate (1 November 1922) and the months following the abolition of the caliphate (3 March 1924). In such a context of great international turmoil, organising a global pan-Islamic congress to elect a new caliph was thus gaining ground: there was a growing sense that issues like the legitimacy of an Ottoman caliphate, its future, the eligibility of a caliph, the obsolete nature of the institution of the caliphate itself for the 20th century, and many others, needed to be debated in a universal assembly and collegial context.

The idea of calling a congress on the caliphate was not new; on the contrary, it had been emerging since the 1880s, mainly as an alternative and opposing solution to the Ottoman caliphate or, on a more general level, to realise radical religious reform.

This approach was never favoured by the Ottoman high bureaucracy, primarily in sultanic circles, who believed that an Islamic congress not organised under Ottoman auspices would fatally undermine the political and religious credibility claimed by the Ottoman sultan-caliph. In particular, the sultan in person, Abdülhamid Han (r. 1876–1909), proved reluctant and suspicious towards international Muslim gatherings. This kind of congress was never convened during Abdülhamid's reign, probably as he wished to keep decision-making in his own hands.¹

The Muslim reformists of the 19th century were the first to propose the organisation of Islamic meetings on a global scale. They sought a forum to promote, in a binding manner, the

¹ Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman caliphate in the early years of Abdülhamid II: 1877–1882", *Die Welt des Islams*, 1996, 36 (1), 1996, 59–89.

internal reform of Islam and believed that an assembly of influential Muslims would strengthen Islam's ability to resist Western imperialism.²

Nevertheless, three pan-Islamic congresses attempted, in controversial and not always straightforward ways, to propose an assembly solution to issues typically Islamic, such as the question of the caliphate and its universal acceptance by a (more or less) imagined Muslim world.³ More specifically, these are the pan-Islamic Congress for the caliphate in Cairo (1926), the Congress of the Islamic World in Mecca (1926), and the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem (1931). Though they largely failed to achieve their primary objectives, these conventions served as vital venues for strengthening communications among Muslim opinion leaders worldwide and deepening feelings of solidarity among Muslim peoples before nationalist drifts prevailed over pan-Islamic demands. Notably, all three congresses dedicated much time and effort to mere formal arguments on constitutional matters and the formulation of internal regulations, often leaving out far more substantive issues.

This [article-chapter](#) seeks to retrace the most heated theoretical debates on the political and diplomatic actions related to the issue of the caliphate, focusing mainly on the Cairo Congress, the sole one to have an overt agenda concerning the caliphate, and attempting to outline the role eventually played by the last Ottoman claimants to the title, specifically the dethroned Ottoman sultan/caliph Mehmed VI Vahideddin (1861–1926, reigned 1918–1922) and his cousin Abdülmecid Efendi⁴ (1868–1944; caliph 1922–1924), the last caliph of the Ottoman dynasty.

The Forerunners of a General Assembly of Muslims

Late-19th-century universal pan-Islamism, based in the Near East, was probably a direct or indirect consequence of European imperialist policies. It preceded Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī's efforts to persuade Muslims to unite under the umbrella of the Ottoman caliphate.⁵ Al-Afghānī (1838/39–1897) and Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), with their short-lived journal *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link)*, created a model that would be very influential in the following years.

² Martin Kramer, s.v. "Congresses", *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World*, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0159 (accessed 21 March 2022).

³ Cemil Aydın, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

⁴ O. Gazi Aşıroğlu, *Son Halife Abdülmecid*, İstanbul: Çatı Kitapları, 2011; Ali Satan, *Son Halife Abdülmecid Efendi*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2009.

⁵ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Islam: History and Politics*, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, 9–71.

Verso header

A means to achieve this goal, a universal assembly of the world's Muslims, appeared to be a possible solution. Not everyone shared this view: according to many observers at the time, this model of congress was inspired by or in imitation of the West.⁶

The British poet Wilfrid Blunt (1840–1922), well known for expressing sympathy to the Muslim world and influenced by the thought of al-Afghānī, foresaw the possibility of an Islamic collective assembly. In his collection of reprinted articles, *The Future of Islam*, published in London in 1882, he perfectly summarised the concept:

It is surely not beyond the flight of sane imagination to suppose in the last overwhelming catastrophe of Constantinople, a council of Ulema assembling at Mecca, and according to the legal precedent of ancient days electing a caliph. The assembly would, without doubt, witness intrigues of princes and quarrels among schoolmen and appeals to fanaticism and accusations of infidelity. Money, too, would certainly play its part there as elsewhere, and perhaps blood might be shed. But anyone who remembers the history of the Christian Church in the fifteenth century, and the synods which preceded the Council of Basle, must admit that such accompaniments of intrigue and corruption are no bar to a legal solution of religious difficulties. It was above all else the rivalries of Popes and Anti-popes that precipitated the Catholic Reformation.⁷

The famous journalist 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī⁸ of Aleppo (1854–1902) wrote in Cairo his influential *Umm al-qurā* ("Mother of the Villages", i.e., Mecca): an imagined congress of Islamic revival convened in Mecca during the Pilgrimage of 1899 and attended by Muslim participants from various countries. Its publication in the influential Muslim monthly *al-Manār*, directed by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā⁹ (1865–1935), spread the hypothesis of such a congress. Indeed, many believed that the congress had already taken place.

The imaginary congress culminated in a call for a restored Arab caliphate, an idea then in vogue in reformist circles. [...] Kawākibī and Rashīd Riḍā both believed that

⁶ Arup Baisya, "Ideology of pan-Islamism", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 49 (1), 2014, 69–70.

⁷ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882, 131.

⁸ Itzhak Weismann, *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi: Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, London: Oneworld, 2015; Ronen Raz, "Interpretations of Kawakibi's thought, 1950–1980s", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32 (1), 1996, 179–190.

⁹ Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117 (2), 1997, 253–277.

Mecca during the pilgrimage offered the most appropriate stage for such a congress, but other reformists favoured Istanbul or Cairo.¹⁰

Ismail Gaspiralı (Gasprinsky),¹¹ in early November 1907, proposed a general congress of the world's Muslims in the journal *Tercüman*, published from 1883 to 1918.¹² Despite the Ottoman government's suspicious attitude, he drew inspiration from official Ottoman circles. Gaspiralı displayed hesitancy in proposing any Western European metropolis as a venue for the congress, owing to their imperialistic inclinations, not to speak of any part of the Russian Empire, from where he was banned. Therefore, he had decided to convene in Cairo when it became evident that the Ottoman government would oppose the whole idea. To promote his objective, while still in Cairo, Gaspiralı even published *al-Nahda* (*Renaissance*), a newspaper that closed after the February–March 1908 issues. He had already exposed, in November 1907, the need for a convention of Muslims in a speech held in Cairo before 300 prominent Egyptians;¹³ Gaspiralı considered the Ottoman government's adherence to the congress proposal to be of the utmost importance.¹⁴ Nevertheless, he can be considered a champion also of pan-Turkism, for he called for unity and solidarity among the Turkic peoples.

Among the myriad of meetings with some ambition for universal Islamic collegiality, we can also include the Indian context, characterised by many acronyms and formations calling for the unity of India's Muslims but often making universal appeals to the Muslim world and beyond. For example, at its peak, the Khilafat Movement (1919–1924), the well-known political campaign launched by the Muslims of British India, enjoyed immense prestige among pan-Islamic-minded circles, not only in India but also abroad, especially in Egypt, Arabia, and the new state of Turkey.

¹⁰ Kramer, "Congresses".

¹¹ Hakan Kırımlı, s.v. "Gaspiralı: İsmail Bey", *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul: TDV, 13, 392–395; Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 36–45; Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995; Thomas Kuttner, "Russian *Jadīdism* and the Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinsky in Cairo, 1908. A Call to the Arabs for the Rejuvenation of the Islamic world", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, 1975, 16 (3/4), 1975, 383–424.

¹² Yavuz Akpınar, s.v. "Tercüman", *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul: TDV, 40, 492–494; Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les Mussulmans de Russie avant 1920*, Paris, La Haye: Mouton, 1964, 35–46.

¹³ Translated in *Revue du Monde Musulmane*, 4, 1908, 497–500. See also 194–195; 276–283.

¹⁴ Kuttner, "Russian *Jadīdism*", 418.

ha formattato: Tipo di carattere: Non Corsivo

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Verso header

Towards the General Congresses

The historical events that led to the end of the Ottoman Empire determined a decisive push towards effectively organising an international Islamic meeting to discuss the fate of the caliphate and the Muslim world.

After the Turkish War of Independence (*Kurtuluş Savaşı*, 1920–1922), the Allied powers sought to gain an advantage by creating a division between the Istanbul and Ankara governments, inviting both to the Lausanne Peace Conference. Against this move, on 1 November 1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), with only one opposing vote,¹⁵ declared the abolition of the sultanate, also establishing that Ankara would be the only legitimate government, the only one entitled to participate in the proceedings of Lausanne. This fact implied that the government in Istanbul was “illegal” and not representative of Turkey. It also declared that the right to appoint the caliph would rest with the TGNA. Mehmed VI Vahideddin vehemently contested this decision in vain.

Therefore, about two weeks after his deposition, on 17 November 1922, Mehmed VI took refuge with the British because he feared for his safety. The now-former sultan left Istanbul and went to Malta on the British warship *Malaya*. When he left the country, some of his closest associates, including his only son, Ertuğrul, accompanied him to his final destination in San Remo, Italy. At the time, San Remo was a popular destination for royalty and prominent Middle Eastern politicians in exile.¹⁶

When the news came from Istanbul through a telegram sent by Rafet [Bele] (1881–1963)¹⁷ announcing the flight of the deposed Ottoman ruler, the then-prime minister of the TGNA government in Ankara, Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay] (1881–1964), stated that, following the shameful defection of a person holding the office of caliph, the government had come to the conviction that the seat of the caliphate would be vacant from that time. He concluded that the election of a new caliph would be necessary from the perspective of the fundamental requirements of Islam and in the interest of national salvation. “The deposed Sultan,

¹⁵ Ziya Hurşid from Lazistan, later executed for his role in the Izmir assassination plot against Mustafa Kemal of 1926, voted against the abolishment. “The Turkish Plot”, *The Times*, 29 June 1926.

¹⁶ For instance, a deposed Muslim ruler, the shah of Iran Moḥamed ‘Alī shah Qājār, lived in exile in Istanbul at the time, having been forced to abdicate in 1909. In 1924, Moḥamed ‘Alī and his family left Istanbul for France, then moved to San Remo in Italy, where he rented a villa and lived until his death on 5 April 1925. When the shah passed away, Sultan Vahideddin was already in San Remo and attended the funeral. The last photograph of the sultan was taken during this funeral.

¹⁷ Ag. Stefani, “L’Oriente di nuovo minaccia”, *La Stampa*, 7 November 1922.

