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Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Sentence Meaning: A Study in the second half of the 5th book of

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Abstract

The present Ph.D. thesis, *Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Sentence Meaning: A Study in the second half of the 5th book of Nyāyamañjarī*, aims at analysing why a rational human being undertakes an action on hearing an exhortative statement in general and the Vedic injunctions in particular. For this, it draws upon the second half of the fifth book of the Sanskrit work, *Nyāyamañjarī*, written by the 9th century AD Kashmiri intellectual, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. This text dialectically discusses rival views on instigation like those upheld by Bādari, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra and their respective followers. An understanding of these views has immense bearings on issues like the connection between language and reality; the validity of sacred texts; whether or not sacred texts can instigate us independently of any consideration for the result; the difference between agency and eligibility and how they affect interpretations of causality. Hence an attempt has been made to explore the specificities of Jayanta's own view in this regard by comparing it with those of his rivals explicitly mentioned and implicitly embedded in this part of *Nyāyamañjarī*. A comparative assessment of the views of Jayanta and his opponents about how and under what conditions a person undertakes a particular action has also been attempted. With the help of such a comparative assessment it has been possible to underline the real merits of Jayanta's theory of human motivation.

हानोपादानवृत्तूर्ध्वस्थितिमोदाब्धिपारगः।
जयति श्रीगुरुर्नित्यं मद्भ्रीपद्मप्रभाकरः ॥

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Contents

Introduction	1
1. <i>Nyāyamañjarī</i> 5.2	2
2. The present state of research	4
3. Overview and aim of the thesis	8
4. Notable contributions of this thesis	10
5. Principal limitations of the thesis	16

PART A

I. The Bhāṭṭa View on Sentence-Meaning	19
Introduction	19
1. Background	19
2. Meaning of <i>bhāvanā</i>	20
3. Three alternative views about the nature of <i>bhāvanā</i>	22
4. Source of the understanding of <i>bhāvanā</i>	36
5. Classification of <i>bhāvanā</i>	39
6. The <i>modus operandi</i> of <i>bhāvanā</i> : the tripartite structure of the two <i>bhāvanā</i> -s	51
6.1. <i>Arthabhāvanā</i>	52
6.1.1. The Goal of <i>arthabhāvanā</i>	52
6.1.2. The Means of <i>arthabhāvanā</i>	52
6.1.3. The Procedure in <i>arthabhāvanā</i>	58
6.2. <i>Śabdabhāvanā</i>	59
6.2.1. The Goal of <i>śabdabhāvanā</i>	59
6.2.2. The Means of <i>śabdabhāvanā</i>	60
6.2.3. The Procedure in <i>śabdabhāvanā</i>	63
7. <i>Bhāvanā</i> and <i>Vidhi</i>	64
7.1. The futility of resorting to injunctions: the opponent's view	64

7.2. Reply by the Bhāṭṭa	66
7.2.1. The defense of injunctions	66
7.2.1.1. The understanding of the means-end relationship is due to the injunction	66
7.2.1.2. The <i>modus operandi</i> of an injunction: the role of human desire	69
7.2.2. The nature of the instigator	74
8. The relation between <i>śabdabhāvanā</i> and <i>arthabhāvanā</i> and associated issues	77
9. Refutation of <i>bhāvanā</i>	82
II. The Prābhākara view on Sentence-Meaning	98
Introduction	98
Part I	98
1. <i>Niyoga</i> : the meaning of exhortative suffixes	98
2. <i>Niyoga</i> : Instigation and Causality	107
2.1. Instigator-Instigated Relation vs. Action-Agent Relation	107
2.2. Instigation: the general meaning underlying all specific meanings of exhortative suffixes	111
2.3. Exhortative suffix vs. Causative suffix	115
2.4. <i>Niyoga</i> as the instigator and also the thing to-be-done: the Bhāṭṭa challenge	120
Part II	125
Introduction	125
1. How <i>niyoga</i> works: the two correlates (<i>anubandha</i>)	127
2. Śyena and Agnīṣomīya Paśuyāga: the dialectics about the means of <i>Dharma</i> and <i>Adharma</i>	137
2.1. <i>Adharma</i> : the Śyena sacrifice	137
2.2. The means to <i>Dharma</i> : the Agnīṣomīya ritual animal killing	143
2.3. Can the means to <i>Dharma</i> become <i>Adharma</i> ? Distinction between Śyena and Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice	146
3. Enjoining negatively: the negative semantics of prohibitions	157
3.1. The two correlates (<i>anubandha</i>) in a prohibitory command	157

3.2. Prohibition (<i>niṣedha</i>) not possible with regard to ‘ <i>na hanyāt</i> ’	160
3.3. Exclusion (<i>paryudāsa</i>) not possible with regard to ‘ <i>na hanyāt</i> ’	164
3.4. Impossibility of the negative particle’s connection with the exhortative suffix	166
3.5. The Prābhākara’s final position regarding prohibitory injunctions	170
4. Importing or inventing eligibility? The case of the Viśvajit sacrifice	179
4.1. Śabarasvāmin	180
4.2. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa	182
4.3. Prabhākara Miśra	183
4.4. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta	190
5. Niyoga: the principal element in a linguistic cognition	191

III. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Injunctions **195**

Introduction	195
Part I	195
1. Jayanta vs. Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin	195
1.1. <i>Phala</i> : the nature of its centrality	195
1.2. Objection by the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin to the centrality of <i>phala</i>	197
1.3. Jayanta’s counter-objection	200
1.4. Jayanta on the meaning of the term ‘ <i>svargakāma</i> ’ and its construal	208
1.5. Jayanta’s deduction of the subordination of action	224
Part II	228
Introduction	228
1. Construal of <i>svarga</i> vis-à-vis the role of result	229
2. Basis for the postulation of result: <i>anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa</i> and <i>sapratyaya</i>	232
3. Result to be postulated for both fixed and elective rituals	233
4. The <i>modus operandi</i> of prohibitions: role of consequence	235
5. Jayanta on the Śyena problem	240
6. The Vedic injunction is the instigator even with regard to elective rituals: Jayanta’s rejection of the Prābhākara view	242

7. If performance of elective rituals is prompted by injunctions, should non-performance lead to sanctions?	246
8. Commandment vs. Desire: Jayanta on the source of instigation	250
9. Jayanta on the nature of the instigator	254
9.1. Critique of <i>prayoktrāśaya</i> or ‘intention of the instigator’	254
9.2. Jayanta’s reply to the Bhāṭṭa objection to the admission of the result as the instigator	260
9.3. Criticism of <i>śreyaḥsādhanatā</i>	262
9.4. Exhortative suffixes (<i>linādiśabda</i>) and their functions (<i>tadvyāpāra</i>)	269
10. Salient Features of Bhāṭṭa Jayanta’s view on Injunctions	272
11. Conclusion	274

IV. Bhāṭṭa Jayanta on Sentence-Meaning 278

Introduction	278
1. Two views on sentence-meaning: issues involved	279
1.1. Is a treatment of sentence-meaning absent in <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> and <i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i> ?279	
2. First view of sentence-meaning: connected word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning	282
2.1. Is sentence-meaning one word-meaning or many word-meanings?	282
2.2. Role of <i>saṃsarga</i>	283
2.3. Word-meaning(s) vs. sentence-meaning: the mereology of sentence-semantics	284
3. Second view of sentence-meaning: sentence-meaning as word-meanings arranged through a principal-subordinate relation	285
3.1. The objector’s view: <i>saṃsarga</i> cannot be conceived without <i>guṇapradhānabhāva</i>	285
3.2. Jayanta’s view: the postulation of <i>guṇapradhānabhāva</i> is causally dependent on the success of admitting <i>saṃsarga</i>	286
3.3. Jayanta’s initial dissent against the second view	286

3.4. Jayanta's version of the second view: <i>phala</i> or result is the principal element of a sentence	287
3.4.1. Is result also subservient to man? <i>Phala</i> vs. <i>Puruṣa</i>	288
3.4.2. <i>Phala</i> and <i>Kāraṅka</i> vis-à-vis Action	289
3.5. Jayanta's summary of the whole discussion	290
4. Analysis and Observations	290
4.1. Authority vs. Innovation: the historical absence of sentence-meaning in <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> and <i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i>	290
4.2. Two views of sentence-meaning or one?	295
4.3. From Linguistics to Pragmatics	297
5. Conclusion	298
Appendices	300
Appendix I : A note on the word 'śabdapramāṇaka' occurring in NM 5.2	300
Appendix II : <i>Prapañcavilayavāda</i> vis-à-vis <i>Kriyāvākyaṛthavāda</i>	306
Appendix III: <i>Niyoga</i> vs. <i>Phala</i>	316
Appendix IV : Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on <i>Pratibhā</i>	330
PART B	
Discourse on Sentence-Meaning in <i>Nyāyamañjarī</i> (Book 5): Text and English Translation	347
BIBLIOGRAPHY	443

INTRODUCTION

The present Ph.D. dissertation consists of a study and English translation of the dialectical discussion on sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) as found in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM). More specifically, the textual source of this thesis is located in the second half of the 5th chapter (*āhnika*) of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM 5.2).

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's NM is an encyclopedic work that registers the philosophical debates on ontology, epistemology and linguistics in the classical Sanskrit tradition, and it is thus an invaluable tool for investigation on these topics. Due to its clear prose and thorough exposition, the NM has often been used to access a wide range of crucial themes in Indian philosophy. Jayanta, who was affiliated to the so-called "old" (*prācīna*) tradition of Nyāya ("Indian logic"), was active in Kashmir, in the late 9th century AD. NM, his *magnum opus*, is described by him ¹ as a mere re-arrangement of former exegeses of Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), the foundational text of the Nyāya tradition, in acknowledgment of his debt to his predecessors. Jayanta also clarifies at the very outset of the NM² that his work focuses on the classification of categories (*padārtha*-s) utilised in Nyāya and on the definitions (*lakṣaṇa*-s) of these categories; he thus informs his reader that the third type of *sūtra*-s present in the NS, viz. the "examining aphorisms" (*parīkṣāsūtra*-s), will be discussed by him only occasionally.

Jayanta³ was acquainted with earlier commentaries of the NS, including works that are still extant such as Pakṣilasvāmin alias Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), which was certainly his main source in addition to NS, and others which are lost, such as Śaṅkarasvāmin's commentary. He was also conversant with major works of the main interpreters of the Indian philosophical context, from Buddhist Pramāṇavāda ("epistemology"), to Mīmāṃsā (more precisely Pūrvamīmāṃsā, "Vedic ritual exegesis"), Vyākaraṇa ("grammar"), etc. Thus, the NM is a key link in the history not only of Nyāya, but of other Sanskrit philosophical traditions as well. The NM unfolds in 12 books

¹ NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 3.

² NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 29.

³ Kataoka (2006:147) notes that Jayanta mentions himself twice in ĀD as "Bhaṭṭa Jayanta" and not as "Jayanta Bhaṭṭa". As is evident from ĀD (See Dezső 2005:148, 228, 265, 266) itself he mentioned himself also as simply "Jayanta" more than once. In the colophon of NM and NK too, he mentions himself as only Jayanta. Abhinanda, Jayanta's son, too calls him "Jayanta". Hence it seems that "Bhaṭṭa" was not an integral part of the name of the author of NM. Among the four meanings of the word 'Bhaṭṭa' in its un-compounded form given by Apte (1985:710) two are as follows: "A title used with the names of learned Brāhmaṇas", and "Any learned man or philosopher". Accordingly, the word 'Bhaṭṭa' should be considered as a title used for Jayanta by others in recognition of his erudition. Being a title, just as it can prefix a name, it can also occur as a predicative qualifier (*vidheyaviśeṣaṇa*) after the name. Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary (MWD 1899:745) cites instances of the occurrence of 'bhaṭṭa' as an honorific title after the proper name, although at the same time noticing that its use after the proper name "is sometimes omitted".

called *āhnikā*-s (“daily lessons”). It is conceptually structured in two major parts: the first six books treat the *pramāṇa*-s or instruments of acquiring knowledge, such as perception, inference, linguistic communication, etc.; the second six deal with the *prameya*-s or objects of knowledge, within which are also the other 14 *padārtha*-s or categories listed in NS 1.1.1. Of the four *pramāṇa*-s accepted by the Nyāya tradition, *śabdapramāṇa* (“language as an instrument of knowledge”, “verbal testimony”) alone is discussed in books 3 to 6.

1. *Nyāyamañjarī* 5.2

NM 5.2 is the focus of this Ph.D. dissertation. The priority given to NM 5.2 (NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 69-142) is motivated by the importance of the presence in it of a discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). Jayanta deals with the nature of sentence-meaning first by thoroughly presenting the views of other traditions (mainly Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist Pramāṇavāda and Vyākaraṇa) and then refuting or synthesising them according to his own tradition’s viewpoint. Although this dialectic device is common to most philosophical literature in Sanskrit, an acknowledged merit of the NM is the extensiveness and fairness with which rival theories are reported. Hence, the NM is not only worth studying in itself, but also because it constitutes a reservoir of classical Sanskrit linguistics. Thus, the present dissertation intends to highlight the interdisciplinary significance of the views expressed in NM 5.2 in connection with the various theories of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*).

More generally, the systematic discussion of linguistic issues presented in NM 5 offers an excellent example of dialogue and debate among philosophical traditions as a process of refinement of ideas and a heuristic method. Jayanta, though himself a scholar of the Nyāya tradition, was very well acquainted with Mīmāṃsā, as is well shown by the many Mīmāṃsā thinkers whose views are referred to in the NM. This almost double affiliation makes the NM an invaluable tool with regard to the appraisal of Indian linguistics, since it reproduces, e.g., in NM 5, the debate among conflicting views about the primacy of words or sentences in conveying a sentence-meaning, and about the assessment of what this meaning is. Moreover, as shown in Kataoka (2008:3-4) and by Kataoka’s previous studies on the NM, Jayanta often constitutes the first available interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā theses as depicted by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. This is even truer in the case of NM 5, which quotes and comments upon sections of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa’s *Ślokavārttika* for which Umbeka Bhāṭṭa and Sucarita Miśra’s commentaries are not available. NM 5 is thus the keystone for the retrieval of an important part of Indian intellectual history. Furthermore, the NM offers a further advantage among Indian texts, insofar as its author is a historical personality. Hence, on the one hand the reconstruction of the archetype is not *a priori* impossible; on the other, the reconstructed text will provide further insights and historical evidences with regard to the dating of theories and works referred to in it. Apart from its historical significance, the NM is also of philosophical relevance. Mark Siderits, who describes his research as exploring “the possibility that contemporary analytic philosophy might have something to learn from the Sanskrit philosophical tradition” constantly refers to the NM (Siderits 1985a:254-257;

Siderits 1985b:135). John Taber aptly uses another book of the NM about language, namely NM 3, to discuss “how words mean what they mean”, keeping an eye on descriptions of this process in Analytic Philosophy (Taber 1996:21). In another paper (Taber 1989:410), Taber quotes NM 5 while discussing the theory of the sentence in Mīmāṃsā. Likewise, NM 5 deserves similar attention by scholars who are aware of its importance within both Indian philosophy and contemporary debate.

The second part⁴ of NM 5 that forms the subject-matter of this Ph.D. dissertation is a little longer than the first part. It is dedicated to the problem of sentence-meaning. The section opens with the presentation of a list of seven different views, maintained by philosophers of different schools of classical Indian philosophy. These are the views of Buddhist Vijñānavādins, some ancient grammarians, the classical Vyākaraṇa school of Patañjali, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka-s and a certain Mīmāṃsaka, whom Cakradhara, Jayanta’s scholiast, identifies as Bhāṭṭa Nārāyaṇa. In connection with these view, Jayanta deals with various questions related to sentence-meaning such as whether or not sentence-meaning is an external and real thing; whether or not sentence-meaning is distinction, or syntactical connection. He also deals with the broader question of whether a sentence is essentially prescriptive or descriptive in nature. In this connection, Jayanta deals with the principal rival theories of sentence-meaning, viz. those advocated by the Kriyāvākyārthavādins⁵, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka-s, who respectively hold sheer action, human activity and awareness of being enjoined by the Vedic sacred texts to be sentence-meaning. While examining these rival views, Jayanta also deals with the related question of what is it that instigates a person to undertake an action. In course of dealing specifically with questions related to injunctive statements and the nature of the instigator, Jayanta also touches upon the concepts of agency, eligibility and also whether a rational person undertakes an action with an essentially consequentialist motive or whether his approach is necessarily deontic. After examining the rival views, Jayanta seeks to establish that it is *phala* or result desired by a human being which instigates a person to undertake actions. Jayanta also reviews the question of what an instigator is in terms of what counts as the principal element of a sentential cognition. The basis for determining which one is the principal element is that such an element is not dependent on anything else for its realisation. All other meaning elements of a sentence are connected as subordinates to this principal element. Sentential cognition is, therefore, according to Jayanta, hierarchical by nature. Finally, Jayanta deals with the question of the

⁴ This is not just my way of dividing the text, since Jayanta himself is making a sort of “new beginning” here. This is evident from the first half of the following verse written by Jayanta to introduce the discussion of sentence-meaning in NM 5:

evaṃ padārthe nirṇīte vākyārthas̄ cintyate ’dhunā/

In this way, when what a word means has been determined, at this time sentence-meaning is considered.

⁵ As will be shown later in this thesis, the Kriyāvākyārthavādins are to be identified as Bādari and some Vaiyākaraṇas and also Bādari’s followers like Bhartṛmitra, etc.

nature of sentence-meaning, in regard to which his final view is that sentence-meaning is essentially composite in nature and it is word-meanings entering into syntactical connection that constitute sentence-meaning. However, this does not amount to saying that sentence-meaning and word-meanings are exactly identical. Rather, sentence-meaning is more specific in scope than the individual unconnected word-meanings and also has an additional element of syntactical connection as compared to the individual word-meanings not connected to one another.

2. The present state of research

All studies on Jayanta rely on basically two editions (the other ones have not added any fresh information), i.e., the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP}) and the one by K.S. Varadacharya (NM_{Mys.}). The *editio princeps* was edited by Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga and published in 1895 (NM_{EP-I}) and 1896 (NM_{EP-II}) in two volumes, in Devanāgarī script, as part of the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series. The Sanskrit introduction reports two manuscripts as the basis of the edition, one obtained in Kāśī in Devanāgarī script, which was purportedly not very correct, and a manuscript from Pune in Śāradā script, which was reported as “not very useful” by the editor, perhaps due to difficulties with a script not very familiar to him. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī acknowledges the limitations of the material at his disposal that he was unable to decide among uncertain readings (NM_{EP-I}, p. 5). NM_{EP} was the basis of an edition published in 1936 (NM_{Su}) in Devanāgarī script and edited by Suryanarayana Shukla, who segmented the text derived from the preceding edition into thematic paragraphs with headings and added exegetical notes to it. NM_{Su} was revised and published again by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office in 1969 and 1971, but still without fresh manuscript support. Pañcānana Tarkavāgīśa’s editions of NM 1 and part of NM 2, with Bengali translation and commentary, were published in 1939 and 1941. There are no variant readings from other sources registered in the text footnotes, nor do the introductory sections mention any sources besides NM_{EP-I}. In 1969, the first of the two volumes (NM_{Mys.-I}) of K. S. Varadacharya’s edition, in Devanāgarī script, was published. This edition takes into consideration readings from the two previous Devanagari editions and of two additional manuscripts. The second volume edited by Varadacharya (NM_{Mys.-II}) which was published in 1983 used three further manuscripts, and also acknowledges the edition of the *Granthibhaṅga*, the only extant commentary on the NM. The text is segmented in titled paragraphs and is enriched by the editor’s own glosses in Sanskrit. Two more recent editions, published in 1975 and in 1982-1984, use both NM_{EP} and NM_{Su} without reference to new manuscript sources (as shown by Kataoka 2004). The former is in Gujarati script with a Gujarati translation, by Nagin J. Shah. The latter (NM_{GS}; NM_{GS-I}, NM_{GS-II}, NM_{GS-III}), edited by Gaurinath Sastri, includes the *Granthibhaṅga*, which Sastri derives from the text previously edited on the basis of the two extant manuscripts by Nagin Shah in 1972. From 2003 to 2018, Kei Kataoka critically edited in separate articles several passages of the NM, each covering a particular philosophical topic: the *Vijñānādvaitavāda* section of NM 9 (Kataoka 2003); the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* section of NM 4 (Kataoka 2004); the *Īśvarasiddhi* section of NM 3 (Kataoka 2005); the *Śāstrārambha* section of NM 1 (Kataoka 2007a); an annotated translation in collaboration with Alex Watson of the Yogācāra Buddhist doctrine of *Vijñānavāda* section of NM 9 (Watson 2010); the section on the Buddhist refutation of

jāti from NM 5.1 (Kataoka 2011a); the *Prāmāṇyavāda* section of NM 3 (Kataoka 2016); the *Khyāti* section of NM 3 dealing with the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* and the Nyāya theory of *vīparītakhyāti* (Kataoka 2017); the latter half of the *Vijñānādvaitavāda* section of NM 9 dealing with *asatkhyāti* and *ātmakhyāti* (Kataoka 2018). In another contribution, Kataoka (Kataoka 2007b) edited and translated fragments of NM 5 to show the *Atharvaveda* affiliation of Jayanta and his ancestors. He also collaborated with Elisa Freschi (Freschi and Kataoka 2012) on an English translation and study of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* section of NM 4. Finally, Kataoka edited Jayanta's refutation of the *apoha* theory in NM 5 (Kataoka 2008) and Jayanta's view on universals and *apoha* in NM 5 (Kataoka 2009). Alessandro Graheli, has published a critical edition of the NM 6.1 in 2016 (Graheli 2016). In an article (Graheli 2017), Graheli analyses Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's defense of verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*) as an independent instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) against the Vaiśeṣika reduction of it to inference (*anumānapramāṇa*), as found in NM 3. This article also "identifies the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Sāṅkhya positions hinted at in the Nyāyamañjarī, and it analyses the reuse by Jayanta of the arguments conceived by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila."⁶ Elisa Freschi, in a paper (Freschi 2014), made a brief but careful comparative study of exhortative sentences in Mīmāṃsā with the Speech Act Theory of J. L. Austin and his successor, J. R. Searle. As for the classical Indian sources, she chose NM 5.2. Among the many reasons why she chose Jayanta, the following deserve special mention:

"Because he is himself a mediatory (not an insider): Jayanta is indeed a Naiyāyika who knows a lot about Mīmāṃsā, but writes for a Naiyāyika public: hence, he needs to explain the theories he deals with.

Because he is a philosopher: Unlike the authors of primers, who are mainly concerned with giving an overall view of the whole system, Jayanta pauses on each topic and discusses it thoroughly.

Because he writes in order to understand: As it is immediately evident out of the very bulkiness of the part of NM 5 dedicated to śabdabhāvanā, Jayanta carefully examines each definition rather than presupposing them.

Because he is reliable in depicting his opponents' views: He is fair against opponents and his philosophical attitude does not make him interpret freely his predecessors' opinions, as it is often the case with other commentators who are either biased against a certain view, or more philosophically creative, such as Prajñākaragupta or Someśvara Bhaṭṭa. Such commentators end up being less reliable because they integrate what is not found in the original theories, develop them further, emend them, etc."⁷

After a careful analysis of the Speech Act Theory and the theory of *śabdabhāvanā* of the Mīmāṃsaka-s as found in NM 5.2, Freschi shows how:

⁶ Graheli (2017:175)

⁷ Freschi (2014:10).

“Austin stresses the nature of acts of speech acts and, consequently, excludes any epistemological role for them. By contrast, Jayanta and many other Indian thinkers tend to reframe epistemology in order for it to include also direct speech acts.”⁸

Freschi also notes:

“... epistemology in India is a broader field than its Western counterpart (which tends to be tantamount to a philosophy of exact sciences. It can accommodate within itself all sorts of cognition (it also debates on doubtful or erroneous cognitions) and not only descriptive ones...”⁹

In Freschi’s distinctive analysis:

“... Jayanta stresses the epistemological aspect of exhortations. From this point of view he is closer to Searle’s claim (against Austin) that the illocutionary force is an aspect of meaning... Jayanta’s is a double approach, with epistemological concern overtopping the pragmatic one, which is still present through desire. In Austin’s terminology, one could say that Jayanta’s analysis of exhortations takes into account perlocution and language-based illocutionary force.”¹⁰

In another article (Freschi and Keidan 2017:251-290), Elisa Freschi, along with Artemij Keidan, discusses Jayanta’s analysis of the word-object relationship in NM 5. This article also discusses “what did Bhaṭṭa Jayanta want to say when he used different terms which can apparently all be translated as ‘meaning.’”¹¹ Patrick McAllister’s edited volume (McAllister 2017) contains the texts of the sections on Kumāṛila’s refutation of the Apoha Theory and the Buddhist refutation of Kumāṛila’s criticism of Apoha from NM 5, critically edited by Kei Kataoka¹², with English translation of the same by Alex Watson and Kei Kataoka and accompanying studies on Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist sources for the said sections by Hideyo Ogawa, Pascale Hugon, Kensho Okada, Hisataka Ishida, Kei Kataoka, Elisa Freschi and Artemij Keidan and Patrick McAllister. Shivkumar (Shivkumar 1979) discussed the presentation of “the Sāṃkhya concept of sequential stages in evolution” and its criticism by Jayanta as found in NM 8. Here, Shivkumar shows how in spite of Jayanta’s account being based on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, “Jayantabhaṭṭa understands the Sāṃkhya concept of the magnitude of the ultimate source of the universe and the nature of the principles like Ahankāra and the Buddhi exclusively

⁸ Freschi (2014:14).

⁹ Freschi (2014:16).

¹⁰ Freschi (2014:16).

¹¹ Freschi and Keidan (2017:251) in McAllister (2017).

¹² These are basically the revised versions of Kataoka (2008) and Kataoka (2009).

from the Nyāya-standpoint.”¹³ Besides, Shivkumar shows how while “objecting to the evolution of the objects from the composite of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, Jayantabhaṭṭa seems to take the Guṇas of the Sāṃkhya in the sense of qualities as the term *guṇa* is understood in the system of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.”¹⁴ V. N. Jha (Jha 1987) discussed the Bhāṭṭa theory of knowledge and its criticism by Jayanta as found in NM 1. Although Raghunathan (2017) examines Jayanta’s treatment of the theories of *bhāvanā* and *niyoga* in NM 5.2, she does not do so against the background of Jayanta’s sources, and also their differences from the view of the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent in NM 5.2. Lastly, Yoshimizu (2021) examines the basic theoretical framework of the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 against the background of Prabhākara’s own view on *niyoga* in *Brhatī* and compares and contrasts between the two; but Yoshimizu does not deal with the debate that follows between the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 and the Bhāṭṭa opponent, who has been identified by the author of the present dissertation to be Umbeka.

As for translations of the NM, a translation of NM 1-2 in Bengali by Pañcānana Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya was published back in 1939 and 1941. An English translation of NM 1-6 was published in 1978 by his son, Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya. In the preface, the translator expresses his debt to his father’s Bengali translation; however, his is more a free paraphrase than a translation proper and lacks an analysis of the argumentative structure, as well as detailed indexes and exegetical notes, which are essential for an actual understanding of this kind of texts. The text of the NM 5.2 dealing with sentence-meaning was edited on the basis of the published editions along with a Bengali translation by Prabal Kumar Sen (Sen 2013). Sen’s translation is often supplemented by his extremely useful notes in Bengali which contain, among other things, citations of the near-exact sources of Jayanta’s writings. Sen has quoted extensively from the core Sanskrit texts of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, Maṇḍana Miśra, Vyākaraṇa, Buddhist Pramāṇavāda, etc. and tried to lay bare the crucial influences of earlier authors on Jayanta. He has also occasionally explained in Bengali many key concepts discussed in the said section of NM5. However, due to the lack of a systematic historico-critical account of the intellectual influences of earlier authors of different philosophical affiliations on Jayanta, Sen’s work does not help understand better the philosophical arguments discussed in the section on sentence-meaning (*vākyaṛtha*) in NM5 along historical lines. Moreover, Sen’s tracing of Jayanta’s sources is sometimes misleading, especially in respect of his understanding of Jayanta’s indebtedness to Bhartṛhari. Also, the confinement of Sen’s book to the Bengali language limits its access to scholars with a knowledge of the Bengali language. Ayana Bhaṭṭācārya in his Sanskrit work (Bhaṭṭācārya 2012) on Jayanta’s analysis of the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) restricts his discussion to the first four books of the NM. Thus, while reviewing Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s concept of linguistic communication (*śabda*) as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), Bhaṭṭācārya (2012:114-143) focuses on the third and partly on the fourth *āhnikā*-s of NM. Although

¹³ Shivkumar (1979:165).

¹⁴ Shivkumar (1979:164).

Bhaṭṭācārya occasionally discusses the influence of earlier Nyāya authors such as Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, Buddhist writers such as Dinnāga, and Mīmāṃsā writers like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and also Jayanta's influence on later authors such as Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana, yet he seems to be altogether unaware of the findings of the important Euro-American researches on the influences of various pre-Jayanta author on NM. The bibliography of this work of Bhaṭṭācārya (2012:158-161) does not mention a single secondary work on NM. Moreover, due to the absence of a historico-critical introduction, Bhaṭṭācārya's work offers least help in understanding the contents of the relevant portions of NM along historical lines. Besides, the confinement of the book to the Sanskrit language makes it unavailable to the non-Sanskritist scholars. The whole of NM 1 was also translated into English by V.N. Jha in 1995, on the basis of the text of Varadācārya 1969. Nagin J. Shah provided an English paraphrase of the whole NM in three volumes (Shah 1992-1995-1997), and the five volumes of his edition with a Gujarati translation were published in 1975-1992. Two Hindi translations are available, one by Siddheśvara Bhaṭṭa and Śaśiprabhā Kumāra (Bhaṭṭa 2001) and the other by Kiśora Nātha Jhā (Jhā 2001). The former covers NM 1. The latter covers the full NM in two volumes. The editor explains in the introduction¹⁵ that he was working with a copy of the text edited and translated by the late Ānanda Jhā Nyāyācārya. None of these translations is not contextually determined, and lack of attempt on the part of the translator and/or editor to trace Jayanta's sources makes it difficult for the uninitiated reader to appreciate the specificities of Jayanta's thought. Finally, a complete Japanese translation was prepared by H. Marui in 1999 and several English and Japanese translations of short sections have been published by Kataoka. More in general, further pieces of evidence about the date and other biographic information of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, also known as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (see Dezső 2005, Kataoka 2007b), can be found in Frauwallner (1936:267-8)¹⁶; Hacker (1951:146)¹⁷; Oberhammer (1962:9-12); Gupta (1963:92-4)¹⁸; Matilal (1977:45-6); Potter (1977:345-346); Slaje (1986:Introduction)¹⁹, Dezső (2005:Introduction).

3. Overview and aim of the thesis

This thesis is broadly divided into two parts: Part A presents a critical study of the contents of NM 5.2 along historical lines, while Part B hosts an English translation of the text of NM 5.2 as found between pp. 69 and 142 of NM_{Mys.II}. The first part, in turn, unfolds into four major chapters. Chapter I deals with an analysis of the Bhaṭṭa view of *bhāvanā* being sentence-meaning. Chapter II, divided into two sub-parts (Part I and Part II), deal with the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* as found in NM 5.2. The first sub-part (Part I) of Chapter III deals with Jayanta's view on injunctions as extracted from his polemical engagement with

¹⁵ Jhā (2001: 42-43).

¹⁶ Mentioned by Graheli (2015:3).

¹⁷ Graheli (2015:3).

¹⁸ Graheli (2015:3).

¹⁹ Graheli (2015:3).

his Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent, while the second sub-part (Part II) of Chapter III seeks to present a sketch of Jayanta's view on injunctions as emerging from the former's examination of principally the Prābhākara opponent's claim of *niyoga* being the sentence-meaning. However, other voices (e.g., those of Bhartṛhari, Maṇḍana), as has been shown, may also be expected to be heard in this regard. Chapter IV reconstructs Jayanta's view on the nature of sentence-meaning, where apart from other things, Jayanta's historical awareness of a major lacuna in the foundational texts of the Nyāya philosophical tradition, viz. NS and NBh, and how, as an intellectual in his own right, he tries to explain away this lacuna have been analysed. Apart from the four chapters mentioned above, there are four appendices, each dealing with a micro-question emerging out of one or more of the main chapters.

The author of the present thesis is aware that in textual criticism each descriptive and critical decision necessarily presupposes interpretative actions. This is truer in the case of philosophical works such as NM, in which a sound interpretation demands a scrupulous analysis of its argumentative structure against the historical background. Consistent with this, an English translation has been realised. More specifically, although this seeks to be a faithful English translation, yet, it is hoped, it will be readable also by non-Sanskritists. In this way, non-Sanskritist readers will have the chance to appreciate the degree of specialisation and elaboration of classical Sanskrit philosophical discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning as represented by the text of NM 5.2.

The present translation of the theories of sentence-meaning is not a decontextualised one. Rather, my choice of translation of a particular word or concept is principally dictated by the context, the identity of the interlocutor, the semantic history of the concerned word, context, etc. However, I have not attempted to prepare a critical edition of the text of NM 5.2 owing to practical difficulties of obtaining the manuscripts, to which was added the graver difficulty imposed by the Covid pandemic. Although I have mainly followed K. S. Varadacharya's edition of the text which uses newer manuscripts as compared to the *editio princeps*, published by Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, still at a few places I have preferred the readings of the latter since they made more sense and were also consistent with the context. Accordingly, I have indicated in footnotes why my translation of a certain word or a whole line at places does not reflect the text of Varadacharya's edition, but takes into account the reading of the *editio princeps*, which, in my opinion, helps make better sense of the issue involved in that context. Nor even have I attempted to construct an improved text based on a comparison between the readings of the *editio princeps* and Varadacharya's edition. This is because although construction of such an improved text could present better reading, it would ultimately provide us with an eclectic edition only, but not a critical edition *per se*. It is in the same vein that I have refrained from adding critical apparatus to the text reproduced.

A mere translation is not enough to appreciate the depth of the dialogues about sentence-meaning among the representatives of the various schools of Sanskrit philosophy found in NM 5.2. This is because since Jayanta's principal focus was on exploring, elaborating and defending the view on sentence-meaning of his own school, i.e., Nyāya, he gave only a

brief sketch of the views on relevant topics of the rival schools in so far as they were needed to polemically establish the pre-eminence of Jayanta's own view. This has, as a result, at times presupposed a knowledge on the part of the readers of NM 5.2 of the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of the rival schools forming the background of these debates. Accordingly, I have sought to complement the translation with a lengthy study of the principal debates on sentence-meaning found in NM 5.2. Within this study, I have tried to make better sense of Jayanta's arguments by trying to identify the former's interlocutors. An understanding of the specific traits of thought of these interlocutors (e.g., Umbeka) not only helped me understand better the view of Jayanta's interlocutors, but also helped recognise the specificities of Jayanta's own thought and the extent of his intellectual borrowings from his rivals. It is through an understanding of the specificities of Jayanta's thought via his borrowings from not only his predecessors in the Nyāya tradition, but also his sources belonging to rival philosophical schools, that Jayanta's real contributions to the question of sentence-meaning in NM 5.2 has been explored and reconstructed. In fact, it is only through the appreciation of specificities that true convergences may be understood and naïve identifications avoided. I presented extensive quotations from Umbeka's *Tātparyāṭīkā*, aside from the quotations from *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, *Yuktidīpikā*, Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*, *Tantravārttika*, and *Ṭuṭīkā*, Prabhākara's *Brhatī*, Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*, *Bhāvanāviveka* and *Brahmasiddhi*, etc, presented in order to contextualise and analyse the debates, and record the sources and extent of Jayanta's borrowings from his philosophical opponents. Tracing these definite and probable sources also, in my belief, also contributes to the intellectual history of Sanskrit philosophy of the 9th century AD by shedding a flood of light not only on lesser-known sources of Jayanta in NM 5.2 such as Umbeka, but also on the doctrinal development of post-Prabhākara and pre-Śālikanātha Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā on one hand, and post-Kumārila development of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā on the other hand, as found respectively in Umbeka's commentaries on ŚV and BhāVi.

4. Notable contributions of this thesis

The most significant contribution of this thesis is its discovery of **Jayanta's extensive borrowings from Umbeka's *Śloka-vārttikātātparyāṭīkā***. Jayanta borrowed from Umbeka not only in the context of presenting the Bhāṭṭa opponent's theory of *bhāvanā* in NM 5.2, but also for presenting the major part of the Prābhākara opponent's theory of *niyoga*²⁰. Although Sen (2013:31) was probably the first to notice how Jayanta reused a line from Umbeka's commentary on *Bhāvanāviveka*, yet he did not notice how Umbeka's commentary on ŚV was extensively reused by Jayanta mainly while presenting the view

²⁰ Although Kei Kataoka has shown in his separately published critical editions of other parts of NM how Umbeka is a major source for Jayanta (e.g., Kataoka 2017), yet since Kataoka has not prepared a critical edition of NM 5.2. The present thesis may humbly claim to have pioneeringly explored, based on a passing mention by Cakradhara (NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 79) of Umbeka being Jayanta's source for the Prābhākara-Bhāṭṭa debate on the question of defending the malefic nature of the Śyena sacrifice, the extent of Jayanta's borrowings from Umbeka with regard to other issues discussed in NM 5.2. It also indirectly shows how meticulous and reliable is Cakradhara with regard to tracing of Jayanta's sources.

of the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2. The Prābhākara view thus presented in NM 5.2 and discussed in Chapter II of this thesis represents the post-Prābhākara and pre-Śālikanātha stage of development of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, whose source works are now irretrievably lost and for which we have to depend heavily, if not exclusively, on Umbeka's mention of them in course of long excursions in ŚVTā ad ŚV ad MīSū 1.1.2, and 1.1.5. Through this identification of the specific stage in the development of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, I have, as mentioned at the beginning of the second sub-part of Chapter II, attempted to supplement Yoshimizu (2021). It is also to be noted that although Yoshimizu (2021) discusses the basic theoretical framework adopted by the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 and compares and contrasts it with Prābhākara's own view in the *Bṛhatī*, yet he does not analyse how Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent applies his basic theoretical framework to the analysis of malefic Vedic rituals like the Śyena and how this snowballs into a debate with a Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2, whom I could identify as Umbeka. I presented Umbeka's own view and his analysis of Kumā'ila's view, together with quotations from Kumā'ila in Chapter I.

As for the nature of *bhāvanā*, the probable source of the first two of the three alternative views presented in NM 5.2 and as analysed under Section 3 of Chapter I of this thesis, has been shown to be Maṇḍana's *Bhāvanāviveka* and *Vidhiviveka*, although terminologically it comes closer to the latter than the former. In explaining the functioning of *śabdabhāvanā* Jayanta also seems to have accommodated, as analysed under Section 5 of Chapter I of this thesis, Umbeka's specific view, found in his commentary on *Bhāvanāviveka*, that *śabdabhāvanā* is both produced and denoted by the exhortative suffixes. A further point needs to be noted here: in refutation of *śabdabhāvanā* in NM 5.2, it is argued that if the exhortative suffixes, the denotating activity of which is identified by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 with *śabdabhāvanā*, needed yet another denotative activity to denote *śabdabhāvanā*, this would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. **Now this argument of infinite regress has been shown by me under Section 9 of Chapter I to be a direct reuse of Maṇḍana's argument in ViVi. I have also ventured to suggest in the same section based on an analysis of Umbeka's lines from his commentary on BhāVi how a probable rejoinder to some of the charges levelled against *śabdabhāvanā* in NM 5.2 could be offered.**

It has also been the endeavour of this thesis to highlight the structural unity of arguments in NM 5.2, for which repetition of some basic arguments made by Jayanta in various parts of NM 5.2 was deemed unavoidably necessary. This structural unity is especially analysed in the context of reconstructing Jayanta's own view on injunctions in the second half of Chapter III. Part I of Chapter III discusses at length Jayanta's polemical engagement with his Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent. This part, read together with Appendix II, identifies the Kriyāvākyārthavādin as the pre-Jaimini Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Bādari, and some Vaiyākaraṇas, and also Bādari's followers like Bhartṛmitra, etc. In this connection, it has also been shown in Appendix I how Jayanta's Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent's description of himself by borrowing Patañjali's expression, '*śabdapramāṇaka*', is consistent with the convention of using this term as an appellation for the Mīmāṃsā philosophers. Under Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this chapter, it has been

shown how Jayanta argues against his Kriyāvākyārthavādin’s view that the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ within the injunction, “*svargakāmo yajeta*” refers to the agent only. Jayanta’s argument here is that it is not the agent which is referred to by the said phrase but the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) who is entitled to perform the act of sacrifice. While arguing in favour of the notion of an ‘eligible performer’, Jayanta remarks that there is no one who is a ‘*svarga*-desiring’ by birth, by virtue of which he could be termed an agent. Rather, it is a person’s desire for *svarga* which makes him a ‘*svarga*-desiring person’, owing to which he becomes eligible for performing the act of sacrifice. **Now this argument of no one being identifiable as a ‘*svarga*-desiring person’ by birth has been identified by me to be a reuse of a line from Maṇḍana’s BhāVi (vide Section 1.3 of the first part of Chapter III).** Continuing his argument against his Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent, Jayanta says if one were to desire *svarga* and perform the sacrifice, where *svarga* and sacrifice are not connected through a means-end relation, then it would lead to the absurd situation of one desiring X and doing Y where X and Y are not causally related to each other. Although this argument, along with its consequence of causing a sentence-splitting (*vākyabheda*) in the Vedic injunction, is as old as Śābara and was also briefly discussed by Kumārila in his *Tuṣṭikā*, it was discussed at a greater length by Maṇḍana in BhāVi. **In the light of BhāVi and its commentary by Nārāyaṇa, I have analysed how the Kriyāvākyārthavādin’s view, if accepted, ignores a basic unity of content of desire and action, and how such an ignorance could ultimately lead to all results becoming accidental (*ākasmika*) in the sense that their production is not causally determined. If such an accidental nature of the production of results is accepted, it would lead to an almost Cārvākisation of Mīmāṃsā, which Kumārila complained of and mentioned as the reason for his writing a corrective interpretation of Mīmāṃsā in the form of ŚV in verse 10 of the first chapter of ŚV. This analysis also briefly sheds light on the intellectual history of a strong counter-current within Mīmāṃsā, to which a separate section was dedicated by Jaimini in his MīSū.**

The next important analysis which this part of Chapter III offers is that of the ***anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa* and its bearings upon Jayanta’s view of an eligible performer (*adhikārin*).** In a nutshell, ‘*anupādeya*’ or ‘unobtainable factors’ in the context of Vedic ritual actions as explained by the Mīmāṃsakas refer to five things, viz. space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), occasion (*nimitta*), result (*phala*) and the thing fit to be purified (*saṃskārya*), which cannot be brought about by human effort. The concept was already present in a fairly developed form in Kumārila *Tantravārttika* ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.3.24-25, where these five *anupādeya* or ‘unobtainables’ have been discussed as factors which, in addition to the context, help distinguish between fixed and elective varieties of the same ritual (e.g., Agnihotra, Darśapūrṇamāsa, etc.). **Focusing on the main point of these unobtainable factors, viz. their being unobtainable through human effort, Jayanta decontextualised the result and reused its being an unobtainable factor as the basis of distinguishing between the notion of an agent (*karṭṛ*) and that of an eligible performer (*adhikārin*).** Also, Jayanta connected this concept with phrases such as ‘*svargakāma*’ and called *svarga*, which is directly the qualifier of desire (*kāma*) and by extension that of a person, as an *anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa* or ‘unobtainable qualifier of a person’. Now in case

of such Vedic statements as ‘the red-turbaned red-clothed priests perform [the ritual]’, the phrases ‘red-turbaned’ (*lohitoṣṇīṣa*), ‘red-clothes’ which qualify the priests, are, according to Jayanta, something that can be brought about by human effort. By contrast, *svarga* in *svargakāma* being the result cannot be brought about by human effort. For Jayanta, in the former case, since the performance of the ritual by the priests presuppose the wearing of red turbans and red clothes by them, which can be brought about by human effort, what the phrases ‘red-turbaned’ and ‘red-clothed’ refer to is the agent, whereas since *svarga* cannot be brought about by human effort, the phrase ‘he who desires *svarga*’ refers to the eligible performer. In my analysis, since the effort needed for performing the sacrifice by the priests in the former case is based on something which itself is achievable through human effort, a continuity of effort may be understood. This continuity of effort may serve as an explanation for Jayanta’s claim that where the qualifier of a person is conducive to its being an action-factor, the person thus qualified should there be understood as an agent. By contrast, in case of the injunction, ‘*svargakāmo yajeta*’, *svarga* as the result is something which cannot be brought about by human effort, but rather it is the stage which marks the termination of all efforts. This is because if one already has the desired result, one would not make any effort towards it, and hence one can only make efforts directly with regard to the action which serves as the means for bringing about the desired goal or result and not in regard to the result itself. Now since performance of the sacrifice in this case is based on the person’s being someone who desires *svarga*, where neither *svarga* nor a desire for it can be obtained through volition, the undertaking of the action is dependent not on human effort unlike the former case, but on eligibility. I have shown how despite its novelty as a conceptual tool for distinguishing between the notions of agency and eligibility, **Jayanta’s definition of eligibility based on *anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa*** runs counter to the Mīmāṃsā view of eligibility as found in works like *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa* of Āpadeva. From Āpadeva, it is clear that even such qualifiers of a person which can be brought about by human effort can in fact contribute to the person’s eligibility. A case in point is prior requirement in all fire-related ritual actions of the installation and maintenance of the Vedic ritual fire by a householder (*ādhanajanitāgnimattā*).

Part II of Chapter III also highlights how the notion of ‘*sapratyaya*’ or **rational person stands at the center of Jayanta’s view on injunctions**, and how this ultimately provides Jayanta with a basis for claiming that it is the result or purpose which instigates a rational person to undertake any action. To explain: the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 claims that the result, *svarga*, occurring within the compound word ‘*svargakāma*’ in the injunction, ‘*svargakāmo yajeta*’ is need by the injunction in so far as it helps identify the person to be enjoined (*niyojaya*). The person who thus identifies himself as the *niyojya* has his sense of duty activated with regard to the prescribed act. Although the person need to have a desire for *svarga* for being a *svargakāma* and through it the *niyojya*, and being the object of his desire, *svarga* is deemed by that person as the object to be accomplished, yet the injunction does not need *svarga qua* result, but only *qua* qualifier of the person. In other words, although the person needs *svarga* for fulfilling his desire for it, the injunction does not need *svarga* as the object to be accomplished for executing the injunction’s task of instigation. The main zeal for holding so by the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 is that if

one acted out of a desire for the result and not merely on the might of the authority of the Vedic injunctions, which is held by the Mīmāṃsakas as not being dependent upon any other instrument of knowledge, the authority of the Vedic sacred texts would be compromised. However, Jayanta says, given the very fact that a Vedic injunction instigates a rational person, who does nothing which does not serve a purpose of his, the Prābhākaras cannot afford to ignore the role of the result in instigating a person to action. Moreover, if without desiring *svarga* and considering it to be the object to be accomplished, a person does not become a *svargakāma*, and without being *svargakāma* he does not become the person fit to be enjoined by the Vedic injunction, **it is ultimately the result which should be considered as the instigator** of rational human beings.

Jayanta's view of a desired result being the instigator has larger consequences for his theory of human motivation. To explain: if it is ultimately the desired result which prompts one to undertake an action, it will help explain why a person does such prohibited acts such as killing a Brāhmaṇa, having sexual relationship with another person's wife, drinking liquor, etc. Based on Jayanta's hints, I have opined that **it is under the influence of situationally obfuscating factors like extreme hatred, sensual passion, etc. that a generally rational person may sometimes act irrationally**. Although the sacred texts convey the malefic nature of these prohibited acts and the dire consequences of doing them, the person, under the influence of such obfuscating factors, do not recognise those prohibited acts as 'malefic' but rather the opposite of it. For example, under that condition, he consider killing a Brāhmaṇa indeed to be the means for achieving a beneficial end. Hence, in such cases too, results like killing a Brāhmaṇa that are considered by a person to be the means to pleasure, instigate him to kill. What Jayanta seems to imply is, I suggest, that it is not enough for sacred texts to convey that a certain act is malefic, but it is equally important for the addressee to recognise the act in a similar manner.

Another important consequence of Jayanta's theory of the result being the instigator is that, it requires the postulation of a result even in case of fixed and occasional ritual actions, for which, generally, no result is mentioned. Jayanta says that since fixed and occasional Vedic rituals also concern rational people, they cannot act if the ritual actions do not lead to desirable results. Hence it is for securing that they should undertake that results are postulated even in regard to such ritual actions. For postulating results for such ritual actions, one may refer to statements expressing eulogies that apparently have no connection with a particular injunction. Hence, the idea of a rational person lying at the core of Vedic ritual actions, helps achieve a purpose-oriented organic unity of various parts of the Vedic sacred texts, which may be descriptive, prescriptive, laudatory, etc.

Lastly, Chapter III also contains a list of 23 key features of Jayanta's theory of injunctions, which has been prepared by the author of the present dissertation by extracting the foundation arguments that Jayanta makes against his opponents throughout NM 5.2 in general and in the context of dealing with injunctions in particular. This chapter also suggests as a probable hypothesis **why Jayanta had not criticised Maṇḍana's view of *iṣṭasādhanatā*** at length and how he might have been inspired by Umbeka's indirect criticism of *śreyaṣsādhanatā* in his commentary on *Bhāvanāviveka*.

The specific contribution of this thesis with regard to Jayanta's view on the nature of sentence-meaning discussed in Chapter IV is that it shows how Jayanta here followed Patañjali and Śābara's views on sentence-meaning and the probable reason for his quoting from both Patañjali and Śābara. It further examines against the wider background of mereological debate between Nyāya and Buddhism and also Bhartr̥hari's theory of *sphoṭa*, the probable reason why Jayanta held the opinion that although sentence-meaning is brought about by word-meanings, the former is not altogether different from the latter. In a nutshell, it may be said that if Jayanta were to accept sentence-meaning as being altogether different from word-meanings, he would appear a crypto-Bhartr̥harean, although it would be consistent with the general Nyāya approach to mereological problems. Being a crypto-Bhartr̥harean would not have allowed Jayanta to justify his rejection of *Sphoṭa* in NM 6. Moreover, if Jayanta accepted that the individual word-meanings were not reflected at the level of sentence-meaning, Jayanta would be forced to consider both words and word-meanings as unreal like the Bhartr̥hareans, which would further make it impossible for him to justify why Gautama and Vātsyāyana had dealt with word-meaning as being real and external in NS and NBh. If the view of Gautama and Vātsyāyana on word-meaning had to be ignored, Jayanta would face a further difficulty of showing how his view of sentence-meaning is consistent with the Nyāya tradition. Keeping all these difficulties in mind, Jayanta chose to hold that sentence-meaning was not over and above word-meaning, but individual word-meanings syntactically connected with each other. Although, this view compromised with the basic tenets of mereology of the Nyāya tradition, yet it was perfectly consistent with the view on word-meaning found in NS and NBh. This is because, Jayanta could show that since it is ultimately word-meanings which make up sentence-meaning, his view was perfectly consistent with the Nyāya tradition of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. For, as Jayanta claims, by discussing what word-meaning is, the author of NS and NBh made the room for sentence-meaning, although they themselves refrained from making a separate mention of sentence-meaning because they deemed separate efforts in this direction unnecessary. This highlights how **Jayanta was keenly aware of an apparent lacuna in his own tradition regarding sentence-meaning** and this may point out how Jayanta was doing intellectual history in a limited sense. This also proves how Jayanta as an intellectual in his own right twisted this absence of discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning in NS and NBh in favour of his own theory of sentence-meaning being a collection of individual word-meanings mutually connected. In the same vein, it has been shown why is it incorrect to think that Jayanta had proposed two different definitions on sentence-meaning in NM 5.2, and why they are but ultimately, how the bedrock of both is essentially the same, and how the second is the logically expanded outcome of the first. Furthermore, this chapter shows how by **including non-linguistic sources within the understanding of *phala* as sentence-meaning**, Jayanta makes room for explaining why one may be instigated to undertake an act even on hearing on reading non-injunctive statements.

Appendix III analyses how **portions of Umbeka's refutation of the Prābhākara claim of the preeminence of *niyoga* have been reused by Jayanta to establish his own view of the preeminence of *phala*.**

Appendix IV attempts to trace the source of Jayanta's brief discussion on the view of sentence-meaning being *pratibhā* or intuitive flash in Kumāriḷa's ŚV_{va} and in this connection it also tries to take note of the similarities and dissimilarities between Bharṭṛhari's treatment of *pratibhā* and the view of Jayanta's Pratibhāvādin opponent in NM 5.2. **The difference of Bharṭṛhari's view of *pratibhā* with that of the Pratibhāvādin opponent in NM 5.2** may be mentioned. While Bharṭṛhari makes *pratibhā* work for all living beings, the Pratibhāvādin does not mention any such thing. Moreover, for Bharṭṛhari, *pratibhā* is the cause of undertaking of actions (*pravṛttihetu*) by living beings, but Jayanta's Pratibhāvādin does not deal with the instigating aspect of *pratibhā* particularly. *Pratibhā*, for Bharṭṛhari, is six-fold, but no such internal classification of *pratibhā* is mentioned by the Pratibhāvādin in NM 5.2. However, the most important features in Jayanta's discussion of *pratibhā* is that he seeks to identify the view with the view on sentence meaning held by the Buddhist Vijñānavādins that sentence-meaning is a cognition in which occurs an appearance of a connection among word-meanings. This is, as I have said, influenced by Kumāriḷa's critique of *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning in the *vākyādhikaraṇa* of ŚV. It further notes the points of agreement between Kumāriḷa and Jayanta on their respective treatment of *pratibhā*. This appendix also shows how a passage from *Yuktidīpikā*, a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, could be another probable source not only for Jayanta's presentation of important aspects of the *pratibhā* theory in NM 5.2 but also for his criticism of the same. Jayanta also says that **if *pratibhā* which is of the nature of mere cognition were to be accepted as sentence-meaning**, that is, if sentence-meaning did not refer to externally existent real objects, **then such a sentence-meaning would be as good as the statement of a deceiver**. For, a deceiver's statement does not lead to reality. I have also shown here how Jayanta makes an original criticism of the view of sentence-meaning being *pratibhā* and also how he connects the issue to the greater question of the validity of language as an instrument of knowledge. In elaborating upon yet another argument made by Jayanta against his Pratibhāvādin opponent in NM 5.2, I have given a brief sketch of the arguments Jayanta had made against the Buddhist in NM 3, in course of which I have shown how Jayanta's main source for this was Umbeka once again, apart from Kumāriḷa and the obvious reference to ŚāBhā.

5. Principal limitations of this thesis:

- i. This thesis generally does not take into account what Jayanta has said in relation to a certain issue discussed in NM 5.2 in other parts of NM. For this reason, I have not attempted any analysis, for example, of Jayanta's *apoha* as found in the first half of NM 5, or his refutation of *sphoṭa* and his examination of competing views on sentence-compositionality as found in NM 6. Consistent with this, I have not made efforts to separately analyse Jayanta's examination of such views found in NM 5.2 as sentence-meaning is distinction or *bheda*, sentence-meaning is sheer cognition (*vijñānamātra*), sentence-meaning is syntactical connection (*saṃsarga*), etc. which unavoidably required an analysis of Jayanta's detailed treatment of them and connected issues in other parts of NM.

- ii. A survey of Jayanta's influence on posteriority has also not been attempted since it is beyond the scope of this thesis and also the time-frame of the present research.
- iii. I have not attempted to examine at length if Jayanta knew Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, which, as a Nyāya text, enjoys cardinal importance only next to NS and NBh.
- iv. Since Yoshimizu (2021) has compared and contrasted Prabhākara's view on *niyoga* and the modus operandi of injunctions in *Bṛhatī* with that of the Prabhākara opponent in NM 5.2, I have not repeated such a survey to keep Chapter II within a sizeable limit.
- v. I have not compared and contrasted the views expressed by Jayanta in NM 5.2 with those found mentioned in Jayanta's only extant drama, *Āgamaḍambara*.
- vi. I have not attempted any separate survey of the influence of Vaiśeṣika doctrines on Jayanta's treatment of sentence-meaning in NM 5.2.
- vii. I have attempted no comparison of Jayanta's theory of sentence-meaning with the theories of sentence-meaning prevalent in Euro-American linguistics.

PART A

Chapter I

The Bhāṭṭa view on sentence-meaning

Introduction

Bhāṭṭa Jayanta's NM is not only a text-book of classical (*prācīna*) Nyāya through which distil the views of earlier Nyāya philosophers, but it is also a rich repository of theories of epistemology, logic, ontology, language, etc. current among rival schools which had gained prominence by Jayanta's time. This is particularly true of NM 5.2 which discusses at least seven different theories of sentence-meaning. The present chapter aims to discuss the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory presented in NM 5.2 which puts *bhāvanā* or human activity at the centre of sentence-meaning. It is for this reason that for the sake of convenience I will refer to this view throughout this thesis as Bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda and the proponents of this view, Bhāvanāvākyaṛthavādin and the Bhāṭṭa. Be it mentioned herein that I will restrict my discussion to the role played by *bhāvanā* in impelling a human being to undertake an action. In other words, I will only not focus much on the formal linguistic aspects connected with *bhāvanā*, such as what expresses *bhāvanā*, etc.

1. Background

Before embarking upon a discussion of Bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda, it is important to have a brief overview of the contextual background which hosts the discourse in NM 5.2. Four out of twelve chapters of the NM are dedicated to the discussion on *śabdapramāṇa* or language as an instrument of knowledge²¹. This discussion not only takes into account ordinary (*laukika*) human language, but is also deeply linked with the language that makes up the Vedic corpus in general and particularly those portions of the Vedas which deal specifically with ritual actions of various kinds and are replete with prescriptions and prohibitions varying significantly in terms of deontic strength. Such discourses on the validity of language as an instrument of knowledge often boil down to polemical discussions on the validity of the Veda and the command utterances present in it that urge human beings to undertake the performance of various kinds of ritual actions. This is because Vedic ritual actions vary from short and less elaborate processes to very complex, laborious, expensive and time-consuming ones, and one is not motivated to undertake such

²¹ I have followed Freschi (2012) in translating *śabdapramāṇa* as “linguistic communication” mainly in the Mīmāṃsā context. This is because for the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda, which is considered *śabdapramāṇa*, is authorless, and hence there is no scope for it being the utterance of a trustworthy speaker (*āptavācāna*). Therefore, the knowledge generated on hearing the Vedic sentences has been translated as “linguistic communication” and not “verbal testimony”. At places, where constituent parts of Vedic sentences have been translated as “language”, “linguistic units”, “speech units”, etc. the knowledge arising out of them too should be understood as being “linguistic communication”, i.e., communicated by the Vedas themselves, and not through any author or person such as God through the Vedas.

actions unless there is a guarantee that a performance of these rituals lead to desired human ends.

It is thus to be noted that early Indian discourses on sentence-meaning within the Mīmāṃsā school, had their origin in analyses of command utterances²² of the Vedas. The Mīmāṃsā philosopher devised an extensive and sophisticated system of Vedic ritual hermeneutics for this purpose.

However, as Jayanta agrees to the observation of his Buddhist interlocutor, the validity of language as an instrument of knowledge cannot be established unless what a sentence means is an external reality²³. Thus, Jayanta needed to find a theory of sentence-meaning which could at the same time respond fruitfully to the concerns of the Nyāya realism and also cover the meaning of commands.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta discusses at least seven different theories of sentence-meaning. On a majority of these views, it is a particular element of the sentence-meaning that is emphasised and made the principal semantic element featuring in the sentential cognition. It is on account of this principality of a particular element, qualified by other semantic elements of the sentential cognition that are subordinate to it that each of these theories of sentence-meaning is labelled in a particular way. Thus, Bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda is named after the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of *bhāvanā* or human activity, according to which, *bhāvanā* or human activity is recognised as the principal semantic element recognises the latter to be the principal semantic element of sentential cognition generated upon hearing Vedic and non-Vedic sentences alike. It is also to be noted at this point that although the discussion on sentence-meaning in NM 5.2 opens with an investigation of whether or not sentence-meaning is something external and hence real, it slowly assumes the task of identifying that particular element in sentence-meaning which impels one to undertake an action either. This shift of focus from what sentence-meaning *is* to what sentence-meaning *should be* to be able to impel one to undertake an action underlines an essentially pragmatic nature of functioning language.

2. Meaning of *bhāvanā*

As for what *bhāvanā* means, let me start with a statement by Elisa Freschi. Freschi (2012:22) observes:

“The causative verbal noun *bhāvanā* (‘causing to be’) is a recurrent term in Sanskrit philosophy. It designates, for instance, an impression as cause of memory and

²² By the expression ‘command utterances’, I mean both prescriptive and prohibitive sentences found in the Vedas.

²³ *yady evaṃ vākyaṛtham api bāhyaṃ vāstavam antareṇa śabpramāṇatā na pratiṣṭhāṃ labhate....* NM_{EP-I}, p. 363. The Mysore edition (NM_{Mys-II}, p. 136) has *śastrasya pramāṇatā* which does not seem to fit with the context.

intuition, a particular state in meditation in Buddhism and in Kashmir Śaivism, a linguistic function in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetic theory, etc. It is also used in various senses by Bhartr̥hari ... and by other Vyākaraṇa authors.

“The term *bhāvanā* was probably introduced into Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics by Śabara (see, e.g., his commentary ad MīSū 2.1.1) in order to denote the undertaking of an activity by a person.”²⁴

Literally the word *bhāvanā* means ‘bringing about’. In fact, the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka in NM 5.2 defines *bhāvanā* as the activity of the producer directed towards something that is fit to be produced²⁵. With reference to the Vedic injunction, *svargakāma yajeta* – “one desirous of *svarga*²⁶, should sacrifice” – this definition is explained as follows:

“A result like *svarga* is to be brought into being, since it is something that is fit to be accomplished; its fitness to be brought about consists in its being the agent of the action of coming into being. And with regard to the action of coming into being, something which has an origin is seen to be the agent, [and] not something that has always existed or something that has never existed. As [Kumārila Bhaṭṭa] says –

Something which has never existed or something which has always existed cannot be brought about just like the flower of the sky and the sky [respectively]. (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1)²⁷

Since an results like *svarga* which takes on the form of something desirable is different from the sky and its flower, hence it is something fit to be brought about. A human activity which aims at it and produces it is *bhāvanā*.”²⁸

²⁴ Freschi (2012:22).

²⁵ *bhāvyaṇiṣṭho bhāvakavyāparō bhāvanā*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 82.

²⁶ Instead of the common practice of translating *svarga* as heaven I have preferred to retain the original Sanskrit here, which in the Mīmāṃsā analyses of Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara, expresses ‘unsurpassed bliss’. It is something which does not serve the purpose of anything else; in other words, its enjoyability is not dependent upon the enjoyability of anything else. It is enjoyable and hence desirable in its own terms – *niratiśayaprītivacanaḥ svargaśabdaḥ prītiś ca na anyārthā*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 88.

²⁷ MDĀ_{II}, p. 342.

²⁸ *bhāvyaṇ hi svargādi phalaṇ sādhyamānatvāt sādhyatvañcāsya bhavanakriyākartṛtvāt bhavanakriyāyāñca kartṛtvam utpattidharmakasya vastuno dṛṣṭam na nityaṇ bhūtasya nāpi nityam abhūtasya. yathāha –*

*nityaṇ na bhavanaṇ yasya yasya vā nityabhūtata/
na tasya kriyamānatvaṇ khapuṣpākāsāyoriva//*

svargādiś ca kāmyarūpo 'rthaḥ khatatpuṣpābhyāṇ vilakṣaṇa iti bhāvyo bhavati. tanniṣṭhas tadutpādakaś ca puruṣavyāparō yaḥ, sa bhāvanā. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 82.

Further, this *bhāvanā* or ‘bringing about’ is not mere action. *Bhāvanā* rather denotes the human *effort* which is distinguished from what is denoted by the verbal roots like *yaj* (to sacrifice), namely a sequence of perceivable actions. Moreover, it is understood out of the verbal ending, whereas the specific action which is to be accomplished is denoted by the verbal root²⁹. It is therefore understood out of language as being indeed distinct from the concrete action, the action-factors, etc³⁰.

Jayanta summarises these points in an evocative verse:

“It is not produced by something (like the action which is produced by the effort), nor is it the producer of something (in the sense that it does not produce a result like only an action can). It is only the mother of that which is produced (the result) and that which produces it (the action, denoted by the verbal root).”³¹

3. Three alternative views about the nature of *bhāvanā*

At this point, Jayanta presents three alternative views on *bhāvanā* which lay bare the characteristics of it.

According to some,

- i. “It (*bhāvanā*) is indeed a specific action, an internal activity of the cogniser; it is different from the external activities that are of the nature of movement.”³²

According to others,

- ii. “Alternatively, it is the effort of a human being that is called *bhāvanā*, by means of which a person gets detached from the state of inactivity. That effort is the cause of accomplishing actions like sacrifice, oblations, etc. and almost everyone agrees

²⁹ *na kriyāmātraṃ bhāvanā. api tu paridrśyamānapūrvāparībhūtaḥkriyādyādibhāvasvarūpātiriktaḥ puruṣavyāpāraḥ pratyayāt pratīyamāno bhāvanā.*

³⁰ *kriyākāraḥkādīvilakṣaṇaiva sā śabdāt pratīyata ity arthaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 83.

³¹ *na sā kenacidutpādya janikā sā na kasyacit/ kevalaṃ janānī hyeṣā janyasya janakasya ca//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 83.

My interpretation of this verse is based on Prabal Kumar Sen’s annotation. See Sen (2013:62). I am translating *janānī* as “mother” instead of the more neutral “source” or “origin”, in order to preserve the active aspect of it (which would be hidden in a term like “source”).

³² *kriyāviśeṣa evāyaṃ vyāparo jñātur āntaraḥ/ spandātmakabāhīrbhūtakriyākṣaṇavilakṣaṇaḥ// ity evaṃ kecit.*

The reading of the last part of this verse is given as ‘*vicakṣaṇaḥ*’. I have followed the reading of NM_{EP}, p. 337.

that it is different from them. Although it is a property of the self, yet it is not like [other properties of the self, such as] ubiquity. Because of its [syntactical] connection as something to be accomplished, it becomes the content of an injunction.”³³

Others hold that

- iii. “*Bhāvanā* is the common property of the meanings of (specific) verbal roots; it takes on the form (of something) which is not invariably present (in the specific meanings of verbal roots, such as) sacrifice, donation, etc. It is like the generic property of cowhood (which is present in all cows, but is not identifiable with the specific property of a particular cow).”³⁴

Explaining the third view Jayanta says just as in various types of cows like that of the brindled variety, etc. the form of a cow in general is constantly cognised and also specific features such as that of being brindled that are distinct from other specific features, so in the case of actions like sacrifice, it is the form of an activity that is invariably understood, and also specific forms like that of being sacrifice etc. that re distinct from each other. This invariable form, activity, is *bhāvanā*³⁵. This analogy is pushed further and said that just it is impossible to show cowhood separately and as unqualified by brindledness, here too it is impossible to show the pure activity as untinged by sacrifice, etc. This is because it is always understood as being coloured by the specific form of the action. But on that score it should not be thought of as being absent like the self which is permeated by states like pleasure, happiness, etc. Likewise, when a general question such as ‘what does he do?’ arises, out of which the specific activity is not understood, utterance of specific answers like ‘he cooks’, ‘he recites’ is consistent³⁶.

³³ *puruṣasya prayatno vā bhāvanety abhidhīyate/
audāsīnyadaśāpāyaṃ pumān yena prapadyate//
sa yatno yāghomādīkriyānirvṛttikāraṇam/
tasya tadvyatiriktatvaṃ prāyaḥ sarvo ’numanyate//
sa cāyamātmadharmo ’pi na vibhutvādisannibhaḥ/
sādhyarūpābhisambandhāt dhatte viśayatāṃ vidheḥ// ity apare. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 86.*

³⁴ *anye dhātvarthasāmānyam bhāvanāmabhyupāgaman/
yāgadānādyanusyūtam rūpaṃ gotvādi jātivat//*

³⁵ *yathā hi śābaleyādiṣv anugataṃ gorūpaṃ avabhāsate, vyāvṛttaṃ ca śābaleyādirūpaṃ, evam iha api
yāgādīkarmanām anugataṃ ca vyāpārarūpaṃ pratibhāsate, parasparavibhaktam ca yāgādirūpaṃ. yat tad
anugatavyāpārarūpaṃ sā bhāvanā. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87.*

³⁶ *yathā ca śābaleyādyananuraktaṃ pṛthaktvena gotvaṃ darśayitum aśakyam evam ihāpi śuddham
yajyādyananuraktaṃ vyāpārarūpaṃ darśayitum aśakyam, taduparaktatvena tasya sarvadaivāgamāt. na
caitāvata tasya nāstitvaṃ sukhaduḥkhādyavasthānugatasyevātmanah. tathā ca kiṃ karotīty
anavagataviśeṣavyāpārasāmānya praśne sati pacati paṭhatīti tadviśeṣottaravacanam anuṇam bhavati iti.
NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87.*

It is also to be noted that although *bhāvanā* is of a generic nature, yet unlike the generic properties of cowhood or actionhood, it is not cognised as something already accomplished, due to which it should not be the content of an injunction³⁷. Rather in all cases like ‘he should sacrifice’, ‘he should make a ritual donation’, ‘he should offer oblation’, a generic activity which has not given up its sequential nature is understood and it becomes the content of an injunction³⁸. Thus it is this generic activity which is common to the meaning of all verbal roots which denote specific actions and which resides in the state of something that is being accomplished is what is called *bhāvanā* or ‘bringing about’³⁹.

The word *bhāvanā* has been used a number of times in connection with the Bhāṭṭa opponent’s view. But it has not been explained as to what precisely the nature of *bhāvanā* is. Kumāriḷa’s own position in this regard is not absolutely clear. However, the word *bhāvanā* is used first by Śābara (circa pre-5th c. AD) in regard to the interpretation of the Vedic injunction, *svargakāmo yajeta* – “One who desires *svarga* should sacrifice”. As Freschi (2013:153-154) notes:

“In this statement, Mīmāṃsā authors point out an active component, embedded in the verb and corresponding to the fact that one undertakes an activity (*bhāva* or *karman*) in general. This component, they maintain, is expressed by the verbal ending, whereas the verbal root expresses the specific activity undertaken. So, the verbal ending informs one of the sheer fact that an activity is being initiated and one turns to the verbal root in order to nae it. Śābara (possibly before 5th c. AD), who wrote the first extant commentary on the foundation text of Mīmāṃsā system, was presumably the first who called this generic activity *bhāvanā* (lit. “the causing to be”), an action noun from the causative of the root *bhū-*. Thus, he defined an activity in general as the fact of bringing about (“causing to be”) an aim (in the example mentioned above, *svarga*).”

³⁷ This is because an injunction does not report or describe a state of affairs, it is not about something that ‘is’, but it always communicates something that it is as yet unaccomplished and should be brought about, i.e., it speaks of the ‘ought’.

³⁸ *tac ca sāmānyarūpam api na gotvādivat kriyātvavad vā siddhatayā’vabhāsate yena vidher aviṣayaḷ syāt. api ca yajeta dadyāj juhūyād iti sarvatra aparityaktapūrvāparībhūtasvabhāvaṃ tadvyāpārasāmānyam avagamyate vidheś ca viṣayatām pratipadyate.* NM_{EP-I}, pp. 337-338. The Mysore edition (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87) has the reading, ‘*avagamyatena*’, which makes no sense. Also, both Mysore and Sen read ‘*siddhatvena*’ which does not affect the meaning.

³⁹ *tad idaṃ sakaladhātvarthasādhāraṇaṃ sādhyamānāvasthaṃ vyāpārasāmānyam bhāvanety ucyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87.

Śabara reinterprets the Vedic injunction stated above as *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvatyet* – “One should bring about *svarga* through sacrifice”.⁴⁰

For Kumāṛila (c. 7th c. AD), *bhāvanā* lies at the very core not only of injunctive statements, but it is what, according to him, finite verbal endings generally convey. In case of exhortative verbal endings⁴¹, this *bhāvanā* enters into a specific causal relation due to the activity being caused or instigated not by the agent himself but someone or something external to it. As already noted above, while in case of worldly injunctions, this source of instigation is generally a person, it is the Vedic sacred texts themselves, which are thought of as authorless (*apauruṣeya*) by the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, that instigate. It is with a view to accounting for this instigating function of Vedic injunctions and more specifically the exhortative suffixes in them that Kumāṛila formulated the concept of *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*. As for *arthātmikā bhāvanā* or *bhāvanā*, Kumāṛila has glossed it as *prayojakavyāpāra* or “the activity of an instigating agent”.

However, Kumāṛila has not specified whether such an activity of the instigating agent is a mental one or a physical activity or both. If the second option is accepted, then the meaning of *bhāvanā* comes close to the Vaiśeṣika understanding of the category (*padārtha*) of *karman* or movement. Although *bhāvanā* in the sense of physical movement is certainly present in Kumāṛila and also Maṇḍana⁴², who elaborates upon the former’s definition, yet it seems not to be confined to it. To begin with, Kumāṛila defines *bhāvanā* as follows:

tatra yad audāsīnyapracūṭimātreṇa parispandarūpaṃ nirūpyate sā bhāvanā. TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 349.

In that regard, that which is determined to have a form of movement account of mere cessation of inactivity is *bhāvanā*.

But again, it is not clear whether this cessation of inactivity is necessarily entails a physical activity or it could be the agent’s mental activity in the form of volition, will, etc. Elsewhere, in the Ātmavāda section of *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV_Ā), Kumāṛila says:

na parispanda evaikaḥ kriyā naḥ kaṇabhojivat// Verse no. 74c-d, in ŚV_Ā, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 501.

⁴⁰ On the interpretation of *bhāva* as *bhāvanā* in Śabara. See Diaconescu (2012: 243-246; 262-263), and Cummins (2020).

⁴¹ I will use the term exhortative verbal endings, exhortative suffixes and optative and like suffixes interchangeably throughout this thesis.

⁴² I will restrict this discussion to Kumāṛila and Maṇḍana, who are definitely Jayanta’s predecessors and also his sources. Pārthasārathi Mīśra and Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, who come centuries later than Jayanta, discuss the nature of *bhāvanā* in a very sophisticated manner and address newer objections. A summarised account of their respective views on *bhāvanā* can be found in Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992:43-48), Ollett (2013) and Freschi (2013).

Unlike Kaṇadā, for us, action is not only of one kind, [which is] movement.

Read together these two passages give the impression that for Kumārila actions could be both of mental and physical nature. This might have inspired Maṇḍana Mīśra to reinterpret Kumārila’s “cessation of inactivity” as follows:

audāsīnyavicchedo hi karotyārtha udāsīne kriyājñānābhāvāt. audāsīnyapracyuteś ca dvaidham ātmani prayatnād anyatra rathādau parispondāt. BhāVi_{GI}, p. 91.

For, the detachment from inactivity is the meaning of [the finite verb] ‘do’. This is because in a state of inactivity no action is cognised⁴³. And the cessation of inactivity is of two kinds due to volition in the self and [physical] movement elsewhere as in a chariot, etc.

Thus, the interrelation between Kumārila and Maṇḍana’s understanding of *bhāvanā* may be represented as follows:

Kumārila: *bhāvanā* = *prayojakavyāpāra* = *audāsīnyapracyuti*

prayatna parispanda } Maṇḍana

It is to be remembered in this connection that both Kumārila and Maṇḍana claim *bhāvanā* to be over and above the meaning of the verbal root. A verbal root too denotes an action. For example, the verbal root *pac-* in the finite verb *pacati* denotes the act of cooking. Now, if *bhāvanā* were the action of the instigating agent then such actions as placing a vessel on the stove, etc. would be counted as *bhāvanā* and hence the distinction of *bhāvanā* from the meaning of verbal root would be superfluous. Moreover, if *bhāvanā* had a volitional nature, then the meaning of the verbal root *yaj-* which means the vow to sacrifice and hence comes very close to volition would be *bhāvanā* and in that case the meaning of the verbal ending in the finite verb, *yajate*, could hardly be distinguished from the meaning of the verbal root *yaj-*. Although Kumārila encountered this objection⁴⁴ and said in reply⁴⁵ that even if such a position of the opponent is accepted yet there is no fault in so far as *bhāvanā* is understood as that which is common to all specific instances of actions, yet

⁴³ Although Freschi (2013:163) translates ‘*kriyājñānābhāvāt*’ as “neither action nor cognition”, yet I have preferred to understand it as an instance of *śaṣṭhītatpuruṣasamāsa* and hence as leading to the meaning of the absence of any cognition of action.

⁴⁴ *nanu ca yadi prayojakavyāpāro bhāvaneṣyate, tataḥ pacāv adhiśrayaṇādīni yajau ca mānasaḥ saṅkalpa ityādīnāṃ bhāvanātvaṃ, ta eva ca dhātvartha itī dhātuvācyaiva bhāvanā syāt. TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 349.*

⁴⁵ *naiṣa doṣo -*

dhātvarthavyatirekeṇa yady apy eṣā na lakṣyate/ tathāpi sarvasāmānyarūpeṇānyāvagamate// TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 349.

Kumārila does not explain exactly how is it so and why ultimately is it distinct. The only thing which Kumārila says is that the fact of some form of activity being invariably and commonly understood in case of all kinds of verbal roots proves that *bhāvanā* is over and above the specific instances of actions conveyed by them which are mutually distinct. To explain: although a series of distinct micro-actions in the form of placing a vessel on the oven, etc. is understood from the verbal root *pac-* in *pacati*, yet in all these cases, one has the common understanding of ‘someone doing something’. This holds equally true for the verbal root *yaj-*. Thus, it is this unwavering common understanding of sheer “doing” which, according to Kumārila, puts *bhāvanā* over and above the specific form of actions denoted by the verbal root. In support of Kumārila’s contention it may be observed here as follows: if *bhāvanā* is the common element in all kinds of actions and is thus akin to the class notion (*jāti*) which is present in all specific individuals (*vyakti*), why should it not be accepted as being over and above the specific actions denoted by the verbal root? For, *jāti* too is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers as being over and above the individual instances (*vyakti*) in so far as the latter are many and ephemeral, while the former is one and eternal.

In BhāVi of Maṇḍana Mīśra, we come across a more detailed and sophisticated critique of Kumārila’s theory of *bhāvanā*. The main objection⁴⁶ of the objector⁴⁷ there is as follows: there is no movement over and above conjunctions and disjunctions and one only infers action on the basis of such conjunctions and disjunctions. Now, since what the verbal root conveys is nothing more than such a quality of conjunction and disjunction and it is enough to explain what we see, no category of action is needed which is separate from the said quality and which is denoted by the verbal root or the finite verbal ending. As this argument goes against an admission of the Vaiśeṣika category of action (*karman*) distinct

⁴⁶ For details, see Freschi (2013) and Ollett (2013).

⁴⁷ This objector may be understood to be some Vaiyākaraṇa who subscribes to the view of the pre-Jaimini Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Bādari, according to whom there is no action over and above conjunctions and disjunctions. This is evident from the objector’s appeal to Bādari in BhāVi_{GI}, p. 41. That some Vaiyākaraṇas held a view akin to Bādari’s is known from the following line of Prabhākara Mīśra’s Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.1.1:

nanu ca tatra bhavanto vaiyākaraṇāḥ kecit kartāram eva adhikṛtaṃ manyante. yo yasmīn kartṛtayā ’vagamyate sa tatrādhikṛta iti vadantaḥ. nādhikāro nāma kaścid arthāntarabhūtaḥ. sa ca kriyayā sambadhyata iti manyante. brāhmaṇādayaś ca kartṛtayā ’vagamyante smṛteḥ - dvijātīnām adhyāyananam iḥyādānam iti. karṣṇāṃ ca phalakaḥpanā ātmanapadādiliṅgaiḥ. ayam eva cāsau bādariḥpakṣaḥ. Bṛ_V, p. 14.

Well, some of you, venerable Sirs, grammarians, who say that he who is understood as the agent in regard to something is eligible for it, think that it is the agent alone who is eligible. There is no separate thing called eligibility. [You] think that he (the agent) is connected to action. From the Smṛti text – “Study, sacrifice, donation [are duties] of the twice-born” – it is understood that brāhmaṇa, etc. are agents. The assumption of result for the agents [is made] through marks such as the *ātmanepada* [form of the verb]. This indeed is that thesis of Bādari.

from the qualities of conjunction and disjunction on one hand, it also militates against Kumārila and Maṇḍana's view of *bhāvanā* being over and above the action denoted by the verbal root⁴⁸. Maṇḍana criticises this view by observing that conjunctions and disjunctions are just effects of actions and hence the notion of action must not be abandoned on the ground of being reducible to conjunctions and disjunctions. If it were otherwise, then one would be led to the undesirable consequence of understanding a tree as undergoing conjunction and disjunction due to a bird sitting on it and then flying away from it respectively⁴⁹.

Next, Maṇḍana encounters a different objection⁵⁰: if *bhāvanā* is not the same as action, then it should be nothing but volition (*prayatna*) and in case of unconscious agents it is this volition which is referred to metaphorically. But Maṇḍana says, due to the abundance of usage of the verbal ending with regard to unconscious entities, it cannot be said that volition is metaphorically attributed to them. Maṇḍana tries to find a solution by bringing in Kumārila's definition of *bhāvanā* as *audāsīnyapracyuti* or "detachment from inactivity" and reinterpreting it, as already noted above, as being of two kinds, viz. volition (*prayatna*) and movement (*parispanda*). While volition works in case of conscious agents, movement is a fine way for explaining such usages as "a chariot goes". In this way, Maṇḍana can explain such statements as "a chariot goes" without subscribing to his opponent's reduction of *bhāvanā* to volition and for that reason, accepting metaphorical usages in such cases as a matter of that. Maṇḍana says:

*tathā hi - prayatnavantaṃ yatamānam ātmānam anudāsīnam kurvāṇam
vyāpāravantam avaiti parisvandamānam cānyam. ataḥ prayatnaparispandayor
audāsīnyavicchedasāmānyāṃśarūpayos tadavabhāsadhīviṣayatvena
kriyāpadārthatvān na ātmakarṭreṣu tadabhāvaḥ.* BhāVIGJ, p. 91.

To explain: one understands the self, endowed with volition, as being engaged in activity and other [things like the chariot in the statement "a chariot goes"] as moving. Therefore, since volition and movement, which have the form of the general aspect of detachment from inactivity, form the content of the cognition of

⁴⁸ For the Vaiśeṣika view of action, see Sen (2008). For the influence of the Vaiśeṣika view of action on and its relation to the Bhāṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā*, see Freschi (2010, 2013).

⁴⁹ As pointed out by Freschi (2013:162), this discussion is summarily reused by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in NM_{Mys.-1}, pp. 353-354. A similar discussion is found in *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara (991 AD); see NK_{DI}, pp. 460-462).

⁵⁰ This objection might have its source in some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika work because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider *pravṛtti* or volition to be the initiation of mental, verbal and physical activities. See NS 1.1.17.

the appearance [of action], is the category of action. Hence there is no absence of it (action) in [efforts] of which the self is the agent.⁵¹

Freschi's observation on this passage is worth quoting:

“In sum, *kriyā* acquires a wider meaning than *karman* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It designates also mental acts, it stresses the *undertaking* of all sorts of acts, and it designates metaphorically movements of unconscious agents.”⁵²

Coming to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, we find that although in his presentation and reference to the *bhāvanā* theory throughout NM, *bhāvanā* is repeatedly glossed as *puruṣavyāpāra*, yet it is also glossed, albeit less frequently, as *vyāpāra*, *bhāvakavyāpāra*, *karṭṛvyāpāra*, *prayojakavyāpāra*, *puruṣapravṛtti*. It is not clear whether by the word *pravṛtti* Jayanta's Bhaṭṭa opponent exclusively means *prayatna* or effort much in the fashion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika quality of the self called *kṛti* or volition, or whether this alternation is intentional being aimed at an accommodation of Maṇḍana's view of the verbal suffix denoting both activity and effort. Again, since Jayanta's Bhaṭṭa opponent clearly distinguishes between the awareness of being instigated and external physical activity while deliberating upon the need for accepting an exhortative verb-form, it may be conjectured that the word *vyāpāra* in *puruṣavyāpāra* may refer to mental activity and hence its alternation with *puruṣapravṛtti* holds water. This makes further sense in the light of Jayanta's denial in the first book of NM of *bhāvanā* as *puruṣavyāpāra* standing over and above *parispanda*⁵³.

But still another problem persists: *bhāvanā* has been defined at least once as the human activity which pertains to (*tanniṣṭha*) the object to be accomplished (*bhāvya*) like *svarga*, etc. and also that which produces it (*tadutpādaka*). The productive aspect of *bhāvanā* which is clearly suggestive of physical activity makes a strong case for the influence of Maṇḍana's view referred to above. Following Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992:40), it may be observed that external physical activities like sacrifice, etc. are accomplished by the body, sense organs, etc. The mind induces the body, sense organs, etc. However, an inoperative mind cannot induce, just as it does not in the state of deep sleep. Hence a specific activity of the mind as preceding external physical activities like sacrifice, etc. brought about by the body, sense organs, etc. must be accepted. It is in this sense that with regard to the above characterisation of *bhāvanā* as *bhāvvyotpādaka*, the meaning of *vyāpāra* could still be retained as *yatna* or effort or mental activity in as much as such effort or mental activity is an unavoidable causal antecedent of any physical activity of human beings. This

⁵¹ As for how the cessation of inactivity imparts movement to the soul is explained thus by Mazumdar (1977:54-55): “The mind awakens into activity when it comes in contact with the soul. This mental activity may be imagined as a kind of mental motion. Now since it is contact with the soul that imparts activity to the mind, the soul itself may be called as indirectly having the motion.”

⁵² Freschi (2013:164).

⁵³ NM_{Mys.-I}, pp. 48-52.

hypothesis can be further defended in the light of Jayanta’s presentation of the second of the three alternative views on the nature of *bhāvanā* as human effort, by means of which a person’s state of inactivity is interrupted. It is also described as the cause of the accomplishment of activities like sacrifice, oblation, etc. and as being different from the latter⁵⁴. This clearly reminds one of Maṇḍana’s description of the meaning of the finite verb ‘does’ (*karotyārtha*) in BhāVi as “cessation of inactivity” (*audāsīnyaviccheda*) which occurs in two ways, viz. through effort in the self and through motion elsewhere as in a chariot, etc. However, as Elisa Freschi has shown, Maṇḍana himself is heavily indebted to Kumārila’s definition of *bhāvanā* found in TV as “that which is determined as having the form of motion because of sheer interruption of inactivity”⁵⁵, from which inactivity is interpreted by Maṇḍana “rather loosely, in both a physical and mental sense”⁵⁶.

Two more points deserve special attention: First, although *bhāvanā*’s relation to “the interruption of inactivity” is already there in Kumārila, yet from the definition discussed above, it seems that for Kumārila *bhāvanā* leads to movement as the outcome of the “interruption of inactivity” and cannot be identified just with the “interruption of inactivity”. In other words, Kumārila’s text quoted above does not warrant an identification of *bhāvanā* with “the interruption of inactivity”. By contrast, Maṇḍana speaks of “the interruption of inactivity” as taking place as a result of effort (*yatnāt*) in the self (*ātman*) and due to movement (*parispanda*) in other things (*anyatra*) such as a chariot, etc. (*rathādi*). Thus, for Maṇḍana, “the interruption of inactivity” is the outcome of effort or movement. Since Jayanta’s second alternative view of *bhāvanā* discussed above characterises *bhāvanā* as an effort by means of which a person achieves the interruption of inactivity, it can be looked upon as an echo of Maṇḍana’s view of “interruption of inactivity” being the outcome of effort. Again, since immediately after this, it is said that such effort is the cause of the accomplishment of acts like sacrifice, oblation, etc. he seems to reformulate Kumārila’s characterisation stated above. Thus, Jayanta seems to accommodate both the definitions given by Kumārila and Maṇḍana in his presentation. Secondly, although the link between *bhāvanā* and “interruption of inactivity” is already present in Kumārila, yet *bhāvanā*’s ontological status is not stipulated by him. By contrast, on Maṇḍana’s view, “interruption of inactivity” occurs in the self as a result of effort. This might have influenced or inspired Jayanta in carefully characterising the effort called *bhāvanā* to be a property of the self (*ātmadharma*). What is interesting to note in this

⁵⁴ *puruṣasya prayatno vā bhāvanety abhidhīyate/
audāsīnyadaśāpāyaṃ pumān yena prapadyate//
sa yatno yāgahomādikriyānirvṛttikāraṇam/
tasya tadvyatiriktatvaṃ prāyaḥ sarvo ’ numanyate// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 86.*

⁵⁵ *tatra yad audāsīnyapracutyimātreṇa parisparandarūpaṃ nirūpyate sā bhāvanā. TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, 349.*

⁵⁶ Freschi (2013:163).

connection is that in his presentation, Jayanta does not say that the effort called *bhāvanā* is a quality of the self (*ātmaguṇa*), but a property of the self. He further says that although it is a property of the self, yet such an effort is unlike other properties of the self like ubiquity, etc.⁵⁷ As for Jayanta's holding *bhāvanā*, responsible for the "interruption of inactivity", to be a *property* of the self (*ātmadharmā*) and not a *quality* of the self (*ātmaguṇa*), I think, Jayanta is indulging in mere sophistry here. To explain: he seems to make just a terminological difference between *ātmadharmā* and *ātmaguṇa* so that he could avoid the charge of imputing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of *prayatna* or effort being an 'ātmaguṇa' directly. In other words, he wants to avoid the direct use of the term 'ātmaguṇa', which he uses repeatedly in regard to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, and using a closely related term, *ātmadharmā*, in its place with a view to achieving the same result without apparently distorting the Bhāṭṭa view. On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, although there are many qualities of the self, and some of them like ubiquity are eternal, yet on that token not all qualities of the self could be deemed as eternal. Rather, qualities of the self like effort or volition are only accidental and this is justified on the ground that an effort is aimed at a particular result, which forms the object of one's desire. Since desires are transitory and so are their objects, the effort to bring about a particular result too should be transitory or accidental. It is neither eternally present like a generic property (*jāti*), nor is it altogether fictional (*alīka*) like a hare's horn. But since it is connected to something which is to be brought about and is itself accidental, it becomes the object of *śābdabhāvanā* or *vidhi*. In all this, Jayanta seems to partly "Vaiśeṣikize" Kumāriḷa's and Maṇḍana's views on *bhāvanā*, apart from systematising them.

A further point which deserves notice in this regard is that the word *bhāvanā* occurs for the last time in NM 5.2 in the context of Jayanta's examination and denial of the view of sentence-meaning being *udyoga* or "exertion". The relevant passage from NM 5.2 is quoted and translated below:

*apare punar liṅādiśabdaśravaṇe sati samupajāyamānam ātmaspandaviśeṣam
udyogaṃ nāma vākyārtham ācakṣate.*

*tatsvarūpaṃ tu vyaṃ na jānīmaḥ, ko 'yam ātmaspando nāma.
buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskāra hi navātmano
guṇā viśeṣaguṇā bhavanti, nānye. tatrāyam ātmaspando buddhir vā syāt prayatno
vecchādveṣayor anyataro vā? anye tu vikalpayitum api na yuktāḥ.*

*tatra yadi buddhir ātmaspanda ucyate;
tarhi pratibhā vākyārtha ity uktaṃ bhavati. na nūtanam kiñcid utprekṣitam etat.
atha prayatna ātmaspandas;
tarhi bhāvanāyā nāmāntarakaraṇam udyoga iti.*

⁵⁷ *sa cāyam ātmadharmo 'pi na vibhutvādisannibhaḥ/
sādhyaṃrūpābhisambandhād dhatte viṣayatāṃ vidheḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 86.*

athecchādveṣayor anyataro 'sau;
tarhi sukhecchā duḥkhajihāsā vā vākyārtha ity akṣapādapakṣa evāyaṃ nāpūrvam
kiñcit.

athāpi bhāṭṭaparikalpito vyāpāra ātmaspandaḥ;
so 'pi bhāvanaiva nārthāntaram.

athānuṣṭheyah prerakah kaścid artha udyogaḥ;
sa tarhi niyoga eva. upasargānyatvam idaṃ na vastv anyat.

tasmād aśrutapūrveṇa kṛtam udyogaparvaṇā/
sa bhāratamanuṣyāṇām gocaro na tu mādrśām// NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 140-141.

[Jayanta:] But others say that a specific movement in the self called ‘exertion’ which arises when one hears the optative and like [suffixes] is sentence-meaning. We don’t know what the nature of it is. What is this thing called movement in the self? The nine qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, religious merit, religious demerit and subliminal impressions, are the special qualities [of the substance called self] and not others. Of them, should movement in the self, be a cognition, or an effort, or one of the other between desire and hatred. Others are not fit even for being treated as alternatives.

[Proposal by Udyogavākyārthavādin⁵⁸:] Of them, [what] if cognition is said to be the movement in the self?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then it would amount to saying that intuitive flash (*pratibhā*) is sentence-meaning; this is not a new conjecture (on the part of the Udyogavākyārthavādin opponent).

[New proposal by Udyogavākyārthavādin:] Now [what] if effort is [said to be] the movement in the self?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then ‘exertion’ would be the other name for *bhāvanā*.

[Fresh proposal by Udyogavākyārthavādin:] Now, [what] if it (exertion) were one of the other between desire and hatred?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then desire for pleasure or desire to avoid pain would be sentence-meaning; hence it would be the view of Akṣapāda (the author of the NS) only, and nothing new whatsoever.

⁵⁸ I am using this label for the sake of convenience on the basis of the fact that this opponent in NM 5.2 holds *udyoga* to be sentence-meaning. Cakradhara (NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 46) mentions this as the view of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa and credits him as being the founder of a third school within Mīmāṃsā. The identity of this Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, however, remains to be investigated.

[New proposal by Udyogavākyārthavādin:] [What] if again movement in the self were the activity, postulated by the Bhāṭṭas?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] That too would be *bhāvanā* only, and no other thing.

[Final proposal by Udyogavākyārthavādin:] Now, [what] if ‘exertion’ is something which is to be performed [as well as] the instigator?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then it would be commandment only [which is recognised by the Prābhākaras]; the distinction lies in the prefix [in *udyoga* and *niyoga*, but] it is not a different thing.

Hence, no more of the chapter on ‘exertion’⁵⁹, which is [claimed by its proponent as something] hitherto unheard of. It is known only to people who are steeped in knowledge⁶⁰, but not those who are like me.”

Now, it is to be noted that within this passage the word *bhāvanā* occurs twice. With regard to its first occurrence, *bhāvanā* is identified with *ātmaspanda* (movement in the self) and *prayatna* (effort). In this connection, it is worth remembering that in BhāVi Maṇḍana had interpreted Kumārila’s ‘*audāsīnyapracyuti*’ as consisting of both effort (*prayatna*) and movement (*parispanda*) and reserved self as the locus of the occurrence of the former and inanimate objects as that of the latter. Now, in ViVi⁶¹, Maṇḍana uses the expression ‘*spandāspandasādharāṇyenāudāsīnyapracyutyātmavyāpāramātraṃ bhāvanā*’, which means that *bhāvanā* is sheer activity whose nature is the cessation of inactivity and that such cessation of inactivity invariably applies to both movement and non-movement. Maṇḍana’s change in terminology from ‘*prayatna-parispanda*’ (BhāVi) to ‘*spanda-aspanda*’ (ViVi)⁶² is noticeable. *Aspanda* probably corresponds to *prayatna*, the locus of whose occurrence is the self. In the second of these three views on the nature of *bhāvanā* reported by Jayanta, *bhāvanā* is specifically identified with *prayatna* and *ātmadharmā* and its purpose is stated as *audāsīnyadaśāpāya* or detachment from the state of inactivity. Considering these probable correspondences, Jayanta’s Udyogavākyārthavādin opponent’s identification of *udyoga* with *ātmaspanda* and such *ātmaspanda* with *prayatna*, followed by Jayanta’s identification of such *udyoga* with *bhāvanā*, may be said to strongly suggest influences of both BhāVi and ViVi. However, terminologically *ātmaspanda* comes

⁵⁹ Jayanta here plays a pun on the word ‘*udyogaparvaṇ*’, which generally refers to a specific part of the *Mahābhārata* and here to the view that *udyoga* is sentence-meaning.

⁶⁰ Here too Jayanta puns on the word ‘*bhāratamanuṣya*’, which generally refers to the people of Bhārata, i.e. India, or people well-versed in the *Mahābhārata*. Given the present context it is sarcastically used in its etymological sense of people who are steeped in knowledge.

⁶¹ ViVi_{Go}, p. 27.

⁶² That BhāVi predates ViVi is evident from a mention of it in ViVi_{Go}, p. 76.

closer to ViVi. Based on this, it might be conjectured that the second of these three views is perhaps an allusion to Maṇḍana's view of *bhāvanā* as found in BhāVi and ViVi.

In its second occurrence, the Udyogavākyārthavādin proposes to view *udyoga* as *bhāvanā*, as postulated by the Bhāṭṭas. Two points are to be noted in this regard – first, the word used by Jayanta via his Udyogavākyārthavādin is *bhāṭṭa* and not *bhaṭṭa*, which perhaps suggests his being a follower of Kumārila. Second, if the second occurrence of *bhāvanā* is identified as a '*bhāṭṭa*' view, to whom should the view on *bhāvanā* mentioned for the first time in the context of examination of Udyogavākyārthavādin's view be attributed to? This should perhaps be logically attributed to a person, who despite being not a follower of Kumārila, upholds the theory of *bhāvanā* in some form or the other. All this supports my hypothesis that Jayanta's first understanding, in this context, of *bhāvanā* as being of the nature of *ātmaspanda* and *prayatna*, is based on Maṇḍana's BhāVi and ViVi.

Now, the first of these two views, whose key terms are *kriyāviśeṣa*, *jñātrāntaravyāpāra* and *spandātmakabahirbhūtakriyākṣaṇavilakṣaṇa* might correspond to another alternative characterisation of *bhāvanā* by Maṇḍana in ViVi_{Go}, p. 27, mentioned just before the one referred to above. This other characterisation of *bhāvanā* mentioned in ViVi is '*cetanakarṭṛkātmapyāpārātmaka*'. Comparing both these, the common notion which emerges is that *bhāvanā* is an internal activity of which the conscious self is the agent. The characterisation in ViVi might also correspond to the view of the objector embedded in verse 49 of BhāVi, according to which, *parispanda* or movement has to be accepted even in case internal acts of which self is the agent (*ātmakarṭṛka*), and not *prayatna* or effort. Nārāyaṇa, a commentator of BhāVi, says that the reason for insistence on *parispanda* is that with regard to its action is more clearly established as compared to volition⁶³. Now, since the self is ubiquitous and therefore no movement in it is possible⁶⁴, the *parispanda* or movement should be understood, according to this objector in BhāVi, as being caused by *manas* or the internal organ. But Maṇḍana challenges this on the ground that since the *manas* cannot function without the support of the self, the movement should ultimately be understood as belonging to the self, which is the locus of the *manas*. On this V. P. Bhatta's analysis is worth quoting:

“Siddhāntin (Maṇḍana) states that the self, although not possessing any movement in reality, is considered to possess the movement by convention. Siddhāntin explains that the movement, which inheres in the mind and the body, is regarded as belonging to the self, since the same movement is accomplished through the volitional effort of the self. And this instance is similar to the instance of considering the operation of becoming soft (*viklitti*), which inheres in the rice

⁶³ *yathā parispande sphuṭatarā kriyāprasiddhir loke na tathā prayatne. ata ātmakarṭṛkeṣu parispandena prayojanaṃ tasya eva kriyātvavyāvahārasambhavād iti.* BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 171.

⁶⁴ *nanu sarvagatasya ātmanaḥ kathaṃ parispanda.* BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 172.

grains, as belonging to the sentient agent ‘Devadatta’ etc. The operation of becoming soft etc., despite being inherent in the object such as ‘rice grains’, is considered to belong to the agent ‘Devadatta’ etc. due to the fact that the agents ‘Devadatta’ etc. employ the *kāraṅkas* in accomplishing the operation, i.e. due to the fact that the same operation of becoming soft is produced by the effort (operation) of the agent.”⁶⁵

The third of the three views mentioned by Jayanta may be identified as coming from Kumārila’s response to an objection found in TV. Freschi (2013:156-157) explains the context of this debate as follows:

“... an objector in TV states that according to the definition of *bhāvanā* as the “activity of an inciting [subject]”, activities defined by the verbal root, such as laying the vessel on the fire in the case of cooking, or the mental decision (*mānasa saṃkalpa*) to sacrifice would also count as *bhāvanā*.”

Now, I present the text from TV which hosts this debate:

nanu ca yadi prayojakavyāpāro bhāvanā iṣyate, tataḥ pacāv adhiśrayaṇādīni, yajau ca mānasaḥ saṃkalpa ityādīnāṃ bhāvanātvam, ta eva ca dhātvartha iti dhātuvācyā eva bhāvanā syāt.

na eṣa doṣa –

*dhātvarthavyatirekeṇa yady apy eṣā na lakṣyate/
tathāpi sarvasāmānyarūpeṇāvagamya*//33// TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1,
in MDĀ_{II}, p. 349.

[Objection:] Well, if *bhāvanā* is accepted as the activity of an instigating agent, then [acts like] placing the pan on the fire, etc. in case of cooking, and mental resolution, etc. in case of sacrifice would [undesirably⁶⁶] be *bhāvanā*.

[Reply by Kumārila:] This is not a fault.

Although this (*bhāvanā*) is not known apart from the meaning of the verbal root, still it is understood as being common to all [specific acts denoted by individual verbal roots].”

Jayanta seems to clarify the above view with the help of the analogy of the general form of a cow (*gorūpa*) and the specific form of a brindled cow (*śābaleyarūpa*). Although this invariable understanding of the general form of ‘being a cow’ with regard to all cows

⁶⁵ Bhatta (1994:236).

⁶⁶ This is an undesirable consequence because all Mīmāṃsakas starting from Kumārila who accept the *bhāvanā* theory would like to have it as separate from the actions denoted by the verbal root.

cannot be shown separately from the specific form of an individual cow, still on that score it cannot be claimed as being non-existent. Similarly although *bhāvanā* as the activity of the instigating agent cannot be shown in isolation from the specific actions denoted by individual verbal roots, yet it cannot be denied, based on our cognition, that such a general activity is commonly associated as the Jayanta's likening of this undeniability of the general form to the self's being the invariable existence of the self in all states of pleasure, pain, etc. hints at a similarity of approach of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophers to establish the existence of the self as the locus of psychological states. Jayanta also specifically mentions that it is because of the presence of this general meaning that one can answer questions like '*kiṃ karoti*' – 'what does he do?', which concern the specific nature of the act which is being done, with sentences like '*paṭhati*' – 'he recites', '*pacati*' – 'he cooks'. The closely related nature of the question and answer is based on the closely related nature of general form of activity called *bhāvanā* understood out of the verbal ending and specific form of an action denoted by the verbal root. It is also to be noted that although Jayanta uses the analogy of the general form of cow, he provides for a caveat that this general form should not be mistaken for the generic property of cowness (*gotva*). This is because cowness is an accomplished thing in the sense that, on the Nyāya view, it is eternally present; *bhāvanā*, by contrast, being an activity directed towards a hitherto unrealised goal, is essentially processual and hence unaccomplished in nature, for, *bhāvanā* is principally understood from the finite verbal endings which express the "active component of a verb"⁶⁷. Thus, *bhāvanā*'s being the general form of activity is to be understood in an essentially active and productive sense as standing in contrast to the accomplished and hence non-active sense conveyed by verbal nouns.

Based on what has been said above, a hypothesis may be advanced that Jayanta's main source for the nature of *bhāvanā* was as much Kumārila's TV as Maṇḍana's BhāVi and ViVi.

4. Source of the understanding of *bhāvanā*

What expresses *bhāvanā*? Can that which expresses it be identified in a firm way based on semantics or syntax? Here Jayanta follows Kumārila⁶⁸ in noticing that the two aspects need to be conjoined. In fact, there are terms that would semantically be fit to express *bhāvanā*, such as action-nouns like *bhūti*, *bhavana* or *bhāva*, all meaning 'becoming', but do not denote any effort. They name the effort or the fact of becoming but do not express it. In

⁶⁷ Freschi (2013:153).

⁶⁸ See Frauwallner (1938).

this first group of terms naming the effort, but not expressing it belong also terms like ‘Śyena’, ‘Ekatrika’, which are proper names of specific ritual actions⁶⁹.

Why are these words which mean ‘becoming’ cannot be action words? Cakradhara explains in NMGBh as follows:

“That *bhāva bhavana bhūti* etc. are not action-words is due to their not expressing any specific activity; or because they do not denote *bhāvanā* as something to be accomplished.”⁷⁰

By contrast, from those words like ‘(one) sacrifices’, ‘(one) donates’, ‘(one) offers oblations’, which at once mean ‘becoming’ and are action-words, the activity⁷¹ called *bhāvanā* is understood⁷². It is indeed by optative and like forms of those words like ‘(one) should sacrifice’, ‘(one) should donate’, ‘(one) should offer oblations’, that such a meaning is expressed⁷³. Thus it has been observed in the ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1:

“From them (action-words expressing activity) the meaning of [verbal roots like] *yaj-* (meaning, ‘to sacrifice’) etc. are understood along with ‘one should bring about’.”⁷⁴

It is not the case that such a human activity is not understood out of the verb ‘he does’, but on account of not being specified by actions such as sacrifice, etc. they do not acquire the fitness for performance. It is thus proved that it is out of qualified words such as ‘one

⁶⁹ *bhavanti kecid bhāvārthā ye na karmaśabdā yathā bhāvo bhavanaṃ bhūtir iti. bhavanti ca kecid ye karmaśabdā na bhāvārthā yathā śyenaikatrikādayaḥ karmanāmadheyatayā prak samarthitāḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 85.

⁷⁰ *akarmaśabdatvaṃ caiṣāṃ bhāvo bhavanaṃ bhūtir ityādīnāṃ karmaviśeṣavācakatvābhāvān niṣpādyena rūpeṇa bhāvanāyā anabhidhānād vā.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 59.

⁷¹ I have rendered the word ‘*kriyā*’ here as ‘activity’ and not ‘action’, which is normally my choice for the translation of *kriyā*. This is because at the end of this discussion when it is conclusively asserted that it is only from this special kind of ‘existential-cum-action words’ (*bhāvārtha karmaśabda*) that *bhāvanā* is understood, it (*bhāvanā*) is described as ‘*puruṣavyāpāra*’ or ‘human activity’ (emphasis mine) which is ‘*anuṣṭheya*’ or fit to be performed. Given that according to Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic rules, the end of a text cannot be different in purport from its beginning, the word ‘*kriyā*’ is understood by me as having been used in the sense of ‘*vyāpāra*’ or activity. For a historical discussion on how the original Śābarean use of *bhāva* and *kriyā* as “possible substitutes of *bhāvanā*” gets modified in the hands of Kumāriḷa, who “singles out *bhāvanā* as representing the essential structure of all actions...” and “dismisses the other two, *bhāva* and *kriyā*, but by integrating rather than by excluding them”, see Kataoka (2001:10-11).

⁷² *ye tu bhāvārthāḥ santaḥ karmaśabdā yajate dadāti juhōti ity evamādayas tebhyo bhāvanākhyā kriyā gamyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 85.

⁷³ *tair eva liṅādivibhaktiyantaiḥ so ’rtho ’bhidhīyate yajeta dadyāj juhūyād iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 85.

⁷⁴ *tad uktaṃ yajyādyārthaś cāto ’vagamyate bhāvaved iti ca.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 85.

sacrifices’ etc. that the human activity called *bhāvanā* which is fit to be performed is understood⁷⁵.

No one morpheme can be really thought to be the source of our understanding of *bhāvanā*. This is because, if the following is said – without being qualified by the verbal root, the sheer *bhāvanā* understood out of the finite verb, *karoti* – ‘does’, is not fit for being performed, i.e., accomplished and hence, only specific words like *yajeta*, etc. can express *bhāvanā* – then this is not true. For, even though the above examples may be used to underline the influence of the verbal root on an understanding of *bhāvanā*, yet verbal nouns like ‘*pāka*’ (cooking), etc. could be shown as counter-examples, where despite the presence of the verbal root, *pac-*, *bhāvanā* is not understood. Therefore, the objector in NM 5.2 claims that *bhāvanā* is not expressible by the verbal root. In reply, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says that if on that score, the finite verbal ending is claimed to express *bhāvanā*, then he may show a counter-example in the form of such verbs as *bhavati*, where despite the presence of the finite verbal ending, *-ti*, *bhāvanā* is not understood. Hence, *bhāvanā* would not be understood of the verbal ending too⁷⁶. Therefore, the Bhāṭṭa concludes that it is rather better not to try to determine which part of a finite verb expresses *bhāvanā*⁷⁷. By all means, *bhāvanā* is established as being understood either from the verbal root or from the verbal ending⁷⁸. But this must be ultimately understood as highlighting the need for “actions-words that express activity”, such as *yajeta*, *dadyāt*, *juhūyāt*, etc. for a proper understanding of *bhāvanā* as fit for performance. In other words, one should not understand either the verbal root or the finite verbal ending, in isolation from each other, as fixedly denoting *bhāvanā*. It seems that only those kinds of verbal roots which denote the name of an action and also activity, when in combination with finite verbal endings of the exhortative type, that denote *bhāvanā* as something to be accomplished. Although mostly all types of verbal endings are claimed to express *bhāvanā*, yet the need for more specifications, viz. the exhortative form of verbal endings, together with verbal roots that express specific actions like sacrifice, going, reading, etc., cannot be denied. It is for this reason, perhaps, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2, just like Kumāriḥ himself⁷⁹, does not specify any

⁷⁵ *karotiśabdād api kevalāt karṭṛvyāpāro na nāsāv avagamyate sa ca yāgādikarmaṇā ’nanurakto na prayogayogyatām pratipadyata iti viśiṣṭebhya eva yajatyādiśabdebhya bhāvanākhyo ’nuṣṭheyaḥ puruṣavyāpārah pratīyata iti siddham.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 86.

⁷⁶ *pākādiśabdebhya dhātau saty api tadapratīter na dhātuvācyatvaṃ bhāvanāyā iti ced bhavatyādau tarhi saty api pratīyate tadapratīteḥ pratīyavācyatvam api na syāt.* NM_{Mys.-II} p. 87.

⁷⁷ *tad alam anena nirdhāranaprayatnena.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87.

⁷⁸ *sarvathā dhātor vā pratīyād vā bhāvanā ’vagamyata iti siddham.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 87.

⁷⁹ Cf. The following verse –

*bhāvanā gamyamānā ca dhatupratīyayasannidhau/
kasya vācyeti vispaṣṭam na kadācit pratīyate//* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 345.

one morpheme, which, in dissociation from other necessary morphemes, could fixedly express *bhāvanā* in its aspect of something to be accomplished. This will become clearer from the discussion presented in the following section.

5. Classification of *bhāvanā*

It has been stated above that *bhāvanā* is understood out of language. Adding further specification to it, it must be said that *bhāvanā* is understood out of sentences that have optative and like verb forms. The Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says that two types of *bhāvanā*-s are understood out of such sentences; they are *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*⁸⁰.

Out of them, *arthabhāvanā* is of the nature of an instigating activity that is additional to the meaning of the verbal root⁸¹. It has for its content the agent of the action of becoming; it resides in a human being and is an instigating activity; with regard to it, the agent of the action of becoming such as *svarga* and the like becomes the content⁸².

By contrast, the instigating activity that pertains to the exhortative suffixes, in respect of which human undertaking of action is the goal to be accomplished, is what is called *śabdabhāvanā*. In this connection, a verse from Kumārila Bhāṭṭa's TV is quoted, according to which it is optative and like suffixes that speak of *abhidhābhāvanā*, which is another name for *śabdabhāvanā*⁸³. The other half of this verse of Kumārila's, which is not quoted by the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2, asserts the contrasting character of *arthabhāvanā* being perceived in all kinds of tenses and moods⁸⁴.

It is further claimed by the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 that just as on hearing an optative verb form, a person understands his own activity to be specified by sacrifice, etc., likewise he has an understanding of the form 'I am impelled to performed that'⁸⁵.

Once there is proximity between the verbal root and the verbal ending, *bhāvanā* that is cognised, is not clearly understood as being the referent of which [of the two parts, verbal root or the verbal ending].

⁸⁰ *iha hi liṅādiyuktavākyaṣu dve bhāvane pratīyete śabdabhāvanā arthabhāvanā ca iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

⁸¹ *tatra arthabhāvanā tāvad dhātvarthaprayojakavyāpārātmikā darśitā eva.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 86.

⁸² *yo bhavanakriyākartṛviṣayaḥ prayojakavyāpāraḥ puruṣastho yatra bhavanakriyāyāḥ kartā svargādīḥ kartām āpadyate so'rthabhāvanāśabdena ucyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

⁸³ *abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ/ TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 344.*

⁸⁴ *arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyāteṣu gamyate.* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 344. Kumārila uses the term '*arthātmabhāvanā*', which is the same as *arthabhāvanā* and other late popular designations as *ārthabhāvanā* and *ārthībhāvanā*.

⁸⁵ *liṅāntaśravaṇe hi yathā yajyādyavacchinnaṃ svavyāpāraṃ puruṣo 'dhigacchati tadā tadanuṣṭhāne preriote 'ham ity apī pratipadyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

On that score, since exhortative suffixes have the capacity not only to communicate the object to be accomplished, but also to impel a person, sentences with optative and like verb forms are accepted as communicating of two kinds of *bhāvanā*-s or ‘bringing into being’⁸⁶. Thus *arthabhāvanā* is human activity, and *śabdabhāvanā* is the activity of optative and like verb forms⁸⁷. Due to its nature of being the activity of language *śabdabhāvanā* is denoted by language⁸⁸. Since without being understood, *śabdabhāvanā* cannot become a part of action, it is also denoted by language⁸⁹. In this regard, a verse is quoted which speaks of the dual functions of optative and like verb forms of communicating *śabdabhāvanā* and denoting and doing *arthabhāvanā*⁹⁰.

For Kumāriḷa, all verbal endings⁹¹ denote human activity and such human activities are directed towards the accomplishment of specific goals or results. From linguistic cognitions that arise when we hear expressions like, “he cooks”, “he reads”, “he goes”, it is a human activity which is invariably understood. It is verily this human activity⁹² which is called *bhāvanā* by Kumāriḷa. As this is epistemologically presented to us, so can it be deducted grammatically. To illustrate: the Sanskrit finite verb ‘*pacati*’ (he cooks), ‘*gacchati*’ (he goes), etc. can be paraphrased as ‘*pākaṃ karoti*’ (he does cooking),

⁸⁶ *tenānuṣṭheyārthapratipādana iva prerāṇāyām api śabdasya sāmāthyād bhāvanādvayapratipādakaṃ liṅādiyuktaṃ vākyam iṣyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

⁸⁷ *tataḥ puruṣavyāpāraś cārthabhāvanā śabdavyāpāraś ca śabdabhāvanā ’vagamyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

⁸⁸ *śabdavyāpārātmakatvāc ca śabdabhāvanā śabdenābhidhīyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

⁸⁹ *anavataḡā ca satī na kāryāṅgam iti śabdena sā ’bhidhīyate ’pi.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

⁹⁰ *tad uktam – abhidhatte karoti ca.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98. My lines are based on the following interpretation of the verse by Prabal Kumar Sen – “*ejānya balā haiyāche – “abhidhatte karoti ca” (arthāt liṅprabhṛti pratyay śabdabhāvanār jñāpak ebaṅ arthabhāvanār abhidhāyak o kārak – ei ubhayayī haiyā thāke).*” See Sen (2013:131).

⁹¹ Based on TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 345, Diaconescu (2012:276) notes that according to Kumāriḷa, “even in the case of a root ending in a *kṛt* affix, *bhāvanā* is only partially understood from the affix. Not only finite verb forms express *bhāvanā*, but also verbal nouns such as *bhoktavyam*, *paktavyam*, or words formed with *kṛt* affixes like *pakvaḥ*, *pakvavān*, *pācaka*, etc.”

⁹² Although opinions differ as to the precise nature of *bhāvanā*, yet since Jayanta or his Bhāṭṭa opponent understands *bhāvanā* in NM (e.g., NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 52; NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 69, 83, 86, 98) generally as ‘*puruṣavyāpāra*’, I have preferred to translate the term as ‘human activity’. It is also described in NM 5.2 twice as ‘*karṭṛvyāpāra*’ or ‘agential activity’ (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 101, 105) and once as ‘*bhāvakavyāpāra*’ or ‘activity of the producer’ (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 82). Be it mentioned herein that depending upon Kumāriḷa’s interpreters this activity may be variously understood as of a mental nature such as effort (*prayatna*), or physical activity (*vyāpāra*), or both, or specific instances of either of them. Thus, Maṅḡana interprets *bhāvanā* as both effort and physical activity grouped under the common concept of ‘the cessation of inactivity’ (*audāsīnyapracyuti*), Pārthasārathi Mīśra understands *bhāvanā* to be a specific activity (*vyāpāraviśeṣa*). According to Someśvara Bhāṭṭa, *bhāvanā* is nothing but effort (*prayatna*). For Khaṅḡadeva, it is specific effort (*prayatnaviśeṣa*) which is *bhāvanā*.

‘*gamaṇaṃ karoti*’ (he does going), etc. In all these instances of paraphrase, the meaning of the verbal root differs but the finite verbal ending paraphrased as ‘*karoti*’ (does) remains constant. Unlike Śabara, Kumārila, as mentioned by Elisa Freschi, “stressed the productive component of the *bhāvanā* by paraphrasing it with the verb “to do” (*karoti*).”⁹³ This constant meaning of ‘does’ represents human effort or *bhāvanā*. Given that in Sanskrit one may answer to the question, *kiṃ karoti* (what does he do?) with ‘*pacati*’, ‘*gacchati*’, etc. which can be further paraphrased as above, the meaning of the verbal root is said to specify the scope in regard to which human activity takes place. But with regard to such intransitive verbs as ‘*asti*’ (is), ‘*bhavati*’ (becomes), etc. Kumārila says that the finite verbal endings in them convey an activity which is merely the accomplishment of the very existence of the agent. He is of the further opinion that given that an agent has already been established by such intransitive verbs, the finite endings of transitive verb-forms like “he sacrifices”, “he donates”, “he recites”, “he goes”, etc. signify the accomplishment of something other than the agent⁹⁴. This is because with regard to such finite intransitive verb-forms, the verbal root, which generally serves to specify the domain of one’s activity, does not signify anything external to the agent. By contrast, the verbal root of transitive finite verb-forms signifies something external to the agent as the domain of one’s activity which awaits accomplishment. This is further understood from the fact that in reply to the question, “What does he do?”, one says something like “he recites”, “he sacrifices”, “he goes”, “he donates”, etc. but not “he is”, “he becomes”, etc. According to Kumārila, the transitive finite verb-forms, the finite verbal ending of which can be paraphrased as “he does” (*karoti*) convey the activity of an agent, whose coming into being has already been established by the intransitive finite verb-forms⁹⁵. In this sense, the finite intransitive verb-forms may be deemed to be the stepping stone to the understanding of activity of an already established agent aimed at something other than the agent. Viewed from another angle, it transpires that ‘doing’ applies to those things which have not yet come into being, whereas ‘becoming’ to those things which have already come into being. It is with this specific characteristic that Kumārila says that that which exists forever like the sky and that which never exists like the sky-flower cannot be ‘produced’. Thus, he clearly excludes eternal and fictional entities from the purview of ‘doing’, i.e., bringing about. This exclusion is

⁹³ Freschi (2013:155).

⁹⁴ The way such an accomplishment is done will become clear in the immediately following line.

⁹⁵ *iha kebhyaścid dhātubhyaḥ parā tiivibhaktir uccāryamāṇā kartrātmalābhamātram eva vyāpāraṃ pratipādayati yathā ’stibhavatividyatibhyaḥ. aparebhyas tu siddhe kartary anyātmalābhaviṣayavyāpārapratītiḥ. yathā yajati dadāti pacati gacchati. (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 341) – “In this regard, the finite verbal ending which occurs after certain verbal roots like ‘*asti*’ (he is), ‘*bhavati*’ (he becomes), ‘*vidyate*’ (he exists), communicate the activity which [consists] merely [of] the agent’s accomplishment of his [own being] only. By contrast, given that the agent has been already established [in case of ‘*asti*’, etc.], there [occurs] the cognition of the activity regarding the accomplishment of the being of something other [than the agent] from other [verbal roots] as in ‘*yajati*’ (he sacrifices), ‘*dadāti*’ (he makes a sacrificial donation), ‘*pacati*’ (he cooks), ‘*gacchati*’ (he goes).”*

fundamental not only to Kumārila’s way of understanding how Vedic injunctions work, but also, as will be noted shortly below, to core Mīmāṃsā encapsulated in MīSū 1.2.1. As Frauwallner very insightfully observes:

“The object of every making is therefore the subject of a becoming. From this results a relation between making and becoming. Every doing causes a becoming, which corresponds to it. And the making can therefore also be called the activity of an instigating agent (*prayojakakriyā*), the becoming as a corresponding activity of the induced (*prayojyakriyā*).”⁹⁶

Mazumdar’s observation is worth quoting here:

“The difference between the transitive and the intransitive verbs does not relate to *bhāvanā* itself which is common to both. The meaning of the verb in both the cases should figure as the instrumental adjective of *bhāvanā*. Hence the grammatical difference between the transitive and the intransitive is to be understood by conventionally agreeing for the time being to withdraw our notice from the aspect of *bhāvanā*. In the case of a transitive verb we invariably get an explicit karma necessarily related to it. But in the case of an intransitive verb the karma does not directly figure in understanding. We cannot fix it necessarily as – it is the karma. It does not come forth in the sequential apprehension of the explicit sentence. Yet out of context we may extract an appropriate karma of *bhāvanā* in appropriate cases. So in *akarmakadhātu* the karma is unfolded through a long contextual chain (*pāraparyeṇa*).”⁹⁷

But Kumārila seems not to maintain a fixed position regarding the denotation of *bhāvanā* by the finite verbal suffix attached to intransitive verbal roots (*akarmakadhātu*). For example, in such expressions as ‘*ghaṭo bhavati*’ – “a jar becomes”, the activity of the causative agent is implied (*ākṣipta*)⁹⁸ and consistent with this the said expression has to be reinterpreted, as Mazumdar (1977:49) says, as “*kumbhakāraḥ ghaṭam bhāvayati*” – “the potter-man brings about the jar”. Again, Kumārila says later that even in case of intransitive verb-forms like *asti*, *bhāvanā* is present in so far as the agent’s coming into being is to be partially accomplished; but since the agent is not subsidiary to anything else,

⁹⁶ “Das Objekt jedes Machens ist also Subjekt eines Werdens. Daraus ergibt sich eine Beziehung zwischen Machen und Werden. Jedes Machen veranlasst ein Werden, das ihm entspricht. Und das Machen kann daher auch als veranlassende Tätigkeit (*prayojakakriyā*) bezeichnet werden, das Werden als entsprechende veranlassende Tätigkeit (*prayojyakriyā*).” Frauwallner (1938:222). I am grateful to Anja Vukadin, M.A. student of the University of Vienna for very kindly translating Frauwallner’s article into English for me.

⁹⁷ Mazumdar (1977:48-49).

⁹⁸ Kumārila’s line in this regard is the following: *kadācid ākṣiptaprayojakavyāpāraṃ prayojavyāpāramātraṃ ghaṭo bhavati, viklidyanti taṇḍulā iti* (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 343) – “Sometimes, in case of the mere activity of the instigated agent, the activity of the instigating agent is implied [as in] the jar becomes, the rices soften.”

bhāvanā does not manifest itself prominently in such cases⁹⁹. Regarding the agent's not being subsidiary to anything else, Diaconescu's observation is worth quoting:

“The point here is the following: considering that an action is accomplished by an agent with a view to a result, the action may be regarded as subsidiary to an agent and object (result). In intransitive verbs such as *asti*, the agent is identical with the object, so the action is subsidiary only to the agent, who is not yet complete.”¹⁰⁰

Once again, according to Kumārila, in case of such Vedic statements as ‘*rathantaram bhavati*’, etc. the apparently intransitive verb ‘*asti*’ is not used to describe the mere the existence of the *rathantara*¹⁰¹ but what is meant is that such *rathantara* should be brought about, i.e., sung¹⁰².

This discussion on the denotation of *bhāvanā* by finite verbal endings occurring after intransitive verbal roots may be concluded with the following pertinent observation by Frauwallner (1938:223):

“Thus, it appears that Kumārila did not come to a clear opinion on this question, and this is understandable insofar as this very question was irrelevant for the explanation of the Vedic prescriptions, since no verb of becoming occur in them (cf. p.381, 20-28). But he seems to have been more inclined to the view that the *bhāvanā* is to be assumed for all verbs. However, as we have noted above, this is a contradiction to his distinction between the verbs of making and becoming.”¹⁰³

In the foregoing paragraph it has been said that finite verb-forms like *pacati* can be paraphrased as *pākaṃ karoti*, where *pāka* gives the meaning of the verbal root, *pac-* and *karoti* the meaning of the finite verbal ending, *-ti*. However, a problem arises if the finite verbal ending is accepted in the Mīmāṃsā fashion as denoting *bhāvanā*. It is as follows: in finite verb-forms like *karoti* (he does), *bhāvayati* (he brings about), the finite verbal

⁹⁹ *astyādāv api kartraṃśe bhāvye 'sty eva hi bhāvanā/ anyatrāśeṣabhāvāt tu na tathā sā prakāśate//* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 347.

¹⁰⁰ Diaconescu (2012:279, fn. 507).

¹⁰¹ *Rathantara* is a kind of Sāmaveda hymn which is sung in a specific.

¹⁰² *tathā rathantarādiṣu saty api śrutyā bhavanavidhisambandhe tatra sambhavād anumīyamānā bhāvanaiva vidhīyate.* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 348. What is interesting to note here that Kumārila explicitly says that in such cases *bhāvanā* is inferred (*anumīyate*), i.e., it is not linguistically conveyed.

¹⁰³ “Es ergibt sich also, daß Kumārila in dieser Frage zu keiner eindeutigen Stellungnahme gekommen ist, und das ist insofern verständlich, als gerade diese Frage für die Erklärung der vedischen Vorschriften belanglos war, da in ihnen keine Verba des Werdens vorkommen. Doch scheint er nach den erwähnten allgemeiner gehaltenen Äußerungen mehr zu der Ansicht geneigt zu haben, daß die bhavana bei allen Verben anzunehmen ist. Allerdings liegt darin, wie wir oben bemerkt haben, ein Widerspruch zu der von ihm durchgeführten Unterscheidung zwischen den Verben des Machens und Werdens.”

ending ‘-ti’ should also be considered as expressing *bhāvanā* and the verbal root the scope of *bhāvanā*. In that case *karoti* could be paraphrased as ‘*kāryam karoti*’¹⁰⁴, in as much as the finite verb-form, *karoti*, is made up of the verbal root ‘*kr-*’ (meaning, ‘to do’), and the finite verbal ending, ‘-ti’. But semantically this leads to the absurd meaning of ‘he does what is to be done’! Moreover, since the finite verbal ending ‘-ti’ in *karoti* is paraphrased with another *karoti*, this will lead to an infinite regress and hence following the above Mīmāṃsā principle of paraphrase, we will never be able to arrive at a precise and meaningful way of understanding what the finite verb, *karoti*, should express. Kumāriḷa responds to this objection that in such cases the finite verbal ending does not convey any meaning over and above that of the verbal root but only confirms and reiterates (*anuvādamātra*) the latter. Kumāriḷa adds that in such cases any such verbal suffix has to be added to a verbal root, as would reiterate the meaning of the verbal root. This would assist the meaning of the verbal root because, as Kumāriḷa himself says, a use of the verbal root alone would lead to an incorrect form of speech (*aprabhraṃśatvaprasaṅgāt*). Later Mīmāṃsā writers like Anantadeva are of the opinion that the finite verbal ending in such cases are either for the sake of maintaining the correctness of speech, or for expressing the number, agent, etc.¹⁰⁵ This idea has also the support of Sanskrit Grammar. Patañjali¹⁰⁶ reports the convention that a base (*prakṛti*) or a suffix (*pratyaya*) alone should not be used¹⁰⁷.

Kumāriḷa’s view of the verbal endings of finite transitive verb-forms expressing *bhāvanā* immediately triggers the following question: if *bhāvanā* is understood out of all kinds of transitive finite verb-forms, what will be the difference between expressions like “X goes to school” and “X should go to school”? A distinction is certainly grasped in our cognition; it consists in the understanding of X being instigated by someone else (say, Y) to go to school in the second example, which contrasts with the understanding following from the hearing of the first statement in which X is understood as going to school on his own and without being instigated by any external agency. So, it is the regulation of X’s effort towards the act of going which is additionally understood from the second example, and this additional understanding of such regulation of human effort by an external agent is something which is altogether absent in the first example. Further, what would be the difference between such worldly statements as “X should go to school”, and Vedic sentences like “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”? These questions are related

¹⁰⁴ This gloss of ‘*karoti*’ is found in Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent’s discussion of the relevant problem in NM 5.2; see NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 85.

¹⁰⁵ *bhāvayatinā sahākhyātocāraṇaṃ tu sādhutvārthaṃ saikhyādyarthāntarakathanārthaṃ vā*. MNPBhā, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ *athavā samayaḥ kṛto ‘na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na ca kevalaḥ pratyayaḥ’ iti*. MBhā ad Aṣṭ 1.2.64.