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Mohammed VI, appointed a delegation of nine to accompany him to Lausanne, where he intends to plead the cause of Islam against the Kemalists”.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the king of Hijaz, *sharīf* al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī al-Hāshimī (1853–1931), invited Mehmed VI to spend a week in Jeddah in his company. From there, Mehmed VI would deliver a manifesto in Arabic and Turkish for distribution to the people of the Muslim world and elsewhere. However, Ḥusayn tried to avoid excessive dissemination of the text as it could create turmoil and problems with the Turkish government, which had issued assurance that it did not want to make claims on the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ Therefore, Mehmed VI could explain that he had not fled; on the contrary, he had kept to the custom (*sunna*) of exile (*hijra*), following the example of the Prophet Muḥammad. He contested the idea that a restricted group of people who are incompetent on Islamic issues could solve the question of the caliphate.²⁰

In short, he disapproved of the forced and incompetent rulings of Ankara. He rejected the calumny of the nationalist “slanderers”, reprimanding them for their work, and opposed the measure to separate the sultanate from the caliphate.

On 18 November 1922, due to the resolution to abolish the sultanate and based on the flight of Mehmed VI²¹ after a very long session behind closed doors,²² the TGNA decided to appoint as caliph of the Muslims Abdülmecid Efendi,²³ Vahideddin’s first cousin and the eldest surviving male of the Ottoman dynasty.²⁴ One day later, after promising in a text that he would never make any claim to the title of sultan, he was elected caliph under the name Abdülmecid II.²⁵ A few weeks later in Egypt, many ‘*ulamā*’, including several from the prestigious al-Azhar University Mosque at Cairo, declared their allegiance (*bay‘a*) to Abdülmecid. Similar declarations of loyalty came from other Muslim countries. Disdainful Mehmed VI reacted to the news of Abdülmecid’s appointment as caliph by stating:

¹⁸ “Turkey: Mohammed VI”, *The Times*, 28 May 1923; “Le calife est partie pour la Suisse”, *L’Echo d’Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 6 March 1924.

¹⁹ The Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahrām* published it on 16 April 1923. For an Italian translation, see Ettore Rossi, “Il manifesto del Sultano deposedo al mondo Musulmano”, *Oriente Moderno*, 2 (12), 1923, 701–705.

²⁰ *Ibidem* *ibid*.

²¹ Even after his departure, Mehmed VI was still officially the caliph.

²² Zekeriya Akman, “Abdülmecid Efendi’nin Hayatı Ve Halife Seçilmesinde Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde Yaşanan Tartışmalar”, *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi* (İToBiAD), 8 (4), 2019, 4224–2440.

²³ Cevdet Küçük, s.v. “Abdülmecid Efendi Son Osmanlı Halifesi”, *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul: TDV, 1, 1988, 263–264.

²⁴ Vehbi Efendi (1862–1949), a member of parliament for Konya and the representative for religious affairs, upheld this decision by employing a well-known *fetva* that dismissed Mehmed VI from the caliphate.

²⁵ *Al-Akhbār*, Cairo, 8 December 1922; Ettore Rossi, “Il messaggio del nuovo Califfo al mondo Musulmano”, *Oriente Moderno*, 2 (8), 1923, 466–467.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Verso header

Mecid Efendi has attained his goal. It is easy to sit on Murad's emerald throne, but Mecid is not even worthy enough to reach this hero's boots. Poor man, they sent him an imam's coat, and pretending still not to notice he strives to drag his robe to the throne.²⁶

A few days later, Abdülmecid counter-attacked his hated cousin Mehmed, saying:

My father was his uncle. He did not even remember it. How painful it is to have to mention it. Now he has been discarded not only from his position, but also from the family. Let us forget this affair and look ahead to the future. May God bless the future of our country and our religion.²⁷

Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954), one of the last Ottoman *şeyhülislams* of the Empire,²⁸ who was also in exile, declared: “This caliphate is beyond reason. Abdülmecid Efendi cannot represent our beloved Prophet; he cannot even be the devil's representative, as even the devil would not accept such foolishness”.²⁹

The new Turkish state had explicitly instructed the new caliph to have no role in national politics. He was to act solely as the spiritual leader of Muslims worldwide. However, the feeling that Abdülmecid might perpetuate the traditional sultanate's autonomy made the new republican leadership uncomfortable. Furthermore, the caliphate remained the symbol of political power for many Muslims, which concerned some secular-minded nationalists. Between 1922 and 1924, a certain level of confusion about the relative rank of the caliph, especially concerning his legal and political status with the president of the republic, persisted.³⁰

As a result, the government decided to limit the caliph's budget in Istanbul. This strained relations between Istanbul and Ankara and accelerated the National Assembly's long-standing decision³¹ to abolish the caliphate on 3 March 1924³² and order Abdülmecid into

²⁶ Quoted in Murat Bardakçı, *Neslishah: The Last Ottoman Princess*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2017, 44.

²⁷ Bardakçı, *Neslishah*, 44; Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, *Osmanoğullarının Son padişahı Vahideddin Gurbet Cehenneminde*, İstanbul: Sebil, 1978, 34.

²⁸ Mehmet Kadri Karabela, *One of the Last Ottoman Şeyhülislâms, Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954): His Life, Works and Intellectual Contributions* (MA thesis, McGill University Libraries), 2003.

²⁹ Bardakçı, *Neslishah: The Last Ottoman Princess*, 44.

³⁰ Hakan Özoğlu, *From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011, 114.

³¹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Zabıt Ceridesi*, devre 2 [1923–1927], 7, 27–68.

³² “The end of the caliphate”, *The Times*, 5 March 1924; *Le Matin: Derniers Télégrammes de la Nuit*, Paris, 5 March 1924; “En Turquie: L'Assemblée Nationale Approuve et Vote la Suppression du Califat”, *L'Echo*

exile.³³ Turkish officials took him, along with his son Ömer Faruk and his daughter Dürrüşehvar, to Çatalca by car.³⁴ The expulsion order also included the rest of the Ottoman dynasty (some 120 members). Indeed, Mustafa Kemal judged that as long as the Ottoman dynasty resided in Turkey, the opponents of Ankara would be encouraged.³⁵ As Murat Bardakçı wrote,

the imperial family, though aware that something was about to happen, did not remotely consider the possibility that they could be sent away never to return. They mostly thought along the lines: “Our forefathers conquered this land, our family established this six-century-old empire. The Turks cannot do this to us. Without us they are nothing”. And even if they were to be exiled for some time, perhaps for a few months, they believed that the people would certainly call them back. Many of the older members of the family remained in denial even after they went into exile, waiting through all the difficult years abroad to be called back.³⁶

In India and Egypt, the main centres of the debate, the end of the caliphate generated the most disparate and often opposing reactions between those who considered it a shock and a catastrophe³⁷ and those, on the contrary, who considered it proper to abolish an institution emptied of its political significance, not highly effective, and in the hands of the European powers – first and foremost, Great Britain. Finally, it should be noted that part of Muslim public opinion remained indifferent to what was happening. One of the arguments put forward by detractors of the idea of the caliphate, an institution now considered obsolete, was that it was something whose fate was of essential interest to the colonial powers and their puppet elites, driven solely by their mere selfish and personalistic interests. In other words,

d'Alger: Journal Rpublicain du Matin, 5 March 1924; Carlo Alfonso Nallino, “L’elezione del nuovo ‘Califfo’ turco”, *Oriente Moderno*, 1 (7), 1922, 404–406.

³³ “Le khalife déchu s’est embarqué, pour l’Egypte”, *Le Matin: Derniers télégrammes de la nuit*, Paris, 5 March 1924; “Le Calife en Suisse. Le Calife decline l’offre d’une surveillance particulière de la part de la sureté suisse”, *L’Echo d’Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 10 March 1924.

³⁴ There were also his children’s teacher, Salih Keramet Nigâr, two women, his private secretary, Hüseyin Nakip, and his doctor, Selâhaddin Bey. Summary from Reuters, TNA, FO, 141/812.

³⁵ The legal measure ordered the expulsion of all members of the Ottoman dynasty for 28 years for the women of the family and 50 for the men. Among them was Ömer Faruk Osmanoglu (1898–1969), Abdülmeçid’s son and also Mehmed VI’s son-in-law, because he married his younger daughter Rukiye Sabiha Sultan (1894–1971).

³⁶ Bardakçı, *Neslîshah: The Last Ottoman Princess*, 75.

³⁷ “Le khalife en exil. L’expulsion d’Abdul Medjid va émuouvoir profondément le monde Musulman”, *Le Matin: Derniers télégrammes de la nuit*, Paris, 6 March 1924; Kaid-Hammoud, “L’Islam et abolition du califat”, *L’Echo d’Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 14 March 1924.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Verso header

the idea of a caliphate would have left much of Islamic public opinion indifferent had it not been for the propaganda widely promoted and financed by the colonial powers.

Prominent scholars, like the independent thinker Ināyatullāh Khān Allama Mashriqī (*‘allāma Mashriqī*),³⁸ agreed with the TGNA’s decision to abolish the caliphate because he considered it was meaningless to hold on to the institution of a “spiritual caliphate”.³⁹

Following his pan-Islamic Ottoman viewpoint, the Lebanese scholar and activist Shakīb Arslān (1869–1946) supported preserving the Ottoman caliphate and, therefore, Abdūlmecid’s rights to this position. Like Allama Mashriqī, he vigorously rejected the idea of a spiritual caliphate. Both criticised positions, such as that of the distinguished Indian activist Maulana Mohamed Barakatullah (Mawlānā Muḥammad Barakat Allāh, 1857–1927), that the new caliph be a solely spiritual figure who would shun all political affairs.⁴⁰

As Mona Hassan correctly states,

In his estimate, during the summer of 1924, ninety to ninety-five per cent of the Muslim world agreed on the caliphate of Abdūlmecid, and to negate it would merely open Pandora’s box. Abdūlmecid’s pervasive recognition as caliph supplanted and fulfilled the intent of the traditional requirement for a caliph’s Qurayshī lineage, according to Arslān, and therefore, what remained as problematic, in terms of his qualifications for caliphal office, was his lack of temporal power – a shortcoming that could be tolerated in the short term given the condition of the Muslim world.⁴¹

A part of Egyptian religious society declared that the Turkish government’s action could not invalidate their *bay‘a* communicated to Abdūlmecid on 6 December 1922 and that it considered him still in charge as caliph, “at least until a qualified body of Islamic scholars could satisfactorily resolve the dilemma”: the pledge of allegiance to him would remain binding until a legitimising caliph, even Abdūlmecid himself, could be elected through an international Islamic conference.⁴² However, some of the most influential scholars from al-

³⁸ He “was a mathematician, scholar, political leader, and revolutionary who founded the Khaksar Movement and helped bring freedom to British India”, Nasim Yousaf, “Allama Mashriqī”, in Zayn R. Kassam, Yudit Kornberg Greenberg, and Jehan Bagli, eds., *Islam, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018, 57–60; Muhammad Aslam Malik, *Allama Inayatullah Mashraqi: A Political Biography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

³⁹ “The caliphate”, *The Times*, 28 March 1924.

⁴⁰ Mohammed Barakatullah, *The Khilafet*, London: Luzac, 1924.

⁴¹ Mona Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016, 203.

⁴² Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 188.