¹⁰⁷ For a detailed analysis of Kumāriḷa’s view on which part of a verb expresses *bhāvanā*, see Diaconescu (2012:275-286).

directly to the foundation of Mīmāṃsā and form the very basis of the Mīmāṃsā defence of the validity of the Vedic sacred texts. According to Jaimini’s MīSū 1.2.1 since the Vedas aim at action, any part of the Vedic sacred texts which do not aim at action are superfluous. This aiming at action is to be understood not in the sense of describing a state of affairs about an action, but enjoining someone to bring about a hitherto unaccomplished action. Thus, the Vedic sacred texts constitute an independent instrument of knowledge in so far as they deal with action deontologically and not ontologically. For if it were not so, the Vedas would not be necessary in so far as for the knowledge of “what is” could be obtained through instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, etc. However, unlike the sentence “Go to school!”, where an implied human agent is understood as the instigator, the Vedic injunction, “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice” had to be understood by the Mīmāṃsā philosophers like Kumārila in accordance with the general Mīmāṃsā view of the authority of the Vedas founded on the Mīmāṃsā view of the authorlessness of the Vedas. Thus, for making sense of the impending *bhāvanā* or human activity prescribed in such Vedic injunctions as the one cited above, Kumārila had to invest the Vedic injunctive verb forms themselves with such a deontic force as would provide an explanation for why human beings may make efforts towards the prescribed action upon hearing Vedic injunctions. This deontic force that Kumārila attributes to speech in the form of Vedic injunctive suffixes is called *śabdabhāvanā* or linguistic effectuation. Maṇḍana Mīśra views all the finite verbal endings as denoting *bhāvanā* which is of the nature of both effort (*prayatna*) and activity (*vyāpāra*) and reinterprets Kumārila’s *śabdabhāvanā* as *iṣṭasādhanatā* or the property of being the means of the desired end, as being the denoted meaning of injunctive suffixes. However, Umbeka Bhaṭṭa, who commented both Kumārila and Maṇḍana’s works, accepted *preraṇā* or instigation as the additional meaning expressed by injunctive verbal endings¹⁰⁸. Later Mīmāṃsā authors like Āpadeva are

¹⁰⁸ Although Kumārila spoke of both *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*, yet Maṇḍana, who was probably Kumārila’s most immediate successor, accepted *bhāvanā* or *arthabhāvanā* only in *Bhāvanāviveka*. Furthermore, Maṇḍana explicitly rejected *śabdabhāvanā* in *Vidhiviveka* and sought to reinterpret *vidhi* in terms of *iṣṭasādhanatā*. Now, Umbeka, who commented on both Kumārila’s *Ślokaṅgī* and Maṇḍana’s *Bhāvanāviveka*, seems, I suggest, to have attempted to build a bridge between Kumārila’s two types of *bhāvanā* and Maṇḍana’s clarified understanding of *bhāvanā* / *arthabhāvanā* through a reformulation of Kumārila’s *audāsīnyapracūti* as both effort (*prayatna*) and activity (*vyāpāra*). Umbeka’s strategy for achieving this was probably: i) by reinterpreting *śabdabhāvanā* as being of the nature of *preraṇā* (*preraṇātmikā śabdabhāvanā*) and accepting it as the activity of optative and like suffixes (*linādivyāpāra*) in addition to the general meaning of all finite verbal endings as being *bhāvanā* or *arthabhāvanā*, understood by Maṇḍana as standing for both effort and activity, and ii) by sourcing the understanding of *śreyasādhanatā* / *iṣṭasādhanatā* in the meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvartha*), which is in tune with Kumārila’s view of the expectation for the instrument by *arthabhāvanā* being fulfilled by the verbal root. See pp. 92-94 of the Benares edition (1922) of *Bhāvanāviveka* with Umbeka’s commentary on BhāVi in BhāVi_{GS}, pp. 92-94. It was probably because the sourcing of *iṣṭasādhanatā* in the meaning of the verbal root was not possible in *Vidhiviveka* that Umbeka preferred not to comment on *Vidhiviveka* and wrote an exposition on *Bhāvanāviveka* instead. The points made above may lay bare new ways of understanding and interpreting traditionality and innovation in the ancient Indian intellectual context and hence they need a detailed and separate investigation.

emphatic in underscoring the distinction between *śābdī bhāvanā* or linguistic effectuation in case of Vedic injunctions and the understanding “This person instigates me to reading” on hearing the sentence “You should read”. The latter is identified as desire of the instigating agent.

The very semantic foundation of *bhāvanā*, which literally means ‘bringing about’, triggers the following three expectancies – ‘what’ is to be brought about, which is the expectation for the object; ‘by what’ is the object to be brought about, which is the expectation for the means; ‘how’ is the object to be brought about, which is the expectation for the procedure. A fulfillment of these three expectancies helps realise the very essence of *bhāvanā*. As this applies to *bhāvanā* or *arthabhāvanā*, so it holds good for *śabdabhāvanā* too in so far as the latter too is a particular form of *bhāvanā*. This will be clearer from Section 6 of this chapter.

Śabdabhāvanā is called *bhāvanā* in so much as it produces *arthabhāvanā* or human effort. The other names for *śabdabhāvanā* are *preraṇā* or impelling and *pravartanā* or instigation. In so far as instigation is understood, according to Kumārila, out of the exhortative suffix in a Vedic injunction, *śabdabhāvanā* is also called *vidhi* or injunction. It is by bringing *arthabhāvanā* or *bhāvanā*, i.e., activity of the instigating agent into its fold in terms of being the object of accomplishment that *śabdabhāvanā* or *vidhi* gets related to *bhāvanā*, the general meaning of all verbal endings. The fact that on hearing a Vedic injunction like “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, a person understands that he is instigated by the Veda to perform the sacrifice can be taken as a proof for *śabdabhāvanā* being denoted by the injunctive suffix. This impression become stronger when the said understanding is compared with such statements as “apples are red”, on hearing which a person does not feel instigated. According to Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992:39), for the sake of parsimony in both Vedic and worldly injunctions, the instigating power should be deemed as belonging to speech in the form of exhortative suffixes. This is because in case of worldly injunctions too, the feeling of being instigated occurs only because of hearing the exhortative verb form. And it is on the basis of the feeling of being instigated that one looks for the instigating person and infers that it is his desire that the person should be instigated to do some particular thing. By contrast, since on hearing a non-injunctive statement like “the sun rises in the east”, one does not feel instigated, one does not naturally look for the source of his instigation in an instigating human being and there arises no question of inferring his intention.

Sen has noted how Jayanta here quotes the words “*abhidhatte karoti ca*” from Umbeka’s commentary on BhāVi¹⁰⁹. The said words can be found in BhāVi_{GJ}, p. 93 and p. 94. The first of these two occurrence gives the following sequence of the words: *śabda eva karoty*

¹⁰⁹ Since Umbeka’s *Tātaparyāṭīkā* on Kumārila’s ŚV in its extant form does not extend beyond the chapter on *sphoṭa*, it can only be provisionally said that Jayanta has quoted here from Umbeka’s commentary on BhāVi and not that on ŚV.

abhidhatte ca – “Exhortative words indeed produce and denote [impelling].” The second gives the following sequence: ... *linādiḥ preraṇāviśeṣam abhidhatte karoti ca iti vadanti* – “they say that optative and like suffixes denote and produce specific impelling.” What this change in sequence of denotation and production of impelling might have will be explored in Section 9 of this chapter while dealing with the arguments against *śabdabhāvanā* in NM 5.2.

Although the theory of *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* is clearly Kumārila’s, still the former is mentioned only sparingly in Kumārila’s works. Mention of *śabdabhāvanā* can be found in the following passages:

[a] *iha hi linādiyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete śabdātmikā cārthātmikā ca.* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.2.7, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 12.

For, here in sentences containing optative and like suffixes, two activities are understood – [one] being of the nature of language and [the other] being of the nature of the goal.

[b] *abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva linādayaḥ/ arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyāteṣu gamyate//* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.2.1.7, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 344.

Optative and like suffixes express a different denotative activity; but the other activity which is of the nature of the purpose is understood in case of all kinds of verbal endings.

[c] ... *tatrārthātmikāyām bhāvanāyām linādiśabdānām yaḥ puruṣam prati prayojakavyāpārah sā dvitīyā śabdodharmo ’bhidhātmikā bhāvanā vidhir ity ucyate.* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.2.1.7, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 344.

.... the instigating activity of speech units in the form of optative and like suffixes concerning a person in regard to the activity which is of the nature of the goal, is the second activity (*bhāvanā*). It has the nature of denotation; it is a property of linguistic communication, and is called injunction.

In the three passages cited above, the expressions *śabdabhāvanā* or *śabdī bhāvanā* or *śābdabhāvanā*, which are so common in late Mīmāṃsā manuals like *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa*, *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, *Arthasaṃgraha* are not found. What is rather repeatedly found is *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*, *abhidhātmikā bhāvanā*, *abhidhābhāvanā*. So, it is not clear what exactly *śabdabhāvanā* is. Even its being of the nature of speech (*śabdātmakatva*) does not aid our understanding of its precise nature. This has given rise to the following possibilities regarding the nature of *śabdabhāvanā*: (i) is *śabdabhāvanā* the optative and like suffixes themselves? or (ii) is it the denotative power of those suffixes? or (iii) is it such well-known worldly activities like order, permission, etc.? or

(iv) is it some non-worldly activity pertaining to the optative and like suffixes¹¹⁰? Since the third of these alternatives involves human properties which do not hold good, according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, for the authorless Vedas, I will refrain from discussing it¹¹¹.

(i) **Optative and like suffixes are *bhāvanā***

According to some thinkers, the optative and like suffixes themselves constitute *śabdabhāvanā* in so far as they bring about human effort (*pravṛtti*) or desistance (*nivṛtti*). On this view, in case of worldly injunctions, it is the person who uses optative and like suffixes who is the instigator and in case of the Vedic injunctive sentences, it is the optative and like suffixes themselves which is the instigator. Also, on this view, *arthabhāvanā* or human effort is denoted by the verbal suffix, but not the *śabdabhāvanā*. This is because *śabdabhāvanā* is of the very nature of the optative and like suffixes and hence it cannot denote itself. Being of the very nature of the speech units in the form of optative and like suffixes, and on account of bringing about human effort or desistance it fits with Kumārila's expression, '*śabdātmikā bhāvanā*'.

However, this view is untenable for the following reasons: if the exhortative suffixes themselves were *śabdabhāvanā* and hence the instigator, it would become an action-factor (*kāraka*) and not a communicator (*jñāpaka*). If it were not a communicator needing a 'cognitive element'¹¹² it would not be fit to be an instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) since the functioning of an instrument of knowledge always necessarily entails a communicative function and a cognitive element. This would ultimately put to rest the Mīmāṃsā's claim

¹¹⁰ It was Maṇḍana Miśra who seems to have dealt with these alternatives in a systematic manner for the first time and refuted all of them at the beginning of his *Vidhiviveka*. For a summary of Maṇḍana's discussion see Natarajan (1995:22-34) and David (2013b) and David (2015). Here, I have closely followed Prof. Mani Dravid's succinct discussion on these options based on Someśvarabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyasudhā* in his Sanskrit article, *Bhāṭṭamatena Vaidikavidhyarthavimarśaḥ*, which is awaiting publication in a Festschrift volume. I am thankful to Prof. Mani Dravid for kindly sending me the typescript of his article and permitting me to reuse its content. Apart from its proverbial clarity, what is special about Dravid's article is that it seeks to show how each of these alternatives justify Kumārila's use of *śabdātmikā* as the adjective of *bhāvanā*. However, it is possible that Maṇḍana was not the first to come up with these alternatives, and that they were already circulating in Bhāṭṭa circles and that Maṇḍana might have been the first one to systematically arrange and examine their tenability. In fact, Someśvara (author of the commentary, *Nyāyasudhā*, on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*) also discusses these and other options (including Maṇḍana's theory of *iṣṭasādhanatā*) in a succinct manner within the space provided by a few verses in the *anuṣṭup* meter.

¹¹¹ Although order, permission, etc. cannot apply to the Vedas, yet Maṇḍana Miśra pointed out in his *Vidhiviveka* yet another category viz. *upadeśa* or instruction which could apply to the Vedas and to specific worldly cases as well such as a medical prescription. Hugo David views this as an attempt at achieving a "depersonalization of injunctive discourses". For details of the discussion on *upadeśa* and its connection with *iṣṭasādhanatā* as being the instigator along with an illuminating discussion on a general Vedic and Dharmaśāstric background to it, see David (2013b).

¹¹² I owe this term to Natarajan (1995).

of Vedic injunctive sentences being an independent instrument of knowledge. Secondly, if the exhortative suffixes instigated by their mere presence just like wind, etc. one would always unavoidably act or desist as the case may be on hearing a sentence endowed with an exhortative verb-form. But this is not the case. It would also eliminate the role of human desire in regard to his action. More importantly, in case of such elective rituals (*kāmyakarman*) in which no result is directly heard, the injunction would not need to supply a result in the form of *svarga* any more; for, as already noted above, the exhortative suffix would make one act on its own strength and there would thus be no room for human desire for a beneficial goal based on which the injunction would imply a suitable result. Lastly, since the exhortative suffixes would by their very presence instigate one to action, there would be no need for a prior knowledge of the significative relation existing between them and instigation. This would lead to the undesirable consequence of someone ignorant of a particular language starting to act just by encountering any exhortative statement in that language. A further problem would perhaps be that in the absence of the need to imply a goal, the very tripartite structure of *bhāvanā* would have to be done away with.

(ii) **The activity of exhortative suffixes is *śabdabhāvanā***

On this view, the instigating activity (*pravartanātmaka vyāpāra*) conveyed by the exhortative suffixes and the dissuading activity (*nivartanātmaka vyāpāra*) conveyed by exhortative suffixes in association with a negative particle is what is *śabdabhāvanā*. In the world, such an activity pertains to a person who instigates or forbids another person. In case of the Vedic injunctions, the said activity pertains to the speech unit in the form of the exhortative suffixes. Hence in this case it is the sacred texts in the form of the Vedic corpus which is the instigator. Since such an activity (*vyāpāra*) which is a property of language (*dharma*) is identically related to the property-bearer (*dharmin*), it is '*śabdātmikā*' or 'being of the nature of linguistic communication' and hence fits into Kumārila's definition of this type of *bhāvanā* as '*śabdātmikā bhāvanā*'. Since this linguistic activity is expressed by the exhortative suffixes, it is understood from sentences having an exhortative verb-form. And since on this view it is not exhortative suffixes themselves which instigate, but their activity, the exhortative suffixes retain their communicative character and hence function as an instrument of knowledge (*jñāpakatvalakṣaṇapramāṇatva*). Since instigating sentences are causes of human effort only through the mediation of human desire, and desire does not necessarily arise on hearing an injuntion, there is no question of one unavoidably undertaking the prescribed action on hearing it. This also justifies the need for a prior knowledge of the significative relation between the exhortative suffixes and instigation, since exhortative suffixes give rise to the linguistic cognition of which instigation is the content. Since on this view the crucial role of human desire in regard to human effort is admitted, and desire is always goal-oriented, the way for admitting a suitable result in the form of *svarga* is paved with regard to elective rituals mentioning no specific result.

According to Dravid (2023), there are two sub-views even within this view. According to the first sub-view, the activity of exhortative suffixes consists of nothing but the capacity (*śakti*) called ‘denotation’ (*abhidhā*) conducive to the denotation of *arthabhāvanā*. Although such power of denoting *arthabhāvanā* exists in all types of verb-forms, yet it is the denotative power which pertains to the exhortative suffixes only which is intended to be *śabdabhāvanā*. This justifies Kumāri’s statements mentioned in [b] and [c] cited above. Since the property of denotative power of words is identical with the speech unit in the form of exhortative suffix, the property-bearer, it is fit to be termed as being of the nature of linguistic communication (*śabdātmikā*). The second sub-view is in favour of admitting a non-worldly activity (*alaukika vyāpāra*) pertaining to exhortative suffixes (*linādiśabdaniṣṭha*) over and above the activity of denotation. It is more cumbersome to postulate that such a non-worldly activity pertains to the exhortative suffix (*linādiśabdaniṣṭhatva*), it is denoted by such suffixes (*tadvācyatva*) and it is conducive to human effort (*pravṛtṭyanukūlatva*). Hence it is more parsimonious to postulate that the denotative power which is already established as pertaining to exhortative suffixes (*linādiṣṭhatayā klpta*) is the instigator (*pravartanātva*) and is denoted by the exhortative suffixes (*tadvācyatva*)¹¹³.

Even this view is not immune to defects. To begin with, it is not clear that when the power of denotation is common to all speech-units, why should that pertaining to the exhortative suffixes alone should be intended to be *śabdabhāvanā* and hence the instigator. If there is any specific element in the power of denotation belonging to the exhortative suffixes, then it is that specific element that should be deemed to be the instigator and not the power of denotation itself. Secondly, since the said denotative power is inferred from the effect having the form of comprehension of meaning, it becomes impossible for it to be the denoted meaning of exhortative suffixes. For, this violates the principle that the meaning obtained from linguistic communication is not obtainable from other instruments of knowledge because the denotative power is obtained through the instrument of knowledge called inference. Thirdly, before being denoted by the exhortative suffixes, if the denotative power is already established as being the instigator, then its denotation is superfluous. If the denotative power is not already established as the instigator, any cognition of it as the instigator arising out of exhortative suffixes is bound to be unveridical. This is because it is not known to one that exhortative suffixes express the denotative power which has the form of the instigator.

(iii) A non-worldly activity pertaining to exhortative suffixes is *śabdabhāvanā*

¹¹³ Pārthasārathi Miśra enters into a pertinent discussion as to whether the activity of exhortative suffixes called denotation (*abhidhākhya śabdavyāpāra*) has the form of a knowledge of exhortative suffixes (*linādiśabdajñānarūpa*) or that of the subliminal impressions arising from it (*tajjanyasaṃskārarūpa*). He addresses relevant objections to it and tries to proffer their solution in NRM, pp. 77-86.

This is the view which seems to have been accepted by almost all later Mīmāṃsā writers such as Āpadeva, Laugākṣī Bhāskara, Kṛṣṇayajvā, and neo- Mīmāṃsā¹¹⁴ writers like Khaṇḍadeva. On this view, by virtue of its property of being instigation, instigation (*pravartanātvena rūpeṇa*) is the meaning denoted by the exhortative suffixes and not by virtue of any other property. Although the meaning of exhortative suffixes is understood to be instigation in general, yet it is identified as taking on specific forms like order, permission, inducement, instruction, etc. only later depending upon the context. Since in the case of the Veda the instigating power cannot reside in any human being, as it happens with order and permission, the Vedic *śabdabhāvanā* is defined as the activity (*vyāpāra*) that pertains directly to the exhortative suffixes.

On this view, the word *abhidhābhāvanā* is understood as a genitive endocentric compound (*śaṣṭhītatpuruṣasamāsa*), meaning the bringing about of *abhidhā*. This is because, the word *abhidhā* is understood as being of the nature of language, in accordance with its derivational understanding as that by means of which something is denoted (*abhidhīyate* 'nayā'). Alternatively, *abhidhā* is understood as *pravartanā* or instigation, which is denoted (*abhidhīyate*) by the exhortative suffixes (*linādibhiḥ*); that *abhidhā* or instigation is *bhāvanā* or 'bringing about' in so far as it brings about human effort. Hence the expression *abhidhābhāvanā* should be understood as an instance of a *karmadhāraya* type of endocentric compounds.

6. The *modus operandi* of *bhāvanā*: the tripartite structure of the two *bhāvanā*-s

Bhāvanā which is understood out of optative and like verb forms takes on the form of '*bhāvayet*' or 'one should bring about'. But *bhāvanā* being a human activity is aims at a goal like all other activities. Since a goal is not achievable without an understanding of the means by which such goal is achieved and the procedure to be followed for making the means work properly, *bhāvanā* expects also the latter two. Thus once *bhāvanā* has been understood in the form of 'one should bring about', it immediately triggers the following questions – 'what' should one bring about, 'by what means' should one bring about and 'how' should one bring about? Without a fulfilment of these three expectancies, *bhāvanā*, which is sheer activity, is not fit to be carried out. This is because the fulfilment of these three expectancies helps specify the scope of *bhāvanā* with regard to its object, the means or instrument, and the procedure. Since these three basic expectancies are unavoidable for the human activity called *bhāvanā* to be carried out, these form an integral part of *bhāvanā* and may be understood as imparting a tripartite structure to *bhāvanā*. Thus an awareness

¹¹⁴ On "New Mīmāṃsā", see McCrea (2002).

of *bhāvanā* implies the knowledge of three components: ‘what’ should one bring about; ‘by what means’ should one bring about and ‘how’ should one bring about¹¹⁵.

6.1. *Arthabhāvanā*

6.1.1. The Goal of *arthabhāvanā*

As for *arthabhāvanā*’s expectancy for ‘what’ should one bring about, the answer is provided with the help of an analysis of the paradigmatic Vedic injunction, *svargakāmo yajeta* – “one desirous of *svarga*, should sacrifice.” It is the expression “one desirous of *svarga*” which fulfils this expectation since *svarga* is the thing to be brought about¹¹⁶.

It may be argued that the expression *svargakāma* or ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ refers to a person, and not the result. But according to Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent the real purport of this sentence is to point out the result of the action prescribed¹¹⁷. Being the thing to be brought about, *svarga* is desired, and hence it comes under the fold of ‘what’ in the form of ‘one should bring about *svarga*’¹¹⁸.

6.1.2. The Means of *arthabhāvanā*

As noted above, *svarga* is understood as the thing to be brought about by the action prescribed and as fulfilling the expectation of the “what”. In this connection, one may ask if desire (*kāma*) in ‘*svargakāma*’ should be the object to be brought about by *bhāvanā*. But desire cannot be the object to be brought about by *bhāvanā* because desire occur on their own, that is, independently of human effort. In fact, it is based on one’s pre-existing desire for *svarga* or like that one comes under the purview of an injunction, and one does not desire something on coming under the purview of injunction. It is the very nature of a thing which generates a desire for it in a human being. Hence desire cannot be the thing to be brought about. Hence it is *svarga* which is to be brought about by *bhāvanā*.

Next comes the expectation for the “by what means”. The answer given is that it is ‘by sacrifice’ that one should bring about the goal.

¹¹⁵ *bhāvayed ity avagate nūnam apekṣātrayaṃ bhavati kiṃ bhāvayet kena bhāvayet katham bhāvayed iti.* NM-Mys.-II, 2, p. 88. This is a general statement about the epistemological architecture of *bhāvanā*. However, the details that immediately follow belong to *arthabhāvanā*. Although at this point of Jayanta’s text, it is not specifically understood that this delineation is about *arthabhāvanā*, yet towards the end of the section on *bhāvanā*, when Jayanta analyses the tripartite division of *śabdabhāvanā*, he says that a similar structural symmetry of *arthabhāvanā* has already been mentioned, which is clearly an allusion to this part of the text.

¹¹⁶ *tatra kim ity apekṣā svargakāmapadena pūryate kiṃ bhāvayet svargam iti.* NM-Mys.-II, p. 88.

¹¹⁷ *nanu svargakāma iti puruṣanirdeśo ’yaṃ na phalanirdeśaḥ. satyaṃ svargaparas tv ayaṃ nirdeśaḥ.* NM-Mys.-II, p. 88.

¹¹⁸ *sādhyatvena ca svargaḥ kāmyata iti sa eva hi kim ity aṃśe nipatati svargaṃ bhāvayed iti.* NM-Mys.-II, p. 88.

But to this it is objected as follows: it is ‘(one) should sacrifice’ that is found in the Vedas and not ‘by sacrifice’. Whence does one understand that *svarga* should be brought about “by sacrifice”? More precisely, which component of the verb, *yajeta*, conveys it?

The finite verb, *yajeta*, is made up of a combination of the base (verbal root) and the suffix (finite verbal ending). It has been contended that *bhāvanā* is denoted by the optative suffix. So merely the verbal root *yaj* (meaning ‘to sacrifice’) remains available as a possible candidate for conveying the meaning ‘by sacrifice’. Now, in order to understand that sacrifice, the denoted meaning of the verbal root, *yaj-*, is the instrument, it is necessary to appeal to the third case-marker. This is because, the third case-marker expresses instrumentality. But the third case-marker can only apply to the nominal base, *yāga*, and not to the verbal root, *yaj-*, due to the constraints of Sanskrit grammar. So in the absence of the third case-marker, how could the verbal root, *yaj-*, alone express the meaning of *yāgena* or ‘by means of sacrifice’¹¹⁹?

In reply, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says that in regard to *bhāvanā*, it is the fitness for the specific role to be played by other semantic elements of the injunction which determines in what capacity would each of these other semantic elements will be connected with *bhāvanā*. Since sacrifice, which is denoted by the verbal root, *yaj-*, is fit to fulfil *bhāvanā*’s expectancy for the instrument, it should connect with *bhāvanā* as the means of bringing about the goal of *bhāvanā*, viz. *svarga*¹²⁰. The Bhāṭṭa adds that surely due to formal grammatical constraints the third case-marker, which denotes instrumentality, cannot be added to the verbal root, *yaj-*. But it is due to the unique capacity of speech units for which the sacrifice should be understood as the instrument of *bhāvanā*¹²¹.

Here the opponent asks, what is that speech unit, owing whose unique capacity the sacrifice is understood to be the means¹²²? To this, the Bhāṭṭa answers that it is the unique capacity of the speech units, which express *bhāvanā*, that it should be understood that the sacrifice is the instrument¹²³.

It has already been seen before that *bhāvanā* is human activity and it is the very nature of human activity to be always goal-oriented. Now, when *bhāvanā* is understood out of

¹¹⁹ *nanu yāgeneti na śrūyate kintu yajeteti. tac cākhyātapadaṃ prakṛtipratyayātmakasamudāyarūpam. tatra liṅpratyaṣya bhāvanā vācyety uktam. yaj iti dhātumātram avaśiṣtam. tasya kṛdantasya trītyāntasya yāgeneti yo ’rthaḥ sa katham ekākinā tena pratyāyyeta.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 88.

¹²⁰ *yo hi tasyāṃ yathā sambaddhuṃ yogyas tam asau tathā pratyēṣyati nānyathā iti karaṇākāṅkṣāpūraṇena samabandhayogyo yajir iti tathaivaiṣa bhāvanayā ’bhisambadhyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²¹ *aprātipatiktvād dhi trītyā tatra mā sma bhūt/ śabdāsāmarthyabhyā tu nūnaṃ karaṇatā yajeh//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²² *kasya punaḥ śabdasya sāmartyam etat.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²³ *bhāvanāvācīna iti brūmaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

exhortative suffixes, an additional aspect of *bhāvanā* is understood, viz. that *bhāvanā* or human activity *is to be accomplished*. Since it is impossible to accomplish an activity without further specifications, it necessarily requires such specifications as what is to be brought about, by what means, and in which way. Now, *svarga*, though remotely situated in the Vedic injunction as compared to the verbal root, means supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*). It is in the very nature of such pleasure to be desired by all. And one desires only that thing which one does not have, but which is possible to be obtained. By contrast, although the sacrifice, on account of being denoted by the verbal root, is more proximate to the speech unit which expresses *bhāvanā*, viz. the exhortative suffix, is not desirable. This is because any Vedic ritual action like sacrifice is very complex, laborious, expensive and time-consuming. So human beings naturally do not desire such actions for their own sake. In other words, a person undertakes such actions only by virtue of his understanding that such actions will lead to a desire goal of his. Hence these actions are desirable not as the goal but as the means to the goal. In that case, it becomes imperative for the person to understand that a causal relation obtains between the sacrifice and *svarga*, the object of his desire. Although this causal relation is not denoted by any particular word in the injunction, yet the internal semantics of *bhāvanā* in its aspect of something to be accomplished, together with the basic nature of human beings delineated above, makes possible such an understanding based on the internal computation of the addressee of the injunction. Since ultimately it is based on the understanding of *bhāvanā* in its aspect of being something to be accomplished that follows from the unique capacity of exhortative suffixes, the understanding of the sacrifice as the means is attributed to the unique capacity of the exhortative suffixes.

In continuation of his above reasoning, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 remarks that it is not a king's order that instrumentality has to be denoted by the third case-marker alone¹²⁴. What he perhaps suggests by this is that rules of grammar cannot regulate our understanding of words in Vedic injunctions. Rather, it is the pragmatics of human activity that can override the rules of grammar.

At this point, the objector to the Bhāṭṭa says that because it is understood that instrumentality is denoted by the third case-marker, that it is postulated that the third case-marker expresses instrumentality¹²⁵. What he perhaps means is that the phenomenology of our understanding of something to be the means is what regulates the third case-marker's being denotative of instrumentality. Perhaps it is by observing extensive usage of the third case-marker in the world to mean the instrument, that grammarians had formulated the grammatical rule that the third case-marker expresses instrumentality. Thus, the objector

¹²⁴ *ṭṛtīyayaiva karaṇatvam abhidhānīyam iti neyaṃ rājājñā*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²⁵ *tatas tadavagtes tathābhyugamyate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

asks, why should such a rule be not applicable also to the Vedic injunction under consideration¹²⁶.

In response, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 presents the following counter-argument –

“Is any second case-marker which denotes it (the objecthood) heard with regard to the meaning of the verbal root, whose being something to be accomplished is [claimed to be] understood [by you] from the verb?”¹²⁷

What the Bhāṭṭa means by this is this – just as his opponent may claim that sacrifice is not the instrument on account of an absence of the third case-marker, so could the Bhāṭṭa too say that the objector’s claim of sacrifice being the object of *bhāvanā* is not tenable, because of an absence of the second case-marker, which expresses the grammatical object.

In response, the opponent says that if this is the case, then since the meaning of the verbal root is understood as the thing to be brought about, the sacrifice should come under the purview of ‘what’ and become the object of *bhāvanā*¹²⁸. As for fulfilling the expectancy for the means, it should be the ‘rice’ or ‘barley’ carrying third case-marker in the injunction, *vrīhibhir yavair vā yajeta*¹²⁹ – “one should sacrifice with rice or barley” – that should get connected with *bhāvanā*¹³⁰. This is because, sacrifice cannot take up the distant role of the instrument upon ignoring the very proximate role of being the object which qualifies the optative verbal ending which denotes an activity to be accomplished¹³¹.

In reply, the Bhāṭṭa says that it would have been so were not the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ – ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ available; but since it is heard it cannot be so. This is because ‘*svarga*’ or supreme pleasure has syntactical connection with *bhāvanā* by virtue of its being something to be accomplished. Given that *svarga* has already been construed as the object to be accomplished, the sacrifice can no longer connect as the object, but only as the means of achieving *svarga*¹³². This is because, as already noted above, *svarga* being of the nature of supreme pleasure is desired by everyone and it is therefore capable of

¹²⁶ *evam ihāpi svargakāmo yajeteti tathāvagatir bhavantī kim iti na mṛṣyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²⁷ *ākhyātāt sādhyatā yā ca dhātvarthasyāvagamyate/
dviṭīyā śrūyate tatra kiṃ vā tadabhidhāyini//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²⁸ *nanv evaṃ tarhi dhātvarthasya sādhyatāvagateḥ kim ity aṃśe yajinā patitavyam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹²⁹ ŚaBrā_I 11.3.1.3.

¹³⁰ *kenety apekṣite vrīhibhir ityādi sambadhyatām.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹³¹ *na punar yajih sādhyarūpavyāpārābhidhāyipratyayopasarjanībhūtakarmatām atipratyāsannām anāruhya dūravartinīṃ karaṇatām adhiroḍhum arhati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 89.

¹³² *syād etad evaṃ yadi hi svargakāma iti na śrūyeta, tasmīṃs tu śrute na evaṃ bhavitum arhati. kutaḥ –*

*svarge sādhyatvasambandhād alabdhvā sādhyatānvayam/
yajis tadānugūnyena karaṇāṃśe ca tiṣṭhati//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

fulfilling *bhāvanā*'s expectancy for what should one bring about. From this it transpires that it is the very nature of 'svarga' which compels it to be construed as the object to be accomplished and all other semantic elements of a Vedic injunction are accordingly adjusted and assigned other specific roles. Thus, the Bhāṭṭa says that the apposition of the sacrifice and words, expressing ritual names like *Jyotiṣṭoma*¹³³, which also carry the third case-marker that reiterates the instrumentality of sacrifice makes sense¹³⁴. This is an allusion to the Vedic injunction, *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāma yajeta* – “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*”. Here the word, '*jyotiṣṭomena*' – “by means of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*”¹³⁵, carries the third case-marker which reiterates the role of the sacrifice as the instrument. which are but names of rituals and which reiterate the sacrifice's instrumentality, would make sense¹³⁶. This is because, when names such as *Jyotiṣṭoma* are found mentioned, it immediately triggers a search for the thing which it names. Now that 'svarga' for the reasons delineated above has been fixed as the object of accomplishment thereby staying the possibility of the sacrifice to be the thing to be realised, it is but logical that the word '*jyotiṣṭomena*' bearing the third case-marker should refer to the sacrifice, which serves as the means for achieving 'svarga'.

At this point, the opponent comes up with a counter-example where words such as 'Agnihotra'¹³⁷, as in the Vedic injunction, “One should offer the Agnihotra oblation”¹³⁸, appear to name the thing, i.e., the ritual action in the form of oblation, which is to be accomplished¹³⁹. From the surface structure of the injunction, it seems that it is the oblation called Agnihotra which is to be brought about, for, the second case-marker attached to Agnihotra reiterates the patienthood of the oblation.

¹³³ *karmanāmadheyatvaṃ jyotiṣṭomādīnāṃ śabdānāṃ uktam*. Mysore, Vol. 2, p. 90.

¹³⁴ *sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca jyotiṣṭomādibhiḥ padaiḥ/ evaṃ satyupapadyeta karaṇatvānuvādibhiḥ//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

¹³⁵ ĀŚS 10.2.1.

¹³⁶ This is because, when names such as *Jyotiṣṭoma* are found mentioned, it immediately triggers a search for the thing which it names. Now that 'svarga' for the reasons delineated above has been fixed as the object of accomplishment thereby staying the possibility of the sacrifice to be the thing to be realised, it is but logical that the word '*jyotiṣṭomena*' bearing the instrumental case-marker should refer to the sacrifice, which serves as the means for achieving 'svarga'.

¹³⁷ For a detailed discussion of how words such Vedic sentences as giving the names of rituals like 'Jyotiṣṭoma', 'Agnihotra' are to be understood, see Chapter 3 in Śuklā (1999). For a succinct discussion of the grounds on which a particular word in a Vedic prescriptive sentence is considered as expressing the name of a ritual (*nāmadheya*) and not the sacrificial substance (*dravya*) or deity (*devata*), see Bhāṭṭācāryya (2006: 114-120).

¹³⁸ *agnihotraṃ juhōti*. TaiSa 1.5.9.1.

¹³⁹ *nanu sādhyatvapakṣasākṣitām api karmanāmadheyāni bhajante agnihotraṃ juhōtīti*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

To this, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says that it is a fault; for according to him, the meaning of the verbal root takes up the role of the instrument only after it has become the object to be accomplished¹⁴⁰. To explain¹⁴¹: *svarga* is the ultimate object to be accomplished, and the sacrifice is understood as the instrument of accomplishing it; however, in order to work as an instrument for *svarga*, the sacrifice itself needs to be completed. Hence people undertake the procedural actions to perform a sacrifice in order to ultimately achieve the result of the sacrifice. Thus, since it is such a yet-to-be-done sacrifice that the eligible perform (*adhikārin*) actually does, that for him, it is the immediate object to be accomplished. Once completed, such a sacrifice gives rise to an unprecedented intermediate potency called *apūrva*¹⁴², which subsequently produces *svarga*, the ultimate result. It is only after having been performed that the sacrifice becomes fit to be regarded as the instrument (*karaṇa*) which brings about *svarga*. Since an injunction is about a future event, all understanding of its components like the object to be accomplished (*sādhyā*), the means for accomplishing it (*sadhana*) and the procedure (*itikartavyatā*) are permeated by a notion of unactualised potentiality. Thus, the result is to be understood as the ‘future result’, the means as the ‘future means’. Therefore, also in case of the Vedic injunction, ‘one should offer the Agnihotra oblation’, the act of *homa* or oblation called Agnihotra is the means, otherwise the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’ – “one desirous of *svarga*”¹⁴³ will not obtain a syntactic connection¹⁴⁴.

Now the Bhāṭṭa takes up for discussion the charge by his opponent that it is improper for the sacrifice to take up the distant role of the instrument at the expense of the proximate role of being the object to be accomplishment. In reply to this, the Bhāṭṭa says that such a charge is incorrect, because it is only that syntactical contiguity which is not in contraction with semantic fitness, which is the cause of construal of a word into the injunction, and

¹⁴⁰ *naiṣa doṣaḥ - sādhyā eva bhavan bhāvārthaḥ sādhanatām avalambate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

¹⁴¹ I owe this understanding of the text to my teacher, Mm. Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī.

¹⁴² Kumāriḷa defines *apūrva* as follows:

*karmabhyaḥ prāgayogyasya karmaṇaḥ puruṣasya vā/
yogyatā śāstragamyā yā parā sā ’pūrvam iṣyate//* TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.5, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 364.

The supreme fitness obtainable from the sacred texts [that] the [main] ritual action or the person [who performs the ritual] lacks [in order to yield or enjoy the final result respectively], before [performance of the ritual is completed], is regarded as the ‘unprecedented’.

¹⁴³ Although the opponent cited the Vedic injunction, *agnihotraṃ juhōti*, which is found in TaiSa 1.5.9.1 as a case in support of his contention that even names of rituals can denote the fact that the act denoted by the verbal root is the object to be realised (*sādhyā*), the Bhāṭṭa answered it by implicitly referring to a similar but more elaborate Vedic injunction, *agnihotraṃ juhōti svargakāmaḥ* – “one desirous of *svarga* should offer the Agnihotra oblation”, which is found in the MaiU 6.36.

¹⁴⁴ *tatrāpi hi svargabhāvanāyām agnihotrākhyo homaḥ karaṇam eva, anyathā svargakāmapadānanvayaprasaṅga ity uktam*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

not a one which contradicts it¹⁴⁵. Since *svarga* alone is fit to be the object to be accomplished for the reasons discussed above, it is construed as the object to be accomplished, and the sacrifice as the instrument¹⁴⁶. Thus semantic fitness based on pragmatic considerations is what ultimately regulates the capacity in which the various semantic elements in an injunction have to be construed.

6.1.3. The Procedure in *arthabhāvanā*

Once it has been understood that it is through the actions like sacrifice that results like *svarga* are to be brought about, the next expectancy for the procedure, ‘how to bring about’, arises. It is called *itikartavyatā*¹⁴⁷. Such procedures can be known from the primary sentence itself, from which the eligible performer and the action to be undertaken are also known. As an example of this, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 cites (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 91) the following injunction: *etasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā paśukāmo hyetena yajeta* (TāBrā 17.7.1) – ““One desirous of cattle, should sacrifice with this (by means of the Agniṣṭut) after doing (imposing the tune of) the *sāma* hymns called Vāravantīya pertaining to the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, on the [Ṛgvedic sacred formulas called] Revatī””. This injunction alone communicates the eligible performer (*adhikārin*), the result, the means as well as the procedure. The procedural actions can also be known from other statements. For example, the Bhāṭṭa cites the following injunctions delineating the procedural details of the Full and New-Moon Sacrifices (*Darśapūrṇamāsayaḡa*): ‘*vṛihīn avahanti*’ (ĀŚS 1.19.11) – “one should thresh the rice”, ‘*taṇḍulān pīnaṣṭi*’ (ĀŚS 1.21.7) – ““one should pound the [threshed, unhusked and winnowed] grains”, ‘*samidho yajati barhir yajati tanūnapātam yajati*’ (TaiSa 2.3.1) - “one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *samidh*, one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *barhi*, one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *tanūnapāt*”. In contrast to the former statement cited from the TāBrā 17.7.1, the basic Vedic injunction for the Full and New Moon Sacrifices, ‘*darśapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta*’ – “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice with the New and Full-Moon” (TaiSa 2.2.25), which prescribes the performance of the

¹⁴⁵ *yat tu pratyāsannatvāt sādhyāmśopanipātītetu ucyate tad ayuktam. yogyatvāvirodhinī pratyāsattiḥ sambandhakāraṇam na tadviparītā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90. The *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-I}, p. 339) reads *pratipattiḥ* in place of *pratyāsattiḥ*, which means cognition. In that case it would mean that it is the cognition which does not contradict the semantic fitness, which is the cause of the syntactical relation and not that which is opposed to it.

¹⁴⁶ *yogyatvam ca svargasyaiva sādhatāyām yajeś ca karaṇatāyām ity uktam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 90.

¹⁴⁷ According to Sen (2013:104-105), *itikartavyatā* refers to the specific duties involved, the performance of which is required for completing the act prescribed by the Vedic command utterance. Sometimes when the prescribed action can be brought about in more than one way, words the *itikartavyatā* portion communicates the particular way which has to be followed in order to bring about the action – “*ye prakāre, arthāt ye kartavyaviśeṣer anuṣṭhāner mādhyame vihīta kriyāṭi niṣpanna karite hay, tāhāke itikartavyatā bale. anek samay vihīta kriyāṭi ekādhikbhāve karā sambhav haile sekhāne kon upāy avalambanīya, tāhāi itikartavyatābodhak śabder dvārā jñāpita hay.*”

New and Full-Moon Sacrifices by someone who desires *svarga*, does not provide for the manner in which the said sacrifices have to be carried out. Thus, one has to refer to other Vedic statements for understanding the procedure.

Itikartavyatā or procedure which in almost all cases fulfils the expectation for the ‘how’ part of *bhāvanā* has either a seen or an unseen purpose¹⁴⁸. Acts such as grinding of the rice are connected to the main sacrifice (viz. the New and Full-Moon Sacrifices) by way of a seen purpose¹⁴⁹ and hence they are to be known as direct benefactors¹⁵⁰. By contrast, those varieties of *itikartavyatā* such as the fore-sacrifices (*prayāja*) called *samit* which benefit the sacrificial act, the meaning of the verbal root, in an unseen way¹⁵¹, are called distant benefactors¹⁵².

The Bhāṭṭa concludes this discussion by observing that it is thus by obtaining *bhāvanā*, which has become fit for performance on account of connection with the three parts that both prescriptions and prohibitions come into force¹⁵³.

6.2. Śabdabhāvanā

6.2.1. The Goal of śabdabhāvanā

Since *śabdabhāvanā* is of the nature of *bhāvanā*, it too should, just like *arthabhāvanā*, have a tripartite structure represented by its expectations for the goal, the means, and the procedure¹⁵⁴. It is *arthabhāvanā* or human activity which fulfils the expectancy of *śabdabhāvanā* for ‘what’ should it bring about. Since *śabdabhāvanā*, which has been

¹⁴⁸ *itikartavyatā hīṣṭā dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭaprayojanā/
prāyaḥ sarvatra bhāvārthe kathamañśopādīnī//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 91.

¹⁴⁹ The seen purpose served is here the grinding of the rice, without which *puroḍāśa* or the sacrificial cake cannot be prepared, and if the sacrificial cake cannot be thus prepared, the sacrifice will be rendered incomplete.

¹⁵⁰ *dr̥ṣṭopakāradvāreṇa sambaddhā peṣaṇādīkā/
itikartavyatā jñeyā sannipatyopakāriṇī//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 91.

¹⁵¹ More precisely this unseen way consists in the production of the unseen or unprecedented (*apūrva*). For a more or less detailed description of the Full and New Moon Sacrifices, see Chapter XXX in Kane (1941).

¹⁵² *bhāvārtham anugr̥hṇāti yā tv adr̥ṣṭena vartmanā/
samidādyātmikām āhustām āradupakāriṇīm//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 91.

¹⁵³ *evam aṃśatrayāśleṣalabdhanuṣṭhānayogyatām/
bhāvanām idr̥ṣṭim prāpya vṛttir vidhiniṣedhayoh//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 91.

¹⁵⁴ *nanu śabdabhāvanā ’pi bhāvanātmakatvād arthabhāvanāvad aṃśatrayam apeṣata eveti tad asyā darśayitvam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

identified as the meaning of exhortative suffixes or *vidhi*, is the instigator of human beings to action, it is but proper that *bhāvanā* or human activity should be its object¹⁵⁵.

6.2.2. The Means of *śabdabhāvanā*

As for the means of *śabdabhāvanā* the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says:

“The activity of the word which expresses the scope in regard to which one is fit to be enjoined enters into its (*śabdabhāvanā*’s) ‘means’-portion. Just as *svarga*, etc. which is to be brought about is accomplished by sacrifice, etc. for which that (sacrifice, etc.) becomes its (*svarga*’s) instrument with regard to *arthabhāvanā*, similarly here (*śabdabhāvanā*) too, since the undertaking of action by the person who is fit to be enjoined is accomplished on understanding the scope, etc., the activity [of the word] which expresses it (the scope) is understood to be the means.”¹⁵⁶

It is to be noted here that the standard Bhāṭṭa view on the means of *śabdabhāvanā* is that it is a knowledge of the exhortative suffix which is the means of *śabdabhāvanā*. However, Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent claims here that the means of *śabdabhāvanā* is the activity of such words which express the scope in regard to which one is enjoined (*niyojyaviśayasamarpakapadavyāpāra*). This would immediately lead one to form the impression that it is the activity of the verbal root which is to be understood, on this view, to be the means of *śabdabhāvanā*. This is because it is the verbal root which expresses actions like sacrifice, etc. that have been seen to be the thing in regard to which one is directly enjoined. But as Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent had argued before, it is because of the capacity of speech-units expressing *bhāvanā* that sacrifice is construed as the means. Now, apart from being the means, actions like sacrifice, help specify the scope of human activity or *bhāvanā*. Hence, just as the understanding of sacrifice as the means of *bhāvanā* is based on the capacity of speech-unit that express *bhāvanā*, the sacrifice’s being the scope with regard to which human activity is carried out also should ultimately be based on the capacity of such speech-units. Now, since *bhāvanā* as a productive activity directed towards the accomplishment of something which is as yet unaccomplished is understood out of the exhortative suffixes, it is in the capacity of speech-units in the form of such exhortative suffixes to make possible the understanding of sacrifice not only as the means of *arthabhāvanā*, but also the sacrifice’s being the scope in regard to which a person is

¹⁵⁵ *puruṣapreraṇātmako hi vidhiḥ śabdabhāvaneti tatsādhyā puruṣapravṛttir eva tatra bhāvyatām pratipadyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

¹⁵⁶ *karaṇāṃśe tu tasyā niyojyaviśayasamarpakapadavyāpāro nivīśate. yathā hi yajyādinā svargādir bhāvyaḥ sampadyata iti arthabhāvanāyām asau tatkarāṇatām avalambate, evam ihāpi niyojyapuruṣapravṛttir viśayādyavagamāt sampadyata iti tadabhidhāyakavyāpāro ’tra karaṇatām pratipadyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 98.

enjoined. In sum, it is the activity of exhortative suffixes which is to be understood by the expression, ‘the activity of words expressing the scope in regard to which a person is fit to be enjoined’, used by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2. Now, since this activity is, according to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā-s, nothing other than the instigating power of exhortative suffixes (*linādinīṣṭhapravartanāśakti*)¹⁵⁷, it is a knowledge of this instigation power of exhortative suffixes that should be finally understood to be the means or instrument of *śabdabhāvanā*.

In the context of the three parts of *śabdabhāvanā* meeting its three expectancies, it was pointed out that human exertion is seen to take place on hearing sentences endowed with verb-forms ending in optative and like suffixes and it does not take place in an absence of them. Hence it is a knowledge of such exhortative suffixes, which, through the joint method of concomitant presence and concomitant absence, is found to be the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā*. But here a number of difficulties arises, which seem to strike at the very root of the Mīmāṃsā theory. These difficulties and their probable solutions have been discussed at length by Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992), although no sources for them are explicitly mentioned by him. But since these problems have important bearings on Mīmāṃsā in general and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of *bhāvanā* in particular, and Gaṅgopādhyāya is the only author I know who notices the problem of the conflict between the eternality (*nityatva*) of Vedic words and the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of the knowledge of exhortative suffixes, I present a brief summary of the arguments found in Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992:41-43) below.

To begin with, an instrument (*karaṇa*) is a cause (*kāraṇa*), which is endowed with an activity (*vyāpārat*) and any cause whatsoever precedes the effect. So, if the knowledge of exhortative suffixes is the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā*, which produces human activity, then *śabdabhāvanā* which is of the nature of the denotative power, would be an effect and hence non-eternal. But this is not acceptable by the Mīmāṃsā-s. According to Mīmāṃsā, Vedic words, their respective meanings and the significative relation between them are eternal. As a result of this, *śabdabhāvanā*, which is of the nature of denotative power pertaining to Vedic injunctive verb-forms, is also eternal. Being eternal it exists even before one hears the exhortative verb-forms and hence the knowledge of the exhortative suffixes cannot be the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā*. Therefore, what is it that is fit for fulfilling the need of *śabdabhāvanā* for the instrument? It cannot be said that there is no expectation of *śabdabhāvanā* for the instrument; for, until a person hears the Vedic injunctive statement, “One who desires *svarga* should sacrifice”, which is endowed with an exhortative verb-form, and has an awareness of the injunction as instigating him, he does not undertake the prescribed act of sacrifice.

¹⁵⁷ This will be clear from the discussion that is hosted in the following paragraphs.

The solution to the above problem is the following: since according to the Mīmāṃsā system the eternality of Vedic words, their respective meanings and the significative relation obtaining among them cannot be dispensed with, *śabdabhāvanā* which is of the nature of the eternal denotative power cannot be something which is fit to be produced or accomplished. On this score, it should be admitted that the hearing of exhortative suffixes is not the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā* in the same sense in which a contact of sense-organs is with respect to the knowledge of forms, etc. (*rūpādijñāna*). This is because, even before hearing the exhortative suffixes, eternal *śabdabhāvanā* pertaining to Vedic exhortative verb-form does exist, but knowledge of forms, etc. does not exist prior to the contact of sense-organs with their respective objects. Hence as a way out, the word ‘*karāṇa*’ or instrument used with regard to *śabdabhāvanā* should be reinterpreted as ‘*jñāpaka*’ or communicator. To explain: unlike the contact of sense-organs with their respective objects which *produces* the cognition of forms, etc. the knowledge of exhortative verb-forms does not produce *śabdabhāvanā*, but only *manifests or reveals* and hence communicates the eternally existing deontic force of Vedic exhortative verb-forms.


But the above reinterpretation of the word ‘*karāṇa*’ as ‘*jñāpaka*’ can be objected on the ground that being an instrument consists of being an action-factor, and not a communicator; to accept it in the sense of ‘*jñāpaka*’ one has to resort to *lakṣaṇā* or secondary significative power of words. Now in ancient Indian linguistic traditions, appeal to secondary significative power is discouraged if any other way out is available. Ancient Indian linguistics prefer, wherever possible, the postulation of additional significeds to additional significative powers¹⁵⁸. Coming back to the main point of the objection, when there is an expectancy for the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā* it relates to the primary sense of instrumentality. Hence it is not appropriate to accept the secondary meaning of ‘being a communicator’ (*jñāpakatva*) as fulfilling this expectation.

In reply to the above objection, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas may resort to the following analogy: an axe becomes the instrument of a person by producing the person’s desired outcome of cutting wood, but not by producing the person. This is because the axe simply lacks the capacity to produce the person. Similarly, the knowledge of exhortative suffixes become the instrument of *śabdabhāvanā* not by producing *śabdabhāvanā*, but *arthabhāvanā* or human activity, the thing to be accomplished (*bhāvya*) by *śabdabhāvanā*. This is again because the knowledge of exhortative suffixes simply lacks the fitness to produce *śabdabhāvanā*. This is because being the deontic force of Vedic verb-forms *śabdabhāvanā* is eternally present and cannot be produced.

However, on a deeper analysis, it seems that knowledge of the exhortative suffixes is not the cause of human activity. Because a person who has not studied grammar, would be deprived of the cognition “*ayaṃ śabdo māṃ pravartayati*” – “this speech-unit (exhortative suffix) instigates me” on hearing exhortative verb-forms even for a number of times. Hence, no activity will be undertaken on his part. Therefore, it has to be said that it is a

¹⁵⁸ For more on *lakṣaṇā* in general, see Kunjunni Raja (1977:229-273). For the role of *lakṣaṇā* in Kumārila’s model of sentence-compositionality, see McCrea (2020).

knowledge of the instigating power (*pravartanāśaktijñāna*) pertaining to exhortative suffixes (*liṅādiniṣṭha*) which is the instrument (*karaṇa*) of *śabdabhāvanā*. And since an instrument presupposes a *vyāpāra* or intermediate operation, it is *cikīrṣā* or the will to do which would be such intermediate operation. In accordance with this revised understanding the sequence of the hearing of exhortative suffixes leading to the genesis of exertion may be sketched as follows:



6.2.3. The Procedure in *śabdabhāvanā*

The activity of words expressing laudation of the prescribed act constitutes the procedural part. It is a fact that on hearing an exhortative word the listener is not much motivated. Rather, it is when the listener's mind is further pleased by the knowledge of various kinds of excellence of the enjoined act that ensues from laudatory statements, that he is motivated to undertake the action even more. Thus, the abundance of effort is caused by laudatory statements. Hence the activity of laudatory statements fulfills the expectancy of *śabdabhāvanā* for the procedure¹⁵⁹.

The action whose performance is prescribed by the exhortative suffix requires a lot of physical labour. Moreover, it is expensive and sometimes also time-consuming. So, it is not something desirable in itself, but only in so far as it leads to a desired human end like *svarga* which is supreme pleasure. Thus, a human being needs an additional amount of motivation to perform the action. Such additional motivation is supplied by the such portions of the Vedic sacred texts that highlight particular excellences ensuing from the performance of such actions. It is on understanding these excellences that a person gets the additional push which he needs to perform the sacrifice.

¹⁵⁹ *itikartavyatāmṣe tv arthavādapadavyāpāro 'syāvatiṣṭhate. kevalam vidhipadaśravane hi sati na tathā pravartayitum utsahante śrotāro yathā 'rthavādajanitabahuprakārakarmaprāśastyajñānaparipoṣitahṛdayāḥ santa ity arthavādāḥ pravṛtṭyatiśayahetavaḥ. tena tadvyāpāra itikartavyatāmṣam asyāḥ pūryatīti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 98-99.

7. *Bhāvanā* and *Vidhi*

7.1. The futility of resorting to injunctions: the opponent's view

Like in previous sections, also this one is opened by the insidious questioning of an opponent, who prompts the following discussion.

The opponent comes up with the objection that since *bhāvanā*, which is the meaning of a sentence, has been demonstrated by the Bhāṭṭas to be understood out of all types of verb forms, it is useless to resort to *vidhi* or injunctions¹⁶⁰. Should one resort to injunctions because (1) they communicate the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga*, or (2) for the sake of successful undertaking of or abstention from activity¹⁶¹? The first alternative does not work since even without referring to injunctions, one understands *bhāvanā*. And once *bhāvanā* has been understood, the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga* can also be obtained by means of a consideration of syntactico-semantic expectancy, semantic fitness and proximity¹⁶². This is because *bhāvanā* being a productive activity unavoidably requires a thing to be produced and in connection with it, the means for producing. As for the second alternative, the opponent points out that undertaking of action is dependent upon one's desire¹⁶³. This is because, once *svarga* has been understood as the object to be accomplished and sacrifice the means for it, he who desires *svarga*, naturally would undertake the performance of sacrifice for accomplishing *svarga*. An injunction, by contrast, cannot do anything to a person who does not undertake the action on account of not desiring the object which the action can accomplish¹⁶⁴. In case of prohibitions too, he, who has understood acts such as consumption of liquor, killing of brāhmaṇa, etc. as the means for incurring religious demerits, refrains, owing to a desire to avoid such religious demerits, from such actions¹⁶⁵. Thus the injunction is not the basis for undertaking of and desistance from activity and hence even for that purpose one cannot resort to injunctions¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁰ *kimarthaṃ punar vidhir āśrīyate. vartamānāpadeśiṣv apy ākhyāteṣu bhāvanā pratīyata iti darśitavān bhavān ataḥ kiṃ vidhinā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶¹ *tasya hy āśrayaṇaṃ svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvabodhanāya pravṛttinivṛttisiddhaye vā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶² *sādhyasādhanasambandhas tāvad ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatāparyālocanayā vartamānāpadeśino 'py ākhyātāt bhāvanāvagame sati bhavaty evāntareṇāpi vidhim.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶³ *pravṛttir api puruṣa icchānibandhanā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶⁴ *svargasya sādhyatve yāgasya ca sādhanatve 'vadhārite yaḥ svargam icchet sa tatsiddhaye pravartata eva. yas tu necchet tasya vidhir api kiṃ kuryāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶⁵ *niṣedhādhikāre 'pi surāpānabrāhmaṇahananādeḥ pratyavāyasādhanatvāvadhāraṇāt tatparijihīṣayā puruṣo nivarteta...* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶⁶ *pravṛttinivṛttyor na kāraṇaṃ vidhir iti tadarthaṃ api tadāśrayaṇam asāmpratam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 92.

Although these objections are very briefly mentioned in verse nos. 12-13 of Kumāṛila's ŚV on MĪSū 1.2.5, yet the elaboration on it made by Umbeka in his commentary on the said verses seems to be the more immediate source of Jayanta's presentation of these objections in NM 5.2. Hence, the relevant extract from Umbeka's ŚVTā are presented below –

[a] *kimarthaṃ punar jaimininā vidhir āśritas tasyāpy aṅgikaraṇaṃ svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvāvagamāya pravṛttisiddhaye vā? na tāvat sādhyasādhanabhāvāvagamāya; yato 'ntareṇa api vidhinākhyāteṣv eva sādhyasādhanabhāvo 'vagamyate; tāni hi karotyārthaṃ bhāvanām avagamayanti; sā ca sādhyam sādhanam cāntareṇa nopapadyate.* ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 185.

But for what purpose has Jaimini resorted to the injunction? Also, is it (injunction) accepted for the sake of understanding the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga*, or for the sake of accomplishing undertaking? It is not for an understanding of the means-end relation, to begin with; for, even without the injunction, the means-end relation is understood with regard to the verbal endings. This is because, they (the verbal endings) make known *bhāvanā*, which is the meaning of the finite verb 'does'. And it (*bhāvanā*) does not hold water without an end to be brought about and the means.

[b] *tatraitat syāt - pravṛttisiddhyārthaṃ tadāśrayaṇam; tad ayuktam; viśiṣṭaprayojanāṅgibhāvanām avagamyatprajoyanārthinecchayaiva pravartante; yas tu tat prayojanaṃ necchati, tasya vidhir api kiṃ kuryāt?* ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 186.

In that regard, let it be so that it (injunction) is resorted to for the sake of accomplishing undertaking [of action].

That is incorrect. It is after understanding that *bhāvanā* has a specific purpose as its [constituent] part, people who seek [to achieve] that purpose undertake [the action] owing to desire alone; but what should even an injunction do to him, who does not desire that purpose [to be served]?

[c] *niṣedhādhikāre 'pi rāgato hanane pravartamāno nañā nirvartyata iti kiṃ vidhinā?* ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 187.

In case of prohibited actions too, a person who has resolved to kill is dissuaded by the negative particle [occurring in the prohibition]; hence what should the injunction do?

Apart from questioning the utility of resorting to injunctions, the opponent in NM 5.2 also questions the nature of injunctions, for, in his opinion, the nature of an injunction is uncertain¹⁶⁷. In reply, the Bhāṭṭas may say that the definition of an injunction consists in

¹⁶⁷ *kaś cāyaṃ vidhir nāmety etad api na vidmaḥ.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 92.

instigating someone to an activity which he has not already undertaken; but an injunction cannot be defined as the communication of something previously unknown, because of an overextension of such a definition¹⁶⁸. As to how the latter definition overextends, is explained by Cakradhara, Jayanta's scholiast, as follows: if an injunction communicates something hitherto unknown, then the prediction made by a fortune-teller in the form of 'you will acquire a village' would also count as an injunction¹⁶⁹! Now the opponent insists that "instigating someone to an activity which he has not already undertaken" remains unclear and therefore philosophers have not reached a consensus about the nature of the instigator¹⁷⁰.

What is it that instigates a person? Is it the exhortative suffixes, or their activity, or commandment, the meaning of the exhortative suffixes, or results like *svarga*, or the instrument of achieving something beneficial, or desire, etc. that should be considered to be the instigator¹⁷¹? Since the nature of the instigator remains unknown, an injunction too is unknown¹⁷².

7.2. Reply by the Bhāṭṭa

7.2.1. The defense of injunctions

7.2.1.1. The understanding of the means-end relationship is due to the injunction

In reply, the Bhāṭṭa opponent says that it is due to the might of the injunction that the sacrifice is construed into the statement, "One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", as the means and *svarga* as the result¹⁷³. He argues that without a exhortative linguistic form, the

¹⁶⁸ *vidherlakṣaṇaṃ tāvad apravṛttappravartanam/ atiprasaṅgadoṣeṇa nājnātajñāpanaṃ vidhiḥ*// NM_{Mys-II}, p. 92.

¹⁶⁹ *ajñātajñāpane hi vidhau grāmaṃ bhavān lapsyate ityādeḥ sāmudravidyāvvyākhyānasyāpi vidhitvaprasaṅgāt.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 64.

¹⁷⁰ *kintu ko 'sāv apravṛttappravartaka iti na jānīmaḥ pravartakasvarūpe hi samśerate prāvādukā iti.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 93.

¹⁷¹ *kiṃ liṅādīḥ śabda eva pravartakas tadvyāparo vā tadartho vā niyogaḥ, phalaṃ vā svargādi, śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ vā, rāgādir vā.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 93.

¹⁷² *pravartakasvarūpānavadhāraṇād vidher apy anavadhāraṇam iti.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 93.

¹⁷³ *yad ayaṃ sādhanatvena yaḥ abhihito 'nvayaḥ/ svargasya ca phalatvena sa eva mahimā vidheḥ*// NM_{Mys-II}, p. 93.

Maṇḍana too says this, although in a different context, as follows –

api cāśrutaphaleṣu phalādhyāhāraḥ kvacit kratūpakāraḥ śrutānām api svargādīnām phalatvādhyāvyasāya iti sarva eṣa mahimā vidheḥ (ViVi_{Go}, p. 11) - "Moreover, that results are supplied in case of [rituals] where results are not directly mentioned, [some rites] are postulated as rendering assistance

phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ in the expression ‘one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice’ would be akin to the expression ‘*śuklo hotā*’¹⁷⁴ – ‘the white Ṛgvedic priest’¹⁷⁵. To explain: just as in the expression ‘*śuklo hotā*’, no means-end relationship is understood between the quality of whiteness and the Ṛgvedic priest, and it just describes the latter, so the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ would not communicate any means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga*, but would simply serve as the description of the sacrifice. This would lead to the undesirable consequence of the addressee of the injunction not understanding the sacrifice as the means for accomplishing *svarga* and hence he would not feel motivated to undertake the sacrifice. As a result of this, the very purpose of admitting injunctions would be defeated. What this ultimately implies is that, if the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ were to function just like the phrase ‘*śuklo hotā*’, then it would merely reiterate the agent of the sacrifice and hence merely describe him. As a result, the instigating function of an injunction could not be carried out. It is due to the presence of the exhortative suffix in the said injunction, that is, the unique instigating capacity of an exhortative suffix, that a person who desires *svarga* understands that he is being instigated by the injunction to undertake the act of sacrifice, which is the means to his desired end. Implied also is the view that it is due to the presence of the injunctive suffix that the phrase *svargakāma* would not merely reiterate the agent, but convey the hitherto unknown eligible performer (*adhikārin*) of the sacrifice.

The point made by Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent that without the exhortative suffix, a mere description of the agent would follow from the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’, seems to be an echo of the following lines from Umbeka’s ŚVTā:

vidhyabhāve hi “svargakāma yajete”ty atra sannihitadhātvarthakarmikāyāṃ bhāvanāyāṃ padāntaropāttasvargakāmaḥ kartety etāvad avagamyate – svargakāma yāgaṃ karoti iti. ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 187.

For, in the absence of the exhortative suffix, the *svarga*-desiring person obtained from a different word (*svargakāma*) in “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice” is the agent of bringing about, of which the proximately situated meaning of the verbal root (sacrifice) is the object; hence this much is understood – he who desires *svarga* performs the sacrifice.

If it were not for the exhortative suffix, Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent points out, it would not be possible to accept *svarga*, which is remotely situated in the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’, to be the object to be accomplished. This is because, it would be rather easier for the meaning of the verbal root, which is by nature a collection of many sequential acts, to

to the [main] ritual, and that *svarga*, etc. which are found mentioned, are ascertained to be the results [accruing from the performance of a certain ritual action] – all this is the uniqueness of the injunction.”

¹⁷⁴ ŚāBrā 25.10.

¹⁷⁵ *vidhivacanam antareṇa hi svargakāmo yajeteti puruṣalakṣaṇārthasvargakāmaśabdaḥ śuklo hotetivat syāt.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 93.

get connected with the meaning of the verbal ending which is *bhāvanā*, on account of the contiguity, characterized by obtainment from the same conjugated verb form, *yajeta*¹⁷⁶. To explain: the verb *yajeta* [(one should) 'sacrifice'] occurring in the injunction, '*svargakāmo yajeta*', can be split into two parts: the verbal root, *yaj-* (meaning 'to sacrifice') and the verbal ending *īta*, which, according to the Bhāṭṭas, denotes *bhāvanā*. So, based on the proximity on account of both *bhāvanā* and sacrifice being denoted by the parts of the same verb, sacrifice would have a greater claim to be the object to be accomplished by *bhāvanā*. By contrast, the word '*svarga*' in '*svargakāma*' placed apart from the verb '*yajeta*'. Moreover, '*svarga*' itself occupies a secondary position within the compound '*svargakāma*' on account of its being the qualifier of the word '*kāma*'. Hence *svarga*'s claim to be the object to be accomplished by *bhāvanā* in terms of its syntactical position within the injunction is very weak. But that *svarga* still construes as the object to be accomplished and sacrifice as its means is due to nothing else than the might of the exhortative suffix¹⁷⁷. It is for this reasons that injunctions must be resorted to¹⁷⁸. The uniqueness referred to above consists of the deontic force of the injunction. Apart from structural reasons, the meaning of the verbal root which is identified as a series of actions is a more fitting candidate for being the object to be accomplished because it is something in regard to which a person can directly make efforts. By contrast, *svarga* is not something in regard to which one can directly make efforts. Hence, sacrifice would naturally not allow a reversal of its potential thematic role of being the object to be accomplished. It is only because of the exhortative suffix that this reversal is made possible and *svarga* is understood as the object to be accomplished and sacrifice its means.

The reply by Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa opponent is an echo of the following verses from Kumārila's ŚV on MīSū 1.2.5 –

*vidhāv anāśrite sādhyāḥ puruṣārtho na labhyate/
śrutāsvargādibādhenā dhātvarthaḥ sādhyatām vrajet//
vidhau tu tam atikramya svargādeḥ sādhyateṣyate/* Verses 14-15ab, in ŚV_{DS},
p. 151.

If the exhortative suffix is not resorted to, an object of human desire is not obtained as the thing to be accomplished. By setting aside [results,] *svarga*, etc. which are heard [within the injunction], the meaning of the verbal root becomes the object to be accomplished. But if the exhortative suffix [is resorted to], that (meaning of the

¹⁷⁶ *tadā*

caikapadopādānalakṣaṇapratyāsattisambandhanisargaghaṭitapūrvāparībhūtasvabhāvadhātvarthasādhyatāt ikrameṇa dūrāt svargasyānyatropasarjanībhūtasya katham kalpayitum śakyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 93.

¹⁷⁷ *tasmād eṣa viśiṣṭaḥ sādhyasādhanasambandho vidhiprasādalahya eva bhavati na anyathā.* NM, Mysore ed., Vol. 2, p. 93.

¹⁷⁸ *iti vidhir āśrayaṇīyah.* NM, Mysore ed., Vol. 2, p. 93.

verbal root) is overstepped as a result of which *svarga*, etc. can be regarded as the object to be accomplished.

Commenting on these verses Umbeka too says a similar thing in ŚVTā –

api ca vidhikṛto viṣayaṃ prati svargayāgayoḥ karmakaraṇabhāvaḥ. ŚVTāAu ŚVTā, p. 190.

Moreover, in regard to the content [of the injunction], the means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga* is based on the exhortative suffix.

In his commentary on Maṇḍana's BhāVi too, Umbeka says the same thing as follows –

vidhipramāṇako hi svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvo na pratyakṣādhipramāṇakaḥ. BhāVi_{IGJ}, p. 93.

For, the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga* is based on the instrument of knowledge, the [Vedic] injunction, [and] not on instruments of knowledge like perception, etc.

7.2.1.2. The *modus operandi* of an injunction: the role of human desire

It may now be asked how an injunction communicates such a means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga*¹⁷⁹. In reply it is pointed out by the Bhāṭṭa that it does so because of its nature of instigating someone who is *sapratyaya* or rational. The expression *sapratyaya* used by the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 seems to be a synonym of the word *buddhipūrvakārin* used by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa at a number of places in the *Tantravārttika*. On the meaning of the word *buddhipūrvakārin* it is worth quoting a few passages from TV collected and translated by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu in Yoshimizu (2007:207):

“In the TV, Kumārila often calls a human being “one who applies his intellect in advance of action” (*buddhipūrvakārin*) and describes that a *buddhipūrvakārin* concerns himself about his own benefit on the occasion of any action. Cf. TV, p. 113, 3 : TV', II, p. 10, 22 (*kecit*): “In fact, people who apply their intellect in advance of action would not take on that thing if it were not useful for themselves.” (*na hy ātmānupakāriṇaṃ santam enaṃ buddhipūrvakāriṇaḥ puruṣaḥ prayatnena dhārayeyuḥ*); TV, p. 134, 22 : TV', II, p. 37, 17: “First in the ordinary world, people who apply their intellect in advance of action do not undertake even the slightest part of a work that would bring no benefit.” (*loke tāvad buddhipūrvakāriṇaḥ puruṣā mātrām api na niṣprayojanāṃ prayuñjate*); TV, p. 383, 22-23 : TV', II, p. 350, 18-19: “One who applies his intellect in advance of action does not carry out an unworthy work even if being asked for hundred times.” (*na ca buddhipūrvakārī puruṣaḥ puruṣārtharahitaṃ vyāpāraṃ vacanaśatenāpy ukto 'nutiṣṭhati*); TV, p. 662, 11-12 : TV, IV, p. 19, 12-13: “In fact, no one who applies his intellect in

¹⁷⁹ *kathaṃ punar vidhir apy amuṃ sādhyasādhanabhāvaṃ bodhayati. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 93.*

advance of action desires *svarga* just to take place, but [one desires it] to come to be enjoyed by himself.” (*na hi kaścīd buddhipūrvakāry evaṃ kāmāyate svarga ātmānaṃ labhatām iti. kiṃ tarhi, mamopabhogyaḥ syād iti.*)”

The word also seems to be synonymous with expressions like ‘*prekṣapūrvakārin*’, ‘*prekṣāvat*’, used by Jayanta throughout NM¹⁸⁰. Coming back to NM 5.2, it is seen that the Bhāṭṭa opponent also says that a rational human being does not get motivated to undertake an action, which does not lead to a desired human end, even though he may be urged in a hundred ways¹⁸¹. Lest its very nature of being an instigator be compromised even when a person is instigated, the injunction decisively communicates *svarga* and sacrifice the means¹⁸². Since *svarga* is by its very nature desired by human beings¹⁸³, it is construed into the injunction as the object to be accomplished, and consistent with this, the sacrifice is construed as the instrument of accomplishing *svarga*.

Here the influence of the following passage from Umbeka’s ŚVTā seems very obvious –

vidhir api vā puruṣārthāsādhake [emended from *puruṣārthasādhake*] *vyāpāre puruṣeṣv apravartamāneṣv ātmanaḥ pravartakatvavigatim āśaṅkamānaḥ puruṣārtharūpam eva sādhyam ākṣipan sannihitataram api dhātvarthaṃ bhavatikriyākartṛtvānupādānād apuruṣārthatvāc ca na bhāvanāyāṃ bhāvvyatvenāvagamayati, svargādi tu [svargādiṣu] yady api kāmāsambandhenopakṣiṇām, tathāpi tasya ‘svargo me bhūyāt’ ity evaṃ kāmāyānātvena bhāvvyatvenopādānāt puruṣārthatvāc ca vidhir bhāvanābhāvvyatvam avagamayan na vihanyata ity eṣā tāvat prakriyā. ŚVTā, p. 102.*

Or, given that human beings are not motivated in regard to activities which are not means of achieving human end, an injunction, being afraid of the loss of instigation, does not communicate the meaning of the verbal root, which although is more proximate, to be the thing to be brought about with regard to *bhāvanā*. This is because, [the injunction rather] implies a human end to be the thing to be accomplished, [and because the meaning of the verbal root] is not obtained as the agent of the action of becoming and also because of [the verbal root’s meaning’s] being something not desirable [in itself] by human beings. By contrast, although *svarga* and the like cease [to function] by virtue of [its] connection with desire, is

¹⁸⁰ For example, see NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 436, 481, 487, 583, 670, 697, 698, 699.

¹⁸¹ *na cāpuruṣārtharūpe vyāpāre puruṣaḥ prayatnaśatapreryamāṇo ’pi sapratyayaḥ pravartate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 93-94.

¹⁸² *pravartamāne ’pi puṃsi pravartakatvākhyanijasvarūpasāṅkocanam āśaṅkamāno vidhiḥ puruṣārthasvabhāvaṃ svargaṃ sādhyatayā vyavasthāpayati yāgaṃ cāsya sādhanatayeti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁸³ This is because *svarga* is supreme pleasure (*niratisāyaprīti*) which is desirable by human beings for its own sake unlike other kinds of pleasures which are desired for the sake of a hierarchically higher pleasure.

communicated by the injunction as the object to be brought about with regard to *bhāvanā*. This is because, on account of being the object of desire as in “may *svarga* be there for me”, it (*svarga*) is obtained as the agent of the action of becoming and also because it is something desirable by human beings. On account of communicating this, the injunction does not fail [in regard to its essential nature of being an instigator]. This is the indeed manner [of explaining how an injunction instigates].

The opponent had complained that the injunction could not do anything to the person, who despite being instigated by it, would not undertake the action. In reply to this, the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 says that an injunction does not instigate a human being like wind and the like¹⁸⁴. For, wind and other physical instigators instigate a rational human being and also those who are not; by contrast, an injunction instigates only rational human beings¹⁸⁵. And the instigation amounts to producing an awareness of the form ‘I am instigated’. It is not the case that an injunction can afford to generate such an awareness in a rational human being without communicating the result. Rather, once the result is communicated, such an awareness is indeed produced. And once the awareness has been generated through such a functioning of the instrument of knowledge¹⁸⁶, the addressee is indeed instigated by the injunction¹⁸⁷. If on account of laziness, etc. or because of lack of need, the person does not physically perform the action, it is not a problem¹⁸⁸. This is because the injunction's task has been accomplished in so far as it has generated the awareness in the addressee in the form ‘I am instigated’¹⁸⁹. This is because the understanding of instigation and actual activity are two different things¹⁹⁰. What is important to note here is that the Bhāṭṭa defends the need or validity of the injunction from the instigator’s point of view, and not from the standpoint of the person whom the injunction instigates. His main concern is to prove that the injunction does not fail to execute its own task, viz. instigation, because on hearing an injunction, a person understands that he is instigated (*pravartita*) by the injunction. But what the Bhāṭṭa ignores discussing is whether one’s awareness of being instigated

¹⁸⁴ *yat tu darśite 'pi svargādaḥ phale na pravartate cet puruṣaḥ kiṃ vidhiḥ kuryād iti tad apy ayuktam. na hi vayvādivat puruṣasya pravartako vidhiḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁸⁵ *vayvādiḥ khalu sapratyayam api taditaram api pravartayati. vidhis tu sapratyayasyaiva pravartakaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁸⁶ This refers to the injunction, which is an instance of *śabdapramāṇa* or language as an instrument of knowledge.

¹⁸⁷ *na ca phalam adarśayatā vidhinā sapratyayasya īdṛśam jñānam janayituṃ śakyam. phale tu darśite sati tad asya jñānam janitam eva. anena janitaṃ cej jñānam pramāṇavṛttena pravartita evāsau vidhinā puruṣaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁸⁸ *ālasyaḍīnā 'narthitvena vā bahiḥpravṛttiparyantatayā cen na pravarteta, mā pravartiṣṭa.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁸⁹ *vidhinā tu svarkartavyaṃ kṛtaṃ pravartito 'ham iti jñānajanāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

¹⁹⁰ *anyo hi pravartanāvagamo 'nyaś ca bāhyo vyāparaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 94.

(*pravartita*) is sufficient enough for him also to be *pravṛtta*, i.e., undertake the prescribed action.

Thus, a rational human being is instigated by an injunction in the sense that he understands the action prescribed by the injunction as leading to some desired end, and it is only after recognizing this that he mentally resolves to act. The role of the injunction ends with the communication of such a means-end relation and it is by means of such communication only that injunctions instigate their addressees to undertake actions. So, a rational human being's desire to achieve something beneficial for his own sake and the injunction's catering to that need by making known the proper means, which is otherwise unknown, are what constitute the crux of the instigating function of Vedic injunctions on the Bhāṭṭa view. Thus, an injunction, unlike wind, etc. does not push a human being physically, but it only urges him to do something which the person might find beneficial. It generates in the person the awareness of being instigated. When a rational person feels instigated by a Vedic injunction, his trust in the injunction as leading to a beneficial human end, leads him to compute the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga*, which is implied by the injunction. On such a computation of the means-end relation, the person may undertake the prescribed action, if the action leads to some desired end of his. His physical activity in this regard is expected to take place only if there are no stronger and situationally irreversible obfuscating conditions like laziness, etc. But even if the person does not act at the physical level, the Vedic injunctions validity is not compromised, for it does not instigate at the physical level, but only at a cognitive level by generating the awareness of being instigated. It is important to note here that the distinction of an injunction as an instigator from wind, etc. is based on a similar distinction made and argued for by Maṇḍana in ViVi¹⁹¹.

The Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 argues that in case of Vedic prohibitions like 'one should not kill', the prohibitory injunction cannot stop the addressee, who, driven by desire, has made up his mind to do something, unless it communicates that the prohibited action, which is denoted by the verbal root, (in this case, the act of killing, denoted by the verbal root, *han*), is the means for obtaining something maleficent¹⁹². Thus, it seems that prescriptions and prohibitions work similarly by communicating means-end relation. The communication of such a means-end relation in case of prohibitions has the explicit feature of leading to the understanding that the act which is being prohibited leads one to dire consequences (*anartha*).

Svarga, which means supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*), is *puruṣārtha* by its very nature (*puruṣārthasvabhāva*) and hence is always desirable by human beings. But the category of *puruṣārtha* also includes things like rain which are only situationally desired (as in case of

¹⁹¹ See ViViGo, p. 5, 7.

¹⁹² *niṣedhe ca na hanyād iti niṣedhyamānasya bhāvārthasyānarthatām anavabodhayan vidhir na rāgataḥ pravartamānaṃ pumāṃsaṃ nirodhum utsatahe*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95.

one who needs to cultivate land). By contrast, *anartha* is something which is always undesirable. However, whereas for Mīmāṃsā philosophers like Maṇḍana Miśra prescriptions and prohibitions directly denote that the action enjoined or prohibited is the means of obtaining a *puruṣārtha* or *anartha*, the Bhāṭṭa embedded in NM 5.2 seems to suggest that these are only implicitly *communicated* (*avabodhayati*) and not *denoted* by prescriptions and prohibitions. This is because for Kumārila, it is linguistic *śabdabhāvanā* which is the denoted meaning of optative and other exhortative suffixes, without which there would be no way to explain why only exhortative sentences instigate us, and not indicative suffixes.

In order to undertake the enjoined action or desist from doing the prohibited one, a rational human being needs to have primarily understood the prescribed action to be the instrument of obtaining a *puruṣārtha* or the prohibited action as leading to *anartha*. Whence comes this primary understanding? In the case of situationally desirable objects, like rain or cattle, these are independently desired and their desirability is considered a given primitive, that does not need to be explained further. Similarly, *svarga* is explained as supreme pleasure and desire for supreme pleasure is intrinsic to all rational human beings.

But why should one trust the Veda to tell us the right means to achieve these desirable ends? It is in the very nature of human beings to desire and strive for happiness. Now, for the Mīmāṃsakas, a belief in the uncontradicted nature of the validity of the Vedas in accordance with the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*)¹⁹³ helps a rational human being to trust that the Veda prescribes the right means for achieving the desired object - whether it is situationally desirable objects like cattles etc. or *svarga*, which is supreme pleasure, and hence naturally desirable by human beings. By contrast, Jayanta has explained previously in Book 4 of NM that the Veda is an instrument of knowledge because it is composed by a reliable author viz. God¹⁹⁴.

At this point of the discussion, Jayanta addresses a further objection and goes back to the question of why one needs injunctions, given that *bhāvanā* is conveyed also by non-prescriptive sentences. The Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 answers that even though actions are conveyed also by non-prescriptive sentences, one has to depend upon prescriptions or prohibitions for knowing that a certain action has been prescribed or prohibited¹⁹⁵. He explains that the point is about explaining how Vedic injunctions work, and not about composing Vedic injunctions. Even though there would be other ways to comprehend that

¹⁹³ For a general overview of the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya*, see Taber (1992).

¹⁹⁴ Although the word God is here used as a translation of the Sanskrit word *īśvara*, yet it does not intend to echo the Christian concept of God. For Jayanta's concept of *īśvara* in relation to the greater problem of the validity of language as an independent instrument of knowledge, see Bhaṭṭācārya (2012:133-138). For a discussion of the origin and development of the concept of *īśvara* in the Nyāya system in general, see Part I in Vattanky (2011).

¹⁹⁵ *vidheyavan niṣedhye 'pi tasyaiva vyāpara ity avasīyāśrayaṇīyo vidhiḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95.

something is a *puruṣārtha* or *anartha*, yet the Bhāṭṭa is here concerned with explaining how is an action learned to be *puruṣārtha* or *anartha* from the Vedic injunctions. For making specific sense of an injunction like “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, a rational person ponders over its meaning and arrives at the conclusion that it communicates *svarga* as the thing to be accomplished and the sacrifice as its means. Since this meaning is obtained on the unique strength of the injunction, it is reasonable that one should resort to injunctions¹⁹⁶.

7.2.2. The nature of the instigator

Now the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 replies to the complaint made earlier that the nature of the instigator is uncertain. He examines the possible candidates and refutes them one by one

a. Result – Phala or result cannot be the instigator since it cannot be decided whether being accomplished or unaccomplished the result should be able to instigate. In regard to these two alternatives, an already accomplished result cannot be the instigator precisely because it is accomplished. This is because one does not strive for something which one possesses. Nor can it be held that a result which is unaccomplished such as the horn of a mule is fit to be the instigator. For, one has never seen it¹⁹⁷. In other words, one does not desire such things as a mule’s horn because they do not exist and hence efforts are not possible with regard to them.

b. Desire – If it is now said that it is the result as forming the object of desire that is the instigator, then in that case it is actually the desire which would be the instigator and not the result¹⁹⁸. But even this is not a viable option. For, even when a very strong desire for something has arisen in someone, he cannot act towards it unless he determines what the means for accomplishing his desired object is. Thus one, desirous of *svarga*, does not perform the *sāṅgrāhiṇī* sacrifice, the result of which leads to the acquisition of village, a situationally desirable thing¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹⁶ *na hi vāyam adyākṛtaṃ vidhim āśreyamo jahīmo vā. pratipattāro hi vāyam vedasya na kartārah. tatra ca savidhikāni yajeta svargakāma iti prabhṛtīni śrūyante. teṣāṃ mūmāṃsyamāno ’rtha idṛg avatiṣṭhate svargaḥ sādhyo yāgaḥ sādhanam iti. sa cāyam vidhisāmārthyalabhya iti yuktaṃ vidher āśrayanam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95.

¹⁹⁷ *yat tu pravartakasvarūpāniścayād vidher aniścaya iti tatrāpy ucyate – phalaṃ tāvan na pravakartakaṃ siddhyasiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ. phalasyāpravartakatvaṃ siddhatvād eva. na hi yad yasyāsti sa tadarthaṃ yatate. nāpy asiddhasya kharaviṣṇāprakhyasya phalasya pravartakatvaṃ yuktaṃ adṛṣṭatvāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95. As I have said under Section 14.2 of Part II of Chapter III, this objection is probably based on Maṇḍana’s ViVi.

¹⁹⁸ *atha kāmanāviṣayikṛtaṃ phalaṃ pravartakam iṣyate seyaṃ kāmanaiva pravartikā bhavati na phalam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95.

¹⁹⁹ *etad api na peśalam upajātapravṛddhatararāgasya api kāmyamānopāyaparicchedam antareṇa pravṛtṭyanupapatteḥ. na hi svargakāmaḥ sāṅgrāhiṇīm anutiṣṭhati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 96.

c. **Instrument of acquiring something beneficial** – Even if one desires something, has, until one knows the precise means to achieve it, one cannot act. Hence desire is not sufficient to instigate a person to act. Rather, it is being the means to achieve the desired object which is fit to instigate one to act. This is indeed the way things work in the world. It is seen that on knowing from a doctor’s prescription that the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree and the like are the means for regaining health, a patient makes efforts towards procuring it. Likewise, a hungry person, on knowing that rice is the means for satiating hunger, makes efforts for eating it²⁰⁰.

But, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 says, even this is not correct. For does the instrument of achieving one’s desired object instigate one while remaining unknown or after becoming known? It cannot be the former because one who has not known something to be the means for accomplishing the object of desire is not seen to undertake the action. For example, one who has not known that the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree from some source to be the means for regaining, does not make efforts for procuring it, even though he desires to be cured.

Therefore, the cause of knowing an act to be the instrument of achieving the desired end is what is the instigator. With regard to worldly things the instrument of achieving something desirable can be ascertained even through concomitant presence and concomitant absence, i.e., through observation. But with regard to things that are unseen like *svarga* the ascertainment of the instrument is based solely on linguistic communication in the form of sacred texts²⁰¹.

d. **Exhortative words** – Since with regard to unseen things like *svarga* the instrument cannot be ascertained without the help of linguistic communication in the form of sacred texts, it is linguistic communication only which should be the instigator. However, language is not by its very nature the instigator, for in that case it would be at par with wind, etc.²⁰² And, if language were an instigator like the wind, or like a demon or like a bad king, then one who has not learned the relation between words and their meanings would undertake an action just on hearing words. But this is not the case. Therefore, it is

²⁰⁰ *tad varaṃ śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ pravartakam. loke ’api caivam eva vyavahāro dr̥śyate. harītakāyādīnām ārogyasādhanatāṃ vaidyācāryacodanāto ’vagatya tadupayogādāv āturajanaḥ pravartate. tṛptisādhanatām odanasya manyamānas tadbhakṣaṇāya bubhukṣītaḥ pravartata iti śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ eva pravartakam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 96.

²⁰¹ *etad api na caturasram. śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ hy anavagatam avagatam vā pravartakam bhavet. nānavagatam avyutpannasya pravṛtter adarśanāt. yo hi harītakīnām ārogyahetutāṃ na kutaścīd adhigatavān nāsau tadarthy api tām upayūkte. tasmāt tadbodhahetuḥ pravartakaḥ. sa ca dr̥ṣṭe viṣaye ’nvayavyatirekād api sambhavati. kiṃ tena. adr̥ṣṭe tu viṣaye śreyaḥsādhanatādhiḡamaḥ śabdaikanibandhana(h)...* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 96.

²⁰² It should be noted that the description of such a mechanistic view of a speech unit’s being the instigator, along with its refutation, is to be found in ViVi_{Go}, pp. 4-5; 14. Maṇḍana calls the proponents of such a view ‘Śabdavidhivādin’ (ViVi_{Go}, p. 10).

to be accepted that language functions as an instigator only on the basis of its making known the meaning²⁰³.

Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa opponent, however, says, it is not the case that when even when indicative verbs and their respective meanings are understood a rational human being undertakes an action. Therefore, exhortative verbs become instigators by way of denoting instigation. In other words, not any verb form whatsoever instigates one to undertake an action but only imperative and like verbs, i.e., exhortative verbs because of their unique capacity of denoting instigation²⁰⁴. Thus, these exhortative verbs instigate a rational human being. Such a rational human being understands that he has been instigated by the exhortative suffixes in regard to an action that leads to a desirable end of his. It is on that score that he undertakes the prescribed action.

Now, action-factors like the sense organs such as the eye produce sensory knowledge without requiring any intermediate knowledge of the relation between the object and the instrument; it is for this reason that they are known as *kāraka*-s or action-factors. By contrast, language necessarily requires a knowledge of the relation between words and their respective meanings, i.e., a cognitive content for generating linguistic cognition. It is for this reason that language is not a *kāraka* or action-factor but a *jñāpaka* or communicator. Despite this difference, language acts inevitably as an instrument in producing a cognition of its meaning. Now since an instrument is an action-factor and an action-factor cannot execute its task without an intermediate operation, the latter is necessary for it²⁰⁵. In this connection, the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 observes that exhortative suffixes operate not only to generate the cognition of their meanings, but also in producing human undertaking. The proof for this comes from the fact that we understand and experience them to be such²⁰⁶. To explain: once the meaning has been understood through the exhortative suffix, undertaking of action is seen and this proves that exhortative suffixes are not only capable to communicate a meaning, but also to produce undertaking

²⁰³ *adr̥ṣṭe tu viṣaye śreyaḥsādhanatādhiḡamaḥ śabdaikanibandhana iti tadadhigamopāyaḥ śabda eva pravartakaḥ. ata eva śabdo 'pi na svarūpamātreṇa pravartakaḥ vāyvādītulyatvaprasaṅgāt. yadi hi pavana iva piśāca iva kunrpa iva śabdaḥ pravartako bhaved anavagataśabdārthasambandho 'pi śravaṇaparavaśaḥ pravarteta na caivam asti. tasmād arthapratītim upajanayataḥ śabdasya pravartakatvam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 96.

²⁰⁴ *na ca nāma padapratītau vartamānāpadeśakākhyātāt padārthapratītau ca satyāṃ sapratyayaḥ pravartamānaḥ kaścīd dr̥ṣyata iti liṅādir eva śabdaḥ pravartanābhīdhānavāreṇa pravartako bhavitum arhati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

²⁰⁵ *śabdasya ca jñāpakatvāc cakṣurādīkārakavāilakṣaṇye saty api pratīijanmani karaṇatvam aparīhāryam. karaṇaṅca kārakaṃ kārakaṅca na nirvyāpāraṃ svakāryanivṛttikṣamam iti vyāparas tasyāvāśyambhāvī.* The reading of the Mysore edition (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97) is*karaṇaṅca kārakaṅca na nirvyāpāraṃ...* I follow the reading of the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-I}, pp. 342-343), which makes more sense here.

²⁰⁶ *liṅādeś ca śabdasya na pratīijanmamātre vyāpāraḥ kintu puruṣapavr̥ttāv api tathā 'vagamāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

of action²⁰⁷. Such an operation of exhortative suffixes known as *śabdabhāvanā* is what is called *vidhi* and this alone is the instigator²⁰⁸.

The argument seems to be the following: the word ‘*jñāpaka*’ which is translated as ‘communicator’ here means the agent of the action of communication²⁰⁹. Now since an agent cannot accomplish an action without an intermediate operation (*vyāpāra*), it is required of the exhortative suffixes to have such an intermediate operation, which is identified by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 as *śabdabhāvanā*. This argument is particularly interesting for the following reason: in ViVi Maṇḍana had identified the exhortative suffixes and as a matter of that the injunction itself to be *jñāpaka* or communicator and denied the possibility of its being a *kāraka* or action-factor, and made it is necessary for such a communicator to have an intermediate operation of such a communicator. But despite the logical necessity of such an intermediate operation in the form of *śabdabhāvanā*, also known as *abhidhābhāvanā*, Maṇḍana had refuted the possibility of *śabdabhāvanā*’s being the cause of instigation (*pravṛtthetu*). Instead, Maṇḍana had sought to establish that exhortative suffixes denote the prescribed action’s being the means to the desired end and for practical reasons only such a denoted meaning of exhortative suffixes should, according to him, successfully instigate a person. Thus, the status of being an instigator which Maṇḍana denied to *śabdabhāvanā* is being defended here by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2. The ground on which such defence is based is the following – since an exhortative suffix is the agent of communication, it needs an intermediate operation like any other agent. Such an intermediate operation of the exhortative suffix is *śabdabhāvanā*.

8. The relation between *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* and associated issues

Since *śabdabhāvanā* is an intermediate operation of exhortative suffixes and *arthabhāvanā* is human activity directed towards the accomplishment of a desired human goal, it may be asked as to how these two are related. According to the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2, it is by virtue of the relation which is characterised by being obtainable from the same speech-unit that these two are understood to be connected to each other²¹⁰. To explain: for the Bhāṭṭas, all the verbal endings express *arthabhāvanā* or human activity directed towards a specific human goal and in case of exhortative verbal endings, instigation is additionally denoted. Thus, on hearing exhortative verb-forms, one understands that he is instigated. Hence,

²⁰⁷ *liṅā ’rthāvagame sati pravṛttir dṛśyata iti tatrāpi liṅvyāpāraḥ prabhavati*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

²⁰⁸ *sa cāyaṃ liṅādīvyāpāraḥ śabdabhāvanānāmadheyo vidhir ity ucyate. sa eva pravartakaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 97.

²⁰⁹ Cf. *jñānakārakasyaiva jñāpaka ity ākhyānāt* (ViVi_{Go}, p. 7) – “for, it is the agent of [the action of] communication which is called a communicator.”

²¹⁰ *na ca vidher vākyārthānavayalakṣano doṣa āśaṅkanīya ekapratyayopādānalakṣaṇayā pratyāsattiyā tadanvitavāgamāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 99.

although in case of all other tenses and moods, *arthabhāvanā* or activity is invariably understood, yet one does not specifically to be instigated by someone or something other than oneself; by contrast, on hearing exhortative verb-forms, one invariably understands that someone or something external to the concerned person is urging the latter to do something. This is due to the unique deontic force these exhortative suffixes are endowed with. Thus, it transpires that both *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* are expressed by the same exhortative suffix. Hence this fact of their being obtainable from the same speech unit is the basis for their being connected to each other. In view of the fact that for the Mīmāṃsā philosophers the Vedas are authorless, it is linguistic communication in the form of the exhortative suffix itself which is accepted to instigate human beings to action. Hence it is *śabdabhāvanā* or *vidhi*, the intermediate operation of the exhortative suffixes which enjoin human beings to *arthabhāvanā* or human activity²¹¹. In support of this, the Bhaṭṭa opponent cites the following verses from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa –

“The relation between injunction (*śabdabhāvanā*) and *bhāvanā* produced by the fact of being graspable from a single²¹² (exhortative) verbal ending is ascertained, to begin with, before [understanding both the *bhāvanā*-s’ connection with] the meaning of the verbal root.”²¹³

“With regard to his own activity, a person is enjoined as an agent.”²¹⁴

Now an opponent comes up with the following objection –

“[Objection:] Well, you only have said that prior to [an understanding of the connection with] the meaning of the verbal root, the relation of *bhāvanā* [which accomplishes] it (the specific action denoted by the verbal root) and the injunction is understood. Despite being obtainable from a single speech-unit (exhortative suffix), the meaning of the verbal root is, to begin with, denoted by the root portion. Both the injunction and *bhāvanā*, by contrast, are denoted by the suffix part. Therefore, sheer *bhāvanā* is touched by the injunction, not [the *bhāvanā*] which is qualified by the scope, etc. But sheer [*bhāvanā*] is unfit for being carried out. And that [*bhāvanā*], set out by the fulfillment of the result, instrument and procedure parts, which is fit to be carried out, has not been touched by the injunction. Does a

²¹¹ *vidhir bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣaṃ niyujkte*. NM_{Mys-II}, p. 99.

²¹² Here the word ‘single’ is to be understood in the sense of ‘same’.

²¹³ *vidhibhāvanāyos tv ekapratyayagrāhyatākṛtaḥ/ dhātvarthāt prathamam tāvat sambandho vyavasīyate*// Verse no. 79, in ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 618.

²¹⁴ *svavyāpāre puruṣo hi kartṛtvena niyujyate*. TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 349.

rational human being act with regard to the meaning of the verbal root, the action-factors, etc. that have not been touched by the injunction?”²¹⁵

The essence of the objection is that although *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* are related to each other through the relation of being expressible by one and the same exhortative suffix, yet since *arthabhāvanā*, which is human activity is always about something, i.e., a specific goal, and a knowledge of the means and procedure for achieving the said goal is unavoidably required, the said *arthabhāvanā* in its pristine form becomes unfit for application. In other words, a rational person, who looks for the specific goal towards which he should direct his efforts and also the means and procedure for accomplishing the end, fails to have the necessary information and is hence unable to undertake the action. This is again because although *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* have got connected to each other and led to the understanding in the person that he is instigated to do something, yet, in the absence of *arthabhāvanā*'s connection with the meaning of the verbal root, from which is understood the means, and also with the result, expressed by such terms as *svarga* (occurring within the compound *svargakāma*), the understanding of the three requisites of *bhāvanā*, viz. ‘what’, ‘by what means’, and ‘how’ are not available.

In reply to the above objection, the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 says:

“[Reply by the Bhāṭṭa opponent:] We say – although the injunction, on account of being denoted by a single [exhortative suffix which forms a part of the exhortative verb, and which also denotes *arthabhāvanā*] at first approaches the sheer *bhāvanā* alone, which has not yet been specified by the meaning of the verbal root; yet, since being so it (injunction) does not find that it can, in that (state), execute its own nature of being the instigator of a rational person, it does not cease [to function] with that much only. But, just like the husband, who has married a child girl, it (the injunction) sits with its hands stretched out so long as *bhāvanā* is not perfect in respect of all parts²¹⁶ [and hence] fit for being carried out [by the rational person]. And [Kumārila] says –

Although the injunction touches *bhāvanā* unmixed by others, still, it (injunction) does not cease in that much only, due to lack of capacity [to

²¹⁵ *nanu ca tvayaivoktaṃ dhātvarthāt pūrvataraṃ tadbhāvanāyā vidheś ca sambandho 'vagamyate. ekapadopādāne 'pi dhātvarthas tāvat prakṛtyaṃśābhidheyaḥ. vidhibhāvane tu dve api pratyayāṃśena abhidhīyete iti. ataś ca svacchaiva bhāvanā vidhinā sprśyate na viśayādyanuraktā. svacchā ca na prayogayogyā bhavati. yathā ca phalakarāṇetikartavyatāṃśaparipūrtiprasthītā prayogayogyā na tāṃ vidhiḥ sprśtavān. avidhisprśteṣu ca dhātvarthakārakādiṣu kimiti sacetāḥ puruṣaḥ pravarteta iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 99-100.

²¹⁶ The parts of *bhāvanā* alluded to here are the three requirements of the goal to be accomplished, its means and the procedure.

instigate a rational person]. An injunction instigates a person with regard to the scope which has to be brought about, and devoid of the three parts [a person] does not carry out the *bhāvanā*. Therefore, the injunction, which has already set out²¹⁷, waits so long as *bhāvanā* becomes fit [to be carried out when its three requirements have been fulfilled and hence it] has no expectation for anything else.” (Verse nos. 55-57, ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, pp. 275-277).”²¹⁸

The main point made here is that since an injunction instigates a rational person, who without knowing what his goal is and what are the means and procedure for achieving that goal, cannot and do not engage in any activity, it cannot cease to operate just after getting syntactically connected to the pristine and unspecified *bhāvanā* on account of both of them being denoted by the same exhortative suffix. Thus, in order for it to discharge its task of instigation of a rational person, the injunction keeps operating until the words expressing the goal, means and procedure get syntactically connected to *bhāvanā*. Once these are connected to *bhāvanā* and there is no semantic expectancy for anything else, the injunction instigates a rational person with regard to such a qualified *bhāvanā*. So, lack of fitness on the part of the injunction to instigate a rational person to pristine *bhāvanā* and the semantic expectancy on the part of a rational person for ‘what to bring about’, ‘by what means to bring about’ and ‘how to bring about’ together contribute to an extended operation of this intermediate operation of exhortative suffixes called *śabdabhāvanā* or *vidhi*.

It is interesting to note that later Mīmāṃsā authors like Pārthasārathimīśra identify stages in the activities of an injunction. According to Pārthasārathi, *yogyatā* or fitness is also a cause of such a relation; otherwise, *bhāvanā* bereft of the three parts is unfit for getting connected to the injunction, which instigates a conscious human being²¹⁹. He identifies the connection of the injunction with *bhāvanā* as being based on their having been denoted by the same exhortative suffix. Pārthasārathi calls this the stage, where unqualified *bhāvanā*

²¹⁷ This means the injunction has already been related with sheer *bhāvanā*.

²¹⁸ *ucyate – yadyapi vidhir anadhigatadhātvarthānurāgatayā svacchām eva bhāvanām ekābhīdhanātvāt prathamam ākrāmati tathāpi tādrśī tasyām sapratyayappravartanātmakanijasvarūpanirvahaṇam alabhamāno na tāvaty eva viramati kintu pariṇītabālakanyako vara iva tāvad vilambamānaḥ prasāritahasta āste yāvat sarvāṅgasundarī prayogayogyā bhāvanā na bhavati. āha ca –*

*yadyapy anyair asaṃsprṣṭām vidhiḥ sprṣati bhāvanām/
tathāpy aśaktīto nāsau tanmātre paryavasyati//
anuṣṭheye hi viṣaye vidhiḥ puṃsām pravartakaḥ/
aṃśatrayeṇa cāpūrṇām nānutiṣṭhati bhāvanām//
tasmāt prakrāntarūpo 'pi vidhis tāvat pratīkṣate/
yāvad yogyatvam āpannā bhāvanā 'nyānapekṣiṇī//* (Verse nos. 274-276, ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, pp. 649-650). NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 100.

²¹⁹ *yogyatā 'pi sambandhakāraṇam na vā 'mśatrayāparipūrṇā bhāvanā cetanapravartanātmakavidhyānyayogyeti.* NRĀ on verse no. 275 of ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 650.

and the injunction get related to each other, ‘the touching of injunction’ or the ‘commencement of injunction’²²⁰.

The Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 concludes his discussion on *bhāvanā* thus –

“This extended and gradually expanding cognition has for its proper content *bhāvanā* with [its expectations for] all the parts fulfilled. There is but one action of cooking, which starts from the placing of a cooking pan on fire, etc. [and extends] up to the accomplishment of rice [when] it requires nothing else, [for which the action of cooking] is of the nature of a collection of many [action-] moments such as bedewing, sowing unhusked rice grains, stirring by ladle, emptying water, etc. Likewise, this linguistic cognition [extends] from the preliminary cognition [of words] up to the determination of sentence-meaning without any further expectation²²¹. And [Kumārila] says –

“This knowledge of the cogniser which starts budding from the words, etc. blossoms into word-meanings and will bear fruits in [the form of] sentence-meaning.”²²²

In other words, although linguistic cognition, for the Bhāṭṭa opponent, starts with the cognition of the first word yet it ends only with the ascertainment of sentence-meaning because the latter is the stage when there is no expectancy for anything further. Thus, non-expectancy is the indicator of the completion of the process of linguistic cognition, which is essentially the cognition of sentence-meaning. The TV verse quoted by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 uses the analogy of the process of a tree bearing fruits via the intermediate stage of bearing flowers. A tree does not end with producing flowers but reaches completion with regard to the purpose of its very existence when it bears fruits. Similarly, a person starts with the cognition of the individual words, from where he is led to the cognition of word-meanings; but this is not the end of the process, because individual word-meanings cannot satisfy his expectation for understanding what the purpose of a sentence, which he has heard, is. Hence his semantic expectancy is met only when

²²⁰ *pratyāsattiviśeṣād dhi vidhibhāvanayor anvayena bhavitavyam ity etāvat prathamam avagamyate tādr̥ṣī cāvasthā vidhisparśa iti vidhiprakrama iti ca ucyate.* NRĀ on verse no. 276, in ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 650.

²²¹ *vākyārthaḥ punar bhāvanātmā ’vagamyamānaikayaiva buddhyainekajātiguṇadravyakriyādyāṅgakalāpakalmāṣitatanur avagamyate tādr̥ṣy ekaiva iyaṃ vākyād vākyarthabuddhiḥ. yathā hi sthālyadhiśrayaṇāt prabhṛti ā nirākāṅkṣaudananiṣpatter ekaiveyaṃ pākakriyā salilāvasekataṇḍulāvapanadarvīghaṭṭanāsravaṇādyanekakṣaṇasamudāyasvabhāvā tathā prathamapadaññānāt prabhṛti ānirākāṅkṣavākyārthaparicchedād ekaiveyaṃ śābdī pramitiḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 101.

²²² *āha ca –*

*padāt prabhṛti yā caiṣā prajñā jñātur vijṛmbhate/
puṣpītā sā padārtheṣu vākyārtheṣu phaliṣyati//* (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.3.30, in MDĀ_{II}, p. 235).
NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 101.

individual word-meanings connect with each other and deliver the sentence-meaning, where *bhāvanā* is the principal semantic element, and all others subordinate to *bhāvanā*. Thus, just as from the simplest and shortest step the most complex and elaborate step is reached in case of the instances of both the tree and a person's linguistic cognition, so the operation of exhortative suffixes ends only when *bhāvanā* has been understood as being qualified by the goal, means and procedure, which renders it fit to be carried out. Due to its purpose-oriented nature, an injunctive sentence produces a variegated cognition as it were. But despite its variegated nature, the cognition is unitary from the phenomenological point of view, because, even though all the distinct semantic elements do not connect with each other, they do connect with *bhāvanā*, the nucleus. It is on account of such connection with and serving the purpose of specifying *bhāvanā*, the central semantic element of the linguistic cognition, that the unitary nature of the cognition cannot be denied.

9. Refutation of *bhāvanā*

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta presents a refutation of the theory of *bhāvanā* through an interlocutor, whom Sen (2013:145) seeks to identify as a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka²²³. The first objection in this regard is presented in the form of a question as to whether or not a separate activity is needed by exhortative suffixes to denote or produce its activity called *śabdabhāvanā*, which is the thing to be done as well as the thing to be denoted²²⁴. If it were not needed, then just as the exhortative suffixes were capable of expressing its own activity, viz. *śabdabhāvanā*, so should they be capable of expressing the meaning, i.e. *arthabhāvanā* too without requiring the postulation of any intermediate stage of *śabdabhāvanā*²²⁵. Now if a separate activity were said to be needed, then it would lead to an infinite regress and there

²²³ Although Sen does not adduce any reason in favour of such an identification, yet it may be said that since the refutation of the Bhaṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā* is immediately followed by a discussion of *niyoga* as a more competent candidate for being the meaning of exhortative suffixes, it is not improbable that this opponent is a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka philosopher. A further clue that hints at this identification is the following: one of the most important points that the opponent of the *bhāvanā* theory made against it was that if the exhortative suffix were to denote *arthabhāvanā*, produce and express *śabdabhāvanā* apart from denoting the grammatical agent and its number, then it would be too great a load for the said suffix. Hence it is but legitimate to postulate one such thing as the meaning of the exhortative suffix which has both the natures of 'something to be done' and 'instigation', which would not unlike *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* face the problem of lack of syntactical connection and put too great a load on the exhortative suffix. Immediately after this (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 104) the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* is introduced as that single thing denoted by exhortative suffix and which is of the nature of being something to be done and that of an instigator and it is claimed to be that, in expressing which, the exhortative suffix does not experience any great load. Notwithstanding what has been said above, it is better to say that there are multiple voices to be heard in Jayanta's refutation of *bhāvanā*, including Jayanta's own.

²²⁴ *tad etad ananumanyamānā anye pracakṣate –yo 'sau śabdabhāvanākhyāḥ śabdavyāpāraḥ śabdasya kāryo 'bhidheyaś ca tam abhidadhataḥ kurvato vā śabdasya vyāpārāntaram asti na vā?* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

²²⁵ *yadi tāvan nāsti tad eṣa vyāpārāntaranirapekṣasavyāpāram iva artham api vadatu viśrāmyatu vyāpārakalpanā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

would be no way out²²⁶. This objection of infinite regress seems to be a direct reuse of the following line from Maṇḍana's ViVi –

abhidhāyās cābhidhā 'pekṣaṇe 'navasthāpātāt. ViVi_{Go}, p. 17.

If [an additional] denotative activity were accepted for denotation, [then there would be the] undesirable consequence of infinite regress.

Moreover, Jayanta adds his own voice and observes that since the possibility of any activity other than physical movements has been already ruled out²²⁷ while considering a general definition of instruments of knowledge, *śabdabhāvanā* cannot be considered as an activity of language²²⁸. This is because physical movements like moving upwards, moving downwards, etc. are not possible with regard to the exhortative suffixes on account of their being insentient. Further, *arthabhāvanā* has been described by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 as a human activity directed towards the accomplishment of a goal. It is to be remembered that on the Bhāṭṭa view, *jñāna* or cognition is also an activity²²⁹. But the occurrence of a cognition, according to Jayanta, does not make any one an agent. It is rather the inherence of a specific quality, viz. *kṛti* or effort, which makes an agent. Hence, qualities like cognition, etc. are not fit to be called activities since they have an accomplished nature²³⁰. In explanation of this, Pañcānana Tarkavāgīśa explains:

“The accomplishment or non-accomplishment of qualities like cognition, etc. are not dependent upon human will and this is what contributes to their being of an accomplished nature. By contrast, those things which can be brought about and not brought about by will, have an unaccomplished nature. In short, it may be said, that which is not fit to be brought about [through human effort] has an accomplished nature, and that which is fit to be brought about [through human effort] has an unaccomplished nature.”²³¹

²²⁶ *asti ced asya tadabhidhāne vyāpārāntaraṃ tadā 'navasthāpratīkāraḥ kaścīd anveṣaṇīyaḥ. na cāsau dūrād api labhyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.*

²²⁷ See NM_{Mys.-I}, pp. 44-53.

²²⁸ *bhūtapariśpandavyatiriktavyāpāranirāsaś ca pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇe vistareṇa kṛta ity asau mārga ihāpy anusaraṇīyaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.*

²²⁹ For an analysis of Jayanta's examination of the Bhāṭṭa view of cognition, see Jha (1987).

²³⁰ *etena bhāvanākhyāḥ karotyārthaḥ puruṣavyāpāro vākyārtha ity yo 'bhyupagataḥ so 'pi pratyukto vedītavyaḥ. na hi puruṣavyāpāraḥ kaścīd upalabhyate viśiṣṭaguṇasamavāya evāsya kartṛtvam. na ca jñānādayo guṇā eva vyāpārasaṃjñāvācyāḥ, siddhasvabhāvatvāt. NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 52.*

²³¹ *arthāt tāhāder sampādan o asampādan svecchādhīn nahe. ataeb tāhārā siddhasvabhāv. kintu yāhāder sampādan o asampādan svecchādhīn, tāhārā sādhyasvabhāv. ek kathāy balite gele balite hay, yāhā anuṣṭheya nahe tāhā siddhasvabhāva, yāhā anuṣṭheya tāhā sādhyasvabhāva. Tarkavāgīśa (1939:157).*

The upshot of what has been said above is that a cognition in so far as it cannot be brought about through human effort, is of an accomplished nature, and hence a cognition cannot be considered as an activity. This is perhaps because cognitions do not set one to motion even at the mental level, but *kr̥ti* or effort surely does so.

Since the activity of exhortative words called *śabdabhāvanā* has been described as something to be produced (*kārya*) and that which is to be denoted (*abhidheya*), it naturally leads to the question whether i) it is first denoted and then produced, or ii) first produced and then denoted, or iii) produced and denoted at the same time²³². The first option does not hold water since denotation of something which is as yet unproduced is incorrect; for example, it is not the case that one names one's son, who is not born as yet. For, if it were so, then a word would be devoid of an actual referent²³³. As Prabal Kumar Sen explains:

“It is only when a denoter-denoted relation exists that a word can denote a meaning. Any relation whatsoever belongs to both the relata. Without both the denoter and the denoted remaining at one place the denoter-denoted relation cannot obtain between them. If the object of denotation is absent at the time of denotation, such a denoter-denoted relation cannot obtain between them; hence the word would become non-denoter or be devoid of the object to be denoted. Although the fact of words being devoid of [their respective] objects [of denotation] is accepted by the Buddhists, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā philosophers do not support it. Thus, words becoming non-denotative would not be a welcome objection for them, but an undesirable consequence.”²³⁴

The third alternative, i.e. the activity called *śabdabhāvanā* is produced and denoted at the same time, is also not tenable because in this case too, the fault of *śabdabhāvanā* having not been produced before being denoted remains uncleared²³⁵. To explain: since the act of

²³² *yaś cāsau vyāpāraḥ kriyate cābhidhīyate ca sa kiṃ pūrvam abhidhīyate tataḥ kriyate pūrvam vā kriyate paścād abhidhīyate yugapad eva vā 'sya karaṇābhidhāne iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

²³³ *na tāvat pūrvam abhidhīyate tataḥ kriyate 'nutpannasyābhidhānānupapatteḥ. na hy ajāte putre nāmadheyakaraṇam. arthāsaṃsparśī ca tathā sati śabdaḥ syāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102. Cakradhara explains the last point as follows: *anutpannatvena asatsamatvād vyāpārasya tadviśayatve śabdasya arthāsaṃsparśitvam* (NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 71) – “On account of being not produced as yet, the activity (*śabdabhāvanā*) is akin to [something] non-existent (e.g., a sky-flower) [and] if [such a linguistic activity] were the content of the word (exhortative suffixes), [then the word] would not touch upon the object.”

²³⁴ *śabda o tāhār arther madhye vācyā-vācaka sambandha thākilei śabda arther vācaka haite pare. sambandhamātrei ubhayaniṣṭha haiyā thāke. vācyā evaṃ vācaka – ei ubhaya ekatra nā thākile tāhāder madhye vācyā-vācaka sambandha haite pāre nā. abhidhāna kāle abhidheya artha avidyamāna haile tāhāder madhye ai vācyā-vācaka sambandha thākite pāribe na; ejanya śabdaṭi avācaka vā arthaśūnya haiyā paḍibe. pader avācakatā vā vācyarahitvatva bauddha sampradaya svikāra karileo bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakrā ai siddhānter samarthak nahen. ejanya śabder avācakatvaprasaṅga upasthit haile tāhārā iṣṭāpatti karite pāriben na, uhā tāhāder pakṣe aniṣṭaprasaṅgai haibe.* Sen (2013:147-148).

²³⁵ *ata eva na yugapad ubhayam, anutpannatvānapāyāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

denotation presupposes, at least for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā philosophers, the presence of the denoter and the object to be denoted, simultaneous production and denotation cannot guarantee the presence of the object to be denoted prior to the act of denotation and hence the fault shown with regard to the first alternative gets extended to the third one too. Moreover, there would be the undesirable consequence of excess of efforts if there are simultaneous production and denotation²³⁶.

The remaining alternative that exhortative suffixes first produce the activity called *śabdabhāvanā* and then denote it, is also not tenable since after finishing one operation a word is not seen to be further operative²³⁷. To explain: it is accepted by almost all Indian philosophers that words, cognitions and actions can produce only one effect through a single operation²³⁸. For, before they could operate for producing any further effect, they themselves die out. and for which they cannot produce any additional effect on the basis of either the previous operation or any new one. Consistent with this principle, since on the second alternative, the exhortative suffix will have exhausted its operation after producing *śabdabhāvanā*, it would not be able to operate further to denote it.

At this point a sarcastic remark is made by Jayanta's opponent. The opponent asks as to how should the exhortative suffix, despite being a great bull²³⁹, afford to bear too great a load²⁴⁰? This is because it has to denote the grammatical agent and its number, denote *arthabhāvanā*. Moreover, it has to produce *śabdabhāvanā* and then express it. Thus such a great load is indeed unbearable by it²⁴¹. The issue involved here can be understood with reference to the generally accepted Mīmāṃsā rule, “*ananyalabhyo hi śabdārthaḥ*”, which says that what is conveyed by linguistic communication (*śabda*) is not understood through any other instrument of knowledge²⁴². For, if *śabda* were to denote even those things which are accessible through other means of knowledge like perception, inference, postulation, etc. the very need for either *śabda* or the rest would be rendered useless. This would

²³⁶ *prayatnagauravaprasaṅgāc ca*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

²³⁷ *nāpi kṛtvā 'bhidhānaṃ viramya vyāpārāsaṃvedanāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

²³⁸ *śabdabuddhikarmaṇāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāvāt* – although this formulation is to be found in the second chapter of Viśvanātha Kavirāja's *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, still this principle was conceptually functional very long before since it played a cardinal role in determining, for example, how linguistic cognitions occur, what the constituents of a linguistic cognition are, how many *vṛtti*-s or significative powers of words should be accepted, etc.

²³⁹ This comparison of the exhortative suffix is warranted by the fact that the polysemic word 'go' is used to mean both bull and word.

²⁴⁰ *api cāyaṃ tapasvī līṅādīḥ pratyayaḥ saty api govṛndārakatve katham amum atibrhantaṃ bhāraṃ vakṣyati*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 102.

²⁴¹ *kartāraṃ ca tatsaṃkhyāṃ cākhyāsyati. bhāvanāṃ abhidhāsyate. śabdabhāvanāṃ ca kariṣyati tāṃ ca vadiṣyati durbaho 'yaṃ bhāraḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 102-103.

²⁴² For more on this, see Melis and Pontillo (2017) and Bronkhorst (2009).

ultimately destroy the validity of linguistic communication in the form of the Vedic sacred texts, which are claimed by Mīmāṃsakas to convey such information as are not available from other instruments of knowledge. It is the novelty of content (viz. what ought to be brought about) which distinguishes *śabda* from others. Also, denotation of more than one thing by a word would lead to sentence-splitting (*vākyabheda*). This in turn can create confusions when such word-meanings get connected as subsidiaries to a central semantic element of a linguistic cognition. Since on the Mīmāṃsā view, sentences necessarily execute a pragmatic function, such confusion about one or more subordinate elements of a linguistic cognition can cause doubt in regard to the way of executing the purpose. In the Vedic context if a word (say, those expressing substances) expresses two different meanings, it would be hard to decide which one of the two meanings should be accepted. The problem complicates when such substances serve only unseen purposes within a given Vedic ritual, for, both the kinds of substances could in that case be claimed to serve the unseen purpose. This, together with another rule that a word uttered for once can communicate only one meaning at a time, explains why denotation of many meanings by a single speech unit at a time is a great load for it.

This is followed by a very fundamental objection raised by the opponent. According to the opponent, no syntactical connection between *arthabhāvanā* and *śabdabhāvanā* could be shown. It is not enough to say that both are related by means of the relation of being denoted by the same exhortative suffix. This is because, since *arthabhāvanā*, which is of the nature of human activity, is the principal element of a linguistic cognition and hence the sentence-meaning, the meaning of other words occurring in the injunction like ‘one desirous of *svarga*’, etc. would get connected to such a principal element as subordinates. This connection of words like ‘*svargakāma*’ as subordinates is on account of their fulfilling the expectancy of *arthabhāvanā* in regard to the thing to the result, the instrument thereof and the procedure for doing so²⁴³. However, *śabdabhāvanā*, on account of not fulfilling any of the expectancies of *arthabhāvanā*, cannot connect as a subordinate element to the principal element, viz. *arthabhāvanā*. This is again due to the fact that two equal things are not seen to get connected to each other, just as in case of “a pot, a piece of cloth”, “he cooks, he reads”²⁴⁴. To explain: a linguistic cognition (*śābdabodha*) is a qualified cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*), in which the constituent word-meanings (*padārtha*) are arranged in a hierarchy. The very basis of this relation among word-meanings in a linguistic cognition

²⁴³ *kaś cāyaṃ śabdabhāvanānāmadheyasya vidher vākyārthe bhāvanāyām anvaya iti vaktavyam. nanūkta evaikapratyayābhidheyatvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandha iti – na brūma ābhidhānikaḥ sambandho nokta iti. kintu puruṣavyāpārātmikāyā arthabhāvanāyāḥ pradhānatvena vākyārthatvāt tadapekṣyamāṇaphalakarāṇetikartavyatāmśapūraṇena svargakāmādīpadāntarābhidheyo ’rthaḥ samanveti guṇatvena. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 103.*

²⁴⁴ *śabdavyāpāras tu tadapekṣitam anyatamam api nāmśaṃ pūrayitum alam iti na tatra guṇatām avalambate. na ca dvayoh pradhānoḥ ghaṭaḥ paṭa itivad vā pacati paṭhatītivad vā sambandha uplabhyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 103.*

is the principle of principal and the subordinate (*guṇapradhānabhāva*). When a particular word-meaning features in a linguistic cognition as the principal element it exhibits various kinds of expectancies related to its nature, purpose, instrument of realisation. All these expectancies are fulfilled by other word-meanings featuring in the linguistic cognition, and as a result of fulfilling such expectancies of the principal element, they serve to clarify and specify the principal element by way of connecting with it as subordinates. Coming to *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*, it may be observed that although *arthabhāvanā* serves to fulfill the expectancy of *śabdabhāvanā* as to what is to be brought about, yet it is seen that Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas postulate *arthabhāvanā* as the principal element of a linguistic cognition. Hence, if *arthabhāvanā* is the principal element and *śabdabhāvanā* has to connect with it, the latter has to fulfill at least one of the three expectancies of *arthabhāvanā*, by virtue of which *śabdabhāvanā* could be deemed as subsidiary to *arthabhāvanā*. It is only in this way that *śabdabhāvanā* could find a proper place in the linguistic cognition. But this is not the case since, as noted above, *śabdabhāvanā* fulfills none of the three expectancies of *arthabhāvanā* and on this score it cannot become a subsidiary to *arthabhāvanā*. On account of not being not a subordinate element, *śabdabhāvanā* becomes the principal thing and since a linguistic cognition can admit only one principal element, *śabdabhāvanā* cannot feature in such linguistic cognitions where *arthabhāvanā* features as the principal element. If it were otherwise, it would go against the very architecture of linguistic cognitions.

Now, the Bhāṭṭa opponent might say that *arthabhāvanā* in so far as it fulfills the expectancy of *śabdabhāvanā* for the content, would become subsidiary and hence there would not be the problem of two principal elements²⁴⁵. But in that case, it is *śabdabhāvanā* or *vidhi* that on thus being the principal element would be sentence-meaning, and not *bhāvanā* or *arthabhāvanā* since the latter has become subordinate²⁴⁶. This would also refute the fundamental thesis of the Bhāṭṭas that it is *arthabhāvanā*, which is defined as the activity of the producer directed towards the thing to be produced²⁴⁷. Being denoted by the same word too cannot act as a basis for the syntactical connection of *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*, for in cases of words like *akṣāḥ*, *pādāḥ* and *māṣāḥ* similarly one does not find syntactical connection among the meanings denoted by the same word²⁴⁸. To explain: the words *akṣāḥ*, *pādāḥ*, *māṣāḥ* are examples of *ekaśeṣa* type of compounds. The

²⁴⁵ *athārthabhāvanā śabdabhāvanākhyasya vidher viśayasamarpaṇena guṇatām avalambate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 103.

²⁴⁶ *vidhis tarhi vākyārtho na bhāvanā tasyā aprādhānyāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 103.

²⁴⁷ *ata eva hi vākyārtham bhāvanām pratijānate/*

.....

keyaṃ bhāvanā nāma. bhāvyaṇiṣṭho bhāvavakavyāpāro bhāvanā. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 82.

²⁴⁸ *ekābhīdhānābhīdheyatvaṃ ca na bhāvanayor anyonyasamanvaye kāraṇam akṣāḥ pādā māṣā ity ādau adarśanāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 103.

concerned Pāṇini rule for this, *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau* (Aṣṭ 1.2.64) is briefly explained by Madhav M. Deshpande as follows:

““When a number of homophonic nominal stems occur with the same case ending, only one of the homophonic nominal stems is retained [and others are deleted].” This rule is interpreted in the following way. A plural form such as *vṛkṣāḥ* “trees” is grammatically derived from a sequence of many singular forms such as *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca*. Only one of these stems is retained and a plural affix added after it.”²⁴⁹

In case of the plural form, *akṣāḥ*, too, it may be observed that it is derived from a number of singular homophonic nominal stems *akṣaś cākṣaś cākṣaś ca*, where the first *akṣa* may mean dice-cube, the second may mean the stick that connects the axle in a chariot, and the third may mean sense-organs. Although, according to the Pāṇini rule cited above, the final plural form, *akṣāḥ*, expresses a collection of these individual meanings, yet no connection among these individual meanings of the constituent homophonic nominal stem, *akṣa*, is ever understood. One has to similarly understand in case of the word *pāda*, which variously mean foot, the foot of a meter and the one-fourth part of any thing, and also *māṣa*, which variously means a kind of cereal, a unit of measurement used by the goldsmiths and a stupid person. Now, just as despite being expressed by the same plural form, *akṣāḥ*, none of the meanings of the constituent individual homophonic nominal stems, *akṣa*, syntactically connect with each other, so do *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* not syntactically connect with each other in spite of being denoted by the same exhortative suffix. It is interesting to note that the example of the *ekaśeṣa* compounds cited by Jayanta to argue that *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* do not get syntactically connected with each other despite being denoted by the same word, is interpreted by Prabal Kumar Sen as an instance of *anvayavyabhicāra* or ‘disagreement in presence’²⁵⁰. Sen also shows how a *vyatirekavyabhicāra* or ‘disagreement in absence’ occurs between ‘being denotable by the same word’ and ‘mutual syntactic connection’. In such an expression as *nīlam utpalam* – “a blue lotus” – although the blueness and lotus are expressed by different words, yet they get syntactically connected with each other. And if either disagreement in presence or disagreement in absence occur in regard to two things, no direct or indirect causal relationship can be accepted to obtain between them. It is for this reason that ‘being denotable by the same word’ cannot be the basis for the syntactical connection between two or more things denoted by the same word²⁵¹.

²⁴⁹ Deshpande (1992:89).

²⁵⁰ *eirūpe ekapadābhidheyatva evaṃ paraspar anvayer madhye anvayavyabhicāra āche*. Sen (2013:153).

²⁵¹ *punaś ca, ‘nīlam utpalam’ – ei sthale vākyāntargata padadvayer artha nīl o utpal bhinna bhinna pader dvārā upasthāpita haoyāy tāhāder madhye ekapadābhidheyatva nāi, athaca tāhāder pārasparik anvay haiyā thāke. eirūpe ekapadābhidheyatva o paraspar anvayer madhye vyatirekavyabhicārao āche. konao duiṭi vastur madhye anvayvyabhicāra athavā vyatirekavyabhicāra thākile tāhāder madhye kāryakāraṇabhāva athavā*

The final point that the opponent makes against the Bhāṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā* is with regard to the basis of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka's postulation of the two *bhāvanā*-s being denoted by the same exhortative suffix²⁵². In reply the Bhāṭṭa might say that such a postulation is based on the fact that upon hearing the exhortative suffixes, two separate cognitions – one about something to be done and the other about being impelled – do not occur. In other words, it is one cognition only which has for its content something that is to be done, and also impelling. Thus, the cognition ensuing from the hearing of the exhortative suffixes is only one, but their content is two things. Hence, it is proper to accept that *śabdabhāvanā* (representing impelling) and *arthabhāvanā* (representing something to be done) are denoted by the same exhortative suffix²⁵³. The opponent closes his critique of the theory of *bhāvanā* by responding that if it were because of the fact that no two cognitions sequentially occur which separately have something to be done and instigation as their respective content and both of them form the content of a single cognition only which ensues from the hearing of exhortative suffixes, then it is better to accept only one such thing as the meaning of exhortative suffixes, as would cover both these aspects. And if such one thing is accepted as the meaning of exhortative suffixes, then on account of its singularity one would not have to worry, unlike in case of *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*, as to how to mutually connect the meanings of exhortative suffixes. This would also save one from putting an excessive load of denoting and producing *śabdabhāvanā* on the exhortative suffix²⁵⁴.

It has already been at the end of Section 5 above how Jayanta quotes words probably from Umbeka's commentary on Maṇḍana's BhāVi in order to present the Bhāṭṭa view that *śabdabhāvanā* which is an activity of the optative suffixes is both denoted and produced by such suffixes. It has also been noted how in Umbeka's commentary on BhāVi two different sequences of the two words 'abhidhatte' and 'karoti' are found. Now, the criticism of *śabdabhāvanā* in terms of three alternatives regarding the sequence of the

prayojoyaprayojakabhāva svikāra karā yāy nā. eijanya duiṭi ba tatodhik vastur ekapadābhidheyatva nāmak sambandhake ai vastugulir pārasparik anvayer prayojak balā yāy nā. Sen (2013:153).

²⁵² *kiñca kasyānurodhena dve bhāvane pratyayavācyete. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 104.*

²⁵³ *ucyate liṅādiśravaṇe sati kārye ca preraṇāyām ca na dvir utpadyate matiḥ. NM_{EP-I}, p. 346.* The reading of the Mysore edn. is as follows – *ucyate liṅādiśravaṇe sati kārye ca preraṇāyām ca buddhir utpadyata iti* (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 104) – “On hearing exhortative suffixes, a cognition arises in regard to something to be done and instigation.” The reading found in the *editio princeps* has been preferred to the Mysore reading since the former emphatically and explicitly denies the possibility of two separate cognitions, of which one would have ‘something to be done’ as its content and the other instigation. Through this, it also implies the occurrence of nothing but a single cognition which has both ‘something to be done’ and instigation as its content. However, the Mysore reading neither explicitly denies the occurrence of two cognitions nor affirms the occurrence of a single cognition; rather, the understanding of it as expressing the occurrence of a single cognition is based on a stretch of imagination.

²⁵⁴ *yady evam eka eva tādrśo 'sau liṅartho bhavatu tadekatvāc ca na parasparam anvayaś cintayiṣyate. na ca pratyaye 'py atibhāra āropayiṣyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 104.*

denotation and production of *śabdabhāvanā* by the exhortative suffixes discussed in the current section may have been triggered by the two different sequences in the occurrence of them shown in Umbeka's commentary.

It will not be out of place to mention here that despite commenting on Maṇḍana's *Bhāvanāviveka*, Umbeka held *preraṇā* or impelling to be the additional meaning conveyed by exhortative suffixes. It is worth remembering that in ViVi, Maṇḍana rejected Kumārila's *śabdabhāvanā* and held *śreyaḥsādhanatā* to be the meaning denoted by the exhortative suffixes. Nevertheless, Umbeka seems to have attempted a reconciliation of Kumārila's view of *śabdabhāvanā* with Maṇḍana's reinterpretation of Kumārila's *audāsīnyapracūti* as consisting of both *prayatna* and *parispanda*.

I will conclude this chapter by presenting the following extract from Umbeka's commentary on BhāVi²⁵⁵ and my analysis of it, that will give an idea of the arguments Umbeka had advanced in favour of *śabdabhāvanā*. It will also perhaps indirectly provide key to answering some of the objections against *śabdabhāvanā*, discussed by Jayanta in NM 5.2.

(a) [Pūrvapakṣin:] *nanu prayatnaspandamātrabhāvanābhyupagame liṅāder acetanātmakatvena sarvagatatve ca prayatnaparispandābhāve sati śabdabhāvanābhyupagamo mīmāṃsakānām mithyaiva syāt. tatra kecid āhur - bādham mithyā eva. na hi liṅāder acetanasya sataḥ svasmin vyāpāro 'sti yaṃ bhāvanāśabdo 'bhiniviśeta.*

[Opponent:] Well, if only effort and movement are accepted, in the absence of effort and movement the acceptance of *śabdabhāvanā* by the Mīmāṃsaka-s would be wrong since exhortative suffixes are unconscious (and hence cannot make efforts) and [they are] present everywhere [for which they cannot move]. In that regard, some say – certainly [be] it wrong. For, there is no activity of the exhortative suffixes in regard to themselves which the word *bhāvanā* could refer to.

(b) [Umbeka:] *nanu preraṇā 'sti.*

[Umbeka:] – Well, there is [such an activity, which is] impelling.

(c) [Pūrvapakṣin:] *kutaḥ punar iyaṃ preraṇā pratīyate?*

[Opponent:] But whence is this impelling understood?

(d) [Umbeka:] *liṅāder eveti brūmaḥ. na hi svavyāpārasya śabdānabhidheyatvāt.*

[Umbeka:] We say [impelling is understood] from the optative and like suffixes only. For, it is not the case that the activity of a speech unit is not denoted [by it].

²⁵⁵ BhāVi_{GJ}, pp. 92-94.

- (e) [Pūrvapakṣin:] *na hi svavyāpāraṃ kaścic chabdo nivadati. na vā svavyāpāraiḥ sambandhagrahaṇaṃ sambhavati prāk śabdād avidyamānatvenāgrahaṇāt. avyāpārarūpapreraṇābhyupagame tu na śabdabhāvanāsiddhiḥ prayojakavyāpārasya bhāvanātvābhyupagamāt. na ca vyāpārarūpā 'pi preraṇā nāma kācid asti.*

[Opponent:] No speech unit expresses its own activity. Nor is it possible to grasp a relation with its own activity before a unit of speech [functions], because it is not grasped on account of being absent. But *śabdabhāvanā* is not established if impelling is postulated as being of the nature of non-activity; this is because it is the activity of an instigating agent which is postulated as *bhāvanā*. Nor even is there anything called impelling which is of the nature of activity.

- (f) [Umbeka:] *nanu liṅādeḥ preraṇām avagacchāmaḥ. na 'yajeta svargakāma' iti vākyād dhātvarthasya śreyahśādhanatvamātrābhyupagamāt.*

[Umbeka:] Well, it is from optative and like suffixes that we understand impelling. For, out of the sentence, “One who desires *svarga* should sacrifice”, it is not only conveyed that the verbal root is the means of achieving something beneficial [but impelling is also conveyed].

- (g) [Pūrvapakṣin:] *na preraṇā nāmā 'nyā kācid avagamyate. tasmāc chabdabhāvanā nāma nāsty evety avagamyate. taddvaividhyam anupapannam. abhidhānalakṣaṇo 'py arthapratipattikarmaḥ śabdavyāpāro na gamyate. śabdād eva tu nirvyāpārād arthāvagamaḥ. na ca nirvyāpārasya kāratvaṃ viruddham. kāṣṭhāder jvālādau vyāpārāntararahitasyāpi karṭṛtvadarśanāt. tasmād arthapratipattikarmikā sambandhagrahaṇakaraṇikocāraṇetikartavyatopetā prayojakaśabdavyāpāralakṣaṇā 'bhidhābhāvanā nāsti.*

[Partial Proponent]: Nothing additional called impelling is understood. Therefore, it is understood that there is nothing called *śabdabhāvanā*. The twofoldness [of *bhāvanā*] is unreasonable. A linguistic activity characterised by denotation and having as its object the understanding of meaning is also not understood. By contrast, meaning is understood from language, that does not perform any activity. There is no contradiction if something, which has no activity, is an action-factor. For, fuel sticks, etc., despite being devoid of any other activity, are seen to be agents of burning, etc. Therefore, there is no denotative *bhāvanā* (*abhidhābhāvanā*), which is characterised by the activity of instigating speech-unit; which has the understanding of meaning as its object, the grasping of relation as the instrument [and] is endowed with the procedure in the form of utterance.

- (h) [Umbeka:] *tad etad apeśalam. preraṇātmikā viśiṣṭā [tā]vad arthabhāvanāvat karṭṛsaṅkhyāvac ca liṅādeḥ pratīyate. tatra sambhavanādau satyāpi liṅprayogena dhātvarthasya śreyahśādhanatvam avagamyate. sā cābhidhānavac chabdavyāpārah, prāk śabdāt sattve pramāṇābhāvāt. ato na sad abhidhānam. śabda eva karoty*

abhidhatte ca. na cābhidhānavac chabdavyāpāratvād anabhidheyatvaṃ pratipattivirodhāt. aḡhītasambandho 'pi ca liṅ prerāṇām abhidhatte svārthavyutpannasambandhād dhātoḥ paraḥ prayuktaḥ, kim atra kurmaḥ?

[Umbeka]: This is not appealing. A specified [*bhāvanā*] which is of the nature of impelling, is, to begin with, understood from optative and like suffixes, just like *arthabhāvanā* and the agent and the number [pertaining to the agent are understood]. In that case (when exhortative suffixes are used), even if possibility may [also] be conveyed, the meaning of the verbal root is understood as the means to [achieve] something beneficial. And just like denotation, it (impelling) is an activity of exhortative suffixes, for there is no proof for the existence [of impelling] before linguistic communication [comes into force]. Hence, denotation does not already exist (it is produced by the exhortative suffix). It is linguistic communication alone which produces and denotes [instigation]. It is not the case that on account of being an activity [impelling] is not denotable like [the activity of] denotation, for it contradicts [our] understanding [which is, as explained, the following]. Even without a connection with its meaning having been grasped, the optative suffix, as occurring after a verbal root, whose (the verbal roots') relation with its own meaning has been acquired, denotes impelling. What should we do in this regard? [Language works this way: Suffixes denote instigation, even though no linguistic unit denotes denotation itself].

- (i) [Umbeka:] *anye tv āhur - liṅādiyuktavākyaśravaṇasamanantaram puruṣapravṛttidarśanād avagamyate pravṛttihetubhūto 'rtho 'nena puruṣeṇa asmāc chabdād avagata iti.*

[Umbeka's report of some other view:] But others say – since immediately on hearing a sentence endowed with the optative [verb-form] undertaking of action by human beings is seen [to take place], it is understood that the person has understood from this speech unit (i.e., exhortative suffix) the meaning which is of the nature of the cause of undertaking.

- (j) [Umbeka:] *na pravṛttihetutvaṃ liṅādeḥ sambhavati, sambhāvanādaḥ vyabhicārāt.*

[Umbeka:] Being the cause of undertaking is not possible for optative and like suffixes because of deviation in case of possibility, etc. [where despite the occurrence of the optative suffix undertaking of action does not take place].

- (k) *nāpi phalasya, vidhim antareṇa svargādeḥ phalatvānavagamāt. vidhipramāṇako hi svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvo na pratyakṣādīpramāṇakaḥ. ata eva uktaṃ – “codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah” iti.*

[Umbeka]: Nor should [then] *svarga*, etc. [be the cause of instigation], for without the injunction, [*svarga*, etc.] are not understood as the result. For, the means-end relation [obtaining] between [the act of] sacrifice and *svarga* is known [only] from the

injunction and not from perception, etc. Therefore, indeed, it has been said – “Religious duty is the beneficial purpose which is known [only] from the Vedic injunctions” (MīSū 1.1.2).

- (l) ... *nāpy arthavādānām pravartakatvaṃ, stutimātrāvagamāt. tadanyathānupapattikalpitavidhyabhyupagame 'pi vidhir eva pravṛtīhetuḥ syāt.*

.... Nor even can laudatory statements be the instigator, for, mere eulogy [of the prescribed act] is understood [out of them]. Even if we assume that there is a postulated injunction [beyond the laudatory statements], since they would not make sense otherwise, it is this injunction only which would be the cause of undertaking.

- (m) *tenānvayavyatirekābhyām līnārthaṃ pravṛtīhetum avagacchāmaḥ. sa ca preraṇātmakatvād vinā pravṛtīhetur na bhavati iti preraṇātmikā sā 'vagamyate.*

On that score, it is through concomitant presence and concomitant absence that we understand the meaning of the optative suffix to be the cause of undertaking of actions. Without being of the nature of impelling, it (the meaning of the optative suffix) does not become the cause of undertaking. Hence it is understood as being of the nature of impelling.

- (n) *kāryātmakavidhyarthavādīno 'py arthāt preraṇaiva pravṛtīhetuḥ. tatra kāryātmakatvaṃ prāñ nirākṛtatvān na sambhavatīti preraṇātmako līnārtha ity ucyate. tatraiva puruṣāntarpravṛtīdarśanāvagate preraṇātmake vidhyarthe liño vyutpattiḥ.*

Even for those²⁵⁶ who hold that the meaning of the injunction is something to be done, it is implicitly impelling only which is the cause of undertaking. In that regard, since [the meaning of the injunction's] being of the nature of something to be done has been previously refuted, it is not possible [for it to be the cause of undertaking]; hence it is said that the meaning of the optative suffix is of the nature of impelling. One learns to use the optative suffix only in order to signify the injunction's meaning, which consists of impelling and is grasped from seeing another person undertake an action.

- (o) *tena sāmānyena rūpeṇa preraṇā 'bhidheyā viśeṣarūpeṇa līnādikāryā. sa viśeṣo lakṣaṇayā śabdenāvagamyate. yathābhidhānaśabdo 'bhidhānaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhatte viśeṣarūpeṇa ca karotim.*

For that reason, in its general form impelling is the object to be denoted [by the optative and like suffixes], and in its specific form, [impelling] is the thing produced by the optative and like suffixes. That specific [form] is understood by means of linguistic communication through secondary signification²⁵⁷. This is just like the word

²⁵⁶ This seems to be an allusion to the view of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka-s.

²⁵⁷ Since instigation (*preraṇā*) is both denoted and produced by the optative suffix, and denotation is the primary task of any speech unit, the question naturally arises as to how we know that instigation, which has

‘denotation’ denoting the act of denotation in its general form, and the [finite verb] ‘does’ in its (denotation’s) specific form.

(p) *idaṃ tv atīsaundhryeṇopanyastam - pratītiśaraṇās tv agrīhatasambandha eva liṅādiḥ preraṇāvīśeṣam abhidhatte karotīti ca vadanti.*

It has been presented with great pride²⁵⁸ [that] – those who resort to what they apprehend say that the optative and like suffixes without indeed their connection being grasped express a specific impelling and produces it.

(q) *tasmād asti puruṣapravṛttikarmikā vidhijñānakaraṇikā ’rthavādotpāditaviṣayaprāśastyajñānetikartavyatopetā liṅādivyāpāraḥ preraṇātmikā śabdabhāvanā.*

Therefore, there exists *śabdabhāvanā*, which is of the nature of impelling; which is the activity of optative and like suffixes; which has human undertaking of actions as its object; a knowledge of the injunctive suffix as the instrument; and understanding of excellence of the scope (the instrument in the form of the prescribed action), produced by the laudatory statements as the procedure.

(r) *abhidhānalakṣaṇo ’pi ca devadattāder iva vyāpāraḥ śabdabhāvanā. na cābhidhānām nāstīti vaktavyam. nirvyāpārasya kāṣṭhādeḥ pradhānakriyāyām anvayānupalabdheḥ svavyāpāre vyāpārāntarābhāve ’pi. tenārthpratipatīlakṣaṇām pradhānakriyām nirvartayaṅ chabdaḥ kāṣṭham iva viklittiṅ svavyāpāreṇa nirvartayatīti gamyate. ata eva śabdo ’bhidhatte ity ucyate. anyathā niṣkriyasyāyam api vyapadeśo niribandhana eva syāt.*

Even though it is characterised by denotation, *śabdabhāvanā* is an activity like [the activity] of Devadatta etc. It cannot be said that there is no [additional] denotation. For, fuel sticks, etc., that have not engaged in any activity, are not seen to have any connection with the main action [of cooking] even though there is no other activity in

been denoted, did not exist forever and was produced by the optative suffix at some point of time. An obvious way out could be inferring or postulating the coming into being of something which has been denoted, but this would compromise the ‘linguistic’ (*śabda*) nature of the thing produced as it would invite the intervention of other instruments of knowledge like postulation, which is surely an undesirable consequence. It is for avoiding such an undesirable consequence that Umbeka seems to have resorted to *lakṣaṇā* or the secondary signification, which would ultimately help retain the linguistic nature of the instigation which has been produced by the optative suffix.

²⁵⁸ Although it may seem *prima facie* to be an opponent’s assertion, yet this is perfectly consistent with Umbeka’s view stated above, according to which, it is on the basis of our apprehension that impelling (*preraṇā*) is accepted as an activity of the exhortative suffixes. Hence, I have sought to identify this as the view of Umbeka. Moreover, if it were an opponent speaking, then one would naturally expect Umbeka to refute it later, which is however not the case. Further, this passage may be considered as referring back to (h) above.

regard to its own activity [of burning, etc.]²⁵⁹. For that reason, speech units [like the optative and like suffixes] are understood as bringing about through their own activity [of instigation] the main action characterised by the understanding of meaning [of being instigated to do some specific thing]. This is similar to a fuel stick accomplishing softening [of rice] through its own activity [of burning, etc.]. Therefore, indeed it is said that speech units [in the form of optative and like suffixes] denote [their own activity of instigation]. Otherwise, even this reputation of the non-active²⁶⁰ [exhortative suffixes as being the basis of an understanding of being impelled] would be without any basis.

(s) *pratipattis tu pratipattuh kriyā nābhidhātuḥ. na hi śabdo 'rthaṃ pratipadyata ity ucyate.*

Understanding, by contrast, is an action of the person who understands and not of that which denotes. For, it is not said that a word understands the meaning.

(t) *tenāsty abhidhānalakṣaṇā 'pi bhāvanā. aṃśatrayaṃ tv asyāḥ prāg eva darśitam.*

For that reason, there exists a *bhāvanā* which is characterised by denotation. Its three parts have been demonstrated earlier indeed.

(u) *tasmād anyo 'pi bhāvanāprakāra iti dvaividhyaṃ yuktam.*

Therefore, a different type of *bhāvanā* also exists; hence the twofoldness [of *bhāvanā*] is reasonable.

Based on the above extract, the following observations may be made:

- (i) Apart from *prayatna* and *parispanda*, Umbeka holds *preraṇā* to be an additional meaning expressed by the exhortative suffixes (a, b, and c).
- (ii) *Preraṇā* is the nature of the tripartite *śabdabhāvanā* and hence identical with it. Thus, *preraṇā* is an activity of the exhortative suffixes. (a, c, and q).
- (iii) Although *preraṇā* is an activity of exhortative suffixes, which can logically be of the nature of denotation, yet *preraṇā* itself is also denoted by the exhortative suffix. However, Umbeka does not seem to postulate an additional act of denotation for denoting *preraṇā* or *śabdabhāvanā*, since

²⁵⁹ This seems to be a direct refutation of the partial proponent's claim above that there is no contradiction if something, which has no activity, is a action-factor. By 'svavyāpāre', which I render here as 'its own activity', I understand the immediate task of burning, etc. that is performed by fuel sticks.

²⁶⁰ In other words, although it is a fact that speech units (e.g., the optative and like suffixes) are insentient, and hence cannot have any activity just as a sentient being can have, we still have the understanding that the speech units are impelling us. If this can be attributed to the speech units on the basis of the phenomenology of our understanding of having been instigated, there is no harm in accepting that those speech units denote as well produce *śabdabhāvanā*.

this would attract Maṇḍana’s criticism of infinite regress, which has been later reused by Jayanta. Umbeka’s basis for postulating the denotation of *preraṇā* seems to be based on the phenomenology of the hearer on one hand (d, f, m, and s) and an interpretational deadlock on the other (m).

- (iv) Since the meaning of the exhortative suffixes cannot instigate a person without being of the nature of impelling (m) and also given that it is understood from exhortative suffixes, *preraṇā* has to be held as being understood from the exhortative suffixes in addition to *arthabhāvanā*, the agent, number, etc. (h). This necessity argument may also serve as a rejoinder to Jayanta’s criticism of great load.
- (v) From the argument made by Umbeka in (h), it appears that *preraṇā* cannot be denoted before being brought about by the exhortative suffixes. Hence, based on this argument, *preraṇā* seems to be first produced and then denoted by the exhortative suffixes.
- (vi) Due to its occurrence after the verbal root, whose meaning has been already learnt, exhortative suffixes seem to denote *preraṇā*, even though one has not already grasped the denoter-denoted relation between these suffixes and *preraṇā* (h, q). It is not clear if it is implied that a prior knowledge of the meaning of one part of a verb, viz. verbal root, is responsible for an understanding of the meaning of the other part, viz. the exhortative suffix *per force*, even though the meaning of exhortative suffix has not been learned as yet by a person²⁶¹. From Umbeka’s remark, “What can we do in this regard?” (h), it seems that Umbeka takes such an understanding for granted and the main basis for this is his necessity argument made in (m). In other words, Umbeka is unable to explain in causal terms how could *preraṇā* or impelling be understood to be the meaning of exhortative suffixes by someone who has not yet learnt the use of these suffixes.
- (vii) Umbeka says in (o) that *preraṇā* or impelling in its general form is denoted by the exhortative suffixes and its specific form is produced by those suffixes. Although Umbeka does not specify what this general form and specific form mean, yet as a working hypothesis it may be suggested that the general form of *preraṇā* consists of the sheer awareness, “I am instigated”, and its specific form is about the understanding of the action denoted by the verbal root as the scope with regard to which one has been instigated. This hypothesis makes special sense in the light of the fact that

²⁶¹ It may be of interest to future researchers to investigate whether this view of Umbeka might have had any bearing or influence on the ‘*kriyākārya*’ view of later Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas like Rāmānujācārya. For an analysis of the problem as it appears in Rāmānujācārya’s text, see Freschi (2012:45-54).

in (n) Umbeka mentions that the Prābhākara's notion of *kārya* or 'sense of duty' is, albeit implicitly, *preraṇā* or impelling only. This also comes surprisingly close to the Prābhākara opponent's view in NM 5.2 that *niyoga* is of the nature of something to be done (*kāryātman*) as well as of the nature of impelling (*preraṇātman*)²⁶².

- (viii) The specific form of *preraṇā* is mentioned as being available through *lakṣaṇā* or the secondary signification.

²⁶² See NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 104. It should not, however, be lost sight of that Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 does identify, unlike Umbeka, the two aspects of *niyoga*, viz. that of being something to be done and something that impels. Of course, the identification of *kārya* with *preraṇā* is Umbeka's own and it is done with a view to denying to an understanding of *kārya* the role of the instigator. Umbeka here differs from Maṇḍana's criticism of the Prābhākara view of *kartavyatā* being the instigator in ViVi. According to Maṇḍana (ViVi_{Go}, p. 77), *niyoga* consists of mere instigation, which is conveyed by the exhortative suffixes, due to which the instigated person realises on hearing exhortative verbs that he is instigated. But, Maṇḍana claims, the understanding of the act in regard to which such a person is instigated to be something to be done (*kārya*) is based on the instigator's being someone who must be obeyed (*anuvīdheyatva*) in the sense that such obedience will lead to the obtainment of some desirable end or avoidance of some undesirable consequence. Thus, while Maṇḍana does not hold the understanding of *kartavyatā* to follow from the understanding of being instigated, Umbeka precisely does so. Umbeka's doing so should also be understood to be consistent with his basic view that 'being an instigator' (*pravartakatva*) lies at the very core of any kind of injunction and it is an invariable nature which is never abandoned by the injunction. This specific view of Umbeka on the nature of injunctions will be analysed in Chapter II of this thesis, which deals with the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* as found in NM 5.2.

Chapter II

The Prābhākara theory of *Niyoga*

Introduction

The main objection levelled, as it has been seen in the preceding chapter, the Bhāṭṭa philosophers embedded in NM 5.2 was that it is cumbersome to accept a separate function for exhortative suffixes called *śabdabhāvanā* which would produce human efforts in regard to actions prescribed by Vedic injunctions. *Śabdabhāvanā* is claimed by the Bhāṭṭas to be both produced and denoted by the prescriptive endings. But it cannot be satisfactorily explained as to whether it is first denoted and then produced, or first produced and then denoted or denoted and produced at the same time. The problem is that Bhattas cannot avoid a separate *kārya* slot, because they are claiming that the *śabdabhāvanā* functions exactly like any other *bhāvanā* and is therefore produced. Further, if the exhortative suffixes had to denote *arthabhāvanā* and produce and express *śabdabhāvanā* in addition to its usual task of denoting the grammatical agent and its number, it would be cumbersome for it. Besides, no syntactical connection between *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* could be possible even though they were expressed by one and the same exhortative suffix.²⁶³ Hence it is rather better to accept such a thing as the meaning of the exhortative suffix which would cover both the aspects of ‘being something to be done’ and being the instigator. Thus, it remains for the Prābhākara²⁶⁴ to squarely meet this challenge of showing such an element, the acceptance whereof would not cause an unbearable load for the exhortative suffix.

Part I

1. *Niyoga*: the meaning of exhortative suffixes

According to the Prābhākara, it is *niyoga* or commandment, which is understood out of exhortative suffixes and in denoting it no great load is placed on the exhortative suffix. It is that in regard to which no other instrument of knowledge than the exhortative suffix applies. It is *niyoga* which is the sentence-meaning.²⁶⁵ What is implicitly at stake here is

²⁶³ For a detailed account of these problems against see Section 9 of Chapter I.

²⁶⁴ Whenever the word Prābhākara is used here singly it refers to the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2, unless otherwise specified.

²⁶⁵ *yo liṅādīpratyayād avagamyate yam abhivadato na tasya atibhāro yatra na tadvyatirekeṇa pramāṇāntaram kramate, sa niyogo nāmā vākyārthaḥ.* NM^{Mys.} II, 104.

that an awareness of commandment does not follow if one does not know the denoted relation between the exhortative suffix and commandment.

Niyoga or commandment is understood out of the suffix part of verb-forms conjugated in the optative and like moods (e.g., *yajeta*, ‘one should sacrifice’) and it is on hearing such exhortative suffixes that one feels instigated. One does not understand oneself to be instigated if there are no such exhortative verb forms, although there may be other words present. Thus, instigation is conveyed by such exhortative suffixes only. The Prābhākara elaborates on this as follows:

śabdaikagocarā tu niyogo vyutpattiś ca tatra sūpapādā eva, yo hi yajeta dadyāj juhuyāt iti liṅādibhyo vidhiḥ pratīyate katham asau liṅādīnām agamya iṣyeta. vyutpattiś cāsya vyavahārād avakalpate. gacchādhiṣveti śṛṇvan vṛddhaś ceṣṭamāno drśyate. ceṣṭā ca svātmani pravartakāvagamapūrvikā drṣṭā. pratyakṣadrṣṭe ca āmrādau sukhasādhanatayā ’nvayavyatirekābhyām avagate tadanusmaraṇāt pravartamānaḥ kasmīṃścid ātmākūte samupajāte sati bhautikaṃ vyāpāram ārabhate. sa ca ātmadharmā ātmeva svasvaṃvedyaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 108.

Commandment is known from linguistic communication only; and a learning of [the exhortative suffix’s relation] in regard to it (commandment) can indeed be well explained²⁶⁶. How could the injunction which is understood out of optative and like [suffixes] in ‘one should sacrifice’, ‘one should offer sacrificial donations’, ‘one should offer oblations’, be accepted as not being knowable from optative and like [suffixes]? [One’s] learning [of such a meaning] is considered to originate from ordinary language usage. A properly conditioned speaker is seen to act on hearing [such exhortative verb-forms as] ‘You must go’, ‘You must recite’, etc. Activity is seen to presuppose an understanding of instigation in one’s own self. Mangoes, etc. which are known through perception, are understood through concomitant presence and concomitant absence as the means of pleasure. Due to remembrance of it (that mangoes, etc. are means of pleasure), he, who makes efforts, begins acting physically once a certain volition of one’s own has arisen. And that property of the self is self-revealing just like the self.

From the above, the following points emerge: First, while the understanding of instigation on hearing exhortative verb-forms made the Bhāṭṭa postulate a separate activity of exhortative suffixes to account for such understanding of instigation, the Prābhākara held this to be the very meaning of exhortative suffixes. Second, the proof for this comes from the fact that a linguistically conditioned hearer is seen to act on hearing exhortative verb-forms like ‘go’, ‘read’, etc. – this is an instance of ‘concomitant presence’. Through ‘concomitant absence’ it is seen that one does not act when one hears non-exhortative

²⁶⁶ These two assertions by the Prābhākara opponent seem to be the reasons for the claim that denotation of *niyoga* or commandment does not put a great load on the exhortative suffixes.

verb-forms like ‘[he] goes’, ‘[he] reads’, etc. Hence implicit here is the reasoning that whenever exhortative verb-forms are heard, one understands himself to be instigated and undertakes the prescribed action, and when non-exhortative verb-forms are heard, there follows no understanding of instigation, which could lead to an undertaking of an action. Thus, it is the peculiar nature of exhortative suffixes and for that reason exhortative verb-forms to give rise to such an awareness of being instigated. Third, activity is preceded by a specific volition in the self of the hearer. The analogy of mangoes mentioned serves to distinguish between ordinary cases, where volition springs from the remembrance of the understanding of mangoes, etc. being means to pleasure, and cases of Vedic and ordinary injunctions, where volition is preceded by the addressee’s understanding of having been instigated by the injunction to perform the prescribed act. The difference in the spring of volition in the two cases can be schematically represented as follows:

1. Perception of mangoes
2. Ascertainment of mangoes to be means to pleasure (through concomitant presence in the form of eating and enjoying the taste, and concomitant absence in the form of not having access to the enjoyment they accord without there being available)
3. Remembrance of mangoes as means to pleasure
4. Volition (I shall acquire mangoes, which are the means to pleasure)
5. Activity (going to market, buying mangoes, eating them, etc.)

1. Hearing a linguistically conditioner speaker saying to another linguistically conditioned speaker: “Bring the cow!”
2. Understanding of instigation by the person commanded (“I am instigated”)
3. Volition (“I shall act”)
4. Activity

This leads to the question as to what is *niyoga*? The Prābhākara explains:

yasmin sati niyukto ’ham atreti pratipadyate puruṣaḥ so ’sāv arthaḥ. sa eva vidhir ity ucyate. vidhau hi liṅādipratyayaṃ smarati pāṇinir na dhātvarthe yāgādau na karṭṛvyāpāre bhāvanāyām. vidhiś ca nāma preraṇātmaka eva. ata eva vartamānāpadeśikākhyātajanitapratītilakṣaṇeyaṃ praṭītir yajeteti. atra hi praiṣapraiṣyayoḥ sambandho ’vagamyate. anya evāyaṃ kriyākartṛsambandhāt praiṣapraiṣyasambandhaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 105.

It is that meaning, which being there a person understands, ‘I am instigated in regard to this’. That indeed is called injunction. Pāṇini teaches optative and like suffixes with regard to [the meaning of] injunction, [but] not with regard to sacrifice, etc., that are the meanings of verbal roots [and] not with regard to *bhāvanā*, the activity of the agent. An injunction is indeed of the nature of an impeller. Therefore, this understanding [ensuing from the hearing of exhortative verb-forms like] ‘one should sacrifice’ is distinct from the understanding produced by indicative verb forms. For, in this regard, one understands the relation of the instigator and the instigated. This instigator-instigated relation is indeed different from the action-action-factor relation.

So, according to this explanation, *niyoga* is that awareness due to which a person understands himself to be instigated in regard to something. Although it was earlier said that it is the meaning of the exhortative suffixes yet since such a meaning of the exhortative suffixes is subject to the understanding of it as such by a competent and properly linguistically conditioned user, it is ultimately to be understood as the cognition that arises on hearing exhortative verb-forms in which a person understands himself to be instigated. Such an instigation is experienced, according to the Prābhākara, as if by a rule on hearing exhortative verb-forms and not upon hearing non-exhortative verb forms. This is because the latter report only state of affairs and do not, at least phenomenologically, urge us to do something unlike the exhortative verb-forms.

In connection with the contention that *niyoga* is known from exhortative suffixes alone, the Prābhākara engages into the following small clarificatory discussion with his opponent:

nanu yadi liṅādivyatirekeṇa nānayto niyogo ’vagamyate katham asau niyogaśabdāt pratīyate. katham vā niyogaśabdasya nāmno ’py arthaḥ pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ syāt.

ayi sādho! na niyogo nipūrveṇa yujinā ghañantena bodhayitum śakyate. vyavahāramātram etat. svarūpam ākhyātum āśrīyate. yathā tu yajetety evamādibhyaḥ so ’vagamyate tathā nānyata ity ata eva na pramāṇāntaragocaro dharma ity āhuḥ. liṅārtho hi niyogo vākyārthaḥ. sa eva dharmāḥ. sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamyā iti. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 109.

[Objection:] Well, if commandment is not understood from anything other than the optative and like [suffixes], how is it understood from the word ‘*niyoga*’? Or, how should the meaning of the nominal stem *niyoga* be knowable from other instruments of knowledge?

[Reply:] O wise one! Commandment is not made known by [the word ‘*niyoga*’, which is formed by] adding the *ghañ* suffix to the verbal root *yuj-*, which is prefixed by *ni*. It is mere usage, which is resorted to for mentioning (commandment’s) own

verbal form²⁶⁷. But, the way it (commandment) is understood from such [words] as ‘[one] should sacrifice’, [it is] not [understood] similarly from other [words or sources]. From this alone is religious duty (*dharma*) (*niyoga* or commandment) is said to be unknowable from other instruments of knowledge. For, commandment, which is the meaning of optative [and like suffixes] is sentence-meaning. That alone is religious duty (*dharma*). And that is not knowable from other instruments of knowledge.

Prabal Kumar Sen brings out the significance of the objection as follows:

“As a result of calling *niyoga*’s not to be the content of other instruments of knowledge, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā philosopher has faced a situation where there is problem on both sides (i.e., both the alternatives are not acceptable). If *niyoga* is not understood by means of the word ‘*niyoga*’, it has to be said that the word ‘*niyoga*’ is meaningless. Besides, it is also difficult to understand why cannot the meaning of the word ‘*niyoga*’ be understood through grammatical, i.e., etymological analysis of the [said] word. A *niyoga* is understood from the word ‘*niyoga*’, then the Prābhākara view that *niyoga* is made known only by optative and like suffixes has to be discarded, since the word ‘*niyoga*’ is different from the optative and like suffixes.”²⁶⁸

The answer provided by the Prābhākara is that the use of the word ‘*niyoga*’ as the mere verbal form used conventionally to label the awareness of being instigated on hearing exhortative verb-forms seeks to set aside the objection of the opponent that if *niyoga* is known from exhortative verb-forms only, how could the noun *niyoga* which has no such exhortative linguistic unit attached to it denote *niyoga*. In other words, the fact that one understands a specific thing to be done on hearing an injunction is not communicated by the injunction itself, but is based on the awareness in the person of being instigated by the injunction. Thus, it is instigation (*pravartanā*), which is denoted by the injunction, i.e., the exhortative verb-forms located within it and the understanding of ‘being something to be

²⁶⁷ Regarding the word *svarūpa* used here in Vyākaraṇa’s technical sense of the verbal form used for a concept, without it itself referring to the characteristics of that concept, see the entries, *svarūpagrahaṇa*, *svarūpayogyatā* and *svarūpavidhi* in Abhyankar (1961:409-410). I am grateful to Dr. Elisa Freschi for kindly pointing this out.

²⁶⁸ *phalataḥ niyogke pramāṇāntarer agocara balāy prābhākara mīmāṃsaker “ubhayataḥpāśā rajjuh” (arthāt ubhay vikalpai agrahaṇayogyā) – ei paristhiti haiyāche. ‘niyog’ śabder dvārā yadi niyoger bodh nā hay, tāhā haile ‘niyog’ padṭike arthaśūnya balite haibe. etadbhinna ‘niyog’ pader vyākaraṇasammata vyutpatti, arthāt prakṛti-pratyayādi viśleṣaṇa haite ai pader artha bodhagamya haibe nā kena, tāhā bujhāo duṣkar. ār yadi ‘niyog’ – ei pad haite niyoger bodh hay, tāhā haile ‘niyog ekmātra ‘liṅ prabhṛti pratyay dvārāi bodhita hay’ – ei prābhākara mata parityakta haibe, yehetu ‘niyog’ padṭi ‘liṅ’ prabhṛti pratyay haite bhinna. Sen (2013:175).*

done' is derived from this awareness of instigation by the addressee²⁶⁹. An analogy of it is to be found in the word 'adjective' which merely works as the label for a conceptual tool which helps identify, classify and explain quality, etc. etc, without the *word* adjective itself being understood as a quality. To strengthen this idea, the Prābhākara goes on to equate *niyoga* or commandment with *dharma* or religious duty which, according to the Prābhākara system, is known only from the Vedic sacred texts, which constitute an independent instrument of knowledge in terms of communicating religious duty or 'ought' instead of mere reporting state of affairs as are done by other instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, etc. Thus, once *niyoga* is held to be *dharma*, and *dharma* is duty or that which ought to be done, which is known only from Vedic injunctions, it cannot be a banal thing existing in the outer world.

According to the Prābhākara, the specific volition or intention which arises in one's own self is self-revealing like the self and it is not knowable from some other instruments of knowledge. Thus, the Prābhākara says:

ahampratyayamyō hy ātmā nāsau parasmai darśyayitum śakyate na ca na carcayitum śakyate. etāvatā nānubhūyate iti na śakyate vaktum. paro 'pi hy enam ahampratyayenānubhavaty eva. tathāyam api bhautikavyāpārahetur ātmākūtaviśeṣo na pramāṇāntaravedyo bhavati. na ca na vedyate tatsamvedane sati ceṣṭāyā dr̥ṣṭatvāt. tasmāt param api gacchādhiṣveti śabdaśravaṇe sati ceṣṭāpannam dr̥ṣṭvā tasyāpi tādr̥kpreraṇāvagamo 'numīyate. sa ca śabdāntaraśravaṇe sati apy adr̥śyamāno liṅādiśravaṇe ca sati dr̥śyamānas tadartha evety anvayavyatirekābhyaṃ avagamyata itīyatīyaṃ vyutpattiḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 108.

For, the self is known from the 'I'-awareness; it is not capable of being shown to others, but not incapable of being reflected upon. From this much, it cannot be said, that (the self) is not experienced. For, others too indeed experience this (self) through the 'I'-awareness. Similarly, this specific volition too, which is the cause of physical activity, is not known from other instruments of knowledge. And it is not the case that [it] is not known, because activity has been seen [to occur] once it (the specific volition) has been experienced. Therefore, on watching another [person] act upon hearing words like 'go', 'recite', etc. a similar understanding of impelling is inferred. That (understanding of impelling) is not seen even when other

²⁶⁹ In his criticism of this view, Maṇḍana says that the understanding of the prescribed act as something ought to be done is owing to the enjoiner's (*niyoktr*) being someone who must be obeyed (*anuvidehyatva*). In other words, Maṇḍana seems to deny the understanding of the prescribed act as something to be done as following automatically or mechanically from the chronologically primary understanding of being instigated. Cf. *pravartanāmātraṃ niyogaḥ. sa ca liṅādyartha iti pravartito 'ham atreti pratipattiḥ śabdāt. kartavyatāvagamas tu niyoktur anuvidehyatvāt. anuvidehyanīyoge mamedam kartavyam ity adhyavasāyāt. itaratra tu pravartanāmātrapratīteḥ. uktaṃ ca kartavyatāviśayo niyogo na niyogaḥ kartavyatām āha. ViVi_{Go}, p. 77.*

words (indicative verbs) are heard, and seen when optative and the like are heard; [therefore,] it is the meaning of them (optative and like suffixes). This is understood through concomitant presence and concomitant absence and it is this much what is learned [regarding the denotative relation obtaining between the exhortative suffixes and instigation].

Here a vital point deserves analysis. The Prābhākara opponent says that although the self is not fit to be shown to others as it would be possible in case of externally existent things such as a cat, yet it is understood indirectly from the 'I'-awareness. But on that score, it cannot be said that it is not experienced. The Prābhākara uses this as an analogy for accepting a specific volition in the self (*ātmākūtaviśeṣa*) which is the cause of physical activity of both oneself and others. This analogy is then further extended by the Prābhākara to the case of sentences having exhortative verb-forms to infer a phenomenologically unavoidable additional element (*preraṇāvagama*), viz. the awareness of being instigated. This extended chronology can be shown in the form of the following chart:

	Candidate	Not known through	Known through
1.	Self	perception	self-evident in experience
2.	Awareness of specific volition, which is the cause of physical activity	any other instrument of knowledge	self-evident in experience on account of its locus being the self, which is self-revealing.
3.	Understanding of instigation	non-exhortative statements	statements containing exhortative verb-forms

Notwithstanding what has been said above, it might mislead one to think the understanding of instigation is the same as the specific volition in the self, mentioned as the cause of physical activity in view of the following statement made by the Prābhākara above:

“Similarly, this specific volition too, which is the cause of physical activity, is not known from other instruments of knowledge. And it is not the case that [it] is not known, because activity has been seen [to occur] once it (the specific volition) has been experienced. Therefore, on watching another [person] act upon hearing words like ‘go’, ‘recite’, etc. *a similar understanding of impelling* is inferred. (emphasis mine).”

But this similarity is not necessarily to be understood in terms of a total identity between the specific kind of volition occurring in the self and the understanding of instigation. Rather, it should be understood in terms of the analogy pertaining to the acceptance of the existence of the Self and the specific volition on experiential grounds despite being inaccessible by instruments of knowledge like perception, etc. This specific volition in one's own self is described by Cakradhara as taking on the form *upādeyam etan mayā*²⁷⁰ – ‘this is to be appropriated by me’. By contrast, as it has already been noted, the understanding of *niyoga* or commandment consists in the generation of the awareness ‘I am instigated in regard to this’. Thus, the understanding of *niyoga* is the preliminary understanding of the sheer fact of being instigated without having the touch of any mental resolution to act. The specific kind of volition that rises in the self refers, on the other hand, to a state where a kind of self-appropriation of the act in regard to which the person has been instigated takes place. Hence an awareness of the prescribed action in regard to which a person has felt instigated being something that ought to be done (*kartavyatābodha*) should be accepted as the logical link between the awareness of instigation and the understanding of the specific volition. Thus, the understanding of *niyoga* is the stage which may be called *pravartanā* and the arousal of a specific volition in the self may be called *pravṛtti*.

It may now be asked: if *niyoga* is not known through any other means than the exhortative verb-forms and since this presupposes a proper learning of the given language, how should one (e.g., a child), who has not yet acquired any language, learn *niyoga* to be the meaning of exhortative suffixes given that unlike in the case of ‘*gām ānaya*’ – “Bring the cow”, one cannot *see* *niyoga*? The Prābhākara’s answer is the following:

tad etad āmapratyakṣam. liṅādiśravaṇe sati preraṇāvagatir bhavati prathamaśrutāc ca liṅāder asau na bhavati. na ca pramāṇāntareṇa so 'rtho darśayitum śakyate. kuryād ity asyārthaḥ kuryād ity anenaiva pratipādyate na prakārāntareṇa iti. evaṃ vyutpattau sambhavantyām api yair agrhūtasambandha eva liṅādiḥ svarupasāmarthyenaiva preraka iṣyate te 'tyantabhīra va ity upekṣaṇīyāḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 108.

It is self-revealing. One understands impelling on hearing optative and like [suffixes] and it (understanding of impelling) does not follow from the optative and like [suffixes] heard for the first time. And, such a meaning (instigation) cannot be shown through some other instrument of knowledge. The meaning of ‘[one] should do’ is arrived at through ‘[one] should do’ only, [but] not in any other way²⁷¹. Even when acquisition [of instigation as the denoted meaning of exhortative suffixes] is

²⁷⁰ NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 75.

²⁷¹ What is at stake here is learning of instigation as the meaning of exhortative suffixes for the first time without the help of any other instrument of knowledge like perception.

thus possible, those who consider that optative and like [suffixes] should instigate by virtue of the capacity of their [sheer] verbal form without indeed their denotative relation with instigation having been grasped, are extremely timid [and hence] fit to be ignored.

The point made here is that the mere hearing of exhortative suffixes without the listener's prior knowledge of them as denoting instigation is not enough for one to be aware of instigation. If it were not so, one, despite being ignorant of a particular language would feel instigated when a command is issued to him in that language by using an exhortative verb form. This is obviously an unwelcome consequence. However, it must not be lost sight of that since language learning implies the observation of the use of particular words to mean particular objects and an understanding of their mutual relation. The opponent, whose view is ignored herein, sought to circumvent this problem by proposing to invest the very verbal form of exhortative suffixes with the unique capacity to instigate without their denotative relation with instigation having been grasped. This is again because the opponent was afraid that if a knowledge of the denotative relation between exhortative suffixes and instigation were an unavoidable precondition, it would put to rest the Prābhākara's claim of instigation being knowable *only* from exhortative suffixes, because in that case it would certainly involve the roles of *pratyakṣa* or perception and *anumāna* or inference, which are independent *pramāṇa*-s or instruments of knowledge. To explain: a linguistically unconditioned person of a speech community observes that every time when people of the same speech community hear specific words (i.e., exhortative verb-forms) in a sentence uttered by other members of that speech community they act in a certain way and when such specific words are lacking, they do not act. From repeated observations of such episodes the linguistically unconditioned person of that speech community would come to infer that only such specific words have the capacity to instigate people to act and regard instigation to be the meaning of such specific words. Although, the Prābhākara repeatedly denies the role of any other instrument of knowledge in helping one learn instigation to be the meaning of exhortative suffixes, yet since he denies the understanding of instigation on hearing exhortative suffixes for the first time on one hand and asserts that the meaning of exhortative suffixes is to be learnt from exhortative suffixes alone on the other hand, it seems to me that he commits the fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmāśrayadoṣa*). Moreover, since the Prābhākara admits the observation of activity of a linguistically conditioned speaker of a speech community based on the utterance of exhortative sentences by another such speaker as the source of knowledge of the denotative relation between exhortative suffixes and instigation, he indeed seems to me to contradict his own claim of *niyoga* being knowable only from exhortative suffixes.

2. *Niyoga*: Instigation and Causality

2.1. Instigator-Instigated Relation vs. Action-Agent Relation

It has been already noted above that the Prābhākara, while explaining what *niyoga* is, contended that the instigator-instigated relation that is understood with regard to *niyoga* is different from the action-agent relation. This is immediately challenged by an opponent, according to whom this instigator-instigated relation is nothing apart from the action-agent relation. Such a contention of the opponent led to a lengthy polemic with the Prābhākara which is worth reproducing here at length:

nanu yajeteti kriyākarṭṛsambandho 'vagamyate.

na brūmo nāvagamyata iti kintu praiṣapraiṣyalakṣaṇo 'pi sambandhaḥ prathamam avagamyate. preṣito hi kriyām kartum udyacchatīti.

nanu kriyāsambandhitayaivāsau preṣyate yajatām bhavān iti.

satyaṃ kriyāsambandhitayaiva preṣyate. preṣyate tu saḥ. preṣyate ced ayam anyas tarhi sambandhaḥ. kriyāsambandhāt tu ubhasambandhitām asya rājagavīkṣīravat avagamiṣyāmaḥ. yathā gau rājñā ca sambadhyate kṣīreṇa ca yā rājasambandhinī sā kṣīrasambandhinī yā kṣīrasambandhinī sā rājasambandhinīti. evam ihāpi puruṣaḥ preṣitena ca sambhantsyate kriyayā ca. yaḥ preṣyate sa karoty atha yaḥ karoti preṣyate sa iti.

nanu nedam ubhayaṃ bhavati. praiṣo 'pi kriyaiva. pravartanaṃ hi kurvan pravartayatīty ucyate. so 'yaṃ kriyāsambandha eva bhavati. na tato 'nyaḥ praiṣapraiṣyasambandha iti.

syād etad evaṃ yadi vāyvädivat pravartane²⁷² kartā liñādiḥ syāt. prerito 'ham atreti tu jñānanakatvaṃ vidheḥ pravartakatvam. sa eṣa pravartanaṃ jñāpayati na karotīty anya evāyaṃ kriyākarṭṛsambandhāt praiṣapraiṣyasambandhaḥ.

nanu jñānam api kriyaiva. tatkarāṇe ca punar api sa evāyaṃ kriyākarṭṛsambandhaḥ.

maivaṃ kārakajñāpakayor bhedasya suprasiddhatvāt. iha ca yo 'yaṃ yāgapuruṣayoḥ kriyākarṭṛsambandhas tato 'nyaṃ praiṣapraiṣyasambandham

²⁷² I have accepted the reading found in the *editio princeps*, 'pravartane' (NM_{EP-I}, p. 347) in place of the Mysore reading, 'pravartate'. This is because, what is being discussed here is the impossibility of exhortative suffixes to instigate like the wind, etc. To explain: that which instigates (*pravartayati*) is the instigator (*pravartaka*) and the act of instigating is *pravartana*. It is on being instigated (*pravartita*) that a person undertakes (*pravartate*) the prescribed action and hence is known as he who has undertaken the action (*pravṛtta*). Thus, if the 'pravartate' reading were accepted, then it would lead to the undesirable consequence of the exhortative suffixes undertaking the prescribed action!

upadarśayitum pravṛttāḥ smaḥ. sa tato vilakṣaṇaḥ pradārśita eva. vilakṣaṇye 'pi tasya yathākathañcin nāma kriyamāṇaḥ na vārayāmaḥ.

bhavatv ayam anyaḥ praiṣapraiṣyasambandhaḥ. sa tu prathamam avagamyata ity eṣa kuto niścayaḥ.

uktam atra preṣito 'ham iti hi viditvā kriyāyāṃ pravartate. ācāryacoditaḥ karomīti hi drśyate. yajeteti śrute niyukto 'ham iti prathamam avagacchati. tato yajate. tenāyam ādyaḥ sambandhaḥ. pāścātyas tu kriyākartṛsambandhaḥ. tad yo 'yaṃ liṅārthaḥ prathamam avagamyate praiṣo nāma sā preraṇā sa niyogaḥ sa vākyārthaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 105-106.

[Objection:] It is the action-agent relation which is understood in “[one] should sacrifice.”

[Reply:] We do not say that [the action-agent] relation is not understood; but the relation characterised by the instigator and the instigated is also understood at first. For, it is he who has been instigated, who undertakes an action.

[Objection:] Well, in “You, sir, should sacrifice” he (the person) is instigated in terms of his relation with the action only.

[Reply:] True; [the person] is instigated in terms of his relation with the action indeed. But he is instigated. If he is instigated, then this relation [of the instigator and the instigated] is different [from the action-agent relation]. But because of [the person's] relation with the action we shall understand this [person] to be connected with both [action and the instigation] just like ‘the milk of the royal cow’. Just as a cow is related to a king and milk – that [cow] which is related to the king is related to milk, [and] that [cow] which is related to milk is related to the king; likewise, here too, the person is related to the instigation and the action. It is he, who is instigated, who acts; [and] it is he who acts, who is instigated.

[Objection:] Well, both these things do not happen. Instigation too is action indeed. For, [an instigator] is said to ‘instigate’ [someone] on account of producing instigation. And that is a relation with action only; [but] not the instigator-instigated relation, which is different from it (the action-agent relation).

[Reply:] It would have been so if like wind, etc., optative and like [suffixes] were the agent with regard to instigation. However, the injunction's (the exhortative suffixes') being the instigator consists in [its] producing the awareness, “I am instigated in regard to this”. This (the injunction) communicates instigation, [but] does not produce it. Hence, this instigator-instigated relation is different from the action-agent relation.

[Objection:] Well, awareness too is an action²⁷³. And in producing that (awareness) it is the action-agent relation which is again [obtained and not the instigator-instigated relation].

[Reply:] It should not be so, because the distinction between a communicator and an action-factor is very well established²⁷⁴. Here, we have set out to show that the instigator-instigated relation, which obtains between the [act of] sacrifice and the person [who performs it], is different from the action-agent relation. [And] it (the instigator-instigated relation) has indeed been shown to be distinct from that (the action-agent relation). Despite the utter distinction, if it (the instigator-instigated relation) is being named in some way whatsoever, we do not oppose [it].

[Objection:] Let this instigator-instigated relation be different [from the action-agent relation]. But whence is it is ascertained that that it is cognised at first?

[Reply:] It has already been said in this regard [that] it is [so] because one undertakes an action after understanding ‘I am instigated’. For, it is seen [from such usages as] “Being instigated by the teacher I do [it]”. On hearing “[one] should sacrifice”, [the person] at first understands “I am enjoined”. Then [he] sacrifices. On that score it is the primary relation. But the action-agent relation is the latter one. Thus, it is this meaning of the optative [suffix] called instigation which is first understood; that is instigation, that is commandment, that is sentence-meaning.

From the above, it transpires that the opponent identifies the instigator-instigated relation with the action-agent relation in terms of the physical act of doing. In his opinion, production of the awareness of being instigated is similarly an action. The Prābhākara holds the primary relation to be that of the instigator and the instigated in terms of the awareness it gives rise to in the listener when he hears such injunctions as “You should sacrifice”, “You should read”, “You should go”, etc. An agent or for that reason, an action-factor (*kāraka*) is so called in so far as he participates in the process of accomplishing an act. However, in case of injunctions such as “You should go”, “You should sacrifice”, etc. the addressee of the injunction has not already participated in any process that would bring about an action. Rather, it is upon hearing such injunctions that he recognises that he is urged to do some specific thing. It is this understanding of being instigated with regard to an action hitherto not undertaken that prompts him to undertake the action thereafter. It is unlike the report of someone already doing something; and for this reason, it cannot be said that the person has already participated in the process of bringing about the prescribed

²⁷³ According to the Vaiyākaraṇa-s, a verbal root expresses an action in accordance with the view enunciated in MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 1.3.1. Since the verbal root *jñā-* expresses awareness, hence awareness is an action. For Jayanta’s specific refutation of this view, see NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 52, and Jha (1987).

²⁷⁴ For instance, see the relevant discussion by Maṇḍana in this regard in ViViGo, pp. 4-11.

action and hence he is not fit to be termed an agent or an action-factor. Thus, here the efforts on the part of the agent with a view to realising the act is itself dependent for its accomplishment on the occurrence of the awareness of being instigated to do that action. This clearly proves that the instigator-instigated relation is different from and prior to the action-agent relation in such cases where deliberation on commands is involved. In fact, no one denies the occurrence of an action-agent relation even in such cases of command utterances, least of all the Prābhākara. Still since the very incentive to undertake the action comes from the awareness of instigation, the instigator-instigated relation has to be accepted as the primary relation which is understood in such cases as preceding the action-agent relation.

A further reason why the instigator-instigated relation is not the same as the action-agent relation is the fact that the latter is essentially a causal relation which requires the operation of the cause to bring about the effect. A case in point is food causing nourishment to our body. Unlike the instigator-instigated relation, this causal relation works in terms of a set of physical actions that the food taken in does to bring about nourishment. By contrast, the instigator-instigated relation works in terms of the instigated person's taking cognizance of the fact of being instigated. But such a specific kind of understanding is not required in a causal relation, which can also obtain among inanimate objects. Thus, it is only if instigation were an act of physically pushing someone to do something that the opponent's contention that instigation too is an action would have held water. But as with all other opponents in NM 5.2 the Prābhākara holds the instigative function of injunction consisting of an essentially communicative nature because the injunction merely communicates to someone that an external agency (here, the Vedic injunction) requires the former to do something as yet unaccomplished. It is in this way that an injunction is not an instigator like wind, etc. which physically pushes someone and brings about a change in at least its physical state. In contrast to this, an injunction brings about a new awareness in a human being by means of which he recognises that some specific thing is to be done because someone or something other than himself wants him to do it. It is this sense of instigation and the subsequent subjective appropriation of that instigation by the person that may make him undertake the prescribed action which he has understood to be his duty. As Susil Kumar Maitra says commenting on this passage:

“Enlightenment (*jñāna*) is not causation (*kriyā*). The rational motive is no subtle force, *jñāpaka*, what reveals, and *kāraka*, what compels, being fundamentally distinct. The *Vidhi*, the Imperative is a motive (*pravarttaka*) simply by its function of revelation of the Law, *i.e.*, of the act as something commanded. Its suggestive force is through an appeal to the reason, but does not amount to a compulsion of the will.”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ Maitra (2013:137-138).

Analysing this distinction in the broader context of the Prabhākara's distinction between a *niyojya* or the person enjoined by a command utterance and *kartr* or grammatical agent, Patrick Cummins observes in his 2020 article, *Commands and the Doctrine of Apūrva in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, as follows:

“...the command *makes* someone into an agent of the commanded act, and this necessitates a pre-agentive state articulated by the command so that the listener understands that the command pertains to them (as they cannot be an agent as such before the performance of the command). This pre-agentive state is the state of being the obligatee (*niyojya*). For Prabhākara, classical *kāraka* theory comes into effect after the *niyoga-niyojya* moment. That is, the obligatee (*niyojya*) understands himself to be the agent (*kartr*). Prabhākara does not spell out the contents of these awareness events, nor the mechanism of the transition/recognition that obligatee (*niyojya*) is the agent (*kartr*).”²⁷⁶

The pre-agentive state that is highlighted above in Cummins's comment lies at the heart of the distinction between the two relations of instigator-instigated and action-agent. It implies a mentally as well as physically pre-active stage, from which the active stage would follow. However, the active stage does not follow necessarily and straight away, but only via the awareness of the person of something to be done when he hears Vedic injunctions consisting of exhortative verb-forms. Such a passage from pre-active to active stages also presupposes the absence of stronger and situationally irreversible obfuscating factors, like laziness, etc. Nevertheless, given that Prābhākara philosophers think that injunctions, in so far as they are communicators, have an epistemic content, viz. commandment to communicate; hence absence of undertaking of action by the addressee of the injunction does not affect the injunction's status of being an instrument of knowledge. This is because, an instrument of knowledge necessarily functions at the cognitive level in sharp contrast to action-factors which function at the physical level.

2.2. Instigation: the general meaning underlying all specific meanings of exhortative suffixes

Now, it may be asked as how could it be the case that it is only *niyoga* or command which is the meaning of the exhortative suffix. The discussion in this regard is as follows:

nanu vidhāv iva nimantraṇādiṣu liṅloṭāv api smaryete eva.

satyaṃ - te tu preraṇāyā eva aupādhikā avantarabhedāḥ. samahīnajyāyoviṣaya eva prayogopādhinibandhana eva preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇādibhedavyavahāraḥ. preṣaṇā tu sarvatra anuṣyūtā ’vagamyate. taduktaṃ “pravartakatvaṃ tu śabdārthaḥ sarvatra aparityāgād” (Bṛ ad MīSū 1.1.25) iti. sa cāyaṃ liṅādīnām arthaḥ praiṣo ṇijarthavilakṣaṇaḥ pratīyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 106-107.

²⁷⁶ Cummins (2020:245, fn. 37).

[Objection:] Well, [the meaning of] the optative and the imperative [suffixes] too is indeed taught [by Pāṇini] to be unavoidable invitation²⁷⁷, etc. just as [it is taught to be] commandment.

[Reply:] True; but they are just internal distinctions, based on external conditioners, of impelling only. This use of the distinctions like inducement, formal request, etc. is based on the external conditions of application [of the exhortative suffixes] in regard to peers, inferiors and superiors. However, instigation is understood to be uninterruptedly present everywhere (in order, request, unavoidable invitation, etc.). Hence it has been said [by Prabhākara in Bṛ 1.1.25] – “Being an instigator is the meaning of the word (exhortative suffix) because [that meaning] is maintained everywhere.” That meaning of the optative and like [suffixes, which is] instigation is understood to be different from the meaning of the causative suffix.

The source of the objection is rooted in two rules in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 3.3.161 – *vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhiṣṭasamprārthaneṣu liṅ*, and 3.3.162 – *loṭ ca*. The first rule is translated and explained by Rama Nath Sharma²⁷⁸ as follows:

“Affix *LIN̄* occurs after a verbal root when *vidhi* ‘command, injunction’, *nimantraṇa* ‘invitation’, *āmantraṇa* ‘polite address, pro forma invitation,’ *adhīṣṭa* ‘polite wish, solicitation’, *sampraśna* ‘proper question’, and *prārthanā* ‘request, prayer’ is denoted.

EXAMPLES:

kaṭaṃ kuryāt ‘he should make the mat’
grāmaṃ bhavan āgacchet ‘you, sir, should come to the village’
iha bhavān bhuñjīta ‘you, sir, please eat here’
iha bhavān āsīta ‘you, sir, please sit here’
adhīcchāmo bhavantaṃ māṇavakaṃ bhavān upanayet ‘it is my earnest wish that you please perform the initiation of my son’
kiṃ nu khalu bho vyākaraṇam adhīyīya ‘should I study grammar’
bhavati me prārthanā vyākaraṇam adhīyīya ‘it is my request that I should study grammar’

1. This rule introduces affix *LIN̄* after a verbal root when *vidhi*, *nimantraṇa*, *āmantraṇa*, *adhīṣṭa*, *sampraśna* and *prārthanā* are denoted. Note that the first four meanings all entail instigation of some sort or the other. Separate mention of particular words is simply an expatiation (*prapañca*) of the same. There have

²⁷⁷ I translate *nimantraṇa* as unavoidable invitation, since if such an invitation is ignored, it leads to religious demerit. An instance of it cited in the *Nyāsa* commentary on *Kāśikā* ad Aṣṭ 3.3.161 is the invitation of the maternal grandson to eat at his maternal grandfather’s post-funeral ceremony (*śrāddha*).

²⁷⁸ Sharma (1995:577-579).

been some efforts to differentiate these meanings. Thus, *vidhi* is to be used in the context of a command issued to someone younger, or someone who is an employee. Conversely, *adhīṣṭa* may entail a situation where one entreats an elder, or respectable person, to do something. Commentators explain this with *satkārapūrvako vyāpāraḥ* which is mostly approaching one's elders, for example, a teacher, in order to request them to do something. A difference between *nimantraṇa* and *āmantraṇa* is made on the basis of *kāmacāra* 'doing as one pleases'. That is, *āmantraṇa* can be seen as an invitation which a person can decline without any (ritual) consequences. A *nimantraṇa* is glossed as *niyogakarāṇa*, something one is delegated (and may be obligated) to do. This clearly rules out 'doing as one pleases' (*kāmacāra-karaṇam*). The scope of these meanings can be summarized as command, request, and deliberation."

The second rule is translated and explained as follows:

"Affix *LOT* also occurs after a verbal root when *vidhi*, *nimantraṇa*, *āmantraṇa*, *sampraśna* and *prārthanā* are denoted.

EXAMPLES:

kaṭaṃ tāvad bhavān karotu 'in the meantime, you please make the mat'

grāmaṃ bhavān āgacchatu 'you please come to the village'

amutra bhavān āstām 'you please sit there'

iha bhavān bhūṅktām 'id'

adhīcchāmo bhavantaṃ mānāvakaṃ bhavān adhyāpayatu 'it is my wish that you please teach my son'

adhīcchāmo bhavantaṃ mānāvakaṃ bhavān upanayatām 'id.'

kiṃ nu khalu bho vyākaraṇam adhyayai 'it is my wish to study grammar, sir'

bhavati me prārthanā vyākaraṇam adhyayai 'id.'"

Now the Prābhākara's answer above is based on the following passage of Prabhākara Mīśra's Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.25 –

nanu ca preṣaṇādayo 'py avagamyante loke.

upādhayo hi te, na śabdārthāḥ.

ke punar amī upādhayo nāma?

upādhayo hi taṣasthā prayogadarśanamātrāc chabdārthaṃ viśeṣe 'vasthāpayanti yathā dṛtīharyabhidheyasya paśutvam. evam asau niyogaḥ samahīnajyāyobhiḥ prayujyamānaḥ preṣaṇādivyapadeśaṃ labhate. pravartakatvaṃ tu śabdārthaḥ sarvatraparityāgāt. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 106-107.

[Objection to Prabhākara:] Well, injunction, etc. are also understood in the world.

[Reply:] [They are so understood] because they are external conditioners, [and] not the [denoted] meaning of the word.

[Clarificatory question by the opponent:] Again, what are those conditioners?

[Reply by Prabhākara:] External conditioners, while remaining aloof²⁷⁹, fix the [denoted general] meaning of a word to a specific [meaning] based merely on the observation of [worldly] usage, just as being an animal [is the conditioner] of [the general meaning] denoted by the word 'dṛtihari'. In this way that *niyoga*, on account of being used by peers, inferiors and superiors obtain the appellation of inducement, etc. However, being instigation is the [general denoted] meaning of the word (exhortative suffixes), since [this general meaning of being an instigation] is maintained everywhere.

In explanation of the above-cited NM 5.2 passage in the light of the given *Bṛhatī* passage, it may be said that *upādhi*-s or external conditioners are such properties which in spite of not being denoted by words regulate the general denoted meaning of a word and impart to it a specific semantic shade. And this specification of the general denoted meaning of a word is done by such external conditioners on the basis of worldly usage of such words in those specific senses. A case in point is the word *dṛtihari*. According to Apte's *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*²⁸⁰, the word *dṛti* means "a leathern vessel for holding water", "hide", among other things. Accordingly, the word *dṛtihari* would etymologically mean 'dṛtiṃ harati' – one, who carries off such leathern vessels used for holding water, hide, etc. But in ordinary usage this word is used to mean a specific animal, viz. dog. Etymologically even if a human being carries off such items he could be termed 'dṛtihari'. But although dog is not the denoted meaning of the word 'dṛtihari', yet it is this specific thing in regard to which the meaning of the said word has been fixed and this is based on frequent use of the word in the ordinary world to mean a dog. This is perhaps due to the fact that dogs are seen to habitually carry off leathern articles like shoes, water vessels, etc. while holding them on to their mouth. Thus, it is *paśutva* or 'being an animal', which is the external conditioner in regard to the word 'dṛtihari' since although 'being an animal' is not the denoted meaning of the said word yet it is that which contributes to the regulation of the word 'dṛtihari' to mean a dog. Coming to the context of instigation, it is the instigated person's being inferior or younger (*hīnatva*), peer (*samatva*) and superior or elder (*vyāyastva*) that act as external conditioners with regard to the exhortative suffixes.

²⁷⁹ The expression "remaining aloof" used in a literary way means in this context that the external conditioners in the form of specific shades of meaning of instigation like 'order', 'request', etc. do not form an invariable part of the meaning of the exhortative suffixes. It is for this reason that these specific semantic nuances are not denoted by the exhortative suffixes; it is rather a general sense of instigation that is conveyed by them. It is with reference to who instigates to whom, whose purpose such instigation serves, etc. that the general meaning of instigation is finetuned into the specific meanings. Thus, it is these specific meanings' being not denoted by the exhortative suffixes that they may be described as being "aloof" from the denoted meaning and external.

²⁸⁰ Apte (1985:507).

This is because, although ‘being inferior’, etc. are not the denoted meaning of these suffixes, yet while remaining outside the ambit of the denoted meaning these impart specific shades of meaning to instigation like order, request, instruction, etc.

2.3. Exhortative suffix vs. Causative suffix

While noting that instigation is the general meaning underlying all nuanced meanings the Prābhākara observed that the meaning of exhortative suffixes is different from that of the causative suffix. This triggered the following debate of the Prābhākara with his opponent:

nanu prayojakavyāpāre ṇij vidhīyate. proyajakavyāpāraś ca praiṣaḥ. praiṣe ca loḍādayo vidhīyante iti ṇijartha eva loḍarthaḥ. tathā ca kuru kurv iti yo brūte sa kārayatīty ucyate.

na, pratītibhedāt. anyā hi karotu kuryād iti pratītir anyā ca karoti kārayatīti pratītiḥ. prayojakavyāpāro hi ṇijartha jñāpakavyāpāras tu liṅathaḥ. pravṛttakriyāviṣayaś ca prayojakavyāpāro ṇijartha iha tu tadviparīta. tatra hi kāryam paśyataḥ pravartanam iha tu pravartitasya kāryadarśanam iti mahān bhedaḥ.

tatra yathā kurvantaṃ kārayati tathaiva ihāpi praiṣaḥ pravartamānaṃ prerayati nāpravartamānaṃ sthāvaram iti. na hi vanaspatir ucyate yajasveti.

na, sthāvarāder ayogyatvāt. brāhmaṇādis tu yaḥ preriyate ’sāv apravṛttakriya eva. na hi yajamāna eva yajeteti codyate kintv apravṛttakriya eveti sarvathā ṇijarthād vilakṣaṇo liṅarthaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 107.

[Objection:] Well, the causative [suffix] is taught [by Pāṇini] in regard to the activity of the inducing agent. And the activity of the inducing agent is instigation. Since imperative and like [suffixes] are taught [by Pāṇini] in regard to instigation, it is the meaning of the causative suffix only, which is the meaning of the imperative suffix. And he, who says ‘do [it], do [it]’, is said to make [someone] do [something].

[Reply:] [The meaning of the causative suffix is] not [the same as that of the imperative suffix] because of distinction in the awareness [ensuing from ‘do’ and ‘makes do’]. For, the awareness [ensuing from] ‘[he must] do’, ‘[he] should do’ is different; and the awareness [ensuing from] ‘[he] does’, ‘[he] makes him do’ is different. For, the activity of the inducing agent is the meaning of the causative suffix; but the activity of the communicating agent is the meaning of the optative suffix. The operation of the inducing agent which is the meaning of the causative suffix has for its content an action which has already been undertaken; but in this case (optative suffix) it is opposite to it. The big difference [between these two] is this: there (in case of the causative suffix) a person who understands what is to be done is induced, but here (in case of the optative and like suffixes) a person who has already been instigated understands what is to be done.

[Objection:] There (in case of the causative suffix) it is the person who is already doing [something] is made to do [that thing]. Likewise, here (in case of optative suffix) too, the instigator instigates [someone, who is] already instigated, not [an] inanimate [object]. For, it is not said to a tree “[you] should sacrifice”.

[Reply:] [It is] not [so], because inanimate objects lack the fitness [to be instigated to do something]. As for a brāhmaṇa, etc., by contrast, who are instigated, he does not indeed undertake the action [before being instigated]. For, a person who is already sacrificing is not impelled as “You, Sir, should sacrifice”, but it is someone who has not already undertaken [the] act [of sacrifice] only [who is impelled by means of the injunction, “You, Sir, should sacrifice”]. Hence the meaning of the optative suffix is by all means different from the meaning of the causative suffix.

The above objection is rooted in Aṣṭ 3.1.26 – *hetumati ca*. An English translation and analysis of the said rule by Rama Nath Sharma²⁸¹ is presented below:

“Affix *ṆiC* occurs after verbal roots when *hetumat* ‘causal action’ is expressed.

EXAMPLES:

kaṭaṃ kārayati ‘he has someone make the mat’
odanaṃ pācayati ‘he has someone cook the rice’

1. This rule introduces affix *ṆiC* after a verbal root when causal action is expressed. The word *hetu* is used in this grammar in both the sense of cause (*nimitta*) and as the causal agent (*hetu*). Thus, we have rule 1.4.55 *tatprayojako hetuś ca* whereby the instigator (*prayojaka*) of an independent agent is additionally termed *hetu*. This, obviously, has derivational consequences. Consider, for example, the sentence *devadatto yajñadattena taṇḍulam pācayati* ‘Devadatta has Yajñadatta cook the rice’ where Devadatta is prompting Yajñadatta to cook the rice. Yajñadatta is still the independent agent (*svatantrakartṛ*; 1.4.54 *svatantraḥ karttā*) though with a qualification. He is now being prompted by Devadatta. In this context, Devadatta is the prompter or causal agent. He is an agent independent of the action of prompting. He, therefore, is assigned the additional term *hetu*. Rule 3.1.26 *hetumati ca* requires the introduction of affix *ṆiC* when the activity of agent termed *hetu* is to be expressed.

Commentators caution that the condition of *hetumati* should not be interpreted as meaning ‘causal agent’ per se. it should instead be interpreted as denoting the characteristic action (*vyāpāra*) of instigation (*preraṇa*). Thus, the action of

²⁸¹ Sharma (1995:260-261).

instigation characteristic of the causal agent (*prayojakavyāpāra*) is the denotatum of *hetumat*.”

The opponent in NM 5.2, whose view has been cited above, probably thinks that both the cases are same since the motivation to do something in both these cases does not come on one’s own but is due to some external agent. And once one acts upon being instigated by someone or something else, the person who instigates is said to make the other person do the work and hence is fit to be called the instigator and the person who does it is deemed instigated.

The main difference that the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 stresses here is the difference in the awarenesses generated on hearing the two statements, “*devadatto yajñadattaṃ gamayati*” – “Devadatta causes Yajñadatta to go” and “*gaccha*” – “Go!” respectively. In explaining this difference further, Cakradhara cites the following verse from Bhartṛhari –

*dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe pṛchāder loḍ vidhīyate/
sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo ṇicah// VP_{Rau} 3.7.126.*

The imperative suffix is prescribed [to apply to verbal roots like] *prach-* [meaning ‘to ask’, etc.] if instigation of the mere substance [is aimed]. But when it is the instigation of the [substance] which is in action, it is the content of the causative suffix (*ṇic*).

The expression ‘*dravyamātram*’ – “mere substance” in the above VP verse means a person who has not yet undertaken the action in regard to which he is being instigated and in such a case, it is the imperative suffix which has to be used. By contrast, when it is about instigating a person, who has already undertaken the action in regard to which he is instigated, it requires the use of the causative suffix.

In the first instance, “*devadatto yajñadattaṃ gamayati*”, it is Devadatta, the instigating agent, who is understood to be the agent of the finite verb ‘*gamayati*’ (meaning ‘makes go’), which is formed by adding the causative suffix *ṇic* to the verbal root ‘*gam*’, meaning ‘to go’. Yajñadatta, the instigated person, on the other hand, is not understood to be the agent of the action of ‘making go’, although the ultimate action of going is performed by him. By contrast, with regard to the verb, ‘*gaccha*’, used in the second instance, the instigating agent is not understood to be the agent of the finite verb ‘go’, but it is the person who is instigated that is understood to be the prospective agent of the same. This is a difference noticeable at the structural level of the two statements.

A further distinction which has been mentioned by the Prābhākara is that the exhortative suffixes instigate an *apravṛttakriya* or a person who has not already undertaken an action, while the causative suffix instigate a *pravṛttakriya* or a person who has already undertaken the action in regard to which he is instigated. However, it may be asked: why does a person who has already undertaken an action on his own, needs further to be instigated in regard to that same action? The answer to this is not clearly to be found in the NM 5.2 passage

under discussion. However, let us try to explain this with the help of the following two examples –

Case 1: A mother says to her son: “*paṭha*” – “Study!”

Case 2: The statement: “*mātā putraṃ pāṭhayati*” – “The mother makes her son study”.

In Case 1, the finite verb *paṭha* – “study!” is in the imperative mood (*loṭ*). Here the command is uttered with the desire that the son should study; but there is no further effort on the part of the mother to ensure that her son actually undertakes the study. But with reference to Case 2, what does it mean to say that the mother *makes* her son *study*? What exactly does it mean to *make study*? It means that the mother does not cease by merely expressing her wish that her son should study by uttering “Study!”, but she makes further efforts to make sure that her son does not stop the study he has begun. In other words, the mother ensures that her son continues the study that he has begun either on his own or after hearing her mother’s command and does not leave it midway.²⁸² The mother may ensure this by physical activities like sitting by the side of the son, etc., through verbal activities like telling her ‘now read this’, ‘now read this’, clearing any doubt, etc. or just through her body language²⁸³. In short, it is to prevent the discontinuity of the action already begun by someone either on his own or on being instigated by someone else, that the causative suffix is used.

This also further explains, in my opinion, the difference between the relation of *prerya-preraka* pertaining to the exhortative suffixes and the relation of *prayojya-prayojaka*, which belongs to the causative suffix. While the *prayojya* or the induced and *prayojaka* or the inducer²⁸⁴ are mutually dependent in so far as the *prayojaka* ensures through his activity – either verbal or physical – the continuity of the action begun by the *prayojya*, the *preraka* or instigator’s task ends with communication of commandment to the *prerya* or the induced and there is no further concern of the *preraka* whether or not the *prerya* actually does it or ceases to do it midway after beginning it.

²⁸² I am grateful to Prof. Lalit Kumar Tripathi, for explaining this difference at length.

²⁸³ This is also the sense in which commentators of Bhartṛhari like Helarāja interpret this verse: *apavrṭtakriyasya dravyamātrasyāpratilabdhakartṛbhāvasya karṭṛtvārtha eva praīṣe dyotve loḍ upadiśyate.... pavrṭtakriyasya tu viramāśankāyāṃ mā viramśid ity abhisandhāya kartur eva svatantrasya prayojakahetuvyāpāre ṇij vācaka upadiśyate* – “When instigation of such a person, who has not begun action, **a mere substance**, that is, he who has not yet attained the state of being an agent, to agency is intended to be implied, the imperative suffix is taught.... By contrast, the causative suffix (*ṇic*) is taught to denote the activity of an inducing agent in regard to an independent agent, who has already begun an action, [and] who is apprehended [by the inducing agent] to cease operating, [for which the inducing agent] wants “may he not cease”.

²⁸⁴ Although both *prayojaka* and *preraka* cause instigation, yet keeping in mind the subtle difference between their way of instigating just discussed above, I have translated *prayojaka* and *prayojya* as inducer and induced respectively, and *preraka* and *prerya* as instigator and instigated respectively.

Such a major distinction noted above has a great bearing on explaining the functioning of a Vedic injunction also. To explain: As noted above in Section 3A, the instigation caused by the Vedic injunction consists in merely producing in the addressee the awareness having the form “I am instigated in regard to this” and not in seeing to it that the action is begun and continued and not given up midway. Were it not so, then as an instigator, the Vedic injunction would be at par with wind, etc. which physically pushes one to do something and hence there would be no need for the addressee to *understand* that he is urged by the Veda to do some specific thing. Further, if it were not so, then deliberations in Vedic sacred texts on the capacity (*sāmarthyā*), etc. of a person to undertake the prescribed action would be useless; for, if the Veda were not a mere instigator (*preraka*), but an inducer (*prayojaka*), then it would be imperative for it not only to make sure that the prescribed action is undertaken but also that it is continued and left away in between and that would have been impossible for the Vedas to do since after all the Vedas being a collection of words are insentient entities. In that case, all *arthavāda* passages in the Vedic sacred texts, which reinforce a prescription or prohibition by praising or rebuking the prescribed or prohibited act respectively would be useless. This is because if the Vedic injunction were to physically make one act and continue to act, there would be no need for the addressee to take cognizance of the praise or rebuke of the prescribed or prohibited act offered by the *arthavāda* passages and strengthen his understanding that the prescription or the prohibition must be complied with. Further, no distinction in terms of qualities of obligation to perform the acts prescribed by Vedic prescriptions could be done as a result of which no distinction between fixed (*nitya*), occasional (*naimittika*) and optional (*kāmya*) ritual actions could be maintained, for everything would be fixed and compulsory and this would do away with the roles of desire and free will at least in the case of the optional rituals (*kāmyakarman*). Moreover, under such a circumstance, due to the absence of any prohibitory expression, such Vedic statements as “*śyēnena abhicāran yajeta*” – “One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Vedas”, would not be treated as a prohibition in disguise on having been interpreted in the light of the general prohibition, “*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*” – “one should not kill living beings”. As a consequence of this, since everyone would unavoidably undertake the malevolent Śyēna sacrifice, the Veda would become a perennial and irremediable source of suffering.

Notwithstanding what has been said above, it may be noted that the above explanation is offered from the standpoint of the impeller²⁸⁵. But Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent seeks to highlight this difference from the standpoint of the impelled, and the basis for this is the phenomenology of the person impelled²⁸⁶. To explain: it is true that in case of inducement, the induced has undertaken the action and has already understood the action to be his duty

²⁸⁵ I use this word in a general sense which should cover both the specific meanings of the instigator and the inducer. Likewise, the word impelled used in the next line should be understood as being generally used to mean both the instigated and the induced.

²⁸⁶ I am grateful to Dr. Elisa Freschi who drew my attention to and advised me to focus on and explain the difference from the standpoint of the phenomenology of the person impelled.

and the inducer only makes sure through his verbal or physical activities that the action is not abandoned midway. But in case of instigation, it is only after being instigated by the instigator that the instigated person understands the action in regard to which he has been instigated is his duty. Thus, while in the former case, the understanding of duty does not result from the inducer's inducement, in case of the latter, the awareness of duty precisely is the result of the act of instigation done by the instigator. In light of the above analysis, it may be observed that from the impeller's standpoint a gross similarity between the two cases may be claimed based on the fact that in both, the source of impulsion is external to the impelled person, and the only way to distinguish them that remains is a consideration of whether continuation of actual performance of the action is desired or just mere undertaking. But even when this difference is admitted, it cannot be denied that in case of instigation (as contrasted with inducement), the communication of instigation to the person intended to be instigated is resorted to. If this is pushed further and the psychology of being instigated is investigated, then it appears that being instigated entails an awareness of something to be done, i.e., a sense of duty. Now if this very sense of duty is made the basis for accounting for this distinction, then a better explanation is perhaps achieved. That is, if the sense of duty precedes impulsion, it is a case of inducement, and if the reverse, then it is instigation. Similarly, this can also better account for the difference between a person who has already undertaken an action (*pravṛttakriya*) and one who has not (*apravṛttakriya*). This is because *pravṛtti* or undertaking of an action is dependent upon the realisation of one's sense of duty with regard to the concerned act. Given that this difference is based on the cognitive element of understanding of duty, it helps explain why inanimate objects can neither be instigated on the ground that they cannot resolve to act upon understanding duty, nor can they be induced in so far as their actions are not determined by any mental resolution to act, which is again based on an understanding of duty. Hence inanimate objects cannot be induced not to abandon the act, which would be in accord with the intention of the inducer to let him act on.

2.4. *Niyoga* as the instigator and also the thing to-be-done: the Bhāṭṭa challenge

Now, the Prābhākara meets the fundamental challenge of proving that *niyoga* is both the instigator and the thing to-be-done without having to resort to the Bhāṭṭa way of accepting two separate functions of the same exhortative suffix in addition to its usual function of denotation of the grammatical agent and its number. This takes on the form of the following dialectical engagement with his Bhāṭṭa opponent –

nanu līnārthaḥ preraṇātmako 'yaṃ vyākhyātaḥ kāryātmā cāyam anuṣṭheyo dharmāḥ. sa eva ca vākyārtho yukto. kārye 'rthe vedasya prāmāṇyam iti hi mīmāṃsakāḥ. tasmāt punar api bhāṭṭapakṣavad dvayam āpatati – prerakaś ca vidhiḥ kāryarūpaś cānuṣṭheyo 'rtha iti.

sukhaidhito niranusandhāna iva āyusmān evaṃ vyavaharati. na hy anyaḥ preraka anyaś cānuṣṭheya ity uktam. niyoga eva prerako niyoga eva cānuṣṭheyaḥ.

*kathaṃ dvairūpyam asya śabdo vadatīti cen maivam prerakatvam eva śabdārtha
ārthas tu kāryatvam. yato vidhir evānuṣṭheyatayā 'vagamyata ācāryājñāṃ karomi
rājājñāṃ karomitīti.*

*kimarthaṃ tarhi viṣayānuṣṭhānam iti cen, na hy ājñā ghaṭādivat svarūpeṇa kartuṃ
śakyā 'pi tu viṣayadvāraṃ tatsampādanam. kamaṇḍaluṃ bibhrhīty
ācāryeṇājñāptaḥ kamaṇḍaluṃ bhṛtvācāryājñāṃ kṛtāṃ manyate. so 'yam niyoga
evānuṣṭheyah.*

*nanu rājājñāyā karomīty api vyapadeśo dṛśyate. sa cānanuṣṭheyām eva ājñāṃ
darśayati.*

*maivam tatrāpy ājñāivānuṣṭheyā. preṣaṇābhiprāyeṇa tṛtīyānirdeśa ity evaṃ kecit.
anye tu śabdaṃ kāryatvam niyogasya prerakatvam tv arthād ity ācakṣate.*

*anuṣṭheyatā hi tasya nijam rūpam. svasiddhaye sa tu niyojyam niyuñjānaḥ preraka
ity ucyate. tad idaṃ kāryatvam aparityaktaprakabhāvam asyāvagamya.
prerakatvam cāparityaktakāryabhāvam ity anyatarad atra śabdaṃ rūpam
anyatarac cārthaṃ rūpam iti na bhāṭṭair ivāsmābhiḥ pratyaye gurur bhāra
āropitaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 109-111.*

[Objection:] Well, this meaning of the optative [and like suffixes called *niyoga*] which has been explained as being of the nature of impelling is what is to be done; [and] that, which is fit to be performed, is religious duty. And it is logical that it (commandment) alone is the sentence-meaning. For, according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, the Veda [as an instrument of knowledge] is valid with regard to something which is to be done. Therefore, once again, just as on the Bhāṭṭa view, two things undesirably follow: an injunction is the impeller, and it, having the form of something to be done, is what is to be performed.

[Reply:] O long-living one! You, Sir, speak like someone who has been brought up with [excessive] comfort, and lacks enquiry. For, it has been said that the impeller and that which is to be performed are not different [things]. The commandment alone is the impeller, and the commandment alone is that which is to be performed.

[Objection:] How does the speech-unit (the exhortative suffix) speak of its (commandment's) dual form?

[Reply:] It should not be so. Being an instigator alone is what is directly conveyed by the speech-unit (exhortative suffix); [but] being something to be done is implied. [This is] because an injunction alone is understood as that which is to be performed as in – 'I carry out the order of the teacher', 'I carry out the order of the king.'

[Objection:] Then, why is it that the scope²⁸⁷ is performed?

[Reply:] This is because an order in itself cannot be accomplished unlike a jar, etc., but its accomplishment takes place through the [accomplishment] of the scope. ‘Hold the water-pot’ – on being so ordered by the teacher, one thinks the teacher’s order to be have been done upon holding the water-pot. On being ordered by the king – “Go to the royal camp” – one considers the royal order to have been accomplished upon going to the royal capital. That commandment alone is what is to be performed.

[Objection:] Such statements as ‘I do by the order²⁸⁸ of the king’ are also seen. And that shows the order as something which is not to be performed.

[Reply:] It should not be so. There too, the order alone is what is to be performed. It is with an intention of [conveying] the instrument of instigation that the third case-marker is mentioned. Such is the view of some.

Others say that the commandment’s being something to be done is what is directly conveyed by the speech-unit (the exhortative suffix), but [its] being an impeller is implied. Its being something to be performed is its own form. But it is called an ‘impeller’ in so far as it enjoins a person fit for enjoinder for the sake of its own accomplishment. Thus, its being something to be done is understood as something unbefitting of its character of being an impeller. And its being an impeller is [understood] as something unbefitting of its being something to be done. Hence, since one of them (either its being something to be done or its being an impeller) has a linguistic nature, and the other an implied nature, we, unlike the Bhāṭṭas, have not imposed a great load on the [exhortative] suffix.

The main problem of the Prābhākara with the Bhāṭṭa theory of the denotation of both *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* was that it would contract a crucial rule of linguistic cognition that a word cannot operate again once it has ceased its operation. In other words, through a single operation, a word cannot denote more than one thing. This rule holds true for the denotative function of exhortative suffixes too. The Prābhākara upheld his theory of *niyoga* to be the meaning of exhortative suffixes on observing the fact that it is only upon hearing sentences endowed with exhortative verb forms that one feels instigated, and not otherwise. Hence, the Prābhākara appealed to such worldly usages as “I do the order of the king”, “I do by the order of the king”, etc. only to prove that *niyoga* or commandment

²⁸⁷ Scope here refers to the specific action denoted by the verbal root in regard to which one makes efforts directly, and which also serves to specify the boundary of the commandment.

²⁸⁸ The present usage which registers the use of the instrumental case with regard to the king’s order is cited by the opponent as a counter-example in order to invalidate the Prābhākara claim that it is *niyoga* which is something to be accomplished. By contrast, the Prābhākara says consistent with his basic thesis that *niyoga* is what instigates and also what is to be done, that the use of the instrumental case does not in any way put to rest his claim that *niyoga* is what is to be done, but rather reaffirms his parallel claim of *niyoga* being that which instigates a person for its accomplishment and hence the instrument of instigation.

itself is what instigates and also it alone is the thing which is to be done. However, for this, like the Bhāṭṭa, the Prābhākara did not hold both these understandings of *niyoga* of “being the instigator” and “being the thing to-be-done” to be *denoted* by exhortative suffixes; for, in that case it would have led him to the same cumbersome situation of which he complained against the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2. Rather, the Prābhākara identified this with the nature of *niyoga* itself and attributed either of these two understandings of ‘being an instigator’ and ‘being the thing to-be-done’ to different but related levels of human cognitions, viz. those of language and implication.

What we find here are views of two Prābhākara sub-schools, according to one of which, the awareness of instigation belongs to the linguistic level while the understanding of the thing to-be-done comes from implication. According to the other sub-view, it is just the other way round. To explain the first Prābhākara sub-view: Let us assume, a teacher orders his student “*vedān adhīṣva*” – “Study the Vedas!” Now, on this Prābhākara sub-view, immediately on hearing the exhortative verb form ‘*adhīṣva*’ – “study!”, the student understands that he is being instigated and with this understanding of his having arisen, the denotative function of the exhortative suffix ends. But since the student deliberates that one is always instigated to accomplish a hitherto unaccomplished act, and there is no reason of his case being a solitary exception to that, the instigation must be about something which is to be done, and thus he understands through implication that it is the act of studying the Vedas which is the thing to be done, i.e., the thing to be accomplished. And with this accomplishment of the act of studying the instigation itself will be accomplished. Since instigation cannot be about nothing and must be about some concrete thing that can be accomplished through human effort, it is the act of studying, understood out of the verbal root portion of the finite verb ‘*adhīṣva*’, which is implicitly recognised as that thing the performance whereof would ultimately accomplish the instigation itself. In explanation of the second Prābhākara sub-view, the following may be said – the student first understands at the linguistic level that studying the Vedas is his duty and with this the denotative function of the exhortative suffix comes to an end. But he does not stop there but deliberates that since duty implies instigation by some external agency, he is instigated to accomplish the act of studying the Vedas by the teacher.

Explaining these two sub-views Kiyotaka Yoshimizu observes in his 2021 article, *Prābhākara and Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent*, that:

“This alternative relation between incitement and duty is assumed on the side of the enjoined person (*niyojya*), whereas the first is assumed on the side of the enjoiner (*niyokṛt*), that is, the Vedic scripture. As incitement and the sense of duty are inseparable from each other in both cases, one of them is indirectly known when the other is directly known from the injunction. Therefore, this opponent states that his position has no necessity to assume two distinct entities for the two forms of enjoinder, incitement and duty, unlike the Bhāṭṭas.”²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Yoshimizu (2021b:95).

However²⁹⁰, in my opinion, the first sub-view offers a more logical and hence more convincing explanation of the cognitive process that follows from the hearing of exhortative suffixes. This is because, it is rather more logical that on first having the understanding of being instigated, the student should most expectedly inquire as to what is it in regard to which he is instigated and arrive at the implied understanding that the instigation is about the concrete act of studying the Vedas. By contrast, the second sub-view that one derives his understanding of instigation by means of implication from the preliminary linguistic cognition of the act of studying being the student's duty is rather forced and requires a greater stretch of imagination. Moreover, on the second sub-view if in the beginning of the understanding process itself, one recognises the concrete act of studying the Vedas to be his duty, he would not generally have any further necessity of understanding that the duty understood by him is necessarily preceded by instigation; he could rather set himself out to accomplish the act of studying the Vedas on the basis of this preliminary understanding of duty alone. Thus, if the general Prābhākara view of *niyoga* being both the instigator and the thing-to-be done is to be defended and the understanding of either of these two related characteristics of *niyoga* has to be identified as coming from the primary level of linguistic cognition, it is rather the understanding of instigation that should be identified as belonging to the linguistic level and hence the primary one. This is again because the understanding of mere instigation is not enough to pacify the listener's expectancy for clarification of the meaning understood out of the linguistic cognition and because of instigation being always about something to-be-done, it triggers further expectation for what is it doing which the instigation itself could be understood as accomplished. The logical sequence of linguistic cognition leading to the cognition of an implied meaning is thus better explained with the help of this first Prābhākara sub-view. It also better fits with the general Prābhākara view²⁹¹ that the instigator-instigated relation is prior to the action-agent relation and that it is only *after* understanding that one is instigated that one acts²⁹². Moreover, if instigation were available only at the level of implication and not at the level of language, the Vedic command utterances would cease to be the sole instigator of men with regard to Vedic ritual actions, considered to be *dharma* or religious duty by Mīmāṃsā philosophers, by means of *denoting* instigation.

An alternative way of interpreting either of 'being an instigator' and 'being something to-be-done' as belonging to the level of implication could be, in my opinion, perhaps the following: although either of these has to be accepted as not coming from the linguistic levels, yet since the understanding of that characteristic of *niyoga* would logically and inevitably follow from the meaning understood out of the linguistic level, the subsequent

²⁹⁰ My only dissatisfaction with Yoshimizu's analysis is that it does not take note of the possibility of how the first view, as I show above, is more logical and convincing and more in tune with a crucial claim of the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2.

²⁹¹ See Section 2.1. above.

²⁹² *yajeteti śrute niyukto 'ham iti prathamam avagacchati. tato yajate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 106.

meaning could still be considered linguistic in an extended sense²⁹³. This is because the implication that comes into operation and delivers the implied meaning is based on the linguistic level of meaning. In other words, implication as an instrument of knowledge does not operate here independently of the instrument of knowledge called linguistic communication (*śabdapramāṇa*), but is necessarily based on the latter due to which it contributes to the extension of the denoted meaning in a way. In this way, despite being not obtained directly on account of the denotative operation of the exhortative suffix, the implied meaning could still be identified as an extended linguistic meaning in so far as it contributes to the quelling of the hitherto unfulfilled expectancy for clarification of the meaning obtained at the linguistic level. This could, as a result, also help the Prābhākara avoid the Bhāṭṭa problem of accepting two *bhāvanā*-s denoted by the exhortative suffix, while being able to show both these aspects of *niyoga* as ultimately belonging to the linguistic level.

Part II

Introduction

In this second part of the present chapter, I will discuss the Niyogavākyaarthavādin's view on how an injunction works; in course of this the requirements for a successful working of a commandment, its bearings upon the discrimination between religious duty (*dharma*) and contrary-to-religious duty (*adharma*), the non-difference between the ways in which injunctions concerning fixed and elective rituals work, etc. will also be dealt with. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu has already dealt with a few parts of this section in his recent article, *Prabhākara and Jayanta's Prābhākara Opponent on Vedic Enjoinment (niyoga)*²⁹⁴ where he has analysed at length the doctrinal and methodical differences between Prabhākara and Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent and shown the points of deviation of the latter from the former. He has also shown, relying upon his previous researches and also that of Patrick Cummins's recent article²⁹⁵, how Jayanta's opponent is different and perhaps prior to Śālikanātha, Prabhākara's commentator and the principal systematiser of the Prābhākara system. According to Yoshimizu, this "deviation may have occurred as a result of the increased sectarian confrontation between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools of Mīmāṃsā. The Prābhākaras may have attempted to differentiate themselves from the Bhāṭṭas who emphasized the spontaneity in human action, by emphasizing the sense of duty evoked from outside and ignoring the human spontaneity asserted in Prabhākara's

²⁹³ For a very interesting analysis of extended signification in accordance with the Prābhākara theory of *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, see Saxena (2019).

²⁹⁴ Yoshimizu (2021b).

²⁹⁵ Cummins (2020).

theory.”²⁹⁶ However, what Yoshimizu has not said is which particular stage of development in the Prābhākara system does Jayanta’s Prābhākara represent. This is where I step in and seek to supplement Yoshimizu research by showing that it is the post-Prābhākara and pre-Śālikanātha stage of development in the Prābhākara system of thought as reported in Umbekabhāṭṭa’s (also only Umbeka) *Tātparyāṭīkā* (ŚVTā), the earliest available commentary on Kumārilabhāṭṭa’s ŚV. Although Prābhākara or any follower of his is not mentioned directly by Umbeka, yet even a cursory look at the opponent’s view presented in ŚVTā and its comparison with the view of Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent found in NM 5.2 will convince one that it is none other than a post-Prābhākara Prābhākara philosopher whose views are dialectically engaged with. Thus, in so far as it renders crucial assistance in identifying the unnamed opponent in ŚVTā as a Prābhākara, the value of Jayanta’s text as a historically informed text gets enhanced. It is pertinent to mention here that although scholars like Kei Kataoka have noticed the importance of Umbeka’s ŚVTā as a major source for Jayanta²⁹⁷, in respect of the latter’s discussion of the theories of erroneous cognition (*khyātivāda*) and the question of validity of cognitions (*prāmāṇya*), yet the fact of ŚVTā being a major source for Jayanta’s discussion of various theories of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) in the second part of the fifth book of *Nyāyamañjarī* has not been, to the best of my knowledge, noted by any scholar heretofore. Thus, my discussion of Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s view in this part will follow historical lines. Since I completely agree with Yoshimizu’s analysis of the portions of Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s view, I will summarily mention them whenever and wherever applicable.

It is to be noted that Jayanta reuses ŚVTā in a variety of ways: sometimes he quotes lines from it verbatim, sometimes he changes a word here and there in Umbeka’s text to make it clearer, sometimes he paraphrases Umbeka’s lines and explains them a little bit thereafter, etc. But in all these cases Jayanta presents the Prābhākara opponent’s view very systematically, which is missing in Umbeka’s own text, where it appears to be presented in course of lengthy digressions from the main issue. Another value of Jayanta’s text in this respect is that it also reconstructively records the views of post-Kumāriḷa Bhāṭṭa response to Prābhākara challenges. The view reproduced by Jayanta has been identified by Cakradhara, Jayanta’s commentator, as belonging to Umbeka. Given that Umbeka’s ŚVTā is available to us only up to the Sphoṭavāda section, some of the responses of Umbeka found in Jayanta might be supposed to be present in other sections of ŚVTā that have not yet come down to us. Of relevance to this study are portions of the ŚVTā on the ŚV on the *Codanasūtra* (henceforth ŚVTāCo only), i.e., MīSū 1.1.2 and the *Autpattikasūtra* (henceforth ŚVTāAu only), i.e., MīSū 1.1.5. The page numbers mentioned

²⁹⁶ Yoshimizu (2021b:135-136).

²⁹⁷ Kataoka (2016), Kataoka (2017).

are those of the ŚVTā, edited by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri and revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy and published in 1971 by University of Madras.

1. How *niyoga* works: the two correlates (*anubandha*)

Having established that it is *niyoga* or commandment which is the thing to be done (*kārya*) as well as the instigator (*preraka*), Jayanta's Prābhākara says the following about how *niyoga* works:

sa cāyaṃ niyogaḥ pratīyamāno 'yajeta svargakāma' ity anubandhadvayāvacchinnāḥ pratīyate. yajyādinā 'sya viṣayānubandho dhātunocyate. 'svargakāma' ity adhikārānubandhaḥ padāntareṇa arpyate. tatra ca svargakāmasyaivādhikāro nirvahati. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 111.

That very commandment, which is being cognised, as in “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, is understood as delimited by two correlates. By the verbal root, *yaj-* and the like, its scope²⁹⁸-correlate is denoted. By a different word – ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ – the eligibility-correlate is communicated. And in regard to that (the scope), it is only the one who desires *svarga*, who is eligible.

As Yoshimizu notes, Jayanta's Prābhākara deviates here from Prābhākara's view of only one *anubandha* or correlate of *viṣaya* or scope being necessary for a commandment's functioning and mentions the additional *anubandha* or the eligibility-correlate. It is important to understand the meaning of the two words, *viṣayānubandha* and *adhikārānubandha*. Cakradhara explains them as follows:

anubadhyate 'nyato 'vacchidya svātmany eva vyavasthitaḥ pratītiṃ prāpyate yena asau viṣayānubandhaḥ, yena vā 'nuṣṭhātrantarāvacchedena niyatānuṣṭhātrkatvena avasthāpyate 'sau vidhyānubandho 'dhikārānubandhaḥ. NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 77.

That, by means of which it (i.e., *niyoga* or commandment) gets bound up, [i.e.,] is cognised as established in itself only after having been separated from others is the correlate of scope. Or, that, by means of which [the *niyoga* or commandment] is established as having a fixed performer through separation from other performers is the correlate of injunction [known as] the correlate of eligibility.

Thus, it transpires from the above that both the correlates function to save the scope and eligibility from unduly getting extended to acts and people that are unfit in regard to a particular injunction. The first one, namely the scope-correlate specifies the act to be done perhaps through the specification of the procedural actions and the second one, the eligibility-correlate, specifies the eligible performer, by excluding people who are unfit

²⁹⁸I have followed Yoshimizu (2021b) in translating *viṣaya* as scope, since the correlate of *viṣaya* specifies and hence delimits the range of action that is to be done by the *adhikārin*, just as the correlate of *adhikāra* specifies and delimits the range of the persons who are fit for undertaking the prescribed action.

for undertaking the performance of the scope-correlate specifies. These help the proper functioning of an injunction without leading to any confusion and without requiring, as will be shown later in this chapter, any further element like the result for executing the injunction's task of instigation.

The following lines from ŚVTā also mention these two *anubandha*-s:

nanu vidhyāśrayaṇe 'pi preryaviśeṣaṇasya sādhyatvaṃ yāgādeś ca sādhanatvaṃ katham avagamyate, na hi vidhiḥ phalaṃ vinā vidhātum asamarthaḥ, tasya preryaviśayamātrāpekṣaṇāt; preryaviśayaśravaṇān nairākāṅkṣye sati preryaviśeṣaṇasya dhātvarthasādhyatvakalpanā puruṣabuddhiprabhavā eva syāt. ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 187.

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, even after resorting to the injunction, how is it learnt that that which qualifies the person to be instigated²⁹⁹ is the thing to be accomplished and sacrifice and the like means [for accomplishing the said element which qualifies the person]? For, it is not the case that an injunction is incapable of prescribing without [resorting to] result, since it (i.e., the injunction) requires only the person to be instigated and the scope. Since there is no [further] expectancy [for anything more by the injunction] if that which qualifies the person is postulated to be the thing to be accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root, [such a postulation] would have its origin in human intellect only.”

What is mentioned by Umbeka's opponent as '*preryaviśayamātrāpekṣā*', or the expectancy for the person to be instigated and the scope is similar to the *adhikāra* and *viśaya anubandha*-s of Jayanta's opponent. Jayanta seems to have change *prerya* into *adhikāra* perhaps for the sake of maintaining terminological consistency in his text.

Immediately after this, Jayanta's Prābhākara anticipates an objection from the Bhāṭṭa side that without knowing the meaning of the verbal root to be the means of accomplishing *svarga*, no one would be instigated to undertake the action. He says the following:

yadi bhāvārthasya svargaṃ prati sādhanatvaṃ avagamyate, evaṃ tarhi svargakāmena asau kṛto bhavatīti svargakāmapadānvaye prāktana eva mārgo 'numantavyaḥ. na punaḥ svargādiphalaḥpradarśanapūrvakaṃ vidheḥ pravartakatvaṃ, asvātantryaprasaṅgāt. na hi īdṛśaṃ śāstrasya dainyaṃ yat phalaṃ vinā puṃsaḥ pravartayitum na śaknotīti. anyathā 'yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta' ityādāv apravartakaṃ śāstraṃ syāt. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 111.

And in regard to that (the scope), it is only the one who desires *svarga*, who is eligible. If the meaning of the verbal root were known to be the means in regard to *svarga*, then in this way that (the sacrifice) would be done only by one who is

²⁹⁹ An example of a *preryaviśeṣaṇa* is *svarga* within the phrase, '*svargakāma*'.

desirous of *svarga* [as the result of the sacrifice]; hence in regard to the syntactic connection of the word ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ one had to infer the previous (Bhāṭṭa) way [of construing the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’]. But an injunction does not instigate by showing results like *svarga*, etc., because of the undesirable consequence of [the injunction’s] loss of independence [as an instigator]. For, the sacred text is not such poor that it could not instigate men [to undertake an act] without [showing] the result [accruing therefrom]. Otherwise, the sacred text would not be the instigator in such cases as ‘one should sacrifice as long as one lives’, etc.

The Prābhākara here makes an attempt to uphold the epistemic integrity of Vedic sacred texts by denying any possibility of the sacred texts luring one to perform ritual actions by showing results. As has been already shown in the chapter on Bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda, the Bhāṭṭa philosophers had contended that without understanding the prescribed action to be the means of achieving something desirable, a *sapratyaya* or rational person would not be motivated and it is for the fear of its essential nature of being an instigator getting compromised that the Vedic injunction implicitly communicated the means-end relationship between the act of sacrifice and *svarga*. Thus, what the injunction is dependent on, according Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent, is the communication of the prescribed act’s being the means to some desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatva*). What is to be noted here, by contrast, is that Jayanta’s Prābhākara repeatedly stresses that such means-end relationship is not communicated by the injunction, and as a matter of that by the sacred texts. I think the point involved here is that such means-end relationship is not directly conveyed by language, i.e., the injunction itself, but postulated only by the addressee of such injunction. This becomes clearer when read in the light of the following passage from Umbeka:

*na hy atra jyotiṣṭomādeḥ karaṇatvaṃ svargāder vā sādhyatvaṃ kenacid abhihitam;
tasya kāmamātrasambandhopādānāt dhātvarthasya ca
bhāvanāmātraviśeṣaṇatvaśruteḥ.* ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 100.

Here [in the injunction, “One desirous of *svarga*, should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma] there is nothing which denotes that Jyotiṣṭoma and the like are the means, or that *svarga* and the like are the things to be accomplished. This is because it (*svarga*) is obtained as having a connection merely with [the word] desire, and the meaning of the verbal root is heard to be the qualifier of merely the effectuation.

The word ‘*śruti*’ in the above quote means direct mention. Thus, it may be understood that the Prābhākara implicitly stresses here that such means-end relationship is not directly communicated by language. This position of Jayanta’s Prābhākara and also that of Umbeka’s is in direct contradistinction to Prabhākara’s own position in the *Bṛhatī*, according to which, on “hearing the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” one who desires heaven becomes eligible to hold the sacrifice (*adhikārin*) feeling that one is enjoined (*niyojya*), or in other words, realizing that it is one’s duty to hold the sacrifice. To obtain this feeling, however, one needs to realize that one can attain heaven through sacrifice.

This realization is enabled by the syntactic connection of “*svargakāmaḥ*” with “*yajeta*.” After a brief analysis, Prabhākara concludes that this syntactical connection is established only when the sacrifice is thought subservient to heaven.”³⁰⁰ As for the way how this is made possible for Prabhākara, Yoshimizu says:

“Prabhākara does not transform “*svargakāmo yajeta*” into “*svargam yāgena bhāvayet*” as Śabara did to secure the relationship between the sacrificial action and heaven as a means and the purpose to be accomplished by it.³⁵ Nevertheless, Prabhākara asserts that “*svargakāmaḥ*” and “*yajeta*” can be syntactically connected (*ekavākyatā*) as a pair of words that denotes the enjoined person (*niyojya*) and the scope (*viṣaya*) of the same enjoinder (*niyoga*) only when the object of desire, heaven, can be accomplished through sacrificial action. In other words, the relationship between the enjoined person and the scope of the same enjoinder implies that the sacrificial action is a means and heaven is its purpose”³⁰¹

Thus, it is the device of *ekavākyatā* which, according to Prabhākara and as analysed by Yoshimizu, which makes this understanding of the means-end relationship possible. However, this understanding is still ‘indirect’ in the sense that this relationship and the consequent subservience of the act of sacrifice to *svarga* is not *denoted*, according to Jayanta’s and Umbeka’s Prābhākara opponents, by the injunction.

As for the dispensation of result for upholding the epistemic integrity of sacred texts, Umbeka’s Prābhākara opponent continues:

na ca vidhiḥ phalaṃ vinā vidhātum asamarthas, tasya niyojyaviṣayamātrāpekṣaṇāt. ata eṣa vākyārtho – yaḥ puruṣaḥ svargādi kāmāyate, sa yāgaviśiṣṭāṃ bhāvanāṃ kuryād iti. kimarthaṃ punar asau niṣphalānuṣṭhāne pravartate iti cet, vidhis tāvad evam avagamyate; yadi tu tathā na pravartate kim atra kurmaḥ? ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 100.

And it is not the case that the injunction is incapable of prescribing [an action] without [resorting to] result; because it only awaits the person to be enjoined and the scope. Hence this is the sentence-meaning [which emerges from the said injunction] – the person who desires *svarga* and the like, may he do the effectuation which is specified by sacrifice. But if [it is asked as to] why that [person] undertakes the performance [of such an action, which] lacks a result, [it must be said that it is because of] the injunction being understood as such. But if he does not undertake [the action] as such, what should [we] do in this regard?

³⁰⁰ Yoshimizu (2021b:102).

³⁰¹ Yoshimizu (2021b:101).

The above passage is clearly echoed by Jayanta's Prābhākara who avowedly denies the need for result by the injunction to instigate a person to a ritual action. For Umbeka's Prābhākara opponent, as it is for Jayanta's Prābhākara, the instigation is achieved by the injunction just by fulfilling the criteria of the person to be enjoined and the scope. In order to show that the fulfilment of these two criteria do not in any way involve any direct communication of the means-end relationship, Umbeka's Prābhākara takes help of the surface structure of the injunction, which in fact does not contain any such linguistic element which could be expressive of the said relationship. In other words, what seems implied by such a presentation of the meaning of the injunctive sentence is that this Prābhākara perhaps values the information directly communicated by a Vedic injunction through *abhidhā* or direct significative power and not that one, viz. the result, which, though also known, is not communicated directly by the injunction. This would also help him do away with any subjective consideration of the result, which could ultimately strengthen the general Mīmāṃsā point of the authorless nature of the Vedic sacred texts. It is also interesting to note how Jayanta rephrases the above passage in his own way, thereby making it more condensed and to the point.

Now, in the last line of the last NM passage quoted above, it is seen that Jayanta's Prābhākara says that if it were not the case that the injunction did not stand in need of the result for instigating a person, the Vedic sacred text could not instigate people in case of such injunctions as "One should sacrifice as long as one lives", where apparently no result is mentioned. This statement immediately leads to the following discussion:

kiṃ 'yāvajjīvam' ityādicodanāḥ phalaśūnyā eva?

om ity ucyate. na hi vidhiḥ phalam ākāṅkṣati, api tu niyojyaṃ viṣayaṃ ca – kasya niyogaḥ, kutra niyoga – iti. te ete ubhe apy ākāṅkṣe paripūrṇe. tatra – jīvato niyogo, yāge ca niyoga – iti. ataḥ paraṃ phalakaḥ paraṃ puruṣabuddhiprabhavaṃ bhavati, na śāstrīyam. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 111.

[Clarificatory question to the Prābhākara:] Are such injunctions as "As long as one lives [one should sacrifice]", etc. devoid of results?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] We say, 'yes'. For, the injunction does not expect a result, but the person to be enjoined and the scope – [as represented respectively by the questions:] whose enjoinder [is it?] [and] in regard to what is the enjoinder? Both these expectations are fulfilled with regard to that (the injunction), [namely] – it is the enjoinder of someone who is alive, and the enjoinder is with regard to [the act of] sacrifice. Any postulation of result hereafter has its origin in the human intellect, [and] not in the sacred texts.

Here, Jayanta's Prābhākara clearly tries to establish an likeness between injunctions for elective rituals and those for fixed rituals in respect of their instigation in so far as, according to him, the requirements regarding the two correlates of the person to be

enjoined or eligibility and the scope are fulfilled, just as it is in case of the Vedic injunction, "One who desires *svarga* should sacrifice". The use of the word ‘*codanā*’ here gives an important hint to this likeness, for this can perhaps serve as the probans of the following syllogism:

svargakāmādicodanāḥ phalaśūnyāś, codanātvād, yāvajjīvam ityādicodanāvat.

The injunctions such as “One desirous of *svarga*”, etc. are devoid of results; because they are injunctions; just as it is the case with injunctions such as “As long as one lives”, etc.

What is really intended to be highlighted here is not only the injunctions like those beginning with “as long as one lives” are devoid of results (which is logical, because, otherwise, one would stop performing them as soon as one gets the result or the desire for the result ceases), but also the result-bound ones³⁰².

The word ‘*codanā*’, which has already been glossed by Śabara in his commentary on MīSū 1.1.2 as “*kriyāyāḥ pravartakavacanam*” – “a statement which prompts [the undertaking] of action” – underlines the essential instigating aspect of Vedic injunctions and hence the essential validity of Vedic sacred texts as an independent instrument of knowledge. For Prābhākaras, only the Vedic language is an independent instrument of knowledge and it is consistent with the general Mīmāṃsā view that “since the Veda has for its purpose actions, statements [in the Veda] which have not that (i.e., action) as their purposes are superfluous”³⁰³. Thus, it is by virtue of its being a *codanā* or an instigating statement that a similar way of functioning of these two types of Vedic injunctions – the elective and fixed types – could be claimed. Thus, since the expectations for the two correlates have been fulfilled, any postulation of result is not required by the injunction, and all such postulations would have a human origin and would not be grounded strictly in the authorless Vedic sacred texts. Umbeka’s Prābhākara too stresses this point when he says the following –

*nanu vidhyāśrayaṇe ’pi preryaviśeṣaṇasya sādhyatvaṃ yāgādeś ca sādhanatvaṃ
katham avagamyate, na hi vidhiḥ phalaṃ vinā vidhātum asamarthaḥ, tasya
preryaviśayamātrāpekṣaṇāt; preryaviśayaśravaṇān nairākāṅkṣye sati
preryaviśeṣaṇasya dhātvarthasādhyatvakalpanā puruṣabuddhiprabhavaiva syāt;
yataḥ preryaviśeṣaṇam bhāvanābhāvyatām apratipādyamānam api jīvanavat
preryaṃ viśeṣaṇayitum śaknoty eva. nāpi bhāvanāyāṃ bhāvyākāṅkṣāyāṃ*

³⁰² However, Maṇḍana advocated in the ViVi the postulation of such a result, viz. the elimination of accumulated religious demerits, in case of fixed rituals, as would be fixedly desired and desire for which would never wane. Postulation of such a result would help explain the parity of fixed rituals with the elective ones.

³⁰³ MīSū 1.2.1.

sannihitatvāt preryaviśeṣaṇasya sādhyatvaṃ, jīvanasyāpi sādhyatvaprasaṅgāt. ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, pp. 187-188.

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, even after resorting to the injunction, how is it learnt that the qualifier of the person to be instigated is the thing to be accomplished and sacrifice and the like [its] means? For, it is not the case that an injunction is incapable of prescribing without [resorting to] result, since it (i.e., the injunction) requires only the person to be instigated and the scope. Once there is no more expectancy when the person to be instigated and the scope are heard, if one postulates that the qualifier of the person is the thing to be accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root, then such postulation would have its origin in the human intellect only. This is because the qualifier of the person enjoined can indeed qualify the person enjoined even without having been understood as the thing to be accomplished by *bhāvanā*, just as it is the case of being alive [in the Vedic injunction, “As long as one lives, one should sacrifice]. Nor even it is the case that in case of the effectuation’s expectation for the thing to be brought about, the qualification of the person enjoined [is to be understood] as the thing to be accomplished, [just because] it is in proximity; for, that would lead to the undesirable consequence of even life [in the Vedic injunction, “As long as one lives, one should sacrifice”] becoming the object to be accomplished.”

It is to be noted here that the reason for Jayanta’s Prābhākara’s not assuming *svarga* to be the thing to be brought about by the act of sacrifice was that it would bring in human elements into the fold of the pristine non-human and authorless purity of the Vedic sacred texts. By contrast, Umbeka’s Prābhākara seems to have put forward an additional reason in regard to that: if in the case of the elective ritual, *svarga*, the qualifier of the enjoined person, were to be postulated as the thing to be brought about, then on the same logic, life, the qualifier of the enjoined person in case of injunction for the fixed type, too had to be postulated as the thing to be brought about. This is because, like Jayanta’s Prābhākara, Umbeka’s Prābhākara too seems to have believed in an essential similarity in the mode of working of all³⁰⁴ types of Vedic injunctions and that too on the basis of what an injunction had directly to say and the structural similarity of the above two injunctions of elective and fixed types. But this is certainly an undesirable consequence, for, being alive cannot be achieved through human effort, and hence it is considered as a *nimitta* or occasion. And if this undesirable consequence could not be done away with it would ultimately strike at the very root of the validity of the Vedic injunctions.

³⁰⁴ I say all types of Vedic injunctions since, as will be shown later in this chapter, these Prābhākaras believed that even in case of prohibitions, postulation of consequences like that of downfall into *naraka*, etc. as an incentive to abide by prohibitions, would have its origin in human imagination only.

Now, Jayanta's Prābhākara makes an interesting contrastive observation in regard to elective rituals:

kāmādhikāre tu niyojyataivānyathā svargakāmasya nopapadyata iti svargasya sādhyatvam abhyupagataṃ, na punar vidheḥ phalārthatvāt. ata eva na tatra vaidhī pravṛttiḥ, lipsayaiva pravṛttatvāt. āha ca – “tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā” (MīSū 4.1.2) iti. sādhyasādhanabhāvapratipādanaparyavasīto hi tatra vidhivyāpāro, na prayogaparyavasīta iti. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 111-112.

But in case of elective rituals, a *svarga*-desiring person's being an enjoined person is not otherwise established; hence *svarga* is postulated to be the thing to be accomplished, but not because the injunction expects the result. And [in this regard, Jaimini] says – “its desire is characterised by [one's own] purpose” (Mī.Sū. 4.1.2). The function of the injunction culminates there in communicating the means-end relationship, and not [unlike the injunctions for the fixed rituals] in [instigating the person to] performing [of the prescribed act].

This apparently intriguing passage may be thus understood: although the injunction does not need any result for executing its task of instigation, but only the two correlates of eligibility and scope, yet since the correlate of eligibility or the person enjoined is here obtained with a reference to the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ – “one who desires *svarga*”, the syntactic structure of the same denotes *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*). But this does not mean it is the object to be accomplished by the act of sacrifice. For, there is no linguistic element in the injunction itself which warrants such an understanding. Thus, *svarga* is not the *sādhya* of the act of sacrifice but only of the person enjoined in so far as it is the object of his desire; this is because the former understanding is not warranted by the linguistic structure of the injunction itself. However, since for the activation of one's sense of duty through the identification of oneself as the person enjoined, it is essential for him to recognise that he has desire for *svarga*, it is but natural and reasonable for him to hold *svarga* as the object to be accomplished and consider the act of sacrifice as a means for it. But the injunction itself does not need any such object to be accomplished as *svarga* for instigating the person in the sense that it does not strictly instigate the person for accomplishing *svarga*. It instigates a person only when the person has desire for *svarga*, as a result of which he becomes enjoined to the act. In other words, although it is not compulsory for one to desire *svarga*, yet as soon as one realises that one has desire for *svarga*, it becomes incumbent for him to abide by the injunction. It is in this sense that the function of an injunction in case of elective rituals is claimed by Jayanta's Prābhākara to end with the communication of the means-end relationship. This is also found in Umbeka's Prābhākara thus:

atha bhāvārthaviṣayo vidhir niyojyaviśeṣaṇasya sādhyatām anāpādya na paryavasyati. ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 189.

Now, an injunction, which has a positive purpose as its scope, does not cease operating without causing [the person to arrive at the understanding that] the qualifier of the person enjoined [is] the object to be accomplished.

The claim here made by Jayanta's Prābhākara that in case of elective rituals the motivation to do the main act is due to desire and that to do the procedural actions is due to the instigation of the injunction is also found mentioned by Umbeka's Prābhākara opponent thus:

[a] *kāryasvabhāve tu vidhyarthe 'rthāpravartakatvaṃ, lipsayaiva pravṛttatvāt pravṛttikṣaya iti...* ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 97.

As for [the view of the Prābhākaras, according to whom] the meaning of the injunction (i.e., the exhortative suffix) is of the nature of duty, [such a] meaning [of the exhortative suffix having the form of something to be done] does not instigate [in case of elective rituals]; this is because, there is loss of undertaking of the activity [on the part of the exhortative suffix to instigate] since [the person] has already been motivated [in regard to the elective ritual] on account of [his] desire.

[b] *atha kaścīd brūyāt - karaṇārthe bhavatu pravṛttis, tasyeṣṭasādhanatvād; itikartavyatānubandhe tu vidhim antareṇa neyaṃ pravṛttir bhavati; na hi tat phalasādhanam iti.* ŚVTāAu, in ŚVTā, p. 186.

Now, one (viz. the Prābhākara) may say – let us assume that one undertakes the action [due to desire³⁰⁵], which is the instrument, in so far as it is the means to something one desires. Yet, one would never undertake the procedure unless because of the prescription, because the procedure is not a means of the result.

Jayanta's Prābhākara's further assertion that in such cases the function of the injunction does not extend up to the performance is to be understood in terms of its not instigating a person to perform the act of sacrifice independent of his desire. But this is not the case with fixed rituals, where the correlate of *niyoja* or enjoined person is obtained not necessarily with reference to any such phrase as contains the word 'desire'. Rather, it is phrases like 'as long as one lives', etc. which speak of being alive as the occasion (*nimitta*) for performing the sacrifice. Now since life is not something which can be obtained through human effort, one cannot wish it and bring it about at one's will. An absence of the element of desire in such qualifiers of the person enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*) saves the injunction from the culpability of instigating a person to something which could lead to dire consequences. Hence, the injunction, "One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice

³⁰⁵ Although Umbeka's opponent does not directly mention desire, yet from the reason he adduces, namely, that the main act is the means for accomplishing one's desired end and the contrast he makes in the next line regarding the motivation to do the procedural actions, it becomes clear that the motivation to do the instrument comes from something which is independent of the injunction, and hence it can be nothing but desire.

with the Śyena”, cannot be held responsible for instigating one to undertake the Śyena. This is because the injunction only caters to the need of the addressee, who has already made up his mind to kill his enemy, by communicating the śāstric means of killing his enemy.

It is perhaps keeping in mind this crucial role of desire in activating the sense of enjoyment, as a result of which it becomes incumbent upon the enjoined person to perform the elective rituals, that Jayanta’s Prābhākara has remarked that in case of elective rituals one is instigated not by the injunction, but by one’s own desire for the result. In support of his contention, Jayanta’s Prābhākara cites the following MīSū 4.1.2:

yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā avibhaktatvāt

The desire for [getting] that, which human beings take delight in, is characterised by [one’s own] purpose, since [the desire for getting it] is inseparable [from the delight].

This translation is based on an understanding which is in accordance with Śābara’s gloss of this as “*tasya lipsārthenaiva bhavati, na śāstreṇa*”³⁰⁶ – “a desire for that [in which human beings take delight] occurs due only to [one’s own] purpose, [but] not due to [the instigation by] the sacred text.”

Yoshimizu notes how Prābhākara’s understanding of the same MīSū differs from Śābara’s. It is worth quoting Yoshimizu³⁰⁷ in this regard:

“However, Prābhākara finds this paraphrase by Śābara unsatisfactory. Śābara explains that the motivation to undertake an action that brings about delight (*prīti*) comes from one’s desire to pursue a purpose (*artha*), but not from the Vedic scripture (*śāstra*). Prābhākara thinks that without Vedic scripture, one cannot imagine how desirable heaven is and how one can attain heaven. Therefore, he revises Śābara’s words by assuming that this “scripture” (*śāstra*), which Śābara says to have nothing to do with the fulfilment of human desire, only means an injunction that expresses the hierarchical relation (i.e., subordination, *śeṣa*) by a case suffix, in other words, an injunction of application (*vinīyoga*). This revision indicates Prābhākara’s view that the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*” does teach *puruṣārtha* by promising the attainment of heaven as the result of the sacrifice.

“... According to Prābhākara, the ultimate purpose (*artha*) that definitively characterizes the sacrificial action as beneficial to a human being (*puruṣārtha*) is not the satisfaction of a human being’s desire, but rather the accomplishment of enjoyment (*niyogāsiddhi*), that is, the Veda’s desire. Without carrying out the enjoyment issued by the Veda, one cannot expect to attain the object mentioned in the injunction, no matter how eagerly one desires

³⁰⁶ ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.1.2, in MDĀ_v, p. 2.

³⁰⁷ Yoshimizu (2021b:119-121).

it. The eternal Veda requires people to maintain the sacrifice tradition, but one who has fulfilled this requirement becomes guaranteed to gain the desired result.

With the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” the Veda promises the attainment of heaven to one who fulfilled the duty to preserve the Vedic tradition through the performance of the fixed sacrifice. In the passage quoted above, Prabhākara states that this guarantee can be read in this injunction through an operation called “incorporation” (*upādāna*). In the Mīmāṃsā exegesis, the verb “*upa-ā-√dā*” and the noun “*upādāna*,” literally, “taking up,” were used in the sense that the priest who executes a sacrifice brings a ritual element into a scene of the sacrifice following an injunction (*vidhi*). Applying *upādāna* as his technical term, Prabhākara defines it as a “requirement of enjoinder” (*niyogākṣepa*), by which an injunction can indicate that a ritual element is adopted for the sake of something else, even without resorting to a case suffix. According to Prabhākara, ... the relationship between the enjoined person (*niyojya*) and the scope (*viṣaya*) of an enjoinder implies that the sacrificial action is a means and heaven is its purpose. Prabhākara holds this linguistic implication as a sort of *upādāna* that works in “*svargakāmo yajeta*.””

As Yoshimizu correctly notes³⁰⁸, Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent does not speak about Prabhākara’s device of *upādāna* as guaranteeing on behalf of the Veda the attainment of *svarga* through the sacrifice. Rather, it seems to me that Jayanta’s Prābhākara subscribes to Śabara’s interpretation in order to uphold his view that Vedic injunctions do not need any result for its own sake to instigate human beings to ritual actions. This, as will be clear from the subsequent sections of this chapter, was done by Jayanta’s Prābhākara to save the Vedas from the charge of instigating human beings to perform such elective rituals as the Śyena, meant for killing one’s enemy, which causes religious demerit (*pāpa*) and ultimately the downfall of its performer into *naraka*.

2. Śyena and Agniṣomīya Paśuyāga: The dialectics about the means of *Dharma* and *Adharma*

2.1. *Adharma*: the Śyena sacrifice

Having thus contended that in case of elective rituals the instigation comes from one’s desire for a particular result, Jayanta’s Prābhākara extends this into the sphere of the identification of *dharma* or religious duty and *adharma* or contrary-to-religious duty. The Prābhākara says:

ata eva śyenāder adharmatvam. tatra hy ‘abhicaran’ iti śatrā śatruṃ vaidikenopāyena jighāṃsur adhikārī darśitas tasya. na tatra śāstraṃ pravartakam. “jānāty eva asau ‘mayaitat kartavyam upāyaṃ tu na veda” (Cf. ŚāBhā 6.2.14) ity evam. upāyamātram asyopadiśyate śyenaḥ. ‘śyenaṃ kurv’ iti tu na vidhiḥ prabhavati, jighāṃsāyā eva tatra pravartakatvāt. ataḥ śyenāder adharmatvāt tadvyudāsārthapadopādānaṃ ‘codanālakṣaṇo’ rtho dharma’ (MīSū 1.1.2) iti.

³⁰⁸ Yoshimizu (2021b:121-122).

kāmādhikāreṣu hītikartavyatāmśe śāstrīyā pravṛtīḥ. yathoktaṃ – “kratvartho hi śāstrād avagamyata” (ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.1.2) iti. bhāvārthamātrasya hi karaṇatvam avagatam. itikartavyatāmśas tu na karaṇatvāvagativelāyām upnipatita iti tatra lipsāyā abhāvāc chāstram eva pravartakam. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 112.

This is why Śyena and the like are contrary-to-religious duty. The *śatṛ* suffix in ‘intent upon bewitchment’ (*abhicaran*) has shown a person desirous of killing the enemy by Vedic means to be the eligible performer of that (the Śyena sacrifice). In regard to that (bewitchment) it is not the sacred text which is the instigator. It is like this – “he (who is intent upon bewitchment) knows indeed: ‘It is to be done by me’, but [he] does not know the means.”³⁰⁹ Śyena is taught only as the means for this [man]” (ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.2.14). ‘Do the Śyena’ – this is not how the injunction appears, because it is the desire to kill which is the instigator there (in regard to killing). Thus, Śyena and the like being contrary-to-religious duties, it is in order to exclude them [from *dharma* or religious duties] that the word ‘beneficial’ (*artha*) has been included [in the *sūtra*,] – “Religious duty is something beneficial that is known [only] from the Vedic injunctions (MīSū 1.1.2).

In case of elective rites, one is prompted by the sacred text in regard to the procedural part. As has been said [by Śābara] – “That which is for the sake of the ritual is known from the sacred text.” (ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.1.2) For, it is only the meaning of the verbal root which has been understood to be the means. The procedural part does not feature at the time of understanding the means. Hence, due to the absence of desire in regard to that (the procedural part), it is the sacred text which instigates [one to perform the procedural actions].

In the above passage, Jayanta’s Prābhākara shows how his understanding of elective sacrifices justify the Śyena sacrifice as a contrary-to-religious duty, and helps save the Veda remain immune to the charge of instigating people to acts of evil. The Śyena sacrifice is meant for killing one’s enemy. The concerned Vedic injunction is:

śyenena abhicaran yajeta. ĀŚS 22.4.13.

One intent upon bewitchment may sacrifice with the Śyena.

Being an elective sacrifice, the Śyena lies outside the pale of injunction. Since killing is prohibited according to the general prohibition, “One should kill living beings”, because it leads to *pāpa* or religious demerit that causes the downfall of man, the injunction and as a matter of that, the Vedic sacred text cannot be held responsible for urging one to perform the Śyena sacrifice for killing one’s enemy. According to the Prābhākara, the word ‘*abhicaran*’ – “intent upon bewitchment” supplies with the eligibility-correlate. Thus, it is the person who wants to kill his enemy (*jighāmsu*) who is the person enjoined. The sacrifice called Śyena supplies with the scope-correlate.

³⁰⁹ Cf. ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.2.14.

The *śatṛ* suffix in *abhicaran* suggests that the person has already made up his mind to kill his enemy. To reinforce this point, the Prābhākara cites a line from Śabara's commentary which says that such a person who has already made up his mind to kill his enemy does not know the means for it. Since the correlate of eligibility involves a particular kind of desire, namely that of killing one's enemy, here too, the person looks for the proper means for satisfying his desire. Thus, the Vedic injunction cannot be held responsible for urging him to perform the Śyena sacrifice to kill the enemy. To emphasise this point, Jayanta's Prābhākara analyses the linguistic structure of the Vedic injunction, *śyenena abhicaran yajeta*. According to him, the injunction does not say: *śyenaṃ kuru*, i.e., "Do the Śyena!", but "*śyenena yajeta*", i.e., "[the person intent upon bewitchment] may sacrifice with the Śyena". In *kuru*, which is the conjugated form of the verbal root, *kr*. (meaning 'to do') in the singular number of the second person in the imperative mood, there is a sense of strong obligation involved. In *kuryāt*, which is the conjugated form of the verbal root, *kr*. (meaning 'to do') in the singular number of the third person in the optative mood, by contrast, gives the sense of recommendation and hence weak obligation. If it were the case that the person was under a strong obligation to perform the Śyena sacrifice just as it is in case of the Agnihotra sacrifice of the fixed type, the Vedic sacred texts would be culpable of instigating one to commit socio-moral and religious sins.

A similar view is also expressed by Umbeka's Prābhākara opponent in the context of examining Śabara's remark in his commentary on MīSū 1.1.2 that "Śyena and the like are not understood to be duties":

nanu ca dvau vidher vyāpārāv – ekas tāvāt kāmyamānabhāvārthayor upāyopeyabhāvajñāpanākhyo 'paro 'nuṣṭhāpaktvarūpas, tatra yo 'dhikāraavidhipramitopāyopeyabhāvottarakālīnas tadanuṣṭhāpakatvarūpaḥ prayogarūpo vidhivyāpārah, so 'nena bhāṣyena virudhyate "naiva śyenādayaḥ kartavyā vijñāyante"; - naiva śyenādayaḥ prayojyeti yāvat, tatra puruṣasya lipsayaiva pravṛttatvāt. uktaṃ ca "tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇe" iti. yas tu tataḥ pūrvabhāvy upāyopeyabhāvapratipādanarūpo 'dhikāraavidhivyāpāras, tadabhiprāyaṃ "yo hi hiṃsitum icchet, tasyāyam abhyupāya iti hi teṣāṃ upadeśa" iti; etad bhāṣyam upāyamātratayaiva vidhānapratipādanaparam upapadyate. ... "śyenena abhicaran yajeteti hi samāmananti" iti śyenasya upāyamātratāṃ darśayati; "na abhicaritavyam iti" iti ca prayojyatāṃ niṣedhati. evaṃ sati niṣiddheṣu codanālakṣaṇeṣūpāyeṣv anarthatvam, aniṣiddheṣu ca jyotiṣṭomādiṣv arthatvam iti. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, pp. 96-97.

[Objection by the Prābhākara opponent:] Well, there are two functions of the injunction – one, to begin with, is called the communication of the means-end notion [obtaining] between the [object] which is being desired and the meaning of the verbal root; the other is being the cause of performance. Of them, that function of the injunction which comes after the means-end relation has been known from the injunction of eligibility, that which causes performance of it (i.e., the meaning

of the verbal root which represents the prescribed act), is an activity of the injunction which has the form of performance. That is in conflict³¹⁰ with this [passage of Śabara's] commentary – “Śyena and the like indeed are not understood to be duties” – in so far as it means that Śyena and the like are not fit to be performed; this is because the person has undertaken them (i.e., the Śyena and the like) out of desire alone. And it has been said “its desire is characterised by [one's own] purpose” (MīSū 4.1.2). By contrast the function of the injunction of eligibility which is prior to that (i.e., the function of the injunction which is the cause of performance), which has the form of the communicator of the means-end relationship, is meant by the following: “He, who may wish to kill, this is his means and hence the instruction about them”. This [passage from Śabara's] commentary is justified as aiming at the communication of prescription in terms of the means only. ... [The injunction] “For, [the Veda says] one who is intent upon bewitchment may sacrifice with the Śyena” shows the Śyena to be the mere means; and [the following line from Śabara's commentary –] “Bewitchment is not to be done” prohibits the performability [of the Śyena sacrifice]. It being so, the means known from the Vedic injunctions which are prohibited are malefic and [those means known from the Vedic injunctions] which are not prohibited like the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like are beneficial.

To bolster the argument, the Prābhākara makes a distinction between the source of motivation for performing the main act and that of performing the procedural actions. Any Vedic ritual act is made up of a main act and a number of subsidiary procedural actions.

³¹⁰ The conflict is the following: the injunction, “One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena”, communicates that the Śyena is the means of accomplishing bewitchment to someone who wants to kill his enemy. Since it stipulates the rite for someone who intends to do bewitchment, it can be considered as an injunction of eligibility. From what has been said above by Umbeka it seems that, when the means-end relation between the Śyena sacrifice and bewitchment has been communicated by the injunction, what one understands from the injunction is that he is instigated by the injunction to undertake the Śyena sacrifice, which causes the death of the eligible performer's enemy. However, consistent with the general prohibition, “One should not kill any living being”, Śabara has said that one does not understand that the Śyena is to be done, i.e., the injunction and for that reason the Vedic sacred texts does not instigate one to perform the Śyena. For, if it were so, then the sacred texts could be held responsible for leading the person to a state of suffering. This is because, the Śyena is the śāstric means of killing one's enemy and death of the enemy is its result. Now since killing is bad in the sense it is prohibited, the injunction could not ideally instigate the person to do the Śyena. The conflict arises especially in the light of the fact that there is no expression like ‘na’, etc. in the injunction which could prohibit the performance of the Śyena. On the contrary, the surface structure of the injunctions gives the prima facie impression that the injunction urges the person to do the Śyena. It is only when the content of this injunction is read together with the aforementioned general prohibition to kill and also in the light of the fact that the injunction communicates Śyena to be the means only for that person who is intent upon bewitchment, that it is understood that the injunction *does not prescribe the performance* of the Śyena sacrifice, but just *communicates* the Śyena to be the means of killing one's enemy to someone who wants the death of his enemy. Thus, Śabarar's statement above is only apparently in conflict with the surface structure of the Śyena injunction.