Azhar took an opposing stance, consistent with their decision not to profess loyalty to him.⁴³ They concluded that the Islamic community was not linked to Abdülmecid. They also published a decision in which they declared that

the Caliphate of Prince Abdülmecid was not a legal Caliphate, since the Islamic religion does not recognize a Caliphate in the terms which were laid down for him [by the Turkish government] and which he accepted. Hence the allegiance (*bay'a*) paid to him by Muslims was not valid in Islamic Law.⁴⁴

Abdülmecid Efendi used his caliphal titles to invite Islamic leaders to participate in a pan-Islamic gathering to resolve the issue.⁴⁵ On 11 March 1924, the deposed caliph held a press conference in the Grand Hôtel des Alpes in Territet (Montreux), Switzerland,⁴⁶ intending to provide answers to the many attestations of loyalty that had come from all parts of the Muslim world and to the international press, which was astonished by the turn of events.⁴⁷

Feeling the need to address both sets of concerns, Abdülmecid decided to organize a press conference where he could simultaneously clarify his position and convey his response to Muslims across the world. Decrying what he termed the irreligious Turkish Republic's claim to have abolished the Islamic caliphate, Abdülmecid declared the heinous act to be “fundamentally sacrilegious, null, and void” (*şeriat-ı garray-i Ahmediyye'yi münkir böyle bir karar-ı batılı keenlemeyekun*) and called for the leaders and representatives of the Muslim community to cooperate with one another, in communication with him, on the planning of a grand international conference to discuss and ultimately rectify this lamentable state of affairs.⁴⁸

⁴³ Hilal Livaoglu Mengüç, “Ottoman caliphate in the Egyptian Press: Examples from *al-Ahrām*, *al-Muqaṭṭam* and *al-Manār*”, *Journal of History Studies*, 10 (9), 2018, 175–188.

⁴⁴ Cit. in Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Islamic world since the peace settlement”, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, Vol. 1, London: Oxford University, 1927, 82.

⁴⁵ Murat Bardakçı, “Hanedan Yayınları ve Halife Abdülmecid'in Yeşil Kitab'ı”, *Müteferrika*, 3, 1994, 49–62. See also the memoirs of the educator of Abdülmecid's children, Salih Keramet Nigar, *Halife İkinci Abdülmecid: Yurdundan Nasıl Sürüldü, Sonra Nerelerde Yaşadı, Ne Zaman ve Nerede Öldü*, İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka, 1964, 10–20.

⁴⁶ “L'abolition du Califat: L'entrée en Suisse a été laborieuse”, *L'Echo d'Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 11 March 1924; Nigâr, *Halife İkinci Abdülmecid*.

⁴⁷ Aşiroğlu, *Son Halife Abdülmecid*, 91–95.

⁴⁸ Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 184.

ha formattato: Tipo di carattere: 10 pt, Non Corsivo

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Verso header

On that date, Abdülmecid presented his proclamation addressed to the Muslims to journalists worldwide:⁴⁹

In the name of God, merciful and forgiving,

Banished from my beloved country by the decision of the secular Turkish Republic, which seeks to abolish the sacred institution of the caliphate, I address from this hospitable land of exile this message of fatherly greeting and faithful rallying to the Muslim world.

The decision of the present majority of the Turkish National Assembly is incompatible with the spirit of Islamism and its higher interest, as well as with the fundamental condition of the election of this Assembly representing the noble and valiant Turkish nation which has entrusted it, in conformance with our glorious Islamic and national traditions, with the distinguished honour. To continue to support this sacred institution, I deem it my imperative duty to declare today to the Muslim world that I consider this measure, which is fundamentally sacrilegious, to be null and void.

By its unanimous approval of my election, a year and a half ago to the supreme magistracy of Islam, the Muslim world has confirmed me in the exercise of this august function. The secular republic, having, by its encroachment on true national sovereignty, withdrawn entirely from any right to participate in the interventions, it is now up to the Muslim world alone to rule with full authority and freedom on this vital question.

I, therefore, invite the most influential leaders and representatives of the Muslim communities throughout the world to cooperate actively in this plan and to send me, as soon as possible, their concrete proposals and contributions for the meeting of a great inter-Islamic religious congress which I propose to convene at the appropriate time and place, in order to take together such decisions as the situation requires.

Lacking any other resource than the infinitely precious one lavished on me by the powerful and very comforting Muslim solidarity, whose generous manifestations go

⁴⁹ “L’abolition du Califat en Turquie. Le Calife va convoquer un concile de tous les chefs religieux de l’Islam”, *L’Echo d’Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 16 March 1924.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

to my heart, I implore the Almighty for his compassionate blessing for the ultimate success of our religious cause.

Given at Territet, Switzerland, on 5 *sha' bān* 1342 (11 March 1924).⁵⁰

Formattato: Extract Source

A few days after this declaration, the director of the Near East Section of the Swiss Foreign Ministry went to Abdülmecid to inform him that the Turkish government had disliked his statement and asked the Swiss government not to allow him to carry out any political activities.⁵¹ Abdülmecid replied by explaining that his statements did not mean to hurt Turkey.⁵²

Instead, he fulfilled his duty to the Muslims who had sworn allegiance to him. Living in exile meant supporting himself through financial aid from abroad, weakening his political ability to impose his decision. This condition inevitably weakened his position internationally and pan-Islamically:⁵³ “[Y]et a plethora of other contending candidates for the position of caliph quickly emerged in the aftermath of Abdülmecid’s sudden loss of stature and morally persuasive power”.⁵⁴

The abolition of the caliphate poisoned relations between the more radical nationalists, including Mustafa Kemal himself, and the moderates, such as Rauf [Orbay] and Kazım Karabekir (1882–1948), both of whom had met with Caliph Abdülmecid shortly before the abolition of the office.⁵⁵

Following Abdülmecid’s suggestion, immediately after March 1924, the leading ‘*ulamā*’ of al-Azhar had proposed that a Congress for the caliphate, in which representatives from all over the Muslim world would participate, be held in Cairo within a year, by spring 1925.

Shaykh Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl al-Jizāwī, the rector of al-Azhar University, delivered a speech that was widely circulated in the European and Middle Eastern media. Although well known, it is worth quoting again:

Whereas the Caliphate in Islam implies general control of the spiritual and temporal affairs of Islam; whereas the Turkish government deprived the Caliph Abdul Mejid of

⁵⁰ “La proclamation d’Abdul Mejid au monde Musulman”, *Journal et feuille d’avis du Valais et de Sion*, 15 March 1924; *L’Echo d’Alger: Journal républicain du matin*, 14 March 1924. The proclamation was published by various newspapers and journals around the world, for example, in *Le Temps*, 13 March 1924, and in *Giornale d’Italia*, 13 March 1924 (later reproduced by the journal *Oriente Moderno*, 4 (3), 1924, p.177.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

⁵¹ R.E., “Lettre de Berne”, *Feuille d’Avis de Neuchatel et du Vignoble Neuchatelois*, 13 March 1924; *Feuille d’Avis du Valais et de Sion*, 15 March 1924; *Feuille d’Avis du Valais et de Sion*, 16 March 1924.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

⁵² Küçük, “Abdülmecid Efendi”, 264.

⁵³ Bardakçı, “Hanedan Yayınları ve Halife Abdülmecid’in Yeşil Kitab’ı”, 52–55.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

⁵⁴ Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 184.

⁵⁵ Azmi Özcan, s.v. “Hilâfet”, *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul: TDV, 17, 546–553.

Verso header

his temporal powers, thereby disqualifying him from becoming Caliph in the sense that Islam required; seeing that in principal the Caliph is destined to be the representative of the Prophet, safeguarding everything concerning Islam, which necessarily means the Caliph should be subject of respect, veneration and obedience; and whereas the Caliph Abdul Mejid no longer possesses such qualifications and has not even the power to live in his native land; now therefore it has been decided to convene an Islamic conference in which all Muslim nations shall be represented in order to consider who should be appointed Caliph.⁵⁶

It took more than two years before they were in a position to organise the congress. The Egyptian highest state offices, including Egyptian king Fu'ād (reigned 1923–1936), prime minister Sa'd Zaghlūl (1858–1927), the *Wafd* party, and secular bodies in general, kept well away from matters concerning the organisation and conduct of the congress. It was postponed for a year due to a delay in the organisational phase, and the Hijaz was at war. In addition, general elections had unexpectedly been called in Egypt. Moreover, prominent scholars from al-Azhar, like the well-known *Shaykh* Yūsuf al-Dijwī (1870–1946), considered Egypt to be historically, culturally and geographically worthy of presenting itself as the leader of the Muslim world, but not at a time when the principles of Islamic law did not guide the country and when British-inspired Egyptian governments ruled.

Between the declaration announcing the organisation of the Cairo Congress of the Caliphate (in March 1923) and the actual event (in May 1926), numerous personalities ran for the caliphate office, and many organisations postulated their candidacy. Among them, at least three were Ottoman: Mehmed VI, Abdülmecid II, and Mehmet Selim.⁵⁷

Apparently there is the caliphial candidature of prince Mehmet Selim, not so much because it is hoped that he will succeed but so that he can, at the appropriate time, take precedence over some other dangerous candidature.⁵⁸

The Ottoman dynasty continued to have supporters in the Near and Middle East. However, Abdülmecid was losing ground and visibility as the months went by.⁵⁹ It is emblematic, in this regard, that he learned about the organisation of the Cairo Congress from reading

⁵⁶ “The caliphate”, *The Times*, 28 March 1924.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 147.

⁵⁸ “«Pare che ci sia la candidatura califfale del principe Mehmet Selim, non tanto perché si spera che abbia successo, quanto per poterla, al momento opportuno anteporre a qualche altra candidatura pericolosa»», ASMAE, Turchia, serie affari politici, 1919–1930, b. 1716, “Organizzazioni anti kemaliste”, 6 April 1926, 199.

⁵⁹ Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 199.

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Mohammed Barakatullah's famous volume on [the](#) caliphate,⁶⁰ as recorded in the memoirs of his children's educator, Salih Keramet Nigâr.⁶¹

The other names were the result of unofficial or alleged candidatures: the presumptive Ḥusayn of Hijaz,⁶² king Fu'ād of Egypt (1868–1936), the sultan of Morocco, Mūlay Yūsuf b. Ḥasan (1882–1927), but also his counterpart 'Abd al-Karīm from Rif, and even Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah, Aga Khan III (Sultān Moḥammed Şāh, Āghā Khān, 1877–1957), as well as several minor rulers.

Mustafa Kemal offered Turkey's support to *sayyid* Mahdī Aḥmad al-Sanūsī's (1873–1933) election at the pan-Islamic conference in Cairo. In return, the Turkish government asked him to legitimise Ankara's stand on secularism. *Sayyid* Sanūsī was known to support the nationalist movement in Turkey and Mustafa Kemal himself.⁶³ He initially favoured abolishing the sultanate and establishing a caliphate with purely spiritual powers but was extremely surprised by Mustafa Kemal's decision to abolish the caliphate altogether.⁶⁴

The 1924 Pilgrimage season became the pretext for holding an extemporaneous collective assembly of Muslims.⁶⁵ Indeed, it was predominantly a meeting of Arabs, with an Indian component participating as observers.⁶⁶ The Hajj Congress, held in Mecca in July 1924, under the auspice of the *sharīf* of Hijaz, Ḥusayn, was a sort of preliminary meeting concerning the following pan-Islamic conventions to be held after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.

During the Hajj Congress, opposition to Ḥusayn's quest for the caliphate found in the exiled Tunisian nationalist leader, *shaykh* 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Tha'ālibī (1875–1944), an eloquent voice to formulate his viewpoint. Al-Tha'ālibī argued that such a congress was not representative of Muslim world opinion and thus lacked the authority to resolve the caliphate issue. The '*ulamā*' did not reach an agreement to invest Ḥusayn with the caliphate, so the main achievement of the convention was declaratory. Reflecting the declining fortunes of *sharīf* Ḥusayn, the gathering ended with a declaration in which the participants specified that Muslim unity was a primary objective. However, Arab unity was the basis for a future union

⁶⁰ Barakatullah, *The Khilafet*, 61–62.

⁶¹ Nigâr, *Halife İkinci Abdülmecid*, 29–34.

⁶² Almost everyone, no doubt, discarded the then-king Ḥusayn: the other rulers of Arabia did not accept him, apart from his sons. Hashimis exercised their authority only through foreign financial and military support; in their hands, the caliphate would have been a consequence of European imperialism.

⁶³ Timuçin Mert, *Atatürk'ün Yanındaki Mehdi*, Istanbul: Hükümdar, 2018.

⁶⁴ Özoğlu, *From Caliphate to Secular State*, 104.

⁶⁵ British Library, Asian and African Studies, P 3125/1925, The Cairo Caliphate Conference: The Islamic Congress at Mecca.

⁶⁶ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 235.

Verso header

of all Islamic countries. They also avoided the mere mention of the caliphate.⁶⁷ Even these modest results were nullified when Ḥusayn's rival, 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd (c.1880–1953), conquered Mecca in October 1924. As a result, Ḥusayn abdicated the Hijazi throne and abandoned his bid for the prestigious seat.⁶⁸

Many prominent Muslim leaders from India, like the Ali brothers⁶⁹ and Allama Mashriqi, tried to get in touch in person with Mustafa Kemal, who generally refused to receive them, respond to their entreaties, or accept the advice of foreign personalities. Notably, Allama Mashriqi wrote a letter to Kemal on 12 October 1925 calling for:

Establishment of a central league of Islamic nations protecting the interest of every Muslim nation through effective political force.

Establishment of general Islamic *bayt al-māl*,⁷⁰ [...] to which every Muslim, wherever he lives, will contribute.

Religious and moral adhesion of the entire Muslim world to the elected president of the Islamic league.⁷¹

Allama Mashriqi, like many others in Egypt, India, and elsewhere, agreed with the TGNA's decision to abolish the caliphate because it depleted its traditional attributes. Accordingly, a highly powerful and effective caliphate could make sense. This trend of thought considered the equation between a spiritual caliphate and papacy to be meaningless and an invention of the European powers, joined to weaken the Muslim world.

Although king Fu'ād of Egypt had announced that he took no personal interest in the matter, it was a widespread opinion in the Middle East that the British wanted to take advantage of the difficulties the French were facing at that time in the Middle East and continued to try to achieve their goal, which was to unite all the Arab territories in a federation under the rule of

⁶⁷ Jean-François Legrain, *L'idée de califat universel et de congrès Islamique face à la revendication de souveraineté nationale et aux menaces d'écrasement de l'Empire Ottoman*, Lyon: Maison de l'Orient et la Méditerranée, 2006 (new edition), 111.

⁶⁸ Basheer M. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941: A Political History*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998.

⁶⁹ Muḥammad 'Alī Jawhar (1878–1931) and Shaukat Ali (Shawkat 'Alī, 1873–1938) were two leading figures of the Khilafat Movement, cfr. Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The Circles of Maulana Mohamed Ali", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38 (4), 2002, 51–62.

⁷⁰ This denomination has been used to designate the *Umma* treasury since the time of the Rashidun caliphate (632–661 AD), cfr. Noel J. Coulson, Claude Cahen, et al., s.v. "Bayt al-Māl", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005 (2nd edn).

⁷¹ Nasim Yousaf, *Allama Mashriqi's Monumental Speech at the Global Islamic Khilafat Conference, Cairo, May 1926*, Alexandria, Dr, Lexington, KY: AMZ Publications, 49.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Fu'ād, ~~Their aim was to consolidate all the Arab regions into a federation under the leadership of Fu'ād,~~ whom they viewed as a compliant figurehead possessing moral and material influence over the entire Islamic world. British politicians and journalists had been transparent about their intentions in this regard.⁷²

According to the organisers, ensuring Egypt's centrality within the Muslim world was essential. They deliberated on the personalities they should invite to participate, disregarding sectarian and confessional boundaries. Therefore, the entities invited to participate in the congress included scholars of all orientations and Ibadis.⁷³

At the same time, a vibrant ideological and theological clash also developed in Egypt and the Arab world, involving some of the scholars of the time, the most famous of whom was 'Alī 'Abd-l-Rāziq (1888–1966).⁷⁴ Their works⁷⁵ undoubtedly influenced the political and academic debate and the very course of the Cairo Congress.⁷⁶

In 1926, in an attempt to offer a general overview of the confused situation at the time, the influential scholar Louise Massignon (1883–1962), after examining the various views of the Muslim elite on the caliphate and inter-Islamic sovereignty, classified current trends as follows:⁷⁷

- a Conservatives who supported the Ottoman caliphate. Abdülmecid and an influential faction in Cairo embodied the moderate inclination towards supporting a purely spiritual caliphate. According to the informant, Prince Ömer Tosun ('Umar Tūsūn) of Egypt was collecting funds for the return of Abdülmecid to Istanbul as caliph, and he would give financial support to this secret organisation.

⁷² Ettore Rossi, "Contro il Congresso per il Califfato al Cairo", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 259.

⁷³ Rainer Brunner, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: The Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and Restraint*, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004.

⁷⁴ 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*, Cairo: Maṭba'at Miṣr, 1925; Ali Abdel Razek, *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, trans. Maryam Loutfy, ed. Abdou Filali-Ansary, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

⁷⁵ In particular, 'Abd-l-Rāziq's modernist thesis in 1925 aroused considerable emotion in Egypt because of his views that were considered bold:

- The Qur'an leaves believers free to choose a government.
- The caliphate, not mentioned in the Qur'an, is not one of the "foundations of Islam".
- The Prophet, entrusted with a personal apostolic mission, was not charged with constituting a government that could be transmitted after him.

Islam is not legislation with immediate authority but a law-making religion whose decrees are applied by "executing powers" left to the free choice of the faithful. On 12 August 1925, the Grand Council of the 'Ulamā' of Al-Azhar extracted and condemned seven proposals from this work, a decision that was the pretext for a significant modernist and secularist campaign against this religious mechanism.

⁷⁶ In 1926, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī (1895–1971) published a controversial work on the caliphate that would further ignite the debate in the following years. Al-Sanhoury, *Le califat, son évolution vers une Société des Nations Orientales*, préface Édouard Lambert, Paris: Geuthner, 1926.

⁷⁷ Louis Massignon, "Introduction", in *Etudes sur la notion Islamique de souveraineté*, special issue of *Revue du monde Musulman*, 68 (8), 1925, p.8. See also, "L'entente Islamique internationale et les deux congrès Musulmans de 1926", *Revue des sciences politiques*, 49, 1926, 481–485.

ha formattato: Colore carattere: Automatico

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Tipo di carattere: 10 pt, Non Corsivo

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Verso header

- b Arab hyper-nationalists, including the Hijazi “right”, in favour of the ex-king Ḥusayn (5 March – 3 October 1924) and a Wahhābī “left” which, since the capture of Mecca, predominated in Arabia, among Arab students in Europe, and even among some Indians.
- c Regional nationalists, whether they were secular, such as Turkish nationalists or “particularists”, as seen in some Egyptian nationalists.
- d Reformists, for whom the caliph should be no more than the delegated administrator of a community advisory council; those on the “right” would like to “limit the council’s activity to religious matters dealt with diplomatically”; those on the “left”, affiliated “to the Turkish republicans and even to the Muslim communists of Russia”, would “willingly give it political, revolutionary, and dictatorial powers”.

Considering the substantial size of the Maghreb community in Egypt and its widespread presence in the Arab-speaking world, the involvement of Muslims from North Africa was deemed crucial. Egypt, at least at first, went so far as to secretly ask France for its support to facilitate the participation of representatives from Algeria and Tunisia. On 19 November 1924, in a letter sent from Algiers to Minister of Foreign Affairs Théodore Steeg (1868–1950), then French governor of Algeria, wrote as follows:⁷⁸

on the participation of Algerian Muslims in the congress planned by the Cairo ‘*ulamā*’. [...] The question of the caliphate has never arisen in Algeria. Communicating a list of Algerian personalities to the Cairo ‘*ulamā*’ would be inappropriate [...] A public discussion would soon emerge on the issue of the delegates [...] In addition to the agitation, which would inevitably be the consequence of the polemics involved, our adversaries would have ample opportunity to cast suspicion on our representatives in advance.

France should not concern itself with the question of the caliphate, as any intervention would risk provoking a reaction contrary to the desired effect; on the other hand, it should avoid anything that might resemble an attempt to unify the Muslim countries under French control.

We must avoid interfering in the appointment of caliphs. This question, as far as we are concerned, is exclusively a matter for the conscience of our Muslims, whether they are French citizens, subjects, protected or administered. We have no interest in attempting to unify French Islam, as this unification could one day turn against us.

⁷⁸ “«sur la participation des musulmans de l’Algérie au Congrès qu’ont projeté les uléma du Caire [...] La question du Khalifat ne s’est jamais posée en Algérie [...] Il serait inopportun de communiquer aux uléma du Caire une liste des personnalités algériennes [...]. Une discussion publique ne tarderait pas à s’instituer autour des délégués [...] et en outre de l’agitation qui serait fatalement la conséquence des polémiques engagées, nos adversaires auraient beau jeu pour faire peser à l’avance la suspicion sur nos mandataires”», Text in Jacques Crémadeills, “La France, Abd-El-Krim et le problème du Khalifat (1924–1926). Remarques à propos de quelques archives inédites”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 6 (1), 1973, 72.

Formattato: Extract

Moreover, any support we might give to a candidate for the caliphate would probably discredit him in the eyes of his co-religionists.⁷⁹

It is worth noting that the French perspective was not uniform. In the case of Beirut, the issue of the caliphate was seen within the broader context of international politics. However, in contrast, for Lucien Saint in Tunis and Lyautey in Rabat, the problem was primarily viewed within the context of French colonial issues.⁸⁰ Moreover, a specific risk could arise concerning the Cairo Congress for Algeria:

I am referring to those practitioners and lawyers who, in Alexandria, at the call of *amīr* Khālīd, grandson of *amīr* ‘Abd al-Qādir, the legendary hero of Algeria, and on the initiative of prince Omar Toussoum (Ömer Tusun / ‘Umar Ṭūsūn), met – not in a mosque or any other religious establishment – but at the clinic – probably a polyclinic – of Dr Abdoul Aziz Effendi Emran (‘Abd al-‘Azīz Efendi ‘Imrān), and, after many speeches and many congratulations, decided to send two energetic protests, one to the assembly of the *‘ulamā*’ of Cairo, contesting its right to decide on a question as delicate as that of the caliphate – a doctor is probably more competent in this matter than the rector of al-Azhar since in this case it concerns a moribund. The other was addressed to the Government of Mr Mussolini, severely criticising it for having dared to issue a decree ordering the Muslims of Libya and Tripolitania to pray in the mosques for the sovereign of Italy.⁸¹

Also, the French diplomatic representation in Cairo did not warmly welcome the Egyptian request because, as it had no list of authoritative personalities to suggest, the risk was to leave room for Maghrebi representatives stationed in Egypt, in principle not particularly favourable to France, if not exactly hostile.⁸²

⁷⁹ «nous devons éviter d’intervenir dans la désignation des Califes. Cette question, en ce qui nous concerne, relève exclusivement de la conscience de nos Musulmans, qu’ils soient citoyens, sujets, protégés ou administrés français. Nous n’avons aucun intérêt à tenter une unification de l’Islam français, car cette unification risquerait un jour de se retourner contre nous. Au surplus, tout appui que nous donnerions à un candidat au Califat aurait probablement pour résultat de le discréditer aux yeux de ses coreligionnaires», in “La suppression du Califat turc”, *L’Afrique française: Bulletin mensuel du Comité de l’Afrique française et du Comité du Maroc*, 1 January 1924, 157.