In case of fixed sacrifices, if one is unable to perform all subsidiaries, one may perform only the main act and that would not lead him to any religious sanction; but a total avoidance which involves the non-performance of even the main act certainly gets one sanctions. By contrast, since it is not compulsory for one to perform the elective rituals, but only if a person has the desire for the particular result which is mentioned in the injunction, one needs to perform them exactly as prescribed. This also presupposes that the person has absolute eligibility in terms of his desire for the result, physical fitness, caste qualification, availability of necessary resources, etc. It is not enough for the person to perform just the main act, but it is required of him that he *must* perform the main act along with all the subsidiary acts exactly and precisely as they are prescribed. Any mistake or omission in performing the ritual precisely as it is prescribed renders the ritual fruitless and hence a failure. Now, even though one has the liberty to choose the main act in an elective ritual in accordance with one's desire for the particular result, he does not have such an independence with regard to the subsidiary acts or the procedural actions. For, what are those acts that need to be done to complete a sacrifice can be known only from the Vedic sacred texts that are the sole source of our knowledge in this regard. Thus, although our desire prompts us to select and perform a particular main act (e.g., the Śyena sacrifice) and the sacred texts have no role in it, yet as for the question as to how to execute it, we depend on a knowledge of the procedural actions, available only from the sacred texts, and hence the motivation to undertake such procedural actions are due solely to the instigation of the sacred texts.

With reference to the remark made by Jayanta's Prābhākara that at the time of cognising the meaning of the verbal root to be the instrument, the procedural part is not present, Cakradhara makes the following comments:

nanu yathā phalasādhanasya karaṇatvāt tatra lipsānibandhanā pravṛttir, evam itikartavyatāmśasyāpi karaṇopakāradvareṇa phalasādhanatvam astīti tatra lipsātaḥ pravṛtṭiḥ kim iti na bhaved, ity āśaṅkyāha - itikartavyatāmśas tv iti.

phalāsiddhim avāntarīkurvan niyogaṃ sādhayaty atas tasya phalena sambandho, netikartavyatāyā ity eke. anye tu prayogakāle karaṇasya itikartavyatāpekṣaṇaṃ, na pratipattikāle. adhikārāvasthāyāṃ hi karaṇasyeva phalāsiddhāv upāyatāvagamaḥ, prayujyamānas tu śuddho 'nupkr̥taḥ phalāsiddhaye na prabhavatīti prayogakāle pravṛttasyetikartavyatāpekṣaṇaṃ na prathamataḥ. phalārthitayā na tatra karaṇa iva pravṛttir ity āhuḥ. NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 78.

[Objection:] Well, just as the motivation in regard to the means for the result is based on desire, because of [such means'] being the instrument [of accomplishing the result], likewise, since the procedural part too is the means for the result by means of assisting the instrument, why should not the motivation in regard to that (i.e., the procedural actions) be not due to desire? – Having raised such a doubt thus, [Jayanta's Prābhākara] says – *the procedural part, by contrast, etc.*

[Reply:] Some [think] that [the instrument] accomplishes the commandment (*niyoga*) by making the accomplishment of the result subordinate, so it has connection with the result, but not with the procedure. By contrast, others [say that] "it is at the time of performance that one needs the procedure, not at the time of cognising [what the means for realising the desired result is]. For, in the state of eligibility, the instrument alone is understood as the means for accomplishing the result. But the pure [instrument], when being executed, cannot lead to the accomplishment of the result [on account of being] unassisted [by the procedure]. Hence at the time of performance, the person who has already set out, needs the procedure, but he does not need it from the beginning. Because of seeking the result there is no motivation [of his at the beginning] in regard to that (i.e., the procedural actions) unlike in regard to the instrument."

The upshot of the above argument is that since one needs the result one searches for the immediate means thereof and does not initially care for how the means could be used to accomplish the result. It is only after one has gotten hold of the right means that one wonders as to how to properly operate that means to acquire the desired result. So, it is question of relative exigency which determines which one between the instrument and the procedure should be looked for out of a desire to obtain a particular result.

It is to be noted here that although in Section A above it was said that for him, who has desire for *svarga* and becomes the person enjoined in regard to the Vedic injunction, "One, who is desirous of *svarga*, should sacrifice", it becomes incumbent to perform the sacrifice, yet it is to be understood as being not a strong obligation. If it were not so, then on account of not performing the act of sacrifice, the person would be liable to face religious sanctions. Further, on the same score, the Śyena sacrifice, which is identified here by Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent as a kind of elective sacrifice, too had to be performed, failing which the person intent upon bewitchment would have to face religious sanctions. But, no Mīmāṃsā philosopher would entertain the view that one gets sanctioned for not performing the Śyena sacrifice, even though he was eligible for doing it on account of having a desire to kill his enemy. This is also consistent with the Prābhākara opponent's remark that in case of elective rituals the function of the injunction does not extend up to performance, but ends with the communication of the means-end relationship. And if it were a strong obligation to perform the Śyena sacrifice as soon as one had the desire to kill, it would remain an instance of *adharma* or contrary-to-religious duty any more, but rather would count as *dharma* or religious duty. Moreover, the very need for identifying Śyena as an elective ritual and all efforts to justify its not being urged by the Vedas to be done would be in vain. Besides, when a factor other than the sacred text, like desire, is present as the instigator there is no need for the sacred text to instigate in that regard on the ground of superfluity and also on the ground that it would do away with the very independence of the Vedic sacred texts as an independent instrument of knowledge. Although it cannot be denied that on this Prābhākara's view both the injunctions for fixed rituals and elective rituals need only the two correlates, eligibility and scope, for successfully instigating a person, yet the similarity in the way of functioning of the two kinds of injunctions does not necessarily imply that the obligation they impose upon their respective addressees are also of equal degree. Rather, the differences in the degrees of obligation play a crucial role in determining the difference in the nature of the two injunctions.

2.2. The means to *Dharma*: the Agnīṣomīya animal slaughter

Having described the reason why the Śyena sacrifice is *adharmā* or a contrary-to-religious duty, Jayanta's Prābhākara now presents a contrast by arguing why the Agnīṣomīya animal slaughter, a procedural action within the Jyotiṣṭoma type of Soma sacrifice is an instance of *dharma* or religious duty. Jayanta's Prābhākara says:

ata evāgnīṣomīyahimśāyā nādharmatvam. 'na himśyāt sarvā bhūtāni'ti niṣedhaḥ sāmānyaśāstram. sāmānyaśāstram ca viśeṣaśāstrakroḍīkṛtaviṣayaparihāreṇa pravartata ity agnīṣomīyahimśāyāḥ śāstrīyatvān na niṣedhavidhir anarthatām bodhayed iti. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 113.

For this only, is the killing in Agnīṣomīya [animal sacrifice] and the like is not a contrary-to-religious duty. The prohibition, 'One should not kill living beings' is a general statement of the sacred text. And a general statement of the sacred text operates by abandoning the scope that has been taken into its fold by a specific statement of the sacred text. Therefore, since the Agnīṣomīya killing is [prescribed by a specific statement of the] sacred text, the prohibitory injunction would not communicate the maleficence [of the Agnīṣomīya animal-killing].

The reason why, according to Jayanta's Prābhākara, the killing of a goat dedicated to the Vedic deities, Agni and Soma, in the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice, a procedural action within the Jyotiṣṭoma type of Soma sacrifice, is not a contrary-to-religious duty is because there is an explicit prescription in regard to such killing – *agnīṣomīyaṃ paśum ālabheta*³¹¹ – “One should kill the animal dedicated to Agni and Soma”. This prescription is not in conflict with the general prohibition – *na himśyāt sarvā bhūtāni*³¹² – “One should not kill living beings” because the prohibition mentioned above is general in scope, while the prescription is specific in scope. In other words, the prescription does provide the killing of only the Agnīṣomīya animal and not any animal whatsoever; moreover, it does so not for the sake of personal reasons but for completing the main sacrifice. Thus, the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice has no human end to serve, unlike the Śyena sacrifice, which has an exclusively human purpose, viz. killing of one's enemy, to serve. Although the terminologies, *puruṣārthahimśā* or 'killing for the sake of human end' and *kratvarthahimśā* or 'killing for the sake of the ritual' are not explicitly used, yet conceptually they are very much present here. Generic passages in the sacred texts become active after having taken into account possible exceptions. Since the prescription which provides for the Agnīṣomīya animal slaughter is not in conflict with the general prohibition providing for the non-killing of all living beings on the ground that the former is a specific statement of the sacred text and the latter a general one, the Agnīṣomīya animal killing

³¹¹ TaiSa 6.1.11.

³¹² Although this is generally cited as a prohibition of Vedic origin, yet it cannot be traced to the extant Vedic corpus. However, it occurs as the first quarter of the first half of verse no. 5 of the 269th chapter from the Vanaparvan of *Mahābhārata*.

enjoys immunity from the charge of being the cause of religious demerit and also the advantage of being the content of a specific Vedic prescription. It is because of this advantage that the general prohibitory injunction, “One should not kill living beings” cannot convey the Agnīṣomīya animal killing being a source of maleficence and hence suffering for man.

It is pertinent to mention here that the Prābhākara opponent in ŚVTā categorically mentions the Agnīṣomīya to be neither a human end nor a means of it:

yas tu na puruṣārtho nāpi puruṣārthasādhanam, tasyādhikāraavidhisahitaiḥ śrutyaḍibhir avagatatādarthyasya api prayogavidhir evānuṣṭhānam prayunkte yathā ’gnīṣomīyādiṣu. tad uktam – “kratvartho hi sāstrād avagamyate” (ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.1.2) iti. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 97.

Even though it, which is neither a human end nor a means for accomplishing a human end, is understood through [the six proofs which assist the injunction of application, starting with³¹³] direct mention, etc. to be for the sake of that (i.e., the archetype ritual), it is the injunction of performance alone which prompts it. It has thus been said [by Śabara in his commentary on MīSū 4.1.2] – “For, that which is for the sake of the ritual understood [only] from the sacred texts”.

An important question in this regard may now be dealt with. Should the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice, which is part of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, be considered *dharma* (religious duty) or *adharmā* (contrary-to-religious duty)? Surely not *adharmā* because there is an explicit Vedic prescription for it. One may be tempted to consider it as *dharma* in so far as Jyotiṣṭoma is *dharma* and Agnīṣomīya is part of Jyotiṣṭoma. Again, Jyotiṣṭoma is *dharma* in so far as it yields *svarga* via *apūrva*, and *svarga* is not something that is prohibited. But this is not how the Mīmāṃsakas look upon Agnīṣomīya and the like.

In ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.1 we find the following line –

ko dharmāḥ kathalakṣaṇaḥ kāny asya sādhanāni kāni sādhanābhāsāni kiparāś ca iti?

What is dharma? What is its definition? What are its means? What is its pseudo means? What does it aim at?

Again, on MīSū 1.1.2 Śabara says –

tena yaḥ puruṣa niḥśreyasena sayunakti sa dharmāśabdena ucyate. ... yo niḥśreyasāya jyotiṣṭomādiḥ...

³¹³ For details, see Gajendragadkar (1998:12-29, 111-173).

Therefore, that which connects a human being with supreme pleasure is referred to by the word *dharma*... That which is for the sake of supreme happiness [like] *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc.

Acts like *Agnīṣomīya*, etc. are *kratvartha* or those actions which are meant for the sake of the ritual. Those actions which are meant for the sake of the ritual do not have any result of their own, but they just bring about the completion of the ritual of which they form parts. From the ŚāBhā passages cited above, it transpires that *dharma* and its means (*sādhana*) are clearly distinguished and *Jyotiṣṭoma* is identified as *dharma* in so far as it connects its performers with supreme happiness (*niḥśreyas*) in the form of *svarga*; for, *svarga* is supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*). Now, it is in the very nature of a *sādhana* or means to bring about the *sādhya* or that which is to be brought about. Since the *Agnīṣomīya* has no result of its own to produce, but is meant simply for bringing about the completion of *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it is to be considered as the *sādhana* or means, and since *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself is *dharma*, so *Agnīṣomīya* and other *kratvartha* actions related to *Jyotiṣṭoma* should be understood as *dharmasādhana* or the means to *dharma*. Similarly, in case of the Śyena sacrifice, etc. which are avowedly declared by Mīmāṃsakas as *adharmasādhana*, their respective procedural actions should be understood as *adharmasādhana* or the means of *adharmasādhana*.

Thus, *kratvartha* ritual actions which bring about the completion of the main ritual, of which they are parts, are neither *dharma* nor *adharmasādhana* in themselves, but the *sādhana* or means to *dharma* or *adharmasādhana* only respectively. It is keeping this in mind that I have described the *Agnīṣomīya* animal sacrifice to be the means to *dharma* in the title of this section.

Jayanta's line, “*sāmānyasāstram ca viśeṣasāstrakrodīkṛtavīṣayaparihāreṇa pravartata iti agnīṣomīyahimśyāḥ śāstrīyatvān na niṣedhavidhir anarthatām bodhayed iti*” has been quoted by the great 13th c. AD commentator of the Vedas, Sāyaṇācārya in his commentary on the word *adhvara* occurring in the 4th *sūkta* of the 1st *kāṇḍa* of *Atharvaveda*³¹⁴. The relevant extract from Sāyaṇa's commentary is as follows:

*adhvarīyatām. dhvaro himśā na vidyate 'sminn ity adhvaro jyotiṣṭomādir yāgaḥ. tam ātmana icchatām. nanu jyotiṣṭomādāv agnīṣomīyasavanīyānubandhyāḥ paśava ālabhyante katham tatra himśā'bhāva iti cen, mā evam. na atra himśyā abhāvaṃ brūmaḥ. kintu tajjanitapratyavāyābhāvaṃ. tathāhi – 'na himśyāt sarvabhūtāni' iti sāmānyasāstram viśeṣasāstrakrodīkṛtavīṣayaparihāreṇa pravartata iti parīkṣakasiddhiḥ*³¹⁵.

³¹⁴ I am grateful to Dr. Vinoth Murali, Researcher at the Department of Indology, French Institute of Pondicherry, India, for bringing this *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* passage to my notice.

³¹⁵ The probability of this line's being a quotation from NM 5.2 is further strengthened by the fact that just after a few lines from this, Sāyaṇa quotes yet another line from NM 5.2, which is as follows –

tathā cōktam –

[As for the expression, *adhvarīyatam*] *Dhvara*, that is, killing does not exist in this; hence *adhvara* is sacrifices like the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc. Those who desire it (*adhvara*) for their own selves [are meant by the word, *adhvarīyatām*].

[Objection:] Well, given that in *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc. animals related to the *savana* dedicated to Agni and Soma are killed, how could there be an absence of killing?

[Reply:] It is not so. We don't say there is an absence of killing in this regard, but the absence of religious demerit produced by it (killing). To explain – the generic passage of the Vedic sacred texts, “One should not kill any living being” comes into operation after having taken into account possible exceptions; such has the examiner established.”

2.3. Can the means to *Dharma* become *Adharma*? Distinction between Śyena and Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice

The above justifications by Jayanta's Prābhākara of the malefic and non-malefic nature of the Śyena sacrifice and the Agnīṣomīya animal killing immediately snowballs into the following debate with the Bhāṭṭas³¹⁶:

[a] *nanu śyene 'pi śāstrīyā pravṛtīḥ. pravartakatvaṃ hi vidheḥ svarūpaṃ pramāṇāntaravilakṣaṇam. nānvayavyatirekavat sādhyasādhanapratītimātraparyanto hi vidhivyāpāro bhavitum arhatīti sarvatra vidheḥ prayokṛtvānapāyāt. evam eva ceyam pravṛtīḥ 'śyena yajete'ti.*

ucyate – 'pravartito 'ham' iti jñānajananaṃ vidheḥ prerakatvam. tat satyaṃ sarvatra tulyaṃ karaṇe ca śyene, itikartavyatāyām agnīṣomīye. bāhye tu pravṛtilakṣaṇe bhautike vyāpāre yatra lipsādi prakārāntaram asti, tatra bhavanti api vidheḥ prayokṛṣaktir udāste, paśupuroḍāsaprayājavat. tatrodāsīne vidhau niṣedhasāstram avatarati 'na hiṃsyād' iti. yadi tu sarvatraiva prayokṛṣaktir anudāsīnā³¹⁷ bhavet, tadā jyotiṣṭomān na viśiṣyeta śyenaḥ, śāstrīyāyāṃ pravṛttāv agnīṣomīya iva niṣedhasāstrasyānavakāśāt.

sādhyasādhanabhāvapratītimātraparyavasito hi vidhivyāpāro na prayogaparyavasita iti.

This is almost the same as the following line from the NM (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 112) – *sādhyasādhanabhāvapratīpādanaparyavasito hi tatra vidhivyāpāro, na prayogaparyavasita iti.*

³¹⁶ As will be evident from the lines to be quoted shortly hereafter, this Bhāṭṭa is none other than Umbekabhaṭṭa, the oldest among Kumārila's extant commentators.

³¹⁷ The Mysore reading is 'udāsīnā'; but it is not consistent with the point made in the very next line which may be treated as a gloss of the present one. The main point that the Prābhākara here wants to make is that if in all cases (i.e., Śyena and Agnīṣomīya) the instigating power of the injunction does not remain inoperative, that is, if the motivation for performance of both comes from the injunction itself and not from desire in case of the Śyena, the prohibition cannot find scope for operation in regard to the Śyena. Therefore,

[b] *jyotiṣṭome 'nullaṅghitanīṣedho 'dhikārī, svargasyānīṣiddhatvāt. śyene tu hiṃsāyāḥ pratiṣiddhatvād utkrāntanīṣedho 'dhikārī iti cen –*

maivam – adhikārīdaśāyām api bhavanmate vidheḥ prayoktrtvānapāyān na niṣedhaśāstram avakāśam labhata iti śyene 'pi nāvadhīritanīṣedho 'dhikārī syāt.

[c] *nanu na vidhiḥ phale prayojyam prerayati 'phalam kurv' iti. karmaṇi tv enam pravartayati 'yajasve'ti. tenādhikārīdaśāyām apratihato niṣedhaśāstrāvakāśaḥ.*

āyusman! asmatpakṣam evāśrito 'si. phale cen na pravartayati vidhiḥ puruṣam, phalārthitvād evainam upāye pravartanam tatrāpi na prerayet. upāyānabhijñāsya tūpāyam eva darśayet. yāvadaḥprāptam hi vidher viśayaḥ. tad uktaḥ – “jānāty eva asau mayaitat kartavyam, upāyam tu na veda” iti. pratīr apīyam idrīśy 'abhicaran yajete'ti. 'yadi tvam śāstrīyenopāyena vairiṇam hantum udyataḥ, śyenena jahi, śyenas tavopāya' ity arthaḥ. tad alam atiprasaṅgena.

kāmādhikāreṣu tāvan na phalākāṅkṣī vidhiḥ. phalam tv adhikāre hetur iti sthitam. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 113-114.

[a] [Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] Well, in case of the Śyena too, one's motivation [to undertake the action] is due to the [instigation of] the sacred text. For, being an instigator is the real nature of an injunction, which is different from other instruments of knowledge. Since, unlike concomitant presence and concomitant absence³¹⁸, the operation of an injunction cannot end merely with being the instrument³¹⁹ of cognising the means-end relationship, because the power of the injunction is not lost anywhere. Similar indeed is this undertaking [which is prompted by the Vedic sacred text in the form of the injunction] 'one should sacrifice with the Śyena'.

[Reply:] In reply it is said – an injunction's instigation consists in generating the cognition, 'I am instigated'. True, that it is the same in case of Śyena, the

I have accepted the reading of the *editio princeps* (p. 351) here, which is 'anudāsīnā' since it makes possible the point mentioned. For an elaboration on this see the analysis below.

³¹⁸ Concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) only communicate, i.e., describe that if X, then Y and if no X, then no Y. So, they only describe the state of affairs. By contrast, an injunction does not *describe* the state of affairs, but prompts people do so something. The difference intended to be highlighted by Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa opponent is based on the descriptive function of concomitant presence and absence and deontic function of injunctions. This is also in keeping with the Mīmāṃsā view (MīSū 1.2.1) that since the Vedas aiming at [the accomplishment of] action, those portions of the Vedas which do not aim at action are superfluous.

³¹⁹ The *ktin* suffix attached to the verbal root, *i-* prefixed by *prati*, is used in the instrumental sense. Hence *pratīti* here does not refer to the act of cognition, but the instrument of cognition.

instrument, and Agnīṣomīya, the procedure. But in cases of external physical actions [such as eating, etc.], characterised by undertaking, where other forms [of instigators like] desire, etc., are available, even though the instigating power of an injunction may be present, it is inoperative, just as in case of the main ritual of ‘*paśupurodāśa*’. In that situation, the injunction being inoperative, the prohibitory injunction, “one should not kill”, comes into force. If the instigating power of injunction were active in all cases, then Śyena would not be different from the Jyotiṣṭoma. The motivation [to undertake the Śyena sacrifice] being due to [instigation by] the sacred text, the prohibitory injunction (“One should not kill living beings”) would not, just as in Agnīṣomīya, have scope for operation.

[b] [Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] In case of Jyotiṣṭoma, the eligible performer has not transgressed the prohibition, since *svarga* is [a result which is] not prohibited. But in case of Śyena, since killing is prohibited, the eligible performer is one who has already transgressed the prohibition.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It should not be so. Since on your view, the instigating power of injunction is not lost even at the time of eligibility (at the time when the injunction merely communicates the eligible performer), the prohibitory injunction does not acquire scope of operation; thus, in case of the Śyena too, the eligible performer is one who has not disregarded the prohibition.

[c] [Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] It is not the case that the injunction impels the person regarding the result [like] – ‘do the result’. But it instigates him in regard to the act [of sacrifice] – ‘sacrifice!’ Therefore, the scope for operation of the prohibitory statement of the sacred text remains unobstructed [even] at the time of eligibility.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] O long-living one! You are ending up using our view only! If the injunctions do not instigate a person regarding the result, then let it not instigate him with regard to the means too, where, on account of being the seeker of the result indeed, he is. Let it (the injunction) rather show only the means to someone who is ignorant of the means; for, the content of an injunction is something unobtained. Thus, it has been said [by Śābara] – “he indeed knows ‘I have to do this’; but he does not know the means.” (ŚāBhā 6.2.14). The understanding also is of this kind: ‘one intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice.’ This amounts to saying: ‘If you are intent upon killing the enemy through the means provided by the sacred texts, then sacrifice with the Śyena; the Śyena is your means.’ No need for further discussion on this incidental point.

It is established that in case of the elective rituals, the injunction indeed does not need the result; the result is but the basis of eligibility.

The main point that the Bhāṭṭa opponent in Jayanta makes is that the task of an injunction is not merely descriptive in the sense that it ends with the communication of the means-end relationship between the meaning of the verbal root and the qualifier of the enjoined

person. It is rather essentially prescriptive and it is this instigating function of an injunction which contributes to its and as a matter of that the Veda's uniqueness as an instrument of knowledge. For, other instruments of knowledge like perception and those based on it like inference, etc. operate within the epistemological sphere of that which is already existing, the 'is'; whereas, the linguistic communication (*śabdapramāṇa*) in the form of the Vedic sacred texts operates, according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers in general, in regard to the 'ought'. Thus, although from the statements "betablockers are the remedy for high blood pressure" and "one suffering from high blood pressure should take betablockers" there is no difference as regards the communication and understanding of the means-end relationship between betablockers and curing blood pressure, yet these two statements are substantially different in respect of the functions they perform. While the first statement has a descriptive function of the established fact of betablockers being the remedy for high blood pressure, the second statement explicitly enjoins a person who suffers from high blood pressure to the task of taking betablockers with a view to curing the disease. So, it is the deontic force conveyed by 'should take' in the second statement which sets it apart from the first one and brings the 'ought', which is otherwise unavailable from other instruments of knowledge, into its scope of operation. An injunction is held to be an independent instrument of knowledge in so far as it communicates something which is as yet unknown through others the other means of knowledge. Hence it is this 'ought' which is unknown and unobtained by means of the other instruments of knowledge which contributes to an injunction's being an independent instrument of knowledge.

Continuing the above argument, the Bhāṭṭa says that since even the injunction about Śyena is an injunction, it cannot give up its essential nature of being an instigator and hence the motivation to do the Śyena, i.e., the main rite, should also be due to the instigation caused by the sacred texts and not by one's desire. It is to be noted here that the Bhāṭṭa opponent says in [a] "*sarvatra vidheḥ prayokṛtvānapāyāt*" – "because the power of the injunction is unlost everywhere". The Prābhākara opponent too says of this Bhāṭṭa opponent that according to the latter "*adhikāridaśāyām api vidheḥ prayokṛtvānapāyāt*" – "Since in your view, the instigating power of injunction is not lost even at the time of eligibility (i.e., even at the time of the injunction communicating the eligible performer)". In explanation of "*bhavanmate prayokṛtvānapāyāt*", Cakradhara says the follows:

bhavacchabdenombekaṃ nirdiśati. tasya sarvāvasthasya vidheḥ prayokṛtvānapāya iti hi pakṣaḥ. NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 79.

By the word 'you' [Jayanta's Prābhākara] refers to Umbeka. For, it is his (i.e., Umbeka's) view that the injunction in all its states does not cease to be an instigator.

This is corroborated by the following extracts from ŚVTāCo, where in criticism of his Prābhākara opponent's view that an injunction at first conveys the means-end relationship, Umbeka speaks of being instigator as the essential nature of injunctions of all types:

na hy atra prathamam upāyopeyabhāvaḥ pratīyate 'pi tv anavagatopāyatvasya bhāvārthasya vidhir anuṣṭhānaṃ bodhayati – 'idaṃ tvaṃ kurv' iti;

yāvadadhikārahetusadbhāvam anuṣṭhāpako vidhyartha, na śrutyādivadupāyamātrapatipādakaḥ. utpattiviniyogayor api prayogavidhir eva; phaladvāreṇa tv etau vyapadeśāv – ayam viniyogavidhir ayam utpattividhir iti, yathā “dadhnā juhōtī”ty utpattividhir eva viniyogavidhir ity ucyate. tasmād agnihotre “dadhnā juhōtī”iti, “agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma” iti sarvatra prayogarūpa eva vidhiḥ. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 97.

For, it is not the case that here the means-end relationship is understood at first. By contrast, the injunction conveys the performance of the meaning of the verbal root in the form – ‘you should do this’, [where the meaning of the verbal root] has not yet been understood as the means [for accomplishing a desired end]. Being the cause of performance is the meaning of the injunction, [which invariably remains so] so long as the basis of eligibility stays; [but an injunction] is not the mere communicator of the means just like [the six assisting proofs of the injunction of application, viz.] ‘direct mentioning’, etc. In regard to origination and application too, it is the injunction of performance only. It is but through the result [each injunction achieves] that these two designations [make sense] – such as ‘this is the injunction of application’, ‘this is the injunction of origination’. This is just like the injunction of origination, “one should offer oblation with curd”, indeed, which is called the injunction of application. Therefore, with regard to the Agnihotra, in “one should offer oblation with curd”, “one, who desires *svarga*, should offer [the] oblation [called] Agnihotra”, the injunction in all cases has certainly the form of [promoting] performance.

na hi pravartakatvaṃ muktvā ’nyo vidher vyāpāra ity uktam purastāt. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 100.

For, it has been said before that barring instigation, there is no other function of an injunction.

Now, the main point that Jayanta’s Prābhākara makes in reply to the Bhāṭṭa objection is that even if it is accepted that all kinds of injunctions, starting from the injunction of origination to the injunction of eligibility do not fail to instigate the person, yet when there is some other source of instigation like desire, etc. the instigating power of the injunction, although existent, is not operative, but remains suspended. To explain: in case of the Śyena sacrifice, no one can deny the role of desire to kill one’s enemy causing one to undertake the Śyena sacrifice. Now since the motivation to perform the Śyena has already been obtained from an extra-scriptural source like desire, any further act of instigation of the part of the injunction would be nothing but a superfluity. Moreover, if the injunction were to instigate the person to perform the Śyena, the sacred texts would be held responsible for leading one to the path of evil and the consequent downfall. Thus, it has to be accepted that the injunction itself does not instigate a person to undertake the Śyena. The Prābhākara

likens this suspension of the instigating power of the exhortative suffix in case of Śyena to the Prayāja called Paśupuroḍāśa. To explain³²⁰:

Animal sacrifice (henceforth *paśuyāga* only) is an ectype sacrifice of the archetypal New and Full Moon (henceforth *Darśapūrṇamāsa* only) sacrifice. According to the rule, “*prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā*” – “[any] ectype [rite] is to be done just as the archetype [rite]”, the details of the archetype are analogically transferred (*atidiṣṭa*) to the ectypes³²¹. Accordingly, the fore-sacrifice (*prayāja*), after-sacrifice (*anuyāja*), etc. are analogically obtained in the *paśuyāga*. In the middle of the *paśuyāga*, a subsidiary cake sacrifice (henceforth *puroḍāśayāga* only) is prescribed. The deity of the main *paśuyāga* is also the deity of the subsidiary *puroḍāśayāga*. Now, this *puroḍāśayāga* being also an ectype of the archetype, *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, would obtain the details of the latter like *prayāja*, *anuyāja*, etc. But since the subsidiaries of the archetype, *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, like *prayāja*, *anuyāja*, etc. are performed for the immediate archetype of the *puroḍāśayāga*, viz. *paśuyāga*, the required assistance of them is received by the *puroḍāśayāga* from this very performance. The *puroḍāśayāga* no more expects the performance of the subsidiaries of the main archetype, *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, and hence these subsidiary rites are not performed separately for the *puroḍāśayāga*³²². Thus, although the injunction “*prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā*” is still obtained with regard to the *puroḍāśayāga* in so far as it is an ectype of the *paśuyāga*, yet its purpose having been already served, it remains inoperative.

Another example may here be cited. There is a Kūrmapurāṇa verse which prescribes the eating of food either facing the east or facing the sun. The first half of the verse³²³ runs as follows:

prāṇmukho ’nnāni bhuñjīta sūryābhimukha eva vā/

One should either facing the east or facing the sun.

Now, the exhortative suffix *īta* is heard after the verbal root *bhuj*, meaning ‘to eat’, and there is prima facie an injunction to eat. However, since eating is available from another instrument of knowledge namely perception, the injunction, although heard, does not instigate one to the act of eating. In other words, the instigation power of the exhortative suffix is suspended or inoperative in regard to the act of eating. What is prescribed instead is the facing to the east or the sun.

Thus, just as in these two examples, despite the presence of an injunction, its instigating power is suspended or inoperative, similarly in case of the Śyena injunction, according to

³²⁰ I am grateful to my teacher, Mm. Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī of the Department of Purvamimamsa of The Madras Sanskrit College for explaining this and the subsequent analogy from the Kūrmapurāṇa at length.

³²¹ For a detailed discussion on the archetypes and ectypes, see Freschi (2012:73-78).

³²² For details, see Chattopadhyay (2017:34).

³²³ Verse 2.12.60; KP, p. 440.

the Prābhākara opponent, although the injunction is heard, it remains inoperative. This is because the decision to perform the Śyena is not prompted by the injunction but by the person's desire to kill his enemy by a Vedic means. Thus, the instigation having already been achieved through desire, there is no need for instigation to be caused by the injunction in that very regard anymore. And this non-functioning of the injunction makes room for the general prohibitory injunction, "One should not kill living beings", to step in and prohibit the performance of the Śyena. Jayanta's Prābhākara furthers this critique by observing that if in accordance with the Bhāṭṭa view it is accepted that the motivation to do the Śyena comes from injunction, i.e., the sacred texts, then it could not be distinguished from the Agnīṣomīya sacrifice. This is because if the motivation to do both the Śyena and Agnīṣomīya were due to the instigation caused by their respective injunctions, then just like the Agnīṣomīya the Śyena too would remain within the precincts of injunction and on that score the prohibition could not prohibit the performance of Śyena, just as it does not in case of the Agnīṣomīya animal killing. Hence the malefic nature of the Śyena sacrifice, if any, had to be attributed to the sacred texts only, which is certainly an undesirable consequence.

Being thus faced with the challenge of distinguishing between the Śyena and the Jyotiṣṭoma, the Bhāṭṭa comes up with a solution based on the point of eligibility. According to the Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2, even if the distinction could not be made in terms of the source of motivation for performance of the two acts of Śyena and Agnīṣomīya (and as a matter of that, the Jyotiṣṭoma) in so far as in both cases, according to him, the respective injunctions, "One intent upon bewitchment may sacrifice with the Śyena" and "One should kill an animal dedicated to Agni and Soma", prompt men to undertake the acts, yet the distinction could nevertheless be based on the point of eligibility. Thus, in case of Jyotiṣṭoma, the eligibility to perform it rests with someone who has not transgressed the general prohibition. This is because *svarga* which is the result of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is not something prohibited, since it is of the nature of "unsurpassed pleasure" (*nīratīśayā prīti*)³²⁴. Since *svarga* causes no harm, it is not prohibited. By contrast, the person who is eligible to perform the Śyena is someone who is intent upon bewitchment. Since the result of the Śyena is killing and killing is malefic and hence prohibited, one can become eligible for it only after having transgressed the warning of the general prohibition. This presentation of this distinction is based on the following passage from Umbeka's ŚVTā –

³²⁴ It is a bit surprising to find that it is the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice which is brought up for this contrastive discussion based on eligibility, and not the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice, a subsidiary of the Jyotiṣṭoma. It is true that being a subsidiary ritual of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the Agnīṣomīya has no separate eligibility from that of the Jyotiṣṭoma and shares the eligibility of the latter. But the question of the operation of the prohibition relates directly to the Agnīṣomīya and only secondarily to the Jyotiṣṭoma. This is again because the Agnīṣomīya has the support of an explicit and specific injunction and also because of being a subsidiary its details and prescription are for the sake of the ritual (*kratvartha*) and not for any human end (*puruṣārtha*). Hence the motivation to perform the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice comes exclusively from the injunction and thus, being already the content of a specific prescription, it cannot be operated upon by the general prohibition.

sādhyam api dvividham artho 'narthaś ca ity āha – dvividham iti sapādaślokena. pratiṣedham anatikramya yad upabhujyate so 'rthaḥ, pratiṣedhātikrameṇa tu yad upabhujyate so 'nartha iti. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 103.

The object of accomplishment also is of two types – beneficial and maleficent; hence [Kumārila says] – by the quarter of the verse³²⁵ [starting with] *twofold*. That which is enjoyed without having transgressed the prohibition is what is beneficial, but that which is enjoyed through a transgression of the prohibition is what is maleficent.

The passage is basic about the explanation of what *artha* and *anartha* are. However, the use of the verb *upabhujyate* gives Jayanta the scope for transforming these definitions of *artha* and *anartha* into the definitions of the *adhikārin* for Jyotiṣṭoma and Śyena ultimately based on the notions of *artha* and *anartha*. This is because the notion of *upabhoga* is inextricably linked up with eligibility, for, eligibility consists in the ownership of a sacrifice³²⁶.

However, this solution is immediately challenged by Jayanta's Prābhākara on a very pertinent ground. Since on the view of Jayanta's Umbeka-like Bhāṭṭa opponent, under all circumstances, an injunction does not lose its essential instigating nature. This also holds true for the injunction of eligibility, which generally conveys the person who is eligible for performing a sacrifice. This is because since the injunction of eligibility is ultimately an injunction, it cannot afford to lose its essential instigating character. And if even at the time of communicating the eligibility in case of an elective ritual like Śyena, the injunction kept on instigating the eligible person, then the element of desire could not save the sacred text from becoming culpable to the charge of instigating a person to the path of evil. This also does away with the very need for desire as the basis of eligibility in case of elective rituals. This is a major loophole in the Umbeka-like Bhāṭṭa opponent's view since in the event of the operation of the injunction's instigating power, the prohibition cannot find scope for operation and it is only if the prohibition is in operation that the question of transgressing it arises. In other words, the question of transgressing the prohibition and becoming eligible for the Śyena sacrifice arises only when the prohibition is in force. In absence of it, the very point does not hold water.

Against this criticism by the Prābhākara, Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa opponent said that it would be really a problem if an injunction were to instigate one in regard to the result; but such is never the case with injunctions. This is because the desire to obtain a result is not dependent on sacred texts and hence does not need the intervention of injunctions of sacred texts to come into being. Rather it is the very nature of the thing desired that gives rise to a desire for the same independently of the sacred texts. Thus, the Bhāṭṭas accept that out

³²⁵ Verse no. 221, *Codanāsūtra*, ŚV_{DS}, pp. 83-84.

³²⁶ For more on this see Jayanta's critique of the Kriyāvākyārthavādin's view of the phrase *svargakāma* denoting an agent (*karṭṛ*) and not an eligible performer (*adhikārin*). See also Appendix I in this regard.

of the three expectations of *bhāvanā* or human activity, viz. those for the result, the means and the procedure, it is with regard to only the last two that the instigating force of an injunction operates. In this respect, it is the ritual action, which is the means, in regard to which the injunction instigates. Hence, although the injunction of eligibility keeps on instigating a person, yet because it instigates one with regard to the means and not the end, the choice of the end rests ultimately with the person. This has the consequence of selecting the means at one's own will and not at the insistence of the sacred text, as a result of which, the general prohibition can enter the scene and thus give the person the scope to either abide by or transgress the prohibition. And once such a transgression occurs, the eligibility for Śyena as contended by Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa is achieved and the Vedic sacred text is saved from the responsibility of instigating one to the path of evil. This makes sense also in view of the fact that it is only in regard to the action that a person can make efforts directly, and not in regard to the result; so, on this ground too, the injunction could instigate one directly to the act, denoted by the verbal root, and not with regard to the result. The result rather appears on its own once its means, the action, has been duly carried out.

The point regarding the result remaining outside the scope of *bhāvanā* has already been discussed by Kumāṛila in the following half-verse of ŚVCo –

phalāṃśe bhāvanāyāś ca pratyayo na vidhāyakaḥ/ Verse no. 222c-d, *Codanāsūtra*, ŚV_{DS}, p. 84.

The [exhortative] suffix does not prescribe in regard to the result portion of human activity (*bhāvanā*).

Reading this and the last quarter of the next verse in its original context of the Śyena sacrifice, Umbeka comments:

śyenasādhyāyā hiṃsāyā vihitatvena pratiṣedhābhāvāt katham tadavāptiḥ pratiṣedhātikrameṇety āśaṅkyāha - phalāṃśe iti. lipsayaiva pravṛttatvān na sādhyāṃśe vidhiḥ prerayati... ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 104.

Apprehending that [it may be urged that] since the killing brought about by the Śyena is not prohibited on account of being prescribed, how is it (killing) [can be said to be] achieved by transgressing the prohibition [Kumāṛila says] – ***in regard to the result portion***. Since one is motivated by the desire [to kill], the injunction does not instigate one in regard to the part about what is to be accomplished....

tataś cāvihitatvād asti pratiṣedhaśāstrasyāvasara ity āha – tena sāmānyata (223c-d) *iti*. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 104.

And therefore, since [killing, the result of the Śyena sacrifice] is not prescribed [by the injunction], the statement of the sacred text about prohibition finds scope [for operation]; hence [Kumāṛila] says – ***therefore generally***.

Umbeka analyses how, while upholding the above view, parts of Śabara's commentary dealing with the problem of Śyena could be made sense of, according to Kumāriḷa –

idānīm yady api ca tavyapratyayaḥ karmaṇi vidhau ca smaryate tathāpi “śyenādayaḥ kartavyā vijñāyante” ity atra vidhivivakṣayā prayujyata ity āha - praśnāpākaraṇa (227c-d) iti. phalasya vidhiviṣaytve nirākṛte kiṃ vidheyam iti vidhiviṣayapraśnāpākaraṇārtha eva tavyapratyayo 'tra vidhivivakṣayā prayukta iti gamyate, na punaḥ sādhye karmaṇi prayuktaḥ, praśnena asambandhād, arthānarthatvayor anupayogāc ca. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 105.

Now, although the primary suffix, *tavya*, is instructed with regard to the object [prescribed] and [also the act of] prescribing, still with regard to [Śabara's statement] “Śyena and the like are understood as duty”, it is used with the intention of [the act of] prescribing; hence [Kumāriḷa] says – *in regard to removing the question*. Once the result has been refuted to be the scope of the injunction, it is indeed in order to remove the question, “what is to be prescribed”, which concerns the scope of the injunction, that the *tavya* suffix is here implicitly understood as having been used with the intention of [the act of] prescribing, but not used with regard to the act to be accomplished. This is because [if it were the act to be accomplished that was intended, then] it would not be consistent with the question and also since it would be not of any use in regard to [the discrimination between] what is beneficial and maleficent.

saty api sādhyatve vidhirahite pratiṣedhātikrānte hiṃsādāv anarthatvadarśanāt; vinā 'pi sādhyatvena vidheyeṣu jyotiṣtomādiṣv arthatvasiddheḥ. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 105.

Although it is something to be accomplished, yet given that there is no prescription [for it], and [one has to accomplish it by transgressing the prohibition], killing, etc. are seen to be maleficent. [By contrast,] even without it being something to be accomplished [at one's will], Jyotiṣtoma and the like, on account of being prescribed, are established to be beneficial.

'abhicaran' iti satuḥ “lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyā” iti puruṣalakṣaṇārthatvam “yo hi hiṃsitum icched” iti vadan – “teṣām upadeśa” iti ca vadan bhāṣyakāraḥ sphuṭaṃ karoti karaṇāṃśasya vidheyatvam; anyathā hy apadeśavacanam na avakalpata iti. ŚVTāCo, p. 105.

“By saying, “he, who wants to kill” and by saying “their instruction”, the commentator [Śabara] makes clear [that] the *śatr* suffix in ‘*abhicaran*’ means [in accordance with Aṣṭ 3.2.126] “[the *śatr* suffix is prescribed to be added to a verbal root, when the action denoted by that verbal root is used in the sense of] the characterisation [or] cause of [another] action” the characterisation of the person [and that] the part [of *bhāvanā* dealing with] the instrument to be the thing which is prescribed [respectively]. For, otherwise, the statement of refusal is not in order.”

In all the above passages from ŚVTā quoted above, the Śyena sacrifice as the means of killing is said to be prescribed by the injunction, but not the result of it, viz. killing.

This solution by Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa having been tabled, the Prābhākara responds to it by saying that if this is the solution intended by the Bhāṭṭas then they unavoidably subscribe to the Prābhākara view only. This is because, if the injunction does not instigate one in regard to the result, then it should not also instigate one, who desires the result, and has set himself out in search of the means. To explain: if because of instigating a person to the result, the Vedic sacred text loses its epistemic independence, then it should not also instigate a person in regard to the act, denoted by the verbal root, in so far as action is understood to be the means for accomplishing the result. But it communicates the means to someone who does not know the means. The reason for this is given by Jayanta's Prābhākara as the very basic condition of an injunction being about something which is not already obtained through other means of knowledge. Although the desire to kill one's enemy occurs to a person independently of the sacred texts, yet the Vedic means thereof is not available from any empirical means like perception, inference, etc., but only from the Vedic injunction, "One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena". In this way, according to the Prābhākara, the injunction could retain its character of being the communicator of something hitherto unknown while still maintaining a moral distance from the result via a basic epistemological isolation. In support of his contention, Jayanta's Prābhākara quotes and paraphrases Śabara and says that if one is prepared to kill the enemy by means provided by the sacred texts, then he should sacrifice with the Śyena, because the Śyena is the means for it.

The point made by Jayanta's Prābhākara that given that the injunction does not instigate a person to the result, it should not also instigate him in regard to the means and his solution of it based on the injunction's communicating only the means to someone who is ignorant of it, can be, I believe, called into question. Even though the Śyena as a means of killing one's enemy through a Vedic way is not known to someone independently of the Vedic injunction, yet in so far as it serves as the means for killing, which is a prohibited act that ultimately results in evil, the Śyena's connection with evil, albeit remote and indirect, should not be denied by the Prābhākara. The point about the Śyena injunction making known the means to people who are ignorant of it, may well serve to justify the epistemic integrity of the Vedic injunction, but it cannot warrant its moral inexpugnability. Moreover, since Jayanta's Prābhākara has already said that an injunction does not instigate in regard to the result, how could he say that the injunction only provides for the means to those who are ignorant of them? For, a means counts as a means only in terms of its relation to the specific end it can accomplish. And this also seems to be a deviation from this Prābhākara opponent's basic point of any injunction whatsoever needing just the correlates of eligibility and scope for successfully instigating a person to an act. One may argue on behalf of Jayanta's Prābhākara that although it has been asserted that the Śyena injunction communicated the means but did not prescribe its performance since only after the means has been performed that it could deliver its result, viz. killing, which would cause the downfall of man. But this also can be argued against in the following way: in so far as the Prābhākara says that it is the *means* which is communicated, the Śyena sacrifice no longer

remains just a scope meant merely for specifying the nature of the act to be done, but starts exhibiting a target-oriented feature, which, due to its direct association with the exhortative suffix cannot resist itself from being understood as a duty. This is because if the injunction does not prescribe either the result or the means thereof, but simply communicates the latter, how is it worth calling an injunction, for, the essential nature of an injunction, even according to the Prābhākara, is *praiṣa* or instigation. More precisely, the question is: if the Śyena injunction does not instigate one either to the result or to the means thereof, then what is it that it instigates to? If the injunction seeks to retain its epistemic integrity merely by virtue of communicating a Vedic means of killing, which is not knowable from other means of knowledge, then it cannot justify the Prābhākara's claim made earlier in NM 5.2 that *niyoga* is *both* that which instigates and which is to be done. Moreover, if the injunction without instigating people to something unknown, just *described* something unknown, how could it avoid being in conflict with the basic Mīmāṃsā principle as enunciated in MīSū 1.2.1 that those portions of the Vedas which do not prescribe action are superfluous? This also leads us to a more fundamental question: should the Vedic injunctions constitute an independent instrument of knowledge by virtue of merely *communicating*, i.e., describing something hitherto unknown by empirical means of knowledge or *also prescribing* the performance of the new thing, thus communicated? Jayanta and Umbeka's Prābhākara opponents have not explained how the act, denoted by the meaning of the verbal root could count both as the scope and the instrument.

It is also to be noted that Jayanta's Prābhākara does not accept the operation of the injunction in regard to the result since that would, in his view, compromise the epistemic integrity of the Vedic sacred texts by making it dependent on the result. By contrast, although Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa does not want the result to be prescribed by the injunction, yet he needs it to be indirectly communicated by the injunction as part of the means-end relationship. This is because, an injunction addresses a *sapratyaya* or rational person, who, even though prompted by a Vedic injunction, does not do anything which does not lead to a desirable result.

3. Enjoining negatively: the negative semantics of prohibitions

3.1. The two correlates (*anubandha*) in a prohibitory injunction

In course of the discussion on the Śyena sacrifice and Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice, the general prohibition, "One should not kill living beings", was inevitably referred to. This makes imperative an understanding of how prohibitions work through the analysis of the negative particle in prohibitions. Thus, the discussion on the functioning of injunctions that unfolded into the discussion on why and in what way the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice is an instance of the means of *dharma* and the Śyena sacrifice that of *adharmā* further snowballs into the discussion of prohibitions. In this regard, Jayanta's Prābhākara says that in case of Vedic prohibitions too, the injunction needs only the two correlates, i.e., the eligibility-correlate and scope-correlate, for a successful functioning. He says:

pratiṣedhādhikāre 'pi pratyavāyo na kalpate/

*niṣedhyād viṣayād eva labdhatvād adhikāriṇaḥ//
 tatrāsau kalpyamāno 'pi narakādīphalodayaḥ/
 avaidhatvaṃ prapadyeta na hy ākāṅkṣedṛṣṭī vidheḥ//
 vidher apekṣe dve eva niyojyaviṣayau prati/
 tatpūraṇena tṛptas tu na vāñchati tato 'dhikam//
 niyojyas tāvad etāvān kruddho 'rihananodyataḥ/
 viṣayas tannivṛtiś ca niyogo yatra gamyate// NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 114-115.*

In case of prohibitions too, religious demerit is not postulated because the person to whom [the prohibition applies]³²⁷ is known from the prohibited act itself. Even if the production of consequences³²⁸ like *naraka*³²⁹ is postulated in regard to that (prohibitions), it (such consequence) would not be understood [directly] out of the [prohibitory] injunction, since the [prohibitory] injunction has no such expectation [for the consequence]. The [prohibitory] injunction expects only two things – the person to whom the prohibition applies³³⁰ and the scope. Once those [expectations] have been fulfilled, [the prohibition] is satisfied and does not expect anything more. The person to whom the prohibition applies is this much – an angry man, who is ready to kill the enemy, and the scope is abstention from it (killing) – it is with regard to this (abstention from killing) that the commandment is understood.

It is clear from the NM 5.2 passage cited above that Jayanta's Prābhākara intends to maintain a uniformity in the working pattern of even a prohibitory injunction. This is because just as in case of positive injunctions, the injunction executes its instigating function through the two correlates of eligibility and scope, in case of prohibitions too, the prohibitory injunction executes its task of dissuasion through the same correlates, viz. the person to whom the prohibition applies (*adhikārin*) and the scope (*viṣaya*), that is the act from which he is dissuaded. Given these two, the prohibition needs nothing more – not

³²⁷ Unlike 'eligible performer' which is normally my translation for the word '*adhikārin*' I have translated it as 'the person to whom the prohibition applies'. This is because the *adhikāra* or eligibility spoken of here is not eligibility in the same sense as it is in case of a positive injunction or prescription. In case of a prescription, an eligible performer has to do something in a positive way, but in case of prohibition not so.

³²⁸ I have translated *phala* as consequence in the context of prohibitions since downfall into *naraka*, etc. are not results in the same sense in which accomplishment of *svarga*, etc. is in case of positive injunctions.

³²⁹ Though the word *naraka* is commonly translated as hell, yet it does not convey the sense of eternal damnation which characterises hell. In TV (MDĀ_{II}, p. 368), Kumāriḥ understands this as being of the nature of supreme suffering (*niratiśayaduḥkhātmaka*). Hence, I have left this word untranslated through just as I have done it in case of *svarga* which does not mean heaven, but supreme pleasure in the present Mīmāṃsā context.

³³⁰ Here the word *niyojya* has been used, just it has been used earlier in the context of positive injunctions, interchangeably with *adhikārin*. Since like *adhikārin* a person cannot be enjoined by a prohibition in the same way as he is enjoined by a positive injunction, I have retained the translation of *adhikārin* in the context of the prohibition as 'the person to whom the prohibition applies' even for the word *niyojya* in the context of prohibition.

even the postulation of downfall into *naraka* as a very strong undesirable consequence of not abiding by the dictum of the prohibition – in order to execute its task of dissuasion. For, if the prohibitory injunction were to dissuade a person by communicating such a dire consequence, it could not dissuade one independently and on its might. Hence, hence the prohibitory injunction would lose its autonomy as an instrument of knowledge separate from the ordinary means of knowledge like perception, etc. It is for this reason that any postulation of such consequences as downfall into *naraka*, etc. would not be warranted by the sacred texts but have its source in human imagination only. Nevertheless, it is not clear that since consequences like downfall into *naraka*, etc. on doing prohibited acts like killing a brāhmaṇa, etc. are known only from the sacred texts, why should they be treated as being of human origin. It is also to be considered that stopping oneself to do something which has already been undertaken needs a greater effort and hence a stronger source of motivation than doing something positive afresh. Moreover, an act like eating a rural cock (*grāmyakukkuṭa*) is not known by ordinary (*laukika*) instrument of knowledge like perception, etc. to be the cause of religious demerit; rather it is commonly understood to be just the opposite – a great source of taste and nutrition. No such overturning of impression takes place in case of positive injunctions. Thus, since it is utmost necessary to supply consequences like downfall into *naraka* to prohibitory injunctions for overturning this opposite understanding, it is not understandable as to why due to his overconcern for upholding the epistemic integrity of the Vedic prohibitory injunction, Jayanta's Prābhākara should neglect and utterly disregard this extremely important point. This also calls into question the firmness of the psychological founding of this Prābhākara's view of prohibitions.

A case which could, however, be made in favour of this Prābhākara view is that just as there are separate phrases like “one who desires *svarga*”, etc. in case of positive injunctions, there is no such phrase available in case of prohibitory injunctions; but since the person to be enjoined could be obtained from the prohibited act itself no incorporation of extra-linguistic units is needed to that effect; for any such unnecessary influx of words would compromise the Mīmāṃsā view of the authorless nature of the Vedic sacred texts. That the prohibited act is sufficient for delivering the *niyojya* can be understood if we consider how a prohibition works. To explain: a prohibition functions by dissuading a person from a specific act he is about to do. Thus, it operates on a person who is about to carry out such an act and hence it is the person to whom the prohibition applies can be easily obtained by a reference to the act prohibited and needs no further linguistic unit to be supplied in this regard. But this is a linguistic argument and that too made from the injunction's, i.e., the instigator's point of view. This line of reasoning utterly disregards the complex psychological computations that invariably crop up in a rational person's mind as soon as he encounters such prohibitions.

The following lines bear evidence to the ŚVTā's being the source of Jayanta's Prābhākara in this regard too:

*nanu "brāhmaṇo na hantavya" ity atra niyoganiyojyaviṣayaśravaṇān nairākāṅkṣye sati kalpyamāno narakapātaḥ puruṣabuddhiprabhava eva syāt. ŚVTāCo, in ŚVTā, p. 106.*³³¹

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, with regard to [the prohibition] “A brāhmaṇa is not to be killed”, once there is lack of expectancy following from the hearing (understanding) of enjoining, the person to whom the prohibition applies, and the scope of [the prohibition], downfall into *naraka* which is being postulated, would have its origin in the human intellect only.

3.2. Prohibition (*niṣedha*) not possible with regard to ‘*na hanyāt*’

At this point a set of very pertinent objections is presented:

[a] *nanu etāvan na vibudhyāmahe niṣedhavidheḥ ko viṣaya iti. 'bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyate' (MīSū 2.1.1) iti sthite nañarthas tāvat pūrvāparībhūtātāvābhāvān na vidher viṣayo 'nanvitābhidhānāc ca. na hi nano 'nantaraṃ liṅbhaktiḥ śrūyate 'pi tu hanteḥ.*

[b] *hananam api na vidher viṣayas, tasya dharmatvaprasaṅgān, nañprayogasya vairthyāprasakteḥ. hanane ca puruṣasya svataḥ pravṛtteś ca.*

[c] *nañviśiṣṭo 'pi na hanyartho 'sya viṣayas, tayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvābhāvāt.*

*yuktaṃ dadhnā juhōtīti home dadhyanuraktatā/
hanteḥ svarūpanāśāt tu na nañarthānuraktatā//*

[d] *puruṣaprayanto 'pi kevalo vidher viṣayaḥ, svataḥ siddhatvāt.*

[e] *na api nañarthānuraktaḥ, kutrāpi nañarthasya viśeṣaṇatvānupapatteḥ. NM_{Mys.-} II, p. 115.*

[a] Well, we do not understand so far what is the content of the prohibitory injunction. This being established that “Action is understood from such ritual-words which signify actions” (MīSū 2.1.1), the meaning of the negative particle is not the content of the injunction. This is because, [that what the negative particle means] is not of a sequential nature and also because it is denoted in a syntactically unconnected manner. For, the exhortative suffix is not heard (mentioned) after the negative particle, but after the verbal root ‘*han*’ [meaning ‘to kill’].

³³¹ The same passage is repeated by Umbeka in ŚVTāAu - *nanu "brāhmaṇo na hantavya" ity atra niyoganiyojyaviṣayaśravaṇān nairākāṅkṣye sati kalpyamāno narakapātaḥ puruṣabuddhiprabhava eva syāt. ŚVTā, p. 189.*

[b] Killing too is not the content of the [prohibitory] injunction, because [if it were so, then] there would be the undesirable consequence of its (killing's) becoming religious duty, and hence the application of the negative particle would be useless. A further reason is that human beings have a natural inclination to killing.

[c] Nor even the meaning of the verbal root, 'han', as qualified by the [meaning of the] negative particle can be its (the prohibitory injunction's) content, because the relation of qualifier and qualified does not obtain between them.

In case of [the injunction,] "one offers oblation with curd", the qualification of oblation by curd is reasonable; but since [on being qualified by the meaning of the negative particle] the very nature of the verbal root, 'han' [meaning, 'to kill'] would be destroyed, its qualification by the negative particle is not correct.

[d] The human effort by itself is also not the content of the injunction, because it is established on its own (independently of the injunction). Nor even is [such a human effort conducive to killing as] qualified by the meaning of the negative particle [can be the content of the command], because nowhere can the negative particle's meaning's being the qualifier be justified.

In [a] a criticism is offered from the point of view of the linguistic structure of a prohibitive injunction, e.g., *na hanyāt* – "one should not kill". Normally, in case of positive injunctions, the scope of the injunction (*vidhi*) is the action, denoted by the verbal root, and an action is composed of many sequential micro-actions. The meaning of the negative particle (*nañārtha*), which is the distinguishing mark of a prohibition, by contrast, cannot be identified as an action and hence as the scope of the prohibitory injunction.

The surface structure of the prohibitive injunction can be thus represented –

na han+yāt

It is clear from the above structure that according to the surface grammar of the prohibition, the exhortative suffix, which constitutes the nucleus of any injunction occurs after the verbal root, *han* and not after the negative particle, *na*. Since Aṣṭ 3.4.69 provides for the application of the verbal suffixes technically known as *lakāra-s* to verbal roots only, the exhortative verbal suffix, *yāt* lacks the morpho-semantic fitness to connect to the negative particle, *na*.

A probable source for this critique could be the following line from Kumāṛila's ṬṬ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.2.19. This, along with the very next *sūtra* hosts the discussion on whether the Vedic command utterance, '*kalañjaṃ na bhakṣayet*', is to be understood as a prohibitory command (*niṣedhavidhi*) or an exception (*paryudāsa*). This is a *pūrvapakṣasūtra* expressing the view of the opponent that it is a case of *paryudāsa*, and this is refuted in the very next *sūtra*. Nevertheless, Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa opponent here seems to have picked up the following line and reused it in criticising Jayanta's Prābhākara:

nakāraś ca karmavyavahitatvān na kartavyatāvacanena sambadhyate. MDĀ_v, p. 234.

And the [negative particle,] *na* does not [syntactically] connect to the word expressing duty (the exhortative suffix) because of being placed apart by the [word expressing the] object [of the duty, viz. the verbal root].

As for the source of the view that since the meaning of the negative particle does not express an action, it cannot be the scope of the injunction, the following line expressing the opponent's view in Prabhākara's Bṛ on MīSū 6.2.19 may be cited –

pūrvapakṣavādī 'bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdā' ity utsargaṃ manvāno viśiṣṭavidhiṃ manyate. Bṛ_v, p. 109.

Considering [the view expressed in the MīSū 2.1.1, starting with] “Ritual-words which mean action” [etc.,] to be the general rule, the opponent considers [*na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet* to be a] qualified injunction³³².

In [b] is to be found a more serious point made. In so far as a prohibitory injunction is an injunction its core is constituted by the exhortative suffix, which can syntactically get connected only to the verbal root. A verbal root, as has already been noted above, denotes an action, which consists of many sequential micro-actions. Now, since in case of positive injunctions, the meaning of the verbal root is understood to be the scope with regard to which one is commanded by the injunction, let the same pattern be repeated here and the meaning of the verbal root, ‘*han*’, meaning ‘killing’, be the scope of the prohibitory injunction too. But if this happens, then the act of killing, in so far as it becomes the scope of the injunction, would become *dharma* or religious duty, which is certainly an undesirable consequence! This is because it will directly be in conflict with the general prohibition, “One should not kill any living being”. As a result, all the punitive measures for killing laid down in the Vedic and Veda-based sacred texts would lose their purpose and become insignificant, and a total collapse of the social, moral and religious order would unavoidably follow. Also, the very need for a separate class of injunctions, viz. that of the prohibitory type, would no longer make sense and hence the very insertion of the negative particle in such prohibitions would go in vain. This will also compromise the

³³² The sense is brought out more fully and clearly in the *Ṛjuvimalā* on the said *Bṛhatī* passage thus:

'bhāvārthā karmaśabdā' ity atrādhikaraṇe bhāvārthānāṃ vidhiviṣayatvam uktam. na ca nañārtha audāsīnyātmako bhāvārthas tena vidhiviṣayatā tasya na yuktā. ṚVi, in Bṛ_v, p. 109.

In the topical section (*adhikaraṇa*), it has been said [under the *sūtra* starting with] “Ritual words which mean action” that the meaning of the verbal roots is the scope of the injunction. And the meaning of the negative particle, which of the nature of indifference, is not the meaning of the verbal root [since the latter denotes action]; hence its (i.e., the negative particle's meaning's) being the scope of the injunction is not logically tenable.

essential nature of an injunction. For, an injunction instigates one to undertake such an action which is hitherto unknown by other instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, etc. But the act of killing is such that the motivation to do it comes naturally from one's extreme hatred for someone and does not need in stand of any injunction in this regard. An important point to be noted here is that the Prābhākara proposes this view on neglecting the significance of the negative particle present in the prohibitory injunction.

Now, if the Prābhākara were to revise his view and say [c] that it is the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, as qualified by the negative particle, which forms the scope of the prohibitory injunction, then this too would not be a viable option. For, no qualifier-qualified relation can obtain between the negative particle and the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, and hence such a qualified meaning remains something unestablished. To illustrate this, the following injunction is analysed:

dadhnā juhōti. MaiSa 4.7.7

In this injunction, the verbal root suffix 'ti' occurring after the verbal root *hu* (meaning 'to oblate') is to be understood as the Vedic injunctive (*leṭ*). Since the form of a verbal root declined in the third person singular number of *leṭ* is generally identical with the form of it declined in the third personal singular number of *loṭ* (the present tense), the meaning of *juhōti* needs to be understood as *juhuyāt* and the whole sentence should be understood as "one should oblate with curd". Now, from a previous injunction, viz. "agnihotraṃ juhōti" (TaiSa 1.5.9.1), the exhortative suffix has already prescribed the performance of *homa* or oblation, which is the meaning of the verbal root, *hu*. So, in case of *dadhnā juhōti*, the exhortative suffix only presents a reiteration (*anuvāda*) of the act of oblation, since it has already been obtained (*prāpta*), and something which is already obtained cannot be prescribed again by the same injunction³³³. That which is already obtained is something in regard to which (*uddeśya*) something else, which is as yet unobtained, prescriptively predicated (*vidheya*). Thus, in case of *dadhnā juhōti* since *homa* or oblation features as the *uddeśya* on account of its being already obtained from the injunction, "agnihotraṃ juhōti", it is *dadhi* or curd which is prescribed by the exhortative suffix here. In this way, *dadhi* becomes the qualifier of *homa*.

Given the above analysis, the Prābhākara might urge that just as the meaning of the verbal root, *hu*, is qualified by *dadhi*, so in "na hanyāt", killing, the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, could be qualified by the negative particle, *na*. But this is not correct, because it overlooks the very purpose which a qualifier serves. A qualifier is meant for specifying the nature of the qualified; thus, curd as a qualifier specifies the qualified, viz. the act of oblation, and makes possible the understanding that the act of oblation is to be performed with curd and not anything else. But with regard to the question of a qualification of killing by the negative particle, such a specification is not achieved because the qualifier, *na*, destroys, so to say, the very nature of the qualified instead of specifying it. Underlying this

³³³ By injunction, is here meant the exhortative suffix in *dadhnā juhōti*, which, though similar in form to the exhortative suffix in *agnihotraṃ juhōti*, is unique in each and every injunctive sentences.

criticism is the presupposition that the meaning of *na* is destruction or absence³³⁴. Thus, the meaning of killing, as qualified by the negative particle, would be “absence of killing”!

Since all verbal suffixes denote human effort (*puruṣaprayatna*), the exhortative suffix too must denote the same. In that case, the Prābhākara might urge [d] that it is pure human effort which forms the scope of the prohibitory injunction under review. But this cannot be a valid point, since pure human effort can also stem from one’s desire, i.e., independently of an injunction. A further point may be made in this regard: if pure effort is the scope of a prohibitory injunction, then the very presence of the negative particle would be superfluous.

Now, to circumvent this problem, it is proposed by Jayanta’s Prābhākara [e] that it is human effort as qualified by the meaning of the negative particle which is the scope of the prohibitory injunction. But this proposal cannot hold water because in all these cases discussed till now, there is no way in which the negative particle could be explained as functioning as a qualifier. To be more specific, if the qualification of human effort by the meaning of the negative particle is provisionally accepted, then it would lead to the same undesirable consequence as has been shown with reference to [c]. That is to say, it would be “absence of human effort” that would form the scope of the prohibitory injunction. But this goes against the very purpose of any injunction, which is instigation of a person with regard to some act. Hence, the Prābhākara’s proposal defeats the very purpose of an injunction.

3.3. Exclusion (*paryudāsa*) not possible with regard to ‘*na hanyāt*’

Now, Jayanta’s Prābhākara comes up with a new proposal, the absurdity of which is immediately exposed by Jayanta –

athāyam abrāhmaṇādinyāyena hantau paryudaste bhāvārthāntare niyogaḥ kalpyate –
‘na hanyād’ iti ko ’rthaḥ?
anyat kim api kuryād iti.
tarhi kiṃ tad bhāvāntaram iti na vicārayituṃ śakyam.
yatkīñcid iti cet –
na; tasya svataḥsiddhatvena vidhyanarhatvāt. avaśyaṃ jīvan pumān kiñcit karoti –
paṭhati, gacchati, bhūṅkte ca. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 116.

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] Now, based on the principle of ‘non-brāhmaṇa’, the verbal root, ‘*han*’, having been excluded, the enjoinder should be postulated with regard to some other verbal root.

³³⁴ It is to be noted that *dhvaṃsābhāva* or the absence caused by destruction of an entity (e.g., a jar) is also a kind of absence in Nyāya.

[Question to the Prābhākara:] What is the meaning of [the sentence] ‘one should not kill’?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [It means –] do anything else.

[Question to the Prābhākara:] Then, what that other action is cannot be deliberated upon.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [What] if it is something whatsoever?

[Reply to the Prābhākara:] No; for, it (doing something whatsoever) being established on its own is not fit to become [the scope of] the injunction. A living human being certainly does something – he recites, he goes and he eats.

Generally speaking, the negative particle refers to two things – exclusion (*paryudāsa*) and prohibition of what is possible (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*). An example of the first case is - *abrāhmaṇam ānaya* – “Bring the non-brāhmaṇa”. Here the negative particle ‘a’ prefixed to the word ‘brāhmaṇa’ signifies that some other person than a brāhmaṇa has to be brought. The example of *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is - *brāhmaṇam nānaya* – “Don’t bring the brāhmaṇa”. Here the negative particle, *na*, gets attached to the exhortative suffix, *hi*, which is already syntactically connected to the verbal root, *nī*, prefixed by *ā*. By virtue of this attachment to the exhortative suffix, it prohibits the act of bringing of a brāhmaṇa. The general rule is that in case of *praṭiṣedha*, the negative particle connects with the verbal suffix and in case of *paryudāsa*, the negative particle connects to any linguistic unit other than the verbal suffix. Also, a *paryudāsa* is ultimately a disguised prescription, and *praṭiṣedha* is a prohibition *per se*.

Now, given that the negative particle cannot get attached to the exhortative suffix for grammatical reasons, and since it signifies the absence of the act of killing on a connection with the verbal root, *han*, Prābhākara proposes the application of the principle of ‘non-brāhmaṇa’, i.e., *paryudāsa* here. To explain: since the negative particle gets connected to the verbal root, which is something other than the verbal suffix, it can only signify *paryudāsa* exclusion. By virtue of *paryudāsa*, which is ultimately a prescription, the meaning of the sentence ‘*na hanyāt*’ – “don’t kill” boils down to ‘*ahananaṃ kuryāt*’ – “do non-killing”. This apparently gives Jayanta’s Prābhākara two advantages: on one hand, he can explain the syntactical connection of the negative particle in the given sentence and on the other hand he will not have to end up with any kind of absence, i.e., something which cannot be done.

But this is immediately challenged by the Bhāṭṭa³³⁵ on the ground that if anything other than killing should be done, and there is no specification of what other thing should be done, then a person will be at liberty to do anything other than killing at his will. And since what he would be doing in that case would be prompted by his desire, the very need for

³³⁵ It will be clear from the immediately following quote from ŚVTāCo that it is Umbeka’s refutation.

the injunction will be superfluous and that will ultimately compromise the epistemic integrity of the injunction.

The above passage is an echo of the following passage from Umbeka's ŚVTā –

*athāpi nañupahitā hantir abrahmaṇādinyāyena
hananaparyudastadhātvarthāntaravācivāt tadavacchinnā bhāvanā pratipādayati,
sā ca vidher viṣaya ity āśayaḥ,*

*tad asat; hananavyatiriktadhātvarthāvacchinnāyāṃ puruṣasya svata eva
pravṛttatvāt; avaśyaṃ jīvan pumān kiñcit karoti gacchati kvacid āsta iti. ŚVTāAu,
in ŚVTā, p. 187.*

[Prābhākara:] Now, in accordance with the principle of 'non-brāhmaṇa', [the verbal root,] *hanti*, conditioned by the negative particle, expresses, except [the meaning of] killing, [some other action denoted by] some other verbal root. Therefore, [the verbal root, *hanti*, qualifier by the negative particle] expresses human activity (*bhāvanā*), as delimited by it (some other action than killing). And that (other action than killing) is the scope of the [prohibitory] injunction. This is the purport.

[Refutation by Umbeka:] That is not true. With regard to [human activity which is] delimited by the meaning of any verbal root apart from [that which expresses] killing, a person makes efforts on his own alone. Certainly, a living human being does something – he goes, he sits somewhere.”

A further grammatical point which could perhaps be made against this Prābhākara proposal is as follows: in cases of *paryudāsa* like 'non-brāhmaṇa', the negative particle functions as the qualifier of the following constituent, 'brāhmaṇa'. In other words, for obtaining the meaning of *paryudāsa*, compounding of the negative particle with a linguistic unit other than the verbal suffix thus seems implicitly to be necessary. But in the given sentence '*na hanyāt*', the negative particle is not already compounded with the verbal root *han* so that it could give the meaning of '*ahanana*' or 'non-killing', i.e., something other than killing.

3.4. Impossibility of the negative particle's connection to the exhortative suffix

The possibility of a connection with the meaning of the verbal root having thus been ruled out, the Prābhākara makes the final proposal of connecting the negative particle to the exhortative suffix. He says –

*atha viṣayāṃśaṃ pariḥṛtya pramāṇāṃśe nañ niviśate, sa hi pravartamānaṃ
pumāṃśaṃ ruṇaddhi, yad dhanyāt tan neti.*

*tad apy anupapannam – anvitābhidhānena vidhivibhakter hantinā 'varuddhatvāt.
preraṇāśaktisvabhāvo vidhiḥ sthitaḥ. yas tu niṣedhātmā nañ pārśve sthitas, tatra na*

vidhiḥ saṅkrāmati. saṅkrāntāv api nañś ca sambandhe sati vidheḥ svarūpanāśo 'vagamyate. svabhāvo hy eṣa nano yad ayaṃ yena yena sambadhyate tasya tasya abhāvaṃ bodhayatīti. ato vidhisambandhe nañ iṣyamāṇa etāvān vākyārtho 'vatiṣṭhate hananavidhir nāstīti. tataś ca hananasya vaidhitvaṃ³³⁶ ca syāt.

[Proposal by Prābhākara:] What if abandoning the scope-part, the negative particle [may be said to] enter the part consisting of the instrument of knowledge (the exhortative suffix)? For, a person who has already undertaken [killing] is blocked by it – ‘you should not kill what [you want to kill].’

[Refutation by Bhāṭṭa:] That too is not coherent; because the [scope for any further syntactical connection of the exhortative] suffix has already been blocked by [the verbal root,] ‘han’, on account of denotation of the connected. The exhortative suffix is established as that which naturally possesses the power to instigate. The exhortative suffix does not pass on to the negative particle, which is of the nature of negation, situated beside. Even if it passes on, then due to a connection with the negative particle it is [rather] the destruction of the [exhortative suffix’s] real nature (that of being an instigator) which is understood. For, such is the nature of the negative particle that it expresses the absence of everything it connects to. Therefore, if a connection of the exhortative suffix to the negative particle is desired, then the sentence-meaning boils down to this much – “there is no injunction about killing”. And from that one has to accept that killing is prescribed by the injunction.

The main drift of the argument that the Bhāṭṭa advances against the Prābhākara here is basically the same as discussed in ii [a] and [b] above. On grammatical grounds, the exhortative suffix gets connected to the verbal root, *han*, and there is no further need for it to connect to something else. This is given a slightly literary flavour by Jayanta and presented as the ‘blocking’, as it were, of the scope for further connection. The notion of ‘blocking’ can also suggest the impossibility of a subsequent abandonment of the verbal root portion by the exhortative suffix. The second interpretation gains ground in the light of the use of the word ‘*saṅkrānti*’ by the Bhāṭṭa opponent here. The word *saṅkrānti* means ‘passing on’, which implies the notion of displacement and hence abandonment. Also worthy of note is the use of the word ‘*anvitābhidhāna*’. Although the word alludes to the famous theory of sentence-compositionality called ‘denotation of the connected’, propounded by Prabhākara and defended by his followers, yet it does not seem to have been used here in that sense. Rather, it is used in the sense of ‘*samanāpadopāttatva*’ –

³³⁶ Although all the printed texts read ‘*vihitvatvaṃ*’, I have followed Sen’s (2013:193) proposal to emend it as either ‘*vaidhatvaṃ*’ or ‘*vihitvatvaṃ*’ in order to obtain the intended meaning of the undesirable consequence of ending up with a prescription for killing. The grammatical structure which aims at obtaining the abstract form of the adjective of the word *vidhi* could either be ‘*vaidhatvaṃ*’ (meaning the property of being something having a connection with a prescription) or ‘*vihitvatvaṃ*’ (meaning the property of having been prescribed). Again, between these two candidates for amendment, I find ‘*vihitvatvaṃ*’ as giving the sense of being prescribed more directly and immediately than ‘*vaidhatvaṃ*’, which can also signify the cognition which arises on hearing a prescription and thus having a connection with the prescription.

being conveyed by the same word, which is here the conjugated verb-form ‘*hanyāt*’ composed of the verbal root, *han*, and the exhortative suffix, *yāt*. Hence due to such a close proximity, the verbal root’s claim to get syntactically connected to the suffix gains precedence over others. Moreover, since it is a verbal suffix, it has naturally the fitness to get connected to a verbal root and nothing else.

The next point which the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 makes is that it is in the very nature of an exhortative suffix to instigate. Now, given that the negative particle denotes absence, its connection with anything signifies the absence of that thing. In case of a connection of the negative injunction with the exhortative suffix, the essential instigating capacity of the latter would be destroyed by the former and hence the core of the prohibitory injunction would be destroyed and it would thus no more be fit to be called an injunction!

The above has the following consequence – if the negative particle gets connected to the exhortative suffix, which is already connected to the verbal root, *han*, then the meaning of the statement, “*na hanyāt*”, would be “there is no injunction about killing”! To put it differently, this would signify the absence of an injunction about killing. Now, an absence always presupposes its counter correlative (*pratiyogin*), and hence absence can be predicated of a really existing thing. In other words, an absence cannot be of something which does not exist at all, e.g., a hare’s horn³³⁷. Thus, if the above sentence is understood as signifying the absence of an injunction about killing, then it would unavoidably imply the existence of a positive injunction about killing. Once an injunction about killing has to be thus accepted, then killing would have the support of a prescriptions and hence the prohibition “one should not kill living beings” would not have the scope for operation on the said prescription. This would ultimately do away with the very purpose of the discourse aimed at discriminating between that which is beneficial and that which is maleficent on the basis of the former’s being prescribed and the latter’s being prohibited.

This point has been dealt with by Umbeka at a greater length in his ŚVTā and more options regarding the Prābhākara’s proposal for the connecting the negative particle with the exhortative suffix have been presented. The sophistication and systematic nature of the discussion cannot leave one unimpressed:

[a] *niṣedhādhikāre ’pi rāgato hanane pravartamāno nañā nivartyata iti kiṃ vidhinā? vidhir apy atra śrūyamāṇo rāgādilakṣaṇam eva pravṛttim anuvadet – yad dhananaṃ kuryād iti; na tv asau vidhāyakaḥ.*

[b] *tathā hi – na tāvad dhananaṃ vidadhāti, tatra rāgata eva pravṛttatvāt.*

[c] *nāpi nañartham, abhāvarūpatvāt.*

³³⁷ This is standardly referred to as *alīkapratiyogikābhāva* or the absence, the counter correlative of which is a fictional entity like a hare’s horn. Of course, no such imagined absence is accepted by the Navyanyāya philosophers.

[d] *nāpi nañarthāvacchinnā bhāvanā vidadhāti, tadavacchinnāyās tasyās cābhāvarūpatvāt.*

[e] *nāpi nañarthāvacchinnasya hananasya, tasyāpy abhāvarūpatvāt.*

[f] *nāpi rāgato hananāvacchinnāyāṃ pravartamānas tatparyudastāyāṃ niyujyate 'navacchinnāyās tasyā vidhiviṣayatvāyogāt.*

[g] *nāpy ahananāvacchinnā vidhīyate abhāvasya avyāpārarūpatvena anavacchedakatvāt.*

[h] *... na ca rāgataḥ pravṛttiṃ vidhiḥ pratibadhnāti; tatas tasya apravartakatvāpātāt.*

[i] *na ca nañupahitasya pratibandhakatvaṃ, tasya apy abhāvarūpāpatteḥ.*

[j] *atha nañā pratibandhaḥ kriyate, tattadbhāvabhāvitvena nañā eva tat sāmartyaṃ, na vidher iti kṛtam ativācālatayā. ŚVTāAu, ŚVTā, pp. 186-187.*

[a] In case of prohibitions too, a [person] who is ready to kill owing to desire [for killing] is dissuaded by the negative particle; hence of what use is the exhortative suffix? [For,] the exhortative suffix, although being heard, would just reiterate the motivation [to kill] characterised by desire and the like only; that is “killing should be done”; but it (the exhortative suffix) does not instigate [a person to abstain from killing].

[b] To explain – in the first place, [the exhortative suffix] does not prescribe killing, since one is already motivated [to kill] owing to desire only.

[c] Nor even [does the exhortative suffix prescribe] the meaning of the negative particle, since [the meaning of the negative particle] has the form of an absence.

[d] [The exhortative suffix does not prescribe] also a human activity, delimited by the meaning of the negative particle, because [when] delimited by that (the meaning of the negative particle), it (a human activity) takes on the form of an absence.

[e] Killing delimited by the meaning of the negative particle [is] also [not prescribed by the exhortative suffix], because that (such killing) too has the form of absence.

[f] Nor is [someone] who has undertaken [an activity that] is delimited by killing, is enjoined to [any action] except it (killing). This is because, in so far as it (activity) is not delimited [by any specific action] it (activity) [has] no connection with the scope of the [prohibitory] injunction.

[g] Nor even [an effort] delimited by non-killing is prescribed [by the exhortative suffix]. This is because, in so far as an absence is not of the nature of activity, it (absence in the form of non-killing) cannot delimit [the scope of the effort].

[h] ... and the exhortative suffix does not obstruct an undertaking [of killing] based on desire; for, in that case, it (the exhortative suffix) would undesirably become a non-instigator.

[i] And the [exhortative suffix, as] conditioned by the negative particle does not obstruct, for, that too would undesirably take on the form of an absence.

[j] [Proposal by the Prābhākara:] [What] if the obstruction is caused by the negative particle?

[Umbeka:] [In that case], since it (obstruction) pertains to the individual actions, that capacity (to obstruct) [would] belong to the negative particle alone, and not to the exhortative suffix. Thus [you are done with your] excessive garrulousness!

3.5. The Prābhākara's final position regarding the prohibitory injunctions

At this point, Jayanta's Prābhākara starts expounding his answer to the objections levelled by the Bhāṭṭa. He says –

atrocitate – dadhnā juhōtīti homasya vacanāntaracoditatvād vidhivibhaktiśaktir upapadaṃ saṅkrāmatīti yathā varṇitam, evam ihāpi hanane svataḥ pravṛttatvena vidhivaiphalyān nañāś ca śrūyamāṇasyānarthakyaprasaṅgād vidhāyikā śaktir nañartham eva sprśatīti kiṃ neṣyate? NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 116.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] In this regard it is said – since [the act of] oblation in [the injunction,] “one should offer oblation with curd” (MaiSa 4.7.7) has already been prescribed by a different statement (a separate injunction, ‘*agnihotraṃ juhōti*’ – “one should offer the Agnihotra oblation”), the power of the exhortative suffix approaches the adjoining word. Just as this has been described, likewise here too (the prohibition, ‘*na hanyāt*’) there would be superfluity of the injunction owing to the fact that one undertakes the action (killing) on his own. And there would be the undesirable consequence of the uselessness of the negative particle that is heard. As a result, why should [you] not accept that the power of instigation [of the exhortative suffix] touches the meaning of the negative particle only?

This is to be understood as a clarificatory question put by Jayanta's Prābhākara to his Bhāṭṭa opponent. He goes back to the example of the injunction, *dadhnā juhōti*, which was cited before by the opponent to show how due to a connection of the negative particle with the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, the very meaning of the verbal root is destroyed. But the Prābhākara uses the same injunction as a counter-example and explains on the basis of its analogy how the instigating power of the exhortative suffix gets connected to the

meaning of the negative particle situated apart. To explain: the act of oblation is prescribed by the injunction, *agnihotraṃ juhōti*, which is a separate injunction from *dadhnā juhōti*. Now since there is no point in prescribing the same act of oblation for a second time, the exhortative suffix in *dadhnā juhōti* merely reiterates the already prescribed act. But since the essence of an injunction is the exhortative suffix and the essence of the latter is its instigating power, so if the injunction fails to instigate a person to something, the very need for such an injunction is defeated. Hence the only candidate left in the said injunction with which the instigating power of the injunction could connect is *dadhi* or curd. Hence the meaning of the said injunction boils down to the following – one should offer oblation with the curd. Here, curd specifies the thing which should be used in the act of offering. Similarly, the Prābhākara contends, in case of *na hanyāt* one is motivated to kill by his hatred alone, and in such a case it is useless for the exhortative suffix in *hanyāt* to instigate a person to the act of killing. But if the exhortative suffix were not to instigate, its instigating power would go in vain, and equally useless will be the presence of the negative particle in the said prohibitory injunction since the latter would fail to prohibit the act of killing. Hence, it is for saving the instigating power of the exhortative suffix as well as for justifying the need for the negative particle that it should be accepted that the instigating power of the exhortative suffix touches the meaning of the negative particle. A subtle point which is to be noted here is that Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent no more mentions that it is the injunction, i.e., the exhortative suffix which gets connected to the meaning of the negative particle, but it is the injunction’s instigating power which gets connected to the meaning of the negative particle³³⁸.

nanūktam atra ‘bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdā’ iti. tatra dadhyanurakto homa eva vidhīyata iti phalato dadhi vihitam bhavati, na pramāṇataḥ. iha tu nañās tadupamardasvabhāvatvān na kenacit³³⁹ saṃsargo dadhyāder iva kalpate. NM_{EP-1}, pp. 352-353.

[Objection:] Well, in this regard it has already been that “[It is from] ritual-words which express activity [that action is understood]”. There (in case of the injunction, *dadhnā juhōti*) it is indeed the oblation as qualified by curd which is prescribed. Hence, it is in essence that curd is prescribed and not based on the instrument of knowledge. But here unlike [in the case of] curd, etc., a connection of the [meaning of the] negative particle with anything is not postulated on account of the destructive nature of it (the negative particle).

³³⁸ The significance of this subtle change made by Jayanta’s Prābhākara will be made clear in the analysis of the subsequent sections.

³³⁹ The Mysore reading (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 117) omits *na kenacit*; but it is present in the *editio princeps* (p. 353). Without accepting this additional portion, the upshot of the argument of the objector would be that because the negative particle destroys the meaning of the exhortative suffix one can postulate the connection of them; this is certainly not what the opponent means, but just the opposite of it.

The main point that the opponent here wants to make is that in case of *dadhnā juhōti*, the connection of the instigating power of the injunction with curd was not based on the instrument of knowledge. By instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is to be understood here the exhortative suffix, because that only expresses the hitherto unknown and unavailable thing, viz. instigation. In other words, it refers to the surface structure of the injunction, with reference to which it is understood that the exhortative suffix connects to the act of oblation denoted by the verbal root, *hu*. Cakradhara³⁴⁰ explains this as follows: since the exhortative suffix occurs after the verbal root, *hu*, meaning ‘to oblate’, it cannot get connected to *dadhi* situated apart. But lest on this score it fails to get a suitable candidate to prescribe and instigate, the whole injunction would result in a failure. It is keeping such an undesirable consequence in mind that the exhortative suffix has to be accepted, by extension, as prescribing the performance of the act of oblation as qualified by the curd. It is in this way that the instigating power of the exhortative suffix can be defended. But in case of *na hanyāt* the instigating power of the injunctive is crushed due to its very connection with the negative particle, which is destructive by its very nature. Hence the analogy which the Prābhākara resorted to is not fit for making sense of how a prohibitory injunction works.

But this fault is sought to be cleared by the Prābhākara thus:

*maivam - nivṛttim eva kurvan*³⁴¹ *viśeṣaṇībhavati. seyaṃ nañupahite hantau śrute hanananivṛttir gamyate. yathā siddharūpadadhyānupraveśe ’pi na homasya sādhyamānā ’vasthā nivartate, tathā nañanuviddhahantyarthāvagatau na pūrvāparībhāvabuddhir nivartate. na hy abrahmaṇavat ’na hanyād’ iti siddharūpabuddhiḥ. so ’yam hanananivṛttirūpaḥ pūrvāparībhūto vidhiviṣayo bhavati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 116-117.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It should not be not so. It is on account of effecting dissuasion that it (the negative particle) becomes a qualifier. When the verbal root, ‘*han*’, conditioned by the negative particle is heard, dissuasion from killing is understood. Just as with the entry of the curd which is by nature something already accomplished, the oblation’s state of being something to be accomplished does not cease, similarly, when the meaning of the verbal root, ‘*han*’, mixed with [the meaning of] the negative particle is understood, the cognition of sequence [with regard to the verbal root *han*] does not cease. For, unlike [the principle of] ‘non-brāhmaṇa’ the cognition in ‘one should not kill’ does not have the form of [something already] accomplished. It is that [meaning of the verbal root, *han*, conditioned by the negative particle and as] having the form of abstention from killing [and] a sequential nature, that becomes the scope of the [prohibitory] injunction.

³⁴⁰ *na pramāṇata iti. juhoteḥ parasyā vidhivibhakteḥ śravaṇāt.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 82.

³⁴¹ The *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-I}, p. 353) has an additional ‘*nañ*’ after *kurvan*. However, contextually the same meaning is obtained even without the explicit mention of ‘*nañ*’.

The Prābhākara here explains the way how the negative particle becomes the qualifier of the verbal root. According to him, it is because of a pragmatic function³⁴² in the form of dissuasion that the negative particle becomes a qualifier. In other words, given that the referential function of the negative particle gives the meaning of absence, which is bound to destroy the meanings of both the negative particle and the verbal root, the Prābhākara had to resort to some other function of the negative particle. It is thus the pragmatic function of the negative particle which the Prābhākara now appeals to. Seen in this light, the Prābhākara's change in outlook from the connection of the injunction to the connection of the instigating power of the injunction to the meaning of the negative particle makes profound sense.

To uphold his argument, the Prābhākara refers to a very basic argument shared by almost all the philosophers in NM 5.2. Since an injunction aims at getting an unaccomplished action accomplished, it cannot instigate a person with regard to things that are not actions and are of an accomplished nature. It is because of their already established nature that things like curd do not stand in need of being accomplished anymore; rather, they assist in the process of accomplishing that which is unaccomplished, viz. the action. *Dravya*-s or substances, among other things, exemplify such accomplished entities. Now, it was said by the opponent above that in case of *dadhnā juhōti*, it is the oblation qualified by curd in regard to which the exhortative suffix is to be understood as instigating a person. The Prābhākara twists this point and says that just as the act of oblation does not lose its state of being something to be accomplished due to its conditioning by curd which is already established, similarly the verbal root, *han*, in '*na hanyāt*', should not lose its sequential nature due to its connection with the negative particle. The point of similarity stressed here is the connection of two things opposite in nature. The nature of curd is essentially opposite to the nature of the already prescribed act of oblation, that is, while the act of oblation is as yet unaccomplished, curd, being a substance, is already accomplished. If such a harmonisation of opposites is possible, why should not the same principle of harmonisation of opposite-natured entities apply to the prohibitory injunction, *na hanyāt*, too? To substantiate this, the Prābhākara further says that in case of the example of 'non-brāhmaṇa', it is an accomplished entity other than a brāhmaṇa that is understood. By contrast, in case of "one should not kill" one does not have the cognition of an already established entity. What is understood instead is that something not yet accomplished is urged to be done, just as it happens in case of positive injunctions like "bring a glass of water". Such a cognition of something to be done even in case of '*na hanyāt*' is made possible by the pragmatic function of the negative particle, which overpowers its own referential probably by virtue of its situation within the framework of an injunction. It is also because of this very pragmatic function of dissuasion that the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, to which the negative particle connects, does not lose its sequential nature³⁴³.

³⁴² I am grateful to Dr. Hugo David who suggested this expression to me.

³⁴³ As to why precisely the sequential nature of the verbal root *han* is retained despite its connection with the negative particle will be explained by me shortly afterwards.

The main basis for accepting a pragmatic function of the negative particle here seems to be the cognition of ‘something to be done’ even upon hearing such sentences as ‘*na hanyāt*’ – “one should not kill”.

However, it may be objected here that if the negative particle as connected to the verbal root, *han*, means *nivṛtti* or dissuasion by virtue of its pragmatic function, then what meaning or function should be understood of the exhortative suffix, *yāt*, in *hanyāt*. If this is sought to be circumvented, one may assert that the exhortative suffix *yāt* perhaps provides an injunctive setting against which the negative particle functions pragmatically and means dissuasion and not absence. But this is too vague an explanation to be reckoned with. For, it still remains unexplained as to what precise semantic value should be understood as belonging to the exhortative suffix, with which there is no direct or indirect connection of the negative particle. Probably anticipating such an objection, the Prābhākara revised his explanation and put forward a new solution, which is as follows:

*athavā vibhaktyarthena nañ sambhantsyati. śuddhasya liñāder arthaḥ pravartako, nañupahitasya tasyārtho nivartaka iti śabdaśaktir evaiṣā ko ’tra paryanuyojoyate*³⁴⁴ *iti.*

*yat tu sākṣān nano ’nantaraṃ vidhivibhaktir notpadyate, tat tasya adhātutvād, dhātoḥ pare tiñādayaḥ pratyayā bhavanti, nānyasmād iti. yogyatayā tu nañarthena tasya sambandhaḥ. na ca tatrāyam artho ’vatiṣṭhate hananavidhir nāstīti. kintu nañupahito vidhir audāsye*³⁴⁵ *puruṣaṃ niyuñkte. tadavacchedakaś ca hantir, anyathā sarvakriyaudāsīnyaṃ pratīyetye alam ativimardena. niṣedhavidher api siddho ’nubandhadvayayogaḥ.* NM_{EP-I}, p. 353.

Alternatively, the negative particle connects with the meaning of the [exhortative] suffix. The meaning of the pure (unqualified) optative and like suffixes is an instigator, and that of it conditioned by the negative particle is dissuader. This is the capacity of speech indeed; who is to be complained in this regard?

As for [the complaint that] the exhortative suffix does not occur directly after the negative particle is due to its (the negative suffix’s) not being a verbal root; [for,] it is after a verbal root, and not something else that the finite verbal endings and

³⁴⁴ The Mysore reading here is “... *śabdaśaktir eva esā vā’paryanuyojoyā iti*” (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 117). But the ‘*vā*’ here does not make sense since the Prābhākara does not name any other candidate who could not be held complained. Rather, since the sense of the passage is that it is the power of speech which accounts for such passage and that cannot be challenged, the ‘*vā*’ seems superfluous. The reading of the *editio princeps* presents the same sense through a rhetorical question – who is to be complained in this regard? Thus, I have followed the reading of the first edition here instead of emending the Mysore reading.

³⁴⁵ The reading of the Mysore edition (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 117) in this regard is *audāsīnye*, which is the same as *audāsye*.

like suffixes³⁴⁶ occur. But its (the exhortative suffix's) connection with the meaning of the negative particle is based on semantic fitness. And in that case, the meaning does not settle down as 'there is no injunction about killing'. Rather the exhortative suffix as conditioned by the negative particle enjoins a person to indifference and the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, becomes the delimiter of it (indifference). Otherwise, indifference would be understood in regard to all actions. No need for destroying [the opponent's objections] too much. [Thus,] the connection of even the prohibitory injunction with the two correlates (scope and eligibility) is established.

To account for the meaning of dissuasion the Prābhākara here proposes the connection of the negative particle with the exhortative suffix in *hanyāt*. Given that the meaning of the exhortative suffix unmixed with anything is that of an instigator, its connection with the negative shade of meaning of the negative particle changes it to a dissuader. But the main thing which comes in the way of such connection of the negative particle with the exhortative suffix is the grammarian's provision for the connection of all kinds of verbal suffixes to verbal roots only. Since optative and like suffixes too are verbal suffixes, they too should connect to verbal roots only. But the Prābhākara says that it is on account of the pragmatic function of the negative particle based on semantic fitness that the negative particle connects to the exhortative suffix, despite formal constraints imposed by the rules of Sanskrit grammar. Thus, this connection should be understood as taking place at the level of pragmatics rather than syntax. It is to be noted here that the ultimate power of dissuasion or instigating negatively rests with the exhortative suffix conditioned by the negative particle.

It was objected earlier that on a connection of the negative particle with the exhortative suffix, the very nature of the injunction would be destroyed and the statement '*na hanyāt*' would mean that 'there is no injunction about killing'. It would thereby imply the existence of an apparent injunction about killing as a result of which killing would have to be accepted as something prescribed by the sacred texts and hence the general prohibition, "One should kill living beings" would not find scope for operation and prohibit the act of killing. However, the Prābhākara seems to imply that this would indeed have been the case if only a referential function of the negative particle were accepted. But when a pragmatic function of the negative particle is taken into account, this problem does not arise.

In the previous proposal of the Prābhākara it was said that based on the pragmatic function of the negative particle, its connection with the verbal root, *han*, does not compromise the sequential nature of the act of killing denoted by the verbal root. On this point, the editor of the Mysore edition, K. S. Varadācārya, just says in his scholium that it is just like motivation, abstention too has the form of an action³⁴⁷. But what exact sequences of micro-

³⁴⁶ By the word '*ādi*' here are probably meant the primary (*kr̥t*) suffixes, like *tavya*, *anīyar*, *kelimar*, *yat*, *nyat*, etc.

³⁴⁷ *pravṛttivan nivṛtter api kriyārūpatvāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 117.

actions are involved in the macro act of abstention has not been explained either by Jayanta's Prābhākara or by Varadācārya. But read in the light of the contention made in this passage it seems that on being conditioned by the negative particle the exhortative suffix enjoins a person to the act of indifference. This indifference may perhaps be thought to be non-activity or abstention from activity. The role played here by the verbal root, *han*, is to delimit the specific act in regard to which such indifference is to be achieved. Thus, in accordance with the prohibitory injunction, *na hanyāt*, one has to be indifferent in regard to the act of killing only and not any act whatsoever. If it were otherwise, then one would be indifferent to any act whatsoever as a result of which the exhortative suffix would lose its essential character of being an instigator. In this way, if one were to abstain from killing, to which he has been already motivated by his hatred for his enemy, he has to make specific efforts in the reverse direction of killing. To explain³⁴⁸: he has to make effort not to allow himself being overpowered by his hatred, not to get hold of an appropriate weapon, not to hold it, not to go out from home, not to travel to his enemy's place, not to strike his enemy, etc. Perhaps all this explains why and how the verbal root, *han*, still maintains a sequential nature, or what it means to be *enjoined* to indifference by the prohibitory injunction. But since unlike in prescription, efforts made in case of prohibitions do not lead to any external physical activity, the mode of abstention described above perhaps ultimately boils down to a sheer mental resolution for not killing.

It is to be noted that both Kumārila and Prabhākara accepted this pragmatic function of the negative particle in case of prohibitions.

Thus, Kumārila says:

*vidhinā yujyate yatra na hanyān na pibed iti/
tatrābhāvārthatā naiva svayaṃ puṃso ruṇaddhi hi//Verse no. 314,
Vākyaādhikaraṇa, ŚV_{DS}, p. 658.*

[In cases such as] “one should not kill”, “one should not drink [liquor]”, where [the negative particle] connects to the exhortative suffix, there [the negative particle] does not signify absence, because it (the negative particle) itself blocks the person [who is about to kill, or drink liquor].

While making sense of the prohibition “one should not eat *kalañja*”, Prabhākara too says in his Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.2.17 –

*atrābhidhīyate. satyaṃ yad āha devānāṃ priyaḥ kintu nāsāv abhakṣavidhiḥ
pratīyate. yato bhakṣayatis tāvād bhakṣaṇam ācaṣṭe. nañ api nivāraṇam nivṛttim
āha. Bṛ_V, pp. 110-11.*

³⁴⁸ It is needless to say, the text does not describe exactly how indifference is an act and how can it retain a sequential nature, which characterises any action. What is provided as explanation is based on my understanding and is thus easily open to challenges.

In this regard it is said. True what the dear of gods (the ignorant one) says, but it (the statement – *na kalañjam bhakṣayet* – “one should not eat *kalañja*”) is not understood as an injunction for non-eating. For, in the first place, [the verbal root,] *bhakṣ* expresses eating. And the negative particle too speaks of dissuasion, that is, abstention (an action).

tasmān na ayam apohnatuṃ śakyate vākyārthaḥ ‘kalañjabhakṣaṇaṃ na kuryād’ iti.
Bṛv, p. 112.

Therefore, this meaning of the sentence, “don’t do the eating of *kalañja*”, cannot be denied.

It is thus on account of its pragmatic function that the negative particle can connect to the exhortative suffix without compromising the instigating power of the latter. And in this case the negative particle dissuades one from a particular act, and does not merely denote, i.e., describe the absence of something.

Having thus demonstrated that even a prohibitory injunction needs nothing more than the eligibility-correlate and the scope-correlate, Jayanta’s Prābhākara concludes:

*evaṃ niyogavyāpāre samāpte phalakaḥkalpanā/
nṛbuddhiprabhavaiva syād ataḥ sāpekṣatā bhavet//
kathaṃ naro nivarteta pratyavāyabhayād vinā/
mā nivartiṣṭa vidhinā tāvad uktaṃ nivartanam//
pravṛddhatararāgāndhaḥ pratyavāye ’pi kalpite/
na nivartata ity evaṃ kiṃ vidher apramānatā//
phalaṃ bhavatu mā vā bhūt puruṣo ’pi pravartatām/
mā pravartiṣṭa vā sve tu nāsty arthe khaṇḍanā vidheḥ//*

*pravartanāvagamajanane hi vidhivyāpāra ity asakṛd uktam. tatra tasya na kiñcid
vaikalyam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 118.

The operation of the commandment having thus ended, postulation of a consequence would have its origin in the human intellect only [and] from this there would be dependence [of the prohibitory injunction on other instruments of knowledge like perception, etc.].

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] Why should a human being abstain [from killing etc. given that] there is no fear for religious demerit?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] May he not abstain; [but] the injunction has communicated [dissuasion]. Does the injunction become unauthoritative if [the person] does not abstain on account of being blinded by excessive desire even when religious demerit has been postulated? May the consequence occur or may it not; may a person undertake [to abide by the prohibition] or not, there is no repudiation

[of the authoritativeness] of the [prohibitory] injunction with regard to its own purpose [of communicating dissuasion].

It has been said more than once that [any] injunction operates for producing an understanding of instigation. In that regard, it does not fail to the least.

Apart from the repetition of the basic position that a prohibitory injunction does not need the postulation of a consequence like downfall into *naraka* for dissuading one from doing prohibited acts like killing, what Jayanta's Prābhākara stresses here is the task of a prohibitory injunction ends with the generation in the addressee of the awareness 'I am dissuaded'. Just like prescriptions, prohibitions too function at the cognitive level of human beings, in so far as they too are instances of the instrument of knowledge called linguistic communication (*śabdapramāṇa*). Since the essential nature of *śabdapramāṇa* is communication, it, and as a matter of that a prohibition, just like a prescription, does not lose its validity or epistemic integrity irrespective of whether or not one abstains from doing the thing in regard to which he has been dissuaded by the prohibition. Jayanta's Prābhākara seems perfectly aware of worldly situations in which a person having been overpowered by rage ignores the warning of the prohibition and proceeds to kill his enemy. But he seems to suggest that even in such cases when the urge for abstention is ignored, the Vedic prohibitory injunction does not lose its essential character of being an instigator; for, the said injunction has already generated the awareness in the person, "I am dissuaded from killing by the injunction." Thus, neither human activity nor inactivity on hearing any Vedic injunction seems to affect the nature of being an instigator of the Vedic injunctions and this is because the Veda instigates by communicating a hitherto unknown piece of knowledge of something to be done or not to be done, and does not push physically like wind, etc.

The aforesaid point made by Jayanta's Prābhākara seems to be an echo of the following argument between Umbeka and his Prābhākara opponent:

atha mataṃ – pratiśedhavidhinā rāgato hanane pravartamānas tato nivartate; sa yadi hananasyāniṣṭaphalatāṃ nāvagacchati, tataḥ kim iti nivartata iti.

uktam eva tadvidhes tāvad iyaṃ avagatir; yadi na nivartate, kim atra kurma iti. yadi ca puruṣeṣv anirvatamāneṣu vidher apramāṇyaṃ bhavati, tataḥ kalpīte 'pi hananasya narakapāte phale 'tivṛddharāgāndho na nivartata eveti vidher aprāmāṇyam aparihāryam eva. tasmān na bhāvārthādhikāreṣu niḥśreyasaphalaṃ nāpi pratiśiddhākāreṣu narakapātaḥ... ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 101.

Now the view [of the Bhāṭṭa]. The prohibitory injunction dissuades [a person, who is] about to kill out of desire [to kill] from that [act of killing]; if he does not understand the result of killing to be maleficent, then would he abstain from it (i.e., killing)?

[Reply by the Prābhākara opponent:] It has already been said, to begin with, that such is the understanding [which follows] from that [prohibitory] injunction; if he does not abstain [from killing] what should we do? If on account of people not abstaining [from the performance of prohibited acts], the invalidity of the [prohibitory] injunction follows, then the invalidity of the [prohibitory] injunction cannot indeed be avoided because of a person's not abstaining [from killing] even on postulating downfall into *naraka* has been as the consequence.

4. Importing or inventing eligibility? The case of the Viśvajit sacrifice

At this point, the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 calls into question Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent's claim that an injunction does not need the result to instigate a person. The basis for this is the presence of such injunctions as '*viśvajitā yajeta*' – "one should sacrifice with the Viśvajit", where no result is mentioned at the linguistic level. Now, since without postulating a result here, the injunction could not proceed, how could the Prābhākara say that an injunction does not need a result? The relevant passage hosting the polemics between the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara opponents in NM 5.2 is as follows:

nanu vidheḥ phalāpekṣā nāsti cet, kiṃ tarhy aśrūyamāṇaphaleṣu viśvajidādiṣu svargādiphalaṃ kalpyate?

anabhiñño devānāṃ priyo – na tatra vidheḥ phalāpekṣā. na ca phalaṃ tatra kalpyate. kintv aśrūyamāṇatvād adhikārānubandhasya, niradhikārasya ca vidher vidhitvānirvahād adhikārānubandhaḥ kalpyate. tatra sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt svargakāmaś codanāśeṣabhāvena niyojyaḥ kalpyate. na ceyam pauruṣī kalpanā, 'śrutyekadeśaḥ sa' iti hi tadvidah.

tad iyam adhikārānubandhakalpanā, na phalakalpaneti so 'yam anubandhadvayāvacchino niyogo vākyārthaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 118.

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] Well, if there be no expectation by the injunction of a result, then why are results like *svarga* postulated in cases such as the Viśvajit and the like, where no result is being heard?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [You are an] unexperienced fool! There is no expectation by the injunction of a result in that regard. No result is postulated there. But since the eligibility-correlate is unheard there and an injunction devoid of the eligibility [- correlate] does not accomplish its being an injunction, it is the eligibility-correlate that is postulated. Because of being non-specific to everyone, a person desirous of *svarga* as [the person] fit to be enjoined is postulated as a supplement³⁴⁹ to the injunction. And this is not human imagination since [those]

³⁴⁹ The expression '*codanāśeṣabhāvena*' translated here as "as a supplement to the injunction" is glossed by Cakradhara in NMGBh (NM_{GS-II}, p. 83) as '*viśvajitā yajeta iti codanāyā ekadeśatvena*' – "as a part of the injunction, "One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit".

adept in it (in the real nature of an injunction) [say that] it is but a part of a Vedic statement (MīSū 4.3.11)³⁵⁰.

Thus, this is a postulation of the eligibility-correlate and not a postulation of result. Hence it is this very commandment qualified by the two correlates that is the sentence-meaning.

As a background to this debate, the consequentialist approach of Śabara and following him that of Kumārila may be taken note of, for it would help us realise better the exact point of departure of Prabhākara and his followers. I will present here only a summarised account of the consequentialist approach without directly quoting texts from either Śabara or Kumārila.

4.1. Śabarasvāmin

MīSū 4.3.10 presents the view of an opponent, according to whom, in case of such injunctions as ‘*viśvajitā yajeta*’ – “one should sacrifice with the Viśvajit”, it is the mere verbal root, denoting the act of sacrifice, which is prescribed. This is because, there is no such word in the said injunction which could express the result and hence in this case the act sacrifice itself is prescribed as the thing to be accomplished and not as the instrument of accomplishing anything else. It could not be argued, according to this opponent, that even though there is no word in the injunction which expresses the result, yet the result could be postulated; for, what the result would be in such cases can only be known from the Vedic injunction and not through a separate instrument of knowledge, viz. postulation. Hence Viśvajit and like sacrifices lack results. Now, commenting on MīSū 4.3.11, Śabara criticises this view and says that the statement about the result would be obtained through implication (*adhyāhāra*) and it is the implication of something to be accomplished. The thing to be accomplished cannot be action itself, since the act of sacrifice does not bring about an action. Rather, it is something other than action which is to be accomplished by the act of sacrifice. It is in regard to this something other than action which is to be accomplished by the act of sacrifice, that the supplying of an understood word is needed. The need for this supplying of the understood word expressing the thing to be accomplished is felt on the authority of the injunction itself. For, it is in this way of supplying the understood word that the injunction would serve its purpose of instigating a person to do something in order to accomplish a purpose of his. To this the opponent objects that such a supplying of the understood word would bring in a human element into the injunction and what would be understood out of it would not be valid in the sense it would no more be of a non-human nature and hence not essentially Vedic. In reply, Śabara says that it is not the supplying of any new word altogether that is intended but the construal of it along with another Vedic text situated elsewhere. The opponent here objects that such cannot be the case because it is only the word which is situated in proximity to

³⁵⁰ What is at stake here is the following: it is a *śrutārthāpatti* and the postulated clause about the *svargakāma* has Vedic status. For *śrutārthāpatti*, see Bijelwan (1973) and for the examination of *śrutārthāpatti* by Jayanta in NM, see Graheli (2020).

another word which can combine with it to form a sentence and give the intended meaning, but not a word which is remotely situated. Śabara challenges this by saying that the basis for combination of words or statements is that such combinations should serve useful purposes, and on this ground even words or statements remotely situated could be said to connect to each other, but not words or statements which although proximately situated fail to serve a useful purpose when combined. Thus, such supplying of understood words cannot turn the Vedic statement into a statement of human in origin. Although such a need for supplying the word has its origin in the human being, and is not found in the Veda, yet this does not cause the Vedic sentence to be of human origin since it is the means of understanding the meaning of the Vedas. When a proximately situated word cannot complete the meaning of given sentence, then even remotely situated words or expressions are construed within the sentence based on its expectancy. Such a construal of even remotely situated words is necessitated by the Vedic injunction itself in the sense that without it the injunction cannot serve a useful purpose, hence, it is but a part of the Vedic injunction itself. If such a supplying were not to be made, then the injunction could not function and hence the situation would lead to the undesirable consequence of the invalidity of Vedic passage. The main point made here is that the act, denoted by the verbal root, itself cannot be the thing to be accomplished and it must be something other than it which needs to be accomplished by the act of sacrifice. As to why the act of sacrifice cannot be itself the thing to be accomplished, this is not explicitly stated by Śabara, although Śabara does categorically say that such injunctions are not devoid of results (*aphala*).

Under MīSū 4.3.13, an opponent says that since there is nothing which can warrant the supplying of the word denoting a particular result at the expense of others in Viśvajit and like cases, all results should be imported. Against this, Śabara argues under MīSū 4.3.14 that since a single result would satisfy the expectation for the result by the injunction, it is but one result which has to be supplied in such cases. This would be also in accordance with the law of parsimony.

Now under MīSū 4.3.15, a very pertinent objection is entertained and replied to. According to the opponent, even though it has been established that in such cases the injunction needs the supplying of only one result for the satisfaction of its expectancy in that regard, yet since there is no rule regulating the choice of a particular result like *svarga*, cattle, sons, etc. any one of them could be supplied. But if this is allowed, then every individual will be at liberty to perform such sacrifices as the Viśvajit for achieving whatever object he desires. This would imply an unfixed causality between the act of sacrifice and the result it leads to. For circumventing this difficulty, Jaimini and following him Śabara argues that it is *svarga* which is to be supplied as the result in such cases. Here *svarga* is glossed by Śabara as *prīti*³⁵¹ or pleasure. All human beings, Śabara says, are ‘*svarga*-desiring persons’

³⁵¹ Although *prīti* is here mentioned as just pleasure, yet under MīSū 6.1.1, Śabara argues at length how *svarga* is not any pleasure whatsoever but supreme pleasure, which is unadulterated by any amount of suffering whatsoever. Moreover, it is argued there only that *svarga* is not any pleasurable substance (*prītimaddravya*) but pleasure itself, so that it is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of any other thing or higher pleasure as in the case of a pleasurable substance.

since it is in the very nature of pleasure to be desired invariably by all human beings. And since the word *svarga* meaning pleasure is general in its scope it cannot be fixed to any particular object of pleasure, desired by only one or a few persons at a time and not by all.

4.2. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Coming to Kumārila, that he reads the above arguments in such a manner as makes them possible to fit into his *Bhāvanā* theory. To explain: Kumārila says in his ṬṬ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.3.11 that a statement expressing duty instigates a person to make efforts. Efforts are accomplished through that which is to be produced. That which is a human end counts as what is to be produced. Therefore, it is the human end which is being produced. Hence, in all forms of Vedic statements, it is the human end which is invariably present – in case of injunctions about auxiliary actions, it is indirectly present and in case of injunctions about main rituals like the New and Full-Moon Sacrifices, etc. it needs to be explicitly indicated. The *Viśvajit* and like sacrifices, in so far as they are not auxiliary are directly the means of achieving human ends. The word *Viśvajit*, which is the name of a sacrifice, figures with the instrumental ending in “One should sacrifice with the *Viśvajit*”. Thus it should be the instrument of the enjoined *bhāvanā*. Now, if the act of sacrifice too is the instrument, then the *Viśvajit* is in apposition with the sacrifice and hence its being the name of the sacrifice is justified. However, if, following the opponent’s proposal in MīSū 4.3.10, the act of sacrifice is understood to be the object to be accomplished, the word *Viśvajit* can no longer be in apposition with the sacrifice; hence it could not be the name of the sacrifice anymore. The *Viśvajit* could not serve as the means of accomplishing the act of sacrifice in so far as it is not a substance due to its not being something already established. For, an already established entity, say a substance, can serve as the instrument for bringing about that which is not yet accomplished and awaits accomplishment (e.g., the act of sacrifice in this case). Thus, it is on the strength of the linguistic force of the exhortative suffix called *śabdabhāvanā* that a word denoting a result has to be supplied. To explain: since according to Kumārila’s *Bhāvanā* theory, the linguistic force of the exhortative suffixes has human activity or *bhāvanā* or *arthabhāvanā* as its object of accomplishment, it is the nature of human effort itself that leads the listener to supply the word denoting the result. This is because, it is the nature of human beings not to make efforts in regard to things which lack an end or result or purpose. A word denoting the result achieved through *bhāvanā* needs to be supplied, because otherwise no human effort would be undertaken and this, in turn, would make the *śabdabhāvanā* fail to achieve its purpose and, this would ultimately lead one to admit that Vedic injunctions are purposeless. As for supplying *svarga* as the result, Kumārila says nothing special and he seems to implicitly subscribe to Śābara’s reasoning in that regard.

What is specially to be noted in the above two accounts is that Śābara simply denied the opponent’s claim of unavailability of result in case of the *Viśvajit* sacrifice and made room for it by way of construing the said injunction with another remotely situated injunction which speaks of *svarga* as the result. But he did not give any explanation whether the result thus spoken of is to be understood as constituting a *puruṣārtha* or human end. It is here that Kumārila seems to fill in the gap left by Śābara as he directly connects the result thus supplied by the Vedic phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ with its being a human end. This is

made possible through the device of his Bhāvanā system, which presupposes an object of accomplishment for the *arthabhāvanā* or human effort, which itself is the object of *śabdabhāvanā* or the linguistic force of an exhortative suffix. It also presupposes that no human effort is made with regard to such acts which lack a result or purpose or human end³⁵². In the light of the above discussion it seems that the opponent in NM 5.2 passage cited above subscribes to a pro-Śabara position since the opponent mentions only the postulation of result but does not specify whether the result is intended there in its capacity as the result or outcome of an action, or in other capacity like the merely qualifying the person fit to be enjoined.

4.3. Prabhākara Mīśra

In order to understand Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent's reply, it is worth seeing what Prabhākara himself had to say on this point in his Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 4.3.11.

[a] *ihādhikārasūnyā vidhaya udāharaṇam. kiṃ teṣām adhikāraikalpanota tāvaty eva paryavasānam iti saṃśayaḥ.*

[a.i] *nanu ca 'saphalam' 'aphalam' ity atra sandeho bhāṣye śrūyate.*

[a.ii] *ucyate – adhikārād ṛte phalaṃ nāstīti svargakāmādhikaraṇe 'tasmāt siddho 'dhikāra' iti vadatā pradarśitam. anyathā hi siddhaṃ svargasya prādhānyam ity upasaṃhāraḥ syāt. Bṛ_{IV}, p. 1029.*

[a] Here [in the topic under discussion] injunctions which are devoid of eligibility are examples. The doubt is whether there should be a postulation of eligibility for them, or they should end up in that much only.

[a.i] [Objection by a pro-Śabara opponent –] Well, the doubt is heard in [Śabara's] commentary to be with regard to [whether the injunction is] 'endowed with a result' or 'devoid of a result'.

[a. ii] [Reply by Prabhākara –] It is said [in reply] – That there is no result without eligibility has been shown [by Śabara] in the *Svargakāmādhikaraṇa* by saying 'therefore, eligibility is established'. For, otherwise, [Śabara's] conclusion would be 'the primacy of *svarga* is established'!

[b] *nanu ca niyoga evādhikārād ṛte na nirvartyate. Bṛ_{IV}, p. 1029.*

³⁵² Cf. Kumārila's statement in the ŚV–

na hi prayojanāpetam vākyam uccāryate kvacit/ prayojanakṣamaṃ nāpi padam ākhyātavarjitam// Verse no. 346, Vākyādhikaraṇa, ŚV_{DS}, pp. 664-665.

For, a sentence lacking in a purpose is not uttered anywhere; nor is a word except a verb capable of [expressing] a purpose.

[b] [Objection by Prabhākara to his opponent –] Well, a commandment indeed is not accomplished without eligibility.

[c] *nanu cādhikārād ṛte' nanuṣṭheyatvān niyogāvagatir bādhyeta. Br̥IV, p. 1030.*

[c] [Objection by Prabhākara to his opponent –] Well, since without eligibility there is no [thing, which is] fit to be performed, the understanding of commandment is blocked.

[d] *atrābhidhīyate – kārakam iva kriyāpekṣaṃ niyogam apy adhikārāpekṣaṃ vadāmaḥ. kutaḥ? loke tathā darśanād devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām iti. na hy anapekṣitaviśeṣaṃ loke vaktāro bhavanti iti devadattaṃ yajñadattaṃ vā 'dhikṛtya līnādayaḥ prayojyāḥ*³⁵³. Br̥IV, p. 1032.

[d] Here it is said [in reply by Prabhākara] – We say commandment to be expecting eligibility just like the causal factor syntactically expects an action. Why [so]? Because, it is so seen in the empirical world as 'Devadatta! Bring the white cow'. For, without expecting specific [addressees] people do not speak; thus, the optative and like [suffixes] are used with reference to Devadatta or Yajñadatta.

[e] *adhikārād hi karṣṭvaṃ sthāsyati na karṣṭvād adhikāraḥ. tasmāc chrutyekadeśaḥ sa ucyate. Br̥IV, p. 1033.*

[e] For, being an agent follows from eligibility, [but] eligibility does not follow from agency. Therefore, [eligibility] is said to be a part of the Vedic injunction.

[f] *atrocyate – vaidikam eva adhyāhariṣyāma iti. etad uktaṃ bhavati. na kārakatayā 'dhyāhriyate. kathaṃ tarhi? adhikārimukhenaiveti. kārakatayā hi phalasambandho laukiko bhavati pramāṇantarāpekṣatvād... ato 'srūyamāṇādadhikārāṇy api sādadhikārāṇīti siddham. Br̥IV, pp. 1033-1034.*

[f] In reply, it is said (by Prabhākara –) We can only supply a Vedic expression. This has already been said. This supplying is not by virtue of being a causal factor. How then? It is by way of the eligible performer [that this supplying is made] For, [if it were supplied] by virtue of being a causal factor, a connection with the result would be worldly in so far as it would depend on other instruments of knowledge... Hence, it is established that even [those Vedic injunctive statements] of which eligibility is not heard, [are] endowed with eligibility.

³⁵³ While explaining Jayanta's Prabhākara's claim that without there being an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) an injunction cannot execute its function of instigation, Cakradhara, who is meticulous in tracing Jayanta's sources, cites this *Bṛhatī* passage. This probably indicates that this portion of Jayanta's text is based on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* itself.

[g] *iha tu sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt svargakāmasya evādhikāro ’trāvagamya-
sāmānyakalpanāyāṃ hi viśeṣāvagamahetvabhāvāt. tad idam uktaṃ – “sa svargaḥ
syāt sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvād” iti.* Br_{IV}, pp. 1035-1036.

[g] But here [in case of the Vedic injunction, “One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit], one understands that the only eligible performer is the one who desires *svarga*, since [*svarga*] is [desirable] for all, without distinction. For, there is no reason why a specific thing should be understood with regard to something postulated in general terms. Thus, it has been said [by Jaimini] – “it (the object of desire) should be *svarga*, since [*svarga*] is [desirable] for all, without distinction.

Prabhākara is keenly aware of the loophole left by Śabara, which is taken advantage of by Kumārila to read Śabara’s lines as favouring his theory of Bhāvanā, through which ultimately Kumārila brought in the concept of *puruṣārtha* by equating it with *phala*. Prabhākara too took advantage of this gap in favour of his theory and viewed *phala* as being dependent upon eligibility. This is because eligibility means the right and responsibility to do something to which he is entitled and in regard to which he is instigated by the Vedic injunctions. *Phala* or result is mentioned, according to this interpretation, not by virtue of its being a result (*na phalatayā*) but by virtue of its being the qualifier of the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣatayā*). This also means that the basis for using (*pravṛttnimitta*) the words *svargakāma* etc. is not the *phala* through its property of being a result, but through its property of being the qualifier of the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣatva*). Prabhākara seems to be perfectly conscious of the consequence of not connecting *phala* to *adhikāra* for he says that if it were *phala* which were really intended by Śabara, then it would establish the pre-eminence of *phala* or result and hence *phala* would be the central element in a linguistic cognition and hence the sentence-meaning.

Now a pertinent question may be asked: if phrases like ‘*svargakāma*’ are needed to be supplied ultimately for the purpose of obtaining the *adhikārin*, why should not one avoid phrases ending in *kāma* or desire, which inevitably calls for the specification of the object of desire? Because, this makes room for the doubt as to whether or not *phala* as *phala* is intended there or *phala* as *niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*. A straightforward answer to this question is not available in the *Brhatī*. However, it may be said that since such supplying of phrases is needed in cases of Viśvajit and like sacrifices, which are ultimately elective sacrifices, the obligation to perform which is not as binding as that of the fixed sacrifices, it is but justified that phrases ending in ‘desire’ are postulated as the qualifier of the person to be enjoined. But this answer is in accordance merely with the general Mīmāṃsā way of classifying ritual actions; for, except for the presence of phrases like ‘*svargakāma*’, ‘*paśukāma*’, etc. which are interpreted as indicating their elective nature, those injunctions themselves do not declare their nature of being elective rituals (*kāmyakarman*). Another answer is sought to be given by Śālikanātha in the *Rjuvimalā* in the context of dealing with what is to be postulated as the object of desire in Viśvajit and like cases to obtain the eligible performer. Śālikanātha says:

yady apy antaraṅgatayā 'vaśyambhāvitayā ca jīvanam evādhikārivišeṣaṇam yuktam, tathāpi prayuktigauravaprasaṅgāt puruṣāṇām ca kāmavṛṇāṇaprapṛṭṭitvād arthitaivādhikārivišeṣaṇam. tatra ca viśeṣo na gṛhyata iti sarvārthinām adhikāra iti. R̥Vi, in BṛIV, p. 1035.

Although [one's being] alive indeed is fit for [being] the qualifier of the eligible person on account of its being internal [to one's being] and also for being unavoidable, yet since that would lead to the undesirable consequence of performance becoming cumbersome and also because the activity of human beings is inclined towards the objects of desire, it is 'being a seeker [of some object of desire]' alone which is the qualifier of the eligible performer. And in that regard (i.e., in case 'being a seeker' is inserted as the eligible performer) no specific [object of desire] is grasped; hence seekers of everything would be eligible.

Thus, although by accepting 'one's being alive' as the qualifier of the eligible performer, one could avoid the fault mentioned above, yet, as even Śālikanātha admits, a human being's effort is naturally inclined towards the object of his desire. But since one cannot accomplish one's being 'alive' through efforts, it cannot be desired, and hence cannot serve as the qualifier of the person to be enjoined in an elective act. For, the very sense of its being an elective sacrifice implies that something is to be accomplished and it cannot be logically anything other than that which the enjoined person desires. Thus, contrary to the claim of Jayanta's Prābhākara, it cannot be established that *svarga* in the phrase '*svargakāma*' only supplies the result *qua* the qualifier of the eligible performer and in this sense, it is at par with 'being alive' in case of fixed rituals. Jayanta criticises this claim of his Prābhākara opponent by saying that without postulating that *svarga* is the object to be accomplished even the mere state of being the qualifier of the person cannot be achieved.³⁵⁴ Nor even can it be said that such a phrase as 'a seeker', without any further specification, should be inserted in order to obtain the eligible performer. Because, in that case it would not specify the object of desire which one seeks to accomplish through the act. Given that objects of desire are multifarious and an object of X's desire cannot be expected to necessarily form the object of Y or Z's desire, lack of specification of the object of desire would result in the seeker of anything becoming the eligible performer. But this is an undesirable consequence since that would defeat the very restrictions concerning eligibility found in the Vedic sacred texts.

The next important point that Prābhākara makes is that without postulating *adhikāra* or eligibility, *niyoga* or commandment is not accomplished. A related point made is that without eligibility one does not perform the act in regard to which enjoinderment takes place and hence the very cognition of the commandment is invalidated. To explain: *niyoga* or commandment is of the nature of *kārya* or something-to-be done. Now, when the cognition of 'something is to be done' arises, it is invariably accompanied by the understanding of what precisely is to be done and by whom it is to be done. For, duty is always specifically

³⁵⁴ *adhikārānubandhābhidhāne puruṣaviśeṣaṇamātram etad bhavatu; kiṃ sādhyatvakalpanayā? viśeṣaṇatvam evānyathā naiva nirvahaṭīti ced, āyātaṃ tarhi phalasya sādhyatvam. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 124.*

about something and for someone. In other words, it is only the person for whom a specific act is a duty who is entitled to do it and no one else. Thus, in the absence of a word or phrase expressing the eligible performer, the cognition of ‘something to be done’ does not attain its full form and without knowing who is it who is enjoined by the injunction to do the sacrifice, one abstains from undertaking the said act. This, in turn, puts at stake the very nature of the injunction since it consists of instigating a person to do a specific act. It may be thought of as a process of appropriation of the duty by the person who is eligible to perform the act and this gives rise to the cognition in the person having the form ‘This is to be done by me’. It is for this reason that the very cognition of something to be done remains vague in the absence of the understanding of the eligible performer and such lack of eligibility due to vagueness ultimately contributes to the command’s getting blocked and invalidated.

In continuation of his point about a commandment or injunction not being able to accomplish its purpose of instigation, Prabhākara compares the need for eligibility by *niyoga* or commandment to that of action by the causal factors of action. Given that causal factors are already accomplished and stand in no further need of accomplishment, they serve the purpose of bringing about an action which is as yet unaccomplished. Just as despite the presence of causal factors a given sentence is not complete without the presence of a speech-unit expressing the action, so is *niyoga* or commandment not complete without eligibility. This is illustrated with an empirical example by Prabhākara. Even in case of empirical commands like – “Devadatta! Bring the cow” – without specifying who is it that is put in charge of executing the duty of bringing a cow, the exhortative suffixes cannot be used. Thus, the very use of exhortative suffixes presupposes the existence of an eligible performer who is entitled to do the work. This principle also holds true for all Vedic command utterances as well.

As mentioned earlier, Yoshimizu has rightly noted that Prabhākara himself nowhere speaks of *adhikāra* or eligibility as an *anubandha* or correlate in addition to *viṣaya* or scope. Nor does Prabhākara’s celebrated commentator, Śālikanātha accept *adhikāra* as an additional *anubandha* anywhere in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. As Yoshimizu has noted, Śālikanātha does mention ‘two correlates’ (*anubandhadvaya*) in his *R̥juvimalā* on *Bṛhatī* ad *MīSū* 6.1.1³⁵⁵. However, it is the view of the opponent. Nevertheless, Śālikanātha mentions *adhikāra* as an *anubandha* in addition to *viṣaya* in explaining the *Bṛhatī* passage noted above [d]. Śālikanātha says:

yathā kārakasya kriyayā sahānvitābhīdhānaṃ, tathā niyogasyāpi na kevalaṃ viṣayeṇa sahānvitābhīdhānam. api tu niyojyapadenāpi ubhayānubandhavyatirekeṇānvīta eva abhīdhātum na śakyate. yathā kriyaikenāpi kāraṇānvitā ’bhīdhīyate dvābhyāṃ bahubhir api tatheha nāsti. Sarvathā ’nubandhadvayānvīto ’bhīdheyo nānyathā ity adhikāryanubandhāśravaṇe aparipūrṇatvād adhyāhāro yuktaḥ. R̥Vi, in BṛIV, p. 1032.

³⁵⁵ Yoshimizu (2021b:107 fn. 49).

Just as there is connected denotation of a causal factor with the action, so is also commandment not denoted in connection with the scope alone. But rather, [in connection] with the speech-unit [denoting] the person to be enjoined too. Without both the correlates indeed the connected [meaning of the injunction] cannot be denoted. Unlike action connected with one causal factor can be denoted and also as connected with two or many [causal factors], it is not so here [in the case of the commandment]. At all times [the sentence-meaning as] connected with the two correlates is fit to be denoted and not otherwise. Hence, in the event of non-hearing of the correlate of the eligible performer, the supplying [of the word denoting the eligible performer] is logical on account of incompleteness.

Śālikanātha seems to have been prompted by the indispensability of eligibility argued for by Prabhākara in the above passages to accept the additional correlate of the eligible performer, even if this would not be warranted by Prabhākara's own lines in the *Brhati*³⁵⁶. And unlike in the *Rjvimalā* ad *Br* ad *ŚāBhā* ad *MīSū* 6.1.1, here *adhikāra* is declared as an *anubandha* not in the context of presenting an opponent's view, but that of the proponent (*siddhāntin*). An analysis of Śālikanātha's difference with Prabhākara's thought being beyond the scope of this chapter, it may be briefly noted that Śālikanātha seems to adduce the reason of connected denotation for supplying the understood word denoting the eligible performer.³⁵⁷ It may be safely asserted in the light of Prabhākara's comment above, that such connected denotation is based on the deontic function of exhortative suffixes. In spite of the fact that Umbeka's Prabhākara opponent repeatedly mentions in *ŚVTāCo* and *ŚVTāAu* the requirement of an injunction of the person to be instigated or enjoined (*prerya / niyojya*) and the scope of the enjoinder (*viṣaya*) for successfully executing its task of instigation, he never calls them *anubandha*-s; although, he does stress the indispensability of both of them again and again and also underlines his contention that an injunction does not need anything beyond them and any postulation of a result over and above these two has its origin in the human intellect only. Now since Jayanta very closely follows Umbeka's presentation of the Prabhākara position in *NM* 5.2 it might have been

³⁵⁶ Given the huge gap in the availability of Prabhākara's works, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that Prabhākara did not accept *adhikāra* as an additional *anubandha*.

³⁵⁷ Cf. *nanv adhikāra eva tatra tatra na śrūyate katham tannibandhanā kalpanety atrāha – aśrūte'py adhikāro vidyata ity uktam tatraiva. Tenāśrūte 'py adhikāre 'nvitābhīdhānabalena klpte paścāt tannibandhanā phalakalpanā* (R̥Vi, in *Br̥V*, p. 13) – "(Objection by Bādari and like opponents –) Well, at times, no eligibility is mentioned, hence eligibility itself is not heard; [then] how should there be postulation [of the result] based on that? In regard to that [Prabhākara says –] **"It has been said that even though unheard, eligibility does exist"** this has been said in that very source (from which I have been quoting before). For that reason, even though eligibility is unheard [still] once eligibility is postulated on the basis of connected denotation, postulation of the result based on it (such an eligibility established on the ground of connected denotation) [takes place] subsequently." The similarity of arguments and the allusion to *Brhati* 4.3.1 might allow us to assert that whether *adhikāra* is an additional *anubandha* or not cannot be determined merely on the basis of its being mentioned as such but should be understood in terms of the indispensable role it plays in defending the essential nature of the injunction which is nothing other than instigation.

the case that Jayanta himself formalised them for the sake of clarity as the two *anubandhas* or correlates of any injunction keeping in mind their indispensability underscored not only by Umbeka's Prabhākara opponent but also by Prabhākara himself, as has already been noted above. It might further be the case that Śālikanātha followed Jayanta's formalisation in his *R̥juvimalā* without acknowledging the latter for the sake of clarity. But in the absence of more definitive evidence, this can remain a hypothesis for the moment.

The final point that Prabhākara makes about such supplying is that if the supplying of the understood word were done such that it would denote agency, it would have an empirical connection with result and would be dependent on other instruments of knowledge than Vedic sacred texts. Prabhākara's commentator, Śālikanātha does explain why and how exactly such an empirical connection with result would occur. However, in an attempt to explain it I may say the following: if there were no *adhikāra* or eligibility but only *karṭṛtva* or agency, then even a member of the Śūdra caste could perform the Vedic sacrifices. Since agency needs only efforts, and whether one can make efforts or not can be known from perception only, i.e., from an instrument of knowledge other than Vedic sacred texts, the role of the Vedic injunctions would be useless. On the other hand, if eligibility is stipulated by the Vedic injunction, then its character of being a communicator of something unknown through other instruments of knowledge is retained; for eligibility is not known from empirical instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, etc. Rather, resorting to empirical instruments of knowledge in this regard, one would only end up in a multitude of alternatives as to the question of eligibility since there are innumerable objects of desire. By contrast, if the phrase '*svargakāma*' is imported from another Vedic injunction, it would retain the Vedic and hence non-human character of the injunction, "One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit", and also help avoid the vagueness. Since *svarga* is known to be unsurpassed bliss only from the Vedic sacred texts and being so it is naturally and uniformly desirable by all, it would not lead to the confusion created by the multitude of options regarding the object of desire. Moreover, no more could a Śūdra step in; for, along with the visible specific condition of being a '*svarga*-desiring person', the general conditions of eligibility like 'being a seeker' (*arthitva*), 'being fit' (*samartha*), 'having a knowledge of the details of the ritual to be performed' (*vidvat*)³⁵⁸ and 'not excluded by the Vedic sacred texts' (*śāstreṇa aparyudasta*) would apply. Thus, once eligibility is established agency can follow. A further point to be noted in this connection is that if the Vedic injunction had only implied an agent (*karṭṛ*) rather than an eligible performer (*adhikārin*), then perhaps the instigating function of a Vedic injunction would be at stake. Because, an agent counts as an agent only in so far as it participates in the process of bringing about the unaccomplished action. So, if after hearing the injunction one did not make efforts towards the prescribed action, the instigating nature of the injunction would be compromised. Thus, an injunction does not merely *describe* the agent of sacrifice, but *instigates* him to carry out his responsibility of performing the action provided he has the requisite eligibility.

³⁵⁸ This general condition is again based on his study of the Vedas, to which only the first three castes, viz. Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya are entitled.

From the foregoing analysis of the passages from Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, it transpires that Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent closely follows Prabhākara in laying bare the rationale for supplying a word denoting the eligible performer in Viśvajit and like cases. Jayanta's Prābhākara does not detail how such supplying could still retain the Vedic and hence non-human character of the injunction under review except for its somewhat passing reference to MīSū 4.3.11. In the absence of a counter-evidence it may be conjectured that he would generally subscribe to Prabhākara's arguments in this regard. What is however markedly different in Jayanta's Prābhākara's presentation is the explicit mention of *adhikāra* as an additional *anubandha*. This stands in sharp contradistinction to Prabhākara, who despite underscoring the indispensability of *adhikāra* for a successful functioning of injunctions, has not explicitly identified it as an *anubandha* in addition to *viśaya* or scope.

4.4. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta

It will not be out of place here to mention here what Jayanta has to say about this point albeit not in the context of any elective sacrifice, but that of the fixed sacrifice. This passage may also be considered as a refutation of Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent's view that since there is no mention of result in injunctions concerning fixed rituals, fixed rituals do not have any result. The relevant passage is as follows:

nanu kāmādhikāre svargaḥ śrūyate nityādhikāre tv asau na śrūyate 'śrūyamāṇaḥ kasyānurodhena kalpyate.

vidher eveti brūmaḥ. svargeṇa śrutenāpi kiṃ kariṣyati yady asau vidhinā nāpekṣyate. "ghṛtakulyā asya bhavanti" ityādivad aśrūto 'pi cāsau vidhinākṛṣyata eva. tasmād vidhir atra pramāṇam na śravaṇāśravaṇe iti kāmīyavan nitye 'pi phalam abhyupagantavyam na vā kvacid api. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

[Objection:] Well, in case of elective rituals, *svarga* is heard (directly mentioned in the Vedic injunction), but it is not heard in case of fixed rituals. Being unheard on what basis is it postulated?

[Reply:] We say – [it is postulated] on the basis of the injunction only. What would one do with *svarga*, even when heard, if it is not expected by the injunction? Just like [cases such as “one who studies the Ṛgveda] for him flow streams of clarified butter”, an injunction attracts (supplies) it (a result) even if it is unheard. Thus, it is the injunction which is the basis in this regard (postulation of result in case of fixed rituals) and not the fact of [the result] being heard or unheard. Hence, a result has to be postulated either for both fixed and elective rituals or for none.

The objection is from Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent who questions the basis for Jayanta's postulating a result in case of fixed rituals, where unlike in elective rituals, no word expressing the result is heard but only that signifying the occasion (*nimitta*) for the performance of the fixed ritual. Jayanta's answer is that the mere fact of the result being heard, i.e., mentioned, or not heard cannot be adduced as a proof for an injunction's

requirement or non-requirement of result respectively. But it is the very need of an injunction which prompts it to attract, as it were, a result distantly situated. Such a view is, of course, consistent with Jayanta's own view that an injunction cannot instigate a rational person without communicating that the act prescribed is a means of accomplishing an end desired by the person. In this respect Jayanta is following his Bhāṭṭa opponent, who too accepts results in case of fixed rituals. Thus, for Jayanta, it is the injunction, or the need of the injunction to instigate a rational person, which requires a result even in case of fixed rituals. A mere non-mention of the result cannot justify the claim that fixed rituals do not need any result, for it will be too naïve. If an injunction needs result, it should need it everywhere – whether the ritual is of the fixed type or elective type. This is perhaps because even an injunction prescribing the performance of a fixed ritual is an injunction which cannot give up, consistent with Jayanta's view, its essential nature of instigating a rational human being, who would not act without the said act leading to a desired goal of his. It is keeping in view this basic nature of any injunction that Jayanta makes the bold assertion that either a result should be postulated in case of the fixed rituals too or it should not be postulated anywhere, i.e., not even in regard to the elective rituals.

5. *Niyoga*: the principal element in a linguistic cognition

Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent sums up the whole discussion and concludes as follows:

[a] *vākyārthatvaṃ cāsya pradhānatvād. anyo hi yajyādir artho 'vagamyamānas tadanupraveśena pratīyate guṇo bhavati. niyogas tu svamahimākṣiptadrṣtopakārānekakāarakakalāpopabṛṃhitasvarūpaḥ pratīyata iti prādhānyam avalambate.*

[b] *kāryaṃ cet pradhānam ucyate niyoga eva kāryam.*

[c] *phalaṃ cet pradhānam ucyate, tad api na siddham, api tu sādhyam. sādhyatvaṃ cāsya niyogādhīnam iti niyoga eva pradhānam.*

[d] *puruṣas tu niyojyamānatvād apradhānam iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 119.

[a] And its (commandment's) being the sentence-meaning is due to its being the principal [element]. Other meanings like that of the verbal root, *yaj*, etc. that are cognised become subordinate on account of entering into (connecting with) it (commandment). A commandment is cognised as but having a nature amplified by a group of many an actions and action-factors. [Such a group of many an actions and action-factors,] which renders visible assistance [to the injunction], is implied by its (the commandment's) own capacity. Hence it (the commandment) is the principal element.

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] [What] if [we say that] it is 'something to be done' which is the principal element?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] In reply it is said – it is the commandment indeed which is to be done!

[Objection by Jayanta:] [What if we] say that it is the result which is the principal element?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] That (result) too is not accomplished, but something yet to be accomplished. However, its being something to be accomplished is dependent upon the commandment. So, it is the commandment which is the principal element. The person, on account of being someone to be enjoined, is subordinate.

From the above, it appears that *niyoga* or commandment is here presented with reference to its position in the linguistic cognition arising upon hearing Vedic injunctive statements. It has already been noted that a linguistic cognition is always hierarchical in nature, where one constitutive semantic element features as the principal one and all others subordinate to and qualifiers of it. Since on hearing a Vedic injunction, one understands ‘I am enjoined’, this is the primary and inevitable understanding and hence fit to form the principal constitutive element of the consequent linguistic cognition. It has already been seen that for a successful execution of its task, a *niyoga*, according to Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent, needs the two correlates of ‘eligibility’ and ‘scope’. But what should the position of these two correlates be in the resultant linguistic cognition? The Prābhākara says that the meaning of the verbal root, which meets the expectancy for ‘what it is that one is commanded to’, gets connected to *niyoga* as a subordinate element. I think this holds true also for the correlate of eligibility. Although *niyoga* or the awareness of ‘something to be done’ is not sufficient enough to cause the instigation, and needs the two correlates, yet the correlates have no purpose independent of delimiting and hence clarifying the awareness of the commandment. Hence it is based on this dependence of the two correlates which specify the commandment that they feature as qualifiers of and subordinate to the principal element, i.e., the commandment.

Since *niyoga* cannot be fulfilled without a delimitation of its scope (*viṣaya*) by the meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvartha*), the *dhātvartha* contributes to the clarification of the initial vague notion of commandment or ‘something to be done’. Now, this meaning of the verbal root represents the ritual act to be performed. Since an action is a sum total of many sequentially arranged micro-actions, which are performed by their respective causal factors (*kāraka*-s), the *niyoga* or commandment may be ultimately said to comprise of a collection of these micro-actions and their respective causal factors. These micro-actions serve specific visible needs to complete the main action, which they constitute. Since these micro-actions assist the main action, which in turn, helps specify the scope of the commandment, these micro-actions and their respective causal factors may be said to amplify the nature of the commandment. Such amplification is to be understood, in my opinion, as the further clarification and specification of the commandment in respect of the procedural details of the action prescribed. But even after such amplification, since *niyoga* remains the nucleus of the linguistic cognition it continues in its role of the principal element.

In [b] an objection is raised which speaks of *kārya* or the notion of ‘something to be done’ as the principal element. Jayanta’s Prābhākara’s reply is that it is but *niyoga* or commandment which is *kārya* or ‘something to be done’. Cakradhara does not comment on this view. But keeping in mind all the opponents in NM 5.2, it may be conjectured that this is the view of a Bādari-like opponent, according to whom it is the sheer sense of duty which instigates a person to carry out a Vedic command. But this does not entail any eligibility since in so far as eligibility means the right to enjoy the result it would be a luring effort made on the part of the injunction to make one act³⁵⁹. This would ultimately compromise the independence of the Vedic sacred texts in instigating human beings. Although the Prābhākara view in Nm 5.2 seems very close to this view in the sense that it too holds that it is one’s awareness of being commanded or enjoined which prompts one to undertake an action, yet it is different from it on a very vital point. For, the Prābhākara needs an *adhikārin* or eligible performer for the injunction to successfully instigate. And such an *adhikārin* or eligible performer is distinct from and the basis of the *kartr̥* or the agent.

In [c], the Prābhākara encounters an objection, which probably comes from Jayanta himself. According to it, since a rational person does not undertake any action which does not lead to a desired result, it is *phala* or the result which should be considered to be the principal element. It could also be a Śabara-like view, for, as has already been noted in the *Bṛhatī* passage [a.ii] above, Prābhākara, apprehensive of Śabara’s position of the result *qua* result being needed in case of Viśvajit and like sacrifices, seeks to take advantage of the gap left by Śabara and interprets it as referring to result *qua* the qualifier of eligibility. Following Cakradhara,³⁶⁰ Jayanta’s Prābhākara’s reply may be understood as follows: if the result were of an accomplished nature, one would not have strived for it and performed the sacrifice. Because it is as yet unaccomplished, it could be the object to be accomplished. However, its being something to be accomplished is dependent upon *niyoga* or commandment. To explain: for *niyoga* or commandment to be realised, there is need of the scope (*viśaya*) and the eligible performer (*adhikārin*). Now, in order to obtain an *adhikārin* in case of elective rituals one has to refer to such phrases as ‘*svargakāma*’ – ‘the *svarga*-desiring person’. Just as in case of fixed rituals, one’s sense of obligation is activated by the awareness of his being alive, so in case of elective rituals it is activated by one’s having a desire for *svarga*. When the desire for *svarga* is needed for activating this sense of obligation, it logically follows that *svarga* is the object of desire and hence the object to be accomplished. But although the accomplishment of *svarga* may be a requirement of the person who is instigated, it is not a requirement of *niyoga* or the commandment or the injunction itself. Rather the injunction needs it only for specifically identifying the person who is entitled to perform the act of sacrifice and providing a basis for the activation of his sense of duty. In other words, the injunction needs the result only

³⁵⁹ For a detailed description of this view, see Appendix I.

³⁶⁰ *na hi siddham phalam uddiśya kaścit pravartate, yac coddīśya pravartate, tat pradhānam sādhyam cet tarhi tatsādhyatā niyogādhinā svargakāmasya hi niyogaḥ. svargasya hi sādhyatām anāpādayannananuṣṭheya eva syāt.* NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 84.

for the sake of obtaining the correlate of eligibility, without which, just like the correlate of scope, it remains too vague and hence cannot be realised. This goes to prove that *svarga*'s 'being the object to be accomplished' (*sādhyatva*) is ultimately dependent upon *niyoga* or commandment and hence it cannot be the principal element of a linguistic cognition arising upon the hearing of Vedic injunctions.

In [d], the Prābhākara deals with the last possible option of the person being the candidate. It seems to be an allusion to MīSū 3.1.5, according to which result is subordinate to the person in so far as results like *svarga* cannot be accomplished for their own sake but only for the sake of getting enjoyed by the person who performs the sacrifice³⁶¹. But the Prābhākara opponent here says that since a person is enjoined by a commandment to the performance of an act, his status cannot be reckoned independently of the injunction. Rather, his status depends on the word signifying the eligible performer (*adhikārin*), which specifies who is entitled to the performance of the prescribed act.

³⁶¹ Jayanta briefly deals with this view in the context of engaging with his Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent. See NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 80.

Chapter III

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Injunctions

Introduction

Statements expressing Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's view on injunctions and what constitutes the instigating factor can be found scattered throughout the second half of the fifth chapter of his *Nyāyamañjarī*. This is because he expresses his view of *phalavākyaarthavāda* (lit. 'The Theory of Sentence-Meaning being a result or purpose')³⁶² mainly while responding to and criticizing the views of his opponents in general and the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin and Niyogavākyaarthavādin opponents in particular. The present chapter aims at reconstructing Jayanta's view on this and allied topics by extracting and interpreting the points he has made mainly in course of denying the views of his opponents. Since an explication of the views of these opponents demands separate treatment, I will refer to or explain these views only in so far as they help contextualise Jayanta's own view. Part I of this chapter will contain an analysis of Jayanta's view on injunctions as expressed in course of his polemical engagement with the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin in NM 5.2. Part II will host an analysis of Jayanta's views on the issue that is found scattered throughout his dialectical engagement with mainly the Prābhākara and other opponents.

Part I

1. Jayanta vs. Kriyāvākyaarthavādin

1.1. *Phala*: the nature of its centrality

The Kriyāvākyaarthavādin³⁶³ opponent in NM 5.2 claims the centrality of *kriyā* or action as contributing to its being the sentence meaning. He says:

³⁶² This is the label that I use for Jayanta's view of sentence-meaning since according to him it is *phala* or result (also identified with purpose) is the principal element of a sentential cognition on account of being something to be accomplished. Jayanta himself calls this opponent's view '*kriyāvākyaarthapakṣa*' (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 83).

³⁶³ Relying on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* on *Śābarabhāṣya* ad MīSū 6.1.1 and Śālikanātha ṚVi thereon, I have identified this Kriyāvākyaarthavādin opponent as Bādari and some Vaiyākaraṇas. Who these Vaiyākaraṇas are is difficult to say at this point of research. The identity of the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin is crucial here because unlike him, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā philosophers accept *svarga* occurring in the phrase '*svargakāma*' (lit. one desirous of *svarga*) as qualifying the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*) to the sacrifice and not a mere agent (*kartr*). The Kriyāvākyaarthavādin is of the view that the phrase '*svargakāma*' refers merely to the agent and it has no connection with any result accruing from the enjoined act. On this view, the act of sacrifice (*yāga*), just like result (*phala*) and a person (*puruṣa*), is not subservient (*śeṣa*) to anything, and

“Since it is yet to be accomplished, the object to be accomplished is understood as the principal element and hence it is the sentence-meaning and it is none other than action.”³⁶⁴

Linguistic cognition (*śābdabodha*) consists of the meaning of individual word-meanings³⁶⁵ arranged in a relation of the principal and the subordinate (*guṇapradhānabhāva*). It is that semantic element of a linguistic cognition which does not serve the purpose of anything else that is considered the principal element. It is on this ground that the said principal element is also called the ‘*sādhya*’ or the object to be accomplished, towards which all other subordinate elements of a sentence are directed. Behind this, lies the assumption that a sentence-meaning is a combination of elements that are already accomplished and that which is yet to be accomplished. Things that are already accomplished are factors which contribute to the accomplishment of that which is as yet unaccomplished³⁶⁶. Jayanta, along with all his opponents who subscribe to the view that sentence-meaning is something real and external, try to identify and argue in favour of that which is the principal one because it is object to be accomplished. It is this relation of being the principal and the subordinate which is used as the main argumentative technique and thumb-rule for determining what constitutes sentence-meaning. Thus, by the expression ‘what constitutes sentence-meaning’ is to be understood the ‘principal semantic element’. For, it is this principal element which is aimed at by all other semantic elements that are subordinate to the former.

Now, given that the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin has sought to identify *kriyā* or action to be the principal element of a sentence, Jayanta pertinently asks:

hence it cannot be understood as the means of achieving the result. It is similar to Prabhākara’s view in so far as it holds that it is solely out of a sense of duty (*kartavyatābuddhi*) which arises on hearing a Vedic injunction that a person undertakes the performance of a prescribed Vedic ritual action. However, Prabhākara and his followers admit the role of *svarga* in identifying the eligible qualifier (*adhikārin*) and hence activating the sense of duty which ultimately prompts one to undertake the prescribed action. But no such role is admitted by Bādari and the Vaiyākaraṇas mentioned above; they rather hold that since eligibility (*adhikāra*) consists of the ownership of result (*phalāsvāmya*) and Vedic injunctions, according to them, lead to no result like *svarga*, *svarga* in ‘*svargakāma*’ cannot act as the qualifier of the eligible performer (*adhikāriśeṣaṇa*). Hence, according to Bādari and his followers, the word ‘*svargakāma*’ does not refer to an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) but only an agent (*kartṛ*). For more on this, see Appendix II.

³⁶⁴ *sādhyañca sādhyamānatvāt pradhānamavagamyate/
tasmāt tad eva vākyaṛthaḥ kriyāto nāparaṃ ca tat//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 74.

³⁶⁵ This is explained in accordance with the ‘divisibility thesis’ (*khaṇḍapakṣa*) pertaining to sentence-compositionality, which, in a nutshell, admits words and word-meanings which constitute sentence and sentence-meaning respectively to be real. For an overview of the ‘divisibility thesis’, see Sen (2005:51-81)

³⁶⁶ *siddhasādhyasamuccāraṇe kasya kiṃtantrateti cintāyāṃ sādhyasiddhaye siddham upāttam iti pratīyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 74.

“Why do accept that action is the principal element? [Is it] from [the standpoint] of the state of affairs? Or, [from the standpoint of] the uniqueness of linguistic cognition?”³⁶⁷

Immediately hereafter, Jayanta asserts the centrality of the *phala* or result in sentence-meaning. He says:

“It is on account of state of affairs that the result is understood as the principal element. A rational person does not perform any action which lacks a result. Whether it is due to the Vedas, or a command of the teacher or a royal decree, people, who do not see a result, do not execute an action. Even this young student acts upon the teacher’s command in order only to avoid getting slapped or for obtaining sweets, etc.”³⁶⁸

Thus, it is clear that Jayanta’s view of the centrality of *phala* or result is based on the state of affairs and this is exemplified by the action of a rational person, who never does anything which lacks a result. In other words, if an action fails to serve the purpose³⁶⁹ of a human being a person does not undertake the said action even if it is commanded by a supreme authority like a king. This purpose can be served by the action either by getting the person some positive result or by helping him avoid a dire consequence. The centrality of *phala* holds true for both worldly actions and those based on Vedic command utterances.

1.2. Objection by the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin to the centrality of *phala*

In sharp contrast to Jayanta’s claim, the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin asserts that the centrality of *kriyā* or action is based on the authority of the Vedic sacred texts and it is owing to one’s conviction in the authority of linguistic communication in the form of sacred texts that one performs a Vedic ritual action. He adds that if on being enjoined by the sacred text to

³⁶⁷ *kuta idaṃ kriyāyāḥ prādhānyam upeyate. vastuvṛttena vā śabdapratyayamahimnā vā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

³⁶⁸ *phalasya vastutas tāvat prādhānyam avagamyate/
na sacetāḥ kriyāṃ kāñcid anuṣṭhati niṣphalām//
vedād guruniyogād vā śāsanād vā mahībhujah/
na vai phalam apaśyantaḥ kriyāṃ vidadhate janāḥ//
bālo māṇavako ’py eṣa capeṭāmātrahānaye/
modakādyāptaye vā ’pi karoti guruśāsanam//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

³⁶⁹ It is to be noted that towards the end of the fifth chapter, Jayanta identifies *phala* with *artha* and *prayojana*, thus indicating that it is not any passive result which ensues from any action, but it is the consequence of a purposeful action carried out by a rational human being.

execute an action, a person does not do it, he transgresses the commandment. It is on account of recognising the authority of sacred texts that one performs an action³⁷⁰.

The Kriyāvākyaarthavādin adds that the centrality of *kriyā* or action is based on the authority of linguistic communication. He illustrates this by citing the example of a compound word, ‘*rājapurusa*’, meaning ‘the king’s employee’. To explain: although in terms of reality, it is the king who is principal, and his employee is subordinate, yet since in a *tatpuruṣa* type of compound, the meaning of the latter component of the compound is deemed the predominant semantic element, linguistic communication expresses that it is the employee and not the king which is the principal element³⁷¹.

The Kriyāvākyaarthavādin continues:

“Likewise, here also in ‘one should sacrifice’, ‘one should make a ritual donation’, ‘one should offer oblation’, it is the action which is principally instructed by linguistic communication. Even [the expression] ‘one desirous of *svarga*’³⁷² is an instruction for the agent in regard to the action. In terms of reality, an action being done, if a result occurs on account of the nature of the act, let it be so. Let even the person delight in the result, but the language is not about an instruction on the result. And [Śabara] says³⁷³: ‘that [act] being done it [the result] occurs by itself alone.’ What is the meaning of ‘by itself alone’? [It means that] linguistic does not express the dependence of the action on result.^{374,375}

The foregoing statement by the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin implies the autonomy of linguistic communication in the form of Vedic sacred texts in instigating human beings and it is

³⁷⁰ *kimarthaṃ punar asau kriyām anuṣṭhātī cet, śāstraprāmāṇyād eveti brūmaḥ. śabdena hi coditas tvayedam kartavyam iti. sa cen niyukto nānuṣṭhātan codanām atikrāmet. śāstrapratyayāc ca kriyām anuṣṭhātī.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 75.

³⁷¹ *athocyate – na vastutaḥ prādhānyam ihāśrīyate ’pi tu śabdataḥ. ... tad yathā rājapurusa iti. vastuvṛtte rājā jagatām īsitā pradhānam puruṣas tapasvī tadicchānuvartanena jīvati. śabdā tu puruṣaprādhānyam ācaṣṭe uttarapadapradhānatvāt tatpuruṣasyeti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

³⁷² This phrase is part of the much-referred-to Vedic injunction, ‘*svargakāmo yajeta*’ – “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”.

³⁷³ ŚāBhā 3.1.3; MDĀ_{IV}, p. 17.

³⁷⁴ Compare the following lines from ŚāBhā on MīSū 3.1.3 – *tasmīns tu kṛte svayam eva tad bhavati. tasmin kṛte phalam asya bhavatīty etāvad gamyate. nāsti śabdo yāgena kriyate phalam iti.* MDĀ_{IV}, p. 17.

³⁷⁵ *evam ihāpi yajeta dadyāj juhuyād iti kriyām prādhānyenopadiśati śabdaḥ. svargakāma ity api kriyām prati kartur upadeśaḥ. vastuvṛttena tu karmaṇi kriyamāṇe karmasvābhāvvyāt phalaṃ ced bhavati bhavatu tat. puruṣo ’pi prīyatām nāma phalena na tu śabdaḥ phalopadeśaniṣṭhaḥ. āha ca tasmīns tu kṛte svayam eva tad bhavatīti. svayam eveti ko ’rthaḥ? na śabdaḥ phalapāratantryam kriyāyāḥ pratipādayatīti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

owing to this autonomy that the centrality of action is to be understood. According to him, result may occur on account of the very nature of an act. Thus, he thinks that it is not the result which is purposefully brought about, but the action. Hence, it is an action which one accomplished directly through one's efforts. In so far as an action is as yet unaccomplished, and for which it needs to be accomplished, that it is the principal thing taught by linguistic communication. The claim of the autonomy of linguistic communication in conveying the centrality of action alone also underlines the supremacy and uniqueness of the former state of affairs in conveying what the principal element in sentence-meaning is.

It is to be noted here that Jayanta presents a polarisation regarding the ground for accepting the centrality of result (*phala*) or action (*kriyā*). However, Kumārila shows while reiterating (*anuvāda*) the view of the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin how *kriyā* or action is the central element on both grounds of state of affairs (*vastu*) and linguistic communication. Kumārila says:

śabdavastubhyāṃ ca pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ. katham? yajeteti pratyayo yasyaiva paraḥ śrūyate tasya śrutyā kartavyatām āha. api cāniṣpannatvād yāgasya bhāvvyatvam. yac ca bhāvyaṃ tatkartavyatām pratipadyate. yan niṣpannaṃ tatkaraṇatvaṃ pratipattuṃ śaknoti dātrādi. anena prakāreṇa bhāvvyamāno yāgo, na svargaḥ. †† ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.1.1, in MDĀ_v, p. 176.

The opponent's thesis is [presented] on account of [the authority of] linguistic communication [in the form of the sacred texts] and [also] state of affairs. That, after which the suffix in *yajeta* is heard, is communicated directly [by the suffix] to be something to be done. Moreover, on account of being unaccomplished as yet, the act of sacrifice is something to be brought about. And that which is to be brought about is understood to be the thing to be done. That which is already accomplished like an axe, etc. [in regard to the act of cutting] is fit to be understood as the means. In this way, it is the act of sacrifice which is to be brought about, [but] not *svarga*.

Jayanta might have invented this dichotomy in order to save his theory of the centrality of result from falling into the pitfalls of linguistic analysis. Moreover, if he would have accepted that action is the principal element also in terms of the state of affairs, it would be difficult for him to distinguish his own view from that of his Kriyāvākyaarthavādin opponent in very broad terms. It is in the same vein, perhaps, that he held towards the end of his discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning that result which is the central element of any linguistic cognition (*śābdabodha*) and also that which instigates rational human beings to act, is understood not only from words, but also by a reference to the context and even through reflection.

1.3. Jayanta's counter-objection

Jayanta contests this view by observing that if action were done not for the sake of the result but merely based on the instigation of the Vedic sacred texts, then it would be hard to establish the syntactical connection of the phrase 'one desirous of *svarga*' within the Vedic prescription, "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice"³⁷⁶. In contrast to the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin's claim that the said phrase refers to the agent, and the agent serves the purpose of action and not the other way round³⁷⁷, Jayanta says that what the said phrase refers to is the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) of an action³⁷⁸. This is so because nowhere is a person understood as a *svarga*-desiring person by birth, on account of which he could be enjoined as the agent to the action³⁷⁹. To explain: one is born as a human being and not as 'a *svarga*-desiring person'; thus being a '*svarga*-desiring person' (*svargakāmatva*) is not an integral part of a person's essence that is present in him congenitally. It refers to a particular state of a person, on account of which he becomes fit to be enjoined as the agent. '*Svargakāma*' means one who has a desire for *svarga* or he who desires *svarga*. In both cases, it is a person, who is qualified by the desire for *svarga*, who is understood from that phrase³⁸⁰.

It is to be noted that Jayanta's argument here is reminiscent of the following passage from the auto-commentary on verse no. 25 from Maṇḍana's BhāVi –

nanu puruṣaviśeṣaṇam eva na sambhavati. ayogānyayogātyantāyogānām anyatamasyāpi vyavacchedāsambhavāt. jātyā ca tasyābhāvāt. BhāVi_{GI}, p. 38.

[Objection by Bhāvanāvādin:] Well, it is indeed not possible for [*svarga* in the phrase "one desirous of *svarga*"] to be the qualifier of the person. This is because there is absence of either [of the three functions of a qualifier, namely] the exclusion of non-connection, exclusion of connection with something else and exclusion of absolute non-connection. And because there is absence of him [who could be known to be a '*svarga*-desiring person'] by birth.

The original context in BhāVi is as follows: right after Maṇḍana's opponent had established that there is no activity called *bhāvanā* over and above the meaning of the

³⁷⁶ *tad etad ayuktam – evaṃ varṇyamāne svargakāmo yajeteti svargakāmapadasya anvayo durupapādaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 77.*

³⁷⁷ *nanu kartṛpadam etat. kartā ca kriyārtho na kartrarthā kriyā. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 77.*

³⁷⁸ *na kartṛpadam svargakāmeti kintv adhikāripadam etat. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 77.*

³⁷⁹ *na hi jātyaiva kaścit svargakāmo nāma kutracit puruṣo 'vagamyate yo 'tra kartṛtvena niyujyeta. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 77.*

³⁸⁰ *svarge kāmo yasyāsau svargakāmaḥ, svargaṃ vā kāmāyate svargakāmaḥ. ubhayathā 'pi svargakāmanāviśiṣṭaḥ puruṣas tasmāt padād avagamyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 77.*

verbal root (*dhātvartha*) and the verbal root, for this opponent, denoted no action (*kriyā*) which is distinct from the qualities of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*), he contends that the Bhāvanāvādin’s understanding of the Vedic injunction “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice” as “one should bring about *svarga* by means of sacrifice” is incorrect and it originates from the Bhāvanāvādin’s fancy only. The opponent³⁸¹ is of the opinion that from the said Vedic injunction it is only understood that a specific kind of person is enjoined to the act of sacrifice, and when it is carried out, results like *svarga*, etc. may occur on their own or due to some reason whatsoever, but not owing to any causal relation with sacrifice. Alternatively, according to this opponent, in the absence of some other plausible reason, a result may not occur at all. At this point, Maṇḍana challenges the contention of the opponent that the word ‘*svargakāma*’ does not refer to a specific kind of person. According to Maṇḍana, this cannot be the case because: i) *svarga* cannot be the qualifier of the person (*puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*) on the ground of not being able to perform any of the three tasks of a qualifier³⁸² and ii) there being no one who is known to be a ‘*svarga*-desiring person’ by birth. Commenting on the second ground, Umbeka observes in his commentary on this BhāVi passage that there is by birth indeed no one ‘who desires *svarga*’ (*svarga*) unlike a brāhmaṇa, on which score he could be a specific person fit to be enjoined to the act of sacrifice³⁸³. Nārāyaṇa, another commentator of BhāVi, is of the opinion that an application of the word ‘*svargakāma*’ to a person is occasioned by his connection with desire for *svarga* and that there is no universal property (*jāti*) of ‘being a *svarga*-desiring person’ (*svargakāmatva*)³⁸⁴.

Now Jayanta asks:

“How does *svarga*, which is being desired, connect with the action of sacrifice? Is it by means of seen assistance or unseen assistance?”³⁸⁵

Both these options of direct and indirect assistance rendered by *svarga* are refuted by Jayanta at length. To begin with, the opponent says that if *svarga* meant sandalwood, sixteen-year-old damsels, etc. then on account of the use of the word *svarga* in apposition with substances like sandalwood, damsel, etc. it would denote substances. According to

³⁸¹ It is perhaps on account of holding *svarga* to be the qualifier of the person that Nārāyaṇa, one of the commentators on BhāVi, calls this opponent ‘Puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvavādin’ in his commentary, *Viṣamagranthibhedikā*. See BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 71.

³⁸² For an explanation of how the word *svarga* cannot function as a qualifier of the person, see V. P. Bhatta’s note in Bhatta (1994:147-149).

³⁸³ *na ca jātyaiva brāhmaṇavat svargakāma yena puruṣaviśeṣaḥ syād...* BhāVi_{GJ}, p. 39.

³⁸⁴ *kāmanāyoganimitta (ttā) śabdasya puruṣeṣu vṛttih. na svargakāmatvaṃ nāma jātir astīty arthaḥ.* BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 71.

³⁸⁵ *tad atra kāmyamānaḥ svargaḥ kathaṃ yāgakriyayā sambadhyate. drṣṭenādrṣṭena vā upakāreṇa.* p. 77, NM, Vol. 2, Mysore edn.

the rule enunciated under MĪSū 6.1.1, since a substance connects with action while being subservient to the latter, it may be said that *svarga*, just like curd³⁸⁶, etc. should render assistance to action³⁸⁷. In the same vein, a desire for such *svarga* should also be considered as rendering assistance to action in so far it forms a part of the procurement of substances and it is due to such desire that a person makes efforts to bring in the proper substances required for carrying out the action³⁸⁸. Jayanta's reply to this is as follows:

“[Jayanta:] This [view] lacks essence, since the word *svarga* does not denote [any] substance. For, this word, *svarga*, expresses pleasure, and not substance. That very sandalwood [which is pleasurable to one who is afflicted by heat] is not *svarga* (pleasurable) for a person who is afflicted by cold, or someone who has not been struck by [the heat of] summer. That very damsel is not said to be *svarga* once desire for sexual pleasure ceases. In this way, the word *svarga* does not deviate with regard to pleasure [itself], but does deviate with regard to [a pleasurable] substance. Thus, since it is not a substance, *svarga* cannot be subordinate to action.

[Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin:] Now, since it is otherwise impossible to explain the cognition of supreme pleasure, a place having a mountain, whose peak is made of gold, etc. is postulated to be *svarga*.

[Jayanta:] [In that case,] it cannot be subordinate to action even more. This is because [in that case,] it would not be possible [for a person] to fetch [such an imaginary pleasurable place], unlike curd, etc. [for rendering assistance to action].”³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ This is an allusion to the Vedic injunction, “*dadhnā juhōti*” – “one should offer oblation by means of curd”, where the word ‘*dadhi*’ (curd) on account of being a substance functions as a factor (*sādhana*) of the act of oblation, and due to its rendering assistance to the action of oblation, it becomes the instrument of accomplishing the said act. This is also suggested by the occurrence of the instrumental ending ‘*ṭā*’ after the nominal stem, *dadhi*.

³⁸⁷ *yadi hi candanaṃ svargaḥ ṣoḍaśavarṣadeśīyā aṅganāḥ svarga itī candanāṅganādidravyasāmānādhikaraṇyaprayogād dravyavacanaḥ svargaśabdāḥ, tadā dravyāṅgāṃ karmasaṃyoge guṇatvenābhisambandha itī dadhyādivat sādhanatvena svarga upakaroti kriyāyāḥ.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 77.

³⁸⁸ *kāmanā ’pi dravyāharaṅgātīvād upakāriṇī, yat tayā dravyam ānetuṃ yatata itī dṛṣṭopakāritvam.* NM_{Mys-II}, pp. 77-78.

³⁸⁹ *tac caītat asāram – svargaśabdasya dravyavācītvābhāvāt. prītivacano hy eṣa svargaśabdo, na dravyavacanaḥ. tad eva candanaṃ sītātūreṇa, agrīṣmopahatena vā na svarga itī vyapadiśyate. sā eva aṅganā viratāyāṃ suratatṛiṣi na svarga ity ucyate. tad evam eṣa svargaśabdaḥ prītiṃ na vyabhicarati, dravyaṃ tu vyabhicarati. evam adravyatvāt svargasya na kriyāṅgatvam.*

athāpi niratiśayasukhapratītyanyathānupattitaḥ parikalpitaḥ kanakagiriśikharādir deśaḥ svargaḥ.

As for the other option of *svarga* rendering unseen assistance, Jayanta’s opponent says that just as in case of the prescription, “meditate mentally on the sea”³⁹⁰, desire for *svarga* renders unseen assistance to the act of sacrifice³⁹¹. Jayanta dismisses this as being nothing but a forced imagination³⁹². This is because, according to Jayanta, *svarga* is supreme pleasure, and such pleasure cannot be dependent on something else, but rather everything else aims at such pleasure³⁹³. From this follows that it is not the act of sacrifice whose purpose is served by *svarga* but it is the other way round³⁹⁴. In this way, since the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ does not instruct on any such thing as would serve as an action-factor, it cannot construe into the injunction, “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, as the word referring to the agent³⁹⁵.

The crucial point that emerges from the above discussion is that for being an action-factor it is necessary for *svarga* in the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ to render any kind of assistance – either seen or unseen – the sacrifice. It is then only that *svarga* can connect subserviently with the act of sacrifice. For that reason, the phrase could be expressive of the agent, whose duty is it to bring about the act of sacrifice without any additional urging for result. Starting from Śābara, it has been the strategy of all who oppose this opponent’s view to establish that *svarga* is not denotative of any substance and hence it cannot be subservient to the sacrifice. This is because even as a pleasurable substance its nature of being pleasurable varies from person to person or from situation to situation. On the contrary, if *svarga* is held to be referring to supreme pleasure itself, its nature would not vary in any way. Since such pleasure, by its very nature, is fit to be desired by everyone, it is for it that everyone should strive and hence it should be the goal to be achieved and therefore, the principal element. In that case, it could connect with the prescribed act of sacrifice as the object to be accomplished by the latter, owing to which a means-end relation can obtain between

sutarām tasya na kriyāsādhanatvam avakalpate, dadhyādīvad upādātum aśakyatvāt. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78. This is an almost verbatim reuse of parts of Śābara’s commentary on MīSū 6.1.1-2.

³⁹⁰ For details, see TāBrā 7.7.9. The word ‘*manasā*’ is not present there; instead, we find the word ‘*antar*’ mentioned in its place. Of course, ‘*antar*’ can be understood as both ‘in between’ and ‘internally’ and hence ‘mentally’ by extension.

³⁹¹ *athāpi adṛṣṭena dvāreṇa ‘samudraṃ manasā dhyāyed’ itivat svargakāmanā tatra upakāriṇī.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

³⁹² *tad api kliṣṭakalpanāmātram.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

³⁹³ *prīṭir hi niratiśayā svargaḥ. prīṭeś cānanyārthatvaṃ yuktam. prītyartham anyan, nānyārthā prīṭiḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

³⁹⁴ *tasmān na yāgāya svargo ’api tu svargāya yāgaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

³⁹⁵ *ithaṃ ca kriyāsādhanānupadeśān na kartṛsamarpakatvena svargakāmapadaṃ samanveti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

sacrifice and *svarga*. This would ultimately pave the way for a meaningful construal of the phrase *svargakāma* into the Vedic injunction.

It is interesting to note that the alternative concerning unseen assistance is found mentioned in ŚāBhā on MĪSū 6.1.1³⁹⁶, although Śābara does not illustrate such unseen assistance. Kumārila too does not elaborate upon it in his ṬṬ on the said ŚāBhā passage. However, in Prabhākara's Bṛ, which attributes the entire *pūrvapakṣa* to Bādari [Bā.] and some Vaiyākaraṇas, not only is an elaboration on the point found but the example of mental meditation on sea mentioned by Jayanta is also found. The relevant passage from Bṛ giving the opponent's defence of his own position against the criticism of Prabhākara [Pra.] is given below:

[Bā.] *kartavyatāvagamād eva karmānuṣṭhānaṃ na punaḥ phalasambandhāt. phalasambandhe hi pramāṇāntarāvagamyatā prāpnoti. tataś cānapekṣatvād iti sthito hetur uddhṛto bhavati, sāpekṣatvaprasaṅgāt. ataḥ karma kartavyaṃ kartṛbhir ity anadhikāraḥ.*

Performance of action follows from the understanding of duty alone, but not due to [the action's] connection with the result. For, in case of [any] connection [of the action] with the result [were to be accepted], understanding from some other instrument of knowledge would follow. For that reason, the firm basis [for the Veda's being an instrument of knowledge in the form of] 'being independent' [of other instruments of knowledge] would be uprooted. This is because of the undesirable consequence of dependence [on another instrument of knowledge showing the connection of sacrifice with result]. Therefore, actions are to be done by agents; hence there is [no scope for postulating] eligibility [which entails ownership of the result].

[Pra.] *ucyate. nāyaṃ pūrvapakṣaḥ śreyān svargakāmapadaṃ hy asmin pakṣe yathā na saṃbadhyate tathopariṣṭād vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.*

In reply it is said – such view of the opponent is not good; for, we will later explain the manner how on this view the phrase 'one desirous of *svarga*' does not syntactically connect [with sacrifice].

[Bā.] *yady evaṃ kathaṃ tarhi saṃśayaḥ - kiṃ dhātvarthaḥ sādhyatayopadiśyata uta kāma iti.*

³⁹⁶ *tena svargēcchayā guṇabhūtayā svargadravyaṃ prati yatiṣyate yāgaṃ sādhyatim. athāpy adṛṣṭena tathā 'pi na doṣaḥ* (MDĀ_v, p. 179) – “Therefore, by means of the desire for *svarga* which is subservient to [the act of] sacrifice, [a person] would make efforts to accomplish the substance that is *svarga*. Now if it were [done] through in an unseen way, it would not be a fault.”

If it were like this, why should there be [the following] doubt – is it the meaning of the verbal root which is taught to be the thing which is to be accomplished, or is it desire³⁹⁷?

[Pra.] *nanu ca dhātvarthe sādhye kāmāpadam anyathā na sambadhyata ity uktam.*

Well, in case the meaning of the verbal root is what is to be accomplished, the word [ending in] desire does not [syntactically] connect in any other way³⁹⁸.

[Bā.] *na na sambadhyate 'ṅgatayā ca samudraṃ manasā dhyāyed itivat kāmanam kartavyam prāpnoti.*

It is not that it does not [syntactically] connect [with sacrifice]. In terms of being subordinate, desire [for *svarga*] becomes the duty, just as in “one should meditate mentally on the sea”.

[Pra.] *nanv evaṃ saty ubhayoḥ kartavyatā uktā bhavati.*

Well, if it is so, then both of them (desiring *svarga* and sacrifice) would be said to be duties.

[Bā.] *na, satyam uktā guṇapradhānabhāvas tv atra cintyate.*

No. It's true that [both are] said [to be duties]. But, in this regard, the relation of the principal and the subordinate is being reflected upon.

[Pra.] *katham tarhi siddhārthatayā svargakāmaśabdasya pūrvapakṣaḥ. [pūrvapakṣo 'pi sādhyārthatayā eva]³⁹⁹ katham tarhi bhūtam bhavyāyopadiśyata iti bravīti.*

How then, the opponent's view [hold water in so far as] the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ [is described by him] in terms of being something already accomplished⁴⁰⁰? [The opponent's view too should be that desire for *svarga* is

³⁹⁷ Due to its connection with the verbal ending, the meaning of the verbal root seems fit to be the object to be accomplished, and due to its connection with desire, *svarga* seems to be fit to be the object of desire. This gives the scope for the said doubt.

³⁹⁸ “Any other way” is glossed by Śālikanātha in the *Ṛjuvimalā* on this passage as “*kartyviśeṣaṇatvena*” – “in terms of being the qualifier of the agent”. BrṚVi in BrV, p. 17.

³⁹⁹ This is the editor's addition based on the *Ṛjuvimalā*, which has been suitably accommodated into the English translation of the passage that is presented.

⁴⁰⁰ This is because, the opponent thinks *svarga* to be denotative of substances like sandalwood, etc. and substances are already accomplished entities by their very nature.

something to be accomplished]⁴⁰¹. How then does [Śabara, the commentator] say [in ŚāBhā ad MīSū 3.4.40] – “that which is already existent is instructed with regard to that which is yet to come into being”?

[Bā.] *nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, bhūtam eva hy atropadiśyate. na cet pramāṇāntaraprāptam upādānasiddhyartham kriyate. upadeśe tu bhūtam eva. ...*

This is no fault. It is indeed something which is already established that is instructed in this case⁴⁰². If⁴⁰³ it were not something which has already been obtained through some other instrument of knowledge [than linguistic communication] it is done for the sake of accomplishing integration⁴⁰⁴. But, [due to its position within] the instruction [without having any exhortative element attached to it which could express its being something to be accomplished] that it (the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’) is something already accomplished indeed⁴⁰⁵.

[Pra.] *evaṃ sthite viśaye pūrvapakṣavādī bhūtaṃ bhavyāyeti pūrvapakṣitavān śābdoktābhiś ca yuktibhiḥ. Bṛ. v, pp. 16-18.*

The doubt being thus established, the opponent has, through linguistic reasoning, put forward his view that [even on his view the principle of] that which is already existent is [instructed with regard to] that which is yet to come into being.”

⁴⁰¹ This gives scope for the doubt whether the thing to be brought about is the act of sacrifice or the desire for *svarga*.

⁴⁰² Śālikanātha does not explain in R̥Vi how is it that according to the opponent it is indeed something already accomplished which is instructed. A probable explanation could be that the word ‘*svargakāma*’ does not have any exhortative linguistic element attached to it and this perhaps give the opponent the scope for interpreting it as something already accomplished. Thus, it seems to be on mere formal linguistic grounds that the opponent makes his theory consistent with the rule of the existent being for the sake of that which is yet to come into being. I am grateful to Mm. Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī for suggesting this probable explanation to me.

⁴⁰³ This line presupposes an implicit clarificatory question from Prabhākara that if it were indeed something already established, how could it be instructed as something which is to be done (*kartavya*).

⁴⁰⁴ On *upādāna* or integration, see Section 5.3 in Yoshimizu (2021).

⁴⁰⁵ Summarily speaking, desire for *svarga* is something already accomplished due only to there being no speech unit (e.g., any exhortative ending) attached to the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ which could express that it is to be brought about, and hence duty. On the other hand, it is something to be done (*kartavya*) in so far as desiring *svarga*, just like meditating mentally on sea, is not known from any other instrument of knowledge than the Vedic injunction, and an injunction can communicate only a novel element in terms of its being something to be done, i.e., not yet accomplished.

It is to be noted here that nowhere in these passages does Prabhākara⁴⁰⁶ directly mention the opponent's view of desiring *svarga* as a subordinate duty of sacrifice as serving an unseen purpose (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*). However, since the opponent likens it to the prescription for meditating on the sea by the Prastotr̥ while chanting the *prastāva* of the *rathantara*, which evidently has no visible purpose, it is implicit that the opponent's proposal for desiring *svarga* too should have an unseen purpose to serve. Jayanta's credit lies in clearly spelling this out as an illustration of the alternative concerning unseen assistance rendered to action by *svarga* or a desire for it. It is further to be noted in this connection that Pārthasārathi Mīśra has mentioned this alternative option not in his *Tantrarātna* commentary on ṬṬ, but in the chapter dealing with the problem of construal of the phrase *svargakāma* in his independent treatise called ŚāDī⁴⁰⁷. But, here too, Pārthasārathi does not mention it to be serving an unseen purpose, although Pārthasārathi's commentator, Somanātha does gloss it in the *Mayūkhmālikā* as having an unseen purpose to serve⁴⁰⁸.

Following Śābara and Kumārila, Jayanta says that *svarga* is supreme pleasure. Now being supreme pleasure *svarga* is not dependent on anything else and it has nothing to

⁴⁰⁶ Prabhākara does not seem to refute this opponent's view directly, but he refutes the opponent's view of the impossibility of the phrase '*svargakāma*' referring to an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) at a larger scale. Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the complex array of arguments Prabhākara produces, I abstain from discussing his solution, and reserve it for a future paper.

⁴⁰⁷ See the following two passages from ŚāDī –

(i) *tad ayam arthaḥ - svargaṃ sādhanatvena kāmāyamānā [em. kāmāyamāno] yajeta, svargena yāgaṃ kuryād ity arthaḥ. yad vā svargakāmanaiva samudramanodhyānavad guṇabhūtakartr̥viśeṣaṇaṃ satī yāgāṅgam upadiśyata iti dvedhā pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ -*

Then, this is the meaning – He who desires *svarga* in terms [of its] being the means, should sacrifice, which means, [one should] do sacrifice by means of *svarga*. Alternatively, indeed the desire for *svarga*, which while being the qualifier of the agent in a secondary way, is prescribed as a subsidiary of sacrifice just like the meditation on the sea. Therefore, the opponent's view is two-fold. ŚāDī, p. 445.

(ii) *svargaśabdaś candanādiṣu prayogād dravyavacanam iti na sādhanatvāsambhavaḥ... athavā svargādikāmanaiva yāgāṅgam iti sarvathā yāga eva bhāvīyo na tenānyat phalam. asati ca phale 'dhikārābhāvād anārambhaṅgyam adhikāralakṣaṇam.*

Due to [its] application to sandalwood, etc. the word *svarga* is denotative of substances; hence its (*svarga*'s) being a means is not impossible... Alternatively, the very desire for *svarga* is subordinate to sacrifice; hence in all ways, sacrifice alone is the thing to be brought about; no other result is [brought about] by means of it (sacrifice). In the absence of the result since there is an absence of eligibility, [the sixth] chapter [of Jaimini's MīSū dealing with the question of] eligibility is not fit to be commenced. ŚāDī, pp. 445-446.

⁴⁰⁸ *svargakāmanāyā guṇatvena vidhāne samudramanodhyānādivad adr̥ṣṭārthatvāpatteḥ...* "If the desire for *svarga* is prescribed as being subordinate, there would be the problem of [such desire] having an unseen purpose [to serve] like the meditation on the sea..." ŚāDī_{May}, p. 445.

accomplish. Rather, everything else is for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, *svarga* is not subordinate to the sacrifice, but rather the action of sacrifice is for the sake of accomplishing *svarga*. In this way, since linguistic communication does not teach the means of bringing about the action, the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’, is not construed as the term referring to the agent of the action⁴⁰⁹. Thus, once it has been established by Jayanta that the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’, cannot refer to the agent of the sacrifice because the word ‘*svarga*’ means supreme pleasure, which aim at nothing anything else but at which everything else aim, action cannot be held to be the object to be accomplished. Hence, it does not follow that it is action which is the principal element of sentence-meaning.

1.4. Jayanta on the meaning of the term ‘*svargakāma*’ and its construal

Next, the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin opponent in NM 5.2 asks, if the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ is not construed as the term referring to the agent, how should it then be construed. In reply, Jayanta says that it should be understood as denoting the eligible person (*adhikārin*)⁴¹⁰. Now a series of clarificatory questions and Jayanta’s responses thereto follows, which is worth quoting at length:

“[Kriyāvākyaarthavādin:] What is meant by an eligible performer?

[Jayanta:] The owner of the action. The word ‘eligible’ denotes lordship.

[Kriyāvākyaarthavādin:] Well, it is the agent alone who owns the action; no one else.

[Jayanta:] It should not be so. One is an agent in so far as he is already an owner, and not an owner on account of being the agent.

[Kriyāvākyaarthavādin:] Well, what other relation can there be between the action and the person other than the action-action-factor relation⁴¹¹?

⁴⁰⁹ *prītir hi niratiśayā svargaḥ. prīteś cānanyārthatvaṃ yuktam. prītyartham anyan nānyārthā prītiḥ. tasmān na yāgāya svargo 'pi tu svargāya yāga. itthañca kriyāsādhanānupadeśān na kartṛsamarpakatvena svargakāmapadaṃ samanveti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

⁴¹⁰ *kathaṃ tarhy asya anvayaḥ. adhikārivācitra ity brūmaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 78.

⁴¹¹ The Kriyāvākyaarthavādin, who might have been a Vaiyākaraṇa (see fn. 2), seems to be thinking here in terms of the grammatical notions of action (*kriyā*) and action-factors (*kāraka*) which bring about the same. The *kāraka* or action-factor relevant to this discussion is the agent (*kartṛ*) who is also the subject of the sentence. Probably the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin is forced to think in this way because Sanskrit grammar does not provide for a separate category called *adhikārin* or eligible performer. Further, since he is one for whom Vedic language is the supreme authority (*śabdapramāṇaka*), the understanding of the action-action-factor relationship follows directly from the linguistic level of the Vedic injunction. Hence there is no need for him to deny this understanding coming directly from the linguistic level in favour of the owner-owned relationship, the understanding of which, as implied by him, is far-fetched and remote. For the meaning of

[Jayanta:] In reply it is said – it is on understanding the owner-owned relation in the form of ‘this is my duty, I am the owner in this regard’, that one understands the latter relation of the action and action-factor.”⁴¹²

Following Prabal Kumar Sen (2013:49), it may be said in explanation of the above lines that: the person who is eligible for enjoying the result of an action, and who is capable of performing it is the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) of that action. One cannot be called an eligible performer if he undertakes an action merely on the basis of a desire for it and his capability to perform it. Only a person born in the *kṣatriya* caste is eligible to do the Rājasūya sacrifice. But a person born in the *brāhmaṇa* caste cannot get the result of that sacrifice if he undertakes that action. By contrast, if a *kṣatriya* person is desirous of performing that sacrifice, and has the capability to do so, then upon performing it he will enjoy its result stipulated by the sacred text⁴¹³. So on this view, eligibility is not coterminous with agency, but it is the basis of the latter⁴¹⁴. While agency requires only desire and volition and hence is dependent on the person, eligibility involves the right to enjoy something which comes from an extraneous source. The extraneity in this regard is to be understood in terms of being existent independently of human effort.

Although Jayanta says here that eligibility consists of the ‘ownership of the action’ (*karmaṇaḥ svāmī*), yet, if ownership of action is not dependent on or derived from an ownership of the result, then ownership of action would be tantamount to the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin’s notion of the agent (*karṭṛ*). As a result, the problem of *svargakāma*’s not being able to be construed into the injunction could not be done away with. Consequently, eligibility as separate from agency could not be established. Therefore, ownership of action must be based on the ownership of the result.

the word ‘*śabdapramāṇaka*’ in the context of the discussion on Kriyāvākyaarthavāda in NM 5.2, see Appendix I.

⁴¹² *ko ’yam adhikāri nāma.*

karmaṇaḥ svāmī. īśvaravacano hy adhikṛtaśabdaḥ.

nanu kartaiva karmaṇaḥ svāmī, nānyaḥ.

maivam. svāmī san kartā na kartā san svāmīti.

nanu kriyākāraśambandhavyatiriktaḥ ko ’nyaḥ karmaṇaḥ puruṣasya ca sambandhaḥ.

ucyate. mamedam kartavyam aham atra svāmīti svasvāmībhāvam avagatya pāścātyaḥ kriyākāraśambandho ’vagamyate. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 78-79.

⁴¹³ *jini oi karmar phal bhog karibar yogya, ebaṃ jini oi karmar anuṣṭhāne samartha, tini oi karme adhikārī. kebal mātra anuṣṭhāne sāmārthya o anuṣṭhāner icchā baśataḥ keha karme pravṛtta hailei tāhāke adhikārī balā jāy nā. rājasūya yage kṣatriyeri adhikār. kono brāhmaṇ oi yāger anuṣṭhān karite pravṛtta haile tini oi karmar phal pāiben nā. kintu kṣatriya yadi oi yāg anuṣṭhāne icchuk han, ebaṃ tāhār sāmārthya thāke, tāhā haile tini oi yāg anuṣṭhān karile śāstranirdiṣṭa phal bhog kariben.*

⁴¹⁴ This also probably implies a normative basis of human agency not only in the context of Vedic ritual exegesis, but also day-to-day human activities.

On a comparative note, it may be said that in later Mīmāṃsā texts such as *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa* it is described as the ‘ownership of the result’ (*phalāsvāmya*) and this ‘ownership of the result’ is further glossed as ‘being the enjoyer of the result produced by action’ (*karmajanyaphalabhokṛtva*)⁴¹⁵. Neo-Mīmāṃsaka-s such as Khaṇḍadeva define eligibility (*adhikāra*) as the agency which shares the same locus as property of being the enjoyer of the result⁴¹⁶. Khaṇḍadeva explains that in case of ritual actions like *śrāddha* dedicated to the deceased ancestors, it is the ancestors who enjoy the result of the ritual action called Piṇḍapitṛyajña⁴¹⁷, but still they lack the eligibility. On the other hand, priests like the *ṛtvik*-s, who act as the representatives of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), perform the rituals, but they still are not the eligible performers (*adhikārin*). It is the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) alone who is the eligible performer (*adhikārin*). This is because, as on one hand, he is the agent of the ritual action on account of uttering the sacrificial formulae, paying the ritual fee (*dakṣiṇādāna*), etc. he also enjoys the result of the ritual action performed on the other hand. Hence, he satisfies both the conditions of having the properties of being the agent of the enjoined action and the enjoyer of the result produced by such an action in the same locus⁴¹⁸. Thus, although Jayanta’s statement would give the prima facie impression that it is mere ownership of the prescribed ritual act which counts for a person’s being the eligible performer and Jayanta here adds no further clarification to it, yet it is to be understood in the technical sense of someone possessing the rite to enjoy the result produced by the performance of a prescribed Vedic ritual action. It is only after identifying himself as the person stipulated by the Vedic sacred texts for performing a particular ritual action leading to a desired result and thereby understanding himself as the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) that he identifies himself as the agent of the said action. It is thus entitlement to the result which makes possible his entitlement to the means of achieving the result. Hence eligibility (*adhikāra*) may be said, in this way, to logically precede agency (*karṛtva*).

Hereafter, the Kriyāvākyārthavādin asks:

“Just as the Jātivādin philosophers do not deny the cognition of the individual, so do you not negate the action-action-factor relation. But what is the proof for its (the

⁴¹⁵ *phalāsvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ. phalāsvāmyaṅca karmajanyaphalabhokṛtvam. MNP_{FE}, p. 241.*

⁴¹⁶ *tatrādhikāro nāma phalabhokṛtvasamānādhikaraṇaṃ karṛtvam. BhāDī, p. 594.*

⁴¹⁷ For details see Kane (1941:1085-1090).

⁴¹⁸ *śrāddhādau pitrāde ṛtvijāṃ cādhikāravvyāvṛtṭyartham viśeṣaṇadvayam. BhāDī, p. 594.* However, it is to be noted here that in case of the Satra sacrifice (*yāga*), it is on account of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) being the priest (*ṛtvik*) that the *ṛtvik* becomes the eligible performer (*adhikārin*).

action-action-factor relation's) being [cognised] later [than the cognition of the eligible performer]?"⁴¹⁹

The Kriyāvākyārthavādin here makes an allusion to the argument of the philosophers, according to whom it is the universal property (*jāti*) which is the meaning of a word⁴²⁰. Thus, when the word 'cow' (*go*) is uttered, the hearer understands it as referring to the universal property of cowness (*gotva*). The main argument for holding the universal property to be the referent of a word is that it is invariably present in all individuals (*vyakti*)⁴²¹ which, despite instantiating the universal property, may differ from one another in respect of important specifications like colour, shape, age, gender, etc. Moreover, the admission of universal property as the referent of a word helps one to account for his understanding of a thing (say a cow) in all the three phases of time. All this would be impossible if it were an individual which were the referent of a word. Now, although the Jātivādin philosophers who hold *jāti* or universal property to be the referent of a word do not deny the understanding of the *vyakti* or individual following from the hearing of a word on the ground that a universal property cannot remain altogether separate from a substratum, similarly, the Kriyāvākyārthavādin holds that Jayanta cannot deny the understanding of the action-action-factor relation even while accepting the owner-owned relation. Moreover, since the very grammatical structure of the injunction surfaces the action-action-factor relation and an awareness of it arises directly from the linguistic level, why should Jayanta claim that this understanding comes only next to an understanding of the owner-owned relation, for denoting which, there is apparently no word. Perhaps implied here is the contention made by the Kriyāvākyārthavādin that in order to uphold the consistency of his theory of *adhikāra*, Jayanta is ignoring the validity of the Vedic sacred texts, which directly and most immediately seem to convey the action-action-factor relation.

Now, Jayanta says the following in reply to the Kriyāvākyārthavādin's complaint –

“It is because of the mention of the person as specified by a qualifier which cannot be obtained [by human effort]⁴²². If he has a connection with a qualifier which is

⁴¹⁹ *nanu tvayā 'pi kriyākārasambandho na apahnūyate jātivādinā iva vyaktipratīteḥ. sa tu pāścātya ity atra kiṃ pramāṇam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴²⁰ For details of this view, see Dravid (2001).

⁴²¹ For a detailed discussion on *jāti* and *vyakti* being the meaning of nouns, see Deshpande (1992:17-29).

⁴²² Although human effort as the means is not mentioned by Jayanta himself in the text, yet from an analysis of Cakradhara's gloss on this quoted in the next paragraph above that I have supplied this. Without such supplying it is difficult to understand the reason why and in which specific sense is obtainment intended here.

conducive to being an action-factor⁴²³, then he is fit to be construed as the agent; but as an eligible performer if it is the opposite. Therefore, agency follows from eligibility, but eligibility [does not follow from] agency.’⁴²⁴

According to Cakradhara, if the person is specified by something which can be obtained as a factor of the sacrifice, then he is an agent⁴²⁵. To illustrate the point he cites the Vedic statements: ‘*abhikrāman juhoti*’⁴²⁶ and ‘*lohitoṣṇīṣāḥ pracaranti*’⁴²⁷. The first statement means the following: in a sacrifice the priest should approach the sacrificial fire called Āhavanīya and offer the oblation into it. The second sentence means, the priest of the Śyena sacrifice should wear red turbans, red dresses and wear the sacred threads round their necks (so that they should hang down like garlands) while discharging their duties for destroying the rival. Now both these acts of approaching the Āhavanīya fire and wearing red turbans, etc. are such that they can be obtained through human effort and hence the priests doing so are to be termed as the agents of such acts. By contrast, Cakradhara says, if the person is qualified by something which cannot be obtained as the factor of the sacrifice, then the person is an eligible performer (*adhikārin*)⁴²⁸. He explains

⁴²³ Consistent with Cakradhara’s gloss on this passage translated hereinafter in the main text, it may be observed that if the element which acts as the qualifier of the person is such that it could be brought about by human effort, which in turn would enable the person to carry out a ritual action prescribed, then such a qualifier could be deemed to be conducive to the person’s becoming a causal factor of action. This would make possible the word which denotes the person in the context of a ritual to syntactically and pragmatically connect as the agent of the prescribed ritual direct, i.e., without requiring any logically and chronologically prior state of the eligible performer. By contrast, if the qualifier is such that it could not be brought about by human effort which in turn would enable the person to carry out the ritual action, then such a qualifier could be understood as not being conducive to the person’s becoming the agent of the action directly. What is crucial here to note is that both agency and non-agency in this context is to be understood in terms of the qualifier’s being obtainable through human effort which would further make possible the execution of the prescribed ritual by the person so qualified. In cases where the person is qualified by such an unobtainable qualifier, the qualifier should be understood as contributing to the person’s eligibility. Now, since eligibility, which is inextricably linked with a sense of duty, means the right to enjoy the result produced by the prescribed Vedic ritual, the person finds himself as having been put in charge of a certain act and being prompted by the sense of duty he undertakes the performance of the action and thus becomes the agent. Thus, agency in these cases is clearly grounded in eligibility and not obtained directly through one’s effort.

⁴²⁴ *uktam atra – anupādeyaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭasya puṃso nirdeśād iti. kārakatvānuṅgaṇaviśeṣaṇayogino hy asya kartṛtayā yogyāḥ sambandhaḥ. tadviparyaye tv adhikāritveneti. tasmād adhikṛtasya kartṛtvaṃ na kartur adhikāraḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴²⁵ *yo hi yāgasādhanatvena upādātum śakyate tadviśiṣṭaḥ kartā bhavati.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 53.

⁴²⁶ TaiSa 2.6.1. The entire line reads as follows – *abhikrāman juhoti abhijityai.*

⁴²⁷ ŚBrā IV.2.22. The entire line reads as follows: *lohitoṣṇīṣā lohivasanā nivītā ṛvijāḥ pracaranti strītyai –* “The red-turbaned red-clothed priests, with sacred threads hanging down their neck, perform their [priestly] duties for destroying [the enemy].”

⁴²⁸ *yat tu yāgasādhanatvenopādātum āhartuṃ na śakyate tadviśiṣṭo ’dhikārī.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 53.

this by making a reference to the Vedic injunction ‘*yāvajjīvam juhuyāt*’ (one should offer oblations as long as one lives).⁴²⁹ In Cakradhara’s opinion, since ‘being alive’ cannot be obtained through human effort as the means of the sacrifice; this is because it is self-established and hence it specifies the eligible performer by virtue of being an occasion (*nimitta*)⁴³⁰.

Cakradhara continues:

“[As for] ‘**conducive to being action-factors**’ [it is explained as follows:] It is in connection with the qualifier that the qualified [person] becomes the agent. A connection with the qualifier occurs when the qualifier is fit to be obtained [through one’s effort]. [Thus,] since [wearing of] a red turban can be obtained [through one’s effort] therefore [the priests of the Śyena sacrifice] become ‘red-turbaned’. But in case it lacks obtainability [through human efforts], there occurs no relation of the qualifier and qualified and hence there is absence of a qualified agent. This is [what it means for] an obtainable qualifier [to be conducive] to being action-factors. [As for] ‘**the agency of the eligible one**’, [it is explained as follows:] since a person who desires *svarga* is the eligible performer here, hence an implied agency follows at a later moment than that of eligibility in the form ‘this is the duty of a person who desires *svarga*’. If he does not do that, then his eligibility pertaining to it goes in vain. [As for] ‘**not the eligibility of the agent**’, [the view of the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent is explained as follows:] In regard to the sacrifice which has a *svarga*-person desiring as its agent, the person desiring *svarga* alone is eligible – such an eligibility characterised by fitness is implied. That is said – it (the sacrifice) has a person desiring *svarga* as its agent, if the person desiring *svarga* becomes eligible for that. ‘This is your task’ – this is implied eligibility. This is not correct. This view would hold if the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ would construe in terms of being the agent; but it is not possible. This is the intention.”⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ The actual Vedic prescription seems to be, as quoted by Sen (2013:51) from the *Vārāhaśrautasūtra* 1.1.1.64 – *yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti*.

⁴³⁰ *yathā yāvajjīvam juhuyād iti. na hi jīvanam puruṣaprayatnena yāgasādhanatvenopādātum śakyate, svataḥ siddham tu tan nimittatvena adhikāriṇam viśinaṣṭi*. NMGBh_{GS-II}, p. 53.

⁴³¹ *kāraakatvānugūṇeti. viśeṣaṇasambandhe hi viśiṣṭaḥ kartā bhavati. viśeṣaṇena sambandha upādeyatve sati viśeṣaṇasya bhavati; yato lohītam uṣṇīṣam upādadate ’to lohitoṣṇīṣā bhavanti. upādeyatvābhāvāt tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhābhāvād viśiṣṭasya kartur apy abhāva ity anupādeyasya [sic! em. upādeyasya] viśeṣaṇasya kāraakatvānugūṇyam. **adhikṛtasya kartṛtvam** iti. yataḥ svargakāma ’trādhikāry atataḥ svargakāmenedaṃ kartavyam ity adhikārottarakālam ārtham kartṛtvam. yadi hy asau na karoti tat tadviṣayo ’syādhikāro niṣphala eva syāt. **na kartur adhikārah**. svargakāmakartṛko yo yāgas tatra svargakāma eva adhikṛta iti yogyatālakṣaṇo ’dhikāra ārthaḥ. tadāha, asau svargakāmakartṛko bhavati yadi tatra svargakāma ’dhikriyate. tavāitat karmety ārtham adhikṛtatvam iti. etac ca na yuktam. yadi svargakāmasya kartṛtvenānvayaḥ syāt syād ayaṃ pakṣaḥ, sa tu na sambhavati iti tātparyam*. NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 54.

Following Prabal Kumar Sen's (2013:51-52) explanation, it can be said that *svarga*, which is a special kind of pleasure⁴³², becomes the object of desire without requiring any human effort. This is because it is in the very nature of pleasure to be spontaneously desired. Therefore, it is not the case that after a desire for *svarga* is produced by human effort that one undertakes the performance of a sacrifice. In this way, the phrase 'one desirous of *svarga*' is an unobtainable qualifier of the person, on which score it denotes the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) and not the agent (*kartr*)⁴³³.

The concept of *anupādeya* or something unobtainable is found in Kumāriḷa's TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.3.24. This section⁴³⁴ discusses the reason for distinguishing Agnihotra sacrifice prescribed for one month and the New and Full-Moon sacrifices prescribed for one month from the Agnihotra sacrifice performed every day in the morning and evening, and the New and Full-Moon sacrifices performed every month on the new-moon and full-moon days, respectively. Śābara here is of the opinion that since prescriptions for the performance of the Agnihotra and New and Full-Moon sacrifices for a month are found within the larger context of a sacrifice called Kauṇḁapāyinām-ayana, they are to be distinguished from the Agnihotra performed daily and the New and Full-Moon sacrifices performed every month on the new and full-moon days respectively. However, Kumāriḷa is of the opinion that the ground for distinction lies in the new prescriptions' being detached from the context of the regular sacrifices. But such a detachment of specific sacrifices from the context of regular sacrifices being the cause of their distinction does not hold true always. Rather, such detachment serves as the ground for distinction if it is accompanied by additional factors, which Kumāriḷa calls the '*anupādeya*'-s or 'unobtainable'-s. He enumerates such *anupādeya*-s as cannot be prescribed with regard to any sacrifice to be five in number; these are: place, time, occasion, result, and the thing requiring ritual purification⁴³⁵. The observation made in this regard by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu is worth quoting:

“The five kinds of *anupādeya* factors, namely, place, time, occasion, result, and object of purification, have already been established at the beginning of the performance of a sacrifice, because, ... they are either the circumstances

⁴³² This is because *svarga* is supreme pleasure and it is not for the sake of anything else; rather it is desirable in itself.

⁴³³ *anurupbhābe 'svarga' nāmak sukhviśeṣ puruṣaprayatna vyatirekei kāmanār viṣay hay, jehetu sukh svataḥi kāmya haiyā thāke. ataeva āge puruṣaprayatner dvārā svarga kāmanā utpanna hoyār pare keha yāgānuṣṭhāne pravṛtta hay na – ejaṇya uha oi puruṣer pakṣe anupādeya viśeṣaṇa. sutarām 'svargakāmaḥ' – ei viśeṣaṇa kartṛtver bodhak na haiyā adhikāritveri bodhak haibe.*

⁴³⁴ For a detailed analysis of this and other related sections see Yoshimizu (2004).

⁴³⁵ *yat tv anupādeyaṃ deśakālanimittaphalasaṃskāryātmakaṃ tasya pradeśāntarāvasthitakarma prati vidhyaśakter eṣā vacanavyaktir bhavati tatraiva karma kartavyam iti. MDĀ_{III}, p. 197.*

independent of human activities or the aim expected to be accomplished⁴³⁶ by means of a ritual act. This is the reason why they are regarded as those that cannot be integrated (*anupādeya*) by a person into the performance of sacrifice. Accordingly, the example sentences ... are ‘directions’ (*codanā*) of an original sacrifice distinct from basic sacrifices, because they designate one of these five factors in their own terms and enjoin one to perform a sacrifice under the designated condition. It is, however, not always true that an injunction which designates one of these five *anupādeya* factors enjoins an original sacrifice.”⁴³⁷

Now Kumārila’s view on *phala* or result as an unobtainable factor may be briefly taken note of. Kumārila discusses this in TV ad ŚāBhā MīSū 2.3.25. According to Kumārila, *phala* or result is always something in regard to which (*uddeśya*) something else is prescribed. This prescription is in accord with the final view enunciated under MīSū 6.1.3. If result were to be the thing to be prescribed, then it could be prescribed only with regard to *kriyā* or action and in that case, it would lose its character of being a result⁴³⁸. On the other hand, if action were not prescribed it too would lose its nature of being the means of bringing about a result, and hence would stand bereft of result. Again, if both action and result were prescribed or that with regard to which something else is prescribed (*uddeśya*), then they could not connect with each other⁴³⁹. So the only option left is that of accepting an action as being prescribed with regard to a specific result⁴⁴⁰.

Now, it seems that since *phala* or result is *uddeśya* or something with regard to which something else (action) is prescribed, *phala* cannot be prescribed. But why is result considered *uddeśya*? Because one cannot make efforts directly in regard to the result, but only the means to achieve the result. Rather, once the result is achieved, no further effort is seen to be made by the person who seeks that result. It is in this sense of being *uddeśya*

⁴³⁶ For Kumārila’s reasoning on this see the following paragraph.

⁴³⁷ Yoshimizu (2004:20). His observation on the general sense of *upādeya* and *anupādeya* from the same article (Yoshimizu 2004:18) is also worth noting:

“... the word ‘*upādāna*’ is generally used in the sense of the integration of an object into the domain of one’s control, we may safely say that the *upādeyas* such as sacrificial fire and the like are those that are to be integrated into the performance of sacrifice by human effort, whereas the *anupādeyas* such as the time of performance are those that are beyond the control of human will and therefore cannot be integrated.”

⁴³⁸ This is because the very notion of result entails the termination of a process of action by means of which the former is brought about.

⁴³⁹ This is because syntactical connection occurs only among such things which are hierarchically arranged.

⁴⁴⁰ *siddhāntavādī tu svargakāmādhikaraṇasiddhaṃ pratyarthaṃ cābhisamīyogād iti phaloddeśyatvaṃ matvā vadati na śakyate phalaṃ vidhātum. vidhīyamānaṃ kriyāṅgatvād aphalam eva prāpnoti. kriyā ’pi vā vidhīyamānā tādarthyam pratipadyamānā niṣphalaiva syāt. na ca ubhayor uddiśyamānāyor upādīyamānāyor vā sambandho ’sti iti ekāntena phalam uddiśya karma vidhātavyam. MDĀ_{III}, pp. 200-201.*

on account of not being *directly* the object of one's effort that *phala* or result counts as *anupādeya* or an unobtainable. Other unobtainables like place, time and occasion are so considered because they are established in themselves and stand independent of human will. *Samskārya* or the thing standing in need of ritual purification is also counted as *anupādeya* in so far as it cannot be brought into being through human effort; rather it is because what it is that the act of purification is prescribed with regard to it. Thus, it is in the same sense unobtainable as the result⁴⁴¹.

In view of what has been said above with regard to result, it may be observed that since *phala* or result cannot function as a means of bringing about the action, and since it is the thing towards which an action is directed, it is unobtainable through human effort. Keeping this in mind, Jayanta has sought to classify phrases like 'red-turbaned, red-clothes' and 'one desirous of *svarga*' as qualifier of the agent (*karṭṛviśeṣaṇa*) and qualifier of the eligible performer (*adhikāriśeṣaṇa*) respectively. Since the wearing of red turban and red cloth by the priests can be brought about by human effort and on wearing these, he is further able to carry out his priestly duties, it perhaps implies a continuity of effort. By contrast, *svarga* is the result and the result cannot be brought about directly by human effort because of the very fact that the result implies such a stage in a causal process where all efforts come to an end and bear fruits. Hence, *svarga* can only be the goal towards which all efforts could be directed via suitable action. Here the efforts made by a '*svarga*-desiring person' is not based on anything which has already been brought about by human effort and hence implies no continuity of effort. It is rather prompted by the desire for something which can only be achieved at the end of effort made towards it through proper means of action. Hence, Jayanta prefers to see such qualifiers as *svarga* as denoting the eligible performer.

Jayanta has made a sharp distinction between an 'obtainable' qualifier and an 'unobtainable' qualifier in terms of the former implying agency and the later primarily eligibility and agency only based on it, and in this respect, he has drawn upon the Mīmāṃsā concept of *upādeyatva* and *anupādeyatva*. On a comparative note, it may be said that later Mīmāṃsā philosophers like Āpadeva, and others do not base their understanding of an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) on the notion of the *anupādeya* factors only. I will now cite a few passages from Āpadeva's MNP to show how this extremely popular Mīmāṃsā manual, which still enjoys very wide readership, views *adhikāra*.

Āpadeva says:

[1] *phalāsvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāraavidhiḥ. phalāsvāmyāñca karmajanyaphalabhokṛtvam. sa ca yajeta svargakāma ity evaṃrūpaḥ. anena hi svargam uddiśya yāgaṃ vidadhatā svargakāmasya yāgajanyaphalabhokṛtvam pratipādyate. yasyāhitāgner agnir gṛhān dahet so 'gnaye kṣā mavate 'ṣṭākapālam*

⁴⁴¹ See Yoshimizu (2004:19-20).

puroḍāśaṃ nirvaped ityādibhis tu grhadāhādau nimitte karma vidadhadbhir nimittavataḥ karmajanyapāpakṣayarūpaphalāsvāmyaṃ pratipādyate. MNP_{FE}, p. 241.

The injunction of eligibility is an injunction which communicates the ownership of result. Ownership of results consists in enjoying the result produced by the action. And it is of this form: “One who desires *svarga* should sacrifice”. For, through this, which prescribes [the performance of] the sacrifice with regard to *svarga*, is communicated that he who desires *svarga* enjoys the result produced by sacrifice. But through such [injunctions] as “When fire burns the house of the person, who has installed the Vedic ritual fire, he should offer a sacrificial cake [baked on] eight potsherds, to the devouring fire”, which prescribe an action on the occasion of burning of house, is communicated that the person who has the occasion [of his house being burnt by fire] would enjoy the result, having the form of elimination of religious demerit, produced by action.”

[2] *tac ca phalāsvāmyaṃ tasyaiva yo ’dhikārivišeṣaviśiṣṭaḥ. adhikārivišeṣaṇaṃ ca tad eva yat puruṣavišeṣaṇatvena śrutam. ata eva rājā rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajetety anena svārājyam uddiśya rājasūyaṃ vidadhatā ’pi na svārājyakāmamātrasya tatphalabhokṛtvaṃ pratipādyate, kiṃ tu rājñāḥ satas tatkāmasya.* MNP_{FE}, p. 241.

Such ownership of result belongs only to him who is qualified as a specific eligible performer. The qualifier of the eligible performer is this only that which is directly mentioned as the qualifier of the person. Therefore indeed, by means of this [injunction, having the form] “A king, desirous of sovereignty should sacrifice with the Rājasūya”, which in spite of prescribing the Rājasūya [sacrifice] with regard to sovereignty, the person who merely desires sovereignty is not communicated to be the enjoyer of the result of it, but he who being the king desires it (sovereignty).

[3] *kiṃcit tu puruṣavišeṣaṇatvenā ’śrutam apy adhikārivišeṣaṇaṃ bhavati; yathā ’dhyayanavidhisiddhā vidyā, agnisādhyeṣu ca karmasv ādhānasiddhāgnimattā, sāmārthyaṃ ca. eteṣāṃ puruṣavišeṣaṇatvenā ’śravaṇe ’py adhikārivišeṣaṇatvam asty eva; uttarakratuvidhīnāṃ jñānākṣepaśakter abhāvenā ’dhyanaiddhisiddhajñānavantaṃ praty eva pravṛtteḥ, agnisādhyakarmanāṃ cā ’gnyapekṣatvena tadvidhīnāṃ ādhānasiddhāgnimattvaṃ praty eva pravṛtteḥ.* MNP_{FE}, p. 241.

Some become the qualifier of the person even though they are not mentioned as the qualifier of the person. For example, knowledge [of the Vedic texts] established by the injunction to study (recite the Vedas), being the possessor of the Vedic ritual fire, which has been ritually installed in case of rites accomplished by means of ritual fire, and the capacity [to perform a prescribed rite in the way as it is stipulated

in terms of being physically able and financially resourceful]. Even though these are not mentioned as the qualifier of the person, still they indeed qualify the eligible performer. This is because, since injunctions about subsequent rites lack the capacity to imply knowledge [of the Vedic ritual texts delineating the performance of various ritual actions] apply to only those who have acquired knowledge of the Vedic rituals by means of studying [the Vedas both at the linguistic and semantic levels in accordance with the injunction for reciting the Vedas]. [Likewise,] since rites accomplished by means of ritual fire require Vedic ritual fire, injunctions related to them apply to only those who possess the Vedic fire ritually installed.

From the above three passages the following points emerge:

(a) According to Āpadeva [2], the qualifier of the eligible performer (*adhikārivišeṣaṇa*) is generally the qualifier of the person (*puruṣavišeṣaṇa*);

(b) From [3], it transpires that even if the qualifier of the eligible performer is not mentioned, still it should be understood as being present. This is especially true in cases of such ritual actions which presuppose the accomplishment of another ritual action. A case in point is a ritual action involving the role of the Vedic ritual fire which presupposes the eligible performer's performing the daily fire rites on having duly accomplished the installation of the ritual fire (*agnyādhāna*). Similarly⁴⁴², rites like Darśapūrṇamāsa, Jyotiṣṭoma, etc., which are undertaken only after one has accomplished the installation of the ritual fire, require a person who is adept in ritual exegesis having studied the Vedas in accordance with the Vedic injunction to study and understand the meaning of the Vedic texts studied. Thus, what is expected is that the person should have accomplished the installation and maintenance of the Vedic ritual fire (*āhitāgnimattā*) and also studying and understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts (*vidvattā*). It is only such a person who is eligible for performing more complex Vedic ritual actions.

From [3] and [b] it becomes clear that eligibility conditions like 'being the possessor of the Vedic fire established through ritual installation' (*ādhānasiddhāgnimattā*) and 'being the possessor of study and understanding of Vedic sacred texts' imply something (installation and maintenance of Vedic ritual fire, studying and understanding of Vedic sacred texts) which can be accomplished by means of human effort⁴⁴³. This stands sharply in contrast to Jayanta's claim that if the qualifier of the person is obtainable through human effort it becomes conducive to the person's agency (e.g., 'red-turbaned', 'red-clothed') and only if the qualifier is not obtained through human effort that the phrase *svargakāma* denotes an eligible performer. Again, the example of eligibility cited in [2] above which

⁴⁴² This elucidation is based on A. Chinnaśwami Sastrī's Sanskrit commentary called *Sāravivecanī* on the MNP passage quoted above [3]. See MNP_{Sa}, p. 103.

⁴⁴³ I am extremely thankful to my teacher, Mm. Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī who drew my attention to this very crucial point.

speaks of only such a king's being eligible for the performance of the Rājasūya sacrifice who is desirous of sovereignty, highlights the fact that mere desire for sovereignty is not enough, but only when it is compounded with the person's being a king that eligibility follows. Now, being a king implies one's belonging to the the Kṣatriya caste⁴⁴⁴. But one's being a Kṣatriya is not something achievable by human will. Thus, it seems that both *upādeya* and *anupādeya* elements can constitute eligibility, according to these Mīmāṃsakas and not merely the *anupādeya* one, as claimed by Jayanta and upheld by his faithful scholiast, Cakradhara.

It is perhaps due to his overzeal for upholding the predominance of result in sentential cognition and ascertaining the result to be the instigator in consistence with NS and NBh that Jayanta seems to have ignored the counter points discussed above. But Jayanta's difficulty is understandable since in his own admission the authors of the NS and NBh had not dealt with the nature of sentence-meaning and that of the instigator distinctly anywhere⁴⁴⁵. Also, since Jayanta perhaps did not want to let his theory fall into the pitfalls of linguistic analysis, he sought to explain the role of *phala* or result in terms of the crucial role it plays in day-to-day life and make his theory more realistic and appealing.

Notwithstanding the criticism of Jayanta's theory stated above, it may be looked upon as an original contribution of Jayanta's to Vedic ritual exegesis and a theory of motivation based on it. Even if we consider Jayanta's distinction between agency and eligibility in terms of *upādeya* and *anupādeya* elements as superficial and as an instance of indulgence in sophistry, yet Jayanta's approach could be looked upon despite its perhaps limited application as a novel tool for understanding the crucial question of the relation between agency and eligibility.

Now, Jayanta explains how the eligibility of the person who desires *svarga* is accomplished. The eligible person reflects: 'if the action of sacrifice were for the sake of *svarga*, then that *svarga* should be enjoyable by me⁴⁴⁶; how should I attain *svarga*⁴⁴⁷?'

⁴⁴⁴ *atra rājapadaṃ kṣatriyajātimātravācakam*. MNP_{Sā}, p. 103.

⁴⁴⁵ For a detailed analysis see Chapter Three.

⁴⁴⁶ This is the primary reflection of the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) upon coming to know of the means-end relationship of sacrifice and *svarga* from the injunction, "One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", through the interpretative device of sentence-unity (*ekavākyatā*), and also having the knowledge of *svarga* being supreme pleasure itself (*niratiśayaprīti*). At this stage he desires the goal, viz. *svarga*.

⁴⁴⁷ This latter clause – "how should I attain *svarga*?" is a further reflection of the eligible person. It is his inquiry into the means to accomplish *svarga*. It is preceded both logically and chronologically by his primary reflection described in the immediately preceding footnote.

Thus, on account of desiring *svarga* he is called the person who desires *svarga*⁴⁴⁸. Now if the sacrifice were not a means to achieve *svarga*, then it would lead to the following contradiction – one desires *svarga*, but what he does is the sacrifice; that is, he would desire X while he would do Y⁴⁴⁹. Therefore, without grasping that the sacrifice is the means of achieving the desired goal (*svarga*), the person who desires *svarga* does not become eligible for the act, and without being eligible the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ does not syntactically connect with the act of sacrifice⁴⁵⁰.

Jayanta’s argument above that if sacrifice were not the means of accomplishing *svarga*, it would lead to the undesirable consequence of the person’s desiring X while doing Y, where X and Y are not related to each other, can be traced in Śabara’s commentary on MīSū 6.1.3⁴⁵¹. Although Kumāriḷa’s discussion on this in the ṬṬ is brief, a more elaborate and sophisticated discussion is to be found in Maṇḁana Miśra in his BhāVi⁴⁵² thereon.

To put it briefly, the argument in these works is directed against an opponent, according to whom, *svarga* does not construe as the thing to be brought about by sacrifice, rather it describes the person only. The person performs the sacrifice only on account of being impelled by the Vedic injunction, “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, without any concern for the result. However, in criticism of this view, it has been observed that if a person acts merely on account of being impelled by the authority of the Vedic injunction, the meaning of the said injunction boils down to the following: “one who desires *svarga* should undertake the act of sacrifice”, without any further communication of any means-end relationship obtaining between sacrifice and *svarga*. But this leads to a splitting of the sentence (*vākyabheda*)⁴⁵³ that is unacceptable to a Mīmāṃsaka. For upholding sentence-unity (*ekavākyatā*), *svarga* and sacrifice should be connected with each other through a relation of the principal and the subordinate (*guṇapradhānabhāva*)⁴⁵⁴. If both *svarga* and

⁴⁴⁸ *itthañca svargakāmasyādhikṛtatvaṃ nirvahati – yadi hi tatkarma svargāya syāt, svargo me bhogyo bhavet, katham ahaṃ svargaṃ prāpnuyām ity evaṃ sādhyatvena svargaṃ icchan svargakāma ity ucyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴⁴⁹ *yadi na svargasādhanam tat karma tad viruddham evedam āpatati svargaṃ kāmayate yāgaṃ karotīty anyad icchaty anyat karoti iti hi syāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴⁵⁰ *ataḥ karmaṇaḥ kāmyamānasādhanatām apratipadyamānaḥ svargakāmas tatra naivādhikriyate; na cānadhikriyamānas tatra sambadhyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴⁵¹ *api ca yasya svarga iṣṭaḥ syāt sa yāgaṃ nirvartayed ity asambaddham ivānyad icchaty anyat karoti.* MDĀ_v, p. 183.

⁴⁵² See verses 58-59 of BhāVi along with the auto-commentary thereon.

⁴⁵³ For sentence-splitting (*vākyabheda*) and sentence-unity (*ekavākyatā*), see McCrea (2000:433-437).

⁴⁵⁴ In passing in may be noted that:

“Prabhākara does not transform “*svargakāmo yajeta*” into “*svargaṃ yāgena bhāvayet*” as Śabara did to secure the relationship between the sacrificial action and heaven as a means and the purpose to be

the sacrifice were to be accepted as the principal elements, they would not syntactically connect with each other. This is because any syntactical connection presupposes a hierarchical arrangement of the constituent elements⁴⁵⁵. Such a connection would be possible only if *svarga* is held to be the principal element and the act of sacrifice subordinate to it as a result of which *svarga* would be the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*) by means of sacrifice. But if the sacrifice were to be understood as the principal element, then there would be no other option for *svarga* than to connect with it as something subordinate to it. But in the light of MīSū 3.1.3 read together with MīSū 6.1.1, such a connection would be possible only if *svarga* were a substance (*dravya*). Now, under MīSū 6.1.2, it has been established that the worldly usage of *svarga* as referring to pleasurable substances (*prītimaddravya*) like sandalwood, a sixteen-year-old damsel, etc. cannot hold water since in such instances its being pleasurable varies from person to person⁴⁵⁶. To explain: for one who is afflicted by heat, sandalwood paste is a source of relief and hence pleasurable, but it is a source of affliction for someone who is afflicted by cold. Similarly, a sixteen-year-old damsel is a source of pleasure for someone voluptuous, but she is a source of misery for someone who is averse to sense-pleasures. In this way, the pleasurable nature of *svarga* considered as a substance is not fixed but varies from

accomplished by it. Nevertheless, Prabhākara asserts that “*svargakāmaḥ*” and “*yajeta*” can be syntactically connected (*ekavākyatā*) as a pair of words that denotes the enjoined person (*niyojya*) and the scope (*viśaya*) of the same enjoinder (*niyoga*) only when the object of desire, heaven, can be accomplished through sacrificial action. In other words, the relationship between the enjoined person and the scope of the same enjoinder implies that the sacrificial action is a means and heaven is its purpose.” Yoshimizu (2021:101).

This might explain a major difference between the view of the Kriyāvākyārthavādin (= Bādari and his followers, and some Vaiyākaraṇas) from that of Prabhākara. To put it more bluntly, on the Kriyāvākyārthavādin’s view, we are left with only three options: i) either *svarga*, because of its alleged nature of being a pleasurable substance, subordinately connects with the preeminent element, viz. the sacrifice, or ii) *svarga* simply qualifies the person (*puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*) without implying *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*), or iii) *svarga* is unable to syntactically connect with the preeminent element, the act of sacrifice. By contrast, Prabhākara, while stressing the ultimately independent role of the sacred texts in the form of Vedic injunctions in instigating a person to act, assigns the role of identifying the eligible performer or the person fit to be enjoined (*niyojya*) and activating his sense of duty (*kartavyatābodha*) to *svarga*. He also seems to take into account the charge of desiring X and performing Y where X and Y are not related to each other, by holding that the means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga* is achieved through the device of *ekavākyatā*.

⁴⁵⁵ Jayanta too hints at this loss of sentence-unity when he remarks that if the Kriyāvākyārthavādin’s thesis of the pre-eminence of action (*kriyā*) is accepted, then the syntactical connection of the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ would be difficult to be established logically – *tad etad ayuktaṃ - evaṃ varṇyamāne svargakāma yajeteti svargakāmapadasya anvayo durupapādaḥ*. NM_{Mys-II}, p. 77.

⁴⁵⁶ Jayanta also discusses the same point when he criticises the Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent’s view that *svarga* can render no assistance – either visible or invisible – to the act of sacrifice. The current examples are cited as alleged instances of visible assistance rendered by *svarga*. See NM_{Mys-II}, pp. 77-78.

person to person and also from situation to situation. Moreover, a pleasurable substance is not something desirable in itself but only in so far as it accords pleasure. Further, if *svarga* were to be connected as a substance subordinate to sacrifice, it would lose its very nature of being a result which is to be brought about by an action. It is for this reason that *svarga* is accepted to be supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*) or pleasure in itself, which is always desirable in itself by all. Thus, the only way to save the sentence-unity is to make sacrifice subordinate to *svarga* and this would only be possible if a means-end relationship is postulated to obtain between the two. If it is not so accepted, then there would be the undesirable consequence of performing sacrifice but desiring *svarga* while being unaware of the causal relation existing between the two. If this is opposed on the ground that even then *svarga* would follow on its own, then one who desires a healthy life could also drink snake venom while ignoring and overlooking the causal relationship between snake venom and death! This would also lead to the undesirable consequence of all effects becoming accidental, i.e., without following a causal chain, and this would ultimately bring Mīmāṃsā close to the accidentalism (*ākasmikatāvāda*) of the Cārvāka philosophers⁴⁵⁷.

A further problem⁴⁵⁸ that would occur if *svarga* and sacrifice were not causally related to each other and one were to perform the action solely being impelled by the Vedic injunction, is mentioned by Nārayaṇa, a commentator of Maṇḍana Miśra's BhāVi. Nārayaṇa says, if one desires X and does Y, then there would be no syntactical connection between the two and the act could not be carried out. This is because, it would violate the rule which provides for an identical and shared content of desire and volition⁴⁵⁹. To explain: it is a shared view in Sanskrit philosophy that cognition (*jñāna*) leads to desire (*icchā*), desire to volition (*kṛti*), volition leads to movement (*ceṣṭā*) and movement to action

⁴⁵⁷ It is interesting to note that in the following verse from Chapter I of ŚV Kumārila hints at such a Cārvākisation of Mīmāṃsā being the motivation for him to write the *Ślokavārttika* in order to restore the orthodoxy of Mīmāṃsā:

*prāyeṇaiva hi mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatīkṛtā/
tām āstikapathe kartuṃ prayatnaḥ kriyaṃte mayā//10//*

“In the world, Mīmāṃsā has almost been made worldly (i.e., heterodox); it is for bringing it [back] to the path of orthodoxy that I make efforts.”

Umbeka holds Bharṭṛmitra and his followers responsible for such a Cārvākisation in his commentary on the said ŚV verse. Pārthasārathi Miśra echoes Umbeka in this regard in his *Nyāyaratnākara* commentary on the said verse. For details, see Appendix II.

⁴⁵⁸ For further details of this debate, see V. P. Bhatta's notes to his English translation of verses 58 and 59 of *Bhāvanāviveka* and their auto-commentaries in Bhatta (1994:262-264, 266-269, 270-272). Due to want of space, I have given here only a sketchy account of the main arguments and counter-arguments.

⁴⁵⁹ *anyad icchatā 'nyad anuṣṭhātavyam ity ananvitābhīdhānam aśakyakriyam, kṛticchayor ekaviśayatvaniyamāt.* BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 196.

(*kriyā*)⁴⁶⁰. Now, among these, it is cognition only which has an independent content (*viśaya*) and all others starting from desire share the content of cognition⁴⁶¹. This ultimately suggests a larger unity of thought and action. Thus, if one were to desire X and do Y, where X and Y are not causally related to each other, this essential unity of thought and action and on that score that between desire and effort would be compromised, which is, as already noted above, an extremely undesirable consequence. But if the act of sacrifice were understood to be the means of accomplishing the object of one's desire, *svarga*, then the effort made with regard to sacrifice would ultimately be the effort made towards *svarga*, which is being desired⁴⁶². This would be consistent with the rule of desire and volition having a shared and identical content, which would ultimately save sentence-unity (*ekavākyatā*) of the Vedic injunction, "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice"⁴⁶³.

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. *pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātā 'rtham upalabhya tam īpsati vā jihāsati vā. tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samihā pravṛttir ity ucyate. sāmartyaṃ punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ* (NBh_T, p. 1) – "After being aware of the object through an instrument of knowledge, this cogniser either wants to obtain that (object cognised) or wants to avoid it. A specific activity of his induced by his desire to obtain or to avoid [the object] is what is called undertaking. But the success of this (undertaking) is a connection with the result (the desired object)."

On the Vaiśeṣika view, the undertaking of *dharma* and *adharma* has desire and aversion as its respective causal antecedents. See Thakur (2003:88) in this regard.

This causal sequence is also found in epic sources, such as in the following verse from *Mahābhārata* –

*jñānapūrvodbhavā lipsā lipsāpūrvābhisandhitā/
abhisandhipūrvakaṃ karma karmamūlaṃ tataḥ phalam//* Verse no. 6, Chapter 199, Mokṣadharmā, Śāntiparvan, *Mahābhārata*.

Desire is that which is preceded by the genesis of cognition; desire precedes intention; intention precedes action; therefore, a result has its roots in action.

⁴⁶¹ This is known as *yācitamaṇḍananyāya*. Literally it means borrowing someone's else's ornaments for serving one's purpose. In the Indian epistemological context, it refers to the sharing of content of cognition by desire, volition, movement and action. Although the encapsulation of this idea in the form of a maxim is to be found in late Navya Nyāya texts like Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa's commentary, *Rahasya*, on the *Vyāptipañcaka* section from Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, yet, as is evident from the NBh quotation in the immediately preceding footnote, conceptually this was in circulation many centuries before the emergence of Gaṅgeśa.

⁴⁶² It is worth recalling that since one cannot make efforts directly with regard to *svarga*, the result, it is *anupādeya*. This is because, a result marks the termination of all efforts and stands in no further need of them. Thus, it is only in a secondary and extended sense that efforts, which can be made directly only in regard to the action, may be said to have been made for *svarga*.

⁴⁶³ *yadi ca yāgādīnaṃ svargādisādhanatvaṃ bhavet svargā(yāgā)diviśayā kṛtir iṣyamāṇasvargādiviśayāpi bhavaty eve ti kṛticchayor ekaviśayatvopapatteḥ svargakāmo yajeta ity ekavākyatvam upapadyata iti.* BhāVī_{ViGrBh}, p. 196.

At this point, the opponent may argue that one may still act solely out of a sense of duty generated by the Vedic injunction without any desire for any result.⁴⁶⁴ So, the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’ should just act as the qualifier of the person (*puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*). As an instance, he might cite the case of the fixed (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) ritual actions, which are performed solely out of a sense of duty and the injunctions whereof do not mention any result directly or any such phrase from which any result could be deduced. But against such an objection it may be argued that if such an analogy is appealed to, then even optional rites (*kāmyakarman*) such as Jyotiṣṭoma would become a fixed and occasional rite, and this would ultimately do away with the very distinction among fixed, occasional and optional rites⁴⁶⁵. As a consequence, the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ would convey the occasion (*nimitta*) for performance of the prescribed act, viz. desire for *svarga* and one would be obliged to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma and like optional rites regularly! Also, on account of becoming a fixed or occasional rite, the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice need not be performed precisely as prescribed, but just like fixed and occasional rites, it cannot be performed according to one’s capacity (*yathāśaktyanuṣṭheya*). Lastly, like fixed and occasional rites, a non-performance of Jyotiṣṭoma and like optional rites would lead to future religious demerit due to non-performance (*pratyavāya*)⁴⁶⁶.

1.5. Jayanta’s deduction of the subordination of action

Thus, the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ connects with the sacrifice only in so far as the former denotes the person eligible for performing the sacrifice and it is only when eligibility has been established that agency is implied by it. But again, this eligibility cannot hold water, as has been shown above, without understanding a means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga*. In other words, one has to recognise the sacrifice, for which he is eligible, as an instrument of achieving *svarga*, the object of his desire. Without this, the rule of unity of content of desire and volition would be violated.

⁴⁶⁴ Jayanta’s Kriyāvākyaarthavādin opponent also says the same thing:

kimarthaṃ punar asau kriyām anuṣṭhātīti cec chabdaprāmāṇyād eveti brūmaḥ. śabdena hi coditas ‘tvayedaṃ kartavyam’ iti. sa cen niyukto nānuṣṭhān codanām atikrāmet. śāstrapṛtyayāc ca kriyām anuṣṭhāti. NM_{Mys-II}, p. 75

[Jayanta:] But for what reason does he (a person) perform an action?

[Kriyāvākyaarthavādin:] We say, because of the validity of the [Vedic] sacred texts. For, he is impelled by linguistic communication [in the form of Vedic injunctions] as “this has to be done by you”. Being enjoined if he is not performing [the action], he would transgress the [Vedic] command. It is out of his faith [in the authority of the Vedic] sacred texts that he performs the [prescribed] action.

⁴⁶⁵ For description, analysis and discussion on this distinction of rites in Mīmāṃsā, see Freschi, Ollett and Pascucci (2019:4-8).

⁴⁶⁶ Besides others, unity of content of desire and volition could be perhaps adduced as a foundational reason why the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas accept results with regard even to fixed and occasional rites.

Given this, the sacrifice becomes a means of *svarga*, i.e., it aims at or serves the purpose of something else. Thus, *svarga* is the object to be accomplished and sacrifice the means to it. In this way, the action loses its preeminence (*prādhānya*) and becomes subordinate to the result, and because of subordination it cannot ultimately be the sentence-meaning⁴⁶⁷. Jayanta here quotes MīSū 3.1.4⁴⁶⁸, according to which, Jaimini, unlike the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin Mīmāṃsā philosopher Bādari,⁴⁶⁹ does not confine ‘subservience’ (*śeṣatā*) to substances, qualities and purificatory acts, but extends it to actions like sacrifice. It has already been mentioned⁴⁷⁰ that Bādari and some Vaiyākaraṇas hold that it is the action which is the preeminent element. Perhaps it is these Vaiyākaraṇas who feature as one of the main opponents in Maṇḍana’s *Bhāvanāviveka*. According to them⁴⁷¹, there is no action called *kriyā* separate from the qualities of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*)⁴⁷². These philosophers cite Bādari’s view as encapsulated in MīSū 3.1.3 in support of their contention⁴⁷³. MīSū 3.1.3 states the view that only substances, qualities and purificatory acts are to be considered as being subservient to sacrifice, result and a person. In other words, sacrifice, the result and a person do not become subservient to anything because they do not serve the purpose of anything. By contrast, the triad of substances, etc. render assistance to other things and hence are to be treated as subsidiaries. Under MīSū 3.1.4 Jaimini mentions his own view that even actions are subsidiaries since they serve the purpose of the result by bringing about the latter. Further on Bādari’s view, as elaborated by Śabara, the act of sacrifice does not produce the result, and the result follows on its own, once the sacrifice has been brought about. This also means that the result is not causally produced by the act of sacrifice. The implication of this view is that Vedic injunctions which apparently mention results like *svarga*, cattle, son, village, etc. do not point out a causal relationship between the prescribed action, the sacrifice, and the results mentioned in the injunction. As a corollary to this view, such phrases in Vedic injunctions as ‘*svargakāma*’, etc. do not express the eligible performer (*adhikārin*), but

⁴⁶⁷ *tadevam adhikṛtatvena svargakāmasya karmaṇi sambandhāt svargayāgayoś ca sādhasādhanabhāvāvagamam antareṇa tasyādhikāranirvāhāsambhavād avaśyaṃ kriyāyāḥ sādhanatvaṃ, svargasya ca sādhyatvam abhyugantavyam. ataś ca kriyāyāḥ phalaṃ prati guṇabhāvān na prādhānyam. aprādhānyāc ca na vākyaṛthatvam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 79.

⁴⁶⁸ *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt* – “Jaimini [considers] even the actions [like sacrifice] [to be subservient] in so far as they are for the sake of the result.”

⁴⁶⁹ For Bādari’s view see MīSū 3.1.3. It is to be noted here that according to Bādari, the act of sacrifice, the result and the person do not serve the purpose of anything else and hence they are not subservient to anything.

⁴⁷⁰ See fn. 2.

⁴⁷¹ It is beyond the scope of this work to give an elaborate account of this view. For a succinct account of the debate in BhāVi, see Freschi (2013).

⁴⁷² This argument is also directed against the Vaiśeṣikas who hold *karman* to be separate category.

⁴⁷³ See verse 26 of BhāVi.

only the agent (*kartr*), because eligibility means ownership of action via the ownership of result, and these two ownerships can be logically connected with one another if and only if the action is held to be the means to achieve the result. This view is categorically identified as belonging to Bādari and some Vaiyākaraṇas by Prabhākara in Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.1.1. Prabhākara also uses the label of '*kriyāvākyārthapakṣa*' for this view in the said portion of his *Bṛhatī*. Nārāyaṇa, a commentator of Maṇḍana Mīśra's BhāVi, calls these philosophers 'Puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvavādins'⁴⁷⁴ in so far as they hold that phrases like '*svargakāma*' refer to the agent and hence merely qualify the person. This runs counter to the view of Śabara and Kumārila that given that no rational person undertakes any activity which lacks a desired result, such phrases indicate the result which is produced by the performance of the prescribed action and refer to the eligible performer. Bādari's view also stands in contradiction to the view of Prabhākara. According to Prabhākara, desire (*kāma*) mentioned in such phrases stipulate the object of desire, and the phrase plays a role in identifying the person who is fit to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*). For Prabhākara, an injunction needs the person to be enjoined and this is obtained by a reference to such phrases as '*svargakāma*', but it does not speak of any means-end relation which may obtain between the prescribed act of sacrifice and *svarga*. The role of desire is merely to stipulate the person who is fit to be enjoined, whose sense of duty with regard to the prescribed action is activated as a consequence of this, and he undertakes the action. But for Prabhākara, an injunction itself does not require a result for carrying out its task of instigation because it does so through its own might. Otherwise, the Vedas would not be an independent instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in so far as they would be dependent on the result which can be also obtained from other instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, postulation, etc. Thus, while both Bādari and Prabhākara agree that a person acts on the basis of the authority of the Vedic injunctions and that performance of actions prescribed by Vedic injunctions do not causally lead to any result, Prabhākara accepts the role of the result in merely identifying the person fit to be enjoined (*niyojya*). Bādari, by contrast, altogether denies any meaningful role whatsoever to the result.

Kumārila has mentioned in verse 10 of the first chapter of his ŚV that by his time, Mīmāṃsā had almost been Cārvākised (*lokāyatīkṛta*) and that his efforts were directed towards restoring orthodoxy (*āstikatva*) to Mīmāṃsā. Commenting on this, Umbeka, the oldest of the commentators of not only ŚV, but also Maṇḍana's BhāVi, says that it is Bhartṛmitra and the like who have contributed to this near-Cārvākisation of Mīmāṃsā by means of writing their respective treatises like *Tattvaśuddhi*, etc. Because Bhartṛmitra and others somehow adhered to the Vedas, it could not be said that there was total Cārvākisation of Mīmāṃsā; for, Cārvākas deny the very authority of the Vedas. Among other things done by Bhartṛmitra for achieving such a near-Cārvākisation of Mīmāṃsā is, as Umbeka claims, the denial of beneficial results and malefic consequences to Vedic

⁴⁷⁴ BhāVi_{VGB}, p. 71.

prescriptions and prohibitions respectively. Thus, on this view too, just as it is on that of Bādari's, Vedic ritual actions do not lead to any result. The implication of this view is that religious merit (*puṇya*) and religious demerit (*pāpa*) are not incurred by respectively doing something which has been prescribed by the Vedas and something which has been prohibited by the Vedas. Thus, all occurrences of all results including religious merit and demerit (if any) would be purely accidental (*ākasmika*) and hence this view may be labelled as 'accidentalism' (*ākasmikatāvāda*). This also seems to have the same bearings on the question of eligibility as has already been discussed above.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be noted that Śabara, who mentions Bādari, does not mention Bhartṛmitra and Umbeka, Kumārila's earliest commentator, mentions Bhartṛmitra. From this and also on the basis of the striking similarity of the view of both Bādari and Bhartṛmitra, it may be conjectured that Bhartṛmitra was a follower of Bādari and that he and his followers elaborated upon and expanded Bādari's view. Bhartṛmitra was even more radical and led the view to a quasi-Advaita Vedāntic end by claiming that all injunctions, either by prescribing or prohibiting an action, help an ordinary person turn away from the objects of the material world which act as stumbling block to his realisation of the real non-dual nature of the self. The performance of each action prescribed by the Vedas, on this view, also contributes to a elimination of a specific aspect of the phenomenal world-process (*prapañcapravilāpana*). Maṇḍana examines such a view in its bearings upon the question of eligibility (*adhikāra*) towards the end of *Vidhiviveka* and also in the first chapter of *Brahmasiddhi*. Allusions to such a view of Bhartṛmitra and his followers are also to be found in Advaita Vedānta works such as Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyasambandhavārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*. Jayanta's mention of *prapañcapravilāpana* within the context of his discussion of *kriyāvākyārthapakṣa* in the second half of the fifth book of *Nyāyamañjarī* and his connecting it with MīSū 3.1.3 which records Bādari's view may serve to bolster the hypothesis mentioned above that Bhartṛmitra and his followers elaborated upon and expanded Bādari's view through their own works.

If Bādari's thesis explained above is accepted, then the following problem arises: since there is no action apart from the qualities of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*) and it is only the triad of substance, quality and purificatory process that is subservient (*śeṣa*) to the three principal elements (*śeṣin*), viz. the sacrifice, the result and the person, there would be the undesirable consequence of sacrifice being deemed accomplished by the mere conjunction and disjunction resulting from the bringing in, removal, etc. of substances required for a sacrificial act. To circumvent this problem, Jamini, by contrast, holds that even actions (*karman*)⁴⁷⁵ are subservient to the result, since

⁴⁷⁵ Implied here is the view that there exists action (*karman*) distinct from the qualities of conjunction and disjunction. Needless to say, this stands contrary to Bādari's claim.

the former accomplishes the result and hence serves the purpose of something else⁴⁷⁶. Subscription to Jaimini's view enables one, as has already been discussed above, to account for the sentence-unity (*ekavākyatā*) of Vedic injunctions like "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice" by making possible the syntactical connection between *svarga* and the act of sacrifice. It also helps uphold the unity of content of desire and effort.

Jayanta's argument against the Kriyāvākyaṛthvādin can be summed up thus: the nature of *svarga* or *svarga* as supreme pleasure and not that of any pleasurable object makes it impossible for it to be obtained through human effort; this, in turn, makes the phrase 'one desirous of *svarga*' (*svargakāma*) within the paradigmatic Vedic injunction, "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", an 'unobtainable qualification' (*anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa*) of the person, which ultimately makes the person an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) of the sacrifice and only secondarily an agent (*karṭṛ*) based on his eligibility. Again, since such *svarga*, which is of the nature of supreme pleasure is not for the sake of anything else, but rather all other things aim at it, it is understood as the thing to be accomplished (*sādhyā*) and hence is the principal thing. It is but natural for a human being to desire this specific kind of pleasure which is *svarga*. Now since in regard to the aforesaid Vedic injunction, the eligible performer cannot undertake the sacrifice without understanding the same as the means of achieving *svarga*, his object of desire, it is proper to accept the subordination of the act of sacrifice to *svarga*, the result. In this manner, it is ultimately the result which gets established as the principal element and hence fit for being the sentence-meaning.

Part II

Introduction

In this section, I shall present a sketch of Jayanta's polemics with his Prābhākara opponent. Although the Prābhākara opponent's view has been discussed earlier in a separate chapter, in which connection the great extent to which Jayanta is indebted to Umbeka's *Tātparyaṭīkā* has also been shown, yet Jayanta's refutation of it was not presented there. It is crucial to understand the way Jayanta views his Prābhākara opponent and the arguments he puts forward to refute the former's view. This is because just like the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent in NM 5.2, Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent denies the role of result in instigating a person to undertake an action prescribed by a Vedic injunction. But unlike the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin, the Prābhākara in NM 5.2 does accept *adhikārin* which he also identifies with a *niyojya* or the person fit to be enjoined by a Vedic injunction. It is in this respect that the Prābhākara accepts the role of *phala* in specifying

⁴⁷⁶ The criteria for ascertaining what is subservient is spelt out in MīSū 3.1.2, 'śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt', according to which if X serves the purpose of anything else (say, Y), then X is subservient to Y.

and stipulating the *niyojya*, which would activate his sense of duty with regard to the act prescribed by the Vedic injunction. Thus, although it marks an advancement upon the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin’s theory of the absolute absence of result regarding the performance of Vedic ritual actions, yet the Prābhākara held that for instigating a person the Vedic injunction does not need the result by virtue of its property of being a result. This proves to be a major challenge to Jayanta’s theory of the result being the instigator. Thus, it was incumbent on Jayanta to critically review the Prābhākara theory and show its insufficiency as compared to his own view. As it will become evident from this chapter, in refuting his Prābhākara opponent too Jayanta was greatly influenced by the arguments made by Umbeka in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, apart from some subtle and probable influences of Patañjali and Maṇḍana Miśra. At the end, I will also give a list of the salient features of Jayanta’s theory of prescriptions together with a comparative assessment of Jayanta’s theory and those of his Kriyāvākyaarthavādin, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara opponents. For, I believe, that it is by taking note of the differences among these theories that a real appreciation of the influence of these theories on Jayanta and the latter’s contribution to the debate will be possible.

1. Construal of *svarga* vis-à-vis the role of result

Since the result’s being an instigator is crucially dependent on a successful construal of the word ‘*svarga*’ occurring in the compound word, ‘*svargakāma*’, as the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*), into the Vedic injunction, “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, Bhāṭṭa Jayanta now turns his attention to this question. The Prābhākara opponent here contends that in case of worldly prescriptions like ‘one desirous of healing should eat the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree’, it is the object of one’s desire that is understood as the thing to be accomplished. Likewise, in case of Vedic prescriptions such as ‘one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice’ too, one would understand *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished⁴⁷⁷. It is to be noted here, that apparently the Prābhākara opponent’s claim of *svarga*’s being the object to be accomplished might mislead one to think that the Prābhākara accepts the preeminence of result. Yet it will become clear later in this chapter that the Prābhākara accepts *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*) only in so far as it explains the purpose of *svarga*’s being the object of human desire and thereby its ultimate role in only identifying the person fit to be enjoined with regard to a particular Vedic ritual action via an activation of his sense of duty regarding the said action. In other words, the Prābhākara does not intend *svarga*, the paradigmatic result for Mīmāṃsakas, to be the instigator on the ground of its being the object of human desire and hence the object to be accomplished. This is because, it would compromise, according to the Prābhākara, the Veda’s autonomy with regard to instigating a person and

⁴⁷⁷ *nanu loke kāmyamānasya sādhyatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ harītakīm bhakṣayed ārogyakāma iti. tena vede ’pi yajeta svargakāma iti svargasya sādhyatvam avabhotsyāmahe.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 127-128.

ultimately its validity and authoritativeness as an instrument of knowledge functioning independently of other instruments of knowledge. For, if the Vedic injunction were to depend upon the result, which is obtained through another instrument of knowledge, e.g., perception, it would not be able to independently instigate a person to undertake a Vedic ritual action.

In this regard, Jayanta raises the following question: how is the object of desire understood to be the object to be accomplished even in case of worldly injunctions? Is it understood i) by means of reflecting on the meaning of that word in the injunction which expresses the enjoined person (*niyojya*), or ii) through an examination of the way in which a Vedic injunction functions⁴⁷⁸? Regarding the first alternative, Jayanta observes that the word denoting the person to be enjoined (e.g., *svargakāma* – ‘one desirous of *svarga*’) only says that the person X has the desire for Y, but in no way does it express that Y is accomplished by such and such means⁴⁷⁹. In other words, the linguistic structure of the prescription does not convey the relation between the object of desire and the instrument for achieving it, which seems to be an unavoidable requisite for person X with a desire for Y to undertake the action Z. Under such circumstances, the means-end relationship, i.e., the causal connection between the prescribed act and the object of desire would not been known. In the absence of such an understanding, if one were still to undertake the prescribed act, it would amount to the fact that the subject desires X and he does Y, where X and Y are not causally related to each other⁴⁸⁰. This in turn, would amount to a person’s undertaking of a fruitless action, which clearly contradicts common experience. Implied here is the suggestion that if the Prābhākara were to depend exclusively on the surface structure of the Vedic injunction, then it would not be possible for him to obtain *svarga* as the object to be accomplished even for the sake of merely qualifying the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*). In other words, since the linguistic structure of the injunction only says that ‘a person who desires *svarga* should sacrifice’, it does not say directly that *svarga* is the object to be accomplished, not to speak of its being produced by a performance of the prescribed action. In order to conclude that *svarga* will be accomplished through sacrifice, one has to resort to some other instrument of knowledge like presumption (*arthāpatti*). Since without the help of postulation, a person cannot understand that the sacrifice will indeed lead to *svarga*, he will not undertake the action. Now, a Vedic injunction must be autonomous only in conveying its content, i.e., the command. The problem would arise, therefore, if a Vedic injunction were not able to communicate its content without the

⁴⁷⁸ *sādho loke ’pi katham etad avagatam āyusmatā. niyojyasamarpakapadavācyaparyālocanayā vidhivṛttaparīkṣayā vā?* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

⁴⁷⁹ *padārthas tāvad etāvān evamkāmo hy asāvīti/ idam tu sidhyaty etasmād iti tasya na gocaraḥ//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

⁴⁸⁰ This has already been discussed in connection with the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin’s view in the first part of this chapter.

person's understanding in the manner said above that the sacrifice will certainly lead to *svarga*. In this way, if the injunction failed to convey its content, it would lose its autonomy.

As for the second alternative, Jayanta says the following:

“If [it is said by the Prābhākara opponent] that such is the nature of the injunction, then, o long-living one, you understand correctly. [But, then] what error have the Bhāttas committed in so far as they speak of result even in regard to fixed [sacrifices]?”⁴⁸¹

The nature of the prescription referred to above is that one comes to know invariably from the prescription of the means-end relationship (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*) existing between the act prescribed and the object of desire. Although Cakradhara glosses the ‘result’ spoken of in regard to the fixed ritual actions as ‘the avoidance of future sanctions’ (*pratyavāyaparihāra*), Prabal Kumar Sen⁴⁸² offers a somewhat different explanation of this passage. According to Sen, on the Prābhākara view, elective rituals such as the New and Full-Moon Sacrifices, when performed precisely as prescribed, leads to results such as the *svarga*; but given the fact that there is no result mentioned in case of fixed and occasional ritual actions, one has to perform these actions just because it is incumbent upon him to do it. In case such actions are not performed, one incurs religious demerit. So it is for the sake of avoiding such religious demerit that one should perform the fixed and occasional rituals. By contrast, those (e.g., the Bhāṭṭa philosophers) who contest such a view of the Prābhākaras, say that the non-performance of fixed or occasional rituals at the stipulated time produces a special kind of absence and no sin is produced merely by such a special kind of absence. This is because no result is produced by any absence whatsoever in general⁴⁸³. Rather, if one does something incompatible or anything else at the stipulated time of performance of fixed or occasional rituals, it is then only that one incurs such religious demerit. Thus, upon taking cognizance of the Vedic prescription, “speak the truth”, if one remains silent, then on the Prābhākara view, one would incur sin. But on the Bhāṭṭa view it is only by speaking untruth and not merely because of remaining silent that one would incur sin. Unless the aforesaid Vedic injunction to speak the truth is understood as a prohibition for speaking untruth, remaining silent would be contradictory to the positive injunction for speaking the truth. In other words, the said Vedic injunction is concerned with the nature of the content that should be spoken and not the act of speaking

⁴⁸¹ *vidher eṣa svabhāvaś ced āyusman sadhu budhyase/
bhāṭṭaiḥ kim aparāddham te nitye 'pi phalavādibhiḥ*// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

⁴⁸² Sen (2013:220-221).

⁴⁸³ The Navya Nyāya philosophers, by contrast, hold that for the production of any effect whatsoever, its prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) is causally necessary. However, this view has been contested by other philosophers such as the Advaita Vedāntins.

itself. Sen quotes the following verse in support of the view held by the opponents of the Prābhākaras in this regard –

*svakāle yad akurvaṃs tu karoty anyad acetanaḥ/
pratyavāyo 'sya tenaiva nābhāvena sa janyate*//⁴⁸⁴

It is only on account of what an unmindful person does without doing that for which it is the stipulated time, that he incurs sin and not because of the absence [of performance of the prescribed act at the stipulated act].

Thus, it is probably not correct to accept the view that fixed and occasional rituals are performed with a view to avoiding future sanctions only. In other words, the mere non-performance of fixed and occasional ritual actions does not produce any sin, but the performance of anything incompatible at the stipulated time of performance of these rituals do so.

2. Basis for postulation of result: *anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa* and *sapratyaya*

Jayanta says that whether it is with regard to fixed rituals, for which Vedic prescriptions like “one should sacrifice as long as one lives” are available, or elective rituals, which are prescribed by Vedic injunctions such as “one who desires *svarga* should sacrifice”, it is a person who is specified by such a qualifier that is unobtainable through human effort (*anupādeyaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭa*), who becomes eligible⁴⁸⁵. To explain: one’s being alive in case of fixed rituals and one’s being desirous of *svarga* in case of elective rituals are not something that can be produced by human effort. For, life is not something that can be produced by human effort; nor can desire be volitionally generated. This is because, one’s being alive is simply a matter of fact and not something which ought to be. It is a fact that a person is living without requiring any additional effort on his part to live or bring about his existence. Similarly, it is an object’s very nature which determines whether it would be desirable by a person or not. Hence, the fact is that one is simply alive and one simply has desire for something without there being any role of effort in their occurrence. Thus, life and desire for something occur independently of human volition and hence they serve as the basis for something else’s to be brought about directly by human effort. Although a result is something which is aimed at by the sacrifice, yet it is not something with regard to which one can act directly. Thus, Jayanta seeks to achieve a parity of eligibility in regard to fixed as well as elective rituals in terms of the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) being

⁴⁸⁴ This verse is quoted by Someśvarabhaṭṭa in his NSu commentary on Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.2.5 (MDG_{III}, p. 366). Taber (2007:182) lists this among fragments, quoted by both Someśvara and Śrīdhāra, author of the NK, from Kumāriḷa’s now lost work called BṬ. I am grateful to Mm. Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī for kindly tracing this verse in the NSu.

⁴⁸⁵ *anupādeyaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaḥ/
jīvan vā svargakāmo vā samāno kāmyanītyayoḥ*// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

specified by such a qualifier which is unobtainable through human effort. And the working capacity of an injunction in both these cases is equal as a prescription, which is devoid of a result, cannot instigate a rational person who does not undertake any action which lacks a purpose and who has faith in its efficacy⁴⁸⁶. To explain: since results mentioned by injunctions such as *svarga*, which specify eligible performers, cannot be obtained through human effort in the sense that one cannot act directly in regard to them, but only with regard to their means (e.g., sacrifice), prescribed by the injunction, a rational person who trusts the efficacy of the injunction, would not undertake any such action which does not lead to a desirable result. It is, thus, for meeting this unavoidable condition of instigating a rational person that it has to be admitted that any Vedic ritual – fixed, occasional or elective – presupposes a result and any injunction should communicate the means-end relationship between the prescribed act and the result. Thus, it is on account of such a possible incongruity that a Vedic prescription, prescribing whether a fixed or an elective ritual, has to take recourse to results while instigating a rational person to an action.

3. Result to be postulated for both fixed and elective rituals

Now, regarding the postulation of a result in case of fixed rituals, an objection is put forward by the Prābhākara opponent, for whom, there is no result to be obtained by performance of fixed and occasional rituals. The objection and its reply given by Jayanta are as follows:

“[Objection:] Well, in case of elective rituals, *svarga* is heard (i.e., directly mentioned in the Vedic prescription), but it is not heard in case of fixed rituals. Unheard, on what basis is it postulated?

[Reply:] We say – on the basis of the injunction indeed [that *svarga* should be postulated as the result of performing fixed rituals]. What would one do with *svarga*, even if heard, if it is not expected by the injunction? Just like [cases such as “one who studies the Ṛgveda], for him flow streams of clarified butter”⁴⁸⁷, [where the result is heard], an injunction attracts (i.e., implies) it (i.e., an understanding of the result) even if it is unheard. Thus, it is the injunction which is the basis in this regard (postulation of result in case of fixed rituals) and not [the result’s] being heard or unheard. Hence result has to be postulated either for both fixed and elective rituals or for none.”⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁶ *vidhivīryaprabhāvas tu dvayor api tathāvidhaḥ/ sapratyayaprakatāṃ vidhir nopaiti niṣphalaḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.*

⁴⁸⁷ I have not been able to locate this exact reading; however, the nearest one is to be found, as already mentioned by Sen (2013:221) in ŚaBrā_{III} 11.5.6.4.

⁴⁸⁸ *nanu kāmādhikāre svargaḥ śrūyate nityādhikāre tv asau na śrūyate, aśrūyamāṇaḥ kasyānurodhena kalpyate. vidher eveti brūmaḥ. svargeṇa śrutenāpi kiṃ kariṣyati yady asau vidhinā nāpekṣyate, ghṛtakulyā*

By claiming that it is for the sake of the injunction that result has to be postulated even with regard to fixed rituals, Jayanta again stresses the basic issue of any Vedic prescription whatsoever requiring a result for successfully instigating a rational human being. A rational person trusts the efficacy of the prescription in leading him to a desirable end, without which he would not undertake the act, to which he is instigated by the injunction. This is because the act in itself is laborious and expensive and that it itself does not benefit a person in any way. Thus, what David (2015:586) says in respect of Maṇḍana, holds equally true for Jayanta:

“The reason for which a rational agent obeys an impersonal Vedic injunction is therefore not different from the reason for which he takes any other independent decision. He does so because he understands the existence of a necessary causal link between a certain class of actions (a kind of offering, for instance) and a desired fruit (*phala/iṣṭa*) for which it is a “means [of realization]” (*sādhana*). It is thus the very existence of desire which allows the potential agent to conciliate an essentially painful activity with his own motivational complex, and it is through this device that norms are integrated to his behaviour. In this framework a Vedic injunction such as P1 (“He who desires Heaven should perform the New- and Full-Moon offerings”) is better understood as “The New- and Full-Moon offerings are a means (*sādhana*) to realizing Heaven (*svarga*), the desired fruit (*phala/iṣṭa*)”.”

By citing the example of the laudatory passage speaking of the flowing of stream clarified butter for one who studies the Ṛgveda, Jayanta actually cites a counter-example to the Prābhākara’s claim that there is no result mentioned for fixed and occasional rituals. Jayanta’s counter-example cited here also argues for an organic unity of the entire Vedic corpus based on the purpose-oriented activities of rational human beings. Such an understanding of the Vedic corpus in general and the Vedic injunctions in particular is based on a personalised need-based approach to questions related to religious morality and *dharma* or religious duty. This may be seen as a counter-current where exclusive dependence on the linguistic structure of sacred texts for understanding religious norms is sought to be replaced by an anthropomorphic outlook grounded in the psychology of human desire⁴⁸⁹.

’sya bhavanti (cf. ŚaBrā 11.5.6.4) *ityādivad aśrūto ’pi cāsau vidhinākṛṣyata eva. tasmād vidhir atra pramāṇam na śravaṇāśravaṇe iti kāmyavan nitye ’pi phalam abhyupagantavyam na vā kvacid api.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

⁴⁸⁹ For an analysis of the Dharmaśāstric background to these two parallel approaches – consequentialist and deontic – see David (2015:569-578).

4. The *modus operandi* of prohibitions: role of consequence

Just as Jayanta stresses the need for postulating a result for fixed and occasional rituals, so does he consequences⁴⁹⁰ in case of prohibitions on the basis of the functioning of prohibitory injunctions. Jayanta says that in such cases it is not difficult to assert that such prohibited acts have connection with consequences like downfall into *naraka* etc.⁴⁹¹

Jayanta proceeds to explain how such prohibitions work:

“For, he, who, having a mind tainted by unbearable wrath and hatred, has understood killing of a brāhmaṇa to be the means of achieving pleasure and hence something to be done, [or] he, who being impassioned by unrestrained desires, has understood drinking of liquor to be the means of achieving pleasure, is dissuaded by the [prohibitory] injunction from that (killing of a brāhmaṇa or drinking of liquor), if it is communicated [by the prohibitive injunction] that it (killing a brāhmaṇa or drinking of liquor) is the means of achieving misery. Therefore, just like the avoidance of [future] religious demerit or elimination of accumulated religious demerits in case of fixed rituals, downfall into *naraka* should be

⁴⁹⁰ I have translated the word ‘*phalayoga*’ used by Jayanta as ‘connection with consequence’. My translation of *phala* as ‘consequence’ instead of ‘result’ here is based on the fact that a prohibition does not promise a result in the sense a prescription does upon the eligible performer’s successfully doing the prescribed act. This is again because the consequence of downfall into *naraka* occurs only if the prohibited act is done. But a prohibition aims at dissuading someone from doing something, for which no result other than avoiding the dire consequence of falling into *naraka* can be thought of. So, a direct ‘result’ of a prohibition would be the avoidance of such consequence.

It will not be out of place to mention that modern authors such as Mahāmahopādhyāya Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī have sought to distinguish between the sin incurred on account of not doing a prescribed act and downfall occurring on account of doing a prohibited act. Śāstrī’s view can be found in the following line from his introduction to his 1926 work *Sanātanadharmapradīpa: etāvātā vivakṣitaḥ sārāṃśo ’yam eva – yat vihitākaraṇena pāpamātraṃ, ninditakarmābhyāsena tu pātityam...* (Śāstrī 1926:iii) – “the essence of what has been intended to be said so far is this that by not performing what is prescribed one merely incurs sin, but by practising a prohibited action one faces downfall...” The basis for such a view of Śāstrī’s is a passage quoted by him from the *Gautamadharmasūtra* (21.1-2): *brahmaha-surāpa-gurutaḥpagamātāpitryonisambandhi-stena-nāstika-ninditakarmābhyāsipatitātyāgyapatitatyāginah [patitāḥ.] pātakasamyogāḥ [ca]* – “People who murder a Brahmin; drink liquor; have sex with the wife of an elder (A 1.6.32 n.) or with a woman who is related through his mother or father, or through marriage; steal gold; become infidels; habitually commit forbidden acts; refuse to disown someone fallen from his caste; or disown someone who has not fallen from his caste – these have fallen from their caste, as also those who instigate sins causing loss of caste, and those who associate with outcastes for a year.” [Patrick Olivelle’s translation]. Olivelle (2000:172-173).

⁴⁹¹ *pratiśedhādhikāre ’pi vidhivṛttaparīkṣayā/ evaṃ narakapātādiphalayogo na durbhāṇaḥ//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 128.

postulated as the consequence of [performing] prohibited actions. Otherwise, the discrimination between what is beneficial and what is maleficent is not established.

In this way, [when] killing of a brāhmaṇa, etc. would not be contrary-to-religious duties, whence will Śyena, Vajra⁴⁹² and the like be [so]? Thus, the inclusion of the word ‘beneficial’ [in MīSū 1.1.2] would be redundant. If it is accepted that activity in regard to the instrument (the action denoted by the verbal root) based on desire [for the result] and that in regard to the procedural actions is due to the sacred texts, that too is incorrect. For, it is not the pure instrument which is capable of producing its own result, because it is the instrument, together with the procedural actions, which is known as the ‘instrument’.”⁴⁹³⁻

494

The Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2 had argued that even after postulating religious demerit a person blinded by a greater amount of attachment keeps on doing the prohibited act. But this cannot be the reason why one should regard the prohibitory injunction as invalid and unauthoritative. Thus, irrespective of whether or not the consequence of religious demerit should occur and whether or not the person instigated should undertake the prohibited act or refrain from doing it, the prohibitory injunction does not fail with regard to its own purpose of communicating dissuasion⁴⁹⁵. But in his response to this point,

⁴⁹² The Vedic injunction about Śyena reads as follows: *śyenenābhiracan yajeta* – “one intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena.” Since there is no negative particle present in the sentence which could communicate the unbeneficial nature of the Śyena sacrifice, it is ultimately on the basis of its result consisting in causing the death of the eligible performer’s enemy that Śyena itself is considered an instance of *adharmā* or contrary-to-religious duty by the Prābhākaras. By contrast, the Bhāṭṭas contend that Śyena is in itself not *adharmā* but only in a secondary sense of its being the instrument of an unbeneficial result, viz. death of one’s enemy, which is explicitly prohibited by the general prohibition – *na hanyāt sarvā bhūtāni* – “one should not kill living beings.”