⁸⁰ Crémadeills, “La France, Abd-El-Krim et le problème du Khalifat”, 51.

⁸¹ The *Journal du Caire*, which referred to individuals without a mandate who claimed to resolve the issue of the caliphate, quoted in “Les Débuts de l’Indépendance Égyptienne”, *L’Afrique française: Bulletin mensuel du Comité de l’Afrique française et du Comité du Maroc*, 1 January 1924, 308.

⁸² Uri M. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine*, Leiden: Brill, 1987, 190.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Verso header

The example of Morocco illustrates the great controversy and extreme confusion that the criteria chosen in Egypt generated regarding who should be invited to the congress. On 30 October 1924, the news about the Cairo Congress arrived in Rabat. The matter swiftly gained increased significance in Paris. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of the French stance remained unaltered and can be succinctly summarised as “neutrality” and a “wait-and-see stance”, taking into account the viewpoint of the sultan.

Henceforth, Morocco had three problems: the Cairo Congress was postponed to 1926, the Mecca Congress, which was also scheduled for 1926, and ‘Abd al-Karīm, who had links with these two congresses.⁸³ In 1926, the organisers considered ‘Abd al-Karīm to be the legal representative of a Muslim country in the same capacity as the sultan of Morocco.

Prior to the postponement, the Egyptian organisers had informally reached out to France, using their embassy in Cairo, to inquire about the delegates set to participate in the congress, bypassing the Moroccan sovereign. However, with the rescheduled date, they directly extended an invitation to Mūlay Yūsuf b. a-Ḥasan without involving the French authorities, a move that would ultimately bring about a notable shift in the Moroccan sovereign’s stance.⁸⁴

For his part, the sultan of Morocco reacted ~~very~~ vehemently and, on his initiative, refused to send representatives to a congress that welcomed representatives of one of his rebel subjects (namely, ‘Abd al-Karīm). From that point onwards, France placed the issue in the general context of colonial political problems, moving it beyond the strictly Moroccan framework.

French diplomacy took an interest in this problem because of British influence on the event. The possible sending of Moroccan delegates to Cairo could have induced Moroccan delegates to adhere to progressive and subversive ideas concerning the interests of the Moroccan sultanate. On the other hand, if sent, the Moroccan delegation would undoubtedly contribute significantly to the subject matter of the ongoing discourse in the Cairo Congress, as clearly stated in a letter sent by Steeg to the French minister of Foreign Affairs on 13 March 1926:

Sending Moroccan delegates to Cairo could have the disadvantage of exposing them to a current of new ideas which could seduce them and provoke an inappropriate feeling of Muslim solidarity. [...] In order to exercise some influence on the congress, the support of Moroccan delegates would not be irrelevant.⁸⁵

⁸³ Jean Hess, “L’Islam, le rîff et les Turcs d’Angora”, *Le Petit Oranais*, 26 June 1925.

⁸⁴ Crémadeills, “La France, Abd-El-Krim et le problème du Khalifat”, 53.

⁸⁵ “«L’envoi éventuel au Caire de délégués marocains pourrait présenter l’inconvénient de mettre ces derniers en présence d’un courant d’ idées nouvelles qui pourraient les séduire et provoquer chez eux un

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

The 1926 General Congress for the eCaliphate in Cairo⁸⁶

Formattato: Titolo 1

The Caliphate Congress (*mu'tamar al-khilāfa*) was finally held in Cairo under the chairmanship of *Shaykh* al-Jizāwī, rector of al-Azhar, on 13–19 May 1926, notwithstanding the protests of the Egyptian supporters of Abdülmecid II. At the same time, Mehmed VI sent a written protest to the Caliphate Congress,⁸⁷ confirming what he had always stated, namely that he had never waived the right to reign and be caliph.⁸⁸ He also wrote a proclamation to the Islamic world, which received little prominence in the Middle East or the West, especially not in Italy, his host country.⁸⁹

On 16 May 1926, while the conference was in progress, Mehmed VI passed away unexpectedly in San Remo, with no communication from Cairo regarding the election of a new caliph. In contrast to the continued accusations levied against him by the Turks, he steadfastly asserted until his final moments that he had not betrayed his homeland and his people. Throughout this period, he consistently reaffirmed his belief that the distance separating him from Istanbul and the caliphate seat was only temporary. During his exile in San Remo, he emphasised in his statements that he harboured the hope of one day returning to his homeland to reclaim the throne that he believed had been unjustly taken from him.⁹⁰

After Mehmed's death, Ankara's interest in the exile community shifted from San Remo to Nice, where Abdülmecid Efendi was now head of the Ottoman family and held several meetings at his residence seeking to enter into contact with various governments for

sentiment inopportun de solidarit  musulmane. [...] Mais pour exercer une action au sein du congr s, l'appoint de la d l gation marocaine ne serait pas n gligeable”⁸⁶, text in Cr madoills, “La France, Abd-El-Krim et le probl me du Khalifat”, 71.

⁸⁶ The reports and proceedings of the Islamic congresses in Cairo, Mecca, and Jerusalem were translated into several European languages. The most detailed text is written in French by Achille S kaly, “Les deux Congres Generaux de 1926: Le Congr s du Khalifat [Le Caire, 13–19 May 1926] et le Congres du Monde Musulman [La Mecque, 7 June – 5 July 1926]”, *Revue du Monde Musulmane*, LXIV, 1–224). The Italian journal *Oriente Moderno* also offered in great detail the proceedings of the congresses in a section devoted to press review (6, 1926, 255–273; 11, 1931, 526–530, 580–581). Toynbee's and Gibb's reconstructions are extremely indebted to S kaly and *Oriente Moderno* (Toynbee, “The Islamic world since the peace settlement”, 81–91; H.A.R. Gibb, “The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931”, in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, 99–110). The main Egyptian and Arab newspapers of the time followed all the proceedings step by step.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

⁸⁷ “Protests Islam Congress; ex-sultan Mehmed Khan opposes selection of a caliph”, *New York Times*, 5 May 1926.

⁸⁸ Two days after Abd lmecid's famous press conference in Territet (see footnote n. 46), on 13 March 1924, he too declared that the caliphate issue could not be the sole responsibility of a single people (the Turks) but was one that only a council of experts appointed by the entire Islamic world and the consensus of the umma (*ijma-i umma*) should resolve. See a letter written by Mehmed VI to the president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929), complaining about the abolition of the caliphate and the expulsion of the Ottoman dynasty in 1924. See Hakan  z gl , “Sultan Vahdettin'in ABD Bařkanı Coolidge'e G nderdiđi Bir Mektup”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 142, 2005, 100–106.

⁸⁹ Riccardo Mandelli, *L'ultimo sultano. Come l'impero ottomano mori a Sanremo*, Torino: Lindau, 2011.

⁹⁰ řaduman Halici, “San Remo G r řmeleri: Vahideddin, Bir 'İttihatçı' ve  ç 'Y zelliik', *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Arařtırmaları Dergisi* (CTAD), 11 (22), 2015, 267–303.

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Verso header

diplomatic support.⁹¹ Indeed, some of Mehmed's close collaborators and relatives moved to Nice, including Mehmed's son Ertuğrul Efendi, who was only 14 years old at the time, and his older sister Sabiha Sultan. One observer at the time could write that:

While the Cairo congress members were discussing the need for a caliphate, the princes of the Ottoman royal family, meeting with a few former ministers and other loyalists at San Remo, at the tomb of *sulṭān* Mehmed VI, decided to give him a successor and to proclaim him *sulṭān* and caliph at the same time. The decisions of the Ottoman princes will be no more effective than the resolutions of the Islamic Congress in Cairo.⁹²

Outside al-Azhar University, the organisers established as many as 14 committees for the caliphate to support the organisation of the Cairo Congress itself.

The governing council (*majlis idāri*) of the congress had previously met on the evening of 25 April and had noted that the congress had become the object of much criticism since the conditions had changed from two years earlier, when it was resolved to hold the congress (25 March 1924).

Significantly, several essential actors, both in India and in the Arab world (including some of Egypt's hosts) declined the final invitation in February 1926, claiming, variously, that convening the congress was inappropriate. For example, the Indian Central Committee for the caliphate had met on 8 and 9 March 1926 and, after much discussion, sent a telegram to *Shaykh* al-Jizāwī, thanking him for the invitation and saying that the present situation in the Muslim world was not conducive to the convening of a congress to deal with the question of the caliphate and elect the caliph.⁹³ Naturally, Turkey abstained from involvement in this matter, as it was not a government priority at the time. Given the prevailing circumstances in Egypt, supporting king Fu'ād was deemed impractical, as he was considered a puppet ruler, which would have essentially placed the significant position under British influence.

Nor could the office be given to Ibn Sa'ūd, sultan of the Najd and king of Ḥijāz, because he was still in the first phase of the creation of his vast empire, which began with the conquest of

⁹¹ Satan, *Son Halife Abdülmecid*, chapter 4.

⁹² «Pendant que les congressistes du Caire devisaient sur la nécessité du califat, les princes de la famille royale ottomane, réunis avec quelques anciens ministres et quelques autres fidèles, à San Remo, sur la tombe du sultan Mehmed VI, ont décidé de lui donner un successeur et de le proclamer en même temps sultan et calife. Nous croyons que les décisions des princes ottomans n'auront pas une plus grande efficacité que les résolutions du congrès islamique du Caire.»⁹³ Dr. Isk, "Le congrès du califat et la réforme religieuse de l'Islam: Jérusalem, 14 mai", *La Liberté: Journal politique, religieux, social*, 21 May 1926.

⁹³ *Al-Ahrām*, 2 May 1926.

Hijaz; appointing him as caliph would have brought unnecessary challenges and complications at that moment, which he sought to avoid.

While Allama Mashriqi asserted that a caliph without power was meaningless, Abdülmecid called for his demands to be taken into account to regain those caliphal prerogatives that would give him adequate political power.

Hence, at the last minute, the governing council changed its agenda, excluding the designation of any person as a caliph.⁹⁴ Considering the time-sensitive and complex international political situation, *Shaykh* al-Jizāwī insisted that the exchange of views should occur from a purely religious point of view.

The participants resolved that the congress should confine itself to discussing the following six points:⁹⁵

- 1) Exposing the true nature (*ḥaqīqa*) of the caliphate and the requirements (*shurūṭ*) of the caliph in Islam.
- 2) Caliphate and dutiful in Islam.
- 3) How to tighten the caliphate contract.
- 4) Is it now possible to establish a caliphate meeting the requirements of the *sharī'a*?
- 5) If it is not easy to establish this caliphate, what is to be done? If the congress resolves that it is necessary (*wujūb*) to appoint (*naṣb*) a caliph, what [arrangements] will be made to implement this?

From a theoretical point of view, this agenda is excellent. The scholars of Islam will be able to enlighten the entire Muslim world on the question of the caliphate through their debates and decisions. They will most probably declare that, without a caliph, Islam is beheaded, and they will urge the Muslim world to give itself a leader as soon as possible. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, what will be the value of such resolutions? Do we think that Ibn al-Sa'ūd, *sulṭān* of the Najd and king of the Hijaz, will be convinced by the arguments of the organisers? Will the Turks abandon all their policies of recent years and accept the opinion of the Cairo *'ulamā'*? Will the Sultan of Morocco be asked to give up his title of caliph of Maghreb? Would al-

⁹⁴ "Annexe N. 2. Décision portant ajournement a un an de la réunion du Congrès Général musulman du Khalifat en Égypte", in Sékaly, "Les deux Congres Generaux de 1926", 3–36; Ettore Rossi, "Il Califfato e il Re d'Egitto: mutamento al carattere del Congresso", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 263; Carlo Alfonso Nallino, "Proteste contro il restringimento del programma e proposta di differire il Congresso", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 264.

⁹⁵ Sékaly, "Les deux Congres Generaux de 1926", 29–30; Carlo Alfonso Nallino, "Limitazione del Congresso per il Califfato l Cairo", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 263–264.

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Verso header

Sanūsī be persuaded to adhere to the principles laid down by the Cairo assembly?
What about Fayṣal, Ḥusayn and ‘Abd Allāh?⁹⁶

Of the 610 invitations sent to institutions and individuals between February and March 1926, only 44 delegates attended the congress, 15 of whom were Egyptians.⁹⁷ Among the most influential were *Sayyid* Muḥammad Idrīs al-Sanūsī from Cyrenaica, *Shaykh* Muḥammad al-Ṣālīḥ from Tunisia, Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī from Palestine, *Sayyid* al-Mīrghanī al-Idrīsī (of the ‘Asīr), ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Tha‘ālibī, then a professor in Baghdad, a Tunisian but a delegate from Mesopotamia.⁹⁸

Others were delegates from Johor in the Malacca peninsula, Mesopotamia, and South Africa. Rashīd Riḍā,⁹⁹ pro-Wahhābī editor of the *al-Manar* magazine and member of the congress committee, was absent, being in Arabia with Ibn Sa‘ūd. Allama Mashriqī attended in a personal capacity as a prominent personality. He was in the British government service then, so reports often erroneously indicate the absence of Indian speakers. For example, Jacob M. Landau states, quoting a French archive source, that “[c]onspicuous by their absence were such important Islamic centres as India, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Algeria”.¹⁰⁰ Allama Mashriqī’s role would have been fundamental in developing the debate during the proceedings¹⁰¹ with his speech in Arabic.¹⁰²

The Rifans from Morocco, conscious of being scrutinised, opted not to send delegates but instead appointed Egyptians to represent them. In this way, *Shaykh* Ḥusayn Wālī and Muḥammad Farrāj al-Mīnyāwī represented ‘Abd al-Karīm at the Cairo Congress. They were

⁹⁶ “«Au point de vue théorique, cet ordre du jour est excellent. Les savants de l’Islam pourront éclairer, par leurs débats et par leurs décisions, tout le monde musulman sur la question du califat. Ils déclareront très probablement que, sans calife, l’Islam est décapité, et ils adjureront le monde musulman de se donner, le plus vite possible, un chef. Mais, au point de vue pratique, quelle sera la valeur de telles résolutions? Croit-on qu’Ibn el Séoud, sultan du Nejd, et roi du Hedjaz, se laissera convaincre par les arguments ‘des organisateurs? Espère-t-on que les Turcs vont renoncer à toute leur politique de ces dernières années pour se ranger à l’avis des oulémas du Caire? Demandra-t-on au sultan du Maroc d’abandonner son titre de calife d’El Maghreb? Obtiendra-t-on d’El Senoussi une adhésion aux principes qu’établira l’assemblée du Caire? Et Faïçal, et Hussein, et Abdallah?»», Isk, “Le congrès du califat et la réforme religieuse de l’Islam”.

⁹⁷ Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 209.

⁹⁸ Annexe 5. Congrès Général islamique du Khalifat du Caire. Procès-verbal de la première séance tenue le jeudi 1er zilkadé 1344 de l’Hégire (13 mai 1926), in Sékaly “Les deux Congres Generaux de 1926”, 46–48; Ettore Rossi, “Inaugurazione del Congresso per il Califfato al Cairo”, *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 265.

⁹⁹ Henri Laoust, *Le califat dans la doctrine de Raṣīd Riḍā*, Beirut: l’Institut français de Damas, 1938.

¹⁰⁰ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 237.

¹⁰¹ Yousaf, *Allama Mashriqī’s Monumental Speech*.

¹⁰² ‘Ināyatullāh Khān al-Mashriqī, *Khiṭāb, 13 May 1926, Mu‘tamar-i Khilāfat, Qāhirah, Miṣr*, Rawalpindi: Furūgh-i Islām Foundation, n.d.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

not the only ones to represent Morocco since the Darqāwī order's *shaykh* attended in a personal capacity.¹⁰³

According to the committee, the congress had failed to garner adequate support across the Islamic world to bestow upon any elected caliph the requisite moral authority. Hence, the gathering was to be considered completely unofficial. It was also resolved, at the proposal of *Shaykh* Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (1881–1945) and after lively discussion, that each delegate of Muslim peoples to the congress should express his opinion in his own name and not in the name of the nation he represented. In other words, governments accredited none of the delegates.

The congress closed on 20 May, proclaiming the need for further agreements among Muslims to establish a caliphate following the precepts of *sharī'a*, possibly in a new meeting of representatives of all Muslim countries to be organised in Cairo.

In principle, the congress had remained entangled between orientations related to Egyptian issues and global arguments supported by non-Egyptian actors.

If anything, the Cairo Caliphate Congress illustrated the erosion of the power of the 'ulamā' class, and the influence that the evolving sense of nationhood began to exercise on the outlook of modern Muslims.¹⁰⁴

The 1926–Mecca Congress

Viewed solely from a caliphal standpoint, the two assemblies that followed the Cairo Congress could have achieved more effective results, even though they had substantial significance in the broader context of pan-Islamic affairs. The Cairo Congress itself had been disappointing compared to the intentions declared immediately after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate. However, it had tried to maintain its focus on the issue of the caliphate.

Conversely, the election of a new caliph did not feature on the agendas of the Mecca meeting in 1926 and the Jerusalem meeting in 1931. Nevertheless, global public opinion, whether from Muslim or non-Muslim perspectives, did not align with the views of those convening these two gatherings, persistently interpreting them as endeavours to select a new caliph.

¹⁰³ For a brief period, the French harboured suspicions that he might be working as an agent for 'Abd al-Karīm. However, it was later ascertained that he was an operative representing the Spanish, leading to his permission to proceed to Cairo.

¹⁰⁴ Basheer M. Nafi, "The Abolition of the Caliphate: Causes and Consequences", in Abdulrahim Ali, Iba Der Thiam, and Yusof A. Talib, eds., *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture: Islam in the World Today, Retrospective of the Evolution of Islam and the Muslim World*, Paris: UNESCO, 2016, 190.

Verso header

The Muslim World Congress was held in Mecca between 7 June and 5 July 1926, during the *hajj* season, a few weeks after the Cairo meeting. Ibn Sa'ūd, whose position in the Hijaz was still insecure, aimed at discussing the future of the holy places and the safe organisation of the Pilgrimage.

In defiance of the diplomatic cautions of the organisers about caliphal issues, on 8 June 1926 in Cairo, a press release from the Reuters news agency titled, not surprisingly, “Nouveau congrès du califat”, stated that Ibn Sa'ūd opened the Mecca Congress, which was to examine the situation of the holy cities of the Hijaz and the question of the caliphate. Fifty-nine delegates represented India, Russia, Java, Syria, Palestine, 'Asīr, Hijaz, Egypt and Sudan. Sharraf 'Adnān had been appointed chairman. The heads of the Indian and Russian delegations were appointed as vice-chairpersons.

The Mecca gathering had a higher number of participants compared to the Cairo meeting, with approximately 70 representatives from various regions of the Muslim world, including official delegations from Egypt and Turkey.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, in contrast to Cairo, in Mecca, many delegates could attend in an official capacity.

Invitations were sent to the governments of four Islamic countries (Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Yemen), which were *de jure* and *de facto* independent; to those of two countries (Egypt and Iraq) that were independent *de jure* but not altogether *de facto*; to one Islamic ruler ('Abd al-Karīm in the Moroccan Rif) who was independent *de facto* but not *de jure*; to one Islamic ruler (the *bey* of Tunis) who was both *de jure* and *de facto* under the protectorate of a European power; and to two Muslim official bodies (the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine and the Central Religious Directorate for the Muslims of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic).¹⁰⁶

The opening of the congress, which took place on 7 June 1926, was attended by nearly 60 delegates; but, apart from the delegation representing the Muslims of the USSR and those who represented Saudi dominions of the Najd, the Hijaz, and the 'Asīr, all these delegates were entirely unofficial. The Turkish government, which had accepted Ibn Sa'ūd's invitation this time, had delayed sending its delegation, and the other governments had not yet replied. When, however, the congress, after suspending its sittings from 17 to 26 June on account of the Pilgrimage, reopened on 27 June, not only a Turkish but also an Afghan and a Yemeni official delegation made their appearance. A few days earlier, the Egyptian government had also decided to send a delegation.

¹⁰⁵ Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism, and the Palestine Question*, 102.

¹⁰⁶ Toynbee, “The Islamic world since the peace settlement”, 312.

However, representatives from Iran and Iraq did not arrive, for political and possibly sectarian reasons. Among the most distinguished participants were the Egyptians Rashīd Riḍā and *Shaykh* Muhammad al-Zawāhirī (1878–1944), the Ali brothers from India, as well as the *muftī* Ḥājjī Amīn al-Ḥusaynī (1897–1974) from Palestine.¹⁰⁷ It seems that al-Ḥusaynī had several confidential meetings with the Saudi king concerning the situation in Palestine and the Syrian uprising. The matter of the caliphate was not on the agenda for discussion, and it was not considered a topic of international politics.

In his address to the congress, Ibn Sa‘ūd stated that other states’ internal or international affairs should not be the subject of discussion. This issue caused some unease among many delegates.

The 1931 World Islamic Congress¹⁰⁸

The Jerusalem General Islamic Congress of 1931 played a pivotal role in the resurgence of pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism.¹⁰⁹ As Weldon C. Matthews argued,¹¹⁰ the congress unmistakably exhibited a preference for pan-Islamism and the tenets of political Islam, consequently eclipsing the prevailing nationalist sentiments that existed within the Islamic milieu.