⁴⁹³ This is because if *adharmā* or a contrary-to-duty act is not understood as the means for achieving something unbeneficial then there would be no way left to distinguish it from *dharma* or duty, which serves as the instrument of achieving something beneficial.

⁴⁹⁴ *yena hi durviṣahakleśadveṣakaluṣitamanaṣā brāhmaṇahananaṃ sukhasādhanam iti kartavyam iti grhītam, nirargalarāgarasikena surāpānaṃ sukhasādhanam iti grhītam, sa tato vidhinā vāryeta yadi tad asukhasādhanam iti jñāpyate. tasmān nityeṣu pratyavāyaparihāra iva upāttaduritaḥṣaya iva vā pratiśidhyamāneṣu karmasu narakapātaḥ phalam ity abhyupagamanīyam. itarathā hy arthānarthaviveko na sidhyati.*

*evañca brahmahatyāderapi naivāsty adharmatā/
kiṃ punaḥ śyena vajrāderityarthagrahaṇaṃ vṛthā//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 129.

⁴⁹⁵ *pravṛddhatararāgāndhaḥ pratyavāye ’pi kalpite/
na nivarteta ity evaṃ kiṃ vidher apramānatā//
phalaṃ bhavatu mā vā bhūt puruṣo ’pi pravartatām/
mā pravartiṣṭa vā sve tu nāsty arthe khaṇḍanā vidheḥ//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 118.

Jayanta seems to reuse his Prābhākara opponent's main argument of absence of guarantee of refrainment from a prohibited act against the latter.

The point to be noted here is that just like prescriptions for fixed and elective rituals, a prohibition too does not accomplish its task of dissuasion by means of any inherent deontic force alone, as claimed by the Prābhākara opponent, but by communicating the prohibited act to be the means of achieving something maleficent. Thus, were it not for the person's understanding or identification of the act as leading him to a dire consequence, he would not desist from it. This can also account for such cases where even after being urged by the prohibitive injunction to desist from a certain act, one ignores to do so on account of being overpowered by hatred (as in the case of killing a brāhmaṇa) or passion (as in the case of drinking liquor)⁴⁹⁶. According to the implications of Jayanta's theory, such a failure should not in any way be attributed to the injunction's inability, because the injunction does not fail in respect of communicating that the act prohibited is the means of achieving something maleficent. Rather, it is the person's failure to understand it as leading to an extremely maleficent situation which should be held responsible for non-desistance.

Both the objection by the Prābhākara opponent and Jayanta's criticism thereof seem to be perhaps influenced by Maṇḍana's brief but seminal comments on the problem of the provision by the Vedic sacred texts for the performance of Śyena in the *tarkakāṇḍa* of *Brahmasiddhi*. The context there is as follows: Maṇḍana claimed that the Vedic sacred texts do not express distinction (*bheda*) but only the non-duality of Brahman. But an opponent asks, how could the sacred texts, in the absence of the distinction in the form of the three-fold requirements of *bhāvanā* – that is, the object to be accomplished (*sādhyā*), the means of achieving it (*sādhana*) and the procedure (*itikartavyatā*) – provide for the well-being of human beings in so far as such provision presupposes the said distinctions⁴⁹⁷? Maṇḍana replies to this by resorting to the analogy of the Śyena sacrifice. Maṇḍana says⁴⁹⁸: in case of the Śyena sacrifice aimed at causing the death of one's enemy, the object to be accomplished, viz. death of one's enemy is prohibited by the general prohibition, "One should not kill living beings". Nonetheless, the Śyena is prescribed by the injunction, "One

⁴⁹⁶ In the context of examining the need for resorting to an injunction while discussing the Bhāṭṭa opponent, Jayanta remarks: *pravṛttir api puruṣa icchānibandhanā. svargasya sādhyatve yāgasya ca sādhanatve avadhārite yaḥ svargam icchet, sa tatsiddhaye pravartata eva. yas tu necchet tasya vidhir api kiṃ kuryāt. na hy apravartamānasya puṃso vidhir gale pāśaṃ nidadhāti, rajjvā vā bāhū badhnāti. niṣedhādhikāre 'pi surāpānabrāhmaṇahananādeḥ pratyavāyasādhanatvāvadhāraṇāt tatparijihīṣayā puruṣo nivartate iti pravṛttinivṛtṭyor na kāraṇaṃ vidhir iti tadartham api tadāśrayaṇam asāmpratam.*

⁴⁹⁷ *syād etad asaty bhede 'mśatrayapratyastamayāt kuto hitaśāsanam.* BS_{Ku}, p. 43.

⁴⁹⁸ I have taken the help of Kedāranātha Tripāṭhī's Sanskrit commentary, *Kalā*, on BS, which itself seems to be a more lucid and elaborate version of Śaṅkhaṇḍī's commentary on the same, for clarifying Maṇḍana's cryptic lines. See BS_{KT}, pp. 227-228.

intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena”, thus seemingly prescribing the causing of death of one’s enemy. Similarly⁴⁹⁹, although the Vedic texts represented by the Upaniṣads and the like aimed at the non-dual Brahman speak of the absence of all kinds of distinctions, the ritual injunctions of the Vedas provide for the well-being of man desirous of results⁵⁰⁰. This immediately leads to a debate between Maṇḍana and his opponent. Since this debate is immediately relevant to the purpose of showing Maṇḍana’s influence on both Jayanta and his Prābhākara opponent with regard to the postulation of dire consequences following from the performance of prohibited actions, I translate the passage below:

tathā hi – niṣiddhānarthodayā katham hiṃsā sādhyā syāt.

*atha bhavati kasyacit tīvrakrodhākrāntasvāntatayā
samuddhatadhvāntatiraskṛtavivekavijñānasyānartham apy arthatvena paśyataḥ
śāstropadeśam atikrāmataḥ. BS_{Ku}, p. 43.*

To explain – how is killing, in so far as the maleficence ensuing from it is something prohibited, something to be accomplished?

It could be [something to be accomplished] for someone, whose notion of discrimination [between what is beneficial and what is harmful] has been covered by intense ignorance on account of [his] mind being overpowered by extreme hatred, [and] who [thus] views even something harmful as beneficial [and thereby] transgresses the instruction of the sacred text [in the form of the prohibitory injunction, “One should not kill living beings”].

In the above passage, Maṇḍana speaks of a person’s considering the killing of his enemy to be something to be accomplished through the performance of the Śyena sacrifice under the influence of obfuscating factors in the form of his sense of discrimination being eclipsed due to the overpowering of his mind by extreme hatred for his enemy. Thus, although ideally Śyena is not to be performed by any rational human being so that it should not cause the killing of one’s enemy thereby leading to dire consequence in the form of extreme suffering in *naraka*, a person, under the influence of extreme hatred, wrongly considers it to be beneficial and hence something to be accomplished. Although, Maṇḍana discussed this merely to substantiate his analogy on the basis of which he could establish that the Upaniṣadic texts speak of the non-dual Brahman parallelly to the Vedic

⁴⁹⁹ The similarity consists in the following: even though the part of *bhāvanā* relating to the thing to be brought about (*sādhyāṃśa*) is impossible in the case of the Śyena, still there can be a prescription about it. Likewise, all the three parts of *bhāvanā* are ultimately impossible because they do not exist due to the non-duality of Brahman being the ultimate purport of the Vedas, still Vedic commands about them are possible.

⁵⁰⁰ *ucyate – yathā khalu śyenaḍiṣu na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtānīti pratiṣedhāt sādhyāṃśapratyastamaye ’py anuśāsanam, evaṃ sarvatra sarvāṃśapratyastamaye ’pi. BS_{Ku}, p. 43.*

injunctions' providing for ritual actions aimed at the well-being of man, which is grounded in distinction and hence duality, Jayanta surely knew the *Tarkakāṇḍa* of BS since he referred to it explicitly in Book 9 of NM. Here, he might have taken the passage on the Śyena out of context in order to reuse the argument not only for substantiating his own point but also that of his Prābhākara opponent in a cogent manner.

It is interesting to note here that Jayanta's postulation of "avoidance of future religious demerit due to non-performance" (*pratyavāyaparihāra*) or "elimination of accumulated religious demerits" (*upāttaduritaḥaya*) as the result of performing fixed rituals might be influenced by Maṇḍana's acceptance of the same in the ViVi. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss Maṇḍana's lengthy arguments in ViVi to prefer "elimination of accumulated religious demerits" to "avoidance of future religious demerit due to non-performance", yet a very brief account of the same may be presented. The opponent in ViVi⁵⁰¹ had argued that fear of incurring religious demerit is a stronger reason to perform the fixed rituals than the desire to obtain religious merit. But Maṇḍana challenges this position⁵⁰² and says that it is elimination of accumulated religious demerits which should be accepted as the purpose of performing the fixed rituals. This is because, according to Maṇḍana, one may be sometimes indifferent to pleasure and its cause, but one is always grieved by sorrow and its causes. Hence one will always desire to get rid of sorrow and its cause. Even if one seeks something beneficial, he would certainly desire to eliminate the elements that cause obstruction to its realisation. Since accumulated religious demerits may prove to be stumbling blocks to achieving one's desired goal, it is but reasonable that a rational person would prefer to get rid of such demerits. Since knowingly or unknowingly a person keeps on accumulating religious demerits, and if performance of fixed rituals helps eliminate them, it is but logical that one would undertake their regular stipulated performance with a view to eliminating accumulated religious demerits. Maṇḍana says that since elimination of accumulated religious demerits is something fixedly desired, its acceptance as the purpose of performing fixed rituals would not in any way compromise the fixedness of the fixed rituals. Thus, Maṇḍana discusses the question of the result ensuing from the performance of fixed rituals within the greater context of how to uphold and guarantee the fixedness of the fixed rituals and also how postulation of such results would not compromise the independent nature of linguistic communication in the form of the Vedic injunctions.

The sophistication and depth of Maṇḍana's discussion on the question of admission of result are evidently absent in Jayanta. Jayanta's main focus is on establishing the unavoidability of a result in case of fixed and occasional rituals just as a consequence is needed in case of prohibitions. By doing this he wanted to make his view on injunctions

⁵⁰¹ ViViGo, p. 219.

⁵⁰² ViViGo, pp. 220-221.

prescribing the performance of fixed and occasional rituals and those prescribing the abstinence from certain actions consistent with his general theory of the result being the instigator. Thus, this overzeal for establishing a result in every case made Jayanta neglect the equally connected questions of the nature of such result, various options regarding the result and their comparative strength and weakness, the independence of the Vedic sacred texts as an instrument of knowledge, how the fixedness of fixed rituals could be upheld even if a result were accepted as being the purpose of performing them, etc.

5. Jayanta on the Śyena Problem

Next Jayanta rejects the Prābhākara solution for accounting for the contrary-to-duty (*adharmā*) nature of Śyena and like sacrifices. Since the injunction about Śyena, “One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena”, has no negative particle which could have imparted to it the character of being a prohibition by directly communicating the maleficent (*anartha*) nature of the consequence, it is difficult to prove that the content of this injunction ultimately comes under the field of operation of the general prohibition stated above. However, the observable conduct of men whose actions unflinchingly comply with the prescriptions and prohibitions of the Vedic sacred texts (*śiṣṭa*)⁵⁰³ is that they refrain from undertaking the Śyena sacrifice. The Prābhākara opponent’s way of accounting for this was to identify it as an elective ritual (*kāmyakarman*). Now, according for the Prābhākara opponent, a person is instigated only by his desire for the particular result to undertake the main action, (in this case the Śyena sacrifice), which serves as the instrument (*karana*) of achieving the final result in an elective ritual. However, in regard to the performance of the procedural actions, one is instigated by the prescription since no other source of knowledge like perception, inference can tell us the way in which the instrument, i.e., the Śyena sacrifice, could be performed. On account of such a sophisticated separation of the main Śyena ritual from the procedural actions and the respective motivations to perform them, the Veda cannot be held responsible for prompting him to undertake the main action which ultimately leads to a maleficent end. What the Veda does in this case is to just provide, i.e., make known to the person who has already made up his mind to kill, the *śāstric* means for killing. It is this *śāstric* means of killing one’s enemy that is unknown to the person. This is in contrast to the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice which is carried out merely as a procedural action within the archetypal Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice in order to complete the latter.

⁵⁰³ The word *śiṣṭa* is formed by adding the primary suffix *kta* to the verbal root *śās*, meaning ‘to direct’. Thus, the word *śiṣṭa* means he has accepted the directions of the Vedas in regard to his conduct. The rendering of it as ‘cultured people’ as in Olivelle (2000:16), Yoshimizu (2021:132), etc. fails to highlight the supremely binding nature of the Vedic sacred texts for such people in matters of religious duty and contrary-to-religious duty.

But Jayanta rejects such a view by observing that a “pure instrument”, i.e., the main rite as bereft of the procedural actions, cannot be treated as an instrument, for an instrument together with the procedural actions is known to be the instrument per se.⁵⁰⁴ Jayanta observes that such a division of ritual actions into instrument and procedure is superfluous. Jayanta observes:

“This is a superfluous division characterised by instrument and procedural actions. It is the meaning of the verbal root, having its nature amplified by all the accessories (procedural actions) that becomes the means of [achieving] the object of one’s desires, but not that which falls short of even a single accessory. It is for this reason only that [people adept in rituals] want all the accessories of elective rituals to be performed. Therefore, just as in case of the instrument, undertaking of the procedural actions too would be instigated only on desire.”⁵⁰⁵

In other words, an instrument as divorced from the procedural actions cannot serve the purpose of an instrument proper, i.e., it becomes unfit for producing the result and thus renders the ritual unsuccessful. Moreover, the instrument-procedure distinction being superfluous, saying that it is desire for the result which instigates one to undertake the instrument would amount to saying that the one undertakes the procedural actions, which form an inseparable part of the instrument, being instigated by desire only. Under such circumstances, since one would be instigated by his desire to undertake both the instrument and the procedure, the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice, a procedural action within the elective ritual called Jyotiṣṭoma, whose end result is *svarga* that is not prohibited, could not be distinguished from Śyena and would become *adharmā* or a contrary-to-religious duty⁵⁰⁶!

It is interesting to note that such a critique made by Jayanta strongly echoes the following passage from Umbeka’s *Tātparyatīkā* –

lipsāyāś ca pravartakatve viṣayavad itikartavyatāyām api saiva pravartayati, setikartavyatākasyaiva viṣayasya phalotpattau nimittatvād; avāntaravibhāgas tv ayaṃ karaṇetikartavyatālakṣaṇas; tataś ca prayogavidher uccheda eva... ŚVTā, p. 98.

⁵⁰⁴ *na hi tat karaṇaṃ śuddhaṃ sādhanāyopakalpate/ setikartavyatākaṃ hi karaṇaṃ karaṇaṃ viduḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 129.*

⁵⁰⁵ *avāntaravibhāga evaiṣa karaṇetikartavyatālakṣaṇaḥ. sakalāṅgopabrñhitasvarūpas tu bhāvārthaḥ kāmyānāpāyatāṃ pratipādyate, naikenāpy aṃśena nyūnaḥ. ata eva kāmyānāṃ karmaṇāṃ sarvāṅgopasaṃhāreṇa prayogam icchanti. tasmāt karaṇavad itikartavyatāyām api lipsāta eva pravṛtīḥ syāt. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 129.*

⁵⁰⁶ *ubhayatrāpi lipsātaḥ satī caivaṃ pravartane/ agnīṣomīyahimsādeḥ śyenādivadadharmatā// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 129.*

In case [one's] desire is the instigator, it alone should instigate one even in regard to the procedural actions just as it does in case of the scope (i.e., the main act); this is because a scope as endowed with the procedure alone is the basis for the production of the result. But this division characterised by instrument and procedure is superfluous; and due to it (i.e., such a division) [the need for] the injunction of performance will be exterminated indeed.

According to Umbeka, all types of injunctions are instigators at their core. It is by instigating someone to an action hitherto not undertaken, and not merely by communicating, i.e., describing the means-end relation that an injunction retains its essential instigating character. Hence, if one does not undertake the performance of the Agnīṣomīya animal killing on being instigated by the specific prescription for it found in the sacred texts, but merely on account of being prompted by one's desire, then the very need for an injunction in general and the one which promotes the performance of the subordinate rites (like the Agnīṣomīya animal killing) would be redundant.

6. The Vedic injunction is the instigator even with regard to elective rituals: Jayanta's rejection of the Prābhākara view

The Prābhākara opponent had said that in case of the paradigmatic Vedic injunction, "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", without accepting *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished, it cannot otherwise be justified that the person who desires *svarga* is the person enjoined. This is because, on the view of the Prābhākara opponent in NM 5.2, it is the object which is desired by a person is considered by him to be that which is to be accomplished. In other words, a human being does not desire anything which he is already in possession of, but only that which he desires, but presently has not. However, this does not amount to any claim of the injunction itself being dependent on a result. For, the injunction, which on the Prābhākara opponent's view, is the same with commandment (*niyoga*), needs only the person to be enjoined (*niyojya*) and the scope, i.e., the act with regard to which he is commanded or enjoined (*viṣaya*). As for the former, the person to be enjoined is understood by a reference to such phrases occurring in Vedic injunctions as "one desirous of *svarga*", within which the word '*svarga*', by serving as the qualifier of the person, helps him identify himself as the person to be enjoined and thereby activating his sense of duty with regard to the prescribed act of sacrifice. Now, for *svarga* to be the qualifier of the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*), the person himself may need to understand the object of his desire to be the object to be accomplished by means of the prescribed act of sacrifice to which he has been enjoined, but the injunction itself does not need *svarga* for instigating the person. Thus, from the surface structure of the injunction, it appears that the injunction only needs the person to be enjoined to perform the prescribed act, without which the commandment could not be accomplished. Since the identity or qualification of the person is obtained from such phrases as 'one desirous of *svarga*', and the person cannot identify himself as the person enjoined without understanding *svarga*,

the object of his desire, to be the object to be accomplished, *svarga* is understood as the object to be accomplished by the man based on his nature of being a rational human being who never acts if there is no desirable goal to achieve by undertaking such action. Nevertheless, according to the Prābhākara opponent, the injunction itself does not need the result, *svarga* and the like, for executing its function as an instigator. Therefore, once one understands that he is the person who is instigated by the injunction on account of his desire for *svarga*, the injunction's task of communicating instigation is done. If it were otherwise, i.e., if the injunction would have needed the result for instigating the person, whereby it would endorse the result as being situated within the purview of the injunction, then it would be responsible for endorsing a person's desire for killing his enemy by performing the Śyena sacrifice. If it were so, then the sacred texts would be liable to account for the extreme suffering of a person in *naraka* which is the consequence of having killed his enemy through the Śyena. Therefore, the Prābhākara opponent tries to circumvent this problem by identifying the Śyena to be an elective ritual. To explain: although for the Prābhākara the motivation of a man to perform the Śyena, which is an elective ritual, comes directly from the Vedic injunction, "One intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice with the Śyena", yet since an injunction needs the person to be enjoined (*niyojya*) apart from the act to be performed for successfully instigating, and this *niyojya* is identified on the basis of the word which qualifies the person, the injunction *does not* ultimately *prescribe* or *endorse* the object of desire, i.e. killing and on that score, the desire to kill. In further explication of this it may be said, that if the person has no desire to kill his enemy, then he would not identify himself as the person to be enjoined to perform the Śyena sacrifice due to an absence of the appropriate desire, and since without such identification his sense of duty with regard to the act of sacrifice communicated by the Vedic injunction is not activated, he would not undertake the said act, thereby not ultimately allowing himself to cause the death of his enemy and suffer extremely in *naraka* as a consequence thereof. It is in this specific sense that the Prābhākara opponent's remark in NM 5.2 that the function of the prescription in case of elective rituals ends with the communication of the means-end relation and does not extend, unlike in fixed and occasional rituals, up to the performance of the ritual⁵⁰⁷ has to be understood.

In denying this view of the Prābhākara opponent, Jayanta cites Umbekabhaṭṭa's ŚVTā on Kumārila's ŚV ad ŚāBhā MīSū 1.1.5. He says, the relationship between the injunction and the addressee is that of the impeller and the impelled. In regard to the Vedic prescription, "one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", the sacrifice is understood as the content and

⁵⁰⁷ *kāmādhikāre tu niyojyaaivānyathā svargakāmasya nopapadyata iti svargasya sādhyatvam abhyupagatam na punar vidheḥ phalārthatvam. ata eva na tatra vaidhī pravṛttir lipsayaivaa pravṛttatvāt. ... sādhyasādhanabhāvapratipādanaparyavasito hi tatra vidhivyāpāro na prayogaparyavasita iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 111-112.

not as the means of achieving the object which is being desired⁵⁰⁸. This is because, for Jayanta, as it is for Umbeka, if the function of the injunction ended with communicating the means-end relationship only, then the prescription would be akin to an injunction of application (*viniyogavidhi*) as a consequence of which it would lose its essential character of being an instigator of someone who is not already instigated⁵⁰⁹. It is to be noted that here Jayanta seems to subscribe to Umbekabhaṭṭa's view that in all cases an injunction acts as an instigator. Implied is the view that, according to Jayanta, the essential task of a Vedic injunction is to instigate a person to perform a ritual act, in regard to which he has not already been instigated and that it instigates even before communicating the means-end relationship. The communication of the means-end relationship by the Vedic injunction takes place at a later stage with a view only to helping the instigated person realise the instigation in a concrete way; for if it were not for the communication of the means-end relationship, one would be left totally in the dark as to what it is in regard to which one is instigated and what purpose of a rational human being, who never acts aimlessly, would it serve. Thus, even when an injunction performs a specific function, such as the communication of the eligible performer (*adhikārin*), the auxiliaries (*aṅga*), etc. it does not cease to execute its invariable function of instigation. Rather, the communication of the means-end relationship occurs only next to instigation.

In exploring the deeper significance of such a claim, it may be observed that while the Prābhākara opponent proposed one set of a four-fold classification of injunctions into the injunction of origination, injunction of application, injunction about the eligible performer and the injunction of performance based on what the addressee of these injunctions understand upon hearing them and another set of a four-fold classification of injunctions into 'instigator' (*prayojaka*), 'uptaker' (*grāhaka*), 'includer' (*upādāyaka*) and 'enjoiner' (*codaka*) based on the specific functions executed by the injunction⁵¹⁰, one may say in tune with Jayanta's general strategy that it could not be denied that despite such specific understandings stemming from the hearing of these injunctions and the specific functions carried out by the injunctions, neither does the addressee cease to understand himself as being instigated by the injunction nor does the injunction itself cease to instigate the addressee in all cases. This is a crucial point made by Umbeka and following him, Jayanta.

⁵⁰⁸ *vidhipuruṣayor hi preryapreraḥkabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. tatra yāgādayo viṣayatvena pratīyante, na iṣyamāṇopāyatvena.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130. Compare with this the following line from Umbeka: *vidhipuruṣayor hi preryapreraḥkalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. tatra yāgādayo viṣayatvena sambadhyante, na punar iṣyamāṇopāyatayā.* ŚVTā, p. 191.

⁵⁰⁹ *sādhyasādhanamātrapratipādanaparyavasitavyāpāras tu vidhir viniyogapara eva syāt. tataś ca apravṛttapravartakaṃ nijam rūpaṃ jahyāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130. As has already been noted in Section 2.1 of Part II of Chapter III, Cakradhara identifies it as Umbeka's own view, viz. that any kind of injunction whatsoever does not lose its essential nature of being an instigator.

⁵¹⁰ For both these sets of classification of injunctions by the Prābhākara opponent see NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 119-121.

This is again because, without acknowledging this constant understanding of instigation and invariable act of instigation on the parts of the addressee and the injunction respectively, the very need for a Vedic injunction in regard to Vedic ritual actions would be called into question. This, in turn, is due to the fact that the causal relationship of Vedic ritual acts with the objects of human desire is knowable only from the Vedas and not from any ordinary means of knowledge like perception, etc. So, it is only the Vedas which can prompt one in regard to Vedic actions⁵¹¹. In other words, if an injunction communicated or described every gritty detail needed but failed to instigate, then the very purpose of it communicating the nitty-gritties would be useless in the sense that it would not be able to answer the fundamental question as to why does the injunction express such details. The only answer that is possible is that the injunction wants to instigate a person to do or refrain from doing the thing which it prescribes or prohibits respectively. As a result of its not instigating, the entire corpus of injunctions found in the Vedas would be at par with non-prescriptive statements, as a consequence whereof the Veda would lose its validity as an independent instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). This is again because, according to Jaimini and all subsequent Mīmāṃsakas, “since the Veda is meant for (instigating a person) to action, portions of it which do not have such an aim in view would be useless.”⁵¹²

Next, Jayanta summarises his point by challenging the above-mentioned four-fold classification of injunction proposed by the Prābhākaras and observing the following:

“The four states of the injunction are asserted on the basis of the result. Being an instigator is that nature of its which [invariably] follows it in all the states. The injunction’s being of the nature of something to be done presupposes an understanding of impelling⁵¹³. It is on becoming fit for being impelled that a person determines it (the prescribed action) as something to be done. It is only impelling which is first

⁵¹¹ This does not, however, by any means, compromise the role of the result or purpose as an instigator on Jayanta’s view, because a Vedic injunction instigates a rational human being, who, just like for the Bhāṭṭas, does not undertake any act which lacks a purpose. Thus, implicit is the suggestion, that even though the instigation by Vedic injunctions is needed in case of a Vedic ritual act, yet it is not sufficient in the sense that it cannot always guarantee that the subject would make efforts towards the prescribed act. This is again because a Vedic injunction, being a communicator (*jñāpaka*), can only instigate by generating in the subject an awareness “I am instigated by the Veda.” But since Vedic injunctions do not instigate physically like wind or a tyrant king, it cannot necessarily lead one up to the stage of making efforts. Herein comes the role of the object of one’s desire, which is the same as result or purpose of one’s action. Such a purpose gives the incentive to undertake the actions. For more on this, see the conclusion of this chapter.

⁵¹² *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyaṃ atadarthānām*. MīSū 1.2.1.

⁵¹³ This is an echo of Umbeka’s own view on the *modus operandi* of an injunction. For details see the extract from ŚVTā translated in Section 8 below.

understood from the direct mention of optative and like suffixes; the understanding of the means-end relationship presupposes the understanding of it (impelling).”⁵¹⁴

7. If the performance of elective rituals is prompted by injunctions, should non-performance lead to sanctions?

Now, the Prābhākara opponent objects that if it were accepted that one would undertake the performance of even the elective rituals being prompted by the injunctions, then one would incur religious demerit if he did not perform such rituals. This would be again because he would be transgressing the injunction which urges him to act⁵¹⁵.

To this Jayanta replies as follows:

“It should not be so. This is because it is he, who wants to accomplish *svarga*, who is eligible in regard to it (the elective ritual). Others are indeed not eligible, just as people born in the Kṣatriya caste [are not eligible] with regard to the Vaiśyastoma ritual [for which only people born in the Vaiśya caste are eligible]. It is not the case that the person incurs religious demerit while not doing it. The person who seeks *svarga* indeed acts on account of [the instigation caused by] the injunction. If one holds that one undertakes the instrument being prompted by one’s desire, then that (desire) alone should touch the procedure part, which is meant for the sake of ritual. A person who desires to assist the ritual would [in that case] act in regard to it (the procedure) and thus the injunction will be uprooted everywhere.”⁵¹⁶

Underlying the above reply are the following suggestions:

First, it is the desire to accomplish *svarga* which makes one seek the adequate means. Up to this point, Jayanta’s view seems to be in tune with the Prābhākara opponent’s view on the same topic.

However, Jayanta does not stop here but goes on to make such a desire for *svarga* the very source of the person’s eligibility. For him, this desire is something which separates the eligible person from the ineligible ones. But again, according to Jayanta, if the person does

⁵¹⁴ *vidheś caturavasthatvaṃ phalataḥ kila kathyate/
prerakatvañca tadrūpaṃ sarvāvasthānugāmi yat//
kāryātmatāpi vidhyarthe preraṇājñāptipūrvikā/
preryeṇaiva satā puṃsā tat kāryam avadhāryate//
līnādiśrutitaś cādaḥ preraṇaiva pratīyate/
sādhyasādhanasambandhabuddhis tadbuddhipūrvikā//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130.

⁵¹⁵ *nanv evaṃ kāmyeṣu vidhitaḥ pravṛttāv iṣyamāṇāyām apravartamānaḥ pratyaveyād vidhyatikramāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130.

⁵¹⁶ *maivam. svargaṃ siṣādhayiṣoḥ tatrādhikārāt. anyas tv anadhikṛta eva kṣatriyadir iva vaiśyastome. nāsāv akurvan pratyavāyam arhati. svargārthī tu vidhitaḥ pravartata eva.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130.

not do anything, he is not liable to incur any sin. This is exactly the moot point which the Prābhākara opponent raises: once eligibility is established how should one remain immune from incurring religious demerits if he does not act and thus transgress the injunction? Is it not the case that the person transgresses the deontic force of the injunction by not acting even though he has the required eligibility? The way-out put forward by Jayanta is that such a person who desires *svarga* indeed acts having been instigated the injunction. In my opinion, this perhaps suggests that not all kinds of desires are capable of pushing one to act. It is well known that desires may rise and fall and even if one has the desire for something one might not act because he is lazy or has other obfuscating conditions. It is perhaps this particular kind of desire which is also hinted at by Cakradhara when he says: “the idea is this that one would not be a ‘seeker of *svarga*’ if one is not acting.”⁵¹⁷ So it is only that kind of desire which inevitably pushes one to make efforts to act by overcoming obfuscating conditions (if any) like laziness, etc. that is perhaps identified by Jayanta as the source of one’s eligibility, and persons having not such a strong and pushing desire are placed outside the ambit of eligibility.

Thus, once one has this strong desire for accomplishing *svarga* or any other desired object, one would only be eager to find the means to obtain it. It is such a desire which makes him eligible for the elective rituals which are the means of accomplishing *svarga*, etc. that are communicated by the injunction. The compelling nature of the desire providing one with eligibility makes one but obey the injunction and undertake the prescribed actions.

Jayanta now proceeds to refute the Prābhākara opponent’s contention that in case of elective rituals one undertakes the instrument, i.e., the main act out of sheer desire and the auxiliary acts being prompted by the injunction. Jayanta says that if it were so then such a desire would even touch upon the auxiliary acts in so far as they render assistance to the main ritual and it would be because of a desire to assist the ritual, i.e., the main act, that one would undertake the auxiliary acts. This would do away with the role of injunction and render it useless everywhere⁵¹⁸. This is certainly an unwelcome consequence for the Prābhākara opponent since he was most concerned with upholding the autonomy of the Vedic sacred texts in the form of injunctions and prohibitions in prompting eligible people.

What is to be noted here is that the claim made by Jayanta above that the understanding of means-end relationship that follows from the hearing of exhortative suffixes is preceded by an awareness of instigation seems to be based on Umbeka’s *Tātparyatikā*. It is worth noting that this seems to be Umbeka’s own view as distinguished from the view of

⁵¹⁷ *apravartmāno na svargārthī syād iti bhāvaḥ* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 96.

⁵¹⁸ *lipsayā tu karaṇāmśe pravṛttir iṣyamāṇā kratvartham itikartavyatāmśam api saiva sprśet. kratūpakārahāmo hi tatra pravartata ity evaṃ sarvatra vidhir utsīded eva ity alaṃ prasāṅgena.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 130. The Mysore reading is ‘*maivam*’. But this does not fit with the context. I have preferred the ‘*saiva*’ reading from the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP}, p. 360).

Kumārila which he explained. Hence, I present the relevant passage from Umbeka’s commentary which records both of them –

*vidhir api vā puruṣārthāsādhake*⁵¹⁹ *vyāpāre puruṣeṣv apravartamāneṣv ātmanaḥ pravartakatvavigatim āśaṅkamānaḥ puruṣārtharūpam eva sādhyam ākṣipan sannihitataram api dhātvarthaṃ bhavatikriyākartṛtvānupādānād apuruṣārthatvāc ca na bhāvanāyāṃ bhāvvyatvena avagamayati, svargādi tu*⁵²⁰ *yady api kāmasambandhena upakṣiṇam, tathāpi tasya ‘svargo me bhūyād’ ity evaṃ kāmyamānatvena bhavatikriyākartṛtvenopādānāt puruṣārthatvāc ca vidhir bhāvanābhāvvyatam avagamayan na vihanyata ity eṣā tāvat prakriyā.*

vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ - “jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta”, “yāvajjīvaṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyaṃ yajeta”, “brāhmaṇo na hantavya” ity evamādiṣu vākyeṣu preraṇāpratipattiyuttarakālaṃ kāmyamānopāttaduritaḥṣayanarakapātādayaḥ sādhyatvena pratīyante; na ca tatra bādhaḥ kāraṇadoṣajñānaṃ vā kadācid udeti. kiṃnibandhanā punar iyaṃ pratipattir iti ced, yadanantaram yad utpadyate, tad evāsyā nibandhanam; evaṃvidhavākyaṅnantaram ceyam utpadyate; tasmād idam eva kāraṇam iti. tasmād bhāvanārthavidhir vidheyārthatām avagamayati, niṣedhavidhiś ca niṣedhyasyānarthatām iti. ŚVTā, p. 102.

Or, given that human beings are not motivated in regard to activities which are not means of achieving human end, an injunction, being afraid of the loss of instigation, does not communicate the meaning of the verbal root, which although is more proximate, to be the thing to be brought about with regard to *bhāvanā*. This is because, [the injunction rather] implies a human end to be the thing to be accomplished, [and because the meaning of the verbal root] is not obtained as the agent of the action of becoming and also because of [the verbal root’s meaning’s] being something not desirable [in itself] by human beings. By contrast, although *svarga* and the like cease [to function] by virtue of [its] connection with desire, is communicated by the injunction as the object to be brought about with regard to *bhāvanā*. This is because, on account of being the object of desire as in “may *svarga* be there for me”, it (*svarga*) is obtained as the agent of the action of becoming and also because it is something desirable by human beings. On account of communicating this, the injunction does not fail [in regard to its essential nature of being an instigator]. This is the indeed manner [of explaining how an injunction instigates].

But we say – with regard to [injunctive] sentences like “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma”, “One should sacrifice with the Full and New

⁵¹⁹ Emended from ‘*puruṣārthasādhake*’ to make the meaning consistent with the context.

⁵²⁰ Emended from ‘*svargādiṣu*’ since the 7th case-ending does not make sense here in the light of the presence of the word ‘*upakṣiṇam*’ for which no corresponding noun in the neuter gender in the nominative singular is otherwise to be found.

Moon (sacrifices) as long as one lives”, “A brāhmaṇa is not to be killed”, subsequent to an understanding of impelling, objects of desire (e.g. *svarga*), removal of accumulated religious demerit, downfall into *naraka*, etc. are understood as things to be accomplished. There occurs neither invalidation nor a cognition of causal defect in that regard at any point. If it is asked as to what is it that such an understanding is based on, [then in reply it is said –] if something [say, Y] occurs after something [say, X], then that (X) alone is its (Y’s) basis. In this manner, this (awareness of impelling) arises upon [hearing] such a sentence; hence this (injunction) alone is the cause. Therefore, a prescription which has *bhāvanā* as its object makes known that the thing fit to be prescribed (the action denoted by the verbal root) is beneficial [in nature] and a prohibitory injunction makes known that the thing to be prohibited is maleficent [in nature].

The second view above is that of Umbeka, according to whom it is the awareness of being instigated which chronologically arises first. This should be the primary awareness logically too, for the defining characteristic of any injunction whatsoever, according to Umbeka, is that of ‘being an instigator’. What is specially to be noted here is that Umbeka thinks that this process holds equally true for elective, fixed and prohibited acts, as hinted by the mention of the prescriptions for the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the Full and New Moon sacrifices, and also the prohibition about non-killing of a brāhmaṇa. And the basis for this understanding is said to be the relevant injunctions, upon hearing which such an awareness arises. This is in conformity with a view of causality, according to which if Y arises after X, X is the cause or basis of Y. This causality cannot be challenged or termed as faulty in so far as no invalidating counter-cognition arises; nor is one’s understanding invalidated due to defects in one’s instrument of cognition. This is consistent with the general Bhāṭṭa view of a valid cognition being about an object hitherto unknown and not invalidated by any other instrument of knowledge.

The contrast of this view with the first one seems to consist in degrees of emphasis put on the instigating character of an injunction. While the first view does not seem to deny the understanding of instigation, yet it does not seem to accept it to be the primary awareness which is generated on hearing injunctive statement of every kind. Rather on the first view, the emphasis seems to be more on the rational subject who does not act even after being prompted by the injunction, unless the prescribed act leads to a desired goal of his. The implication of the means-end relation between the act and the result by the injunction here does not seem to suggest a logical or chronological posteriority to instigation, unlike on the second view. Rather, the communication of the means-end relationship by the injunction seems to take place at the same time when the injunction communicates the instigation, although the former is not directly denoted. Moreover, on the second view, the injunction itself does not seem to communicate the means-end relationship, but it is the rational addressee of such injunctions, who probably computes it on his own. Since such a computation is ultimately based on the primary understanding of instigation communicated by the injunction, a communication of it is perhaps secondarily attributed to the injunction on the second view.

8. Commandment vs. Desire: Jayanta on the source of instigation

Next, Jayanta examines how on the Prābhākara opponent's view, *niyoga* or commandment could be the instigator. Jayanta's polemics in this regard is worth quoting:

“[Jayanta:] Given that a connection with any other means of knowledge has been denied to it (commandment), how does, on your view, one learns [the word-meaning relationship] based on usage [of elders] with regard to sentence-meaning, which is of the nature of commandment?”

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It has been said that on seeing activity to be preceded by a specific volition in oneself one infers similarly in case of others too.

[Objection by Jayanta:] This is incorrect, because there is no basis for understanding impelling even in regard to one's own self. Unlike the self, [and] cognition, impelling is self-revealing [just] because there no basis for understanding impelling. If cognition of impelling were to be self-revealing – then, to begin with, one has to find out the occasion for its genesis. It is not linguistic communication [which could be the basis], because language acquisition is absent at that time. [For you], who understands that activity is preceded by an understanding of impelling, the inference of it (the understanding of impelling) is established in regard to others seen acting. You say that the basis for it (such an inference) is the optative and like suffixes. But that understanding of impelling in one's own self at the time of language acquisition [for the first time] is to be pondered over. If [you say that] the understanding of it is based on some other means of knowledge, then get up! [your claim that sentence-meaning, which is of the nature of commandment, is] the content of linguistic communication only is not established.”⁵²¹

Jayanta's main point here is that neither instigation in itself nor a cognition of it can be held to be self-revealing by the Prābhākara. For, in both cases the problem that the Prābhākara would face is to account for the instrument of knowledge through which commandment which is of the nature of an instigator is understood for the first time to be the meaning conveyed by the exhortative suffixes. Without there being language

⁵²¹ *pramāṇāntarasamparkavikale bhavataḥ katham/
niyogātmani vākyārthe vyutpattir vyavahārataḥ//*

nanūktam – ātmākūtaviśeṣapūrvikāṃ ceṣṭām ātmaniṣṭhāṃ dṛṣṭvā paratrāpi tathānumānam iti. ayuktam idam. svātmany api preraṇāvagamanimittābhāvāt. na hy ātmeva saṃvid iva preraṇāvagamanimittābhāvāt preraṇā svaprakāśā. preraṇāsaṃvit svaprakāśeti cet. tadutpāde tarhi nimittaṃ tāvan mṛgyam. na tāvac chabdas tadānīṃ vyutpattiyabhāvāt. svātmani preraṇāvagamapūrvikāṃ hi ceṣṭām upalabdhavatas te paratra ceṣṭādarśanāt tadanumānam setsyati. tannimittaṃ liṅādih śabda iti bhotsyate. sa punar vyutpattikāle svātmany eva preraṇāvagamaś cintyo vartate. pramāṇāntarāt tu tadavagama iti ced – uttiṣṭha asiddham śabdaikagocaravam. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 131.

acquisition, it is not possible to know how commandment could be the referent of the exhortative suffixes. If for knowing commandment to be the referent of the exhortative suffixes some other instrument of knowledge is appealed to, then it would put to rest the Prābhākara claim that linguistic communication is the sole source of our knowledge of commandment and this would nullify two further claims made by the Prābhākara that the Vedic sacred texts are authoritative in so far as they instigate an eligible person independently of other instruments of knowledge and that they enjoy complete autonomy in this regard.

Two further points, which, in my opinion, can be made against the Prābhākara position are as follows: First, if commandment were self-revealing then it need not be known from linguistic communication and hence the need for language acquisition would be rendered superfluous. Second, if commandment, on account of being self-revealing, were not the referent of exhortative suffixes and on that score remained outside the ambit of linguistic communication, then its ontological status would have to be inquired into and its nature ascertained. For, if commandment were not the meaning of exhortative suffixes, what would it ontologically be?

Now, Jayanta contrasts the Prābhākara theory of commandment with that of his own. Jayanta says:

“One’s being the seeker for the result and nothing else called impelling is understood as the instigator in regard to the effort in one’s own self for the fruit of the wood-apple tree and the like, whose being the means of [achieving] pleasure has previously been ascertained. It has therefore been said –

Activity follows from desire on account of recollection [of a thing previously experienced as the means of achieving pleasure]. (PVB 2.4.183)

For, it is the desire for the result that is self-revealing there.⁵²²

Therefore, in place of a knowledge of the impeller [ensuing] from exhortative suffixes, which is postulated by others, may that beautiful [desire for the result] alone be postulated as the instigator. It is either to avoid [getting] slapped or for the sake of obtaining sweets that a young student undertakes study; but he does not [do so] due to any commandment such as “you should offer oblation.”⁵²³

⁵²² *yā ceyaṃ pūrvāvadhāritasukhasādhanabhāve kapitthādau svātmani pravṛttir upalabdhā, tatra prerakatvena phalārthitā nirjñātā nānyā kācīt preraṇā. taduktam –*

*smaraṇād abhilāṣeṇa vyavahāraḥ pravartate/
phalaviṣayā hīcchā tatra svasaṃvedyā// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 131.*

⁵²³ *ataś ca prerakajñānaṃ śabdād api parasya yat/
kalpyate kalpyatām tatra prerikā saiva sundarī//
capeṭāparihārāya modakādyāptaye ’pi vā/*

Then how does one say, “I do it being impelled by the teacher”?

Let there be such a way of saying things. But instigation by the teacher is not the cause there, rather the desire to obtain something beneficial and avoid something detrimental. Thus, it is reasonable that the result is the instigator, because it is attested by experience.^{524*}

A point that needs specially to be mentioned in this connection is that when Jayanta says that it is the *phala* or result which is the instigator, what he means by it is that it is *phalaviṣayecchā* or the desire which has for its content the result which is the instigator. Jayanta also uses such expressions such as *iṣyamāṇam phalam*⁵²⁵ or the result which is being desired in this regard. This, in my opinion, serves the following purposes: First, by linking desire to result, Jayanta does away with the possible objection that not all results are capable of instigating one to act, but only those desires which would be so strong as to compel one to act and thus secure the undertaking of action by the person⁵²⁶. Second, since according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category scheme, *icchā* or desire is a quality (*guṇa*) of the self (*ātman*), its ontological position is well-established unlike *niyoga* or commandment. Third, since on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, *icchā* or desire is produced by *jñāna* or cognition, and desire shares the content of cognition, there is no possibility, unlike the Prābhākara view of *niyoga*, of desire and its content remaining unknown.

A further point which is worth noting here is that although for Jayanta it is the result or a desire for it which prompts a person to undertake an action and it is the same for Vedic and worldly actions, yet, unlike the Bhāṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā* or the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga*, it is not available exclusively from linguistic sources. Rather, as Jayanta says, the result is sometimes obtained directly out of linguistic communication, sometimes by a reference to the context or sometimes through reflection⁵²⁷. Since such a result is not understood exclusively out of linguistic communication, and even within that not exclusively from exhortative suffixes, it helps explain why even after hearing non-exhortative statements, one might act⁵²⁸. This suggests that since *phala* is not understood

pravartate vatur nāsau juhudhīti niyogataḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 131-132.

⁵²⁴ *kathaṃ tarhy evam ācaṣṭe ācaryacodito 'haṃ juhomi. astu ayam vyapadeśaḥ. ācāryacodanā tun a tatra kāraṇam api tu hitāhitaprāptiparihārārthitvam eva ity ataḥ phalaṃ pravartakaṃ yuktam anubhavasākṣikatvāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 132.

⁵²⁵ *phalasyaiveṣyamāṇasya paśyan prerakatāmataḥ/ yam artham adhikṛtyeti sūtram vyadhita sūtrakṛti*// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 134.

⁵²⁶ See Section 8 above.

⁵²⁷ *kvacit sākṣāt padopāttaṃ kvacit prakaraṇāgatam/ kvacid ālocanālabhyaṃ phalaṃ sarvatra gamyate*// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁵²⁸ Jayanta says:
vartamānāpadeśe 'pi phalaṃ yatrāvagamyaṭe//

exclusively from exhortative statements, and reflection is one of the many ways of comprehending it, a rational person, who does not act if his action does not lead to a desired result, computes the result or consequence internally upon hearing a non-exhortative statement like “a beta-blocker lowers blood pressure.” It is by means of such a computational process that a person reacts to an indicative statement or a command and decides to undertake an action.

An analysis of Jayanta’s mentioning of *ālocanā* or reflection as a source of understanding *phala* or result is not out of place⁵²⁹. Although it cannot be denied that even when the predominant element of a linguistic cognition – be it *kriyā*, *bhāvanā*, *niyoga* or *phala* – is understood from exclusively linguistic sources, some amount of reflection by the person who understands it is necessary for many reasons like understanding the relation of it with other component semantic elements of a sentence, etc. However, the reflection which Jayanta alludes to seems to be not an ordinary reflection, but understanding of the means-end relationship between two things independently of linguistic sources. This becomes particularly significant when this is read in the light of Jayanta’s reference to a half-verse from Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (2.4.183). This verse, which Jayanta cites against his Prābhākara opponent’s view of *niyoga* and in favour of his own view of the desired result (*iṣyamāṇaphala*) being the instigator, says, that when something previously ascertained means of attaining pleasure is remembered, the desire to obtain it again leads to the undertaking of activity by the person⁵³⁰. What this suggests is that one can learn even from one’s experience by the twine methods of concomitant presence and concomitant absence that a thing X is the means to achieving pleasure. Now even when this object is no more, and the experience has also long died out, one’s memory of it may be triggered by suitable stimulus. As a result of remembering that the previously experienced object is the means to achieving pleasure, one may desire to obtain it and accordingly may make efforts in that direction. Since undertaking of activity may be instigated by the desire to

*tatra pravartate loko liṅādiṣvaśruteṣvapi/
bhavatyārogyasampattiṃ bhūñjānasya harītakīm//
tatkāmo bhakṣayecceci ko viśeṣaḥ pravartane/ NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 123.*

Even when the [verb] expresses the present tense, if the result is understood, worldly people act in regard to that [i.e., the result], even though optative and the like [suffixes] are not heard. What is the difference regarding the instigation between ‘he who eats the fruit of the myrobalan tree regains health’ and ‘he who wants it [i.e., who wants to regain health] should eat [it]?’

⁵²⁹ *kvacit sākṣāt padopāttaṃ kvacit prakaraṇāgatam/
kvacid ālocanālabhyaṃ phalaṃ sarvatra gamyate// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.*

Result is understood everywhere; sometimes it is obtained directly out of words, sometimes it (result) comes from the context, [and] sometimes it comes through reflection.

⁵³⁰ *smaṇād abhilāṣeṇa vyavahāraḥ pravartate.* Quoted in NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 131.

obtain a thing which is remembered to be the means of achieving pleasure, Jayanta seems to claim that the result may be understood as the instigator even from reflection, where reflection is to be understood in the special sense of computation of the means-end relation between two things independently of linguistic sources.

In the light of the above analysis, it may be said that Jayanta's theory of *phala* as being understood also from reflection may also perhaps help explain cases like suckling of mother's breast by a baby who has no access to any language whatsoever. Of course, in such cases the knowledge of the act of suckling mother's breast as leading to a desirable result of satiating hunger is produced, in the absence of any other plausible cause, by *jīvanādr̥ṣṭa* or the unseen potency responsible for such apparently automatic and uncaused actions like breathing, coughing, suckling the mother's breast, crying, etc.

Next, it must be observed that Jayanta's statement that even in case of statements made by others it is nothing other than desire for the result which should be postulated as the instigator, implies, in my opinion, to do away with the hierarchical distinctions among order (*ājñā*), request (*prārthanā*), permission (*anujñā*) and instruction (*upadeśa*), which is so elaborately dealt with by Maṇḍana in his ViVi. For, in all cases, Jayanta seems to imply, that if it were not for the desire to obtain the result, one would not act even if one were facing a royal command.

9. Jayanta on the nature of the instigator

9.1. Critique of *Prayoktrāśaya* or 'Intention of the Instigator'

At this point, Jayanta, just like his Bhāṭṭa opponent, undertakes an examination of the nature of the instigator. In doing so, Jayanta mentions the view of one of his interlocutors, according to whom, it is the intention of the instigator which instigates a person to act; this is again because no acts upon hearing a statement made by someone, obeying whom, no purpose of one's own is served. By contrast, even from the bodily gestures like movement of the eyebrow, etc. of a person, who is worth obeying for the realization of one's own end, and who might not even be speaking, a person can understand his intention and act⁵³¹.

Jayanta says that this view is incorrect because by inferring the intention of the instigator, one acts due to the possibility of fulfilling one's own need and not because he wants that only the instigator should be pleased. Even if one wants that the instigator should be pleased, it is ultimately because it would be the cause of his own pleasure, and not merely

⁵³¹ *ye 'py āhuḥ prayoktrāśayasya pravartakatvaṃ yato 'nanuvidheyasya vacanāt na pravartamānaḥ kaścīd dr̥śyate. anuvidheyasya puṃsaḥ kiñcid abruvato 'pi bhrūbhaṅgādīnāśayam avagamya pravartata iti.* NM_{Mys.}-II, p. 132.

for the sake of the instigating person's pleasure only⁵³². This is quite in tune with Jayanta's theory stated above that a young student offers oblation not because he is enjoined to do so by his teacher, but for his own purpose of either avoiding punishment or getting rewarded.

Jayanta pushes this argument further and says on a kind of sarcastic note that even the Buddha, who has resolved for the well-being of all, serves the purpose of others as his own purpose, and the instrument for serving his own purpose is constituted by the serving of the purpose of others⁵³³. Therefore, Jayanta concludes, it is one's own pleasure which instigates.

In respect of the above view of self-interest being the sole motive for undertaking any action, Jayanta seems to be echoing the following lines from Patañjali's MaBhā –

sarva ime svabhūtyarthaṃ pravartante. ye tāvad ete guruśuśrūṣavaḥ nāma te 'pi svabhūtyarthaṃ pravartante – pāralaukikaṃ ca no bhaviṣyati, iha ca naḥ prīto gurur adhyāpayiṣyatīti. tathā ya ete dāsāḥ karmakarā nāma te 'pi svabhūtyarthaṃ pravartante – bhaktaṃ cailaṃ ca lapsyāmahe. paribhāṣāś ca na no bhaviṣyantīti. tathā – ya ete śilpino nāmaite 'pi svabhūtyarthaṃ pravartante – vetanaṃ ca lapsyāmahe. mitrāṇi ca no bhaviṣyantīti. MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 3.1.26, p. 68.

All these [people] act for the sake of [accomplishing] their own well-being. To begin with, even the pupils who attend the teacher, indeed act for their own well-being [in the form of] – there will be other-worldly [prosperity] of us [on account of serving the teacher], and here [in this world,] the teacher pleased [as he would be] will teach us. Likewise, these unskilled labourers who work, even they act for the sake of their own welfare – ‘we will gain daily food and clothing’⁵³⁴; there will no punishment for us.’ Likewise – these skilled labourers as they are – even they act for the sake of their wellbeing – ‘we will get wages; we will have [new] customers’.⁵³⁵

The mention of skilled and unskilled labourers is especially significant in the sense that they are normally believed to passively carry out the order of their superiors and have no

⁵³² *etad apy ayuktaṃ yataḥ prayoktrāśayānumānena svārthasambhāvanayā lokaḥ pravartate na punaḥ prayoktaiva prīyatām iti. tatprītir api svaprītihetutvena arthyate, na tatprītitvena. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 132.*

⁵³³ *buddho 'pi hi nāma sakalasattvahitaṃ pratipannaḥ parārthaṃ svaprayojanatayaiva sampādayati. parārthasampādanadvarakaṃ tu tat. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 132.*

⁵³⁴ I have followed V. S. Agrawala in my understanding of the terms *bhakta* and *cela*. I have also understood *dāsa karmakāra* as ‘unskilled labourer’ and *śilpin* as ‘skilled labourer’ after him. See Agrawala (1963:236-237).

⁵³⁵ I have followed Prabhudayāla Agnihotī in understanding ‘*mitra*’ here as new customer. See Agnihotī (1963:310-311).

personal ends to achieve. Patañjali's characterisation of the expectations of these skilled and unskilled labourers underscore the basic aspirations of the common mass of his time, and prove how even these people actively worked towards the accomplishment of their own personal ends.

The influence of Bhartṛhari⁵³⁶ on Jayanta in regard to one's acting for fulfilling one's own need even when conceding to others' intention is even more pronounced –

*nimittebhyaḥ pravartante sarva eva svabhūtaḥ/
abhiprāyānurodho 'pi svārthasyaiva prasiddhaye// VP_{Rau} 3.7.124.*

On every occasion [whether it involves an order from a superior, etc.], everyone [whether it is the instigated agent or the instigating agent] acts for the sake of [his] own wellbeing. Compliance with [the instigating person's] intention too is for the sake of accomplishing one's own purpose indeed.

Jayanta also says that if the intention of the instigating person were to be considered the instigator, then, since according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, the Vedas are authorless, no intention of the instigator could be ascertained and hence no undertaking of Vedic ritual actions would follow⁵³⁷. Thus since one of the major opponents, viz. Mīmāṃsā philosophers, do not agree to the fundamental question of there being an author of the Vedas, the option of such an author's intention being the instigator does not. Moreover, in the light of the fact that the Nyāya philosophers accept Īśvara or God to be the author of the Vedas, if it were to be accepted as the standard Nyāya view on the problem prevalent during Jayanta's time, he was unable to accept it and put it forward in a debate with the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, on the ground just mentioned above. It is perhaps for this reason too Jayanta did not subscribe to this view⁵³⁸.

Despite the possible influences of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari on Jayanta discussed above, the most plausible and strongest influence on Jayanta in this regard seems to be that of Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana connects the question of 'being someone fit to be appeased' (*anuvīdheyatva*) to the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* via the concept of the *niyoktr* or that which enjoins. The relevant passage from ViVi is reproduced and translated below:

*api ca na loke niyogamātraṃ pravṛttihetuḥ sarvasya niyogād apravṛtته.
anuvīdheyaniyogāc ca tadbhāvāt. anuvīdheyatvaṃ niyoktur anyaniyogāt*

⁵³⁶ For a detailed analysis of *prayoktrdharma* in VP and some later works, see Vergiani (2014).

⁵³⁷ *prayoktrāśayasya ca pravartakatve vedārthaprayoktrāśayānavadhāraṇād apravṛttir eva prāpnoti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 132.

⁵³⁸ *ucyate vede 'pi vaktā 'sti. tadāśayavaśena tatrāpi phalārthināṃ pravartanam iti sambhavad apīdam uttaram nācakṣmahe kathāntaraprasaṅgāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 123.

*pravṛtīhetuḥ. anuvidhānakāraṇam cārthānarthaprāptiparihārādi
pramāṇāntarasiddham. na ca vede niyoktā 'pi. kutaḥ punar anuvidheyāḥ.*

nanu śabdaḥ.

*bhavatu nāma niyoktā na tv anuvidheyo hetvabhāvāt. na hy
arthānarthaprāptiparihārayoḥ śabdānuvidhāne pramāṇam asti. ViViGo, pp. 74-75.*

Furthermore, in respect of worldly [affairs too] mere enjoinder is not the cause of one's making efforts. This is because, not everyone acts due to enjoinder and because it (making efforts by human beings) occurs due to the enjoinder by someone who must be obeyed. It is on account of the person's enjoining another [person] that [his] being someone who must be obeyed [is] the cause of [the enjoined person's making] efforts. And obtainment of something desirable and avoidance of something undesirable, which are the cause of obeying someone, is established by means of another instrument of knowledge. There is not even someone to enjoin (*niyoktr*) in case of the Vedas. Whence does [the property of] being someone to be obeyed [occur in connection with the Vedas, which are authorless]?

[Proposal by the Prābhākara opponent:] Well, [it is] linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic injunctions that is the enjoinder and something that must be obeyed too].

[Reply by Maṇḍana:] Let [such linguistic communication] be the enjoinder, but it is not something that must be obeyed, because of the lack of any basis [for its being so]. There is no evidence with regard to obtainment of something desirable and avoidance of something undesirable on accepting linguistic communication to be something that must be obeyed.

Two major points emerge from the ViVi passage quoted and translated above:

i. Maṇḍana is using the word *niyoktr* and *niyoga* in a general sense of urging by someone to do something and he wants this to work as the general basis for both worldly cases of *niyoga* and the technical sense with which it is invested by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā philosophers in the context of analysing the Vedic injunctions.

ii. Based on an analogy of worldly cases of enjoinder being executed on account of the enjoinder's being someone who must be obeyed for the sake of obtaining a desired end or avoiding an undesirable consequence, Maṇḍana complains of the lack of a like enjoinder in case of the Vedas because of the Mīmāṃsā view of the Vedas being authorless. The Vedas cannot somehow be accepted as that enjoinder who must be obeyed also for the reason that in that case the Veda would lose its nature of being a communicating cause

(*jñāpakahetu*) and become an accomplishing cause (*kārahetu*). And, if the Vedas were an accomplishing cause, then the Vedic injunctions' addressees would invariably act on hearing a Vedic injunction. But this is not the case since people are seen not to act even upon hearing the Vedic injunctions owing to the presence of various obfuscating factors like laziness, incapacity, etc. Since a person's or an object's being someone or something who or which must be obeyed is based on one's obtaining a desirable end and avoiding an undesirable end by means of such obedience, the Vedas do not qualify as such an *anuvīdheya*. This is because, on the Prābhākara opponent's view, the Vedic injunctions are not the means to achieve any result by virtue of its being a result which is desired by human beings; rather, the injunction needs results like *svarga* only in so far as they specify of the person to be enjoined (*niyojyaviśeṣaṇa*), whereby his sense of duty with regard to the prescribed action would be activated and he would undertake the performance of the same.

Coming to Jayanta, the following points are noteworthy:

- i. It seems that Jayanta also uses the term *prayokṭṛ* in a general sense just as Maṇḍana does in case of *niyokṭṛ*⁵³⁹. What is more, Jayanta connects the property of being someone or something who or which must be obeyed (*anuvīdheyatva*) with *prayokṭṛ* like Maṇḍana's linking it to *niyokṭṛ*.
- ii. Following Maṇḍana's pattern, Jayanta moves from the human *prayokṭṛ* to the impossibility of a *prayokṭṛ* of the Vedas.
- iii. Since it is the Mīmāṃsā philosophers only who hold the Vedas to be authorless, the argument regarding the impossibility of understanding the intention of the *prayokṭṛ* in case of the Vedas must be directed against some Mīmāṃsaka. Jayanta has also spoken of the inferring of the intention of the *prayokṭṛ* in worldly cases. Now, it is the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā philosophers who reduce linguistic cognition ensuing from the use of worldly sentences to inferences and those following from Vedic sentences as linguistic cognition or *śābdabodha* proper. The immediately preceding context in NM 5.2 is that of Jayanta denying the possibility of *niyoga* or commandment as the instigator. This too speaks of the argument being directed against a Prābhākara-like opponent.
- iv. As shown by David (2013:288-290), Maṇḍana considered command, request and permission to be *prayokṭṛdharma*-s or "properties of a speaker", which is a term that had already been used by Bhartṛhari in VP_{Rau} 3.9.105. Maṇḍana also described such

⁵³⁹ Cf. David (2013:289 fn. 50) also independently points that *niyokṭṛ* and *prayokṭṛ* are used as synonyms (even in Maṇḍana), but seems skeptical of this conclusion:

"It is not impossible, in the context of ViV 5 ..., that the term *prayokṭṛ* stands, with the meaning of "instigator," as a synonym of the term *niyokṭṛ*, used by Maṇḍana in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 26. The parallel with Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. ... and Helārāja's *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ..., where *prayokṭṛ* clearly points to the speaker in general, makes me doubt, however, of this possibility."

prayokṭṛdharma-s as *abhiprāyātiśaya* or “particular intentions” and also *puruṣadharmā* or *nṛdharmā* or “properties of a person”. David is also of the opinion that Maṇḍana’s “insistence on the *personal* dimension of command, etc., is quite understandable in the context of the *pūrvapakṣa*, where such meanings are mentioned to serve two distinct (though closely related) purposes, namely to deny that operations such as command, etc., could be “operations of speech” (*śabda vyāpāra*) regardless of its speaker (ViV⁵⁴⁰ 3) and to contest that the allegedly authorless Veda could convey such “particular meanings” (*arthabheda*) (ViV 5).” Jayanta mentions *prayokṭrāśaya* or “intention of the speaker” but unlike Maṇḍana he does not use it as a general category for command, request and permission and hence does not add the word ‘*atiśaya*’ to *āśaya* like Maṇḍana does in *abhiprāyātiśaya* to identify command, request and permission as “particular intentions”.

It has already been noted under Section 3.2 in the first part of Chapter Three that Jayanta has reused Bṛ ad MīSū 1.1.25 (vide Bṛ_{Ta}, p. 383). Prabhākara already connects the use of *preṣanā*, etc. with people who are equal, younger or inferior and elder or superior, and hence to human beings. Also, since Prabhākara and following him, Jayanta, says that they are external conditioners which specify the denoted meaning of instigation in general based on their usage [‘*prayuj-*’ (Prabhākara) and *prayoga* (Jayanta)], Prabhākara already connects it with *prayokṭṛdharma* like Maṇḍana, albeit indirectly. Maṇḍana seems to have taken over Prabhākara’s view in this regard and added a further category to it, viz. *upadeśa* or instruction to account for the impersonal Veda’s instigation, and for doing this he also highlighted the fact that in case of *upadeśa*, the person instructed is the beneficiary and he is also someone who has not already undertaken the action (*apravṛttakriya*). Jayanta might have known also Maṇḍana’s categorisation since he has evidently quoted from BS and also reused arguments from ViVi and BS. Although he might have known it, still he might have thought it not worthy of discussion because Maṇḍana’s category of *upadeśa* holds good within the framework of the authorless nature of the Vedas claimed by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and Jayanta had already refuted the Mīmāṃsā claim of the Vedas being authorless in the third and fourth books (*āhnikā*) of NM⁵⁴¹.

It is important to note that a late post-Śālikanātha Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā monograph on injunctions and sentence-meaning, viz. Ahobalāsuri’s⁵⁴² *Vākyārtharatna* with the auto-commentary, *Suvarṇamudrikā*, attributes the view of speaker’s intention being the cause of one’s efforts to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers⁵⁴³. Classical (*prācīna*) Nyāya philosophers

⁵⁴⁰ This is Hugo David’s abbreviation.

⁵⁴¹ However, this is just a hypothesis and needs a more detailed and separate investigation, which I reserve for a future paper.

⁵⁴² Ahobalāsuri’s date is mentioned as 1565 AD in Potter (2014:453).

⁵⁴³ See verses 9 and 41-46 and their respective auto-commentary of VāRS.

like Udayana accept the intention of a reliable speaker (*āptābhiprāya*) as the meaning of the exhortative suffixes and it is what instigates a person to act.

In the light of the above, it may be observed that although the influence of Maṇḍana's ViVi on Jayanta's treatment of the problem seems strongly possible, yet Jayanta also might also have aimed at a general review of the problem, taking into account also the Bhartṛharean and Vaiśeṣika dimensions to the concept.

9.2. Jayanta's reply to the Bhāṭṭa objection to the admission of the result as the instigator

The Bhāṭṭa in NM 5.2 had objected that the result could not be the instigator, irrespective of whether it is already accomplished or unaccomplished. To explain: if it were something already accomplished, then it could not prompt one to undertake an action for the sake of accomplishing it, because one never strives for something which is already there in his possession. Nor even could it instigate if it were of an unaccomplished nature. For, an unaccomplished result like the hare's horn could not logically instigate. This is again because a fictional entity like the hare's horn is not known to have instigated a person to act for achieving it⁵⁴⁴. In other words, a person never makes efforts towards something which does not and cannot exist at all.

It is worth noting here that although this objection was discussed in the context of presenting the Bhāṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā* in NM 5.2, for which, it has been mentioned as the Bhāṭṭa objection, yet Maṇḍana's objection to accepting *phala* as the instigator in ViVi may be considered as a probable source for it. The context is as follows⁵⁴⁵: after refuting a few proposals of the Phalaprakavartakatvavādin⁵⁴⁶, Maṇḍana examines the Phalapravartakatvavādin's claim that 'being accomplishable by action' (*karmasādhyatā*) is the cause of undertaking of action (*pravṛttilhetu*) and since such a property inheres in the result, the result can be the instigator. Since desirable results like satiation of hunger, etc. are fit to be accomplished through specific actions, one acts in regard to such actions. Now, Maṇḍana asks, what is this property of 'being fit to be accomplished' (*sādhyatā*)? If such a property is the very essence (*rūpa = svarūpa*) of the result, then on account of its not being determined by any specific means of achieving it, there would occur the undesirable consequence that a person would make efforts with regard to its means as well as the non-

⁵⁴⁴ *phalaṃ tāvan na pravartakaṃ siddhāsiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ. phalasyāpravartakatvaṃ siddhatvād eva. na hi yad yasyāsti sa tadarthaṃ yatate. nāpy asiddhasya kharaviṣāṇaprakhyasya phalasya pravartakatvaṃ yuktam adṛṣṭatvāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 95.

⁵⁴⁵ I have followed Srimohan Bhattacharya's explanatory notes to his Bengali translation of the first half (*pūrvārdha*) of ViVi in making sense of this passage. For details see ViVi_{SB}, pp. 25-26.

⁵⁴⁶ This is my label for conveniently referring to Maṇḍana's opponent in ViVi, according to whom, it is *phala* or result which instigates one to undertake an action.

means of achieving such a desired result. Then, this Phalapravartakatvavādin makes the proposal that the property of ‘being fit to be accomplished’ should be understood as a specific factor (*kāravīṣeṣa*). Now this specific factor is further glossed by the Phalapravartakatvavādin as a specific capacity (*śaktibheda*) of the result which is determined by the means of achieving the result (*sādhanaṇiyata*); otherwise, in the absence of such a capacity a result cannot be a factor. The Phalapravartakatvavādin explains: just as form, etc. have specific capacities on account of which they are invariably grasped by specific instruments like the eye, so should results be understood as having specific capacities for which they are distinct from *ākāśa* or the sky which is eternally present and also from the sky-flower which on account of being a fictional entity is never present. The distinction lies in the fact that results like satiation of hunger, etc. are brought into being through specific means like the act of eating, etc. What Maṇḍana says at this point in criticism of such a view of his Phalapravartakatvavādin opponent is immediately relevant to understanding the influence of Maṇḍana on Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent’s formulation of the aforementioned objections to admitting result as the instigator. Maṇḍana says:

kadā punar ayaṃ śaktibhedaḥ sādhyatābhīdhānaḥ? phalasya bhāvasamaye na tāvat. vaiyarthyaḍ apravṛtīhetutvāc ca. na khalūtpannasya utpādo yadyoginī śaktir arthavati. nāpi siddhe phale tatsādhane kaścit pravartate. abhāvakāle ’py asat kathaṃ śaktimat khapuṣpavat? ViViGo, p. 22.

[Maṇḍana:] But when is this specific capacity said to be fit for being accomplished⁵⁴⁷? It is not, in the first place, when the result exists. This is because it would be redundant and there would be the undesirable consequence of [the specific capacity] not causing any activity. [To explain:] that [result] which has already been produced [by a specific means] is not certainly produced [again] so that the capacity related to it (the result) should be purposeful. Nor is it that anyone makes efforts with regard to an already accomplished result [and] its means. While [the result] is absent, how can the non-existent [result] have [that specific] capacity just like the sky-flower [which, on account of being a fictional and hence non-existent entity, cannot ever have the specific capacity of being accomplishable by a specific means].

It is in respect of the two alternatives of the result being either present on account of having been already accomplished or being absent like fictional entities such as the sky-flower, based on which Maṇḍana has refuted the possibility of each result’s having the specific capacity to be produced by specific means, that Jayanta’s Bhāṭṭa opponent’s objections have a striking similarity both in spirit and in letter.

⁵⁴⁷ In simpler terms, the objection boils down to the following: when or under what conditions can the result be deemed fit to be accomplished, based on which it could urge a person to undertake the appropriate action for bringing it about?

Now Jayanta's answer to the above objections raised by his Bhāṭṭa opponent may be considered. According to Jayanta, it is not the case that the result cannot be the instigator either if it is accomplished or if it is unaccomplished. Once again Jayanta says that the result is the instigator in so far as it is the content of human desire. Its being of an unaccomplished nature is to be understood in the qualified sense of unaccomplished at the moment of being desired and not in the sense of being unfit for accomplishment at all points of time like the flower of the sky⁵⁴⁸. The implication of Jayanta's view is that it is precisely because it is unaccomplished at the moment and yet having the capacity to be brought about, that the result is capable to instigate a person, who seeks it, to undertake an appropriate action for bringing it about. It seems that in answering the Bhāṭṭa opponent's objection, Jayanta indirectly draws upon Maṇḍana's objections regarding the two possible alternatives. This is because, Jayanta has to find a way to explain that the result is neither already accomplished nor something, like a fictional entity, which can never be accomplished. He finds the middle way, the way out, by building his answer on the fact of a result's being desirable by human beings. Since Jayanta's theory implicitly applies to rational human beings, who never act with regard to something which cannot be accomplished, the very desiring of a result by such a person guarantees its being of a potentially accomplishable nature. It is due to this potentially accomplishable nature of the result on account of which it is desired by rational human beings that a result can prompt one to undertake the action to achieve it.

9.3. Criticism of *Śreyahsādhanatā*

Now Jayanta criticises the view of those who think that it is the property of being the means to achieve something beneficial that is the instigator on the ground that despite the presence of such property, one may not make efforts in regard to the action because of lack of desire⁵⁴⁹.

But the upholders of the *śreyahsādhanatā* view might argue that even people who have desires are not found to make efforts in regard to some indefinite object. Rather, it is with regard to the meaning of the verbal root, which is known to be the means of achieving something beneficial. Hence it is the understanding of an action as the means to achieve something beneficial which is the instigator⁵⁵⁰.

⁵⁴⁸ *yat punaḥ phalasya prerakatve dūṣaṇam abhyadhāyi – siddhyasiddhavikalpānupapatter iti – tad apy ayuktam – icchāviṣayīkṛtasya pravartakatvābhyupagamāt. asiddhe kathaṃ kāmaneti ced – asiddhatvād eva. idānīm ca tad asiddham na ekāntāsiddhasvarūpam eva khapuṣpavat.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 132.

⁵⁴⁹ *yad api śreyahsādhanakatvaṃ pravartakam ucyate tad api na cāru satyām api śreyahsādhanatāyām anarthitvena pravṛttyabhāvāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 133.

⁵⁵⁰ *nanv arthino 'pi nāniyataviṣayā pravṛttir api tu nirjñātaśreyahsādhanabhāve bhāvārthe. tasmāt tatsādhanatāvagamaḥ pravartakaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 133. The reading of the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-I}, p. 361) is

To this Jayanta replies as follows:

“True. Even if both (desire for the result and the understanding of the meaning of the verbal root as the means to achieve something beneficial) were there, [still] it is correct to say that it is desire alone which is the instigator, because one undertakes an action only if it (desire for the result) is there. For, setting in (*pravṛtti*) is undertaking. And undertaking is the effect of desire – [such is the view of] the [Vaiśeṣika philosophers, who are the] followers of Kaṇāda. The property of being the means to achieve something beneficial is the basis for fixing the content, but not for producing effort.”⁵⁵¹

By highlighting the causal connection between desire and effort Jayanta stresses the essential unity of desire and effort in so far as that which is the object of desire is necessarily the object towards which efforts are directed. Desire and effort cannot have different objects or contents since it is not the case that one desires something while does something else which is not causally related to the object of his desire. If it were so, then the logical unity of desire and effort, which characterises the actions of rational human beings, would be unachievable. Moreover, the emergence of any effect whatsoever would not be in accord with any kind of causality, but would be sheerly accidental (*ākasmika*). Now rational human beings, as has already been said earlier, desire only those things which can be accomplished through appropriate means and do not desire things which are either eternally present or those which are fictional⁵⁵² entities and hence can never exist. Thus, being a rational person’s object of desire entails that the object can be accomplished by appropriate means. Since it is in the very nature of human beings to do only those things which serve some end desired by them, it is logically the very nature of the desired end which is seen to determine what exactly should be the nature of the means thereto. Hence the logical anteriority of the end makes possible for it a greater claim to be the instigator than its means. The means, by contrast, is dependent for its existence and the possibility of being desired on the end. Hence the logical anteriority of the end as compared to the means thereof also accounts for, on Jayanta’s view, its independence.

slightly different here - *api tu nirjñātaśreyaḥśādhanabhāve’rthe*, which would be translated as “but rather about a thing, which has been known to be the means to achieve something beneficial”.

⁵⁵¹ *satyam. dvaye saty api icchaiva pravartikā vaktuṃ yuktā tasyāṃ satyām eva pravṛttidarśanāt. pravṛttir hi nāma prayatnaḥ. prayatnaś cecchākārya iti kāṇādāḥ. viṣayaniyame tu śreyaḥśādhanatvaṃ kāraṇaṃ na pravṛttyutpāde.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 133.

⁵⁵² Jayanta here does not say that we do not desire unicorns etc. because they are not “achievable through efforts” (*kṛtisādhyā*). Rather, he seems implicitly to use the fact that rational human beings do not desire unreal things as a reason for justifying the link between ‘being achievable through efforts’ (*kṛtisādhyatā*) and desire.

Jayanta's critique of the *śreyaḥsādhanatā* theory is especially interesting for the following reasons: Jayanta was chronologically posterior to Umbekabhaṭṭa, who commented not only upon Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* but also Maṇḍana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*. It has already been noted that not only was Jayanta acquainted with Maṇḍana Miśra's *Brahmasiddhi* on account of quoting from it⁵⁵³, but also because of his conceptual reuses of Maṇḍana's arguments found in the latter's *Bhāvanāviveka* and *Vidhiviveka*. Now, both in the *Vidhiviveka* and *Brahmasiddhi* Maṇḍana uses expressions like 'apekṣitopāya'⁵⁵⁴, 'iṣṭābhyupāya'⁵⁵⁵, 'īhitopāya'⁵⁵⁶, 'īpsitasyopāyatā'⁵⁵⁷, 'samīhitopāyatā'⁵⁵⁸, 'īpsitopāya'⁵⁵⁹, 'samīhitasādhanā'⁵⁶⁰, 'iṣṭasādhanatā'⁵⁶¹, 'apekṣitasādhanatva'⁵⁶². In all these expressions, *icchā* or desire and the subjective aspect on that score are clearly accommodated. Even when Maṇḍana uses the expression '*śreyaḥsādhanatā*', he most probably wants it to mean '*iṣṭasādhanatā*'. Generally speaking, *śreyas* in *śreyaḥsādhanatā* means, in contrast to the meaning of *iṣṭa*, 'supremely beneficial', which has a comparatively greater objective undertone.⁵⁶³ Thus an *iṣṭa* could be just an object of desire without also necessarily being *śreyas*, i.e., supremely beneficial.

⁵⁵³ Jayanta (vide NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 465) has quoted the following verse (no. 1) from the *tarkakāṇḍa* of Maṇḍana's BS –

*āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣedhṛ vipaścitaḥ/
naikatva āgamastena pratyakṣeṇa virudhyate//* BS_{Ku}, p. 39.

Although this verse summarises the view of pre-Maṇḍana philosophers about the nature of perception and its non-conflict with sacred texts (*āgama*) in so far as it mentions the view of learned men (*vipaścita*), yet this very versified formulation is Maṇḍana's own and it is introduced as Maṇḍana's response to an objection, with the word '*ucyate*'. That it is not Jayanta's original verse is clear from his use of the expression, '*tad uktam*', for introducing this verse.

⁵⁵⁴ BS_{Ku}, p. 115, 116; ViVi_{Go}, p. 173.

⁵⁵⁵ ViVi_{Go}, p. 173, 180, 215.

⁵⁵⁶ ViVi_{Go}, p. 181.

⁵⁵⁷ ViVi_{Go}, p. 209, 211.

⁵⁵⁸ ViVi_{Go}, p. 216, 217, 218.

⁵⁵⁹ ViVi_{Go}, p. 219, 221.

⁵⁶⁰ ViVi_{Go}, p. 222, 223, 268.

⁵⁶¹ ViVi_{Go}, p. 267, 307, 313, 319.

⁵⁶² ViVi_{Go}, p. 268, 307.

⁵⁶³ I think an intellectual hinterland of such an opposition between *śreyaḥ* and *iṣṭa* can be located in the later Vedic conflict between *śreyaḥ* and *preyaḥ* as found in *Kaṭhapaniṣad* 1.II2. As Surama Dasgupta explains the import of this verse:

Now, it seems to me that if Jayanta had dealt with the *iṣṭasādhanatā* theory of Maṇḍana instead of *śreyahsādhanatā*, then since the former already accommodated human desire via *iṣṭa* or the object of desire, he might not have been able to distinguish his own theory from that of Maṇḍana's, which could ultimately lead to the subsumption of his view under Maṇḍana's *iṣṭasādhanatā* theory. However, his treatment of *śreyahsādhanatā* probably gives him the chance to highlight the role of *icchā* or human desire and thus uphold his own theory of *iṣyamāṇa phala* or a result which is being desired to be the instigator. To explain: on the *śreyahsādhanatā* view, one had to separately postulate an understanding of it as such, followed by two probable steps of desire for the *śreyaḥ* and the desire for the instrument of achieving *śreyas* (*śreyahsādhana*), and the last one would lead to the generation of efforts on the part of the human being. Given that desire for objects is independent of the teachings of sacred texts, and it is this desire only which leads to the desire for the means, Jayanta might have thought it fit to deem the desire for object itself fit for being the instigator. This seems even more probable because although one directly acts in regard to the means, it is ultimately towards the end that all efforts of a person are directed⁵⁶⁴. An additional advantage of accepting *iṣyamāṇa phala* as the instigator is probably that since desire (*icchā*) is the effect of cognition (*jñāna*) on the Vaiśeṣika view and the content of desire is none other than that of cognition, it would not unlike the *śreyahsādhanatā* model have an additional requirement of being known (*nirjñāteṣṭasādhanabhāvaḥ arthaḥ*). Thus, there is no scope for objects of desire remaining unknown and once known they can immediately prompt one to look for the suitable means for their accomplishment⁵⁶⁵. Thus, it seems to me that, consistent with Jayanta's central

“In the *Kathopanisad* (sic!) we find that the path of the good is sharply distinguished from that of the pleasures derived from the world. This concept of the good, or *śreyas*, implies something beyond the pleasurable and painful and can be found in the essence of the self... The path of the *śreyas* or the good is, therefore, the path of self knowledge and self realisation. The path of satisfaction (*preyas*) leads to the fulfilment of desires relating to the body and does not lead to the realisation of one's own self. The *Upanisad* (sic!) further says that it is only one out of thousands that turns to the path of the good (*śreyas*) and there are only few who can teach the path, and Nacikeṣṭas (sic!) was congratulated that he chose and stuck to the path of the good. The path of the pleasurable leads only to transitory pleasures, while the path of the good leads to eternal bliss which is identical with the self.” – Dasgupta (1961:11).

This is just to suggest a possible origin for the opposition. I will investigate it further in a future paper.

⁵⁶⁴ It is probably for this reason that later Nyāya authors like Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcāna clearly distinguished between desire for the result (*phalaviṣayiṇī icchā*) and desire for the means (*upāyaviṣayiṇī icchā*). See *Muktāvalī* on Kārikā no. 146, in Kā.

⁵⁶⁵ It is probably for this reason that later Nyāya authors like Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana say –

tatra phalecchāṃ prati phalajñānaṃ kāraṇam. ata eva svataḥ puruṣārthaḥ sambhavati. yaj jñātaṃ sat svavṛttitayeṣyate, sa svataḥpuruṣārtha itī tallakṣaṇāt. itarecchānadhūnecchāviṣayatvaṃ phalito 'rthaḥ. See Muktāvalī on Kārikā no. 146, in Kā.

tenets, *śreyas* or the supremely beneficial thing is not beneficial for a person until and unless it is *iṣṭa*, i.e., something which is desired. Given also that results like *svarga*, etc. which, on account of being identified with supreme pleasure, cannot be directly produced by human effort, an understanding of *śreyahsādhanatā* can only help one, as Jayanta says, specify the means for achieving the end and not actually generate efforts in regard to the result. Further, if *śreyahsādhanatā* were accepted as the instigator, Jayanta would not be able to explain why even after hearing the Vedic prescriptions, which prescribe actions that lead to beneficial ends, one would either not be inclined to do them, or be overpowered by desire for things having contrary consequences. In other words, an *iṣyamāṇa phala* or *iṣṭa*, i.e., a result which is desired, would help explain the genesis of different kinds of desires, often under the influence of varying psychological states, which could serve as strong obfuscating conditions blocking or overriding the understanding of actions prescribed by the Vedic sacred texts and which lead to supremely beneficial ends.

It is also interesting to note that Maṇḍana Mīśra was of the opinion that mere *iṣṭasādhanatā* is not an instigator, but *iṣṭasādhanatā* of a (potential) agent was so⁵⁶⁶. In other words, if mere *iṣṭasādhanatā* were the instigator then it would not have been the case that even after hearing a Vedic injunction, a person would not sometimes act. Thus, by linking *iṣṭasādhanatā* to the agent and by presupposing that every rational human being would not fail to understand the *iṣṭasādhanatā* and *aniṣṭasādhanatā* communicated by prescriptions and prohibitions respectively and act accordingly, Maṇḍana tried to secure the success of the prescribed or prohibited act in instigating a person to doing some specific thing or restraining him from doing some specific thing respectively. By contrast, although Jayanta highlighted the role of a *sapratyaya* or rational person in being motivated by an injunction, yet he did not deny the fact that under the influence of strong obfuscating factors, even a rational person might fail to recognise the *iṣṭasādhanatā* or *aniṣṭasādhanatā* communicated by Vedic prescriptions and do just the opposite, the consequence whereof he deems desirable at that moment. Thus, while Maṇḍana's theory presupposes an ideally rational behaviour on the part of human beings in desiring a particular end and the means thereof, human desire in Jayanta's theory has a relative status in the sense that it can occur and differ according to the psycho-physical and social state of a particular human being, who, even though generally rational, might act irrationally sometimes on account of specific impactive factors. Thus, the rationality of a human being, on Jayanta's view, seems to include both ideal and situational types, which gives him the means to explain why an ideally rational human being may apparently act irrationally (e.g., a man's having

The cognition of the result is the cause of the desire for the result. Therefore, [the result] can in itself become the object of human desire. Because its definition consists in its being that, which on being known, is desired to be in oneself, is a desirable human in itself. It boils down to being the content of a desire which is independent of other desires.

⁵⁶⁶ *neṣṭasādhanatāmātram vidhir api tu kartuḥ*. ViViGo, p. 267.

sexual intercourse with another man's wife, which, although prohibited by the Vedic sacred texts, is considered by him to be the means of achieving a beneficial end) under the influence of conditions able to situationally obfuscate one's judgement irreversibly (e.g., extreme sensual passion).

Jayanta's final critique of *śreyaḥsādhanatā* as the instigator is as follows:

“Moreover, ‘being the means to achieve the supremely beneficial’ (*śreyaḥsādhanatva*), as understood out of *bhāvanā*, is accepted by them (who hold that *śreyaḥsādhanatā* is the instigator) to be the instigator. But it cannot be spoken of separately. This is because, since *bhāvanā* consists of three parts, it is while knowing its essential nature that the understanding of the means-end relationship between these two parts, sacrifice and *svarga*, is established. It is not correct to say that the activity (*bhāvanā*) as delimited by the two parts (the means and the end represented by sacrifice and *svarga* respectively) has the form of being the means to achieve the supremely beneficial. For, it lacks such a form on account of being unaccomplished [due to the absence of the procedural part]. Because, the generic property of cowhood cannot be present in a part, like the dewlap, of a cow, which has not [fully] come into being. And it is not the case that without obtaining the three parts the activity called *bhāvanā* is accomplished.”⁵⁶⁷

Cakradhara's understanding of this passage is a bit different. According to him, the *bhāvanā* is incomplete when it is qualified by only two parts of instrument and procedure and lacking in the result or end⁵⁶⁸. Drawing upon the analogy of the generic property of cowhood inhering in a cow, he also says that being the means to achieve the supremely beneficial generally pertains to *bhāvanā* and not to any particular part of it, for, if it were not so, *bhāvanā* could not be called the means for achieving the supremely beneficial⁵⁶⁹. It is clear that Cakradhara makes efforts to show that *bhāvanā* without the result is incomplete and hence not fit to be called the means for achieving the supremely beneficial. This is because, being a faithful interpreter of Jayanta's text, he would, consistent with the central tenets of Jayanta's theory of the instigator, like to uphold the preeminence of the result or purpose.

⁵⁶⁷ *kiṃ ca bhāvanāvagataṃ śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ pravartakam iṣyate taiḥ. tac ca na pṛthag abhidhātum yuktam. bhāvanāyās tryaṃśatvena tatsvarūpāvagamasamaya etadaṃśayoḥ svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvanāvagatisiddheḥ. na cāṃśadvayenāvacchinnasya vyāpārasya śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ rūpaṃ vaktum ucitam, anīṣannasya tasya tādrūpyābhāvāt. na hy anīṣanne gavi tadekadeśasāsnādau gotvarūpaṃ sāmānyam niviśate. na ca aṃśatrayapūraṇam antareṇa bhāvanākyavyāpāranīṣattir iti.* NM_{Mys-II}, p. 133.

⁵⁶⁸ *na cāṃśadvayāvacchinnasyeti. aṃśadvayaṃ karaṇetikartavyatākhyam. anīṣannasya phalāpekṣayā 'paripūrṇasya.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, pp. 98-99.

⁵⁶⁹ *śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ hi bhāvanāyāḥ sāmānyam, na bhāvanāikadeśasya. anyathā hi bhāvanāyāḥ śreyaḥsādhanatvaṃ iti vyapadeśo na syāt.* NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 99.

However, Cakradhara’s interpretation of this passage does not seem proper to me. Even within the *bhāvanā* theory, *śreyaḥsādhanatā* refers to the part of *bhāvanā* delineating the instrument, whose nature is already determined by the object to be brought about by it. Thus, it is rather strange that Cakradhara should understand *śreyaḥsādhanatā* to be comprised of the instrument and procedure parts and not of the instrument part alone. It is also surprising to see Cakradhara sayingt *śreyaḥsādhanatā* applies as a generic property to *bhāvanā*, comprised of all the three parts. For, such a view of *śreyaḥsādhanatā* would go against the basic principle of ascertaining sentence-meaning and the instigator enunciated in NM 5.2 on the basis of identifying the element which is unaccomplished and awaits accomplishment by means of the already accomplished things. Thus, if *bhāvanā* as a whole were to be understood as being endowed with the property of being *śreyaḥsādhanatā*, then the ‘what’ along with the ‘by what means’ and ‘how’ parts would come to be treated as instruments and hence there would be nothing left which could count as the *sādhyā* or the thing which is to be accomplished. This clearly goes against the basics of the Bhāṭṭa theory of *bhāvanā*, according to which *bhāvanā*, which is the meaning of the exhortative suffixes, applies only to the instrument and procedural parts and not to the object part⁵⁷⁰. Although Cakradhara was clearly inspired in holding *śreyaḥsādhanatā* as applying to the whole of *bhāvanā* by Jayanta’s use of the analogy of the generic property of cowhood belonging to a cow as a whole and not to any of its parts, yet he lost sight of the fact that Jayanta had said so only to underline the fact that according to him *śreyaḥsādhanatā* as an instigator would make sense, if at all, only when it is in association with the two other constituent parts of *bhāvanā*, viz. the result and the procedure and not in a state of isolation from them. In other words, Jayanta probably wanted to repeat the first part of his critique by suggesting that *śreyaḥsādhanatā* or the instrument part of *bhāvanā* could only be useful in identifying the specific act which needed to be done only in association with the result and the procedure.

Thus, Jayanta, in my opinion, perhaps did not want to see *śreyaḥsādhanatā* as separate from the *bhāvanā* theory of Kumārila, which has already been refuted in NM 5.2⁵⁷¹. It is

⁵⁷⁰ *phalāṃśe bhāvanāyās ca pratyayo na vidhāyakaḥ*. Verse no. 222c-d, *Codanāsūtra*, ŚV_{DS}, p. 84.

⁵⁷¹ Jayanta might have been inspired to advance this critique by his understanding of Umbeka, who too, despite commenting on Maṇḍana’s BhāVi, sought to harmonise Kumārila’s *śabdabhāvanā* with Maṇḍana’s *iṣṭasādhanatā* by looking upon *śreyaḥsādhanatā* as forming only a part of the overarching structure of *bhāvanā*, as indirectly suggested by the following line from his commentary on BhāVi –

nanu liṅādeḥ preraṇām avagacchāmaḥ. na ‘yajeta svargakāmaḥ’ iti vākyād dhātvarthasya śreyaḥsādhanatvamātrābhyupagamāt. BhāV_{IGI}, p. 93.

[Umbeka]: Well, it is from optative and like suffixes that we understand instigation. For, from the sentence, “One who is desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, it is not only understood that the meaning of the verbal root is the means of achieving something beneficial [but instigation too is understood].

Jayanta's individualistic way of approaching the theory of *śreyaḥsāadhanatā* and refuting it at a foundational level which might also explain why, if this view belongs, as claimed by Cakradhara, who is generally meticulous about Jayanta's sources, to the followers of Maṇḍana Miśra⁵⁷², why had Jayanta not attempted to write a detailed refutation of Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka* or portions of *Brahmasiddhi* that deal with the *iṣṭasāadhanatā* theory. This is because, Jayanta might have considered it fit to strike at the very roots of the *śreyaḥsāadhanatā* view instead of attempting to refuting its gritty details as found in the *Vidhiviveka*. Moreover, a detailed refutation of Maṇḍana's theory was beyond the scope of NM, in which only a broad outline of the rival theories and their refutations were given by Jayanta⁵⁷³.

9.4. Exhortative suffixes (*linādiśabda*) and their functions (*tadvyāpāra*)

Hereinafter, Jayanta mentioned two other candidates for instigator, viz. words with exhortative suffixes (*linādiśabda*) and their function (*tadvyāpāra*) and refers to the

As will be evident from the full debate translated under Section 9 of Chapter One, this is not an objector's point of view.

⁵⁷² *tair iti māṇḍanān nirdiśati*. NMGBh in NM_{GS-II}, p. 98.

⁵⁷³ The following statement of Jayanta at the end of presenting the Prābhākara theory of commandment (*niyoga*) applies to the all the views touched upon in NM 5.2 –

*tatra dvādaśalakṣaṇyāṃ tattadrūpaṃ prakāśitam/
tanneha likhyate'smābhir granthavistarabhīrubhiḥ//
dinmātraṃ tvetadākhyāyi niyogasya yathā'gamam/* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 121.

A similar statement has been made by Jayanta in the context of examining Vaiśeṣika views –

*samānatantre dikkālau vaitatyena vicintitau/
tan neha likhyate loke dveṣyā hi bahubhāṣiṇa//* NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 373.

Although direction and time are elaborately deliberated upon in the sister-school (Vaiśeṣika), yet they are not written here; for, [people] who talk much, are hated in the world.

Although this was written in the context of examining the Vaiśeṣika views on direction and time, yet the statement that people who talk much are hated in the world is of a general nature and is not restricted to a discussion of Vaiśeṣika doctrines alone. As this on one hand may reflect the general mentality of intellectuals current in 9th c. AD Kashmir when Jayanta was active, it may also shed light on Jayanta's approach to writing books in general and writing about intellectual systems other than his own in particular. This statement may also be an indicator that although Jayanta knew the details of many theories of his own school and that of others (including those of his rivals) he intentionally refrained from dealing with them at length, might be with a view to keeping his own work within a sizeable length.

I owe the reference to this verse of Jayanta's about the Vaiśeṣika view on direction and time to Thakur (2003:381-382).

refutation of them offered earlier while discussing the nature of the instigator within the discussion on the Bhāvanā theory of the Bhāṭṭas⁵⁷⁴.

Nor even, Jayanta says, could an injunction instigate someone based either on its own strength or by way of communicating the means-end relationship⁵⁷⁵. If it were by way of communicating the means-end relationship that an injunction instigated a person, then it would be the result or purpose alone which would be communicated, albeit implicitly, to be the instigator⁵⁷⁶. This is because an injunction seeks to instigate a rational (*sapratyaya*) person, who would not act unless he has made sure that by performing the prescribed action, some desired purpose of his would be served.

Now Jayanta takes up for refutation for the last time the Prābhākara position that if a Vedic injunction were to resort to a result for instigating a person it would lose its autonomy. The dialogue between Jayanta and the Prābhākara is as follows:

“The [following] is to be said [in reply] to him, who says that if an injunction were to be the instigator on account of highlighting the result, it would lose its autonomy in so far as it would be at par with perception, etc. – if [an injunction] were devoid of a result, it would lose its independence even more. This is because not even a fool does anything which lacks a purpose. Who, then, is that rational person who would do something which lacks a result?⁵⁷⁷”

[Objection:] Even when the result is highlighted some [people] do not indeed make efforts in regard to that (action).

⁵⁷⁴ The arguments given for refuting these candidates two can be found under section 7B.II.d in the chapter on the Bhāvanā Theory of Sentence Meaning.

⁵⁷⁵ *vidhir api svamahimnā vā prerakaḥ syāt sādhyasādhanabhāvasambandhāvabodhanena vā. svamahimnā prerakatvam asya pūrvam eva nirastam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 134. Jayanta says that the possibility of an injunction instigating a person on account of its own strength or capacity has already been refuted. Although Jayanta says so yet what is in fact to be found within the discussion on the Bhāvanā theory in NM 5.2 is whether an injunction could instigate a person i) through the communication of the means-end relationship or 2) by realising activity or desistance from activity. Of these, the second option is ruled out by the opponent (to whose view Jayanta also most probably subscribes) on the ground that activity is based on human desire and that an injunction cannot take any punitive measure against a person, who even after hearing a positive or negative injunction, does not act or refrain from acting respectively. For details see Chapter I.

⁵⁷⁶ *sādhyasādhanabhāvasambandhāvabodhanapurassare tu tasya pravartakatve phalasya eva pravartakatvam idam anakṣaram abhīhitaṃ bhavati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 134.

⁵⁷⁷ *yas tv āha prerakatvaṃ cet phalaṃ darśayato vidheh/
pratyakṣādisamānavāt svātantryaṃ tasya hīyate//
sa vācyah phalaśūnyatve sutarām asvatantratā/
yad riktam arthaṃ mūḍho `pi na kaścīd anuṭiṣṭhati//
ko hi nāma niṣphalam arthaṃ prekṣāvān anuṭiṣṭhet.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 134.

[Reply:] So what? May he pleasingly not make efforts. It has been said that an injunction is not a causal factor, but a communicator.

[Objection:] Let it communicate [the instigation] even without highlighting the result.

[Reply:] It is unable to communicate it [in that way], since it communicates [instigation] to a rational person and he is not so communicated without the result [having been communicated]. Enough of verbosity!”⁵⁷⁸

The above polemical discussion suggests that according to Jayanta, since an injunction instigates a rational person and a rational person does not do anything which does not serve his purpose, an injunction cannot afford to instigate such a person without resorting to the result. Since as per the Prābhākara opponent’s own admission, there are cases where even after understanding a result to have been communicated by the injunction a person does not act, it is rather superfluous, in Jayanta’s view, for the Prābhākara to expect that a rational person gets instigated by the injunction without its highlighting any result. Even on Jayanta’s view, the epistemic integrity of the Vedic injunctive texts is not compromised in so far as they are mere communicators and the instigation caused by them is seen to belong only to the cognitive level and not at the physical level of actual performance. For this reason, it is perhaps improper to set aside our well-established worldly experience that even after being ordered by a teacher or a king, one acts only when he finds the probable outcome of carrying out the ordered action to be beneficial to him. To put it differently, Jayanta here probably invokes the difference between *pravartanā* (instigation) and *pravṛtti* (undertaking) implicitly for replying to the Prābhākara complaint of the loss of autonomy of the Vedic injunctions. *Pravartanā* is the verbal or non-verbal activity (e.g., utterance of command, a gesture, etc.) of an instigator which is directed towards someone else in order for the latter to undertake a specific action or desist from doing a specific thing. In case of Vedic injunctions, it consists of the communication of instigation in the form of “A person who desires X should do Y” by means of exhortative verb-forms to a person, whose understanding of it takes on the form, “I am instigated by the Vedas to do Y.” With reference to worldly cases, it consists of the verbal communication by an instigating agent of instigation in the form of either an order (e.g. “John must close the door”) or request (e.g. “John, please close the door”) or seeking permission (e.g. “May I go to the disco?) or expression of approval (e.g. “You may go to the disco”) to another person, whose understanding of it takes on the general form, “I am instigated by this person to do this.” *Pravṛtti*, which is translated here synonymously as undertaking, effort and volition, pertains to the person instigated and takes on the form, “I shall do this.” While the

⁵⁷⁸ *nanu phale 'pi darśite kecin na tatra pravartant eva. kiñcātaḥ? kāmam mā pravartīṣata. na hi kārako vidhir api tu jñāpaka ity uktam. nanu phalam apradarśayan api jñāpayet. na jñāpayitum utsahate prekṣāvān hi jñāpyate na ca phalam vinā 'sau tathā jñāpito bhavatīty alaṃ bahubhāṣitayā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 134.

Prābhākara is satisfied with just securing a successful *pravartanā* or instigation for the Vedic injunctions without caring for whether *pravṛtti* or volition on the part of the instigated subject takes place or not, Jayanta is concerned with accounting for the basis of the generation of *pravṛtti* or effort, which is the ultimate goal of this entire instigation-motivation process.

10. Salient Features of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's view on Injunctions

In light of the foregoing discussion, it will not be out of place to summarise the salient features of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's view on Injunctions. These are as follows:

1. It is the result (*phala*) or purpose (*prayojana*) that a subject desires to be accomplished that ultimately instigates one to undertake an action.
2. Like the Mīmāṃsaka-s, Jayanta accepts a division of Vedic rituals into fixed (*nitya*), occasional (*naimittika*) and elective (*kāmya*) types.
3. Just as in case of the fixed and occasional types, it is the Vedic injunction which instigates one to the Vedic rituals. But even then, it is ultimately the subject's desire for the result that motivates him to make efforts to realise the action.
4. Like elective rituals, fixed and occasional rituals too lead to results such as the elimination of accumulated religious demerits (*upāttaduritaśaya*) or avoidance of future religious demerits (*pratyavāyaparihāra*).
5. In case of prohibited actions, consequences in the form of downfall into *naraka*, etc. (*naraka-pātādi*) are to be postulated.
6. An injunction, whether it is of a prescriptive type (*vidhi*) or prohibitive type (*niṣedha*), applies to a rational person (*sapratyaya / prekṣāvat*), who never acts without a purpose and in regard to something which lacks a result.
7. Whether the performance of a Vedic ritual has a result or not does not depend upon its having been mentioned or not mentioned in the corresponding injunction for it. It is rather owing to the need of the injunction which applies to rational human beings who do not act without a purpose that the injunction attracts a result even if the result is remotely mentioned. For, otherwise it would not be possible for the injunction to instigate such a rational person.
8. An injunction is only a communicator (*jñāpaka*) and not a causal factor (*kāraka*). An injunction instigates one at the cognitive level by generating the awareness in that person of having been instigated. It is the result, by contrast, which due to its desirability generates efforts.
9. A generally rational person can also act irrationally sometimes under the influence of situationally irreversible obfuscating factors like extreme hatred, passion, etc.

10. It is not enough for a Vedic prohibitive injunction to communicate to the subject that a certain action is harmful; the subject too needs to understand that similarly. If the subject understands it in the opposite way under the influence of situationally irreversible obfuscating factors, he will not desist from doing it.
11. That result or purpose is the instigator is attested by our experience. Thus, unlike his opponents, Jayanta's identification of the instigator is not dependent solely upon linguistic sources.
12. Result or Purpose is understood to be the most important element in sentence-meaning and hence it is also considered the instigator. The source of our understanding of result or purpose is not merely language but also reference to contexts as well as reflection.
13. Expressions such as "I act out of the king's command", "I offer oblation being instigated by the teacher" are just way of saying things. They do not, in any way, seek to dispense with the sole role of result or purpose as the instigator and establish the role of commandments alone in instigating a person.
14. Whenever a person acts it is because he wants to obtain something which he considers to be desirable or to avoid something which he considers to be undesirable.
15. Even Vedic injunctions cannot alter the fundamental human nature of not acting without a purpose.
16. In the paradigmatic Vedic injunction, "*svargakāmo yajeta*", the word *svarga* should be understood as referring to supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*) and not to any pleasurable object whatsoever. Its being of the nature of the supreme pleasure speaks of its being desirable and hence unaccomplished nature.
17. In order to achieve a unity of desire and effort, it is necessary to accept identical contents for both. It is this unity which accounts for the syntactical and causal relation of *svarga* and sacrifice.
18. The phrase '*svargakāma*' is not there merely for the purpose of identifying the eligible performer of the prescribed act. Rather, the word *svarga* refers to the result or goal or purpose with which the prescribed action (e.g., sacrifice) bears a causal relation.
19. Were *svarga* not to be understood as the result, then one would desire one thing and do another thing, where the object of his desire and the action undertaken by him are not causally related to each other. This would lead to the undesirable situation where syntactical connection of the phrase *svargakāma* within the injunction, "One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", would not be obtained.
20. Since one cannot act directly in regard to results like *svarga*, *svarga* within the phrase *svargakāma* has to be treated as an "unobtainable qualifier" (*anupādeyaviśeṣaṇa*) of the person and hence *svargakāma* would refer first to an eligible performer (*adhikārin*) and only later to an agent (*karṭṛ*).

21. If the qualifier of the person mentioned in the injunction is such that it can be brought about by human effort directly as a consequence whereof, the person thus qualified can make efforts with regard to the prescribed action, the phrase containing such an obtainable qualifier of the person, would denote the agent (*kartṛ*) and not the eligible performer (*adhikārin*). E.g., “the red-turbaned red-clothed priests”.

22. In case of Vedic injunctions like “*yāvajjīvam juhoti*”, the word *jīvana* meaning ‘being alive’ refers to an occasion, which too cannot be brought about through one’s efforts, and hence such expressions as *yāvajjīvam* also serve as the “unobtainable qualifier” of the person and hence refers to the eligible performer.

23. Since *phala* or result need not be understood exclusively from linguistic sources, but also through reflection, one may also get motivated to do something on hearing a sentence which does not have any exhortative verb-form (e.g., Eating apple is good for health). The understanding of impelling from such non-exhortative statements is not essentially different from the ones ensuing from hearing exhortative statements (e.g., One desirous of having good health should eat apples).

11. Conclusion

In conclusion, a comparative assessment of the views on injunctions held by the Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara, and Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponents, and Jayanta may be attempted. To begin with, for the Prābhākara in NM 5.2, *vidhi* or injunction is necessarily and sufficient enough to instigate a person; *phala* or result only supplies the eligibility-correlate (*adhikārānubandha*). To explain: the word *svarga* occurring in the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ only serves to stipulate the person (in this case, a *svarga*-desiring person) who is to be enjoined in regard to the act of sacrifice. The act of sacrifice, which supplies the scope-correlate (*viśayānubandha*), helps specify the scope of action to which the exhortative suffixes command a person. The identification of the person to be enjoined helps activate in him a sense of duty in regard to the action prescribed by the injunction. But the injunction itself does not stand in need of the result for instigating a person, for, if it had to resort to a result, the Vedic sacred texts would lose their autonomy in instigating a person.

For the Bhāṭṭa opponent in NM 5.2 in general and Umbeka in particular, the injunction with an inbuilt result is enough to instigate a ‘*sapratyaya*’ person. By the expression ‘*sapratyaya*’ is meant a rational human being who does not undertake an action which does not produce a desired result. Further, in the context of Vedic injunctions, such a rational human being believes in the efficacy of Vedic injunctions as prescribing such actions which lead to some desirable human end. It does not matter if one does not actually act on account of the operation of obfuscating factors like laziness. In fact, an injunction, insofar as it is only a communicator and does not push a person physically like wind, a bad king, etc. has done its job of instigation which consists of generating the awareness in the

addressee of having been instigated. The *phala* or result is an essential part of this instigating process because it aims at instigating a ‘*sapratyaya*’ person, who is rational and trusts the efficacy of the injunction in leading him to a desirable end. He would not act in regard to the sacrifice, prescribed by the injunction, if it were not the means of achieving a desired goal, because the sacrifice is in itself labourious and expensive and also because no rational person would undertake any action which is fruitless.

For Jayantabhaṭṭa, both the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa models are insufficient, since:

i) They are unable to account for cases where even after knowing that the act prescribed is beneficial, one does not act; and even after knowing that the act prohibited is highly maleficent one proceeds to do it, being overpowered by extreme passion or hatred;

ii) The Bhāṭṭa view only explains how an injunction instigates. On this view, on hearing the injunction, the addressee understands that he is instigated. Since it is not possible to instigate a rational human being without explaining the purpose of doing the prescribed act, the injunction implicitly communicates the means-end relationship existing between the prescribed act and the promised result. But it fails to recognise whether the person, to whom the means-end relation has been communicated, himself also recognises the prescribed act as leading to a desired goal of his.

iii) Both the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views fail to recognise the important role of desire in the process. For Jayanta, it is ultimately the desire for the result which helps the person to identify or disidentify the goal communicated by the *vidhi* as his own. In this regard, his state of mind also exerts a great influence on the generation of the kind of desire that would help him recognise the goal communicated by the *vidhi* to be his own. This accounts for the fact that even when an injunction has communicated to one that killing a brāhmaṇa is bad, one might still kill a brāhmaṇa because he thinks that it is the means to achieve something beneficial under the influence of extreme hatred.

iv) The Prābhākara view fails to recognise various kinds of desires and their relative strengths in causing motivation. For Jayanta, it is only that strong desire for the result, unchallenged by a stronger desire for something else that may be of an opposite nature, which causes one to undertake a particular action prescribed by the injunction.

v) It seems implied by the Prābhākara opponent’s view in NM 5.2 that although the result in the form of *svarga* is necessary for identifying the person to be enjoined (*niyojya*) to the prescribed act and hence the phrase ‘*svargakāma*’ within the injunction, “*svargakāmo yajeta*”, can find syntactical connection, still such a syntactic connection does not need a basis in any actual causal relationship between *svarga*, i.e., the result and sacrifice, the means. The Prābhākara in NM 5.2 is also silent on the point of how can an injunction afford to instigate a ‘*sapratyaya*’ or rational person, without resorting to the result. On the views of the Bhāṭṭa opponent and Jayanta, the very fact of instigating a rational person makes the postulation of an actual causal relationship between the result and the prescribed act unavoidably necessary. By contrast, the Prābhākara view only

emphasises the autonomy of the injunction in the matter of instigation without taking into account the personal motives of the person whom it instigates. However, according to Jayanta, this fails to recognise the basic fact that even the authority of sacred texts cannot alter or do away with the fundamental nature of rational human beings of doing only purposeful acts. It is on this very point that Jayanta remarks that without resorting to a result the injunction cannot even afford to communicate instigation to a rational human being and hence it is the result which should be accepted to be the instigator.

The Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent's account of the modus operandi of injunctions is even more unacceptable to Jayanta. This is because by denying the construal of the phrase *svargakāma* into the injunction, "One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice", the Kriyāvākyārthavādin ultimately denies and loses sight of the fundamental unity of desire and action, which is in my opinion so very necessary for offering a cogent account of the psychology and causality of action. This would ultimately, as has been already discussed, do away with causality and make the occurrence of every effect accidental and hence verge upon accidentalism (*ākasmikatāvāda*).

Since for Jayanta, the *phala* can be understood not only from words, but also from the context and by means of reflection, Jayanta's model can also serve to account for cases where activity follows upon hearing a non-exhortative sentence that just communicates the means-end relation between two things. In other words, in such cases of getting motivated to undertake an action, a rational person does not require an additional linguistic source of instigation in the form of the exhortative suffixes. A case in point is "five or six almonds a day help reduce bad cholesterol" or "tomato increases uric acid". It can also explain why one might act without even necessarily requiring to know means-end relation linguistically. In support of his contention, Jayanta quotes a verse from Prajñākaragupta's PVB, which says that activity follows from desire for a previously experienced thing, which is remembered as a means of achieving pleasure. Jayanta says that the recalling of the fact that the fruit of the wood-apple tree is tasty generates in one the desire for it, which causes him to procure and eat the said fruit. Implicit here is the suggestion that one can understand the means-end relation between two things by observation and inference also, i.e., extra-linguistically, and proceed either to act upon the means or desist from doing so depending upon how strong a desire he has for the result.

Thus, while the models upheld by the Kriyāvākyārthavādins, Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa opponents in NM 5.2 focus more on how the epistemic integrity of the sacred texts can be preserved and how an injunction instigates, Jayanta's model is concerned with explaining how and why a person gets motivated to act. While the opponents focus exclusively on *pravartanā* or instigation, Jayanta's model focus also on *pravṛtti* or undertaking and tries to explain the relation between *pravartanā* and *pravṛtti*. In this connection, Jayanta's model also works as a consistent explanation for situationally irrational activities of generally rational human beings from the standpoints of both the instigator and the instigated. However, the rival models try to explain away these cases only from the

standpoint of the instigator, and the in the light of how despite a person's not undertaking the prescribed action, or desisting from the prohibited action, the instigator has not failed to execute its task of communicating instigation or dissuasion.

Chapter IV

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Sentence-Meaning

Introduction

It has been seen that Jayanta has dealt so far with the question of the identification of that element in injunctive statements which prompts one to act. In this regard, he engaged specifically with the Kriyāvākyārthavādin, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara opponents. It was necessary for Jayanta to deliberate on the nature and identity of the instigator (*pravartaka*) since it dealt with a fundamental question of Indian linguistic thought, viz. whether language is about what ‘*is*’ or what ‘*ought*’ to be. This is connected with the larger question of understanding the validity and authoritativeness of Vedic sacred texts in general and understanding of the functioning of the large body of command utterances, apart from non-injunctive passages, of which the Vedic corpus is composed, in particular. Linguistics as developed within the Mīmāṃsā schools focused on the Vedas and therefore began, unlike, Euro-American linguistics, with an analysis of such command utterances and not with an enquiry into what assertive statements mean. But this by no means sought to overlook the role or importance of non-injunctive linguistic specimens. Rather, the effort made by early Indian philosophers of language such as the Mīmāṃsakas to accommodate descriptive portions of the Vedas by making them subservient to and serve the purpose of the injunctions per se led, it may be said in a loose sense, to a bipolarisation in early Indian linguistic thought. While on one end of it, stood those who attached equal importance to injunctive and non-injunctive statements, thinkers who championed the cause of the pre-eminence of injunctive constructions stood on the other. Moreover, the second group who highlighted the importance of the injunctive portions of the Vedas, did so, as has already been noted earlier, to uphold the authority of the Vedas as an instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) which, according to them, stood independently of other instruments of knowledge. According to these philosophers (who are to be identified as Mīmāṃsakas), such independence could be guaranteed only if it were accepted that what the Vedas communicated were not the ‘*is*’ or something already existent, which was already the field of application of the other instruments of knowledge like perception and inference, but the ‘*ought*’ which expressed itself in the form of duty. According to most Mīmāṃsā authors, such a duty can be construed as the nucleus of a sentence if all its other elements can be construed as subservient to it. This, in turn, presupposed a hierarchical arrangement of the different meaning elements of any sentence where duty or the action which was needed to carry out the duty was made the pivot round which revolved the other semantic elements in a relation of the principal and the subordinate. This again implies that sentence-meaning is essentially a composite whole.

But this view did not go unchallenged since philosophers like Bhartṛhari advocated a radically different view of sentence and sentence-meaning being ultimately and

metaphysically impartite and the understanding of such an indivisible sentence-meaning being due to *pratibhā* or intuitive flash. Hence it became imperative to ponder over the question whether sentence-meaning is composed of micro-components in the form of the individual word-meanings, or it consisted of an indivisible whole. Jayanta too could not neglect this important issue, and so after establishing result or purpose to be the instigator against the views of the Kriyāvākyārthavādin, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara opponents, he proceeded to deliberate upon the nature (*svarūpa*) of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). The word ‘nature’ used here concerns the question of if and how sentence-meaning is composed, i.e., is it a whole brought about by component parts, or is it an indivisible whole throughout.

The present chapter aims at reconstructing and analysing Jayanta’s view of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) discussed towards the end of NM 5.2, as also tracing the influence of the views of the rival schools, viz. Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, on it. This will show, contrary to Jayanta’s own claim, how NM 5.2 at least is not “a mere rearrangement of former Nyāya ideas”⁵⁷⁹ so far as a presentation of the ‘Nyāya’ view of sentence-meaning is concerned, but it is fraught with historically significant philosophical innovations and borrowings. It will also suggest that Jayanta, as a kind of intellectual historian of his time, was keenly aware of a major theoretical lacuna present in the principal textual traditions of his own school, viz. the NS and NBh, and how he, as a colossal intellectual in his own right, sought to fill in the gap. Thus, this chapter seeks to understand Jayanta’s view by means of a historically grounded philosophical study of a significant part of the Sanskrit text of NM 5.2.

1. Two views on sentence-meaning: issues involved

1.1. Is a treatment of sentence-meaning absent in *Nyāyasūtra* and *Nyāyabhāṣya*?

At the end of a long discussion of different views on sentence-meaning in the second half of the 5th chapter of *Nyāyamañjarī*, when Jayanta had identified *phala* or result as the element which instigates a person to undertake an action, he is confronted with the task of spelling out what sentence meaning is in his opinion⁵⁸⁰.

⁵⁷⁹ Graheli (2015:14).

⁵⁸⁰ *parapakṣān pratikṣīpya prerakam kathitam phalam/ evam paramatadviṣṭair vākyārthaḥ svayam ucyatām//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 135.

Having refuted others’ views the result has been said to be the instigator. In the same way, he, who is averse to others’ views, should himself speak on the [nature of] sentence-meaning.

As a first reply to this, Jayanta cites NS 1.1.24⁵⁸¹ and the incipit of the NBh ad NS 1.1.1⁵⁸². as his sources based upon which he had already declared *phala* or result to be the instigator. Here, I would like to present the following lines from NBh ad NS 1.1.1:

atha prayojanam. yena prayuktaḥ pravartate tat prayojanam. yam artham abhīpsan jihāsan vā karmārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvāṇi karmāṇi sarvās ca vidyā vyāptāḥ. NBh_T, p. 3.

Now the purpose. That, being instigated by which one undertakes [an action], is the purpose. It is a purpose⁵⁸³, either desiring to obtain or avoid which one begins an action, pervades⁵⁸⁴ all living beings, all actions, and all knowledge.

In the above definition of *prayojana*, what is specially interesting to note is the mention of people undertaking an action on being instigated by it. The sentence being ultimately in the active voice⁵⁸⁵ emphasises the role of the agent (*karṭṛ*), i.e., the human being in his relation to the performance of action. As on one hand, this definition speaks of the act of instigation done by the purpose, it also speaks of undertaking (*pravṛt-*) of the action by the person instigated. Thus, unlike the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka's ending with the injunction having completed its task by communicating instigation, the NBh also takes into account the dimension of the person undertaking the action, which serves his purpose. In other words, the causal link between the instigation caused by purpose and the undertaking of action is clearly mentioned, and this ultimately helps explain all kinds of *pravṛtti* as being caused by some *prayojana*. Such instigation (*prayuj-*) does not need necessarily to be sourced in any human instigator, rather it should be the purpose, and hence ultimately the object to be accomplished which could prompt one to undertake the required action. Vātsyāyana's connecting *artha* or object with the desire to obtain it (*abhīpsā*) or avoid it (*jihāsā*) is also of special significance, since it highlights that special kind of desire – either of the positive or the negative type – the occurrence of which compels one to undertake an action. To put it differently, the connection of *abhīpsā* (desire to obtain something) and *jihāsā* (desire to avoid something) with action (*karman*) is used

⁵⁸¹ *yam artham adhikṛtya puruṣaḥ pravartate tat prayojanam* (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 135) – “That in regard to which a person acts is what is purpose.”. It is to be noted herein that the word ‘*puruṣaḥ*’ is absent in the standard editions of the NS.

⁵⁸² *pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātā 'rtham upalabhya tam īpsati jihāsati vā. tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samīhā pravṛttir ucyate. sāmārthyam punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ* – “Upon obtaining the object by means of the instruments of knowledge indeed, this cogniser, either desires it or wishes to reject it. His activity prompted by his desire to obtain or wish to reject is called ‘undertaking’. And (his) capacity is its relation with the result.”

⁵⁸³ In keeping with the context, the word ‘*artha*’ here is interpreted as that which is desired (*arthyate yat*) and hence translated as ‘purpose’.

⁵⁸⁴ This is to say that all living beings – whether humans or animals – necessarily act with purposes.

⁵⁸⁵ The sentence in the active voice from the NBh passaged quoted above that is referred to is the following: ‘*karmārabhate*’ – ‘one beings an action’.

by the author of NBh to exclude all other kinds of desires which may come and go without necessarily being able to push a person to action. As has already been noticed and analysed in Chapter III, Jayanta too hinted at such a strong desire, which he also made the very basis of eligibility in case of elective rituals. It is further to be noted that by implicitly equating *prayojana* with *artha* and linking it either with the desire of obtaining something or with the desire of avoiding something, the NBh might have intended any object whatsoever, a very strong desire for or aversion to which compels one to act accordingly. This might also help explain cases where a generally rational person's so-called irrational action is regulated by situationally irreversible obfuscating conditions like extreme hatred, extreme sensual passion, etc. Since Vātsyāyana says that such an *artha* or object and acting in order either to obtain it or avoid it hold true for all living beings, all kinds of actions and all kinds of knowledge, he hints at a parity in the pattern of acting of human beings and animals and also Vedic and ordinary knowledge. In other words, on this view, the way one would act with regard to the Vedic rituals would not be essentially different from the way one would act in ordinary situations. This might have been a source of Jayanta's claim made categorically against the Kriyāvākyaarthavādin and the Prābhākara opponents that the result is to be accepted as the cause of instigation on the basis of material reality (*vastutaḥ*) and not merely on the authority of linguistic communication in the form of Vedic injunctions. However, it is not clear why Jayanta has not referred to this passage in support of his contention, which, as has been analysed above, could have given him better scope to make his points strongly and show how his view is deeply rooted in the Nyāya textual tradition of Vātsyāyana.

Notwithstanding the above, Jayanta himself admits that the authors of the NS as well as the NBh had not indicated what sentence-meaning is anywhere. Whence should, then, Jayanta have learnt what sentence-meaning is for the Nyāya philosophers and set out to defend it⁵⁸⁶? As to why the authors of the NS and NBh did not indicate it, Jayanta says that it is because all the scholarly disciplines have different aims; and that Ānvīkṣikī or Nyāya is the science of the instruments of knowledge and not the science of sentence-meaning⁵⁸⁷.

This immediately leads to the following question: if it so, why has word-meaning, (*padārtha*) been expounded in NS 2.2.66 – “The individual, the configuration and the generic property are the word-meaning”⁵⁸⁸? In reply, Jayanta recognises this as a pertinent question and says that the author of NS had to touch upon the issue in order to answer to the objections of the Buddhist authors claiming that language does not mirror reality. Thus, the discussion on word-meaning aims at an epistemological purpose, namely establishing the validity of language as an instrument of knowledge. In his characteristically sarcastic yet literary style, Jayanta remarks:

⁵⁸⁶ *vākyaarthas tu kvacid api na sūtrabhāṣyakārābhyaṃ sūcita iti kutaḥ śikṣitvā vākyaarthasvarūpaṃ vāyam ācakṣmahe*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 135.

⁵⁸⁷ *kim iti tābhyāṃ asau na sūcita iti cet pṛthakprasthānā hūmā vidyāḥ. pramāṇavidyā ceyam ānvīkṣikī, na vākyaarthavidyēti*. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 135-36.

⁵⁸⁸ *yady evaṃ padārtho 'pi kasmād iha darśito vyaktyākṛtījātayas tu padārtha iti*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

“It is for the sake of pacifying those⁵⁸⁹, who cry while speaking of the inability of words to touch upon external objects, and establishing the validity of language that the author of NS has made efforts.”⁵⁹⁰

The interlocutor goes on by observing that if it is so that without sentence-meaning being something real and external, the validity of sacred texts is not established, then with regard to that too, efforts should certainly be made⁵⁹¹.

Jayanta agrees to the question and observes that since the author of NS had thought that his efforts in that regard had already been on account of his efforts made in respect of explaining what words mean, he did not need to discuss also sentence-meaning as separate from word-meanings, given that, according to Jayanta, there is no sentence meaning over and above the meanings of the words making up the sentence⁵⁹². Thus, in essence, word-meanings indeed are the meaning of sentence⁵⁹³.

2. First view of sentence-meaning: connected word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning

2.1. Is sentence-meaning one word-meaning or many word-meanings?

It is at this point that Jayanta approvingly mentions for the first time in the course of this debate the view that word-meaning indeed is the sentence-meaning⁵⁹⁴. But he immediately clarifies his position by claiming that it is not a single word-meaning which is sentence-meaning; by contrast, it is more than one word-meaning that constitutes the meaning of a sentence⁵⁹⁵.

Here an objector says that even if it is more than one, it is still a word-meaning⁵⁹⁶ and that word-meaning cannot be sentence-meaning⁵⁹⁷. For, as the objector cites, according to the

⁵⁸⁹ This is a reference to the Buddhist internalists who think that the meaning of a word is not an externally existing real thing, but a mental image. For more on this, see McAllister (2017).

⁵⁹⁰ *sthāne prāśnaḥ. śabdānām arthāsaṃsparśitām vadantaṃ rudantaṃ ca śamayitum śabdaprāmāṇyasiddhaye sūtrakṛtā yatnaḥ kṛtaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹¹ *yady evaṃ vākyārtham api bāhyaṃ vāstavam antareṇa śāstrasya pramāṇatā na pratiṣṭhāṃ labhata iti tatrāpi prayatnaḥ kartavya eva.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹² *satyaṃ; padārthapratipādanāyatnenaiva tu kṛtena tatra yatnaṃ kṛtaṃ manyate sūtrakāraḥ, yad ayaṃ pṛthak padārthebhyo na vākyārtham upadiśati sma.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹³ *tasmād ayaṃ āśayaḥ padārtha eva vākyārtha iti.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁴ *tat kim amum eva pakṣam anumodāmahe padārtha eva vākyārtha iti. bādhaṃ brūhmaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁵ *kintu naikaḥ padārtho vākyārtha anekas tu padārtho vākyārthaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁶ *nany aneko 'pi bhavan padārtha evāsau.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁷ *na ca padārtho vākyārtho bhavitum arhati.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Śābara⁵⁹⁸, a word is about a general meaning, while a sentence specific; generality and specificity are two different things⁵⁹⁹. He also cites from Patañjali⁶⁰⁰, according to whom, what is additional here is the meaning of a sentence⁶⁰¹. The objector concludes on the strength of Śābara and Patañjali's views word-meaning and sentence-meaning are different⁶⁰².

To this, Jayanta replies that his statement that 'more than one word-meaning is the sentence-meaning, and not one' has not been properly understood by the objector, whom he describes as 'one, who is full of life' (*āyusmat*), thereby suggesting that he is immature enough and has still a long life to learn⁶⁰³.

2.2. Role of *saṃsarga*

Jayanta goes on to clarify his position as follows: it is the collection of word-meanings connected to each other that is the meaning of a sentence, where the connection⁶⁰⁴ is the additional element of Patañjali's statement, cited by the opponent⁶⁰⁵. Moreover, without implying specificity, a connection does not hold water and this is what satisfies the condition, mentioned by the objector, that sentence-meaning is specific⁶⁰⁶⁻⁶⁰⁷. It is also to

⁵⁹⁸ ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.24. Although Jayanta's opponent cites Śābara's version of this view, yet it can be pushed further back and traced to Patañjali's MaBhā on Aṣṭ 1.2.45. For analyses of it, its influence on Śābara and its provisional acceptance and required reinterpretation by Bhartṛhari and his commentators to uphold the indivisibility of sentence and sentence-meaning, see Ogawa (2012).

⁵⁹⁹ *sāmānye hi padaṃ vartate viśeṣe vākyam. anyac ca sāmānyam anyo viśeṣaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁶⁰⁰ MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 2.3.46.

⁶⁰¹ *anyatrāpy uktam yad atra ādhikyam sa vākyārthaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁶⁰² *tasmād anyañ padārtha anyas ca vākyārthaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁶⁰³ *ucyate – yad etad uktam asmābhir anekañ padārtho vākyārtho, na punar eka iti, tan na gṛhītam āyusmatā.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 136-137.

⁶⁰⁴ The word 'connection' has been used interchangeably with the expressions 'syntactical connection' and 'syntactical relation' to render the Sanskrit *saṃsarga*, *saṅgati* or *vyatiṣaṅga* in the context of Jayanta's view of sentence-meaning in this chapter, unless explicitly indicated otherwise.

⁶⁰⁵ *etad uktam bhavati – parasparasamspṛṣṭapadārthasamudāyo vākyārtha iti saṃsarga evādhika iti 'yad atrādhikyam' ity ucyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶⁰⁶ *na cānākṣiptaviśeṣatvena saṃsarga upapadyata iti viśeṣo vākyārtha ity ucyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶⁰⁷ It is to be noted that Bhartṛhari and his commentators have challenged Patañjali's statement mainly on the ground that if individual words were to express their individual meaning first, they could not give up this general meaning and express a specific one in its place later merely on account of an association with other words in a sentence. This critique is directed against the Mīmāṃsakas and 'general meaning' is sought to be read, especially by Bhartṛhari's commentators, as 'generic property' (*jāti*). Bhartṛhari challenges the notion of the composite nature of both sentence and sentence-meaning on the analogy of words like "the Brāhmaṇa's blanket" (*brāhmaṇakambala*) which is to be understood as a single word and not a compound

be noted here that since it is not the meaning of a word, connection itself cannot be sentence-meaning by virtue of its own nature⁶⁰⁸. In the collection of words, “Bring the white cow”, no word denoting connection is heard. Even if it is heard, its syntactical relation is even more unachievable. For, what is the meaning of “Bring the white cow connection”⁶⁰⁹?

Therefore, sentence-meaning is word-meanings connected together, and not connection itself⁶¹⁰. Here, Jayanta cites from Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī*⁶¹¹, according to which, “it is because connection is cognised from the connected (word-meanings)”⁶¹². Cakradhara, Jayanta’s scholiast, brings out the import of this *Bṛhatī* passage in the NMGBh in the following manner: since it is not the case that without the existence of a connection, the cognition of connected word-meanings is possible, and thus the cognition of connection is obtained through postulation⁶¹³.

2.3. Word-meaning(s) vs. sentence-meaning: the mereology of sentence-semantics

Jayanta concludes the discussion by making a crucial observation that sentence-meaning, brought about by word-meanings, is not understood as separate from the latter. He also reflects on the role of the whole as being distinct from its parts, and considers it non-analogous to a piece of cloth brought about by threads, or a mat brought about by grasses. In the case of a cloth, there are things which can be done by a cloth and which cannot be done through the single constituent threads, like keeping one warm. Sentence-meaning, by contrast, does not abandon its nature of essentially word-meanings, which are connected together through the principal-subordinate relation. This is because, although with regard to the sentence, “Bring the white cow”, a universal property of cowhood, the quality of white colour, and the act of bringing are understood, no whole meaning (as separate from the component word-meanings) is obtained or cognised⁶¹⁴. Therefore, sentence-meaning is not an altogether separate whole⁶¹⁵. It is for this reason that the author of NS has not

word and expressing a single meaning, without any further component meaning. For more on this, see Ogawa (2012).

⁶⁰⁸ *saṃsargas tu svarūpato na vākyārtha apadārthatvāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶⁰⁹ ‘*gauḥ śukla ānīyatām*’ *iti padagrāme saṃsargavādīnaḥ padasyāśravaṇāt. śravaṇe* ’*pi sutarām ananvayāt. ‘gauḥ śukla ānīyatām saṃsarga’ iti ko ’asyārthaḥ?* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹⁰ *tasmāt saṃsṛṣṭo vākyārtho na saṃsargaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹¹ Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.25.

⁶¹² *tad uktam – ‘vyatiśaktato ’vagater vyatiśaṅgasya’*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹³ *na hy asati sambandhe sambaddhapadārthapratītir ity ārthī sambandhapratītiḥ*. NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 101.

⁶¹⁴ *na ca tantubhir iva paṭo vīraṇair iva kaṭas tadatirikto ’vayavisthānīyaḥ padārthair nirvartyamāno vākyārtha upalabhyate, jātiguṇakriyāvagame ’py avayavibuddher abhāvāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹⁵ *na ca padārthāvayavī vākyārthaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

instructed on sentence-meaning separately⁶¹⁶. Incidentally, it is worth noticing that the analogy of the thread and the cloth comes from the MaBhā⁶¹⁷, where it is used discussing a parallel problem, namely whether or not individual phonemes, a collection of which makes up a word, are also meaningful like the word. Jayanta would agree that phonemes and words belong to different levels, but he would deny such a possibility of word-meanings and sentence-meanings belonging to different levels.

3. Second view of sentence-meaning: sentence-meaning as word-meanings arranged through a principal-subordinate relation

3.1. The objector's view: *saṃsarga* cannot be conceived without *guṇapradhānabhāva*

Now, an objector says, a connection does not hold without a relation of the principal and the subordinate⁶¹⁸. And it is not the case that there are many principal elements in a sentence, for, were it so, then there would be no principality⁶¹⁹. This is because, syntactical relation entails a hierarchy and no two principal elements cannot be, thus, syntactically related. In this sense, the notion of principality can be compared to the notion of the linguistic head in modern linguistics which determines the syntactic character of a phrase. Cakradhara explains that no connection is possible between two principal elements and a sentence conveys word-meanings connected to each other. Therefore, on the strength of the fact that a connection does take place in each sentence, we need to agree that it cannot be the case that all word-meanings enjoy principality, but rather that they are subordinate to a single principal element which may be treated as the head of a linguistic cognition⁶²⁰.