In this context, the salient and distinctive matter of concern pertained to Palestine, an issue actively advanced by Palestinian leaders.¹¹¹ This issue is intricately intertwined with the pursuit of overarching ideals within the Arab and Muslim contexts. The Palestinian nationalist and Islamic luminary, the *muftī* of Jerusalem, Ḥājjī Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, and a select group of Arab-Islamic associates actively founded this congress. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions between Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist movement in mandated

¹⁰⁷ He held high offices, being in office as grand mufti of Jerusalem (1921–1948) and president of the Supreme Muslim Council (1922–1937). Lorenzo Kamel, “Identities and migrations: A borderless Middle East’s perspective”, *Storicamente*, 11 (8), 2015, 1–16.

¹⁰⁸ Hamilton A.R. Gibb, “The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931”, in *Survey of International Affairs, 1934*, 95–321; Virginia V[acc]a, “Il Congresso Musulmano di Gerusalemme”, *Oriente Moderno*, 12 (1), 24–45; Carlo A. Nallino, “Lo statuto del Congresso Musulmano generale (o Congresso Panislamico) periodico”, *Oriente Moderno*, 12 (2), 1932, 74–75.

¹⁰⁹ Basheer M. Nafi, “The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem Reconsidered”, *The Muslim World*, 86 (3–4), 2007, 243–272.

¹¹⁰ Weldon C. Matthews, “Pan-Islam or Arab nationalism? The Meaning of the 1931 Jerusalem Islamic Congress Reconsidered”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35 (1), 2003, 2.

¹¹¹ Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 123–141.

Formattato: Titolo 1

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Tipo di carattere: 10 pt, Corsivo, Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Verso header

Palestine, the congress aimed to underscore the Arab-Islamic dimension of the Palestinian conflict.¹¹²

Notably, before the 1931 World Islamic Congress, Palestinian activists had diligently participated in every meeting; however, their endeavours to elicit substantial attention to Palestinian nationalism among fellow pan-Islamists bore little fruit. Convened from 7 to 17 December 1931, the congress witnessed the participation of approximately 150 delegates hailing from diverse corners of the Islamic world, representing as many as 22 distinct nations. The significance of the congress was to galvanise pan-Islamic sentiments aimed at challenging imperial rule and Zionism. In this context, controversy also arose over the issue of restoring the caliphate.¹¹³

Hājji Amīn, without explicitly addressing the caliphate issue, extended invitations to Jerusalem to prominent Muslim figures to collaborate on matters related to Islamic cooperation. According to the Arab and international press, king Fu'ād expressed disappointment, as he harboured aspirations to assume the mantle of the new caliph. This desire persisted despite Abdülmecid's claim as the sole legitimate contender for the caliphal office. Fu'ād deemed any attempt to convene a conference outside of Egypt to discuss the caliphate as a grave affront. The congress, in essence, revolved around the imperative for Muslims to engage in collective deliberations concerning their well-being.

Hājji Amīn was meticulous not to explicitly address the issue of the caliphate as he did not want to alarm the Egyptian and Turkish governments. To reassure the latter, especially, he publicly announced that he would not invite Abdülmecid to the conference, contrary to Shawkat Ali's preference.¹¹⁴ Indian scholars' speeches and talks during the weeks following his brother's funeral had clarified his ideas on the caliphate issue when he made a tour through Palestine and Egypt. Shawkat Ali's comprehensive plans for the resurgence of pan-Islamism primarily revolved around the formation of a consultative caliphate body, comprised of eight to ten individuals, akin to a *shūrā*. While it remains uncertain whether Shawkat Ali envisioned a complete restoration of the caliphate, his proposal included the

¹¹² Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 237; Nafi, "The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem reconsidered", 268.

¹¹³ Thomas Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem in 1931", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (3), 1982, 311–322.

¹¹⁴ Brunner, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century*, 104; Nicholas E. Roberts, "Making Jerusalem the Centre of the Muslim world: Pan-Islam and the World Islamic Congress of 1931", *Contemporary Levant*, 4 (1), 2019, 52–63.

transfer of Abdülmecid's residence from Nice to Jerusalem. According to him, Abdülmecid should have moved from Nice to Jerusalem.¹¹⁵

As Kupferschmidt points out:

Throughout the month of November, the Foreign Office in London was assailed by questions of foreign powers on the forthcoming Congress. Turkey, where the question was even raised in Parliament and where Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Ruştü Bey labelled the Congress as reactionary, was particularly concerned with the possibility of a revival of the caliphate. In spite of an actual disqualification of the ex-caliph Abdülmecid for the caliphate by the 1926 Cairo Congress, the Turkish government seems to have been genuinely alarmed by rumours that he might be moved to set up a caliphal residency in Jerusalem. A clear proof that Ḥājjī Amīn tried initially to invite Muslim Governments – and not Muslims in some private or organisational capacity – was a protest by the Turkish government about the fact that a non-Governmental individual in Palestine had ventured to invite its Head of State.¹¹⁶

At the pan-Islamic scale, a notable outcome of this congress was the cessation of substantial endeavours for the election of a new caliph.¹¹⁷ At the same time, the hope for a caliphate revival endured, albeit in a more abstract form.

Conclusions

In comparison to the 1926 Cairo Congress, subsequent meetings displayed even less emphasis on resolving the vacancy of the caliphate. In Cairo, a sudden change in the congress agenda had already limited the scope of discussions regarding the election of a new caliph, marking the only instance in which the issue of the vacant caliphate was explicitly addressed. In the following month's Mecca Congress, domestic and international political concerns prompted a deliberate avoidance of focusing on the selection of a new caliph. Nominations for the position of caliph among the Muslim community became increasingly nebulous, to the extent that by the 1931 Jerusalem Congress, the concept of a caliph appeared almost obsolete. In summary, within five years, the imperative need for a new, universally recognised and legitimate caliph, irrespective of Islamic orientation or denomination, waned to near

¹¹⁵ "Minute Rendel on meeting", November 20, 1931, FO 371/15282.

¹¹⁶ Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council*, 200.

¹¹⁷ [Ibidem](#), 219.

Verso header

irrelevance. The pan-Islamic movements of previous decades receded, giving way to the ascendancy of new pan-Islamist and prevailing nationalist ideologies.

References

Primary Sources

1) — Archival Sources

[Archivio Storico Ministero degli Affari Esteri \(ASMAE\)](#), Turchia, serie affari politici, 1919–1930, b 1716, “Organizzazioni anti kemaliste”, 6 April 1926, [199].

British Library, Asian and African Studies, P 3125/1925, The Cairo Caliphate Conference: the Islamic Congress at Mecca.

“Minute Rendel on meeting”, 20 November 1931, [Foreign Office \(FO\)](#) 371/15282.

[Summary from Reuters](#), [FO \(Foreign Office\)](#), 141/812.

[Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi \(TBMM\)](#), Zabıt Ceridesi, devre 2 [1923–1927], 7.

[Summary from Reuters](#), [FO \(Foreign Office\)](#), 141/812.

2) — Press

“L’abolition du Califat en Turquie. Le Calife va convoquer un concile de tous les chefs religieux de l’Islam”, *L’Echo d’Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 16 March 1924.

“L’abolition du Califat. L’entrée en Suisse a été laborieuse”, *L’Echo d’Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 11 Mars 1924.

Al-Ahrām, 2 May 1926.

Al-Akhbār, Cairo, 8 December 1922.

“Le Calife en Suisse. Le Calife decline l’offre d’une surveillance particulière de la part de la sureté suisse”, *L’Echo d’Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 10 March 1924.

“The Caliphate”, *The Times*, 28 March 1924.

Dr. Isk., “Le congrès du califat et la réforme religieuse de l’Islam. Jérusalem, 14 mai”, *La Liberté. Journal politique, religieux, social*, 21 May 1926.

“The end of the Caliphate”, *The Times*, 5 March 1924.

Feuille d’Avis du Valais et de Sion, 15–16 March 1924.

Gibb, Hamilton A.R., “The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931”, in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, 95–321.

Hess, Jean, “L’Islam, le Riff et les Turcs d’Angora”, *Le Petit Oranais*, 26 June 1925.

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Formattato: Titolo 3

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_year

Commentato [TB1]: Is this a name (can we spell out in full?) Else not quite clear what this part is

Commentato [UZRI]: The article is signed like this: no other information in available about the author

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_year

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_article_title, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_newspaper_title, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_year, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Recto header

Kaid-Hammoud, "L'islam et Abolition du Califat", *L'Echo d'Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 14 March 1924.

"Le khalife déchu s'est embarqué, pour l'Egypte", *Le Matin: derniers télégrammes de la nuit*, Paris, 5 March 1924.

"Le Calife est partie pour la Suisse", *L'Echo d'Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 6 March 1924.

"Les Débuts de l'Indépendance Égyptienne", *L'Afrique française: bulletin mensuel du Comité de l'Afrique française et du Comité du Maroc*, 1 January 1924, 299–308.

"Le khalife en exil. L'expulsion d'Abdul Medjid va émouvoir profondément le monde musulman", *Le Matin: derniers télégrammes de la nuit*, Paris, 6 March 1924.

Le Matin: derniers télégrammes de la nuit, Paris, 5 March 1924.

Massignon, Louis, ed., "L'entente islamique internationale et les deux congrès musulmans de 1926", *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, 49, 1926, 481–485.

Massignon, Louis, ed., *Etudes sur la notion islamique de souveraineté*, special issue of *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 68 (8), 1925.

Nallino, Carlo Alfonso, "L'elezione del nuovo 'Califfo' turco", *Oriente Moderno*, 1 (7), 1922, 404–406.

Nallino, Carlo Alfonso, "Limitazione del Congresso per il Califfato l Cairo", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 263–264.

Nallino, Carlo Alfonso, "Proteste contro il restringimento del programma e proposta di differire il Congresso", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 264.

"La proclamation d'Abdul Medjid au monde musulman", *Journal et feuille d'avis du Valais et de Sion*, 15 March 1924; *L'Echo d'Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 14 March 1924.

"Protests Islam congress; ex-Sultan Mehmed Khan opposes selection of a Caliph", *New York Times*, 5 May 1926.

R.E., "Lettre de Berne", *Feuille d'Avis de Neuchatel et du Vignoble Neuchatelois*, 13 March 1924.

R[ossi], E[ttore], "Contro il Congresso per il Califfato al Cairo", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 259.

R[ossi], E[ttore], "Il manifesto del Sultano depresso al mondo musulmano", *Oriente Moderno*, 2 (12), 1923, 701–705.

R[ossi], E[ttore], "Il Califfato e il Re d'Egitto: mutamento al carattere del Congresso", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 263.

R[ossi], E[ttore], "Il messaggio del nuovo Califfo al mondo musulmano", *Oriente Moderno*, 2 (8), 1923, 466–467.

R[ossi], E[ttore], "Inaugurazione del Congresso per il Califfato al Cairo", *Oriente Moderno*, 6 (5), 1926, 265.

Commentato [TB3]: First name?

Commentato [U4R3]: The article is signed like this: no other information is available about the author. It sounds as a name without a surname.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Commentato [TB5]: Should this be a new reference? (title of article?)