⁶¹⁶ *tena pṛthag vākyārthaṃ na upadiṣṭavān ācāryaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹⁷ Cf. *ekas tantus tvaktrāṇe 'samarthas tatsamudāyaś ca kambalaḥ samarthaḥ... ime punar varṇā atyantāyavānarthaḥ... evam eṣāṃ varṇānāṃ samudāyā arthavanto 'vayavā anarthakā iti* – “A single thread is incapable of protecting the skin and a blanket [being a] collection of them (threads) is capable... These phonemes are meaningless absolutely [by themselves]... In this way, collections of these phonemes are meaningful [but their] components parts (the phonemes) are meaningless.” MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 1.2.45. The basis for this analogy is both the thread's and a phoneme's being incapable of executing their tasks, viz. protecting the skin and communication of meaning respectively. The word *samudāya* does not clearly express whether this collection presupposes any connection among the phonemes or a mere arrangement of them. If it is the latter, then it would be akin to the Buddhist mereological view of the whole (*avayavin*) being a mere configuration of parts. However, since Patañjali speaks of the conditions of additionality (*ādhikya*) and specificity (*viśeṣa*) being the characterising features of sentence-meaning, it is not unlikely that he would also extend the same principle to the level of words, which despite being made up of non-meaningful phonemes, are meaningful. Of course, Patañjali could deny this extension on the ground of the phoneme-word and word-sentence sets belonging to separate levels when considered from the point of view of meaning. This is because of the fact that while phonemes, which make up words, are not meaningful, words, which make up a sentence, are in fact meaningful. I thank Prof. Tiziana Pontillo for kindly bringing this MaBhā passage to my notice and recommending the incorporation of an analysis of it.

⁶¹⁸ *nanu guṇapradhānabhāvam antareṇa na saṃsargo 'vakalpate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶¹⁹ *na caikasmin vākye bahūni pradhānāni bhavanti, prādhānyam eva hi tathā sati na syāt*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶²⁰ *na hi pradhānānāṃ parasparasambandho bhavati parasparasambaddhapadārthapratipādakaṅca vākyam, ataḥ sambandhabalāt sarveṣāṃ prādhānyābhāvaḥ*. NMGBh, in NM_{GS-II}, p. 101.

In Jayanta's words, there are many subordinate elements⁶²¹. It is because of this one head qualified by many subordinates, which is the meaning of the sentence, that a unitary cognition about sentence-meaning arises⁶²².

3.2. Jayanta's view: the postulation of *guṇapradhānabhāva* is causally dependent on the success of admitting *saṃsarga*

Jayanta admits that although it is so, still it is those connected word-meanings which feature in our cognition, and not an altogether new single thing brought about by them⁶²³. Rather, the relation of the principal and subordinate that is postulated is causally dependent on a successful admission of the connection⁶²⁴.

3.3. Jayanta's initial dissent against the second view

Jayanta also points out that this relation of the principal and subordinate is not fixed, by virtue of which it could be settled that a particular thing only is the principal element⁶²⁵. In some cases, such as "One sprinkles the rice with water"⁶²⁶, it is the *kāraka*⁶²⁷ or "action-factor"⁶²⁸ which is principal, and the action subsidiary. This is because the action-factor, the substance, viz. rice is understood as something with regard to which an action is desired to be done. It is through a reflection upon the import of the use of words that sometimes that which is to be brought about becomes subordinate to what is accomplished, and the opposite sometimes⁶²⁹.

⁶²¹ *guṇās tu bahavo bhavanti*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶²² *yad idam anekaguṇoparaktam ekaṃ kiñcit pradhānaṃ sa vākyārtha iti tadviśayaikasvabhāvā buddhiḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶²³ *satyaṃ; tathāpi ta eva saṃsṛṣṭāḥ padārthā avabhāsante, na tadārabdhaḥ kaścid ekaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 137-138.

⁶²⁴ *saṃsargasiddhikṛtas tu guṇapradhānabhāvo 'bhyupeyate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶²⁵ *sa ca guṇapradhānabhāvo na niyataḥ, yena ekam eva idaṃ pradhānam iti vyavasthāpyeta*. – NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶²⁶ This is a quotation from the ŚaBrā_I 1.3.1.10.

⁶²⁷ "A *kāraka* is that which "does" or "helps to bring about an action," because the word *kāraka* is derived from the root *kṛ* "to do, to make, to act." With the agentive affix *-aka*. Patañjali distinguishes between an action (*kriya*) and a *kāraka*, and says that an action is a specific engagement of the *kāra*kas. He often refers to *kāra*kas with the terms *sādhaka* "means" and *nivartaka* "accomplisher." Deshpande (1992:49).

⁶²⁸ I owe this translation of *kāraka* to Freschi (2012:376).

⁶²⁹ *siddhatantram kvacit sādhyam tattantram itarat kvacit/ śabdaprayogatātparyaparyālocanayā bhavet//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138. Although the general rule is that it is the accomplished entity which serves the purpose of the unaccomplished by bringing about the latter, yet in some cases, like the prescription of a subordinate element (*guṇavidhi*), *dadhnā juhoti* – "One offers oblation by means of curd" (MaiSa 4.7.7), it is the so-called accomplished thing, viz. the curd, which is prescribed and not the act of oblation. This is because, in a previous and preliminary prescription, *agnihotraṃ juhoti*, together with which is to be read the prescription of subordinate elements, the act of oblation has already

Thus, Jayanta says, because of the unfixed nature of the condition of being principal and subordinate it is better to accept only this much that a collection of word-meanings syntactically connected with each other is the meaning of sentence⁶³⁰. He emphatically mentions that no disputant disagrees with regard to the understanding of there being a syntactical connection⁶³¹. More specifically, Jayanta mentions in an immediately following verse that even they, who think sentence-meaning to be either commandment (*niyoga*), or human activity (*bhāvanā*), or action (*kriyā*), invariably accept a group of word-meanings mutually connected⁶³². This is to say that Jayanta's Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara and Kriyāvākya-rthavādin opponents differ as to the identification of the principal element of a linguistic cognition, but they do not call into question the understanding that a linguistic cognition is a composite whole, which presupposes a syntactical connection among the individual word-meanings which make up the linguistic cognition.

3.4. Jayanta's version of the second view: *phala* or result as the principal element of a sentence

Alternatively, Jayanta says, on the basis of the cognition which takes on a unitary form, that indeed a single word-meaning, which is principal, aided by other word-meanings that are subordinate to the principal, which should be accepted as the sentence-meaning⁶³³. But it cannot be determined that a particular word-meaning is that principal meaning⁶³⁴. This is perhaps because there is no fixed rule based on which one could identify something as being fixedly principal in all kinds of sentences. However, Jayanta remarks, if the principal rank is to be indeed given to a single thing only, then it should be given to *phala* or the result⁶³⁵. For, no sentence, which lacks a purpose, is uttered⁶³⁶. In other words, the

been prescribed; thus, prescribing the act of oblation for a second time with regard to the *guṇavidhi* would be merely repetitive (*anuvādamātra*) and superfluous. If the injunction would, thus, not be able to prescribe a new thing, its validity in terms of its being the communication of something hitherto unknown, would be at stake. If the *guṇavidhi* were to prescribe both the act of oblation and the substance, viz. curd, it would lead to the undesirable consequence of sentence-split (*vākyabheda*), which is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas, since according to the latter, a Vedic injunction can be about prescribing only a single thing at a time. For details, see Gaṅgopādhyāya (1992:78-87). Hence, it is according to the requirement of a prescription that the principal and subsidiaries involved in that prescription have to be identified.

⁶³⁰ *tasmād guṇapradhānabhāvānīyamād anyonyasamśṛṣṭaḥ padārthasamudāyo vākya-rtha ity etāvad eva śreyaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶³¹ *saṃsargāvagame ca sarvavādinām avivādaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶³² *vākya-rthaṃ manvate ye'pi niyogaṃ bhāvanām kriyām/ tair apy anyonyasamśṛṣṭaḥ padārthagrāma iṣyate//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶³³ *athavā guṇībhūtetarapadārthānugṛhīta eka eva pradhānabhūtaḥ padārtho vākya-rtha ity ekākārapratītibalād upeyatām*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶³⁴ *ekas tv ayaṃ asāv artha iti na nirṇetum śakyate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶³⁵ *yadi tv avaśyam ekasya kasyacid abhiṣekakalaśo dātavyas, tat phalasyaiva dīyatām*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶³⁶ *na hi niṣprajānam kiñcid vākyaṃ uccaryate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

phala or purpose of a particular sentence may be different from that of another, but it is ultimately the invariable element of *phala* which is present in every sentence whatsoever. In an immediately following verse he says that, result, in some cases, is directly obtained from a word; sometimes it comes from the context and is obtainable through reflection in some cases. Result is, thus, understood everywhere as the purpose of the utterance of a sentence⁶³⁷. The entirety of *kāra*ka-s or action-factors accomplish the action, and by means of the action, the result is brought about⁶³⁸. By contrast, nothing else is accomplished by the result. Therefore, on account of preeminence, it is the result, which on account of being the invariable and principal element of a linguistic cognition, is the sentence-meaning⁶³⁹. It is to be noted that this second view has been formulated in keeping with the phenomenology of the sentential cognition, but without, as will be evident from the later part of this chapter, compromising at all Jayanta's basic view of sentence-meaning being word-meanings syntactically connected.

3.4.1. Is result also subservient to man? *Phala* vs. *Puruṣa*

It is now objected that even a result, which is identified by Jayanta with purpose, is for the sake of a person and hence the person should be the principal⁶⁴⁰. This is to say that although it cannot be denied that a sentence serves the purpose of man and hence is directed towards him, yet this very purpose is not any objective thing, but a subjective choice in so far as it is the purpose of a person. This is also evident from Jayanta's identification of the result which is being desired (*iṣyamāṇa phala*) as that which prompts one to undertake an action. In reply, Jayanta says that it is not so. Because of being of the nature of pleasure, the result subsists in the person; for, pleasure, etc. are the qualities of the self⁶⁴¹⁻⁶⁴². But based on this

⁶³⁷ *kvacit sākṣāt padopāttaṃ kvacit prakaraṇāgatam/ kvacit ālocanālabhyaṃ phalaṃ sarvatra gamyate//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶³⁸ *sakalena ca kārakakalāpena kriyā nirvartyate. kriyayā ca phalam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶³⁹ *na tu phalenānyat kim api nirvartyata iti pradhānatvāt phalam eva vākyārthaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶⁴⁰ *nanu phalam api puruṣārtham iti puruṣaḥ pradhānaḥ syāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶⁴¹ *naitad evaṃ phalaṃ sukhātmakatvāt puruṣāśritaṃ bhavati sukhādīnām ātmaguṇatvāt.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶⁴² This might be a further indication as to why a person, even on being urged by a prohibitory injunction to desist from doing a particular thing under the influence of situationally irreversible obfuscating factors like extreme hatred, extreme sensual passion, etc. may, in fact, do the contrary of what he has been urged to do by the injunction. In the situation, acts like killing a *brāhmaṇa*, having sexual intercourse with someone else's wife, etc. appear to him as the means of acquiring pleasure (*sukha*). This again highlights the importance of the phenomenology of prohibitions on Jayanta's view in determining the direction of action. That is, it is not enough on Jayanta's view for the prohibitory injunction to *merely communicate* to a person that an act X is malefic, but it is equally or perhaps more important to ensure that the person also deems it in that way, or even after deeming it as such he is not overpowered by stronger and situationally irreversible obfuscating factors like extreme hatred, etc. This suggestion also accounts for Jayanta's equation of result with purpose based on NS and NBh and an identification of the same with pleasure (*sukha*), an accidental (*āgantuka*) quality of the self, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

much, the person is not the principal element, for he too makes efforts only for obtaining the result⁶⁴³. In other words, although it is the purpose of man which is served, yet a man himself *desires* the purpose and since its being desired entails its still being unaccomplished and hence fit to be accomplished (*sādhyā*), the result cannot but be the principal element in the ultimate analysis. Jayanta goes on to say that *bhāvanā* of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas is an activity which aims at the result only⁶⁴⁴. It has already been said, Jayanta claims, how *niyoga* of the Prābhākaras cannot be the instigator (in case of Vedic injunctions) without the result⁶⁴⁵. Moreover, he points out, the view that action (*kriyā*) alone is the meaning of a sentence-meaning has been refuted⁶⁴⁶. Jayanta concludes his reply to this objection with a verse where he asserts that because of the result's being the object to be accomplished (*sādhyā*), and because of its not being rejected anywhere, and since action and the like are for the sake of the result, that result or purpose should be considered to be sentence-meaning⁶⁴⁷.

3.4.2. *Phala* and *Kāraka* vis-a-vis Action

Here an objector says, since results like *svarga* are by their very nature already accomplished, they cannot get connected to the *kāraka*-s or action-factors⁶⁴⁸. For, what connection could there be between results like *svarga* which are accomplished and the action-factors which too are already accomplished⁶⁴⁹⁻⁶⁵⁰? If in reply it is said that a connection based on action is obtained here⁶⁵¹, then the result as well as the action-factors would connect with the action; hence, what distinction can be made between the result and

⁶⁴³ *na caitāvatā puruṣaḥ pradhānam. so 'pi hi phalārtham eva yatate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶⁴⁴ *bhāvanā tāvat phalanīṣṭha eva vyāpāraḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 139-140.

⁶⁴⁵ *niyogasyāpi phalaṃ vinā na pravartakatvam ity uktam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁴⁶ *kriyāyā 'pi kevalāyā vākyārthatvam apāstam.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁴⁷ *tasmāt phalasya sādhyatvāt sarvatra tadavarjanāt/
kriyādīnāṃ ca tādarthyāt tasya vākyārthatteṣyate//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁴⁸ *nanu – phalasya svargāder nisargataḥ siddharūpatvāt kārakaiḥ saha sambandho na prāpnoti.* – NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140. *Svarga*'s being of an accomplished nature can only make sense on Bādari's view by virtue of its being understood as a pleasurable substance (*prītimaddravya*) and not supreme pleasure (*niratiśayaprīti*) itself. Further on that view, since the word *svarga* or *svargakāma* is a noun and has no exhortative element attached to it, it could not be understood as an object to be accomplished, but only something already accomplished and hence fit for bringing about the object to be accomplished, viz. the sacrifice.

⁶⁴⁹ *siddhasya ca kaḥ sambandhaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁵⁰ This is because *kāraka*-s (e.g., *dravya* or substances like curd, rice, etc.), which are themselves accomplished (*siddha*) entities, get connected with the action, which is as yet unaccomplished and hence the thing to be brought about (*sādhyā*). Now, if the result, which is the principal element of a sentence, too is accomplished, then of what use can the *kāraka*-s be to such a result?

⁶⁵¹ *kriyāgarbha iti cet.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

the action-factors⁶⁵²? This is to say that if the connection is based on the fact that the action is the head, then there would be no special role for the result to play which is different from the role played by the action-factors.

Jayanta refutes this by observing that it is true that both the result and the action-factors are connected with the action, but the distinction lies in the fact that while action-factors are connected with action as the means of bringing about the action, the result's syntactical connection with the action is due to the former's being the goal to be accomplished by means of that action⁶⁵³. For, it is the result which is accomplished by action, but not the action by the result. Thus, it is established that the result alone is the principal⁶⁵⁴.

3.5. Jayanta's summary of the whole discussion

Jayanta closes the discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning with a verse, where he sums up his view in the following way: it is a group of word-meanings, which is indeed specified by mutual connection, that attains the state of sentence-meaning. Keeping this in mind, therefore, the author of the NS has not spoken of sentence-meaning separately. Or, it is the result which, on account of its pre-eminence, is the sentence-meaning. And since with regard to the result or purpose rational persons make efforts, purpose indeed has been taught by the author of the NS to be the instigator.

4. Analysis and Observations

4.1. Authority vs. Innovation: the historical absence of sentence-meaning in *Nyāyasūtra* and *Nyāyabhāṣya*

Jayanta's entire business in writing this latter half of the 5th chapter of NM is to defend the validity of language as an instrument of knowledge by means of establishing sentence-meaning as something external and real⁶⁵⁵. However, Jayanta was sharply aware of an explicit lacuna in the core-texts of the Nyāya philosophical tradition, the NS and the NBh, in this regard⁶⁵⁶. Such a historical awareness of Jayanta's prompted him to fill in the lacuna and for this, he freely drew upon parts of the theories of sentence-meaning found in the philosophical systems of his intellectual rivals and tried to erect a theoretical edifice of his own, which, according to his implicit claim, does not suffer from the same problems as those of his opponents.

⁶⁵² *tarhi phalam api kārakāṇy api kriyayā sambadhyante ko viśeṣaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁵³ *satyaṃ parantu kārakāṇi sādhanatvena phalaṃ na tu sādhyatvena*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁵⁴ *kriyayā hi phalaṃ sādhyate, na phalena kriyety ataḥ phalasyaiva prādhānyam iti siddham*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁵⁵ This is because if what language meant were just an internal thing in the form of a mental image, as the Buddhists would have it, one would not care to perform the sacrifices, prescribed by the Vedic command utterances, which admit of external objects that are expensive and also a large amount of physical labour.

⁶⁵⁶ Although Graheli (2020:362) recognises this lacuna mentioned by Jayanta and how he sought to justify it, he does not probe the depth of the problem given that it is beyond the scope of his said paper.

The most important concern of Jayanta was to show how his own view of sentence-meaning was firmly grounded in the Nyāya textual traditions of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. But as an intellectual historian of his time, he was honest enough to admit that there was no exposition of sentence-meaning to be found both in the NS and NBh. However, as an intellectual himself, he twisted this reticence of NS and NBh to suit his own purpose of proposing sentence-meaning, thereby filling the gap and showing its roots in the NS. It is to be noted here that while admitting that the NS and NBh are silent upon the question of sentence-meaning, Jayanta highlights this silence as being purposeful and consistent with a major characteristic of Nyāya or Ānvīkṣikī being the science of the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇavidyā*), as distinct from the science of sentence-meaning (*vākyaṛthavidyā*), viz. Mīmāṃsā. Earlier in NM 1, Jayanta had clearly said that if on coming under the influence of bad logicians (*kutārṅkika*), people lose their faith in the validity of the Vedas, and the Vedas are thus tainted, of what service could Mīmāṃsā, its associate, be⁶⁵⁷? At this point, the Mīmāṃsakas might object that if the business of Nyāya were to ascertain the validity of the Vedas, then it has already been done by Mīmāṃsā, because just like the exegesis of meaning, discussion on validity is also found in it⁶⁵⁸. Jayanta's reply to this objection is that the discussion on the validity of the Vedas in Mīmāṃsā is secondary to the exegesis of the meaning of the Vedic statements⁶⁵⁹⁻⁶⁶⁰. For, all the sciences are different, and Mīmāṃsā is the science of sentence-meaning and not the science of the instruments of knowledge⁶⁶¹⁻⁶⁶².

Thus, Nyāya need not ideally focus, as per the implications of Jayanta's claim, on the gritty details of sentence-interpretation required for a correct understanding of statements connected with the prescription and performance of Vedic ritual actions. Moreover, from Jayanta's analysis it transpires how the author of the NS had contributed relevantly to the problems of language as an independent instrument of knowledge, while offering rejoinder to the Buddhist claim of language not being able to mirror the reality. In fact, he has

⁶⁵⁷ *vedeṣu hi tārkikaracitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu śīthilāsthāḥ katham iva bahuvittāyāsasādhyam vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādhaḥ. kiṃ vā tadānīm svāmini parimlāne tadanuyāyinā mīmāṃsāvidyāsthānaparijanena kṛtyam iti.* NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 7.

⁶⁵⁸ *nanu vedaprāmāṇyanirṇayaprayojanaś cen nyāyavistarāḥ kṛtam anena mīmāṃsāta eva tatsiddheḥ. tatra hy arthavicāravat prāmāṇyavicāro 'pi kṛta eva.* NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 10.

⁶⁵⁹ *satyaṃ sa tv ānuṣāṅgikas tatra mukhyas tv arthavicāra eva.* NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 10.

⁶⁶⁰ For an analysis of how the Mīmāṃsā defence of the validity of the Vedas, according to Jayanta, is weaker as compared to Jayanta's, see Section 5b in Kataoka (2006).

⁶⁶¹ *prthakprasthānā hīmā vidyāḥ. sā ca vākyaṛthavidyā na pramāṇavidyeti.* NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 10.

⁶⁶² For an analysis of Jayanta's view on the purpose of Nyāya against the wider background of Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa, see Kataoka (2006). Regarding Nyāya being more suited, according to Jayanta, for the task of defending the validity of the Vedas than Mīmāṃsā, see Section 5a in Kataoka (2006).

explained what word-meaning is, and very indirectly indicated word-meanings⁶⁶³ to be the components of sentence-meaning. Thus, he also indirectly contributed to the understanding of the nature of sentence-meaning. At this point, the question of whether sentence-meaning is one word-meaning or many word-meanings comes up and as a corollary to that, whether sentence-meaning exists over and above word-meanings and hence as a whole altogether distinct from its parts. Jayanta's interlocutor here mentions two conditions, namely *ādhikya* or additionality from Patañjali's MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 2.3.46 and *viśeṣa* or specificity from ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.24, to be fulfilled for a sentence-meaning to be distinguished from word-meaning. Jayanta, by clarifying his initial statement that sentence-meaning is word-meaning shows how not a single word-meaning, but many word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning. The point made by Jayanta is briefly that a) a single word-meaning alone does not make a sentence-meaning, and b) sentence-meaning is not a separate whole over and above the word-meanings, its parts.

He further clarifies that it is a collection of word-meanings syntactically connected to each other that is sentence-meaning and how this satisfies the opponent's demand for the Patañjalian condition of additionality by admitting *samsarga* or syntactical connection as the additional element. And since, Jayanta observes, a connection which does not imply specificity cannot hold water, the opponent's Śabarean condition of specificity is also fulfilled. A word or two may be said in explanation of Jayanta's claim that without implying specificity a connection cannot hold water. Syntactical connection, which features in sentential cognition, presupposes a hierarchical organisation of the constituent word-meanings. Such an organisation is not arbitrary but based on the principle of the principal and subordinate. For something to be the principal element of a linguistic cognition it is necessary for it to be the object to be accomplished (*sādhya*), since that which is unaccomplished is what is sought to be accomplished by means of all that is already accomplished. Now, two or more individual unconnected word-meanings are general in their scope of application. For example, individually the words 'cow' and 'white' refer to all cows in general and all instantiations of the quality 'white'. But in the expression 'white cow', the word 'white' refers not to all white things whatsoever, but only white cows, and the word cow means not any cow whatsoever but only those that are specified by the quality of whiteness. Thus, due to their connection with each other within a sentence, individual word-meanings give up their general scope of meaning and assume a specific shade of meaning, which is, of course, based on the general meaning.

It is worth mentioning here that, the condition of *viśeṣa* or specificity too is as much as Patañjali's as Śabara's. For, as shown in Ogawa (2012), Patañjali says the following line in MaBhā on Aṣṭ 1.2.45: *eteṣāṃ padānāṃ sāmānye vartamānānāṃ yad viśeṣe 'vasthānāṃ sa vākyārthaḥ*, which in Ogawa's translation means "A particular meaning (*viśeṣa*), as a conveyer of which these words conveying a general meaning (*sāmānya*) are established,

⁶⁶³ Here, following Jayanta, the expression "word-meanings" is to be understood in the qualified sense of "word-meanings mutually connected".

is a sentence-meaning.”⁶⁶⁴ Moreover, as Ogawa shows⁶⁶⁵, “in his Bhāṣya on JS 3.1.6.12 Śābara expounds his view about a sentence meaning by employing an expression⁶⁶⁶ strongly reminiscent of Patañjali’s statement.”⁶⁶⁷ This is substantially the same as the ŚāBhā passage cited by Jayanta’s opponent in NM 5.2⁶⁶⁸.

Now, the question is why did not Jayanta make his interlocutor cite the specificity condition of Patañjali’s from MaBhā, but only its adaptation in the ŚāBhā? And also, why did he make his interlocutor cite the *ādhikya* requirement from the MaBhā? I venture to suggest that the probable clue to the answer to these questions lies in the fact that Jayanta was trying to prove historically that the silence of the NS and NBh on the question of the nature of sentence-meaning was not a short-coming, but a philosophical necessity. It has also to be kept in mind that the Nyāya tradition starting from Gautama and Vātsyāyana⁶⁶⁹ admits of the whole (*avayavin*) as distinct from the component parts (*avayava*). But when Jayanta brings up this question of part and whole apropos of sentence-meaning for discussion, he denies the idea of sentence-meaning being an *avayavin* or whole, which altogether different from the *avayava*-s or parts in the form of word-meanings, which bring it about⁶⁷⁰. This is, in my opinion, because, had Jayanta admitted sentence-meaning as a whole altogether different from the constituent parts, then he would have faced the difficulty of not being able to show how a separate treatment of sentence-meaning as distinct from word-meanings is to be found in the NS and NBh.

But again, if he would have just said that a mere collection of word-meanings is sentence-meaning, then he would have run the risk of presenting a crypto-Bhartṛharean view⁶⁷¹; for,

⁶⁶⁴ Ogawa (2012:159).

⁶⁶⁵ Ogawa (2012:161-162).

⁶⁶⁶ *sāmānyavṛtti hi padaṃ, viśeṣavṛtti vākyam. sāmānyenābhipravṛttānām padārthānām yad viśeṣe ’vasthānaṃ sa vākyaṛthaḥ*. Quoted in Ogawa (2012:161).

⁶⁶⁷ Ogawa (2012:161).

⁶⁶⁸ *sāmānye hi padaṃ vartate, viśeṣe vākyam. anyac ca sāmānyam anyo viśeṣaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁶⁶⁹ See NS 2.1.32-36 and NBh thereon in this regard.

⁶⁷⁰ *na ca ... tadatirikto ’vayavisthānīyaḥ padārthair nīrvartyamāno vākyaṛtha upalabhyate... na ca padārthāvayavī vākyaṛthaḥ*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137.

⁶⁷¹ In the context of the discussion on language as an instrument of knowledge, this view is Bhartṛharean on the ground discussed in the immediately following lines in the main text above. Mereologically and ontologically, it could allude to the Buddhist view of the *avayavin* or whole as a mere configuration of parts. Historically too, NS II.1.33-36 and NBh thereon host the debate between the Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers on the question of the existence of a whole over and above the parts. For a succinct summary of the debate between the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas on this issue, see Nyāyatarkatīrtha (1976). To the best of my knowledge, there is no discussion in Buddhist philosophical texts on the question of whether or not sentence-meaning is over and above word-meaning. I am aware of Diñnāga’s understanding, following Bhartṛhari, of sentence-meaning being *pratibhā*, and all notions of word-meanings being based on the process of abstraction (*apoddhāra*) from the impartite sentence-meaning. But Diñnāga’s ultimate purpose served by such understanding of sentence-meaning as *pratibhā* was his denial of the status of an independent

so far as the constitution of sentence-meaning is concerned, Bhartṛhari and his followers do not admit sentence and sentence-meaning to be composite wholes. One of the main bases for this is extending the analogy of existence of words in *brāhmaṇakambala*⁶⁷², whose meaning does not, by any means, reflect the meanings of the individual constituent word-meanings, to the sphere of sentence-meaning. As a result of such extension, the Bhartṛhareans hold that in a sentence like “Devadatta! Bring the cow”, words like Devadatta are devoid of meaning. Hence sentence-meaning, on this view, should be understood as an impartite whole⁶⁷³. Thus, as on one hand, Jayanta wanted to show that the NS is not deficient of a treatment of sentence-meaning, he wanted his view not to appear crypto-Bhartṛharean on the other⁶⁷⁴. It is for this reason that he first made efforts to satisfy his opponent’s primary condition of additionality from the Mahābhāṣya by proposing *saṃsarga* or syntactical connection as the additional element within the view that a collection of word-meanings connected to each other is sentence-meaning. Second, he fulfilled the opponent’s second condition of *viśeṣa* or specificity as coming from *saṃsarga* by means of implication (*ākṣepa*), and he was emphatic in saying that without implying such a specificity, a syntactical connection does not hold water⁶⁷⁵. Thus, as the concept of *ādhiḥkya* or additionality in the form of syntactical connection helps Jayanta explain the source of specificity in sentence-meaning on one hand, it helps him maintain the Nyāya view of the whole (*avayavin*) as being different from the parts (*avayava*) to some extent in an indirect manner, and without a distinct pronouncement, on the other, which ultimately saves his theory from appearing crypto-Bhartṛharean. Moreover, by satisfying the conditions mentioned by his opponents from two different but very important schools of thought, viz. Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa, Jayanta might have intended to suggest that his view of the Nyāya theory of sentence-meaning is not only rooted in the Nyāya textual traditions of Gautama and Vātsyāyana, but also has a basic agreement with the views of two such rival but important schools of thought, which deal preeminently with the philosophy of language. Further, it is also to be noted that when Jayanta closes

instrument of knowledge to language and its subsumption under inference; for details of Diñnāga’s arguments in this regard see Section I in Hattori (2011:135-137). By contrast, Bhartṛhari has no such professed aim of showing that linguistic cognition is not over and above inferential cognition.

⁶⁷² Another example of such word is *aśvakarṇa*, which refers to a particular kind of tree (*Vatica Robusta*), and does not reflect the meaning of the individual words, *aśva* (horse) and *karṇa* (ear). An English language instance of such words is foxglove.

⁶⁷³ VP_{Rau} 2.14. For an analysis of this view, see Section 2 in Ogawa (2012).

⁶⁷⁴ It is to be noted that the first part of NM 6 is dedicated to a presentation and refutation of the Vaiyākaraṇa theory of *sphoṭavāda*, which avowedly declares sentence and sentence-meaning to be impartite. As is evident from Graheli (2015), notwithstanding the fact that Jayanta here mainly reuses Kumārila’s arguments from the Sphoṭavāda chapter of ŚV, Bhartṛhari’s VP is also referred to and so is Maṇḍana’s *Sphoṭasiddhi*. That Maṇḍana followed Bhartṛhari’s view on *sphoṭa* and defended it against the criticisms of Kumārila and others in *Sphoṭasiddhi* has been shown by Akane Saito in Section 4 in general and 4.2 in particular in Saito (2020).

⁶⁷⁵ *na cānākṣiptaviśeṣatvena saṃsarga upapadyate*. NM_{Mys-II}, p. 137.

the discussion on the nature of sentence-meaning with an original verse⁶⁷⁶, he records the finally clarified version of this view of his on sentence-meaning as *anyonyasaṅgativīśeṣita padārthapuñja vākyārtha*, or a collection of word-meanings specified by mutual connection is sentence-meaning, where both the elements of additionality (*ādhikya*) in the form of *saṃsarga* or syntactical connection and *viśeṣa* or specificity caused by such a connection are accommodated. It is unfortunate that a discerning scholar like Prof. Prabal Kumar Sen has omitted the word ‘*viśeṣita*’ in his Bengali translation⁶⁷⁷.

4.2. Two views of sentence-meaning or one?

As regards the seemingly second view of sentence-meaning which has been sketched out in Section 3.4 of this chapter, it may be said that Jayanta does not break away altogether from the basic structure of his theory, viz. many word-meanings syntactically connected with each other make sentence-meaning, but he builds it upon this fundamental idea. However, he adds to it a further clarification of the specificity mentioned before from the angle of *śābdabodha* or linguistic cognition, which necessarily admits more than one word-meaning, although necessarily requiring them to be arranged in an order of one principal element qualified by one or more secondary elements⁶⁷⁸. It is to be noted here that the idea of syntactical connection among word-meanings not being possible without the relation of the principal and secondary makes its first appearance in NM 5.2 in the context of the view of the Vaiyākaraṇas⁶⁷⁹, according to whom, a connection among word-meanings does not hold water without the condition of the principal and subsidiary, and since no sentence is fit to be used without a verb⁶⁸⁰, so action is what is the meaning of a sentence. Such an identification of *kriyā* or action as the meaning of a sentence is based upon its identification as the principal element of the process of linguistic cognition mentioned above. The opponent discussed in Section 3.1 of this chapter would have *saṃsarga* or syntactical connection dependent upon the relation of the principal and subsidiaries. Jayanta, by contrast, reversed the direction of this dependence. He said, although there is a hierarchical arrangement of word-meanings where one particular word-meaning features as the principal element, and all other word-meanings subordinate to it, due to which the content of the ensuing cognition has a unitary form, yet, it is the connected word-meanings only that appear, and not a single thing brought about by them which is

⁶⁷⁶ *anyonyasaṅgativīśeṣita eva yasmād vākyārthabhāvam upayāti padārthapuñjaḥ*/ NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁷⁷ Sen (2013:246).

⁶⁷⁸ For a general introduction to the verbal cognition process and the debates around it by Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa, see Diaconescu (2012).

⁶⁷⁹ *na ca guṇapradhānabhāvam antareṇa saṃsargaḥ padārthānām avakalpate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 74. This line is repeated in NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 137 in the context of the second view of sentence-meaning, where the word ‘*padārthānām*’ is dropped.

⁶⁸⁰ *na cākhyātarahitaṃ vākyam kiñcit prayogayogyam*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 74.

altogether different⁶⁸¹. Hence, in contrast to his opponent, Jayanta claims that the very notion of principal and subordinate is based on the obtainment of syntactical connection⁶⁸². This is again a clear denial of any possibility of a whole, as brought about by parts, and yet altogether from the parts. It also highlights the basic framework of connected word-meanings forming the sentence-meaning. In fact, Jayanta's dedication of a verse in this respect where he claims that all who claim either *niyoga* or *bhāvanā* or *kriyā* to be the meaning of a sentence⁶⁸³, do accept a collection of word-meanings connected to each other. This, in my opinion, suggests that the notion of principal and subordinate plays here the same role as does the Śabarean condition of *viśeṣa* or specificity discussed before, and this specificity takes on the form of the principal and subordinate only when approached from the standpoint of linguistic cognition. Thus, the seemingly second view that only a single principal word-meaning, aided by other word-meanings subordinate to it is the meaning of a sentence is formulated by Jayanta only to account for the phenomenology of a unitary cognition⁶⁸⁴ without admitting any actual ontological distinction of whole and parts. This also does not disturb the basic structure of Jayanta's view of sentence-meaning being a collection of word-meanings specified by mutual connection, but only further clarifies the said specification from the standpoint of linguistic cognition. Hence, in NM 5.2, Jayanta does not ultimately propose two different and exclusive theories of sentence-meaning, but only one basic theory, which is dealt with from different angles only.

It is to be noted that at the end of NM, Jayanta says that he has offered some dialectical discussion on sentence-meaning⁶⁸⁵. Now as is customary with the dialectical method followed in classical Sanskrit philosophical texts, two rival views are proposed and objections, stemming from doubts, etc. to them are entertained by both sides and replied and the clarificatory expansion of the initial views is offered. Consistent with this method it may be observed that although Jayanta starts with the shortest version of his view on sentence-meaning, viz. *padārtha eva vākyaṛthaḥ*⁶⁸⁶, yet he ends with its longest version, which is: *anyonyasaṅgativiśeṣita eva padārthapuñjo vākyaṛthaḥ*⁶⁸⁷. This longest version is nothing but a clarified version of the shortest one based on the objections of the various

⁶⁸¹ *yad idaṃ anekaguṇoparaktam ekaṃ kiñcit pradhānaṃ sa vākyaṛtha itī tadviśayaikaśvabhāvā buddhiḥ. satyaṃ tathāpi ta eva saṃsr̥ṣṭāḥ padārthā avabhāsante na tadārabdhaḥ kaścid ekaḥ.* NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 137-138.

⁶⁸² *saṃsargasiddhikṛtas tu guṇapradhānabhāva abhyupeyate.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 138.

⁶⁸³ Such an identification of either *niyoga* or *bhāvanā* or *kriyā* by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas make sense only in terms of the principal element within the intellectual framework of the process of verbal cognition.

⁶⁸⁴ *athavā guṇibhūtetarapadārthānugṛhīta eka eva pradhānabhūtaḥ padārtho vākyaṛtha itī ekākārapratītibalād upeyatām.* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139.

⁶⁸⁵ *kāñcid vākyaṛthacarcām api viracayatā...* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 717.

⁶⁸⁶ NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 136.

⁶⁸⁷ NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

opponents. Thus, the journey of this view reaching its final clarified form can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

1. *padārtha eva vākyārthaḥ*
- ⇓
2. *naikāḥ padārtho vākyārthaḥ, anekas tu vākyārthaḥ*
- ⇓
3. *parasparasamśṛṣṭapadārthasamudāyo vākyārthaḥ*
- ⇓
4. *anyonyasaṅgativiśeṣita eva [...] padārthapuñjo vākyārthabhāvam upayāti*

1. “The word meaning is the sentence meaning”.
- ⇓
2. “It is not the case that a single word-meaning is the sentence meaning, but several words-meanings are”
- ⇓
3. “Sentence-meaning is a collection of word-meanings mutually connected” (here, *samsarga* or connection fulfils the opponent’s Patañjalian condition of *ādhikya* or additionality and since connection cannot be justified without it implying specificity, hence the second Patañjali-Śabarean condition of *viśeṣa*)
- ⇓
4. “Sentence-meaning is a collection of word-meanings specified by mutual connection” (here both the conditions of additionality and specificity and their causal connection are accommodated)

With reference to *phala* or result being the principal meaning element of sentence Jayanta makes a very important observation that *phala* is not necessarily understood out of words, but is also obtained by referring to the context or even through reflection⁶⁸⁸ sometimes. By allowing such a wide range of understanding of *phala* as the principal element of a linguistic cognition, Jayanta attempts to save his theory from falling into pitfalls of rules pertaining to linguistic cognition, which have rendered his opponents’ theories, as examined by Jayanta, insufficient.

4.3. From Linguistics to Pragmatics

Moreover, Jayanta’s terse statement that no sentence is uttered which is purposeless⁶⁸⁹ points to an important fact that the very formulation of a sentence is meant for serving a practical purpose⁶⁹⁰; in other words, the nature of the purpose to be served dictates the very formulation of a sentence in a particular manner. This again suggests an overlapping of epistemology with linguistics and pragmatics. It is also very much reminiscent of the

⁶⁸⁸ For an analysis of ‘reflection’ (*ālocanā*), see Section 8 of Part II of Chapter III.

⁶⁸⁹ *na hi niṣprayojanam kiñcid vākyam uccaryate*. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 139. This is strongly reminiscent of Kumāṛila’s following remark in ŚV_{vā} –

na hi prayojanāpeta vākyam uccāryate kvacit/346a-b. ŚV_{DS}, p. 664.

No sentence is ever uttered which is devoid of a purpose.

⁶⁹⁰ I owe a clarification of my initial interpretation of this statement to Prof. Parimal G. Patil.

Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa's famous saying that without a purpose, even a dimwit does not undertake any action⁶⁹¹. Moreover, Jayanta's identification of *phala* or result with *prayojana* or purpose, also gives him the scope to trace the roots of his theory of *phala* as the principal element of sentence-meaning in NS 1.1.24 which defines purpose as that object a desire to accept or avoid which, prompts a person undertake any action. Also, Jayanta says that *phala* or result is the sentence-meaning on account of its pre-eminence, the author of NS has instructed on purpose as verily that *phala* which is the instigator⁶⁹². Hereby, Jayanta takes an essentially purpose-oriented view of language, thus reducing the distinction between prescriptive and non-prescriptive statements⁶⁹³.

Jayanta's brief discussion of *phala* or result as the ultimate purpose to be accomplished behind any undertaking of action together with its identification with *sukha* or pleasure, suggests that Jayanta's view of sentence-meaning is predominantly dictated by pragmatic considerations and that it is mainly hedonistic in nature.

5. Conclusion

The foregoing discussion shows how Jayanta starts with the basic idea that "word-meaning is sentence-meaning" and goes on, by engaging into dialectical discussions with the rival theorists, to bring it to its fully developed form as "a collection of word-meanings, specified by mutual connection is what is sentence-meaning". This also helps him account for the historical silence of the NS and NBh on the question of sentence-meaning. Moreover, this chapter shows how the seemingly second view of sentence-meaning that "a single principal word-meaning as aided by other word-meanings that are subordinate to it is what is sentence-meaning" is built upon the basic idea of word-meanings constituting sentence-meaning and the latter not excluding the former. Despite admitting such a hierarchical arrangement of word-meanings, Jayanta emphasises how the sentence-meaning is not altogether different from the constituent word-meanings. In this way, he avoids the Bhartṛharean objection of sentence-meaning being impartite and all notions of constituent parts being available only through the process of abstraction (*apoddhāra*). Implicit is the claim that the Bhartṛharean view of sentence-meaning being non-composite

⁶⁹¹ *prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate*. Verse no. 55, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, ŚV, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 463.

⁶⁹² *prādhānyayogād atha vā phalasya vākyaṛthatā tatra satām hi yatmaḥ/ prayojanam sūtrakṛtā tad eva pravartakatvena kilopadiśtam//* NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 140.

⁶⁹³ In fact, as has already been noted in Part II of Chapter III, Jayanta says that so far as a person is instigated only by the result, and given that, according to Jayanta, the understanding of this result need not necessarily originate from linguistic sources, there is no essential difference between the instigations understood out of the sentences, "One desirous of good health should eat the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree" and "He who eats the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree gains good health." This attempt at doing away with the difference may have a larger consequence of defending the independent validity of even the non-prescriptive parts of the Vedas like the Upaniṣads. Since it is beyond the scope of this present thesis to discuss this at length, I reserve an investigation into it for a future paper.

and impartite, overlooks the phenomenology of sentential cognition which invariably mirrors the word-meanings.

It is also to be noted that Jayanta imports the concepts of additionality from Patañjali and specificity from Patañjali and Śabara to account for the fact that although sentence-meaning is basically word-meaning, yet it is not exactly the same as the latter but has some specificity and as a matter of that an element of novelty. Jayanta's structured argument in this regard shows how the specificity spoken of is rooted in syntactical connection. By bringing parts of his opponents' theories into the fabric of his own theory of sentence-meaning, Jayanta tries to bring it at par with the principal theories of sentence-meaning current at his time, propounded by the rival systems of Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, which are also two of the main schools of classical Indian thought dealing pre-eminently with the philosophical problems of language. Jayanta's approach can thus be described as being simultaneously exclusive and inclusive, traditional and innovative in nature.

Appendix I

A note on the word ‘śabdapramāṇaka’ occurring in NM 5.2

While presenting the view of the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent, according to whom an action being the principal element is the sentence-meaning, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta poses the following clarificatory question to this opponent in NM 5.2:

kuta idaṃ kriyāyāḥ prādhānyam upeyate vastuvṛttena vā śabdapratyayahimnā va? NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

For what reason [do you] accept that action is the principal [element in sentence-meaning]? Is it on account of state of affairs or because of the might of [one’s] conviction [in the authority of] linguistic cognition?

In reply to the above question, the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin clarifies his position as follows:

na vastutaḥ prādhānyam ihāśrīyate ’pi tu śabdataḥ. śabdapramāṇakā vayaṃ yac chabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam. tad yathā rājapurūṣa iti. vastuvṛtte rājā jagatām īsitā pradhānaṃ puruṣas tapasvī tadicchānuvartanena jīvati. śabdā tu puruṣaprādhānyam ācaṣṭe uttarapadapradhānatvāt tatpuruṣasyeti. evam ihāpi dadyāj juhuyād iti kriyāṃ prādhānyena upadiśati śabdaḥ. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 76.

Here, it is not on account of state of affairs that [action] is held to be the principal [element], but due to linguistic communication. We are those, for whom linguistic communication is [the principal] instrument of knowledge; whatever language says is valid for us. For example, [take the compound word] ‘rājapurūṣa’ – the king’s employee. In the real world, it is the king, the lord of the universe, who is the principal one; [whereas] the employee, a devout [follower], lives by abiding by his (the king’s) wish. But linguistic communication speaks of the pre-eminence of the employee, because the latter component of a *tatpuruṣa* type of endocentric compound is the principal [semantic element of such compounds]. Likewise, here in “one should make a sacrificial donation”, “one should offer oblation”, too linguistic communication teaches the pre-eminence of action.

What is interesting to note here that the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent cites the famous MaBhā passage - *śabdapramāṇakā vayaṃ yacchabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam*.⁶⁹⁴ He further uses the example of a *tatpuruṣa* type of endocentric compounds to make his point that exhortative verb-forms occurring in Vedic injunctions speak of the pre-eminence of action, on which score action is to be accepted as the meaning of a sentence. Now this

⁶⁹⁴MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 1.1.1.

quotation from the MaBhā together with the use of a hard-core grammatical example of *tatpuruṣa* compounds might mislead one to identify this Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent with a Vaiyākaraṇa or grammarian, who accepts the MaBhā as an authoritative text. However, Śābarasvāmin quotes the same MaBhā passage in his commentary on MīSū 3.2.35⁶⁹⁵. To contextualise Śābara's use of the same his commentary on MīSū 3.2.34 is also quoted below –

tvaṣṭāraṃ tūpalakṣayet pānāt. MīSū 3.2.34.

ŚāBhā – *asti pātnīvataḥ somaḥ, tatra mantraḥ, agnā i patnīvan sajur devena tvaṣṭrā somam pibeti. tatra sandehaḥ - kiṃ tvaṣṭopalakṣayitavyo na veti. kiṃ prāptam? upalakṣayitavyaḥ. kutaḥ? pānāt, pānaṃ śrūyate - sajur devena tvaṣṭrā somam pibeti. tenāyam agnaye patnīvate saha tvaṣṭrā dīyata iti gamyate. yasmai ca yena saha dīyate, ubhābhyāṃ tad dīyate, evaṃ tat sahadānaṃ bhavati, yathā devadattāya yajñadattena saha śataṃ dīyatām ity ukte, tatrobhābhyāṃ api dīyate. tasmāt tvāṣṭro 'py asau soma iti tvaṣṭopalakṣayitavyaḥ. asāv apīndra iva pibatīti.*

atulyatvāt tu naivaṃ syāt. MīSū 3.2.35.

ŚāBhā – *naitad evam, śabdapramāṇakā vayam, yac chabda āha, tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam, śabdaś cāgneḥ patnīvataḥ pānam āha tvaṣṭuḥ sahabhāvamātram, na hy ananuṣṭhīyamāne sahabhāvaḥ sidhyatīti tvaṣṭari pānam anumīyate. nanu tvaṣṭre pānaṃ coditam. satyam, coditaṃ mantravarṇena, na codanayā. codanā hi pātnīvataṃ grhṇātīti, loka tu kāryaṃ drṣṭvā coditam acoditam apy anuṣṭhīyata eva, lokataś caitat paricchinnam, naivaṃjātīyakena vākyena, tvaṣṭuḥ somaḥ kṛto bhavatīti.*

Ganganatha Jha's translation of these MīSū and the ŚāBhā passages thereon is as follows:

“SŪTRA (34)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA] – “TVAṢṬR SHOULD BE MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THE DRINKING.”

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Pātnīvata Soma* (*Soma* offered to *Patnīvat*); in connection with which there is the *mantra* – ‘*Agnā I patnīvāḥ sajurdevena tvaṣṭrā somam piba.*’ (Taitti. Sam. 1.4.27.1) –

In regard to this there arises the question – Should *Tvaṣṭr* be mentioned or not (in the *mantra* used at the eating of the *Pātnīvata* remnant)?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows: = “*Tvaṣṭr* must be mentioned. – Why? – *Because of the drinking*; as a matter of fact we find ‘drinking’ mentioned in the text (as

⁶⁹⁵ This was kindly brought to my notice by Dr. Elisa Freschi.

done by *Tvaṣṭṛ*) – ‘*Sajūrdevena tvaṣṭṛā somam piba*’; from which it is clear that the offering is made to *Patnīvat* accompanied by *Tvaṣṭṛ*; and what is offered to a person accompanied by another is regarded as offered to both; for instance, when it is said that ‘a hundred should be given to Devadatta accompanied by Yajñadatta’, - the ‘hundred’ is given to both. Consequently, the *Soma-remnant* in question is ‘*tvāṣṭra*’ (related to *Tvaṣṭṛ*) (as well as ‘*pātnīvata*’); hence *Tvaṣṭṛ* must be mentioned in the *mantra*; because, like *Indra*, he also ‘drinks’ the *Soma*.’

SŪTRA (34)

[SIDDHĀNTA] – BECAUSE OF THE INEQUALITY, SUCH SHOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

Bhāṣya.

The view expressed above is not right. As a matter of fact, the Vedic Word is our sole authority; what the Word says that alone we regard as authoritative. In the case in question, what the Word (of the Text) declares is the actual ‘drinking’ by *Agni-Patnīvat* only, - and of *Tvaṣṭṛ*, it declares the mere fact of his *association* (with *Agni-Patnīvat*); - under the circumstances, the actual ‘drinking by *Tvaṣṭṛ* can only be *inferred* from the fact that the said ‘association’ is not established without the *drinking* [and *Inference* is not as authoritative as the Vedic word].

“But the actual *drinking* by (or v.l., ‘offering to’) *Tvaṣṭṛ* is distinctly enjoined.”

True, it is enjoined, but only through the words of the *mantra*, not by a *direct Injunction*; - all that the direct *Injunction* says is that ‘one holds the *Pātnīvata*’; in ordinary life, an act – whether enjoined or unejoined – is performed whenever a need is perceived for it; but their ordinary practice is the determining factor; but texts like those under consideration do not establish any connection between the *Soma* and the deity *Tvaṣṭṛ*.⁶⁹⁶

But this is not a mere case of quotation of a passage from an opponent’s work. Rather, as will be argued below, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers seem to have popularly known by the appellation of ‘*śabdapramāṇaka*’.

In his BrSūŚBhā, Śāṅkarācārya (788-820 AD) refuted the view of the ‘*śabdapramāṇaka*’-s that the ritual action done for the sake of *svarga* does not exclusively produce the entire result in the form of *svarga* for someone who resides in *svarga*, but it produces a little remainder of the result also for someone who is deviated from *svarga* –

tad etad apeśalam, svargārthaṃ kila karma svargāsthasyaiva svargaphalaṃ nikhilaṃ na janayati svargacyutasypī kañcit phalaleśaṃ janayatīti na śabdapramāṇakānām īdrśī kalpanā ’vakalpate. BrSūŚBhā, p. 606.

⁶⁹⁶ Jha (1933:426-427).

This is not [a] charming [view]; for such a postulation, by people, for whom linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic sacred texts] is the [principal] instrument of knowledge, that the action indeed meant for *svarga* does not produce the result, *svarga*, for someone who is in *svarga*, but also produces a remainder of the [said] result (*svarga*) even for someone, who has been detached from *svarga*, cannot be supported.

The sub-commentaries, *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā*⁶⁹⁷ and *Nyāyanirṇaya*⁶⁹⁸, mention this as the view of an *ekadeśin*.

However, Dr. R. Mani Dravid Śāstrī shows in his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, *Uttaramīmāṃsāyāṃ Pūrvamīmāṃsāyāḥ Prabhāvaḥ*, how this BrSūŚBhā passage echoes Kumārilabhaṭṭa's treatment of the problem in the ŚV. The relevant verses from the *Citrākṣepaparihāra* section of Kumāriḷa's ŚV are as follows:

*yeṣāṃ tvihaphalāny eva citrādīnīti kalpanā/
nirnimittam phalam teṣāṃ syād ihākṛtakarmaṇām//14//
citrādīnām phalam tāvat kṣīṇam tatraiva janmani/
na ca svargaphalasyeha kaścid aṃśo 'nuvartate//15//
naiva hy anyaphalam karma sādhyen naḥ phalāntaram/
gautamīye 'pi taccheṣas tasmāc citrādyapekṣayā//16// ŚV_{DS}, pp. 485-486.*

14. They who hold [rituals] like the Citrā, etc. to deliver their results [like cattle, etc.] in this birth only, cannot explain why those people, who have not performed such rituals, should have [those results] without any cause.

15. [For,] the results of Citrā, etc. [performed in a previous life] are exhausted in that life only, and no part of the result [in the form of] *svarga* follows in this life.

16. Because, a ritual action which delivers a particular result cannot accomplish some other [result] for us. With regard to Gautama's [statement] too, the 'remnant' should be understood with reference to the Citrā, etc.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁷ See in BrSūŚBhā.

⁶⁹⁸ See in BrSūŚBhā.

⁶⁹⁹ The import of Gautama statement should be understood as follows – it is only those people who, despite performing the Citrā in a previous life did not get the result in that life due to some stronger impediment, who get the result of the Citrā in this life without performing the ritual.

Dr. Śāstrī also points out how Pārthasārathimiśra in his *Ślokavārttika* commentary, *Nyāyaratnākara* (NRĀ), mentions and identifies this position as that of Bhartṛmitra⁷⁰⁰, etc. The relevant extract from the *Nyāyaratnākara* reads as follows:

...idaṃ tu cintyaṃ, kim ihaiva janmani citrādīnāṃ phalam? uteha vā janmāntare veti? bhartṛmitrādayastv ihaiva manyante. tathā ca yogasiddhyadhikaraṇe vakṣyata iti. tān praty āha –

yeṣāṃ tvihaphalāny eva citrādīnīti kalpanā/

nirnimittaṃ phalaṃ teṣāṃ syād ihākṛtakarmaṇām//14// NRĀ, in ŚV_{DS}, p. 485.

...This is to be deliberated upon, whether Citrā, etc. deliver their [respective] results in this very birth? Or in this birth and in a next birth? Bhartṛmitra and others think that [it happens] in this birth only. And that will be said in the [section called] *Yogasiddhyadhikaraṇa*⁷⁰¹. It is to him that [Kumārila] says –

They who hold [rituals] like the Citrā, etc. to deliver their results [like cattle, etc.] in this birth only, cannot explain why those people, who have not performed such rituals, should have [those results] without any cause.”

That Bhartṛmitra was “recognized generally in India as a Mīmāṃsā scholar” and has been mentioned in that way by great Nyāya authors such as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (who names him twice) and *alamkāra* writers like Mukulabhaṭṭa has been shown by Nakamura (2004:170-174).

Reading the BrSūŚBhā passage in the light of the aforementioned ŚV verses and NRĀ passages and also considering the similarity of the discussion of the above Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta discourses in terms of the content, Dr. Śāstrī arrives at the conclusion that Śāṅkarācārya is here reproducing the view of Bhartṛmitra and others as found in the ŚV:

atra ca pūrvopanyastaślokavārttike ’nūdīta eva pūrvapakṣaḥ śāṅkarabhāṣye pratyabhijñāyate. ataś ca ayaṃ bhartṛmitrādīnāṃ eva pakṣaḥ śāṅkarabhāṣye ’py anūdīta ity avagamyate. Dravid (1997:216).

Here in Śāṅkara’s commentary the opponent’s view is identified with that which has been reiterated in the ŚV [verses], mentioned before. And from this it is understood that it is the view of Bhartṛmitra, etc. which has been reiterated in Śāṅkarācārya’s commentary too.

Moreover, Dr. Śāstrī says:

⁷⁰⁰ For Bhartṛmitra’s view, see Appendix II.

⁷⁰¹ See MīSū 4.3.26-27.

śāṅkarabhāṣye etanmatakhāṇḍane 'pi bhāṭṭapādokta eva prakāro 'valambitah.
Dravid (1997:216).

In refuting this view too, the revered [Kumārila] Bhāṭṭa's mode [of refutation] alone has been resorted to in Śāṅkara's commentary.

And lastly, as a corollary to all preceding inferences, Dr. Śāstrī comments:

atra 'na śabdapramāṇakādīnām īdṛṣī kalpanā 'vakalpata' iti pūrvapakṣina upalambho 'pi tasya mīmāṃsakaikadeśitvaṃ sūcayati. Dravid (1997:217).

Here the recognition of the opponent [by means of the following statement:] “such a postulation by people, for whom linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic sacred texts] is the [principal] instrument of knowledge, cannot be supported” too speaks of his being a partial Mīmāṃsaka.”

Aside from the references given by Dr. Śāstrī, it is to be noted that in his commentary on BrSūŚBhā 1.3.33, Śāṅkarācārya again mentions the ‘śabdapramāṇaka’-s as follows –

na ca śabdamaṭram arthasvarūpaṃ sambhavati, śabdārthayor bhedāt. tatra yādṛśaṃ mantrārthavādayor indradīnām svarūpaṃ avagataṃ na tat tādṛśaṃ śabdapramāṇakena pratyākhyātum yuktam. BrSūŚBhā, p. 273.

The nature of meaning does not consist in the word only, because of the distinction between word and meaning. In that case, he, who believes the Vedas to be the [principal] instrument of knowledge, cannot deny the nature of [deities -] Indra, etc. which is understood in the [Vedic] *mantra*-s and laudatory statements (*arthavāda*).

Here too by the expression ‘śabpramāṇakeṇa’, the Mīmāṃsakas are meant, who clearly deny extra-linguistic physical form (*vigraha*) to Vedic deities like Indra, etc., as is evident from MīSū 9.1.9-10.

The foregoing references may allow us to conjecture that ‘śabdapramāṇaka’ was not merely a description of the Vaiyākaraṇa standpoint made by Patañjali, but it was also used as an appellation for referring to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers. However, for the Mīmāṃsakas, the word ‘śabda’ within the Bahuvrīhi compound ‘śabdapramāṇaka’ seems to have been narrowed down to linguistic communication in the form of the Vedic sacred texts instead of the literal meaning of ‘language’ in general.

Appendix II

Prapañcavilayavāda Kriyāvākyārthavāda

vis-à-vis

In the context of presenting the Kriyāvākyārthavādin opponent's view in NM 5.2, Jayanta says the following on the reason why, on this opponent's view, a person undertakes an action:

kimarthaṃ punar asau kriyām anuṭiṣṭhatīti cec, chabdaprāmāṇyād eveti brūmaḥ. śabdena hi coditaḥ tvayedam kartavyam iti sa cen niyukto nānuṭiṣṭhan codanām atikrāmet. śastrapratyayāc kriyām anuṭiṣṭhati. virataphalābhilāṣaḥ karmasaṃskārād eva paripakvakaṣāyaḥ stokastokaprapaṅcapravidāpanadvāreṇottamādhikāram ārūḍhas tata eva jñātāsvādas tam eva paramapurūṣārtham āsādayatīti dīrghā sā katha tiṣṭhatu. kim anayā? sarvathā kriyāprādhānyāt saiva vākyārtha iti. tad uktam - dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādarir iti. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 75.

But if [it is asked as to] why does he (a person) perform the action [prescribed the Vedic injunctions], we say [in reply -] that it is only because of the validity of Vedic sacred texts. For, [he] is instigated by the Vedic sacred texts as “this is to be done by you”. If on being enjoined he does not perform [the prescribed act], he transgresses the injunction. And he performs [the ritual] action [prescribed by the Vedic injunction] due to his belief in [the validity of] the Vedic sacred texts. A person, who has refrained from desiring the results [of Vedic ritual actions he performs]; whose passions have decayed through the purification [caused by the performance of] Vedic ritual actions; who having ascended the supreme eligibility through gradual dissolution of the phenomenal world process has known the taste [of the real nature of the self] attains that indeed, which is the supreme human end [in the form of knowing the real nature of the self]. Let this long story rest! What if it is so? Since action is the principal element everywhere it (action) alone is the sentence-meaning. It has been said [in MīSū 3.1.3] – “[Being subsidiary applies] to substances, qualities and purificatory acts, according to Bādari.”

From this passage the relation among ‘dissolution of the phenomenal world process’, ‘attaining the supreme human end’ and the pre-eminence of action and as a result of it, action's being the sentence-meaning, is unclear, and it remains so since Jayanta does not explain the interconnection beyond this in NM 5.2.

I believe, this is an allusion to the doctrine of ‘dissolution of the phenomenal world process’ advocated by Bhartṛmitra, a pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā philosopher, who built his theory on Bādari's theory of ‘Action being sentence-meaning’ (*kriyāvārtthapakṣa*) and developed a new soteriological model out of it, which played the role of one of the principal rival views within the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems. Commentators of

Kumārila like Umbeka Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi Miśra, etc. are unanimous in holding that Kumārila wrote the *Ślokavārttika* in criticism of the view of Bhartṛmitra, etc. as expressed in *Tattvaśuddhi* and other works. Umbeka, the earliest of the *Ślokavārttika* commentators writes in his *Tātparyatīkā* on verse no. 10 of the first chapter of *Ślokavārttika* as follows:

nanu vedārthagrahaṇāvismaraṇārtham api tattadbhartṛmitrādiviracitatattvaśuddhyādilakṣaṇaprakaraṇam asty eva iti gatārtham idaṃ vākyam ity ata āha prāyenaiva iti. mīmāṃsā hi sarvāstikaśāstrāṇām agrāṇī. sarvapuruṣārthasādhanaparijñāsyā etannibandhanatvāt. saivamātmikā 'lokāyatam eva satī bāhulyena lokāyatīkṛtā. satsmṛtisadācārāṇām vinā kāraṇena dharmapramāṇatvanirākaraṇād vidhiniṣedhayor iṣṭāniṣṭaphalānabhyugamāc ca. prāyena iti. codanāpramāṇako dharmā ity etāvan mātrena nāstikaśāstrād apasārīta, anyat sāmānyam eva kṛtam ity arthaḥ. tām imām asadvyākhyātrvaśād asanmārganimnagām uddhṛtyāstikapathe kartuṃ sthāpayituṃ vārttikārambhaprayatnaḥ kṛto mayeti. ŚVTā, p. 3.

Well, since, even for the purpose of learning the meaning of the Vedas and non-forgetting [the meaning of the Vedas learnt] monographs characterised by *Tattvaśuddhi*, etc. written by Bhartṛmitra and others exist, the purpose of this statement [by Kumārila] is [already] served; for this reason it is said – **mostly indeed**. For, Mīmāṃsā is the foremost of the orthodox (*āstika*) philosophical systems, since a thorough knowledge of the means for [accomplishing] all the human ends is based on this (Mīmāṃsā). That being of such nature, which is non-heterodox indeed, is to made heterodox to a great extent on account of refuting without any reason that valid law texts and valid conduct [of orthodox people] are instruments of knowledge in regard to religious duty, and also for not accepting beneficial and malefic results with regard to [Vedic] prescriptions and prohibitions. “Religious duty is known [only] from the instrument of knowledge [in the form of] Vedic injunctions” – by [holding] this much only has [Mīmāṃsā] been kept away from [the ambit of] heterodox philosophical systems; the rest has been made common [with the heterodox philosophical systems] – this is the meaning. For the sake of **making** that is, placing, after lifting this (Mīmāṃsā), which has been flowing down the bad path due to the bad commentators, on the orthodox path, this effort for commencing the *vārttika* [type of commentary] has been made by me (Kumārila).

Bhartṛmitra’s work called *Tattvaśuddhi* mentioned by Umbeka has been irretrievably lost. However, since Bhartṛmitra’s view posed such a formidable challenge as it compelled Kumārila to make efforts to restore the orthodox nature of Mīmāṃsā, his views are found mentioned in many Mīmāṃsā texts like *Vidhiviveka* and *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra and many Advaita Vedānta texts like the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* of Śāṅkarācārya and *Sambhandavārttika* of Sureśvarācārya thereon. Jayanta too mentions Bhartṛmitra by name twice in *Nyāyamañjarī*⁷⁰² and introduces his view in the context of discussing the

⁷⁰² NM_{Mys.-1}, p. 531, 559.

Mīmāṃsā view on the nature of the auditory organ. Thus, in Jayanta's opinion too, Bhartṛmitra was a Mīmāṃsā philosopher. Bhartṛmitra has also been mentioned, as shown by Pāṇḍeya (1971:107-108), and Nakamura (2004:170-173), by Yāmunācārya and Mukulabhaṭṭa. Writing about Bhartṛmitra, Nakamura (2004:172) says:

“Now then, what is the significance of the fact that Bhartṛmitra transformed the *Mīmāṃsaka* teachings into those of the Lokāyata? It is a basic tenet of the Orthodox Brāhmaṇas that one attains good rewards if one faithfully observes the rites stipulated in the scriptures and that one receives bad results if one commits acts prohibited by the scriptures. But in the above passage it is held that Bhartṛmitra did not believe in this principle and his theory is criticized as being the same as that of the Lokāyata school. Such views, however, were held by some of the early Vedānta scholars. For example, Bhartṛhari held that in terms of the Absolute Truth there can be no future rewards and asserted that the theory of rewards was a vulgar pedagogical theory propounded to convert the ignorant masses. The tendency to be condescending toward the general teachings of the Orthodox Brāhmaṇas can also be seen in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. Bhartṛmitra probably held views of the same genre. That is, he probably held that teachings such as those presented in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* were vulgar pedagogical theories propounded for the sake of ignorant people who believed in the good effects of rites and that such rites had significance only in this sense. He probably explained the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* from such a standpoint. It may be assumed that for this reason Kumārila and Yāmuna rejected him as a heretic.”

The only scholar who, to the best of my knowledge and belief, attempted at a thorough reconstruction of Bhartṛmitra's views is Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Yogendranātha Bāgcī Tarkasāṃkhyavedāntatīrtha. In a Bengali article entitled *Prācīna Mīmāṃsakagaṇera Dṛṣṭivaicitrya*, published in the 1st volume of *Our Heritage* (1953)⁷⁰³, and later in his posthumous published (1961) Bengali book-length work, *Bhāratīya Śāstra o Sāhitye Advaitavāda*⁷⁰⁴, Bāgcī attempted to reconstruct Bhartṛmitra's views and the classical Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta responses thereto principally on the basis of the last chapter on *adhikāra* or eligibility from Maṇḍana Mīśra's *Vidhiviveka*⁷⁰⁵ and the *Brahmakāṇḍa* portion of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*⁷⁰⁶. Although Hiriyanna (1927) attempted to reconstruct the view of the Prapañcavilayavādins on the basis of references and allusions to their views in Advaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta works, yet he neither specifically identified the view nor did he use the Mīmāṃsā works of Maṇḍana for reconstructing and understanding the view from the Mīmāṃsā point of view. By contrast, Bāgcī in the two abovementioned works of his did not merely paraphrase Maṇḍana's lines but also identified this as the view of Bhartṛmitra and his followers, apart from explaining

⁷⁰³ Tarka-vedāntatīrtha (1953).

⁷⁰⁴ Bāgcī (1961:143-167).

⁷⁰⁵ See ViViGo, pp. 307-336.

⁷⁰⁶ See BSku, pp. 27-29.

the import of them at length and presenting the classical Mīmāṃsā responses to the view made by Śābara, Maṇḍana, etc. He also showed how Bhartṛmitra's view is of Bādari's kind. Bāgcī was also of the opinion that although Bhartṛmitra's view is to be found referred and alluded to in many Advaita Vedānta works as well, it is Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka* only among these texts which attempted at a detailed exposition and critique of his view and also explaining the reason why Bhartṛmitra developed such a view.

In what follows, I give a brief overview of Bhartṛmitra's⁷⁰⁷ view based on Yogendranātha Bāgcī's elaborate reconstruction of the same. While preparing this overview, I have mainly reused Bāgcī's reconstruction based on Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka* and partially that of *Brahmasiddhi*. I believe that if the doctrine of Kriyāvākyaṛthavāda discussed in this thesis is read together with this appendix, it will facilitate the understanding of the view of the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādin opponent found in NM 5.2 fuller and better. However, I have not presented the critiques of Bhartṛmitra's view by Maṇḍana, Sureśvara and others since it is beyond the scope of this appendix and forms the subject-matter of a separate paper, or even a monograph.

To begin with, according to Bhartṛmitra, no action that is prescribed by the Vedas has any separate result. In undertaking actions prescribed by the Vedas, a person ultimately and unknowingly helps himself turn away from desire and hatred in regard to external objects and becomes calm and restrained. It is this desire and hatred for external objects that obstructs a person's true knowledge of the self, because so long as such desire and hatred for external empirical objects exist one cannot become calm and restrained that are the prerequisites of a real knowledge of the self. Such a knowledge of the real nature of the self is the only human end (*puruṣārtha*) communicated by the Vedic sacred texts, according to Bhartṛmitra. Had the Vedic sacred texts spoken of the means for accomplishing the objects of human desire they would not have done their task of turning away human beings from the path of worldly desires; rather, they would have pushed them more on the path of desire and kept them away from the path of the realisation of the true nature of the self. Such realisation of the true nature of the self results in liberation from the ephemeral pleasures and afflictions of mundane existence. In denying any separate result to the prescribed actions, Bhartṛmitra denies that the result of performing actions prescribed by the Vedas is pleasure, and that of actions prohibited by the Vedas is suffering. In the absence of pleasure and pain resulting from the performance of prescribed and prohibited actions respectively in Bhartṛmitra's system, pleasure and pain are but natural to human beings and are accidental in nature. However, he accepts purification of the mind as the result of performing the prescribed ritual actions, although it is not due to the injunction's having prescribed it specifically with the aim of producing such purification of the mind. Rather it is through the visible path of blocking natural inclination

⁷⁰⁷ Although I mention this as Bhartṛmitra's view, yet in the absence of Bhartṛmitra's text and in the light of the fact that Umbeka mentioned Bhartṛmitra and others as being responsible for the near-Cārvākiśation of Mīmāṃsā, it should be understood as the view of Bhartṛmitra and like thinkers. These thinkers seem to have tried to keep alive the counter-current within Mīmāṃsā by producing works like *Tattvaśuddhi*, etc., whereby they kept on responding to the objections levelled against them from time to time by the now-mainstream Mīmāṃsā philosophers like Jaimini and Śābara.

towards worldly objects of desire that such purification occurs, and the performer of the ritual actions becomes restrained.

It is further to be noted that in the absence of any separate result of the prescribed actions, eligibility with regard to action is not established, for eligibility consists in the ownership of the result ensuing from an action. He who enjoys the result of an action is described as the person who is eligible for the action. In the absence of eligibility, all the prescribed actions establish the eligibility of the performer of those actions for self-knowledge only.

According to Bhartṛmitra, the eligibility of the *svarga*-desiring person is not established with regard to the act of sacrifice prescribed by the Vedic injunction, “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”. Bhartṛmitra and his followers say that it is action which is the principal element in all sentences; all other words in a sentence express the action-factors (*kāraṅka*-s) that are required for the accomplishment of action. The singleness of a sentence is due to the singleness of the action – this is what is understood out of linguistic communication. With reference to reality too, this is established. For, that which is to be done, is what is to be accomplished; substances, qualities, etc. are of an accomplished nature, by contrast. It is in the nature of things that something which is already accomplished accomplishes that which is yet to be accomplished. The meaning of the verbal root, *yaj-*, in the Vedic injunction, “*yajeta svargakāmah*”, is the act of sacrifice and since it is of an unaccomplished nature, it cannot be the means to accomplish *svarga*. Rather it is *svarga*, which is of an accomplished nature, that should be termed as the means for bringing about the act of sacrifice. This is because *svarga* means a pleasurable substance, and a substance has an accomplished nature, and hence it is fit for bringing about that which is unaccomplished as yet. In the world too, *svarga* is understood to be a special kind of place, bereft of feelings of hunger, thirst, cold, warmth, etc. From all these reasons, such an understanding as “the act of sacrifice is the means to accomplish *svarga*” neither follows from the linguistic cognition ensuing from the said injunction, nor in terms of reality. If both *svarga* and the act of sacrifice were to be accepted as the objects to be accomplished, then the singleness of meaning of the statement, “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, would have to be done away with.

Mainstream Mīmāṃsā philosophers like Śābara and his followers⁷⁰⁸ may object that according to Mīmāṃsā, the meaning of the verbal root (*dhātvartha*) is not accepted as action (*kriyā*) but it is *bhāvanā* or “bringing about” which is the meaning of the verbal suffix that is termed as action. Thus, the expression “*kriyāpradhānaṃ vākyam*” – “a sentence has for its principal semantic element an action” – actually means “*bhāvanāpradhānaṃ vākyam*” – “a sentence has for its principal semantic element human activity”. The meaning of the verbal root is not the principal element since it is not action at all. Any human effort expects the thing to be brought about and hence the result in the form of *svarga* would get syntactically connected to *bhāvanā*, the meaning of the exhortative suffix. Thus, why should not a result have any connection with action? To this Bhartṛmitra says in reply that although *bhāvanā*, the meaning of the verbal suffix, may be

⁷⁰⁸ I have also referred to these Mīmāṃsā philosophers as anti-Bhārtṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosophers.

accepted by him to be of the nature of action, and that *bhāvanā* expects the thing to be brought about, yet it is the meaning of the verbal roots such as ‘*yaj*’ in the finite verb ‘*yajeta*’ which should be accepted as the *bhāvya* or the thing to be brought about by *bhāvanā* or human effort. This is because the meaning of the verbal root ‘*yaj*’ is first understood, for it is obtained out of the same finite verb ‘*yajeta*’, the suffix part of which, ‘*īta*’, denotes *bhāvanā*. It is incorrect not to accept that which is obtained out of the same word in preference for *svarga*, which is obtained from a different word, i.e., *svargakāma*. To accept *svarga* as the thing to be brought about, one has to resort to the subsidiary instrument of knowledge pertaining to the Injunction of Application (*viniyogavidhi*) called ‘*vākya*’ or syntactical connection. However, *vākya* is weaker than the subsidiary instrument of knowledge called *ekapadaśruti* or direct statement made by one and the same word. For its functioning, the subsidiary instruments of knowledge called *vākya* is dependent on *śruti* or direct statement and *liṅga* or mark. But since *śruti* or direct statement works independently, it is stronger than *vākya* or syntactical connection. Since *svarga* occurring in the compound word ‘*svargakāma*’ functions as a qualification of the person, it cannot get syntactically connected to *bhāvanā*, which is the meaning of the verbal root portion of the finite verb ‘*yajeta*’. Rather, it is *yāga* or the act of sacrifice which is the meaning of the verbal root ‘*yaj*’ which should get syntactically connected to the meaning of the verbal suffix as the thing to be brought about. This is because *yāga* or sacrifice is obtained out of one and the same word (*yajeta*) out of which *bhāvanā*, the meaning of the verbal suffix, too is obtained.

Moreover, on the view of these anti-Bhartṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosophers, *bhāvanā* or bringing about, which is the meaning of the exhortative suffix, is of the nature of human effort. Now, by human effort it is *yāga* or the act of sacrifice, i.e., the meaning of the verbal root, which can be brought about through one’s effort, and not *svarga*. However, the following objection may be levelled against Bhartṛmitra – although the act of sacrifice is brought about through human effort, results like *svarga*, etc. could be established i.e., accomplished, through the act of sacrifice thus brought about through human effort, and in this way *yāga* or the act of sacrifice could get connected to results such as *svarga* as the instrument to the latter. But Bhartṛmitra refutes this view by observing that it is that cause (*kāraṇa*), which has an intermediate operation (*vyāpāravat*) which is accepted as the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*). Accordingly, if the act of sacrifice were to be the instrument of *svarga*, it should have had an intermediate operation (*vyāpāra*) to produce results like *svarga*. But since no such intermediate operation of *yāga* or the act of sacrifice is known, it cannot be the instrument of accomplishing *svarga*.

It may now be objected as follows – by means of the statement “*svargakāmo yajeta*”, the act of sacrifice has been prescribed; now, if the result of this act of sacrifice, which has been prescribed, is not *svarga* mentioned in this injunctive sentence, then in accordance with the “Viśvajit principle”, some other result should be postulated. Although no result is mentioned in the Vedic injunction, “*viśvajitā yajeta*” – “One should sacrifice with the Viśvajit [sacrifice]”, yet *svarga* is postulated as the result on account of the sheer prescriptive force of the injunction about performing the act of sacrifice. Similarly, in case of “*svargakāma yajeta*” too, some other result should be postulated on the strength of the prescriptive force of the injunction. Bhartṛmitra refutes this view by observing that just as

svarga occurring within the compound *svargakāma* in the Vedic injunction, *svargakāmo yajeta*, is unable to get syntactically connected to the prescribed act of sacrifice as its result, any other result like *svarga* etc. postulated even on the strength of the “Viśvajit principle” too cannot get connected to the sacrifice in terms of being the result produced by the latter. This is because, it is the act of sacrifice which is understood out of the said injunction to be the thing to be brought about; hence could the act of sacrifice, which is itself the thing to be brought, be the instrument of accomplishing the result? The properties of ‘being the thing to be brought about’ (*sādhyatva*) and that of ‘being the instrument of achieving something which is as yet unaccomplished’ (*sāadhanatva*) are in opposition to each other and both of these cannot be present in the act of sacrifice, which is of the nature of something to be accomplished.

It cannot be further contended by the anti-Bhartṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosophers that – although the act of sacrifice is understood directly out of the exhortative verb, ‘*yajeta*’ – “[one] should sacrifice”, as the thing to be brought about, yet on the basis of the instrument of knowledge called *arthāpatti* or postulation, it is only results like *svarga*, etc. that are ultimately understood to be the thing to be accomplished. It is obvious that the act of sacrifice cannot be understood to be both the thing to be brought about and the means for accomplishing results like *svarga* on the basis of one and the same instrument of knowledge, for in that case the fault of having different forms (*vairūpya doṣa*), viz. that of the goal and the instrument, would occur. But if on the basis of a different instrument of knowledge the act of sacrifice is understood to be the means for accomplishing the result, the said fault would not occur. But Bhartṛmitra points out that on such a view, it is the *arthāpatti* or postulation only which would be the sole instrument of knowledge for understanding that the act of sacrifice is the means for accomplishing the result. As a result of this, the basic thesis of Jaimini in MīSū 1.1.2 that *dharma* or religious duty is knowable from Vedic injunctions only, would be compromised. This is not a welcome consequence even for Bhartṛmitra’s opponent Mīmāṃsā philosophers. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the instrument of knowledge called *arthāpatti* operates with regard to its content only when such content cannot be explained with the help of other instruments of knowledge. Since the sacrifice is directly understood from the Vedic injunction to be the thing to be brought, there is no incongruity involved regarding nature, for explaining which one should appeal to *arthāpatti*.

It may now be objected that if from injunctions such as “*yajeta svargakāmaḥ*”, the act of sacrifice is understood as being merely the thing to be accomplished, and no further understanding of it as the means for accomplishing *svarga* follows, how could it be a prescription at all? For, it is ‘being the means for a desired object’ which is the meaning of the exhortative suffixes. According to Bhartṛmitra, such a view of the opponent Mīmāṃsakas is incorrect, since it is instigation only which is the meaning of exhortative suffixes. The exhortative suffix does not concern any human end – either beneficial (*puruṣārtha*) or maleficent (*anartha*). Although, instigation is the cause of human efforts, yet exhortative suffixes communicate instigation as the cause of human efforts in a general manner and not in any specific form as order, request, instruction, etc. This is evident from the use of exhortative suffixes to convey all these specific senses of instigation.

According to Bhartṛmitra, the Vedic injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*” prescribing the act of sacrifice causes the dissolution of the identification of the self with the body (*śarīrātmabhāva*). Normally human beings identify the self with the body. That the self is different from the body is not understood by any one in normal course. Thus, having identified the self with the body human beings develop desire and hatred for external objects. Therefore, with the dissolution of this sense of the body being the self, desire and hatred could duly be averted. Although the person who undertakes the prescribed act of sacrifice knows the body to be the self, yet he does so while knowing that this present body of his is unfit for enjoying the result of sacrifice in afterlife. Hence the said Vedic injunction instigates one to the act of sacrifice after dissolving his idea of the identification of the self with the body. Vedic injunctions dissolve the idea of the identification of the self with the body not only in regard to results enjoyable in afterlife, but Vedic ritual actions apparently meant for results enjoyable in this life too turn their performers away from the desire for objects other than those for which they are apparently meant.

In holding that the import of Vedic injunctions lies in the cessation of natural inclination for mundane and supra-mundane objects, there is no scope, according to Bhartṛmitra, for postulation of anything unseen (*adr̥ṣṭakalpanā*). Vedic injunctions about ritual actions accomplish a visible purpose of a human being and make him eligible for the knowledge of the real nature of the self. Thus, if one were to hold that such injunctions express the means for producing results like *svarga*, etc., it would involve an uneconomic postulation of the unseen (*adr̥ṣṭakalpanāgaurava*).

However, the above would, in the anti-Bhartṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosopher’s opinion, amount to saying that if no prescribed act leads to any result, the very purpose of the Vedic sacred texts instructing on ritual actions would be redundant. In other words, if the Vedic sacred texts instructed on purposeless actions, then that very instruction (*upadeśa*) would become superfluous. In reply Bhartṛmitra says that the opponent’s point would be valid only if the instructions of the Vedic sacred texts really lacked a purpose; for, on Bhartṛmitra’s view, the sole purpose of such instruments of Vedic sacred texts is to establish eligibility for the true knowledge of the self. To explain: although the reality of the self, as taught by the Vedic sacred texts, is that it is bereft of the phenomenal world process (*niṣprapañca*), and is of the nature of bliss (*ānandasvarūpa*), yet human beings, who are by their very nature, addicted to external objects and endowed with passion, hatred, etc. cannot easily know or contemplate on the reality of the self. Continuous engagement in ritual actions, taught by the Vedic sacred texts, helps human beings turn away from the natural object of their inclinations and this pacifies human beings’ desires for external objects. With gradual fixation to the methods taught by the Vedic sacred texts, a person restrains himself from sense-attachments. It is only then that a person becomes fit for knowing and contemplating on the reality of the self. Once the eligibility for knowing the real nature of the self is established in this way, the purpose of the Vedic injunctions of instructing on the well-being of man is also established.

But the anti-Bharṭṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosophers may object that if Vedic injunctions actually taught that it is the ritual actions like the act of sacrifice and not results like *svarga*, that were to be brought about, how could liberation (*mokṣa*) be established as the result of injunctions about knowledge⁷⁰⁹ (*jñānavidhi*)? In other words, just as ritual actions are understood out of Vedic injunctions as something to be accomplished, so should *jñāna* or knowledge be understood as the object to be accomplished out of Vedic injunctions about knowledge, and not the result in the form of liberation. Just as injunctions about actions communicate merely instigation in regard to ritual actions, so injunctions about knowledge should communicate only instigation to knowledge. Hence result in the form of liberation could be obtained out of such injunctions about knowledge. In reply Bharṭṛmitra says that knowledge has a visible purpose (*drṣṭārtha*), that is, although the injunction about knowledge does not speak of any connection of knowledge with a result, i.e., liberation, and it communicates that it is knowledge only which is to be accomplished, yet, knowledge is dependent upon its object and the former has no existence independent of the object of knowledge. A knowledge which is devoid of its object is an instance of illusory cognition, which is not accepted by Bharṭṛmitra. According to Bharṭṛmitra, it is contradictory to say that an object of knowledge is different from its revealing cognition. Thus, although there is an injunction about self-knowledge, yet since the prescribed knowledge is dependent on its object, the nature of the self as devoid of the phenomenal world, and also being of the nature of bliss, will be established. Such a knowledge of the nature of the self indeed is liberation. Hence although there is a Vedic injunction about knowledge only, it will still lead to the establishment of the result in the form of liberation.

However, Bharṭṛmitra and his followers may face the question as to how could they, who did not accept *adhikāra* or eligibility of a *svarga*-desiring person with regard to the means for achieving *svarga*, viz. the act of sacrifice, accept eligibility to be established by the injunction about knowledge? The reply given by Bharṭṛmitra is that it is based on the principle of linguistic communication that he has asserted that eligibility is not established by means of Vedic injunctions and it is not an assertion based on any tentative hypothesis (*abhyupagamasiddhānta*). Whatever linguistic communication expresses has to be accepted. Since it is linguistic communication which conveys the establishment of eligibility by the injunction about knowledge, it has to be accepted as such. According to Bharṭṛmitra, actually, eligibility has not been established by the injunction about knowledge. It is rather on account of knowledge's having a visible purpose (*drṣṭārthatāprayukta*) that such eligibility has been established.

At this point, the anti-Bharṭṛmitra Mīmāṃsā philosophers may say the following – just as injunctions about rituals end up being mere commands, injunction about knowledge also should be so. From such injunction about knowledge, the real nature of the self cannot be established. An injunction about knowledge of the self which is devoid of the phenomenal world and is of the nature of bliss, can establish only the action of knowing the content, but not the nature of its content. It cannot be contended by Bharṭṛmitra that just as the injunction about knowledge has for its import the sense of instigation conveyed by the

⁷⁰⁹ By the word, 'knowledge', here is to be understood the knowledge of the real nature of the self.

exhortative suffix, so does its import lie in the nature of the content of knowledge being such and such. This is because in that case there would be the undesirable consequence of sentence-splitting. In reply, Bhartṛmitra may say that owing to the very nature of knowledge the injunction about knowledge will establish the nature of the content of the knowledge, i.e., the self as being devoid of the phenomenal world and of the nature of bliss.

Appendix III

Niyoga vs. Phala

It has been seen in the chapter on Niyogavākyaṛthavāda, how Jayanta's Prābhākara claimed that since *phala* or result is needed in case of an injunction only to provide the eligible performer (*adhikārin*), its being the object of desire and hence the object to be accomplished is not independent of the injunction or *niyoga*. Rather the very accomplishment of the result is dependent on the accomplishment of the *niyoga* or commandment. Hence it could not be the pre-eminent semantic element of the linguistic cognition that arises upon hearing a Vedic injunctive sentence; this lack of pre-eminence is the reason why *phala* or result could not be the sentence-meaning. This dependence of the result on the commandment and its consequent subservience to the latter is refuted at length by Jayanta in the latter part of NM 5.2. For most part of this refutation, Jayanta is heavily indebted to Umbeka Bhaṭṭa's *Tātparyāṭikā* on Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*. It will be evident from a comparison of Jayanta's arguments with Umbeka's lines that how despite basing his presentation on Umbeka's text Jayanta clarifies and adds to his source. Below I will present Jayanta's critique of the Prābhākara position in this regard topically arranged followed by clarificatory comments of mine. I will also provide the parallel passages that are to be found in Umbeka's ŚVTāCo.

1. Problem of two sentence-meanings and the subservience of commandment to result

nanu vidhyartha na bhāvārthavat phale karaṇaṃ yenāsyā tadaṅgatvaṃ syāt. ākṣepakatvāt tu tasya phalārthatvaṃ ucyate. prayokṛtvaṃ hi tasya nijaṃ rūpaṃ.

yady evaṃ bhāvārtha eva sādhyo bhavatu. vidhyarthasya tu kim anuṣṭheyatvaṃ ucyate?

so 'pi bhāvārthasiddhyā sampadyate, 'kṛto mayā svāminiyoga' iti vyavahārād iti cet –

*bhāvārthāt tarhi niṣpattir niyogasya phalasya ca/
ity ekaṭra padagrāme vākyaṛthadvayam āpatet//
kiñcānvitābhidhānena viṣayatvāvadhāraṇāt/
niyogasyaiva bhāvārthanīṣpādyatvaṃ pratīyate//
sa tu bhāvārthataḥ siddhaḥ phalāya yadi kalpyate/
parārthatvād avākyaṛtho bhaved ity upavarṇitam// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 124.*

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, the meaning of the injunction (commandment) is not the means of [achieving] the result in the same way as the meaning of the verbal root, on account of which it would [undesirably] be subservient [to the result]. Rather, in so far as it implies the result that it (commandment) is said to serve the purpose of the result. For, being an instigator is its own nature.

[Reply by Jayanta:] If it were so, then let the meaning of the verbal root be the object to be accomplished. Why is it said that the meaning of the injunction is that which is to be performed?

[Counter-assertion by the Prābhākara:] What if on the strength of the usage, ‘The master’s command has been done by me’ [it is said] that through the accomplishment of the meaning of the verbal root that (commandment) too is accomplished?

[Reply by Jayanta:]

Then by means of the meaning of the verbal root (the prescribed action) the commandment and the result are accomplished; hence two sentence-meanings [undesirably] would occur with regard to a single cluster of words (a single sentence).

Moreover, on account of denotation of the connected, since the scope [of the commandment] is ascertained, it is the commandment alone which would appear to be the object to be accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root. If it (the commandment), [which is already] accomplished [through the prescribed action denoted by the verbal root], is postulated as being for the sake of the result, it (the commandment) would, on account of being for the sake of something else, not be the sentence-meaning – this has already been said.

The Prābhākara wants to say here that *niyoga* or commandment does not need result by virtue of its property of being the result but by virtue of its property of being the qualifier of the eligible performer (*adhikārivišeṣaṇa*). It is in this secondary sense of being the cause of the postulation of the result that the commandment is said to be serving the purpose of the result. In other words, the commandment does not serve as the means of accomplishing the result unlike the prescribed action denoted by the verbal root, on Śabara and Kumārila’s view. The only function executed by a commandment is that of instigating a person, and ‘being an instigator’ is its very essence.

However, given that, on Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s view, it is the action prescribed which is accomplished and not the result in the sense that a person makes efforts directly in regard to the said act, that alone, Jayanta says, should be treated as the object to be accomplished and not the commandment itself.

Now, the Prābhākara may deny this claim of Jayanta’s by observing that since a commandment needs the specific action denoted by the verbal root only for the purpose of delimiting its scope, it is ultimately the commandment which is the object to be accomplished and not the specific action denoted by the verbal root. In other words, since on hearing a Vedic injunction, a person has the primary awareness of sheer enjoinder, and since an unspecified enjoinder is not fit for execution, the commandment duly implies the eligibility-correlate and scope-correlate. But these two correlates do nothing other than specifying who is fit to execute the enjoinder and what exactly is to be done

for executing the enjoinder. Since specifiers have no existence independent of the existence of the thing they specify, it is ultimately the thing to be specified which is the pre-eminent element. The Prābhākara bases his contention on common usages like “I have executed the commandment of the master”, which linguistically at least speaks of the commandment as that which has been accomplished and not the specific action which has been done to accomplish the same.

Jayanta’s response to this is that in that case the prescribed action would be the means of accomplishing both the commandment and the result. As a result of this, there would be two sentence-meanings following from a single Vedic injunctive statement. But this is not a desirable consequence for the Prābhākara as this would violate the principle enunciated under MīSū 2.1.46, according to which, a sentence express a single meaning and not more than one meaning. Secondly, it would create further problem in the light of the Prābhākara doctrine of ‘designation of the connected’, according to which, briefly, a word-meaning is not designated in isolation from other word-meanings of a sentence but always as being syntactically connected with other word-meanings of a sentence. In accordance with this basic Prābhākara doctrine, it is rather the commandment which would appear to be the object to be accomplished by means of the prescribed action. Now, if the said commandment, upon being accomplished by the prescribed action, is postulated as the instrument of achieving the result, it would be subservient to the result in so far as it would serve the purpose of something else, i.e., the result. Because of this loss of pre-eminence and subservience to the result, it would not be the sentence-meaning any more.

Parallel passage from Umbeka’s Tātparyāṅkā:

api ca na tāvad bhāvārtha eva dvayam utpādayati, vākyaṛthatvenānvitābhīdhānena viṣayaviṣayibhāvena ca tasya vidhyarthaṇiṣpādatvāt; ubhayaparatve ca bhāvārthasya ekasmin padagrāme vākyaṛthadvayaprasaṅgāt. nāpi bhāvārthaṇiṣpādīto vidhyarthaḥ svargaṃ niṣpādayati, anyotpādatvāna niṣpādyamānasya bhāvārthavad avākyaṛthatvaprasaṅgāt; svargasya eva iṣyamāṇāsya ananyaniṣṭhasya ca utpādyamānasya vākyaṛthatvaprasaṅgāt. ŚVTāCo, p. 106.

Moreover, to begin with, the action denoted by the verbal root does not produce both [the commandment and the result]. This is because it accomplishes [the commandment, which is] the meaning of the injunction on account of [the commandment being] the sentence-meaning, and also on account of the relation of content and content-bearer [obtaining between the commandment and the meaning of the verbal root] due to connected denotation. If the action denoted by the verbal root were aimed at [denoting both the commandment and the result], it would lead to the undesirable consequence of two sentence-meanings with regard to a single collection of words. It is nor even the case that [commandment, which is the] meaning of the injunction, on having been accomplished by the action denoted by the verbal root, accomplishes *svarga*; for it would lead to the undesirable consequence of [the commandment’s] not being the sentence-meaning. This

is because [the commandment] is being accomplished as something which would produce another thing, just like the meaning of the verbal root. [There would be the further] undesirable consequence of *svarga* alone becoming the sentence-meaning, on account of its being the object which is being desired, its being that which is being produced, and not aiming at [the production of] anything else.

2. Impossibility of accomplishment of commandment by means of the prescribed action

a. Impossibility of simultaneous accomplishment of commandment and result

*bhāvārthas tu dvayaṃ kuryād yugapad vā krameṇa vā/
yugapan nāsyā sāmartyaṃ samatvaṃ ca dvayor bhavet//*

*niyogaś ca śabdaikagocaratvān mā darśi; phalaṃ tu svargapaśvādi tena saha
niṣpadyamānaṃ kim iti na grhyate? NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 125.*

Should the meaning of the verbal root bring produce both [the commandment and the result] simultaneously or in a sequence? There is no capacity of it [for producing them] simultaneously, [and even if it were to produce simultaneously, then] both of them would be equal

And may you not see commandment on account of its being the content of linguistic communication alone. But why could not result like *svarga*, animals, etc. which are produced together with it (commandment) be seen?

This is a continuation of Jayanta's criticism of the view that the prescribed action would accomplish both the commandment and the result. Even if it were accepted that the prescribed action accomplishes both, it would naturally lead to the question whether the commandment and the result are accomplished simultaneously or in a sequence. The first option of simultaneous accomplishment is not tenable since in that case the prescribed action would not have the capacity to produce them simultaneously. Moreover, if commandment and result were to be produced simultaneously, both of them would be the pre-eminent elements of the ensuing linguistic cognition and no qualifier-qualified relation would obtain between them. But if the Prābhākara position of the preeminence of the commandment alone in the linguistic cognition were to be maintained, the result would have to logically be subordinate to commandment and this would not be possible in the event of the result becoming equally pre-eminent as the commandment. This is again because a qualifier-qualified relation can obtain only between a predominant element and the subordinate ones. Moreover, given that according to the Prābhākara view, commandment is known only from linguistic communication, commandment in its accomplished state would not be visible to us since it cannot be the content of a perceptual cognition; but why should results like *svarga* (unsurpassed pleasure), cattle, etc. also be not visible in their accomplished state? This seems to imply the plausibility of the general

Bhāṭṭa view that it is not the prescribed action which delivers the result, for it perishes right after it is performed; but rather the unseen potency called ‘*apūrva*’ (lit. the ‘unprecedented’) produced by the action, which delivers the result in due time⁷¹⁰.

Parallel passage from Umbeka’s *Tātparyāṭkā*:

api ca bhāvārthasādhye niyogaphale kiṃ yugapad uta krameṇeti. na tāvad yugapad, ubhayatra vyāpārāyogāt samapradhānatvaprasaṅgāc ca. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 107.

Moreover, if [both] commandment and result were fit to be accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root, would [they be accomplished] simultaneously or in a sequence? Not sequentially, to begin with; for, [the action] lacks fitness [for producing] both [at the same time]⁷¹¹ and it would lead to the undesirable consequence of [both commandment and result] having equal pre-eminence.

b. Impossibility of sequential accomplishment of command and result

kramapakṣe pūrvam vā niyogaḥ, paścāt phalaṃ, pūrvam vā phalaṃ paścād vā viniyogaḥ siddhyed iti.

yadi pūrvam niyogas,

tadā niyogasyāsampādyatvāt tadviśayalipsāyā anupapatteḥ karaṇāmśe ’pi vaidhī pravṛtṭiḥ syāt.

*yathā niyogaṇiṣpattīḥ prayājādikṛtena tu/
tataḥ pravṛtṭiḥ śāstrīyā bhāvārthe ’pi tathā bhavet//*

iṣyata eveti cet –

*nanvevaṃ tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇety abhyadhāyi yat/
śyenādīnām adharmatvaṃ varṇitaṃ tadviruddhyate// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 125.*

[Clarificatory question by Jayanta:] On the sequence view, should commandment first and then the result or first the result and then the commandment be accomplished?

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] [What] if it were commandment [which were to be accomplished] first?

⁷¹⁰ For the concept of *apūrva* in Śābara and Kumāṛila, see Clooney (1990:224-245) and Yoshimizu (2000). For Prabhākara’s understanding of *apūrva*, see Clooney (1990:245-253).

⁷¹¹ This may be an allusion to the rule of language, cognition and action not being able to operate once their operations have ceased. In other words, for producing commandment and result simultaneously, the action denoted by the verbal root should be performed twice.

[Refutation by Jayanta:] In that case, [since commandment is not a human end in itself and hence] no desire for it is possible, one would undertake [the performance of] even the instrument (action denoted by the verbal root) due to [the instigation of] injunction.

Just as the accomplishment of commandment takes place through the performance of the fore-sacrifices, etc. [in regard to which one is instigated by the Vedic injunctions alone], so should the instigation with regard to the meaning of the verbal root [which is the instrument of achieving the commandment] be due to (caused by) the sacred texts (injunctions).

[Response of the Prābhākara:] What if [we say that] it is something indeed accepted [by us]?

[Reply by Jayanta:]

Well, in this way, the statement [by Jaimini] about its being a purpose attainable through desire [and] the description of the Śyena and the like as contrary-to-religious duty would be contradicted.

The second alternative of the prescribed action producing both the commandment and the result sequentially is now being taken up for criticism. Even within this, there could be two sub-alternatives: i) it is the commandment which is first accomplished and then the result, and ii) the result is first accomplished and then the commandment. Now, with regard to the first sub-alternative, it may be said that in as much as commandment is in itself not a desired human end, no human being can desire to accomplish it for its own sake and hence he will not feel motivated to undertake the prescribed act which is a means to accomplish the commandment. In an absence of desire to carry out the commandment, it will be the injunction which would instigate one to accomplish the commandment. And as this would hold true for fixed rituals, so also for elective rituals. Now, any ritual is comprised of a main act and subsidiary acts, and the beginning of any ritual is marked by the undertaking the performance of the main act. So, if one were to begin an elective ritual, he would be instigated to undertake the performance of the main ritual by the injunction itself. In this way, the Prābhākara would no more be able to stick to his claim that in case of the elective rituals, one is instigated to the main act by one's desire and that to the subsidiary acts by the injunction. This would lead to a further undesirable consequence of the performance of the main act of an elective ritual like the Śyena sacrifice being instigated by the injunction itself! For, in this case, the Vedic sacred texts would be culpable of instigating human beings to tread the path of the evil. This would also leave no way for discriminating between religious duties (*dharma*) like the Jyotiṣṭoma animal sacrifice and the contrary-to-religious duties (*adharmā*) like the Śyena sacrifice.

Parallel passage from Umbeka's Tātparyāṅkā:

atha kramapakṣas, tatrāpi kiṃ niyogasiddhiḥ phalasyāvāntaravyāpāra, uta phalasiddhir niyogasyeti. yadi prathamah pakṣas, tadā naiva lipsayā viṣaye pravṛttir, api tu vidhita eva. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 107.

Now as regards the sequence thesis, should there too accomplishment of the commandment be an intermediate activity of the result, or the accomplishment of the result an intermediate activity of the commandment. If it is the first alternative, then one would not act in regard to the scope of the [injunction, represented by the main act denoted by the verbal root] being instigated by [one's] desire [for the result], but rather due to [the instigation of] the injunction alone.

atha pūrvaṃ phalasiddhis, tato niyogasiddhis,

tarhi phalasya tadānīṃ darśanaṃ bhavet, siddhatvāt.

na ca bhāvārthavelāyāṃ putrapaśvādi dṛśyate/ adṛśyamānam apy etat siddham ity ativismayaḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 125.

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] Now, [let] the result [be] first accomplished, and the commandment thereafter.

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then the result, on account of being already accomplished, would be visible at that time (at the time of the accomplishment of the commandment).

And [results such as] son, cattle, etc. are not seen at the time of [accomplishment of the action, represented by the] meaning of the verbal root. And it is very surprising that despite being invisible they should be [treated as being already] accomplished!

Now, the second sub-alternative is taken up for review. If it were the result which were first accomplished and subsequently the commandment, then since by the time the turn for accomplishing the commandment comes, the result should have been accomplished. And since the result has been already accomplished, they should be visible, i.e., made available for enjoyment. But it runs counter to our experience that results like son, cattle, etc. are available for enjoyment at the time when the prescribed action is being performed. And it is even more strange that such invisible results such as *svarga* that is enjoyable only after one's death should be considered to have been already accomplished.

Parallel passage from Umbeka's Tātparyāṅkā:

nāpi bhāvārtha eva svargādyutpattim avāntaravyāpārīkṛtya kāryaṃ niṣpādyati; kāryaniṣpattes tarhi pūrvaṃ svargādyutpattiyā bhavitavyam; bhāvārthāntaraṃ kālāntare vā? na tāvad anantaraṃ, putrāder adarśanāt; nāpi kālāntare, bhāvārthasya kṣaṇikatvena tadānīm abhāvād, vidhyarthātirikṛtāpūrvānabhyupagamāc ca. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, pp. 106-107.

Nor does the action denoted by the verbal root accomplish the duty (commandment) by making the genesis of *svarga* an intermediate activity. For, then, *svarga* should be generated before the accomplishment of the commandment; [or]⁷¹² should a different action [be accepted as occurring] at a later period [which would accomplish the commandment]? [It is] not prior [to the accomplishment of the commandment that *svarga* should be produced], for [results like] son, etc. are not seen [to occur while the action is still being performed]. Nor [the option of a different action accomplishing the commandment] at a later period of time [is tenable], for, during that time (after the completion of the action), there is no action on account of [action's] being ephemeral, and because [an] 'unprecedented' [potency bridging the ephemeral action and the result] is not postulated [by the Prābhākara] over and above the meaning of the injunction (commandment).”

c. Impossibility of accomplishment of commandment via the accomplishment of result

ataś ca yat kaiścid ucyate – svargasiddhim avāntaravyāpārīkṛtya niyogam eva bhāvārthaḥ sampādayatīti – tad apy apāstam – avāntaravyāpārasya jvalanāder iva pradhānavyāpārāt pūrvaṃ darśanaprasaṅgād iti. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 126.

Hence the assertion by some [Prābhākaras] that – it is the commandment only that is accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root by making the accomplishment of *svarga* an intermediate activity – is also refuted. For, this would lead to the undesirable consequence of the visibility of the intermediate activity such as burning etc. [in case of cooking of food] before the main activity.

This seems to be a reformulation of the second sub-alternative discussed above. According to this reformulation, the accomplishment of *svarga* is accepted as an intermediate activity required to bring about the main act. An example of this is the act of cooking which requires many intermediate steps like washing the ingredients, mixing them, frying, etc. But this view is not tenable, since, according to Jayanta, this presupposes the visibility of the intermediate activities even before the main act is accomplished. But since *svarga* and the like are not visible in any way before the commandment is accomplished and while the action is still being performed, the accomplishment of *svarga* cannot be regarded as an intermediate activity aimed at accomplishing the commandment.

athocyate – svargakāmasya svargaṃ sādhayitum icchato yāge niyogo yaḥ sampādyah śrūyate, sa cet sampannaḥ śabdavṛttena phalam api sampannam eva. ānubhāvīkī tu svargādisiddhiḥ kālāntare bhaviṣyatīti.

⁷¹²Perhaps keeping in mind, the rule of actions not producing two things at a time that this alternative is presented by Umbeka.

etad ayuktaṃ – siddhidvayānupalambhāt. na hy ekā śābdī siddhir, anyā cānubhāvīkī phalasiddhiḥ kutastyā iti cintyam.

*kālāntare ca bhāvārthaḥ kṣaṇikatvān na vidyate/
śaktyādirūpaṃ cāpūrvaṃ na bhavadbhir upeyate//*

bhavanto hy apūrvaśabdena dharmāśabdena ca niyogam eva upacaranti. na ca niyogaḥ śaktivad ātmasaṃskāravād vā kālāntarasthāyī bhavati. sa hi preraṇātmakaḥ, kāryarūpo vā, na ubhayathā api sthairyam avalambate. NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 126.

[Proposal by Prābhākara:] Now it is being said – the enjoinder of a *svarga*-desiring person, that is of him, who desires to accomplish *svarga*, to sacrifice, is directly understood [from the injunction] as something to be accomplished. If it (enjoinder) is accomplished, the result too is indeed accomplished owing to the functioning of linguistic communication. But the accomplishment of *svarga* etc. at the level of experience will occur later.

[Reply by Jayanta:] This is incorrect, because two kinds of accomplishments are not apprehended. For, there is not something called linguistic accomplishment and another thing called experiential accomplishment. It has to be considered as to whence [would there be two such accomplishments].

Because of [its] being short-lived, the meaning of the verbal root does not continue to be there later. And an ‘unseen’ which is of the nature of a potency, etc. is not accepted by you.

It is commandment alone which is figuratively referred to you by the word ‘unseen’ and by the word ‘religious duty’ (*dharma*). And it is not the case that the commandment continues to stay later like a potency or like subliminal impressions of the self. It does not gain stability in both ways – either as an instigator, or as something to be done⁷¹³.

It has been noted earlier above that the main problem with accepting the second sub-alternative is that due to the unavailability of the result while the prescribed act is being performed, the claim that result is accomplished prior to the accomplishment of the commandment by the prescribed act is not tenable. Now, in order to circumvent this problem, the Prābhākara may say the following: a person who desires to accomplish *svarga* is commanded by the injunction to perform the act of sacrifice. So, it is with regard to the act of sacrifice that such a *svarga*-desiring person is enjoined. Now, in accordance

⁷¹³ For change in the Prābhākara view on *apūrva* with special reference to the works of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, see Yoshimizu (2021a), (2021b), and Cummins (2020). The changes pointed out in these articles strongly suggest that Jayanta’s Prābhākara represents a post-Prabhākara but pre-Śālikanātha stage of development of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā.

with the injunction, if the act of sacrifice has been completed, then on the authority of the Vedic injunction, the result too should be considered to have been accomplished. However, the actual experience, i.e., the enjoyment of the result thus accomplished occurs at a later period of time. But this would in no way affect the authority of the Vedic injunction, since the result has already been accomplished at the linguistic level. In explaining this point, Cakradhara says the following: when a royal decree like “the King has given that village to you” is communicated to a king’s minister, the very proclamation of the command accomplishes the purpose of obtaining the village. But the experiential accomplishment of the same takes place at a later period of time by means of the minister’s going to the village and claiming and accepting the proprietorship of it. In other words, even before the proprietorship of the village is physically taken charge of by the minister, his right to enjoy the village is already said to have been accomplished on the strength of the proclamation of the royal mandate.

The above proposal of the Prābhākara opponent is criticised by Jayanta on the ground that no such dual modes of accomplishment are apprehended. A probable reason may be that there is nothing parallel to a royal mandate which is made available to the person who performs the act of sacrifice that would guarantee the experiential accomplishment of *svarga* at a later stage, or more precisely, after the person has died. The act of sacrifice being short-lived cannot stand as a guarantee. It is precisely for this reason that Kumārila postulates an intermediate potency called ‘*apūrva*’ (lit. ‘unprecedented’), which acts a bridge between the act of sacrifice which is no more and the impending result. It is called *apūrva* since it does not exist prior to the completion of the prescribed act and it is this *apūrva* which delivers the result in due time. But no such intermediate potency is accepted by Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent. Rather, the Prābhākara in NM 5.2 uses the word *apūrva* and *dharma* to secondarily mean *niyoga* or commandment to stress their view that the sense of duty associated with the commandment is not known prior to hearing the Vedic injunction, i.e., through worldly instruments of knowledge like perception, inference, etc.

Parallel passage from Umbeka’s Tātparyatīkā:

atha phalasiddhir niyogasya avāntaravyāpāras,

tadā anuṣṭhānānantaram phalasya darśanam syān; niyogasya aniṣpannatvād, apūrvānabhyugamāc ca. na ca śābdī siddhir dvayasya, abhāvāt. ŚVTāCo, ŚVTā, p. 107.

[Proposal by Umbeka’s Prābhākara opponent:] Now, [let] the accomplishment of the result be the intermediate activity of the commandment.

[Umbeka:] Then, the result would be visible before the performance [of the action is completed]. This is because the commandment has not [yet] been accomplished, and [an intermediate potency in the form] the ‘unprecedented’ is not postulated [by the

Prābhākara]. And both [commandment and the result] are not accomplished based on [the authority of] linguistic communication, because of an absence [of such accomplishments].

d. Mere implication of result by the commandment does not accomplishment the result

tatraitat syān – niyogasiddhir ākṣiptaphalasiddhir bhavati. viṣayādyanubandhāvachchino hy asāv eva anuṣṭheyāḥ. tatra yathā tena tena kārakacakreṇa kriyākalāpena vinā sampattim alabhamānas tat tad ākṣipati, tathā ’dhikārānubandhavandhyo ’pi nāsau sampattim adhigacchatīti tam apy ākṣipati. yaś cāyam adhikārānubandhākṣepaḥ, sa evāyaṃ phalākṣepo⁷¹⁴, na tu vidheḥ phalāpekṣitā⁷¹⁵ ity uktam.

etad ayuktam –

*yo hi yena vinā kāmaṃ na siddhyet sa tam ākṣipet/
niyojyamātrākṣepe tu niyogo na phalātmakaḥ//*

niyojyaś caṇḍālasparśeneva svargakāmanotpādamātreṇa niyojyatāṃ pratipanna iti katham niyojyākṣepa eva phalākṣepaḥ.

*nanu ca svargakāma ’tra niyojyo na anyathā bhavet/
yadi svargasya sampattim nādhigacchet svakarmanah//*

naitad evam –

*nareccāmātram evedaṃ na śabdastv iyati kṣamaḥ/
niyojyaḥ svargakāmo hi bhavējīvanavān iva// NM_{EP-I}, p. 358.*

⁷¹⁴ The reading of the Mysore edition (Vol. II, p. 127) here is ‘*phalākṣepeṇa*’, but the third case-ending does not make sense in the present context, especially in the absence of a noun in the nominative case masculine gender to which the pronoun ‘*sa[h]*’ in the text corresponds. Thus, I have followed the reading of the Editio Princeps here.

⁷¹⁵ The Mysore reading, “*na tu vidheḥ phalāpekṣitā ity uktam*”, can be made sense of by considering that it is the eligibility-correlate which implies a result for its own sake, but the injunction does not do so. This is again because the injunction needs only the eligibility-correlate and not the thing which the latter implies too. However, this is not something which has already been said (*ity uktam*). Rather, what has already been in NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 111-112 is that in case of the elective rituals since the *svarga*-desiring person’s ‘being fit for enjoinderment’ (*niyojyatā*) is not otherwise justified that *svarga* has been postulated to be the object to be accomplished, but not because the injunction needs a result (*kāmādhikāre tu niyojyataivānyathā svargakāmasya nopapadyata iti svargasya sādhyatvam abhyupagatam na punār vidheḥ phalārthatvāt*). In view of this the following reading of the *edition princeps* (p. 358) seems to be preferable here: “... *na tu vidheḥ phalāpekṣitā ity uktam*”. The Mysore reading in all probability is a misprint.

[Proposal by the Prābhākara opponent:] Let it be so – the accomplishment of the result is implied by the accomplishment of the commandment. For, it (commandment) alone, as qualified by scope-correlate, etc., is fit to be performed. Just as on account of not being accomplished without a collection of specific action-factors, [and] a string of specific activities, it (commandment) implies them, so in the absence of the eligibility-correlate too, it (commandment) is not accomplished and hence it implies that (eligibility) too. It has been mentioned that such an implication of the eligibility-correlate indeed is the implication of the result, but the injunction does not expect any result.

[Reply by Jayanta:] This is incorrect.

For, may that, without which something is not accomplished, be pleasingly implied by it. But commandment does not partake of the nature of being a result if it implies merely the person who is fit to be enjoined.

A person who fit to be enjoined attains the state of being fit to be enjoined merely on account of the production of a desire for *svarga*. This is like touching a *caṇḍāla* [which makes one fit for purificatory acts prescribed by the sacred texts like bathing, etc.]. Thus, how can the implication of the person fit to be enjoined indeed could be the implication of the result?

[Counter-argument by the Prābhākara opponent:]

Well, a person desiring *svarga* does not become the person fit to be enjoined otherwise, if on account of his own action (performing the action prescribed to him by the injunction) he does not accomplish *svarga*.

[Reply by Jayanta:] It is not so.

This is mere human desire; but linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic injunction] is not capable to this extent [that it would bring about the result]. For, the *svarga*-desiring person would [merely on account of his desire for *svarga*] be the person fit to be enjoined just as the person alive [is the person fit to be enjoined on account of his being alive in case of the injunction, “one should sacrifice as long as one lives”].

The point repeated here by Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent is that the injunction needs the eligibility-correlate for successfully instigating a person and hence it implies it. And it is through such implication of the eligibility-correlate, in which the result is embedded, that the injunction is said to imply the result too. However, it is to be noted that the injunction does not itself need the result for instigating a person and the result is needed only by eligibility, which the injunction directly implies. In causal terms, the injunction may be said to be the cause of the implication of eligibility but not of the result. It is the eligibility implies the result for its own sake, and not for the sake of the injunction. Thus, in regard to the result, the injunction may be said to be *anyathāsiddha* or ‘established otherwise’. It is in this specific sense that the injunction is claimed by the Prābhākara opponent in NM

5.2 to imply the result, but this in way should amount to saying that the injunction *needs* a result for its own sake. This is compared by the Prābhākara to the need for and the consequent implication of a ring of causal factors by a collection of actions.

Jayanta criticises this by observing that it is but logical that X should imply Y, if the causal realisation of X is not made possible without Y. But this does not guarantee that the implication of the eligibility-correlate by *niyoga* makes the latter endowed with the result. To explain this Jayanta cites the example of the touching of a *caṇḍāla*. Although Cakradhara reads here an allusion to an opponent's view in the first sub-chapter (*pāda*) of the 11th chapter of Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra-s, yet given the unavailability of Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* on the said chapter, it is not possible to understand what exactly the opponent's view was. However, following Cakradhara's brief summary it may be said that just as the touching of a *caṇḍāla* voluntarily or involuntarily makes one eligible for purificatory rites like ritual bath, etc. so does the sheer desire for *svarga* makes one eligible for performing the act of sacrifice. But mere desire makes one only eligible but it does not bring about the result. It is as good as an occasion (*nimitta*) as in the case of the touching of a *caṇḍāla* which requires a certain act to be done. But just as the right to take purificatory ritual bath in case of touching of a *caṇḍāla* does not bring about the purification, so the eligibility to perform the sacrifice owing to a desire for *svarga* does not bring about *svarga*.

To such an objection of Jayanta's, the Prābhākara opponent responds by pointing out an implicit difference between the two cases of touching of the *caṇḍāla* and desiring *svarga*: in the former case, one may or mostly touches a *caṇḍāla* involuntarily and hence it may serve as an occasion for purification; by contrast, one who desires *svarga* does not undertake the sacrifice if he does not accomplish *svarga*, the object of his desire, by means of his action. In this way, since the accomplishment of the commandment is not possible without the implication of the person who is commanded (*niyojyākṣepa*) and the latter not without the accomplishment of *svarga*, the object of his desire which makes him eligible for the act of sacrifice, the implication of the person fit to be enjoined may be deemed to be an implication of the latter too.

Jayanta's final criticism in this regard is based on the experience that mere desire cannot lead to the accomplishment of the desired goal. But it is not in the capacity of linguistic communication, i.e., the Vedic injunction, to imply such a far-fetched requirement of the commandment; for, in that case it would be in conflict with the rule – '*śabdabuddhikarmaṇām viramyā vyāpārābhāvaḥ*' – "language, cognition and actions do not function once [they] have ceased [to function]". As part of this rule, once a word has denoted its meaning it cannot function once again to denote an additional meaning. The

first half of Jayanta's verse quoted⁷¹⁶ above seems to allude to this rule. To explain: the phrase '*svargakāma*' – 'a person who desires *svarga*' merely denotes that a person has a desire for *svarga*, and it does not additionally denote that *svarga* is accomplished by the act of sacrifice. It is perhaps for this reason that Jayanta did not restrict the source of the understanding of *phala* or result as the principal element to linguistic communication alone, but he said that *phala* is also known by a reference to the context and through reflection. This has to be accepted again because, as Jayanta says, a rational human being does not act if his action does not lead to the accomplishment of a desired end. Hence, probably keeping the problem of violation of the aforesaid rule in mind that Jayanta says that since the phrase '*svargakāma*' cannot denote anything more than the human desire for *svarga* it is as good as the phrase 'A living person' in the injunction 'As long as one lives one should sacrifice'. In other words, the desire for *svarga* would serve as the occasion (*nimitta*) just like 'one's being alive' and would not imply the result in any way.

⁷¹⁶ *narecchāmātram evedaṃ na śabdastv iyati kṣamaḥ* – "This is mere human desire; but linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic injunction] is not capable to this extent [that it would bring about the result]."

Appendix IV

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on *Pratibhā*

Towards the end of his discussion on sentence-meaning in NM 5.2, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta digresses into a very brief discussion on sentence-meaning being *pratibhā* or “intuitive flash”. Although the very word *pratibhā* might at once trigger the memory of Bharṭṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*, however, the account of *pratibhā* we find in Jayanta seems to be basically a paraphrase followed by a very brief elucidation of the versified treatment of the same by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa in *Vākyādhikaraṇa* of his *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV_{vā})⁷¹⁷⁻⁷¹⁸. The crucial point on which the criticism of *pratibhā* by Kumāriḷa and for that reason by Jayanta is based, is the identification of *pratibhā* with such a cognition which is devoid of any content. Although such an identification is also to be found in Maṇḍana Miśra’s ViVi, yet Jayanta prefers to follow Kumāriḷa’s model of criticism over Maṇḍana’s.

In Kumāriḷa, we do not find the mention of *pratibhā* as an instigating cause (*pravartaka / pravṛttihetu*) and Kumāriḷa’s main criticism is pivoted around his denial of the possibility of sentence-meaning being a content-less cognition. Interestingly enough, for Jayanta too, the critique of *pratibhā* does not feature in the context of his discussion on what counts as the instigating factor; rather it is to be found towards the end of NM 5.2 where Jayanta deliberates on what the *nature* of sentence-meaning (*vākyārthasvarūpa*) is. Further, Jayanta prefers to subsume the theory of *pratibhā* being sentence-meaning under his already criticised Buddhist Vijñānavāda theory of *vijñāna* or cognition being sentence-meaning⁷¹⁹.

By contrast:

“The very localisation of Maṇḍana’s main development on *pratibhā* in the ViV⁷²⁰ suggests that this concept does not belong, in his view, to a general theory of signification or

⁷¹⁷ The only scholar, who to my knowledge, independently suggests Kumāriḷa’s treatment of *pratibhā* in ŚV_{vā} to be Jayanta’s source is Hugo David; see David (2021b:33). I am grateful to Dr. Hugo David for kindly sharing with me a copy of this article during my Ph.D. research at the Department of Indology within the French Institute of Pondicherry, Pondicherry, India, under his supervision from September-November, 2021.

⁷¹⁸ As noted by David (2021:33), Kumāriḷa more briefly dealt with *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning also in verse no. 40 of the *Aphavāda* section from his ŚV.

⁷¹⁹ *anyais tu pratibhā vākyārtha iṣyate. tatpakṣas tu saṃsarganirbhāsaññānanirākaraṇena prāg eva pratikiṣptaḥ* (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 141) – “Others accept intuitive flash to be sentence-meaning. That view has previously been rejected by way of refutation of [the Vijñānavādin’s theory of sentence-meaning being such a] cognition, which has an appearance of [syntactical] connection.”

⁷²⁰ This is the abbreviation for ViVi used in David (2021b).

linguistic communication, but rather to a theory of human action and injunction: it is only as a possible “cause of an activity” (*pravṛtīhetu*) for living beings that *pratibhā* is of interest to Maṇḍana, and only *injunctive* sentences are able to produce such a cognition. “Independent” *pratibhās* of Vedic sages and musical experts are not his main concern, nor is insight born from explicit utterances unless they are, *lato sensu*, of an injunctive nature.... A similar impression is made by the parallel passage in the *Brahmasiddhi*. There, the context is Maṇḍana’s famous explanation of *Brahman* as *akṣara*, the “Sound” or “Phoneme”, in reference to VP 1.1b ([...] *śabdātattvaṃ yad akṣaram*; BSi p. 16.23sq.). In order to substantiate his claim that all objects appearing in the world are nothing but (real or illusory) evolutes of speech (*vāco vipariṇāmo vivarto vā* – p. 18.2), Maṇḍana examines four categories of objects of our experience arguably not having any independent existence in the outside world, and therefore merely consisting of “manifestations of speech” (*śabdavivarta*): injunctions and prohibitions (*vidhi/niṣedha*), the object of a sentence (*vākyaṛtha*), collective entities (*samūha*) like forests, etc. and unreal objects (*asant*) such as hare’s horns, square circles and the like. Significantly, the concept of *pratibhā* only comes up in the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions, while the object of a sentence is explained, in traditional Mīmāṃsaka terms, as an “association” (*saṃsarga*) between word-objects.”⁷²¹

A probable explanation of the reason why despite having acquaintance with Maṇḍana’s works, Jayanta chose to follow Kumāṛila in his critique of *pratibhā* might be, I suggest, the following: even if *pratibhā* were to be treated as an instigator, its basic character of being a cognition devoid of a content in general and any external object in particular could not be denied. Thus, if the doctrine of *pratibhā* could be scratched on the basic ground that no cognition devoid of a content whatsoever could ever exist, and thus it could still less be sentence-meaning, no separate effort would probably be needed for refuting the role of such *pratibhā* in instigating human beings. Such a scheme of criticism could be thus welcomed on the ground of parsimony.

It is well known⁷²² that Diṇnāga was not only the originator of the *apoha* theory, but he also borrowed immensely from Bhartṛhari’s doctrine of *pratibhā* and described sentence-meaning as *pratibhā*⁷²³. It was he other than the Bhartṛharean grammarians who developed

⁷²¹ David (2021b:27-28).

⁷²² See Hattori (1980).

⁷²³ Hattori quotes the following verse from Diṇnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as proof of Diṇnāga’s acceptance of *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning:

*apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyaḍ artho vivecītaḥ/
vākyaṛthaḥ pratibhākhyo ’yaṃ tenādāv upjāyate//*

“This meaning of the word [i.e., *apoha*] has been clarified after extracting the word from the sentence. The meaning of the sentence, which is called *pratibhā* (intuition), first arises by dint of that [meaning of the word].” (Hattori’s translation)

the doctrine of *pratibhā* which led to Bhartṛhari's post-10th c. A.D commentator, Puṅyarāja, term the Buddhist view on sentence-meaning to be 'almost akin to *pratibhā*' (*pratibhāsodara*)⁷²⁴. But before him, Bhartṛhari himself called *pratibhā* sentence-meaning⁷²⁵.

However, Jayanta does not connect the *pratibhā* theory of sentence meaning with the *apoha* theory of word-meaning. Rather, he prefers to read it as another name for *Vijñānavākyaṛthavāda*. By contrast, as Hattori observes:

“It is thus to be affirmed that a sentence denotes its object through the 'differentiation from others' (*anyāpoha*). Dignaga admitted as a psychological fact that *pratibhā* flashed upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis that a sentence expressed its meaning through the exclusion (*apoha*) of the other meanings.”⁷²⁶

Although the *vijñāna* element is present in Dinnāga's theory of *pratibhā* too, yet it is directly related to the negative aspect of the *apoha* theory of word-meaning. In other words, unlike Dinnāga, for Jayanta's Pratibhāvādin opponent, *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning does not lead to any negative understanding of sentence-meaning as 'not non-X', but gives an essentially positive image as 'a tiger is coming'. Further, unlike both Dinnāga and his source for *pratibhā*, Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning for Jayanta's Pratibhāvādin does not need to be grounded in metaphysically unreal stage of word-meanings obtained by means of extraction (*apoddhāra*). In Jayanta, we find an explicit attempt to read it as a *Vijñānavāda* sub-view based on the understanding of *pratibhā* being cognition without having a real external content. But no such explicit attempt is found to be made by Kumāri in ŚV_{vā} verses to formally label it as *Vijñānavāda*.

⁷²⁴ ... *śākyānāṃ vākyaṛtha iti prāyaśaḥ pratibhāsodara evāsau mantavyaḥ* – “that sentence-meaning for the Buddhists is generally akin to *pratibhā* indeed is to be understood”. Puṅyarāja's commentary on Verses 1-2, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{vā-PR}, p. 4.

⁷²⁵ Vide the following verse quoted by Hattori from the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari –

*vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate/
vākyaṛtha iti tāṃ āhuḥ padārthair upapādītām//*

“When the meanings [of the words in a sentence] are understood by separating [the words from the sentence], there arises *pratibhā* which is different [from the meanings of the words]. That [*pratibhā*] effected by the meanings of the words is called the meaning of the sentence.” – Hattori's translation.

This is verse no. 143 in VP_{Rau}.

⁷²⁶ Hattori in Nagatomi, Matilal, et. al. (1980:66-67).

It is further to be noted that Bhartṛhari himself speaks of the inexplicability of *pratibhā* in the *Vākyapadīya*:

Idam tad iti sā 'nyeṣāṃ anākhyeyā kathañcana/

pratyātmavṛtti siddha sā kartrā'pi na nirūpyate// Verse no. 143, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{Rau}.

It cannot be explained to others as this or that in any way; it is established in one's self [although] even the agent [of such subjective experience] cannot ascertain it [in a definite way].

This might also imply at the impossibility of providing a formal definition of *pratibhā*. However, just like his predecessor, Maṇḍana Miśra, Jayanta too attempted at a formal definition of *pratibhā*. It is as follows:

pratibhā khalu vijñānaṃ tac ca śabdena janyate/

na tu śabdasya viṣayo rūpadhīr iva cakṣuṣaḥ// NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 41.

Intuitive flash is [a] cognition indeed and it is generated by language; but it is not the content of language unlike the cognition of forms [which is the content in regard to] the eye.

But this definition provided by Jayanta is deficient in certain important characteristics of Bhartṛhari's view of *pratibhā*. The relevant verses from the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is as follows:

upaśleṣam ivārthānāṃ sā karoty avicāritā/

sārvarūpyam ivāpannā viṣayatvena vartate// Verse no. 145, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{Rau}.

It (*pratibhā*), which is beyond ratiocination, produces the connection of [word-] meanings as it were; having attained the form of all as it were it exists as the object.

sākṣāc chabdena janitā bhāvanānugamena vā/

itikartavyatāyāṃ tāṃ na kaścid ativartate// Verse no. 146, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{Rau}.

It is [either] produced directly by language or by following subliminal impressions [left by language either in this birth or previous ones]. No one transgresses it in regard to the procedure [which is to be followed in carrying out an action].

pramāṇatvena tāṃ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanupaśyati/

samārambhā pratīyante tiraścām api tadvaśāt// Verse no. 147, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{Rau}.

The entire world looks upon it as an instrument of knowledge. The activities of even lower creatures are at its (*pratibhā*'s) mercy.

yathā dravyaviśeṣāṇāṃ paripākair ayatnajāḥ/

madādiśaktayo drṣṭāḥ pratibhās tadvatāṃ tathā // Verse no. 148, *Vākyakāṇḍa*, in VP_{Rau}.

Just as the power of intoxication, etc. of specific substances are seen [to be] due to maturity and [as] not [having been] produced by any effort, so is *pratibhā* for those who possess it.

*svavarvrttiṃ vikurute madhau puṃskokilasya kaḥ/
jantvādayaḥ kulāyādikaraṇe śikṣitāḥ katham // Verse no. 149, Vākyakāṇḍa, in VP_{Rau}.*

Who modifies the voice of the male cuckoo in spring? How have animals, etc. been taught to build nests, etc.?”

*āhāraprītyapadveṣaplavanādikriyāsu kaḥ/
jātyanvayaprasiddhāsu prayoktā mṛgapakṣiṇām // Verse no. 150, Vākyakāṇḍa, in VP_{Rau}.*

Who induces animals and birds to [specific forms of] activities like eating, affectioning, hating, swimming etc. that are well-established connection with specific [forms of] births?

*bhāvanānugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate/
āsattiviprakaṣābhyām āgamas tu viśiṣyate // Verse no. 151, Vākyakāṇḍa, in VP_{Rau}.*

This is produced by language (*āgama*) followed by subliminal impressions (*bhāvanā*) alone. However, language differs on account of proximity [of language learnt in this birth] and remoteness [of language learnt in a previous birth but working through subliminal impressions in a subsequent birth].”

*svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādr̥ṣṭopapāditām/
viśiṣṭopahitām ceti pratibhām śadvidhām viduḥ // Verse no. 152, Vākyakāṇḍa, in VP_{Rau}.*

[Grammarians] speak of *pratibhā* as six-fold according to nature, conduct, practice, *yoga*, the *unseen* [causal factor] and as conditioning special [people].

Now, is presented Jayanta’s text on *pratibhā* and its English translation:

*anyais tu pratibhā vākyārtha iṣyate. tatpakṣas tu saṃsarganirbhāsajñānanirākaraṇena
prāg eva pratikṣiptaḥ.*

*pratibhā khalu vijñānaṃ tac ca śabdena janyate/
na tu śabdasya viśayo rūpadhīr iva cakṣuṣaḥ//*

bāhyasya viśayābhāvāt sā eva viśaa iti cet,

na, tasya samarthitatvāt.

*yo ’pi vyāghra āyāta ity ukte sūrakātaranarādhikaraṇanānākārakāryotpādaḥ - sa bāhye
'rthe vyāghrāgamanātau pratipanne vāsanānusāreṇa bhavan na pratibhāmātrahetuko
bhavati. tasya hi jñāyamāno ’rtho karaṇam, na tajjñānamātram.*

arthas tadānīm nāsti iti cet –

vipralambhavākyaṃ idam asatyārthaṃ bhāviṣyati, na tv abāhyaviṣayaṃ tat. yathā 'vasthite vanitātmani bāhye 'rthe vāsanānusāreṇa kunapa iti, kāmīnī iti, bhakṣyam iti pratibhā bhavanti – tathā śabdārthe 'pi vyāghrāgamane 'vagatē śūrāṇām utsāhaḥ, kātārāṇām bhayaṃ ityādi kāryaṃ bhavati. na tv etāvatā pratibhā śabdārtho bhavitum arhati. tasmāt vākya-prayojanatvena vā yadi pratibhā vākya-rthaḥ kathyate, kathyatāṃ nāma, na tv asau śabdasya abhidheyā.

anabhidheyā 'pi saṃsargavat vākya-rtha iti cet –

tatra apy uktam. saṃśṛṣṭā vākya-rtho na saṃsargaḥ. evam ihāpi pratibhāvanto 'rthā vākya-rtho na pratibheti.

śabdasya ca pratyakṣavad vartamānārthaniṣṭhatvābhāvād anāgatādyarthābhidhāyino 'rthāsannidhānena pratibhāparatvaṃ yad ucyate –

tad apy ayuktam – anāgatādiviṣayatve 'pi tasyārthaviṣayatvaṃ prasādhitam iti kṛtaṃ vistareṇa. NM_{Mys.-II}, pp. 141-142.