Commentato [U6R5]: It is the official text in French of last Caliph's proclamation

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Commentato [TB7]: Should this be with the 'R[ossi], E[ttore]' refs below?

Commentato [U8R7]: This does not seem plausible because it is a Swiss newspaper. Ettore Rossi was an Italian academic who did not give himself easily to the press. The article is signed only with initials and no further details about the author are available.

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: ref_page_range, Tipo di carattere: 12 pt, Colore carattere: Automatico, Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: ref_page_range, Tipo di carattere: 12 pt, Colore carattere: Automatico, Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: ref_page_range, Tipo di carattere: 12 pt, Colore carattere: Automatico, Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

Verso header

Sékaly, Achille, “Les deux Congres Generaux de 1926: Le Congrès du Khalifat [Le Caire, 13–19 mai 1926] et le Congres du Monde Musulman [La Mecque, 7 juin-5 juillet 1926]”, *Revue du Monde Musulmane*, LXIV, 1–224.

Stefani, Ag., “L’Orient di nuovo minaccia”, *La Stampa*, 7 November 1922.

“La suppression du Califat turc”, *L’Afrique française: bulletin mensuel du Comité de l’Afrique française et du Comité du Maroc*, 1 January 1924, 157.

“Turkey: Mohammed VI”, *The Times*, 28 May 1923.

“The Turkish plot”, *The Times*, 29 June 1926.

“En Turquie. L’Assemblée nationale approuve et vote la supression du Califat”, *L’Echo d’Alger: journal républicain du matin*, 5 March 1924.

Toynbee, Arnold J., “The Islamic world since the peace settlement”, in *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, Vol. 1, London: Oxford University Press, 1927.

3) Essays, memoirs and treatises

Al-Sanhoury, ‘Abd al-Razzāq, *Le califat, son évolution vers une Société des Nations Orientales*, Préface by Édouard Lambert, Paris: Geuthner, 1926.

Barakatullah, Mohammed, *The Khilafet*, London: Luzac, 1924.

Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, *The Future of Islam*, London: Kegan Pawl, Trench & Co., 1882.

‘Ināyatullāh Khān al-Mashriqī, *Khiṭāb, 13 May 1926, Mu‘tamar-i Khilāfat, Qāhirah, Miṣr, Rawalpindi: Furūgh-i Islām Foundation, n.d.*

Nigar, Salih Keramet, *Halife İkinci Abdülmecid: Yurdundan Nasıl Sürüldü, Sonra Nerelerde Yaşadı, Ne Zaman ve Nerede Öldü, Ne Zaman ve Nerede Gömüldü?*, Istanbul: İnkılap ve Aka, 1964.

Razek, Ali Abdel, *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, Maryam Loutfy (trans.), Abdou Filali-Ansary (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

Rāziq, ‘Alī ‘Abd al-, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*, Cairo: Maṭba‘at Miṣr, 1925.

Secondary Sources

Akman, Zekeriya, “Abdülmecid Efendi’nin Hayatı Ve Halife Seçilmesinde Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde Yaşanan Tartışmalar”, *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi (İToBiAD)*, 8 (4), 2019, 4424–2440.

Akpınar, Yavuz, “Tercüman”, *İslām Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 40, Istanbul: TDV, 40 2011, 492–494.

Aşıroğlu, O. Gazi, *Son Halife*, İstanbul: Çatı Kitapları, 2011.

Aslam Malik, Muhammad, *Allama Inayatullah Mashraqi: A Political Biography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Commentato [TB9]: Please put in the format ‘first name’, ‘surname’

Commentato [U10R9]: Why? All the references in the book are in the format ‘surname’, ‘first name’, not ‘first name’, ‘surname’. here only the comma between the ‘surname’ and the ‘name’ is missing. Namely Sékaly, Achille. Isn’t it?

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_year

ha formattato: ref_year

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

Formattato: Titolo 3

Commentato [TB11]: First name?

Commentato [U12R11]: ‘Abd al-Razzāq

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

Commentato [TB13]: First name?

Commentato [U14R13]: everything is first name

Commentato [U15R13]: No surname

ha formattato: ref_surname

ha formattato: ref_surname

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_article_title

ha formattato: ref_journal_title

ha formattato: ref_volume_number

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

Commentato [TB16]: Year?

Commentato [U17R16]: Being an encyclopaedic headword, I had omitted the date here, as in other citations. I have included it everywhere in the essay.

ha formattato: Tipo di carattere: Corsivo

Aydın, Cemil, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Baisya, Arup, “Ideology of pan-Islamism”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 49: (1), 2014, 69–70.

Bardakçı, Murat, “Hanedan Yayınları ve Halife Abdülmecid’in Yeşil Kitab’ı”, *Müteferrika*, 3, 1994, 49–62.

Bardakçı, Murat, *Neslişah: The Last Ottoman Princess*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2017.

Bennigsen, Alexandre and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, Chantal, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les Mussulmans de Russie avant 1920*, Paris, La Haye: Mouton, 1964.

Brunner, Rainer, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th century. The Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and Restraint*, Leiden, Boston, MA: Brill, 2004.

Buzpinar, Ş. Tufan, “Opposition to the Ottoman caliphate in the early years of Abdülhamid II: 1877–1882”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 1996, 36 (1), 1996, 59–89.

Coulson, Noel J., Cahen, Claude et al., “Bayt al-Māl”, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005 (2nd edn).

Crémadeills, Jacques, “La France, Abd-El-Krim et le problème du Khalifat (1924–1926). Remarques à propos de quelques archives inédites”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 6: (1), 1973, 48–77.

Göztepe, Tarık Mümtaz, *Osmanoğullarının Son padişahı Vahideddin Gurbet Cehenneminde*, İstanbul: Sebül, 1978.

Haddad, Mahmoud, “Arab religious nationalism in the colonial era: Rereading Rashid Rida’s ideas on the caliphate”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117 (2), 1997, 253–277.

Halici, Şaduman, “San Remo Görüşmeleri: Vahideddin, Bir ‘İttihatçı’ ve Üç ‘Yüzellilik’”, *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi (CTAD)*, 11 (22), 2015, 267–303.

Hassan, Mona, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History*, Princeton, NJ, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Kamel, Lorenzo, “Identities and migrations: A borderless Middle East’s perspective”, *Storicamente*, 11 (8), 2015, 1–16.

Karabela, Mehmet Kadri, *One of the Last Ottoman Şeyhülislâms, Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954): His Life, Works and Intellectual Contributions* (MA thesis, McGill University Libraries, Montréal), 2003.

Kırımlı, Hakan, “Gaspıralı. İsmail Bey”, in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 13, İstanbul, 1996: TDV, 392–395.

Kramer, Martin, “Congresses”, *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World*. www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0159 (Accessed: 21 March 2012).

Kramer, Martin, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_volume_number

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

ha formattato: ref_et al

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_issue_number, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_pub_place, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_pub_house, Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_article_title

ha formattato: ref_journal_title, Tipo di carattere: Non Corsivo

ha formattato: ref_volume_number

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

Verso header

Küçük, Cevdet, “Abdülmeçid Efendi Son Osmanlı Halifesi”, *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 1, Istanbul: TDV, 1988, 263–264.

Kupferschmidt, Uri M., *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under The British Mandate for Palestine*, Leiden: Brill, 1987.

Kuttner, Thomas, “Russian Jadīdism and the Islamic World Ismail Gasprinsky in Cairo, 1908. A Call to the Arabs for the Rejuvenation of the Islamic World”, *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, 1975, 16 (3/4), 1975, 383–424.

Landau, Jacob M., *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Landau, Jacob M., *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Laoust, Henri, *Le califat dans la doctrine de Rašīd Riḏā*, Beirut: l’Institut Français de Damas, 1938.

Legrain, Jean-François, *L’idée de califat universel et de congrès islamique face à la revendication de souveraineté nationale et aux menaces d’écrasement de l’empire ottoman*, Lyon: Maison de l’Orient et la Méditerranée, 2006 (nouvelle édition).

Livaoğlu Mengüç, Hilal, “Ottoman caliphate in the Egyptian press: Examples from *al-Ahrām*, *al-Muqattam* and *al-Manār*”, *Journal of History Studies*, 10 (9), 2018, 175–188.

Mandelli, Riccardo, *L’ultimo sultano. Come l’impero ottomano morì a Sanremo*, Torino: Lindau, 2011.

~~Massignon, Louis, ed., “L’entente islamique internationale et les deux congrès musulmans de 1926”, *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, 49, 1926, 481–485.~~

~~Massignon, Louis, ed., *Etudes sur la notion islamique de souveraineté*, special issue of *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 69 (8), 1925.~~

Matthews, Weldon C., “Pan-Islam or Arab nationalism? The meaning of the 1931 Jerusalem Islamic Congress reconsidered”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35 (1), 2003, 1–22.

Mayer, Thomas, “Egypt and the General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem in 1931”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (3), 1982, 311–322.

Mert, Timuçin, *Atatürk’ün Yanındaki Mehdi*, Istanbul: Hükümdar, 2018.

Nafi, Basheer M. “The abolition of the caliphate causes and consequences”, in Abdulrahim Ali, Iba Der Thiam, and Yusof A. Talib, eds., *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture, Volume 6, Part I: Islam in the World Today, Retrospective of the Evolution of Islam and the Muslim World*, Paris: UNESCO, 2016, 183–192.

Nafi, Basheer M. *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941: A Political History*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998.

Nafi, Basheer M. “The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem reconsidered”, *The Muslim World*, 86 (3–4), 2007, 243–272.

ha formattato: ref_volume_number

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: Italiano (Italia)

ha formattato: Francese (Francia)

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_book_title

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

ha formattato: ref_issue_number

Özcan, Azmi, “Hilâfet”, in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 17, Istanbul: TDV, 1998, 546–553.

Özoğlu, Hakan, *From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011.

Özoğlu, Hakan, “Sultan Vahdettin’in ABD Başkanı Coolidge’ e Gönderdiği Bir Mektup”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 142, 2005, 100–106.

Raz, Ronen, “Interpretations of Kawakibi’s thought, 1950–1980s”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32 (1), 1996, 179–190.

Roberts, Nicholas E., “Making Jerusalem the centre of the Muslim world: Pan-Islam and the World Islamic Congress of 1931”, *Contemporary Levant*, 4 (1), 2019, 52–63.

Satan, Ali, *Son Halife Abdülmecid Efendi*, Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2009.

Wasti, Syed Tanvir, “The circles of Maulana Mohamed Ali”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38 (4), 2002, 51–62.

Weismann, Itzhak, *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi. Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, London: Oneworld, 2015.

Yousaf, Nasim, “Allama Mashriqi”, in Zayn R. Kassam, Yudit Kornberg Greenberg, and Jehan Bagli, eds., *Islam, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018, 57–60.

Yousaf, Nasim, *Allama Mashriqi’s Monumental Speech at the Global Islamic Khilafat Conference, Cairo, May 1926*, Alexandria, DR, Lexington, KY: AMZ Publications.

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house

ha formattato: ref_givname

ha formattato: ref_surname

ha formattato: ref_givname

ha formattato: ref_surname

ha formattato: ref_givname

ha formattato: ref_surname

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_place

ha formattato: ref_pub_house