Others, however, accept intuitive flash to be sentence-meaning. That view has previously been rejected by way of refutation of [the Vijñānavādin's theory of sentence-meaning being such a] cognition, which has an appearance of [syntactical] connection.

Intuitive flash is [a] cognition indeed and it is generated by language; but it is not the content of language unlike the cognition of forms [which is the content in regard to] the eye.

[Objection:] Since there is an absence of external objects, let that (*pratibhā*) alone be the content.

[Reply:] No; for, it (the existence of external objects) has already been defended.

As for the production of different kinds of reactions [which is seen] in brave and coward men on hearing [the sentence] “a tiger has come”, that happens after having understood an external meaning like the coming of a tiger, etc. according to [the person's] personal dispositions, but not due only to intuitive flash. For, it is the meaning which is being understood which is the cause of it, and not a cognition of it alone.

[Objection:] The object is not present at that time (at the time of uttering the sentence, “A tiger has come”).

[Reply:] Then this would be a statement of a deceiver about an unreal object, but not about a non-external object.

Just as [varying] intuitions such as ‘a stinking corpse’, ‘a wanton woman’, ‘a thing fit to be eaten’ occur according to personal dispositions [in a mendicant monk, an amorous person and a beast respectively] with regard to an external object in the form of a woman, similarly once linguistic mean in the form of the coming of a tiger it has been understood,

effects such as the exertion of the brave, and fear of the timid, etc. take place. But by this much intuitive flash cannot become the meaning of linguistic communication. Therefore, if for the purpose of sentence intuitive flash is said to be sentence-meaning, let it be said so, but it (intuitive flash) is not denoted by words.

[Objection:] Just like [syntactical] connection, let [intuitive flash] be the sentence-meaning, although it is not denoted meaning of words.

[Reply:] In this regard too (in regard to such an objection) it was said that sentence-meaning is [mutually] connected [word-meanings, and] not [syntactical] connection [itself]. In this way, here too, objects, which have intuited, are sentence-meaning, and not intuitive flash [alone].

[Objection:] Given that unlike perception, linguistic communication, which denotes objects that are yet to come (future objects), etc. is not grounded in objects that are present, it is on account of non-proximity with the object, that it (i.e., linguistic communication) is said to aim at intuitive flash.

[Reply:] That too is incorrect. Even though it is about objects that are yet to come, yet it is about objects [and not about a mere cognition]. Enough of elucidation!”

Now, the similarities and dissimilarities of Bhartṛhari’s view of *pratibhā* from that of Jayanta’s Pratibhāvādin’s (henceforth Pratibhāvādin only) view of *pratibhā* may be noted.

A. Similarities:

- i. For both Bhartṛhari and the Pratibhāvādin, *pratibhā* itself is its object.
- ii. For both, *pratibhā* is produced by language.

B. Dissimilarities:

- i. For Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* brings about a connection among the metaphysically unreal word-meanings as it were; but no such thing is mentioned by the Pratibhāvādin.
- ii. For Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* is also produced by the subliminal impressions generated by language in a previous birth and which may keep operating in subsequent births. But the Pratibhāvādin does not mention whether by language he also means that subliminal impressions generated by language produce *pratibhā* or not.
- iii. For Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* functions not only in human beings, but also in animals, birds, reptiles, etc. But no such thing is mentioned by the Pratibhāvādin.
- iv. *Pratibhā* for Bhartṛhari is six-fold; but no such internal division of *pratibhā* is mentioned by the Pratibhāvādin.
- v. For Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* determines for human beings as well as animals, birds, etc. as to what exactly to do in regard to the execution of a certain action. But no such characteristic feature is mentioned by the Pratibhāvādin.

vi. *Pratibhā* for the *Pratibhāvādin* leads to the genesis of different responses and reactions in different persons even after hearing the same sentence. Thus, on hearing the sentence ‘the tiger has come’, a brave man exhibits valour, while a coward shrinks due to fear.

Now before analysing the influence of Kumārila on Jayanta’s treatment of *pratibhā*, it is important to note that Kumārila denied the need for accepting *apoha* within the larger context of *viññānavāda* idealism. The relevant verses from the *Aphavāda* chapter from Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika* are as follows:

*sāmānyam vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyākāro bhaviṣyati/
śabdārtho’rthānapekṣo hi vṛthā’pohaḥ prakalpitaḥ//38//*

*vasturūpā ca sā buddhiḥ śabdārtheṣūpajāyate/
tena vastv eva kalpeta vācyam buddhyanapohakaṃ//39//*

*asaty api ca bāhye’rthe vākyārthapratibhā tathā/
padārthe’pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate//40//*

*buddhyantarād vyavacchedo na ca buddheḥ pratīyate/
svarūpotpādamātrāc ca nānyam aṃśam bibharti sā//41// ŚV_{DS}, pp. 407-408.*

“And (the ideas signifying themselves), you would have a *Class*, in the form of a positive entity, in the shape of the *Idea*. And therefore it was an useless effort on your part to have assumed an *Apoḥa*, as forming the denotation of objects, and yet independent of any external (real and positive) objects.³⁸

And this *Idea* appears, in the shape of a real entity, with reference to the signification of words. Therefore we must admit of a positive entity – not in the form of the *negation of other ideas (Apoḥa)* – to form the object signified (by a word, “Cow”).³⁹

Just, as even in the absence of any external objects, we have a cognition (in a positive form, and not in the form of an *Apoḥa*) of the meaning of a sentence,— so, in the same manner, we could also have with regard to the word; and why should we assume an *Apoḥa*?⁴⁰

In the case of all ideas, we are not cognisant of any *rejection of other ideas (Apoḥa)*. Since the idea ends only in bringing about its own form, therefore it does not bear the burden of any other (ideas).⁴¹⁷²⁷

From the above, it is clear that Kumārila here examines the *apoha* theory within the larger context of *viññānavāda*, which seems to be in consonance with Dinnāga view referred to above. However, the only verse which could allude to the equation of *pratibhā* with *viññāna* and also to such *pratibhā*’s being the sentence-meaning is verse no. 40. The 2021

⁷²⁷ Translation by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, in Jhā (1907:302-303).

edition⁷²⁸ and translation of the Apohavāda chapter by Kataoka and Taber has the following reading:

*asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe vākyārthah pratibhā tathā/
padārthe 'pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate//40//*

On this change of reading from *vākyārthapratibhā* to *vākyārthaḥ pratibhā*, Hugo David says in a footnote in David (2021:33) –

“Earlier editions of the text read *vākyārthapratibhā* as a compound, sometimes interpreted by translators as a *tatpuruṣa* with underlying genitive relation, as in G. Jhā’s translation of this verse: “a cognition (...) of the meaning of a sentence” (JHĀ [1985, p. 302]). This interpretation, however, is clearly invalidated by the occurrence of the same compound *vākyārthapratibhā* in Dignāga’s auto-commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5.46⁷²⁹ (PIND [20151, p. 56]), as an equivalent of the expression *vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyah* in the corresponding verse (translated below). If one adopts the reading of earlier editions, the compound would therefore have to be read as a *karmadhāraya* in Kumārila’s verse as well which, as we shall see, mostly relies on Dignāga.”

However, even if this change in reading holds, still the Kumārila verse could be understood as alluding to Dinnāga’s version of sentence-meaning as *pratibhā*.⁷³⁰

Now, the verses from Kumārila’s ŚV_{vā}⁷³¹ which definitely form direct sources for Jayanta’s *Pratibhāvādin*’s account of *pratibhā* are as follows:

*pratibhā 'nekadhā puṁsāṃ yadyapy artheṣu jāyate/
tathāpi bāhya evārthas tasya vākyasya ceṣyate//325//*

Although cognitions of different types are produced in people with regard to objects, still the meaning of that sentence is accepted to be external for use.

vākyaprayojanatvena jānyatvenātha vā yadi/

⁷²⁸ My reference to this recent edition is not based on a first-hand experience, but only on Dr. Hugo David’s account of the point in question in David (2021:33).

⁷²⁹ The verse and the auto-commentary referred to by David (2021:33) is as follows:

“atra ca apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate. [46] padasyāsato <'pi> vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt prakṛtipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahaṇī. tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmād ādāv anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahaṇopāyā vākyārthapratibhā>. vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yo hy anyah tadantarāle śabdārthagrahaṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt>”. Pind’s Ph.D. dissertation, A18.

⁷³⁰ For how *pratibhā* as sentence-meaning is grounded in Dinnāga’s theory of *apoha* and what relation it has with being of the nature of cognition, see Hattori (1979:61-63).

⁷³¹ ŚV_{vā}, in ŚV_{DS}, pp. 660-661.

ucyate pratibhā 'py artho na naḥ kiñcid virudhyate//326//

If cognition is said to be the meaning [of a sentence] in the sense of [its being] the purpose [of a sentence] or something that is produced by [a sentence, then] it is not at odds with our [view].

*śabdādyutthāpitair jñānair ātmāṃśagrahaṇākṣamaiḥ/
yad bāhyam āpyate vastu sa tv arthaḥ pāramārthikaḥ//327//*

The external entity which is obtained by means of cognitions, arising from linguistic communication, etc. that are incapable of grasping themselves (i.e., incapable of making itself or the cognition to be its object) is but the real meaning [of a sentence].

*pratyakṣavyatiriktaṃ tu vijñānam upavarṇitam/
trikālavīṣayaṃ yasmād asannidhir adūṣaṇam//328//*

Since cognitions [arising from instruments of knowledge] other than perception have been explained to be about objects belonging to the three phases of time (viz. past, present and future), the remoteness [of external objects in case of sentences about past or future objects or events] are not [to be counted] as [a] fault.

*anekakāratā yāpi śūrabhīrudhiyaṃ prati/
vāsanānugrahāt soktā kuṇapādīmater iva//329//*

The multiplicity of forms in regard to cognitions [arising respectively in a] brave [person and a] coward [person] is due [the individual] subliminal impressions [of those persons] just as it is in the case of the cognition of a dead body [differently by ascetics, an amorous person and an animal, in accordance with their individual dispositions].

The points on which both Kumārila and Jayanta agree are as follows:

- i.* *Pratibhā* in so far as it is of the nature of cognition cannot appropriate itself as its object and that it should be an external object which should be the meaning of a sentence.
- ii.* If by saying that *pratibhā* is sentence-meaning what is meant is that *pratibhā* or a resultant cognition intended at communicating some specific meaning is the purpose of uttering a sentence it is not at odds with the view of Kumārila or Jayanta. Whereas, Kumārila adds one more option, viz. that of *pratibhā* being the effect (*janya*) of sentence, Jayanta does not mention it.
- iii.* Both accept *vāsanā* or individual dispositions⁷³² to be the cause of a brave man and a coward man differently reacting to the same sentence, “A tiger has come.” Both

⁷³² I am aware of the claim made in Akamatsu (1994:42) based on PS V.46c-d that “Dignāga mentions as causes of *pratibhā* the listener's own notions as well as regular practice. As to the latter, Bhartṛhari regards it as one of the causes of *pratibhā* as we have seen before, but the listener's own notions, according to him, are the cause of various understandings of the meaning of the word.” In the same vein, Akamatsu points out that the version of *pratibhā* found in Jayanta “is not Bhartṛhari's , but this is Dignāga's view to which he referred there” (1994:42 fn. 21). Perhaps the point about “listener's own notions” (*svapratyaya*) mentioned in Dignāga's verse referred to above might have led Akamatsu to draw this conclusion. However, it remains

Kumārila and Jayanta liken this to the event of the understanding of a dead body as a corpse, as a ravishing woman, and as a ‘something fit to be eaten’ by an ascetic, an amorous man and a beast respectively in accordance with their respective dispositions. Jayanta here adds a further clarification that it is the object which is being known (*jñāyamāna artha*) that is responsible for such reactions, and not merely *pratibhā* or the cognition ensuing from hearing the sentence “A tiger has come”.

iv. Both Kumārila and Jayanta agree that just because the object of linguistic cognition is not necessarily something situated in the present time as it is always the case with *pratyakṣa* or perception, it cannot be argued that it is *pratibhā* or mere cognition only and not an actual external object which language aims at. For both of them, despite the possible remoteness of the object of a sentence at the time of its utterance, it is not a fault. Both Kumārila in the *Nirālambanavāda* section of ŚV⁷³³ and Jayanta say that all the instruments of knowledge need external objects for the genesis of a cognition, but it is only *pratyakṣa* or perception which needs the additional condition of the object being present at the time of the genesis of the perceptual cognition⁷³⁴. In other words, it is enough for such external objects existing in either of the three phases of time to be able to produce a cognition about itself on being the content of instruments of knowledge other than perception⁷³⁵.

Two more points that Jayanta adds to this discussion deserve special mention; they are as follows:

First, Jayanta responds to the Pratibhāvādin’s claim that at the time of utterance of a sentence the external object, the meaning of it, is not present. Jayanta says that in that case it would be the sentence uttered by a deceiver, but that would not prove that the sentence is about a non-external object. This is an allusion to Jayanta’s refutation of the Buddhist claim that language does not touch upon external objects in the third book of

to be investigated if Jayanta drew directly upon Dinnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* while dealing with this aspect of *pratibhā*, or he dealt with the version of it as found in Kumārila’s ŚV *Vākyaadhikaraṇa* verse no. 329; this is because terminologically Jayanta is closer to Kumārila (*vāsanā*) than Dinnāga (*svapratyaya*).

⁷³³ Verses 114-119.

⁷³⁴ This is understandable because a perceptual cognition arises when the sense-organs come in actual contact with an external object present before it. However, all other instruments of knowledge starting from inference do not necessarily need an external object existing in the present, but simply a knowledge of an external object which may either exist in the present, or may be existed in the past or will surely come into being in the future. It is interesting to note in this connection the shift in the definition of perception as an instrument of knowledge in Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as being *jñānākaraṇakaṃ jñānam* or the knowledge, the instrument of which is not a cognition.

⁷³⁵ It is interesting to note in this connection that for Kumārila, only that cognition is “without a support” (*nirālambana*) which grasps an object in a form in which it does not exist. This is also termed as the cognition which has ‘absence for its support’ (*abhāvāmbana jñāna*). See verses 117-119 of *Nirālambanavāda* of ŚV. It is also to be noted that for the Buddhist opponent referred to here, all cognitions are “without a support” just like a dream-cognition only in so far as an external object is thought of as the support of a cognition; but for the same Buddhist, cognitions are not really “without support” because a cognition makes itself its object.

*Nyāyamañjarī*⁷³⁶. Jayanta's own view expressed therein is that it is because of the merit or defect of the speaker that language communicates a real or unreal meaning respectively. It will not be out of place to summarise Jayanta's polemics with his Buddhist opponent, since it has an unavoidable bearing on the general question of whether language reflects reality or not⁷³⁷.

To begin with, the objector had complained that even after being invalidated by other instruments of knowledge like perception, sentences like "there are hundred elephants on the tip of the finger" keep on generating such unreal awareness. But Jayanta says that if it were the case that language never generated any correct awareness, then the opponent's objection would be sustained. But it is seen that on hearing the sentence, "there are fruits on the bank of the river", uttered by a reliable speaker (*āpta*), there arises a correct cognition, in which the literal meaning is not undone. This is because on hearing such a statement made by a reliable speaker, one indeed gets the fruits by reaching the river-bank. At this point, the opponent says that even if a reliable speaker utters the sentence, "there are hundred elephants on the tip of the finger", the genesis of an unveridical cognition cannot be avoided. Jayanta denies this claim of his opponent on the ground that a reliable speaker does not utter such kinds of sentences. Jayanta further clarifies his position by replying to the opponent's question as to which of the two – absence of language (*śabdābhāva*) or defect in the speaker – is responsible for not producing a correct cognition. According to Jayanta, even a person, who does not speak, can be a deceiver, through his gestures. Now the opponent may say that such deception may be explained in the following way: one may infer a linguistic cognition from the gesture, and this linguistic cognition can cause the deception. But Jayanta says that it is not understood in this way. For, when on hearing the sentence about the existence of fruits on the bank of the river, one goes to the river-bank and does not find the fruits, as a reason of which, there arises a cognition in him which invalidates his previous cognition generated by the said sentence, he blames the person, who had uttered the sentence, for having deceived him and not the sentence, uttered by him. In the same way, if the listener gets the fruits on reaching the bank of the river, he praises the person, who had uttered the sentence, and not the sentence he had uttered. Likewise, since such human defect is understood also in case of a linguistic cognition inferred from the gestures of a silent deceiver, it is correct to hold that the deception caused by linguistic cognition is due only to human defects and not owing to the very nature of language. The opponent here raises the following objection⁷³⁸ – the validity and invalidity of a cognition is dependent on the nature of the instrument which produces

⁷³⁶ See NM_{Mys.-I}, pp. 412-419.

⁷³⁷ It is to be noted that Jayanta's polemics with his Buddhist opponent in this regard, a summarised account of which follows in the main text above, is basically a compressed paraphrase of lines from Umbeka Bhaṭṭa's *Tātparyaṭīkā* on verse nos. 61-63 from Kumārila's ŚV ad ŚāBhā ad. MīSū 1.1.2. See ŚVTā, pp. 60-62. I refrain from comparing Jayanta's lines with that of Umbeka since it demands a separate treatment, which I reserve for a future paper.

⁷³⁸ This objection and Jayanta's reply thereto have been presented here on the elucidation of this rather intriguing passage given by the Mysore editor, K. S. Varadācārya in NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 418.

it. In linguistic cognition, it is language which is the instrument. Accordingly, the validity or invalidity of a linguistic cognition should be said to be dependent upon language. Thus, of what use are the merits and defects of a human being in that regard? For it is not the case that fire, which is the cause of burning, makes an exception to its nature consistent with the nature of the person, who ignites the fire. The essence of Jayanta's reply to this is that it is true, the validity or invalidity of a cognition is dependent upon the instrument which produces it. But the defect of a person does indeed render even the instrument defiled. For, it is not the case that such an instrument as language functions independently of the person who uses it. And it is the same in case of the instrument which produces perceptual cognition in the form of eyes, etc. Therefore, although a symmetry with sense-organs is to be noted in case of language in so far both produce cognitions, yet the validity or invalidity of the linguistic cognition thus produced is dependent upon the merit or defect of the speaker respectively. Hence it is not the case that language, by its very nature, is exclusively bereft of any connection with external objects.

Jayanta further says that it is but logical to say that just like a lamp, the nature of language consists of its being an illuminator only, and that language is not valid or invalid on its own, because this illuminating nature of language is not suspended even when an opposite, i.e., unreal meaning is understood. The only difference between the illumination caused by a lamp and that by language is that the latter presupposes learning of the word-object relation by the people, who use it for communication. By contrast, the illumination caused by a lamp does not stand in need of any such learning on the part of the lamp. In other words, a lamp illuminates by its very nature and presence, while language illuminates, i.e., communicates an information only when the language is used by such a person who knows how that particular language functions. Given that language is invariably an illuminator in this specific sense, it continues to generate the same unreal cognition generated by the sentence, "there are hundreds of elephants on the tip of the finger", whenever it is uttered later, notwithstanding the fact that an invalidating cognition had arisen on hearing it for the first time which rendered the cognition as unreal. The fact that a sentence continues to communicate the same unreal meaning is not its own fault, but that of the speaker, who uses the illuminator in the form of language to communicate the same unreal meaning again and again. It is the element of validity which is blocked in such cases, but the linguistic cognition in the form of the literal meaning of the sentence, "there are hundreds of elephants on the tip of the finger" does not get suspended. Since a human being expresses his experience to others by means of language, if his perception is incorrect, then the linguistic cognition generated by the sentence used by him will be incorrect if his experience communicated is defective, and if his experience is correct, then the corresponding linguistic cognition will also be correct. If a person instructs another person on something, which he has not himself seen, such an instruction of his is endowed with defect of judgement⁷³⁹. Thus, the non-concomitance of language with external reality is

⁷³⁹ Although the original word in the text is '*buddhidoṣa*', yet it is not the defect of the cognition, but the defect in the judgement of the speaker. For, if it were otherwise, it would have refuted Jayanta's point made so far that the linguistic cognition is defective on its own account, but due to the defect in the person who uses the language in the form of utterance of a sentence to convey a specific information to another person.

not exclusive, natural, invariable and irreversible; it is rather due only to the defect of the speaker who uses language⁷⁴⁰.

However, it is to be noted that the attribution of invalidity of a linguistic cognition to the defects of the speaker is not Jayanta's innovation, but borrowed from the following verse of Kumāriḷa's ŚV ad MīSū1.1.2:

*śabde doṣodbhavas tāvad vaktradhīna iti sthitam/
tadabhāvaḥ kvacit tāvad guṇavadvakṛkatvataḥ//62//*

It is established that the occurrence of defect in linguistic communication is dependent upon the speaker. Sometimes, an absence of it (defect) is due to the [presence of such a] speaker, who is endowed with qualities (merit).

The second and more vital point that Jayanta makes is to situate his debate in the context of his deliberation on the nature of sentence-meaning. A few paragraphs earlier Jayanta had expressed his opinion that it is not syntactical connection which was sentence-meaning, although a collection of words syntactically connected constituted sentence-meaning. It is on the basis of the cognition of the syntactically connected words-meanings in a sentential cognition that syntactical connection itself is implicitly understood to obtain among the constituent word-meanings. Notwithstanding the fact that this such syntactical connection is not the referent of any constituent word of a sentence, it is that which fulfils the need for sentence-meaning being something addition and specific as compared to word-meaning⁷⁴¹. In the same vein, Jayanta imagines a possible objection from his Pratibhāvādin opponent who might say that although *pratibhā* is not the referent of any constituent word, yet just like *saṃsarga* or syntactical connection, it might be said to be sentence-meaning. Jayanta answers this possible objection in a way akin to his reply to his previous opponent who had contended that it was *saṃsarga* or the syntactical connection itself which was sentence-meaning. Jayanta says, just as it is not the mere syntactical connection but the syntactically connected word-meanings which is sentence-meaning, it

Thus, I have adapted the following paraphrase of the word 'buddhidōṣa', provided by Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya's: "If a person without perceiving an object instructs others then his power of judgment is not surely up to the mark, i.e. defective." Bhattacharyya (1978:333).

⁷⁴⁰ It is interesting to note that Jayanta concludes this discussion with the following remark:

tad uktam – tattvam api bhavati, vitatham api bhavati (NM_{Mys.-II}, p. 419) – "It has thus been said – it is also true; it is also false."

This is a clear echo of the following line expressing the opponent's objection in ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.2, with a slight difference in the reading without it causing any alteration of the meaning –

nanv atathābhūtam apy arthaṃ brūyāc codanā yathā yatkiñcana laukikaṃ vacanaṃ nadyās tire phalāni santīti. tat tathyam api bhavati vitatham api bhavatīti (MDĀ_I, p. 15) – "The Vedic injunctions may speak of an unreal meaning too, as in any empirical statement like there are fruits on the bank of the river. That is (can be) also fact; that is (can be) unreal."

⁷⁴¹ For more on this, see Chapter IV.

is not sheer *pratibhā* or intuitive flash, but the external objects in regard to which such intuitive flashes occur that are sentence-meaning. To the best of my knowledge, this objection by the Pratibhāvādin is not found in any extant pre-Jayanta Sanskrit philosophical texts dealing with the doctrine of *pratibhā* and hence it, along with Jayanta's reply thereto, could be considered as an original contribution to this debate on *pratibhā*. This could perhaps also count as Jayanta's additional interpretation of the specific sense in which the Pratibhāvādin's claim that *pratibhā* is sentence-meaning could be understood, apart from Kumārila's understanding *pratibhā* as either being the purpose (*prayojana*) or the effect (*janya*) of the utterance of a sentence. It has already been noted how the first of these two understandings of Kumārila has already been reused by Jayanta in the latter's criticism of the theory of *pratibhā*.

Another probable source of Jayanta's criticism of *pratibhā*, which is very similar to Kumārila's could be *Yuktidīpikā* (YD), one of the ancient commentaries on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SāKā). Before quoting the relevant from YD, it will be proper to see if Jayanta was acquainted with YD. While criticising the Sāṃkhya view of perception (*pratyakṣa*), Jayanta names Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The relevant passage is as follows:

īśvarakṛṣṇas tu "pratiṣayādhyāvasāyo dr̥ṣṭam" [SāKā 5] iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇam avocat. tad api na manoḥnam, anumānādijñānānam api viṣayādhyāvasāyasvabhāvatvena ativyāpteḥ. NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 281.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa has spoken of the definition of perception as "perception is the ascertainment of every object". That too does not appeal to the mind; for, even the cognitions [arising from] inference, etc. have the nature of ascertaining the object; hence [the Sāṃkhya definition of perception is unduly] over-extensive."

Continuing his criticism of the Sāṃkhya definition, Jayanta says:

yat tu rājā vyākhyātavān – pratir ābhimukhye vartate, tenābhimukhyena viṣayādhyāvasāyaḥ pratyakṣam iti tad apy anumānādāv asty eva. ghaṭo 'yam itivad agnimān parvata ity ābhimukhyenaiva pratīteḥ. spaṣṭatā tu sarvasaṃvidāṃ svaṣaye vidyata eva. NM_{Mys.-I}, p. 281.

Rājā⁷⁴² has explained [the above definition of perception given by SāKā] – the [particle] *prati* [in *pratiṣayādhyāvasāya*] means the state of facing [something]; on that ground the ascertainment of object by facing [the object] is perception. But this too is present in inference, etc. Just like [the cognition,] "this is a jar", in [the inferential cognition] "this mountain has fire" the cognition [of the inferred object, i.e., fire] takes place by facing [the object]. All valid cognitions have clarity with regard to their objects.

⁷⁴² For the name of the YD as *Rājavārttika* and other details, see Chakravarti (1951:162-163). About the possibility of the YD itself being a commentary on a prior *Sāṃkhyavārttika*, the text of which is embedded in the YD, see pp. 227-228, in Potter (1987).

Now, the line “*pratir ābhimukhye vartate, tena ābhimukhyena viṣayādhyāvasāyaḥ pratyakṣam*” in the above passage seems to be a close echo of the following line from YD

pratigra<hane> punaḥ kriyamāṇe pratir ābhimukhye vartate. YD, p. 81.

When the [particle] *prati* is accepted, [the sense that we get is that of] facing [the object].

This line or a closely similar line is found, to the best of my knowledge, in any other commentary on SāKā. Hence this may be taken as an indicator of Jayanta’s acquaintance with the YD.

Against the above background, let me present the relevant passage from YD on SāKā 4, which deals with *pratibhā* –

āha – pratibhā tarhi pramāṇāntaram bhaviṣyati.

ucyate – keyaṃ pratibhā nāma?

āha – yo ’yam anādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām abhinne ’rthe bāhye stryādau pratyaye pūrvābhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhedabhinnapratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate sā hi pratibhā. tatha coktam –

*yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate/
svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā// (VP_{Rau}, II.235)*

yena hi yo ’rtho’ bhyastah sukhāditvena tasya vināpi tenārthena śabdamaṭrāt pratipattir utpadyate. tadyathā vyāghro ’tra prativasati ity ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenābhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathuprabhṛtayo bhavanti. tasmāt pratibhaiva devamanuṣyatiraścām itikartavyatāṅgatvāt pramāṇam iti. āha ca –

*pramāṇatvena tāṃ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanugacchati⁷⁴³/
vyavahārāḥ pravartante⁷⁴⁴ tiraścām api tadvaśāt// (VP_{Rau}, II.147). YD, pp. 74-75.*

[The opponent] says – Then, an intuitive flash will be the other instrument of knowledge.

[Reply by the author of YD –] [In reply] it is said – what is this intuitive flash?

[The opponent] says – With regard to the cognition of external objects like women, etc., the cognitions of deities, human beings and animals in this beginningless world differentiated by the forms of ‘a corpse’, ‘a wanton woman’, ‘a thing fit to be eaten’, based on subliminal impressions [produced by] past experience, that arise as part of the way how one should act – that is intuitive flash. And it has been so said [by Bhartṛhari] –

⁷⁴³ In *Vākyapadīya* the reading is ‘*samanuṣyati*’ instead of ‘*samanugacchati*’, though the basic meaning is not affected.

⁷⁴⁴ In *Vākyapadīya* the reading of quarter c of this verse is ‘*samārambhaḥ pratīyante*’ – “the commencement of activities are seen”; however, the sense in case of both the readings remains basically the same.

“Even without [the presence of external objects], there arise from sentences in accordance with [past] experiences, different kinds of understanding in imitation of one’s own knowledge.

He, who has got used to an object as being pleasurable, he understands [it as such] from the mere word [expressing that object] even without [the actual presence of] that object. Just as when it is said, “a tiger lives here”, [one] sweats, trembles, etc. because of past experience even though there is no external object [in the form of a tiger]. Therefore, in so far as it is a part of the way how one should act, it is indeed the intuitive flash of deities, human beings and animals, that is the instrument of knowledge. And [in this regard, Bhartrhari] says –

“The entire world sees it to be an instrument of knowledge. The activities of even lower creatures commence at its (i.e., *pratibhā*’s) mercy.”

Thus, it is evident in his presentation of his *Pratibhāvādin* opponent’s view, Jayanta is as close to the author of the YD as he is to Kumārila.

In his criticism too, Jayanta comes close to the following portion from the YD –

yat tu khalv idam ucyate ’rthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣāsatsv api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir utpadyata iti. satyam etat. sā tu mithyājñānatvāt pramāṇatvena na pariḡhyata ity ayam adoṣaḥ. YD, p. 146.

As regards what has been said – the understanding of [tiger, etc.] based on subliminal impressions [produced by] past experience of objects arises even when tiger, etc. are not [externally] present, it is true. But since on account of being a false cognition it is not reckoned as an instrument of knowledge, there is no fault.

The point made by the author of the YD is that although such cognitions of tiger, etc. do arise even in the absence of the external objects, yet they are false cognitions probably in the sense that at the time of genesis of such cognitions the corresponding objects are not actually present. This falsity of cognition has some similarity with Jayanta’s characterisation of such cognitions as being the statement of a deceiver having an unreal object. However, a greater influence of Śābara’s ideas on Jayanta, as analysed above⁷⁴⁵, cannot be denied.

⁷⁴⁵ See fn. 23.

PART B

Discourse on Sentence-Meaning in *Nyāyamañjarī* (Book 5)

Text and English Translation

भट्टजयन्तकृतन्यायमञ्जरीस्थपञ्चमाह्निकद्वितीयार्धगता वाक्यार्थचिन्ता

एवं पदार्थे निर्णीते वाक्यार्थश्चिन्त्यतेऽधुना।
तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिश्च बहुरूपा विपश्चिताम्॥

Since in this way the meaning of a word having been determined, the meaning of a sentence is now deliberated upon. And about that, the disagreements of learned people take many forms.

केचिदाचक्षते – बाह्यस्य वाक्यार्थस्यासंभवात् पदार्थसंसर्गनिर्भासं ज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थ इति॥

अन्ये तु – वास्तवः पदार्थानां परस्परसंसर्गो बाह्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्याहुः॥

अन्यव्यवच्छेदो वाक्यार्थ इत्यपरे, शुक्लादिपदान्तरोच्चारणे कृष्णादिनिवृत्तेरवगमात्॥

अपरे संगिरन्ते संसर्गस्य दुरपह्ववत्वात् तस्य च गुणप्रधानभावगर्भत्वाद् गुणीभूतकारकनिकरनिर्वर्त्या प्रधानभूता क्रिया वाक्यार्थ इति॥

अन्ये मन्यन्ते – भाव्यनिष्ठः पुरुषव्यापारः करोत्यर्थो भावनाशब्दवाच्यो वाक्यार्थः। लिडादिशब्दव्यापारवाच्यस्तु शब्दभावनाख्यः पुरुषस्यार्थभावनानुष्ठाने प्रवर्तकः स विधिरुच्यत इति॥

अन्ये ब्रुवते – द्वयाभिधाने लिडादेः प्रत्ययस्य भारगौरवाद् विधिरेव वाक्यार्थः, स एवानुष्ठेयः प्रवर्तकश्चेति॥ तत्रापि द्वयी विमतिः – कैश्चित् प्रेषणात्मकत्वं शब्दस्याभ्युपगतम्, लिडादिशब्देभ्यस्तथा तदवगमात्, कार्यान्तरानवगमाद्, भावार्थमात्रकार्यत्वपक्षस्य चातिदौर्बल्याद्विधिरेवानुष्ठेय इत्यर्थात् तस्य कार्यत्वम्॥ अन्यैस्तु – कार्यत्वेन नियोगप्रतीतेरर्थात्तस्य प्रेरकत्वमिति संश्रितम्। कार्यमवगतं स्वसिद्धये पुरुषं नियुङ्क्ते – ममेदं कार्यम् इत्यवगते हि तत्सिद्धये पुरुषः प्रवर्तत इति॥

अपरे पुनरभिनवं वाक्यार्थ उद्योगं नाम वर्णयांबभूवुः – इत्य नैकशाखा विप्रतिपत्तिः। तदत्र किं तत्त्वमिति॥

i. Some say – Since an external sentence-meaning is not possible, a cognition in which there is an appearance of a connection of word-meanings is indeed what the meaning of a sentence is.

ii. But others say – An actual connection of word-meanings with each other which is in fact external is what sentence-meaning is.

iii. On the view of others, sentence-meaning is the exclusion of the other. This is because, one understands the exclusion of black etc. upon the pronouncement of other words such as white.

iv. Others claim – Since a connection (of words) is undeniable and since that (connection) is based on the relation of the principal and the secondary, sentence-meaning is an action, the principal thing, which is brought about by a collection of action-factors that are subrodinate to it (action).

v. Others think, sentence-meaning is human activity, directed towards something that is fit to be brought about; it is the meaning of the finite verb ‘does’ and the referent of the word *bhāvanā*. But the activity of words ending in optative suffixes, called *śabdabhāvanā* is what instigates a person in regard to a person’s undertaking the performance of an action; that is called the injunction⁷⁴⁶.

vi. Others say – since it is too much of a burden for a single suffix such as the optative to denote the two (*śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*), sentence-meaning is nothing but the injunction. That alone is what is to be performed and also the instigator. In that regard too, there are two conflicting views: some have accepted exhortative words to be the instigator since that is how it (being the instigator) is understood from optative and like suffixes. This is also because no other thing which is to be done is understood (from the exhortative suffixes) and the view that the thing denoted by the verbal root alone is what is to be done is very weak. Thus, an injunction indeed is what is to be performed; hence it is by implication what is to be done⁷⁴⁷. By contrast, others resort to the view that since an injunction is cognised as something to be done, its being the instigator is understood through implication. A duty when understood enjoins a person for the sake of its own accomplishment. When a person understands ‘this is my duty’, he undertakes the action in order to accomplish it.

vii. Still others describe a new [candidate for] sentence-meaning called exertion.

Hence, the disagreements are manifold. Therefore, what is the reality in this regard [is what is undertaken for investigation].

अत्रैके तावदाहुः – वाक्यार्थो नाम पारमार्थिको बहिर्नास्त्येव। स हि पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो वा स्यात्? अव्यतिरिक्तो वा? न व्यतिरिक्तो भेदानुपलम्भात्। गौः शुक्लाऽऽनीयताम् इत्यत्र पदग्रामे जातिगुणक्रियादिपदार्थव्यतिरेकेण कोऽसौ वाक्यार्थः? स न दर्शयितुं शक्यते। अव्यतिरेके तु पदार्था एक

⁷⁴⁶ When the word *vidhi* is used in the general sense of an exhortative statement, I translate it as ‘injunction’. But when it is used in the specific sense of a statement which prescribes something, I translate it as ‘prescription’, which should be contrasted with ‘*niṣedha*’ or prohibition that forbids one to do some specific thing.

⁷⁴⁷ I use ‘what is to be done’ and ‘duty’ interchangeably as translations of ‘*kārya*’ and ‘*kartavya*’ throughout this thesis.

वाक्यार्थः प्रत्येकं वा स्यात्? सामस्त्येन वा? न प्रत्येकं, तथाऽनवगमात्; न हि गौरिति पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थो भवति॥

सामस्त्यं तु न तेषामस्ति। तद्धि सत्तया भवेत् प्रतीत्या वा? सत्तया न सामस्त्यमशेषपदार्थराशेरस्तीति न नियतः कश्चन वाक्यार्थोऽवधार्यते।

प्रतीत्या तु सामस्त्यमघटमानम्, युगपद्भावित्वेन ज्ञानानाम् एकपदार्थप्रतीतिसमये पदार्थान्तरप्रतीत्यसंभवात्। पदार्थप्रतीत्युपायाश्च वर्णाः। तेऽपि न युगपद्भाविनः। कुतः प्रतीतिकृतं सामस्त्यम्?

Now, in this regard, one [group of thinkers] says – there is certainly nothing called sentence-meaning that is ultimately external. Well, would it (sentence-meaning) be different from the word-meanings or non-different? It would not be different, since a distinction is not cognised. In the following collection of words – ‘bring the white cow’ – what is the sentence-meaning apart from a generic property (cowness), a quality (the white colour) and an action (bringing)? Such a one (which is distinct from these three) cannot be shown. If it (sentence-meaning) is non-different, then should the word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning, individually or collectively? Not individually, because it is not understood to be so. For, the meaning of the word ‘cow’ alone is not the sentence-meaning.

By contrast, there is no collection of them (word-meanings). [If there were a collection,] would it be by virtue of its existence or cognition? Since by virtue of existence there is no collection of endless word-meanings, no fixed sentence-meaning is ascertained. But a collection [of word-meanings] by virtue of cognition does not happen; this is due to the non-simultaneity of [the occurrence of] cognitions. It is not possible to cognise another word-meaning while one word-meaning is cognised. And the phonemes are the means of cognising word-meanings; but they too do not exist simultaneously. Hence whence should a collection be produced by cognition?

अपि च पदार्थसमुदायः किमितरेतरसंस्थो वाक्यार्थोऽन्यथा वा? न तावदन्यथा – गौरश्चः पुरुषो हस्तीत्येवमादावदर्शनात् । संसर्गस्तु दुरुपपादः। स ह्यपेक्षागर्भो भवति । न चार्थोऽर्थान्तरमाकाङ्क्षत्यचेतनत्वात् । बुद्धीनामपि क्षणिकत्वाद् अन्योन्यं नाकाङ्क्षा। न च तत्कृतः सम्बन्धः॥

Moreover, does a collection of word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning, after getting mutually connected, or otherwise? It cannot be, to begin with, be otherwise, since [sentence-meaning] is not seen in case of [expressions like] ‘cow horse man elephant’⁷⁴⁸.

⁷⁴⁸ This sentence consists of such word-meanings as do not serve the purpose of each other, without which it is not possible for them to get connected with each other. For, syntactical connection presupposes a

A connection⁷⁴⁹ is difficult to establish, for it is based on expectancy [of one word-meaning for another]. And one meaning cannot expect another meaning on account of being insentient. Cognitions [of the meanings] too being short-living cannot have mutual expectancy and hence no connection can be brought about by it (mutual expectancy of cognitions).

अत एव न संसर्गो वाक्यार्थः। न ह्यसावर्थानां ज्ञानानां वा यथोक्तनीत्याऽवकल्पते॥
व्यवच्छेदोऽप्येवमेव निराकार्यः। सोऽपि हि न ज्ञानानामुपपद्यते। तदुक्तम् –

यदि ध्रियेत गोबुद्धिः शुक्लबुद्धिजनिक्षणे।
ततोऽन्याभ्यो निवर्तेत संसृज्येताथवा तथा॥ इति

न चापेक्षायां सत्यामपि सम्बन्धः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते। यथोक्तम् –

अपेक्षणेऽपि सम्बन्धो नैव कश्चित् प्रतीयते।
कार्यकारणसंयोगसमवायादिलक्षणः॥
एकार्थवृत्तिप्रायस्तु सम्बन्धोऽतिप्रसज्यते॥ इति

अर्थानां तु कश्चिदपि भवन् सम्बन्धः शब्दैरनभिधीयमानत्वाद् असत्कल्प एव, न च भेदसंसर्गयोर्वाचकं
किञ्चित्पदमस्त्यश्रवणात्। असति च तद्वाचिनि पदे न तयोः पदार्थत्वम्। अपदार्थस्य च न वाक्यार्थत्वम्॥

श्रुतेऽपि तद्वाचिनि पदे सुतरामसङ्गतिगौः शुक्ल आनीयतां संसर्ग इति कोऽर्थः। तस्माद् बाह्यस्य
वाक्यार्थस्य सर्वप्रकारमसंभवात् पदार्थसर्गनिर्भासं ज्ञानमात्रं वाक्यार्थस्तेनैव लोकव्यवहार इति॥

For this reason indeed, sentence-meaning is not the syntactical connection, since it (syntactical connection) cannot be postulated with regard to either word-meanings or cognitions (of them) because of the reasons already stated.

Exclusion too is fit to be refuted in this manner, since that too is not established with regard to cognitions. That has been said [by Kumārila] –

“If the cognition of cow subsisted at the moment of the genesis of the cognition of white, then it could be excluded from others (cognitions) or connected with it.” (Verse nos. 20b-21a, ŚV_{vā})

hierarchical arrangement of word-meanings, where one word-meaning is the principal element, while all others are secondary to such a principal word-meaning.

⁷⁴⁹ Here connection is to be understood in the sense of syntactical connection and is used interchangeably with the latter.

And even if there were an expectancy [between either the word-meanings or their cognitions], no syntactical connection is understood. As has been said [by Kumārila] –

“Even if there is an expectancy, (still) no connection, characterised by [either of the following –] cause-effect, conjunction, inherence, etc., is understood. A connection based on the presence in the same locus suffers from over-extension.” (Verse nos. 13, 14a, ŚV_{vā})

Even if there is any connection among the word-meanings somewhere, it is fit to be taken as non-existent because of not being denoted by words. It is not the case that there exists some word that denotes the distinction and connection [of word-meanings], for, such a word is not heard. And given that there is no such word that directly conveys them (distinction and connection), they (distinction and connection) are not word-meanings. And that which is not word-meaning does not constitute sentence-meaning.

Even if a word which denotes them is heard, there will be a greater inconsistency. What is the meaning of this – ‘Bring the white cow connection’? In this way, since it is impossible to have an external sentence-meaning by all means, the meaning of a sentence can be a cognition having the appearance of the connection of word-meanings. And it is on the basis of it that linguistic usage follows in the ordinary world.

तदिदमनुपपन्नम् – बाह्यार्थस्यानन्तरमेव विस्तरेण प्रसाधितत्वात्। च संसर्गनिर्भासं ज्ञानं वाक्यार्थो भवितुमर्हति । स्थापयित्वा हि बाह्यमर्थं वाक्यार्थचिन्तां प्रक्रान्तवन्तो वयम्। अतः कोऽवसरो विज्ञानमात्रवाक्यार्थत्ववर्णनस्या॥

न च पदार्थव्यतिरिक्तो नास्ति वाक्यार्थः। इदं तावद्भवान् पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्। किं गौरिति पदाद्यादृशी प्रतिपत्तिस्तादृश्येव गौः शुक्ल आनीयताम् इति वाक्याद् उत भिन्ने एते प्रतिपत्तीति॥

तत्र तुल्यत्वं तावत्प्रतिपत्त्योरनुभवविरुद्धम्। वैलक्षण्ये तु प्रतीत्योर्विषयवैलक्षण्यमपि बलादुपनतम्, असति विषयभेदे प्रतीतिभेदानुपपत्तेः।

यश्च तदतिरिक्तो विषयः, स वाक्यार्थः। एवं केवलगुणक्रियापदोच्चारणेऽपि योजनीयम्। तदुक्तं –

यदाधिक्यं स वाक्यार्थ इति॥

संसर्गोऽपि पदानां न न प्रतीयते। न हि 'गौरश्चः पुरुषो हस्ती'त्यसंसृष्टपदार्थप्रतीतिवद् गौः शुक्ल आनीयताम् इति प्रतीतिः। यथा च संसर्गः प्रतीयते, यश्च प्रतीत्युपायस्तत्सर्वं विस्तरतो निर्णेष्यते। तस्माद् बाह्य एव वाक्यार्थः॥

This is not logical. This is because an external referent [of words] has indeed already been established. Sentence-meaning cannot be a cognition, which has the appearance of connection, for we have started deliberating upon the meaning of sentence after

establishing external objects [of cognitions]. Hence, what scope is there for describing sheer cognition to be sentence-meaning?

It is not the case that there exists no sentence-meaning apart from word-meanings. Being asked, you should explain this – is the kind of cognition that follows from [hearing] the word ‘cow’ exactly the same as the one that follows from [hearing] the sentence ‘bring the white cow’; or are they two different cognitions?

In that regard, a resemblance of the two cognitions is not attested by experience. By contrast, if there is an utter difference between the two cognitions, then an absolute difference in the contents [of the two cognitions] also is per force arrived at, since difference of cognitions cannot be justified if there is no difference of content. The content that is there in addition to it (the content of the cognition following from hearing the word ‘cow’) is what sentence-meaning is. It has been said [by Patañjali] –

“That which is the additional element is the meaning of sentence.” (MaBhā ad Aṣṭ 2.3.46)

Nor even is it the case that a connection of word-meanings is not cognised, for the cognition of ‘bring the white cow’ is not the same as the cognition of unconnected word-meanings as in ‘cow horse man elephant’. It will be elaborately ascertained as to how the connection is cognised and what it means to cognise it. Therefore, the meaning of sentence is something external indeed.

बाह्य एव भवन् न व्यवच्छेदो वाक्यार्थो, विधिरूपत्वेनावगमात्। संसर्गमन्तरेण चान्यव्यवच्छेदस्यापि दुरुपपादत्वात्। न हि शुक्लपदेनासंसृष्टो गोपदार्थः कृष्णादिभ्यो व्यावृत्त इत्यवगम्यते॥

गोशब्दात् सर्वगवीषु बुद्धिरूपसर्पन्ती पदजनिता शुक्लपदसन्निधानाद् अन्यतः कृष्णादेरपसर्पतीति व्यवच्छेदो वाक्यार्थ इति चेन् – मैवम् – तत्सम्बन्धावगमपूर्वकत्वात् तदितरव्यावृत्तेः। तत्सम्बन्धावबोधेनैव सिद्धे वाक्यस्यार्थवत्त्वे पाश्चात्त्यः कृष्णादिव्यवच्छेदावगमो यदि भवति, भवतु कामं, न त्वसौ वाक्यार्थ इति॥

Being external, sentence-meaning cannot be an exclusion, since [sentence-meaning is something that is] cognised as having a positive form. And without a connection, even exclusion of the other is not logically established; for, it is not the case that the meaning of the word ‘cow’, unconnected with the meaning of the word ‘white’, is understood as excluded from [the meaning of the words] ‘black’ and the like.

[Objection:] The cognition arising from the word ‘cow’ that applies to all (kinds of) cows, because of proximity to the word ‘white’, turns (itself) away from black etc. Hence, exclusion is the meaning of a sentence.

[Reply:] It should not be so. For, the exclusion of not-X (from X) is preceded by an understanding of the connection of X. If the exclusion of black, etc. (from X) takes place once the meaning of the sentence has been established through the understanding of the connection of X, may that well be the case, but that is not the meaning of a sentence.

तदेवं विधिरूपे बाह्ये च शब्दार्थोऽवस्थिते सति क्रियामेव केचिद्वाक्यार्थं वर्णयन्ति। अयमेषामाशयः –

पदार्थाः किल वाक्यार्थभावमायान्ति संहताः।

अपेक्षानुगुणान्योन्यव्यतिषङ्गविशेषतः॥

न च गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण संसर्गः पदार्थानामवकल्पते। न चाख्यातरहितं वाक्यं किञ्चित्प्रयोगयोग्यम्। अनुच्चारिते तस्मिन्नाकाङ्क्षाया अनिवृत्तेः। श्रोत्राकाङ्क्षानिवृत्तये च वाक्यानां लोके प्रयोगः। लोकवच्च वेदादप्यर्थोऽवसीयते। आख्याताच्च पूर्वापरीभूतः साध्यरूपोऽर्थोऽवगम्यते, न सिद्धरूपः। सिद्धसाध्यसमुच्चारणे कस्य किञ्चिन्त्रतेति चिन्तायां साध्यसिद्धये सिद्धमुपात्तमिति प्रतीयते॥

साध्यं च साध्यमानत्वात् प्रधानमवगम्यते।

तस्मात्तदेव वाक्यार्थः क्रियातो नापरं च यत्॥

क्रिया हि प्रतीयमाना स्वनिष्पत्तये साधनान्याक्षिपति, तैश्च योग्यैः संबध्यते। तानि च कानिचित् पदान्तरोपात्तानि भवन्ति। कानिचिद् वाक्यान्तरोपनीतानि। कानिचित् प्रकरणान्तरपाठलभ्यानि। कानिचिदारादुपकारकाणि। कानिचित्सन्निपत्योपकारकाणि, कानिचिदन्तिकोपनिपतितान्यपि योग्यताविरहात् परिहरति। कानिचिदतिदूरवर्तीन्यपि योग्यानि स्वसंपत्त्यर्थमाहरतीत्येवं दृष्टादृष्टोपकारकानेककारककलापसंपाद्यमानस्वरूपा क्रियैव वाक्यार्थः॥

In this way, when it has been settled that the meaning of a word is something external and having a positive form⁷⁵⁰, some describe the meaning of a sentence to be nothing but an action. This is what they mean –

Word-meanings, united on account of a specific mutual relation that is conducive to [mutual] expectancy [among word-meanings], reach the state of being sentence-meaning.

A connection of word-meanings cannot be considered without [accepting] the relation of the principal and the secondary. A sentence that is devoid of a verb is not fit for use. This is because, without uttering it (the verb), the expectancy [of the verb] does not go away. And it is for the sake of the fulfillment of the listener's expectation that sentences are used in the ordinary world. Just as in the ordinary world, so from the Vedas too, meaning is ascertained.

The meaning that is understood from a verb is sequential and has the form of something which is to be accomplished, and not the form of something which is already accomplished. When one deliberates as to which is it that depends on the other when

⁷⁵⁰ It is a pre-requisite of all realistic views of sentence-meaning differently holding sentence-meaning to be action, human activity, commandment, result, etc. that sentence-meaning should be external and have a positive form.

things that are already accomplished and things that await accomplishment are uttered together, it is ascertained that it is for accomplishing the unaccomplished that all that is already accomplished is appropriated.

That which is to be accomplished, on account of being something which is in the process of being accomplished, is understood to be the principal thing. Therefore, that alone is the meaning of a sentence and it is nothing other than action.

An action which is being understood implies factors in order for it to be accomplished, and it is with them that are fit [for accomplishing the action] that it (action) is syntactically connected. Some of them (factors) come from other words, some from other sentences; some are obtained from the reading of the context; some remotely act as assisting factors, while some, situated in proximity, act as assisting factors; some, despite being proximately situated, are given up due to their lack of semantic fitness, while some that are fit, even though remotely situated, are brought forth [by action] for the sake of its own accomplishment. In this way, it is indeed an action, that is the meaning of a sentence, which is being accomplished by a collection of factors that render visible and invisible assistance,

यजेत दद्याज्जुहुयादधीयीतेति चोदितः।

क्रियां साध्यतया वेत्ति तां च लोकोऽनुतिष्ठति॥

अधिकारिपदमपि क्रियापेक्षितकर्तृसमर्पणेन तदुपयोगितामेवावलम्बतेऽस्यां क्रियायामयं कर्ताऽनेनेयं क्रिया संपद्यत इति। तत्र च न क्रिया स्वप्राधान्यमुज्झति। न हि क्रिया कर्त्रर्था, कर्ता तु क्रियार्थः। स हि तां निवर्तयन्नुपलभ्यते। शब्दोऽपि तथैवोपदिशत्येष इदं कुर्याद् इति॥

किमर्थं पुनरसौ क्रियामनुतिष्ठतीति चेच्छब्दप्रामाण्यादेवेति ब्रूमः। शब्देन हि चोदितस्त्वयेदं कर्तव्यम् इति। स चेन्नियुक्तो नानुतिष्ठंश्चोदनामतिक्रामेत्। शास्त्रप्रत्ययाच्च क्रियामनुतिष्ठति। विरतफलाभिलाषः कर्मसंस्कारादेव परिपक्वकषायः स्तोकस्तोकप्रपंचप्रविलापनद्वारेणोत्तमाधिकारमारूढस्तत एव ज्ञातास्वादस्तमेव परमपुरुषार्थमासादयतीति दीर्घा सा कथा; तिष्ठतु। किमनया? सर्वथा क्रियाप्राधान्यात् सैव वाक्यार्थ इति। तदुक्तं द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिरिति॥

एतदुक्तं भवति – द्रव्यादीनामेव क्रियां प्रति शेषत्वमनुगम्यते, न क्रियाया अन्यशेषत्वमिति॥

‘One should sacrifice’, ‘One should make a ritual donation’, ‘One should pour oblation’, ‘One should study’ – on being thus impelled, an ordinary man understands an action as something to be accomplished and performs it.

A word denoting the eligible performer (*adhikārin*) too, by virtue of its conveying the agent expected for [the accomplishment of] an action, renders assistance to it (action) – this person is an agent in respect of this action; it is by this person that the action is accomplished. And in regard to him (the agent) the action does not give up its own primacy. For, an action is not for the sake of the agent, but the agent is for the sake of the

action. Because, he is available as an agent in so far as he accomplishes the action. Linguistic communication too instructs like that – ‘this person should do this’.

If it is asked as to why he (the agent) performs an action, we say that it is because of [understanding] the authority of linguistic communication⁷⁵¹. Given that he is enjoined by linguistic communication, which instructs him – ‘this should be done by you’ – he would transgress the prescription, if he does not do that. And it is out of his conviction [in the authority of the] sacred texts that he performs the action. He, whose desires have ceased, whose sins have been removed because of performing actions, who by slowly negating the multifarious phenomenal world process ascends the seat of supreme eligibility, experiences for that reason indeed the [non-dual nature of the self] and understands that to be the *summum bonum*. Let such a lengthy dialogue rest, of what use is it? It is because action is the primary thing everywhere, that (action) alone is the meaning of a sentence. It has been said – “Bādari [holds] substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) and purificatory acts [to be the subservient elements]” (MīSū 3.1.3).

This amounts to saying that substance, etc. follow as subordinates, because of action’s not being subservient to anything else.

अत्रोच्यते – कुत इदं क्रियायाः प्राधान्यमुपेयते? वस्तुवृत्तेन वा? शब्दप्रत्ययमहिम्ना वा?

फलस्य वस्तुतस्तावत् प्राधान्यमवगम्यते।
न सचेताः क्रियां कांचिदनुतिष्ठति निष्फलाम्॥
वेदाद्गुरुनियोगाद्वा शासनाद्वा महीभुजः।
न वै फलमपश्यन्त क्रियां विदधते जनाः॥
बालो माणवकोऽप्येषश्चपेटामात्रहानये।
मोदकाद्याप्तये वाऽपि करोति गुरुशासनम्॥

In this regard, [the following] is being said in response – why do you consider that action is the principal thing? Is it based on state of affairs, or on account of the might of [one’s] conviction in [the authority of] linguistic communication?

The result is understood to be the principal thing based on the state of affairs; [for,] a rational [person] does not perform any action which has no result. People, unaware of the result, do not indeed carry out any action, even though it (the action) is enjoined [to be performed] by the teacher, or ordered by the king. Even this dull student complies with the directive of the teacher either only to avoid getting slapped or for the sake of obtaining sweets, etc.

⁷⁵¹ As will be clear from the following lines in the main text translated above, linguistic communication is to be understood in terms of the injunctions found in the Vedic sacred texts.

अथोच्यते – न वस्तुतः प्राधान्यमिहाश्रीयतेऽपि तु शब्दतः। शब्दप्रमाणका वयम्। यच्छब्द आह, तदेवास्माकं प्रमाणम्। तद्यथा राजपुरुष इति। वस्तुवृत्ते राजा जगतामीशिता प्रधानम्, पुरुषस्तपस्वी तदिच्छानुवर्तनेन जीवति। शब्दस्तु पुरुषप्राधान्यमाचष्टे, उत्तरपदार्थप्रधानत्वात् तत्पुरुषस्येति। एवमिहापि यजेत दद्याज् जुहुयाद् इति क्रियां प्राधान्येनोपदिशति शब्दः। स्वर्गकाम इत्यपि क्रियां प्रति कर्तुरूपदेशः। वस्तुवृत्तेन तु कर्मणि क्रियमाणे कर्मस्वाभाव्यात् फलं चेद्भवति, भवतु तत्। पुरुषोऽपि प्रीयता नाम फलेन, न तु शब्दः फलोपदेशनिष्ठः। आह च 'तस्मिंस्तु कृते स्वयमेव तद्भवती'ति। स्वयमेवेति कोऽर्थः? न शब्दः फलपारतन्त्र्यं क्रियायाः प्रतिपादयतीति॥

Now it is said in response [to the above view on which the result is the primary thing] – the primacy [of action] resorted to here is not based on the state of affairs, but on account of [the authority of] linguistic communication. “We are people, for whom linguistic communication is the [only or the principal] means of knowledge. What linguistic communication says, that alone is valid for us.” (MaBhā 1.1.1). [Let us take the word] ‘the king’s employee’ for instance. In terms of state of affairs, the king, who is the ruler of the world, is the principal one; while the employee, who works hard, lives by following his (the king’s) wishes. But linguistic communication says that the employee is the principal one, because the meaning of the last component of a *tatparaṣa* type of compound word is predominant. Likewise, here too, linguistic communication teaches that the action to be the principal thing, as in ‘one should sacrifice’, ‘one should make a ritual donation’, ‘one should offer oblation’.

In case of [the phrase,] ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ too, an agent has been taught with respect to the action. If, in terms of the state of affairs, the result is achieved once the action is done by virtue of the very nature of actions, let it be so; let also the person be pleased with it the result; but linguistic communication is not about an instruction on the result. And it is said – “When that (the action) is done, it (the result) follows on its own.” (ŚāBhā 3.1.3). What is the meaning of [the expression] ‘on its own’? [It means that] linguistic communication does not communicate that action is dependent on the result.

तदेतदयुक्तम् – एवं वर्ण्यमाने स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति स्वर्गकामपदस्यान्वयो दुरुपपादः॥

ननु कर्तृपदमेतत्। कर्ता च क्रियार्थो, न कर्त्रर्था क्रियेत्युक्तम् –

न कर्तृपदं स्वर्गकाम इति, किन्त्वधिकारिपदमेतत्। न हि जात्यैव कश्चित् स्वर्गकामो नाम कुत्रचित् पुरुषोऽवगम्यते, योऽत्र कर्तृत्वेन नियुज्येत। स्वर्गे कामो यस्यासौ स्वर्गकामः, स्वर्गं वा कामयते स्वर्गकामः। उभयथाऽपि स्वर्गकामनाविशिष्टः पुरुषस्तस्मात्पदादवगम्यते। तदत्र काम्यमानः स्वर्गः कथं यागक्रियया संबध्यते? दृष्टेनादृष्टेन वोपकारेण? यदि हि चन्दनं स्वर्गः, षोडशवर्षदेशीया अङ्गनाः स्वर्गः इति चन्दनाङ्गनादिद्रव्यसामानादिकरण्यप्रयोगाद् द्रव्यवचनः स्वर्गशब्दस्तदा द्रव्याणां कर्मसंयोगे

गुणत्वेनाभिसंबन्ध इति दध्यादिवत् साधनत्वेन स्वर्ग उपकरोति क्रियायाः। कामनाऽपि द्रव्याहरणाङ्गत्वादुपकारिणी, यत् तया द्रव्यमानेतुं यतत इति दृष्टोपकारित्वम्॥

This is incorrect. On being thus described, the construal of the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ into [the injunction,] “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice” would be difficult to justify.

[Objection:] Well, this phrase denotes the agent. And that the agent is for the sake of action, and not the action for the sake of the agent, has already been said.

[Reply:] The phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ does not denote the agent, but the eligible performer (*adhikārin*). Nowhere is a certain person understood to be someone who desires *svarga* by birth such that he can be enjoined as the agent here. The phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ [may be understood as either] ‘one who has desire for *svarga*’, or ‘one who desires *svarga*’. In both ways, a person who is qualified by the desire for *svarga* is what is understood from that phrase. Hence, how would *svarga*, which is being desired, be connected with the action of sacrifice – [would it be connected] by virtue of seen assistance or unseen assistance?

If *svarga* denotes substances because of its use in apposition with substances like sandalwood, damsel as in ‘sandalwood is *svarga*’, ‘a sixteen-year-old damsel is *svarga*’, then [in accordance with the following rule –] ‘in case of a connection of substances with action, the connection takes place by virtue of [the substances being] subordinate [to the action]’ (MīSū 6.1.1), *svarga* assists the action by virtue of being a factor just like curd, etc. The desire [for *svarga*] in so far as it is subordinate to the fetching of the substance also renders assistance; for, it is because of it (the desire) that a person makes effort to fetch the substance. Thus, follows that [*svarga* and a desire for it] render seen assistance.

तच्चैतदसारम् – स्वर्गशब्दस्य द्रव्यवाचित्वाभावात्। प्रीतिवचनो ह्येष स्वर्गशब्दो, न द्रव्यवचनः। तदेव चन्दनं शीतातुरेणाऽप्रीष्मोपहतेन वा न स्वर्ग इति व्यपदिश्यते। सैवाङ्गना विरतायां सुरततृषि न स्वर्ग इत्युच्यते। तदेवमेष स्वर्गशब्दः प्रीतिं न व्यभिचरति, द्रव्यं तु व्यभिचरति। एवमद्रव्यत्वात् स्वर्गस्य न क्रियाङ्गत्वम्॥

अथापि निरतिशयसुखप्रतीत्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्तितः परिकल्पितः कनकगिरिशिखरादिर्देशः स्वर्गः; सुतरां तस्य न क्रियासाधनत्वमवकल्पते, दध्यादिवदुपादातुमशक्यत्वात्॥

अथाप्यदृष्टेनैव द्वारेण समुद्रं मनसा ध्यायेद् इतिवत् स्वर्गकामना तत्रोपकारिणी – तदपि क्लिष्टकल्पनामात्रं – प्रीतिर्हि निरतिशया स्वर्गः। प्रीतिश्चानन्यार्थत्वं युक्तम्। प्रीत्यर्थमन्यन्, नान्यार्था प्रीतिः। तस्मान्न यागाय स्वर्गोऽपि तु स्वर्गाय यागः। इत्थं च क्रियासाधनानुपदेशान् न कर्तृसमर्पकत्वेन स्वर्गकामपदं समन्वेति॥

This lacks essence, because the word *svarga* does not denote substance. For, this word *svarga* denotes pleasure and not substance. Thus, sandalwood is designated as ‘not *svarga*’

by someone who is suffering from cold, and by someone who is not afflicted by the heat of summer. That very damsel is said to be ‘not *svarga*’ once longing for sexual pleasure has ceased. Thus, this word ‘*svarga*’ does not deviate [with regard to the meaning of] bliss, but does deviate with regard to the substance. In this way, *svarga* cannot be subordinate to action on account of not being a substance.

Now, since the understanding of supreme pleasure cannot otherwise be explained, let a place imagined as having mountain with golden peak and the like be *svarga*. In that case, it (*svarga*) would not even more be a factor of action, since it cannot be seized unlike curd, etc.

Now [as for the view that] a desire for *svarga* renders assistance in that regard (sacrifice) through the unseen just like ‘one should mentally meditate on the sea’ (Cf. TāBrā 7.7.9), that too is a forced imagination only. For, *svarga* is supreme pleasure, and it is but logical that pleasure should not be for the sake of anything else. Everything else is for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure is not for the sake of anything else. Therefore, *svarga* is not for the sake of sacrifice, but rather sacrifice is for the sake of *svarga*.

In this manner, since [*svarga*] is not taught as a factor of action, the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ does not syntactically connect in terms of expressing the agent.

कथं तर्ह्यस्यान्वयः? अधिकारिवाचित्वेन ब्रूमः। कोऽयमधिकारी नाम? कर्मणः स्वामी। ईस्वरवचनो ह्यधिकृतशब्दः॥

ननु कर्तैव कर्मणः स्वामी, नान्यो – मैवं – स्वामी सन् कर्ता, न कर्ता सन् स्वामीति॥

ननु क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धव्यतिरिक्तः कोऽन्यः कर्मणः पुरुषस्य च सम्बन्धः? उच्यते – ममेदं कर्तव्यम् अहमत्र स्वामीति स्वस्वामिभावमवगत्य पाश्चात्त्यः क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धोऽवगम्यते॥

How then is this (the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’) syntactically connected? We say, by virtue of expressing the eligible performer.

Who is this eligible performer? He who owns the action. For, the word ‘eligible’ is expressive of lordship.

[Objection:] Well, it is the agent alone who owns an action, and not anyone else.

[Reply:] It should not be so. A person is an agent in so far as he is the owner, and not the owner in so far as he is the agent.

[Objection:] Well, what other relation than that of the action-action-factor can be there between the action and the person?

[Reply:] In reply it is said – it is after understanding an owner-owned relation as “This is my duty; I am the owner in this regard” that one understands the latter relation of the action-action-factors.

न न त्वयाऽपि क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धौ नापह्नूयत एव, जातिवादिनेव व्यक्तिप्रतीतिः। स तु पाश्चात्त्य इत्यत्र किं प्रमाणम्? उक्तमत्रानुपादेयविशेषणविशिष्टस्य पुंसो निर्देशादिति कारकत्वानुगुणविशेषणयोगिनो ह्यस्य कर्तृतया योग्यः संबन्धः। तद्विपर्यये त्वधिकारित्वेनेति तस्मादधिकृतस्य कर्तृत्वं, न कर्तुरधिकारः॥

इत्थं च स्वर्गकामस्याधिकृतत्वं निर्वहति। यदि हि तत्कर्म स्वर्गाय स्यात्, स्वर्गो मे भोग्यो भवेत्। कथमहं स्वर्गं प्राप्नुयाम् इत्येवं साध्यत्वेन स्वर्गमिच्छन् स्वर्गकाम इत्युच्यते। यदि च न स्वर्गसाधनं तत्कर्म, तद्विरुद्धमेवेदमापतति स्वर्गं कामयते, यागं करोतीत्यन्यदिच्छत्यन्यत् करोतीति हि स्यात्। अतः कर्मणः काम्यमानसाधनतामप्रतिपद्यमानः स्वर्गकामस्तत्र नैवाधिक्रियते; न चानधिक्रियमाणस्तत्र संबध्यते॥

तदेवमधिकृतत्वेन स्वर्गकामस्य कर्मणि संबन्धात् स्वर्गयागयोश्च साध्यसाधनभावावगममन्तरेण तस्याधिकारनिर्वाहासंभवाद् अवश्यं क्रियायाः साधनत्वं, स्वर्गस्य च साध्यत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अतश्च क्रियायाः फलं प्रति गुणभावान्न प्राधान्यम्। अप्राधान्याच्च न वाक्यार्थत्वम्। तदुक्तं – कर्माण्यपि जैमिनिः फलार्थत्वाद् इति॥

[Objection:] Well, even you cannot deny the action-action factors relation just as those who accept the referent of a word to be a generic property [cannot deny] the cognition of the individual. But what is the proof of [the contention that] it (action-action factor relation) is a latter one?

[Reply:] It has already been said in this regard that it is [so] because a person specified by an unobtainable qualifier is mentioned. For, he, when having a connection with a qualifier that is conducive to being an action-factor, is fit to be syntactically connected as an agent, but if it is the opposite, then as an eligible performer. Therefore, agency belongs to someone who is already eligible, [but] eligibility does not belong to someone who is [already] an agent.

In this way, the eligibility of one who desires *svarga* is achieved. 'If that action is for the sake of *svarga*, *svarga* should be enjoyable by me. How should I achieve *svarga*' – in this way, on account of desiring *svarga*, [the person] is called 'one desirous of *svarga*'. If that action is not a means of *svarga*, then this contradiction indeed follows – it would be [that] one desires *svarga* and performs the sacrifice – desires something else, and does something else. Hence, one desirous of *svarga*, who does not understand the action to be the means of [accomplishing] the object of one's desire, is not certainly eligible in regard to that (the action). And one who is not eligible does not syntactically connect there (the injunction).

Hence in this way since one desirous of *svarga* connects with the action by virtue of being eligible, and because without [his] understanding the means-end relationship between sacrifice and *svarga* his eligibility is not possible to be achieved, it has to be necessarily postulated that the action is the means, and *svarga* the object to be accomplished. From this, [it follows that] since the action is subordinate to the result, it (the sacrifice) is not the principal element. And on account of not being the principal element, [action is not fit to

be] the sentence-meaning. It has been said – “According to Jaimini, even actions [are subservient] since they are for the sake of the result.” (MīSū 3.1.4)

का चेयं क्रिया वाक्यार्थ इत्युच्यते? य एष यागादिर्भावार्थो धातुवाच्य उत प्रत्ययार्थः कश्चित्तदतिरिक्त इति॥

तत्र भावार्थस्य काम्यमानसाधनत्वादप्राधान्यमुक्तमेव। प्रत्ययार्थेऽपि काम्यमानभावार्थगतसाधनभावापरित्यागैर्नैव प्रतीयमानो वाक्यार्थतामेति, नान्यथेति। स चायं परेषामपि पक्षः। तस्मान्न क्रियामात्रपर्यवसायी वाक्यार्थ इति सिद्धम्॥

And what is this action which is said to be the sentence-meaning? Is it the sacrifice and the like, denoted by the verbal root, which means becoming? Or, something separate, which is the meaning of the verbal ending?

Of them, it has already been said that because of being the means to some desired end, the meaning of the verbal root is not the principal element. The mean of the verbal ending too becomes the sentence-meaning in so far as it does not abandon the meaning of the verbal root's being the means to the object of one's desire, and not otherwise. This is also the view of others. Therefore, it is established that sentence-meaning does not end up being action only.

किमिदानीं फलस्यैव वाक्यार्थत्वं प्रचक्ष्महे? तद्धि प्रधानं साध्यम्। एतदर्थो ह्यखिलः श्रमः। एतदपि नास्ति – क्रियार्थ एव तावद्वाक्यार्थत्वं कथमुत्सृष्टम्? अप्राधान्यादिति चेत् – फलेऽपि समानम्। फलमपि पुरुषार्थत्वादप्रधानम्। न हि स्वर्गः स्वतन्त्र एव सत्तां लभताम् इति यतते पुरुषः, किन्तु स्वोपभोग्यतयैव सर्वमभिलषतीत्यतस्तस्यापि तदर्थत्वान्न प्राधान्यम्। आह च फलं च पुरुषार्थत्वाद् इति॥

हन्त तर्हि पुरुष एव वाक्यार्थो भवतु। स ह्यनन्यनिष्ठः, स्वतन्त्रत्वात्। उच्यते – पुरुषोऽप्यौदुम्बरीसंभारादिषु विनियुज्यत एव। यजमानसंमितौदुम्बरी भवतीति तस्यापि तदर्थत्वम्। उक्तं च पुरुषश्च कर्मार्थत्वाद् इति॥

यद्येवं, संकटे पतिताः स्मः। न विद्मः किं विदध्महे। क्रिया हि फलार्था, फलं च पुरुषार्थं पुरुषः क्रियार्थ इति परिवर्तमाने चक्रे कस्य प्राधान्यं शिष्यः? कस्य वाक्यार्थत्वम्?

Do we now say that the result alone is what a sentence means? For, it being the principal element is fit to be accomplished. Because, it is the pre-eminent thing that is to be accomplished. It is towards this that all efforts are directed.

Even this is not the case. Why has been the (possibility of) the sentence-meaning being the meaning of the finite verb been abandoned? It is for this only that all labours are made.

[Opponent:] Why has the meaning of the verb, to begin with, been sacrificed as sentence-meaning?

[Reply:] It is because [action] is not the principal element.

[Opponent:] Then it is the same for the result too. The result too is not the principal element on account of being for the sake of man. For, it is not the case that a person makes efforts [while thinking thus –] ‘let an independent *svarga* come into existence. Rather he desires everything so that he could enjoy them. Hence, being for the sake of it (man), it (the result) is also not the principal element. And [the opponent in *MiSū*] says – “the result is for the sake of man” (*MiSū* 3.1.5).

Oh! Then let the person be the meaning of a sentence, since he does not aim at anything else because of being independent!

[Reply:] In reply it is said – even a person is enjoined indeed to acts like the cleansing the *udumbara* post, etc. as in “the *udumbara* post is of the size of the sacrificer” (*TaiSa* 6.2.10). Hence, even he (the person) is for the sake of it (the ritual action of cleansing). And it has been said – “a person is for the sake of action” (*MiSū* 3.1.6).

If it is like this, we are fallen into a critical condition; we don’t know what to assert [as the principal element]. For, an action is for the sake of the result, and the result is for the sake of man, [and] the person is for the sake of action – there being such a changing wheel [of pre-eminence], which one should we stipulate as the principal element? And what [should we ascertain to be] the sentence-meaning?

उच्यते – पुरुषस्तावन्न वाक्यार्था आख्यातवाच्यत्व एव तस्य विवदन्ते, का कथा वाक्यार्थत्वस्य? ननु कर्तारि लकार इति स्मरणात् कथं नाख्यातवाच्यः कर्ता? कोऽयं लकारो नाम? स हि वर्तमाने लङ् इति विधाय, कर्तारि शप् युष्मदि मध्यमोऽस्मद्युत्तमः शेषे प्रथमस्तिप्तस्झीति, बहुषु बहुवचनं द्वयेकयोद्विवचनैकवचने इति वाक्यान्तरैर्विभज्य विवृतः। तदेतानि कारकसंख्याविभक्तिविधायीनि सूत्राण्येकवाक्यतया व्याख्येयान्येकार्थविषयत्वात्। एको हि पचतीत्यादिः शब्दस्तैर्व्याक्रियते। तदेवमेष वाक्यार्थो भवति – कर्तुर्बहुत्वे बहुवचनं झीति। सेयं कर्तृसंख्याऽऽख्यातवाच्या भवति, न कर्तेति कुतस्तस्य वाक्यार्थत्वम्? अलं चानया शास्त्रान्तरगर्भया द्राघीयस्या कथया। पुरुषस्तावन्न वाक्यार्थः॥

In reply it is said – a person, to begin with, is not the meaning of a sentence. [For,] his being denotable by the verbal ending itself is disputed, not to speak of his being the meaning of a sentence.

[Objection:] In so far as [Pāṇini] teaches that the verbal endings denote the agent, why should not the agent be denotable by the verbal ending?

[Counter-objection:] What is this verbal ending?

[Reply to counter-objection:] Having been prescribed by [the rule,] “the *laṭ* [form of verbal ending] is prescribed with regard to the present”, it (the verbal ending) is classified and explained by other sentences as in - ‘the [conjugational sign occurring between the verbal root and the verbal ending,] *śap*, [is prescribed] with regard to the agent’, ‘the second person form [of verbal ending is prescribed] with regard to *yusmat* (the second-person

pronoun)', 'the first person form [of verbal ending is prescribed] with regard to *asmat* (the first-person pronoun)', 'the third person form [of verbal ending is prescribed] with regard to the rest', 'the [verbal endings,] *tip, tas, jhi*', 'the plural number [are prescribed] with regard to many [things]', 'the singular number and the dual number [is prescribed] with regard to two things and one thing [respectively]'. Hence, all these *sūtra*-s which prescribe the action-factor, number, case-ending have to be explained as forming a single sentence, because of having a single purpose. For, it is a single word like '*pacati*' – "he cooks" that is analysed by them (the *sūtra*-s). Hence, this is the meaning of the sentence [which is formed by these individual sentences in the form of the individual *sūtra*-s] – the verbal ending [in the third person denoting] plural number [is to be used] if there is a plurality of agents. It is this number of the agent which is denotable by the verbal ending, and not the agent. Hence how could [the agent] be that which a sentence means? Enough of this lengthy tale based on a different intellectual discipline (grammar). The person is not what a sentence means.

फलमपि न वाक्यार्थः, सिद्धासिद्धविकल्पानुपपत्तेः। सिद्धस्य तावत् फलस्याभिधानमेव नास्ति,
साध्यमानत्वेन निर्देशात्॥

साध्यमानत्वपक्षे तु साक्षात्तिसद्ध्यवेदनात्
व्यापार एव तन्निष्ठस्तरि वाक्यार्थ उच्यताम्॥
अत एव हि वाक्यार्थं भावनां प्रतिजानते।
यथोचितफलाढयां च त्रयसम्बन्धबन्धुराम्॥

Result too is not the sentence-meaning. This is because, [either of] the [two] options [of the result being] something already accomplished [and] not accomplished cannot be explained. A result already accomplished is, to begin with, not denoted at all, for, [such a result] is mentioned as something which is in the process of being accomplished.

Since it (result) is not understood as something already accomplished with regard to the view that [the result] is in the process of being accomplished, one should, then, say that it is indeed the activity which aims at it (result) that is the sentence-meaning. For that very reason *bhāvanā*, which is mixed with a proper result [and] bent due to a connection with three [expectations]⁷⁵², is asserted to be sentence-meaning.

⁷⁵² These three expectations are with regard to the result, the means of bringing about the result and the procedure. Sheer *bhāvanā* or human activity as devoid of the result, the means and the procedure is unfit to be carried out. Hence its sheer form of being a human activity is amplified as it were due to its connection with these three things, and hence *bhāvanā* is imagined to bow down under the weight of them.

केयं भावना नाम? भाव्यनिष्ठो भावकव्यापारो भावना। भाव्यं हि स्वर्गादि फलं, साध्यमानत्वात्। साध्यत्वं चास्य भवनक्रियाकर्तृत्वात्। भवनक्रियायां च कर्तृत्वम् उत्पत्तिधर्मकस्य वस्तुनो दृष्टम्; न नित्यं भूतस्य, नापि नित्यमभूतस्य। यथाऽऽह —

नित्यं न भवनं यस्य यस्य वा नित्यभूतता।

न तस्य क्रियमाणत्वं खपुष्पाकाशयोरिवा। इति

स्वर्गादिश्च काम्यरूपोऽर्थः खतत्पुष्पाभ्यां विलक्षण इति भाव्यो भवति। तन्निष्ठस्तदुत्पादकश्च पुरुषव्यापारो यः, स भावना। सा ष्यन्तेन भवतिनोच्यते। प्रकृत्यर्थस्य भवतेः कर्ता यः स्वर्गादिः, स एव ष्यन्तस्य तस्य कर्मतां प्रतिपद्यते। कर्ता त्वस्य प्रयोजकः पुरुषः। णेश्वार्थः प्रयोजकव्यापारः। पुरुषो हि भवन्तं स्वर्गादिमर्थं स्वव्यापारेण भावयति संपादयति । स तत्संपादको व्यापारो भावनेत्युच्यते॥

What is this *bhāvanā*? *Bhāvanā* is the activity of the producer which is directed towards that which is to be produced. For, results like *svarga* are things that are to be brought about because of being objects to be accomplished. Its being something to be accomplished is because of its being the agent of the action of coming into being. And an entity which has the property of coming into origin is seen to be the agent of the action of coming into being; not something which is eternally existent, nor even something eternally non-existent. As [Kumārila] says –

That which does not exist eternally or that which exists eternally, cannot be produced like the flower of the sky and the sky [respectively]. (TV 2.1.1)

And *svarga*, etc. are entities that have the nature of something fit to be desired. They are altogether different from the sky and its flower; hence they are the things fit to be brought about. That human activity which aims at them and produces them is *bhāvanā*. It (*bhāvanā*) is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ in the causative. Those *svarga*, etc. that are agents of the root verb ‘to be’, indeed are understood to be objects with regard to the causative form of it (the verb ‘to be’). The agent of this (causative form of the verb ‘to be’) is but the instigating person. And the meaning of ‘*ṇi*’ [of the Sanskrit causative suffix, *NiC*] is an activity of the instigator. For, a person brings about, that is, accomplishes, entities like *svarga*, that are fit to come into being. That activity which accomplishes it (the result) is called *bhāvanā*.

ननु व्यापारः क्रियैव, तदतिरिक्तस्य व्यापारस्यासंभवात्। क्रियावाक्यार्थपक्षश्च प्रतिक्षिप्तः। उच्यते — न क्रियामात्रं भावना। अपि तु परिदृश्यमानपूर्वापरीभूतयज्यादिभावस्वरूपातिरिक्तः पुरुषव्यापारः प्रत्ययात् प्रतीयमानो भावना। यथाऽऽह —

न सा केनचिदुत्पाद्या जनिका सा न कस्यचित्।

केवलं जननी ह्येषा जन्यस्य जनकस्य च॥ इति

क्रियाकारकादिविलक्षणैव हि सा शब्दात् प्रतीयत इत्यर्थः॥

[Objection:] Well, an activity is nothing but an action, because no activity apart from it (action) is possible, and the view of action being sentence-meaning has already been rejected.

[Reply:] Mere action is not *bhāvanā*, but rather the human activity which is understood out of the verbal ending as being separate from the nature of actions like sacrifice, etc., that have a processual nature is what is *bhāvanā*. As [Maṇḍana?] says –

It (*bhāvanā*) is not produced by anything; it does not produce anything. It is only the mother of that which is produced (the result) and that which produces it (the processual actions denoted by the verbal root).

It is understood from linguistic communication as completely different indeed from action, action-factors, etc. This is the meaning.

ननु च यजत इत्यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थो यागादिः क्रिया। प्रत्ययार्थस्तु प्रेरणारूपो विधिः, कर्तृसंख्यादिश्च; न तु धात्वभिधीयमानव्यापारव्यतिरिक्तो भावनाख्यः पुरुषव्यापारः प्रत्ययात् प्रतीयते। न हि भावनावाचिर्नी काञ्चिद्विभक्तिं स्मरति पाणिनिर्लिङादिमिव विध्यादौ। तस्मान्न भावना वाक्यार्थः। उच्यते – भावनाऽपि प्रतीयत एवाख्याताद् यदि नैपुण्येन शाब्दी प्रमितिरवमृश्यते॥

आस्तां विधिपदं तावद्धर्तमानापदेशिनः।

शब्दाद् यजत इत्यादेर्भावना न न गम्यते॥

पचति गच्छतीत्यतो यथा पाकादिर्धात्वर्थः प्रतीयते, तथा सर्वानुगतः कर्तृव्यापारोऽपि, पाकाद्युपजननापायेऽपि व्यापारप्रतीतेरनपायात्। यथा ह्यौपगवः कापटव औपमन्यव इत्युपगुप्रभृतीनामुद्धारे च निक्षेपे च प्रत्ययार्थोऽनुवर्तते तद्धितान्तेषु, तथाऽऽख्यातेष्वपि सोऽनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते॥

अपि च पचतीत्याख्यातपदस्य यदाऽर्थो व्याचिख्यासितो भवति, तदा पाकं करोतीति वाक्यं व्याख्यातारः प्रयुंजते – पचतीति कोऽर्थः? पाकं करोतीति पाकशब्देत द्वितीयान्तेन साध्यं धात्वर्थं व्याचक्षते। कर्तृव्यापारात्मकं प्रत्ययार्थं करोतीतिपदेन॥

किं च किं करोति देवदत्त इति पृष्ठास्सन्तो द्वये वक्तारो भवन्ति करोति पाकम् इति, पचतीति वा। तदिदमुभयरूपमप्युत्तरमेकार्थम् ; अन्यथा न तेन प्रष्ठा प्रत्याख्येता। तस्मात् पाकं करोतीति पदद्वयस्य योऽर्थः, स एवार्थ एकस्य पचतीति पदस्या। अत्रापि पचत्यर्थादन्यः करोत्यर्थः प्रतीयत एव। योऽसावन्यः करोत्यर्थः, सा भावना॥

[Objection:] Well, in “one should sacrifice”, the meaning of the verbal root is actions like sacrifice; what the verbal ending means is injunction which has the form of instigation, and [also] agent, number, etc. But a human activity called *bhāvanā* which is separate from actions, denoted by the verbal root, is not understood out of the verbal ending. Unlike the optative and like [suffixes taught] in regard to [meanings like] injunction, etc. Pāṇini does not teach any verbal ending which denotes *bhāvanā*. Therefore, *bhāvanā* is not the sentence-meaning.

[Reply:] In answer it is said – *bhāvanā* too is understood indeed from the verb, if linguistic knowledge is carefully reflected upon.

Let exhortative words [be set aside for a moment]; it is not that *bhāvanā* is not understood from indicative speech units (verbal endings).

Just as the meaning of the verbal roots, cooking, etc., are understood from ‘he cooks’, ‘he recites’, ‘he goes’, so also is agential activity, which is inseparably woven together in all; because even when cooking etc. are inserted or taken out, the understanding of activity is not lost. Just as with regard to [the words] ‘Aupagava’, ‘Kāpaṭava’, ‘Aupamanyava’, etc., the meaning of the [secondary suffix] persists even when [the nominal stems,] Upagu, etc. are inserted or taken out in case of [nouns] ending in secondary suffixes, likewise, in case of verbs too, that (activity, viz. *bhāvanā*) is found to be [invariably] following.

Moreover, when the meaning of the verb in ‘he cooks’ is intended to be explained, then [it is paraphrased as] “he does cooking” [where] the meaning of the verbal root, which is yet to be accomplished, is expressed by the word ‘cooking’ carrying the second case-marker, and the meaning of the verbal ending which is of the nature of agential activity [is expressed] by the word ‘does’. Furthermore, when asked, “what does Devadatta do”, there are two [forms of] answer – ‘he does cooking’, or ‘he cooks’. Despite having both the forms, this reply means one thing, otherwise the person who questions would not be convinced by them. Therefore, that which is the meaning of the two words, ‘does cooking’, is verily the meaning of the single word, ‘cooks’. There (in ‘cooks’) too, the meaning of ‘does’ as different from ‘cooks’ is indeed understood. That which is this distinct meaning of ‘does’ is what is *bhāvanā*.

आह — न कर्तृसंख्यादिव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्ययात् धात्वर्थातिरिक्तं व्यापारं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। प्रतिपद्येरंश्चेत् करोतीत्यतोऽपि शब्दात् प्रतिपद्येरन्। न च करोतीत्यत्र प्रकृतिप्रत्ययवाच्ये क्रिये विभज्य दर्शयितुं शक्येते। उच्यते — नेदं साधु बुध्यसे॥

यश्च पाकं करोतीति व्यवहारो विभागतः।

स एव समुदायेन प्रोक्तः पचतिना यथा॥

तथा कार्यं करोतीति प्रतीतिर्नास्ति लौकिकी।

प्रत्ययार्थः करोत्यर्थे पचत्यादौ तु वर्तते॥

कर्तृसंख्याप्रतीतौ च न विवादोऽस्ति कस्यचित्।

तावता निह्वः कार्यो न तु व्यापारसंविदः॥

करोतीत्यादिशब्देभ्यश्च यथा न भवितव्यविशिष्टेभ्यः तत्प्रतीतिरिष्यते, न तथा सर्वेभ्यः॥
के पुनस्ते विशिष्टाः शब्दा, ये भावनामभिदधति? उच्यते —

भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दा ये तेभ्यो गम्येत भावना।
यजेतेत्येवमादिभ्यः स एवार्थो विधीयते॥

भवन्ति केचिद् भावार्था, न कर्मशब्दा, यथा भावो भवनं भूतिरिति भवन्ति केचित् कर्मशब्दा, न भावार्था यथा श्येनैकत्रिकादयः कर्मनामधेयतया प्राक् समर्थिताः। ये तु भावार्थाः सन्तः कर्मशब्दा यजते ददाति जुहोतीत्येवमादयस्तेभ्यो भावनाख्या क्रिया गम्यते। तैरेव लिङादिविभक्त्यन्तैः सोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते यजेत दद्याज्जुहुयादिति। तदुक्तं — यज्याद्यर्थश्चातोऽवगम्यते भावयेदिति चेति इति॥

करोतिशब्दादपि केवलात् कर्तृव्यापारो न नासावगम्यते; यत्र यागादिकर्मणाऽननुरक्तेन प्रयोगयोग्यतां प्रतिपद्यत इति विशिष्टेभ्य एव यजत्यादिशब्देभ्यो भावनाख्योऽनुष्ठेयः पुरुषव्यापारः प्रतीयत इति सिद्धम्॥

[Objection:] We say, other than the agent, number, etc. [people] do not understand an activity separate from the meaning of the verbal root from the verbal ending. Had [they] understood it, [they] would understand it even from the word ‘does’. With regard to ‘does’ it is not the case that the two actions denoted [separately] by the verbal root and the verbal ending can be shown distinctly.

[Reply:] In reply we say – you do not understand it correctly.,

The usage, ‘he does cooking’, based on distinction, alone is expressed by the totality [of] ‘he cooks’; there is no like understanding in the world as ‘he does doing’. But the meaning of the verbal ending in the sense of ‘he does’ is present in ‘he cooks’, etc. No one disputes the understanding of the agent and number. But by this much, the understanding of [the] activity (*bhāvanā*) should not be denied.

Just as this (*bhāvanā*) is not to be understood from words like ‘does’, so should its understanding be accepted from qualified words, [and] not from all words.

But what are those qualified words which denote *bhāvanā*?

Those action-words which express activity, from them *bhāvanā* should be understood. That meaning indeed is expressed by ‘he sacrifices’, etc.

There are some [words] which express activity but are not action-words, like ‘*bhāva*’, ‘*bhavana*’, ‘*bhūti*’. And there are some action-words, that do not express activity, like ‘*śyena*’, ‘*ekatrika*’ which have already been established as the name of ritual actions. But those words which while expressing activity are action-words like ‘donates’, ‘offers oblation’, etc., it is from them that the activity called *bhāvanā* is understood. By means of

them ending in optative and like suffixes indeed that meaning (*bhāvanā*) is denoted – [as in] ‘he should sacrifice’, ‘he should make a sacrificial donation’, ‘he should oblate’, etc. As has been said [in ŚāBhā 2.1.1] – “And from this, the meaning [of the verbal root] *yaj-* etc. and ‘one should bring about’ are understood.” It is not that the agential activity is not understood from the sole word ‘does’ also. Having not been specified by actions like sacrifice, it (the agential activity) is not deemed fit for being performed. Hence it is established that from qualified words like ‘he sacrifices’ the human activity called *bhāvanā* which is fit for performance is understood.

क्रियाविशेष एवायं व्यापारो ज्ञातुरान्तरः।
 स्पन्दात्मकबहिर्भूतक्रियाक्षणविलक्षणः॥
 इत्येवं केचित्॥

पुरुषस्य प्रयत्नो वा भावनेत्यभिधीयते।
 औदासीन्यदशापायं पुमान् येन प्रपद्यते॥
 स यत्नो यागहोमादिक्रियानिर्वृत्तिकारणम्।
 तस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वं प्रायः सर्वोऽनुमन्यते॥
 स चायमात्मधर्मोऽपि न विभुत्वादिसन्निभः।
 साध्यरूपाभिसम्बन्धाद् धत्ते विषयतां विधेः॥
 इत्यपरे॥

This internal activity of the cogniser is a specific kind of action indeed; it is altogether different from external actions that are of the nature of movement.

– This is how some people say.

Alternatively, a human being’s effort is called *bhāvanā*, by means of which a person achieves cessation of the state of inactivity. That effort is the cause of accomplishing actions like sacrifice. That it (the human effort called *bhāvanā*) is different from that (actions like sacrifice) is almost agreed by all. Despite being a property of the self, it (the effort called *bhāvanā*) is not like [other properties of the self, such as] ubiquity, etc. Because of connection with the form of what is to be accomplished, it is the content of injunctions.

– [So] say others.

अन्ये धात्वर्थसामान्यं भावनामभ्युपागमन्।
 यागदानाद्यनुस्यूतं रूपं गोत्वादिजातिवत्॥

यथा हि शाबलेयादिष्वनुगतं च गोरूपमवभासते, व्यावृत्तं च शाबलेयादिरूपम्, एवमिहापि यागादिकर्मणामनुगतं च व्यापाररूपं प्रतिभासते परस्परविभक्तं च यागादिरूपम्। यत् तदनुगतं

व्यापाररूपं, सा भावना। यथा च शाबलेयाद्यननुरक्तं पृथक्त्वेन गोत्वं दर्शयितुमशक्यम्। तदुपरक्तत्वेन तस्य सर्वदाऽवगमात्। न चैतावता तस्य नास्तित्वम्, सुखदुःखाद्यवस्थानुगतस्येवात्मनः॥

तथा च किं करोतीत्यनवगतविशेषव्यापारसामान्यप्रश्ने सति, पचति पठतीति तद्विशेषोत्तरवचनम् अनुगुणं भवतीति। तच्च सामान्यरूपमपि न गोत्वादिवत्, क्रियात्ववद्वा सिद्धतयाऽवभासते, येन विधेरविषयः स्यात्॥

अपि च यजते दद्याज् जुहुयाद् इति सर्वत्रापरित्यक्तपूर्वापरीभूतस्वभावं तद्व्यापारसामान्यमवगम्यते। तेन विधेश्च विषयतां प्रतिपद्यते। तदिदं सकलधात्वर्थसाधारणं साध्यमानावस्थं व्यापारसामान्यं भावनेत्युच्यते। तस्मिंश्च पक्षे धातुवाच्यत्वमपि भावनाया वक्तुं शक्यते॥

पाकादिशब्देभ्यो धातौ सत्यपि तदप्रतीतेर्न धातुवाच्यत्वं भावनाया इति चेद्, भवत्यादौ तर्हि सत्यति प्रत्यये तदप्रतीतेः प्रत्ययवाच्यत्वमपि न स्यात्। तदलमनेन निर्धारणप्रयत्नेन। सर्वथा धातोर्वा प्रत्ययाद्वा भावनाऽवगम्यत इति सिद्धम्॥

Others accepted [*bhāvanā*] to be the general meaning of [all verbal roots], [whose] form, like the universal property of cowness, etc., is woven into [the specific meanings conveyed by individual verbal roots like] sacrifice, sacrificial donation, etc.

Just as an invariable form of the cow appears in [various kinds of cows like] the brindled one, etc., and [so is] the distinguishing form of a brindled cow, likewise, here too, the invariable form of activity and mutually distinguishing forms of sacrifice, etc. [appear] with regard to actions like sacrifice, etc. That which is the invariable form of activity is what is *bhāvanā*.

Just as cowness, as not qualified by [the specific property of being a] brindled cow, is not fit to be shown separately, likewise here too the sheer form of activity, not qualified by the meaning of the verbal root, *yaj-* etc., is not fit to be shown; because, it (the sheer activity called *bhāvanā*) is always understood as being qualified by them (the specific meanings of the individual verbal roots). By this much it is not non-existent, just like the self, which invariably appears through states like happiness, sorrow, etc.

Similarly, when there is a question about the specific [nature qualifying the] general [form of sheer activity] as “what does he do?”, a statement of specific answer as ‘he cooks’, ‘he recites’, is in tune [with the question]. Despite having a general form [the sheer activity called *bhāvanā*] does not appear as something already accomplished unlike the generic property of being a cow, or the general property of being an action, on which score it could not be the content of injunctions.

Moreover, that general activity is understood as that whose sequential nature has been abandoned nowhere in ‘one should sacrifice’, ‘one should make a sacrifice donation’, ‘one should oblate’. For that reason, one understands [*bhāvanā*] to be the content of injunctions.

It is this general activity which is common to the meanings of all verbal roots, which is in the state of being accomplished, that is called *bhāvanā*. On this view, *bhāvanā* can be said to be denoted even by the verbal root.

[Objection:] Since it (*bhāvanā*) is not understood from words like ‘*pāka*’ – “cooking”, even though the verbal root is present [in them], *bhāvanā* cannot be denoted by the verbal root.

[Reply:] Then, since it is not understood even when the verbal ending is present as in ‘*bhavati*’ – “he is”, it should not be denoted even by the verbal root!

Hence, enough of the effort to determine [which speech unit denotes *bhāvanā*]. It is established that by all means, *bhāvanā* is understood either from the verbal root or from the verbal ending.

सा धातोः प्रत्ययाद्वाऽपि भावनाऽवगता सती।

अपेक्षतेऽशत्रितयं किं केन कथमित्यदः॥

भावयेद् इत्यवगते नूनमपेक्षात्रयं भवति — किं भावयेत्? केन भावयेत्? कथं भावयेद्? इति॥

तत्र किमित्यपेक्षा स्वर्गकामपदेन पूर्यते — किं भावयेत्? स्वर्गम् इति॥

ननु स्वर्गकाम इति पुरुषनिर्देशोऽयं, न फलनिर्देशः। सत्यं, स्वर्गपरस्त्वयं निर्देशः। उक्तं हि निरतिशयप्रीतिवचनः स्वर्गशब्दः। प्रीतिश्च नान्यार्थेत्यप्युक्तम्। साध्यत्वेन च स्वर्गः काम्यत इति स एव हि किमित्यंशे निपतति स्वर्गं भावयेद् इति। स्वर्गं कामयते इति च व्युत्पत्तौ विस्पष्टमेव तस्य साध्यत्वम्। बहुव्रीहावपि तस्यैव साध्यत्वं विधिवृत्तपर्यालोचनयाऽवधार्यते॥

That *bhāvanā* while being understood from the verbal root or from the verbal ending expects three parts – what, by what means and how.

When it is understood that one should bring about something, three expectations unavoidably arise – ‘what should one bring about’, ‘by what means should one bring about’ and ‘how should one bring about’. Of them, the expectation for the ‘what’ is fulfilled by the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’. What should one bring about? *Svarga*.

[Objection:] Well, the phrase, ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ mentions the person, [but it] does mention the result.

[Reply:] True. But this mentioning aims at *svarga*. It has been said – “the word ‘*svarga*’ is a statement about supreme pleasure. It has also been said – “pleasure [in itself] is not for the sake of anything else”. And *svarga* is desired by virtue of its being something to be accomplished; for, it only settles down with regard to the ‘what’ portion – ‘one should bring about *svarga*’. If the derivation [of the compound word, *svargakāma*, is understood to be] ‘he desires *svarga*’, its (*svarga*’s) being the object to be accomplished is clear indeed. With regard to [the understanding of the compound as being of the] *bahuvrīhi* type too [with the resultant derivation being ‘he whose desire is with regard to *svarga*], its

(*svarga*'s) being the object to be accomplished is determined by deliberating on the way an injunction works.

एवं स्वर्गं भावयेद् इत्यवगते केन भावयेद् इत्यपेक्षायां, यागेनेति सम्बध्यते॥

ननु यागेनेति न श्रूयते, किन्तु यजेतेति। तच्चाख्यातपदं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकसमुदायरूपम्। तत्र लिङ्प्रत्ययस्य भावना वाच्येत्युक्तम्। यज् इति धातुमात्रमवशिष्टम्। तस्य कृदन्तस्य तृतीयान्तस्य यागेनेति योऽर्थः स कथमेकाकिना तेन प्रत्याख्येता उच्यते — भावना चेत् प्रत्ययार्थ इति सोढमायुष्मता, यागेनेत्यभिसम्बन्धः सोढव्य एव। यो हि तस्यां यथा सम्बद्धुं योग्यस्तमसौ तथा प्रत्येष्यति, नान्यथेति करणाकाङ्क्षापरिपूरणेन सम्बन्धयोग्यो यजिरिति तथैवैष भावनयाऽभिसम्बन्धते॥

Having understood in this way that 'one should bring about *svarga*', as regards the expectation for 'by what means should one bring about', [it is] 'by means of the sacrifice' that *bhāvanā* gets connected.

[Objection:] What is heard is not 'by means of the sacrifice', but 'one should sacrifice'. And that verb (should sacrifice) has the form of a collection of the verbal root and the verbal ending; of it, it has been said, that *bhāvanā* is expressed by the optative suffix. So, the verbal root *yaj-* only remains. How could what it (the said verbal root) means, when ending in the primary suffix and declined with the third case-marker [giving the form] 'by means of sacrifice', be demonstrated by it (the verbal root *yaj-*) alone?

[Reply:] In reply it is said – if *bhāvanā* as the meaning of the verbal ending is tolerated by the long-living one (opponent), [then *bhāvanā*'s] syntactical connection with 'by means of sacrifice' should be tolerated indeed. That which is fit to be connected with it (*bhāvanā*) in a certain way, will be demonstrated by it (*bhāvanā*) in that way, and not otherwise. Sacrifice is fit for connection by virtue of fulfilling the expectation for the instrument; hence, it is in that way (by virtue of being the instrument) only that this (sacrifice) connects with *bhāvanā*.

अप्रातिपदिकत्वाद्धि तृतीया तत्र मा स्म भूत्।

शब्दसामर्थ्यलभ्या तु नूनं कारणता यजेः॥

कस्य पुनश्शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यमेतत्? भावनावाचिन इति ब्रूमस्तृतीययैव करणत्वमभिधानीयमिति नेयं राजाज्ञा। ततस्तदवगतेस्तु तथाऽभ्युपगम्यते। एवमिहापि स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति तथाऽवगतिर्भवन्ती किमिति न मृष्यते?

आख्यातात् साध्यता या च धात्वर्थस्यावगम्यते।

द्वितीया श्रूयते तत्र किं वा तदभिधायिनी?

[Objection:] Since [the verbal root] is not a nominal stem, the third case-marker should not occur in regard to it (the verbal root).

[Reply:] But the sacrifice [denoted by the verbal root] is the instrument indeed owing to the capacity of the speech unit (exhortative suffix).

[Clarificatory question by the opponent:] But the capacity of which speech unit is this?

[Reply:] We say it is that of [those speech units] which express *bhāvanā*. This is not a royal decree that instrumentality must be denoted by the third case-marker alone.

[Objection by the opponent:] [But] since it (instrumentality) is understood from that (third case-ending), it is thus⁷⁵³ postulated.

[Reply:] Likewise, here, in “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, too why can’t you tolerate such an understanding [of instrumentality with regard to sacrifice]?

Is any second case-marker which denotes it (the patienthood of sacrifice) heard with regard to the meaning of the verbal root which is understood from the verb to be the object to be accomplished?⁷⁵⁴

नन्वेवं तर्हि धात्वर्थस्य साध्यताऽवगतेः किमित्यंशे यजिना पतितव्यम् — किं भावयेद् यागम्।
केनेत्यपेक्षिते वाक्यान्तरसमर्पितं व्रीहिभिरित्यादि सम्बध्यताम्; न पुनर्यजेः
साध्यरूपव्यापाराभिधायिप्रत्ययोपसर्जनीभूतकर्मताम् अतिप्रत्यासन्नामनारुह्य दूरवर्तिनीं
करणतामधिरोढुमर्हति उच्यते — स्यादेतदेवं, यदि हि स्वर्गकाम इति न श्रूयेत। तस्मिंस्तु श्रुते नैवं
भवितुमर्हति कुतः?

स्वर्गादिसाध्यसंबन्धादलब्ध्वा साध्यताऽन्वयम्।
यजिस्तदानुगुण्येन करणांशोऽवतिष्ठते॥

स्वर्गस्य हि काम्यमानत्वेन प्रीत्यात्मकत्वेन चानन्यार्थत्वात् साध्यतायां, योग्यत्वात् किमित्यंशोपनिपाते
सिद्धे तत्रालब्धनिवेशो यजिस्तदपेक्षितां करणतामेव योग्यत्वादवलम्बते॥

सामानाधिकरण्यं च ज्योतिष्टोमादिभिः पदैः।
एवं सत्युपपद्येत करणत्वानुवादिभिः॥

कर्मनामधेयत्वं च ज्योतिष्टोमादीनां शब्दानामुक्तम्॥

[Objection:] Well, in this way, then, since the meaning of the verbal root is understood to be the object to be accomplished, sacrifice should fall into the ‘what’ part. ‘What should

⁷⁵³ It is postulated that instrumentality is conveyed by the third case-ending.

⁷⁵⁴ This is a counter-argument advanced by the Bhāṭṭa.

one bring about? Sacrifice'. As for the expectation, 'by what means', let [the word] 'by means of rices', etc. syntactically connect [as the instrument of *bhāvanā*]. But the sacrifice cannot take up the distantly situated role of being the instrument at the expense of the extremely proximate role of being the patient, which is subordinate to the verbal ending expressing the activity having the form of something to be brought about.

[Reply:] In reply it is said – it would be so if the [the phrase] 'one desirous of *svarga*' were not heard. Given that it is heard, it cannot be so.

[Clarificatory question by the opponent:] Why?

[Reply:] Because *svarga* is connected by virtue of being the object to be accomplished, following that (*svarga*'s patienthood) sacrifice, which could not obtain the syntactical connection in terms of the object to be accomplished, settles down in the instrument part.

[*Svarga*] is the object which is being desired, and also it is of the nature of pleasure [itself], due to which it is not for the sake of anything else. For this reason, *svarga*'s settling down in the 'what' part is established on account of its semantic fitness in regard to being the object to be accomplished. Having [thus] not gained entry [into the 'what' part], the sacrifice becomes the instrument awaited by it (*svarga*) [for its accomplishment] by virtue of semantic fitness.

If it is like this, [then sacrifice's] apposition with words like Jyotiṣṭoma, etc. that reiterate the instrumentality [of the sacrifice] is logically explained.

It has already been said that words like Jyotiṣṭoma, etc. denote the names of ritual actions.

ननु साध्यत्वपक्षसाक्षितामपि कर्मनामधेयानि भजन्तेऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति। नैष दोषः — साध्य एव भवन् भावार्थः साधनतामवलम्बते। तत्रापि हि स्वर्गभावनायामग्निहोत्राख्यो होमः करणमेवान्यथा स्वर्गकामपदानन्वयप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्। नामधेयपदं तु कर्मतामनुवदति किञ्चित् करणताम्; अग्निहोत्रम् इत्यादि, ज्योतिष्टोमेनेति । तस्माद् यजेः करणत्वेनैवान्वय इति सिद्धम्॥

यत्तु प्रत्यासन्नत्वात् साध्यांशोपनिपातितेत्युच्यते। तदयुक्तम् — योग्यत्वाविरोधिनी प्रत्यासत्तिः संबन्धकारणम्, न तद्विपरीता। योग्यत्वं च स्वर्गस्यैव साध्यतायां, यजेश्च करणतायामित्युक्तम्॥

[Objection:] Well, there is evidence for names of ritual actions [connecting with actions] that are to be accomplished [as in] – “one should perform the oblation [called] Agnihotra” (TaiSa, 1.5.9.1).

[Reply:] This is no fault. Action, the meaning [of the verbal root], becomes the instrument [of accomplishing *svarga*] while it is the object to be accomplished [by something else⁷⁵⁵].

⁷⁵⁵ That which is the instrument of bringing about the sacrifice is neither the sacrifice itself nor *svarga*, which the sacrifice brings about.

For, with regard to that (bringing about of *svarga*) too, the ritual oblation called Agnihotra is the instrument indeed; otherwise, [as] it has already been said, there would be the undesirable consequence of non-construal of the phrase, “One who desires *svarga*” [into the injunction]. Some of the words denoting the name of the ritual actions reiterate the patienthood [as in] – ‘Agnihotra’, [while] some reiterate the instrumentality [as in] – ‘by means of the Jyotiṣṭoma’. Therefore, it is established that by virtue of being the instrument alone the sacrifice syntactically connects.

As for what you say that because of proximity [sacrifice] falls into the object part, that is incorrect. A proximity which is not at odds with semantic fitness is the basis of syntactical connection, [and] not [that proximity] which is opposite to it (semantic fitness). It has been said that the semantic fitness of *svarga* lies in its being the object to be accomplished, and that of sacrifice in being the instrument [of accomplishing *svarga*].

एवं यागेन भवयेद् इत्यवगते, कथम् इत्यपेक्षायाम् इतिकर्तव्यता तद्वाक्यपठिता, वाक्यान्तरनिवेदिता वा संबध्यते॥

तद्वाक्योपात्ता तावद् — यथैतस्यैव रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमग्निष्टोम साम कृत्वा पशुकामो ह्येतेन यजेतेति॥

वाक्यान्तरोपात्ता — व्रीहीनवहन्ति तण्डुलान् पिनष्टि समिधो यजति बहिर्यजति तनूनपातं यजतीति॥

इतिकर्तव्यता हीष्टा दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजना।
 प्रायः सर्वत्र भावार्थे कथमंशोपपादिनी॥
 दृष्टोपकारद्वारेण सम्बद्धा पेषणादिका।
 इतिकर्तव्यता ज्ञेया सन्निपत्योपकारिणी॥
 भावार्थमनुगृह्णाति या त्वदृष्टेन वर्त्मना।
 समिदाद्यामिकामाहुस्तामारादुपकारिणीम्॥
 एवमंशत्रयाश्लेषलब्धानुष्ठानयोग्यताम्।
 भावनामीदृशीं प्राप्य वृत्तिविधिनिषेधयोः॥

दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेत स्वर्गकामो ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्रानन्तरोक्तरीत्यैष वाक्यार्थो जातो — दर्शपूर्णमासेन यागेन स्वर्गं भावयेद् अनयाऽग्न्या[-ऽग्न्यन्वा-]धानादिकयेतिकर्तव्यतयेति॥

Thus having understood, ‘by means of sacrifice should one bring about’, when there is expectation for the ‘how’, the procedure mentioned in that sentence⁷⁵⁶ or presented by another sentence, syntactically connects [with *bhāvanā*]. [The procedure] which is obtained out of that sentence, to begin with, is, for example – “One desirous of cattle,

⁷⁵⁶ It refers to the sentence, the constituent words whereof have already fulfilled the expectations of *bhāvanā* for the ‘what’ and ‘by what means’ parts.

should sacrifice with this (by means of the Agniṣṭut) after doing (imposing the tune of) the *sāma* hymns called Vāravantīya pertaining to the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, on the [R̥gvedic sacred formulas called] Revatī” (TāBrā 17.7.1).

[Examples of procedure] obtained from other sentences are – “one should thresh the rice” (ĀŚS 1.19.11), “one should pound the [threshed, unhusked and winnowed] grains” (ĀŚS 1.12.7), “one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *samidh*, one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *barhi*, one should perform the [fore-sacrifice called] *tanūnapāt*” (TaiSa 2.3.1).

Procedure, which is supposed to be having either a seen or an unseen purpose, fulfills the [expectation for the] ‘how’ part with regard to the action almost everywhere. The procedure like pounding which are connected [with sacrifice, denoted by the verbal root] by means of seen assistance, are to be known as those rendering direct assistance. But [the Mīmāṃsakas] call that (procedure) like the [fore-sacrifices called] *samidh*, etc., which assists the action [denoted by the verbal root] in an unseen way, as that which assists in an indirect manner. In this way, having obtained such a *bhāvanā*, which has become fit to be performed on obtaining a connection with the three parts, prescriptions and prohibitions function.

With regard to [injunctions such as] “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice with the New and Full Moon sacrifices” (TaiSa 2.2.5), “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma” (ĀŚS 10.2.1), this is the meaning of the sentence produced in accordance with the manner described before – “Through the New and Full Moon sacrifice one should bring about *svarga* through this procedure [consisting of] ‘reinstallation of Vedic ritual fire’⁷⁵⁷, etc.

किमर्थं पुनविधिराश्रीयते? वर्तमानापदेशिष्वप्याख्यातेषु — भावना प्रतीयत इति दर्शितवान् भवान्। अतः किं विधिना? तस्य ह्याश्रयणं स्वर्गयागयोः साध्यसाधनभावबोधनाय; प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसिद्धये वा? साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धस्तावदाकाङ्क्षासन्निधियोग्यतापर्यालोचनयावर्तमानापदेशिनोऽप्याख्याताद् भावनावगमे सति भवत्येवान्तरेणापि विधिम्॥

प्रवृत्तिरपि पुरुषेच्छानिबन्धना स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वे, यागस्य साधनत्वेऽवधारिते, यः स्वर्गमिच्छेत् स तत्सिद्धये प्रवर्तेतैवा यस्तु नेच्छेत् तस्य विधिरपि किं कुर्यात्? न ह्यप्रवर्तमानस्य पुंसः विधिर्गले पाशं निदधाती रज्ज्वा वा बाहू बध्नाति। निषेधाधिकारेऽपि सुरापानब्राह्मणहननादेः प्रत्यवायसाधनत्वावधारणात् तत्परिजिहीर्षया निवृत्तिर्भवति, न विधितः। यस्तु प्रत्यवायान्न बिभेति,

⁷⁵⁷ Although the Mysore text mentions ‘*agnyādhāna*’, I have preferred the reading, ‘*agnyanvādhāna*’ from the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-I}, 340), because *agnyādhāna* which means installation of the Vedic ritual fire by the householder for the first time does not take place within the New and Full Moon Sacrifices. Rather, there is a reinstallation of the ritual fire from the Gārhapatya fire, which is known as ‘*anvādhāna*’. For details, see Chattopadhyay (2017:18).

स विधावपि श्रुते न निवर्तत एवेति। तस्मात् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योर्न कारणं विधिरिति तदर्थमपि तदाश्रयणमसांप्रतम्॥

[Opponent:] But why are injunctions⁷⁵⁸ resorted to? You, sir, have already shown that *bhāvanā* is understood even from indicative verbs. Hence, what is the purpose of the injunction? Is it resorted to for communicating the means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga*, or for securing undertaking of or abstinence from actions? The means-end relation, to begin with, occurs, even without the injunction, through reflection on semantic expectancy, syntactic proximity and semantic fitness, once *bhāvanā* has been understood even from indicative verbs.

Undertaking of activity in human beings [is seen to be] based on desire. Once *svarga* has been understood as the thing to be accomplished, and sacrifice the means, he who would desire *svarga*, would indeed undertake the action for accomplishing it (*svarga*). But he who would not desire, what could even the injunction do to him? For, the injunction does not put a cord around the neck of the person who does not undertake the action or tie [his] arms with ropes. With regard to prohibitions too, because of understanding drinking of liquor, killing of brāhmaṇas, etc. to be the means to incur religious demerit, a person abstains [from doing the prohibited act] with a view to avoiding it (incurring religious demerit). Hence, an injunction is not the cause of undertaking of and abstinence from actions, due to which, resorting to it (injunction) even for that purpose (securing undertaking of and abstinence from action) is incorrect.

कश्चायं विधिर्नामित्येतदपि न विद्मः। ननु चाहुः —

विधेर्लक्षणमेतावदप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तनम्।

अतिप्रसङ्गदोषेण नाज्ञातज्ञापनं विधिः॥

बाढं श्रुतोऽयं श्लोकः। किन्तु कोऽसावप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तक इति न जानीमः; प्रवर्तकस्वरूपे हि संशेरेते प्रावादुका इति॥

We do not even know what this thing called ‘injunction’ is.

[Proponent:] Well, [those who uphold the need to resort to injunctions] say —

The definition of injunction is this much that it is the means of instigating someone who has not already undertaken [the action in regard to which he is instigated]; owing to over-extension an injunction is not that which communicates something hitherto unknown.

⁷⁵⁸ Since injunctions are formally identified as such on the basis of the presence of exhortative verb-forms in them, the whole discussion that follows pertains as much to the injunctive statement as a whole as to the exhortative suffix.

[Opponent:] Fine! This verse is already known [to us]. But we do not know what that is which instigates a person who has not already undertaken [the prescribed action]. For, opponents doubt the nature of the instigator.

किं लिङादिः शब्द एव प्रवर्तकस्तद्व्यपारो वा, तदर्थो वा नियोगः, फलं वा स्वर्गादिः, श्रेयस्साधनत्वं वा, रागादिर्वा? प्रवर्तकस्वरूपानवधारणाद्विधेरप्यनवधारणमिति॥

यत्तावदुक्तं किं विध्याश्रयणेनेति — तत्रोच्यते —

यदयं साधनत्वेन यजेरभिहितोऽन्वयः।

स्वर्गस्य च फलत्वेन स एव महिमा विधेः॥

विधिवचनमन्तरेण हि स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति पुरुषलक्षणार्थस्वर्गकामशब्दः शुक्लो होतेतिवत् स्यात्। तदा चैकपदोपादानलक्षणप्रत्यासत्तिसम्बन्धनिसर्गघटितपूर्वापरीभूतस्वभावधात्वर्थसाध्यतातिक्रमेण दूरात् स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वम् अन्यत्रोपसर्जनीभूतस्य कथं कल्पयितुं शक्यते? तस्मादेष विशिष्टः साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धो विधिप्रसादलभ्य एव भवति, नान्यथेति विधिराश्रयणीयः॥

Are optative and like suffixes the instigator, or their activity, or what they convey, that is, commandment, or results like *svarga*, or the means to the desired end, or passion, etc.? Because the nature of the instigator has not been determined, there can be no determination of the injunction too.

[Proponent:] In reply to what has been said in the first place, namely, ‘what is the purpose of resorting to injunctions’, it is said –

The construal of the sacrifice as the means and of *svarga* as the result, which has been said, is [due to] the might of the injunction.

For, without an injunctive statement, the phrase ‘one desirous of *svarga*’, which is for the sake of defining the person, in “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, would be like “the white priest”⁷⁵⁹ (ŚāṅBrā, 25.10). And in that case, how could one, having stepped stepping over [the claim to be the] object to be accomplished, of the meaning of the verbal root, postulate *svarga*, which is subordinate [on account of being the qualifier] to something else (desire), even from a distance, as the object to be accomplished? [This is because the meaning of the verbal root] has an intrinsically processual nature, [and it is more proximately available than *svarga*] through the relation of contiguity characterised by its obtainment from the same word (verb)⁷⁶⁰? Therefore, this specific means-end

⁷⁵⁹ It would merely be descriptive and thus the injunction, without the presence of the exhortative suffix, would not instigate the *svarga*-desiring person to undertake the prescribed action of sacrifice.

⁷⁶⁰ Since the meaning of the verbal root, which is by nature processual, is obtained from a part, viz. the verbal root, of the same verb, the ending of which indicates *bhāvanā*, it has naturally a greater claim to be the object to be accomplished by such *bhāvanā*.

relation [where *svarga* is the end to be accomplished and sacrifice its means] is obtained only through the grace of the injunction, [and] not otherwise.

कथं पुनर्विधिर्ममुं साध्यसाधनभावं बोधयति? इत्थं बोधयति — स हि सप्रत्ययप्रवर्तकस्वभावः। न चापुरुषार्थरूपे व्यापारे पुरुषः प्रयत्नशतप्रेर्यमाणोऽपि सप्रत्ययः प्रवर्तते। प्रवर्तमानेऽपि पुंसि प्रवर्तकत्वाख्यनिजस्वरूपसंकोचमाशङ्कमानो विधिः पुरुषार्थस्वभावं स्वर्गं साध्यतया व्यवस्थापयति, यागं चास्य साधनतयेति। एवं ह्यवबोधयतोऽस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं निर्वहति॥

[Opponent:] But how does the injunction communicate that means-end relation?

[Proponent:] It communicates in the following way. It has the nature of being the instigator of a rational person. It is not the case that with regard to an activity which does not lead to a desired human end, a person, even on being impelled by hundreds of efforts, will undertake [the said action]. Even if the person undertakes [the action], the injunction, being afraid of the contraction of its own nature called instigator, fixes *svarga*, which is by nature a desired human end, to be the object to be accomplished, and the sacrifice as its means. In this way, by communicating [the specific means-end relation between sacrifice and *svarga*], it succeeds as an instigator.

यत्तु दर्शितेऽपि स्वर्गादौ फले न प्रवर्तते चेत्पुरुषः किं विधिः कुर्यादिति — तदप्युक्तम् — न हि वाय्वादिवत् पुरुषस्य प्रवर्तको विधिः। वाय्वादिः खलु सप्रत्ययमपि तदितरमपि प्रवर्तयति। विधिस्तु सप्रत्ययस्यैव प्रवर्तकः। सप्रत्ययस्य चैतावत् प्रवर्तनं, यत् प्रवर्तितोऽहमिति ज्ञानजननम्। न च फलमदर्शयता विधिना सप्रत्ययस्येदृशं ज्ञानं जनयितुं शक्यम्। फले तु दर्शिते सति तदस्य ज्ञानं जनितमेव। अनेन जनितं चेज् ज्ञानं प्रमाणवृत्तेन प्रवर्तित एवासौ विधिना पुरुषः। आलस्यादिनाऽनर्थित्वेन वा बहिःप्रवृत्तिपर्यन्ततया चेन्न प्रवर्तेत — मा प्रवर्तिष्ट। विधिना तु स्वकर्तव्यं कृतम्, प्रवर्तितोऽहमिति ज्ञानजननात्। अन्यो हि प्रवर्तनावगमोऽन्यश्च बाह्यो व्यापारः॥

As [for the objection that] what should injunction do to that person, who might not undertake the action, even when results like *svarga* are communicated [to him], it is not logical. For, an injunction does not instigate a person like wind, etc. Wind, etc. indeed pushes rational human beings, and even those who are not⁷⁶¹. But an injunction instigates a rational person only. The instigation of a rational person consists in this much that [the injunction produces in such a person] the knowledge⁷⁶², “I am instigated”. Without communicating the result, the injunction is unable to produce such a knowledge in a rational person. But once the result has been communicated, such a knowledge of his (a

⁷⁶¹ This is because the wind does not expect any knowledge of its instigating one to a desired end on the part of the person or thing it physically pushes.

⁷⁶² Although I generally translate *jñāna* as cognition, but since the cognition referred to here is of a veridical nature, I have translated it as knowledge.

rational person) has indeed been generated. The person is instigated indeed by the injunction, provided that this knowledge has been produced by the function of the instrument of knowledge⁷⁶³. If [the person] would not undertake the action up to external activity, on account of either laziness or because of not being a seeker [of the mentioned result], let him not undertake it. But because of producing [in him] the knowledge, “I am instigated”, the injunction has carried out its task. For, understanding of instigation is one thing, and external activity another thing.

एवं विधिवशादेव साध्यसाधनभावधीः ।

सा हि प्रथमनिर्वृत्तप्रेरणाज्ञानपूर्विका॥

यजेतेति प्रेरणा प्रतीयमाना साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धमनवबोधयति विधौ न निर्वहतीति तत्कृतस्तदबोध उच्यते। निषेधे च न हन्याद् इति निषेध्यमानस्य भावार्थस्यानर्थतामनवबोधयन् विधिर्न रागतः प्रवर्तमानं पुमांसं निरोद्धमुत्सहत इति विधेयवन्निषेध्येऽपि तस्यैव व्यापार इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयो विधिः॥

यश्चैष पर्यनुयोगः — किमर्थं विधिराश्रित इति — स तु खलु सरलमतिकृत इव लक्ष्यते। न हि वयमद्यकृतविधिमाश्रयेमो, जहीमो वा। प्रतिपत्तारो हि वयं वेदस्य, न कर्तारः। तत्र च सविधिकानि यजेत स्वर्गकाम इति प्रभृतीनि श्रूयन्ते। तेषां मीमांस्यमानोऽर्थ ईदृगवतिष्ठते। स्वर्गः साध्यो यागः साधनमिति । स चायं विधिसामर्थ्यलभ्य इति युक्तं विधेराश्रयणम्॥

In this way, it is indeed on account of the might of the injunction that [there arises] the cognition of the means-end relation, for, that (cognition of the means-end relation) presupposes the knowledge of impelling which is first obtained.

The impelling that is being understood in “one should sacrifice” is not completed, in case the injunction does not communicate the means-end relation. Hence the understanding [by the person instigated] of it (means-end relation) is said to be produced by it (the injunction). In case of a prohibition, “one should not kill”, an injunction⁷⁶⁴, without communicating the malefic nature of the meaning of the verbal root which is being prohibited, does not have the capacity to stop the person, who has, out of passion, already undertaken [the action which is being prohibited by the injunction]. Hence, an injunction functions with regard to that which is fit to be prohibited in the same way as it does regarding that which is fit to be prescribed. Therefore, an injunction must necessarily be resorted to.

As for the complaint – “why should an injunction be resorted to?” – it appears as if it were made by a simpleton. For, we do not resort to or reject injunctions of recent origin. For we understand the Veda, [but] do not compose it. Statements containing injunctions like “one

⁷⁶³ Here by instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is meant the exhortative suffix and as a matter of that the injunction itself.

⁷⁶⁴ This injunction is to be understood as a prohibitory injunction and not a prescription.

desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, etc. are heard. And upon examination, such a meaning of them settles down – *svarga* is that which is to be accomplished, and sacrifice is the means. And that (meaning) is obtainable through the capacity of the injunction. Hence, resorting to injunctions is logical.

यत्तु प्रवर्तकस्वरूपानिश्चयाद्विधेरनिश्चय इति — तत्राप्युच्यते — फलं तावन्न प्रवर्तकं, सिद्ध्यसिद्धिविकल्पानुपपत्तेः। सिद्धस्य फलस्याप्रवर्तकत्वं सिद्धत्वादेव। न हि यद्यस्यास्ति, स तदर्थं यतते। नाप्यसिद्धस्य खरविषाणप्रख्यस्य फलस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं युक्तम्, अदृष्टत्वात्॥

अथ कामनाविषयीकृतं फलं प्रवर्तकमिष्यते — सेयं कामनैव प्रवर्तिका भवति, न फलम्। तस्माद्वागादिः प्रवर्तक इत्याहुः॥

It was said that since the nature of the instigator is not determined, the injunction is not determined. In reply to that too we say – the result is not the instigator in the first place because the options regarding [the result’s being the instigator on account of either being something] already accomplished [or] not accomplished cannot be logically explained. The result is not an instigator on account of precisely being something which is already accomplished. For, one makes efforts with regard to something which he does not have. Nor even is it correct that an unaccomplished results like the hare’s horn should instigate, because [such a non-existent result] has not [ever] been seen [to have been sought for by anyone].

[Opponent1:] Now, a result which has been made the object of one’s desire, is accepted to be instigator.

[Proponent:] This desire alone is the instigator [then], not the result.

[Opponent2:] Therefore, [the opponent] says – passion, etc. are the instigator.

एतदपि न पेशलम्। उपजातप्रवृद्धतररागस्यापि काम्यमनोपायपरिच्छेदमन्तरेण प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हि स्वर्गकामः सांग्रहिणीमनुतिष्ठति। तद्वरं श्रेयस्साधनत्वं प्रवर्तकम्। लोकेऽपि चैवमेव व्यवहारो दृश्यते। हरीतक्यादीनामारोग्यसाधनतां वैद्याचार्यचोदनातोऽवगत्य तदुपयोगादावातुरजनः प्रवर्तते। तृप्तिसाधनतामोदनस्य मन्यमानस्तद्भक्षणाय बुभुक्षितः प्रवर्तत इति श्रेयस्साधनत्वमेव प्रवर्तकम्॥

[Proponent:] This too is not [a] charming [solution]. Even for one, whose desires have been produced and are mature, it is not possible to act without ascertaining what the means to his desired end is. For, it is not the case that he, who desires *svarga*, performs the *sāṃgrahaṇī* sacrifice⁷⁶⁵.

[Opponent3:] Therefore, it is rather better that the means to desired end should be what instigates. In the world too, human transaction is seen to be like this. Upon knowing from

⁷⁶⁵ The *sāṃgrahaṇī* sacrifice is performed with a view to obtaining villages.

the doctor's prescription that the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree is the means to regaining health, sick people undertake the application of it (the prescribed medicine). Considering boiled rice to be the means to satiate hunger a hungry person undertakes the eating of it (boiled rice). Hence the means to a desired end alone is the instigator.

एतदपि न चतुरस्रम् — श्रेयस्साधनत्वं ह्यनवगतमवगतं वा प्रवर्तकं भवेत्? नानवगतम्, अव्युत्पन्नस्य प्रवृत्तेरदर्शनात्। यो हि हरीतकीनामारोग्यहेतुतां न कुतश्चिदधिगतवान्, नासौ तदर्थ्यपि तामुपयुङ्क्ते। तस्मात् तद्बोधहेतुः प्रवर्तकः। स च दृष्टे विषयेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकादेरपि संभवति, किं तेन? अदृष्टे तु विषये श्रेयस्साधनाधिगमः शब्दैकनिबन्धन इति तदधिगमोपायः शब्द एव प्रवर्तकः। अत एव शब्दोऽपि न स्वरूपमात्रेण प्रवर्तको वाय्वादितुल्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। यदि हि पवन इव, पिशाच इव, कुनूप इव शब्दः प्रवर्तको भवेद्, अनवगतशब्दार्थसम्बन्धोऽपि श्रवणपरवशः प्रवर्तेत, न चैवमस्ति। तस्मादर्थप्रतीतिमुपजनयतः शब्दस्य प्रवर्तकत्वम्॥

[Proponent:] This view too is not correct. Should the means to a desired end be the instigator on having been known or not known [to be so]? It cannot be [the instigator] when it is unknown, because a person without a knowledge [of what the means to his desired end is] is not seen to act. For, he who has not known from any source that fruits of the yellow myrobalan tree are means to regaining health, does not [undertake to] apply it (the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree) even though he seeks it. Therefore, the cause of understanding it (the means to a desired end) [should be] the instigator. In case of seen objects that (cause of knowing) is possible [to be obtained] even from concomitant presence and concomitant absence.

[Opponent3:] So what?

[Proponent:] But in case of unseen objects, an understanding of the means to a desired end is based solely on linguistic communication [of the sacred texts]. Hence, linguistic communication alone, in so far as it is the means to know it (the means to an unseen end), is the instigator. For this reason, linguistic communication too is not an instigator by virtue of its sheer nature, for [in that case,] there would be the undesirable consequence of [linguistic communication becoming] similar to wind, etc. [in respect of instigating people]. For, if linguistic communicator were to be an instigator like the wind, like an evil spirit, like a bad king, then even a person, who has not learned the relation between words and [their respective] meanings, would undertake an action influenced by hearing [the words]. But it is not so. Therefore, linguistic communication, can instigate in so far as it produces the cognition of the meaning [of what words convey].

न च नाम पदप्रतीतौ वर्तमानापदेशकाख्यातात्पदार्थप्रतीतौ च सत्यां सप्रत्ययोऽप्रवर्तमानः कश्चिद् दृश्यत इति लिङादिरेव शब्दः प्रवर्तकाभिधानद्वारेण प्रवर्तको भवितुमर्हति। शब्दस्य च ज्ञापकत्वाच्चक्षुरादिकारकवैलक्षण्ये सत्यपि प्रतीतिजन्मनि करणत्वमपरिहार्यम्। करणं च कारकं च न निर्व्यापारं स्वकार्यनिर्वृत्तिक्षममिति व्यापारस्तस्यावश्यंभावी। लिङादेश्च शब्दस्य न प्रतीतिजन्ममात्रे व्यापारः,

किन्तु पुरुषप्रवृत्तावपि, तथाऽवगमात् लिङाऽर्थावगमे सति प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यत इति तत्रापि लिङव्यापारः प्रभवति। स चायं लिङादिव्यापारः शब्दभावनानामधेयो विधिरित्युच्यते। स एव प्रवर्तकः॥

[Objection:] But even after a word is cognised and word-meaning is cognised from an indicative verbal ending, a rational person is not seen to undertake the action.

[Proponent:] Hence it is the optative and like suffixes which can be the instigator by way of denoting instigation. Since linguistic communication is a communicator, its being the instrument in regard to the genesis of [linguistic] cognition is indispensable, despite the fact that [linguistic communication] is altogether different from the action-factors like the eye, etc.⁷⁶⁶ An instrument is an action-factor, and [an action-factor] is unable to accomplish its own task without an intermediate operation; hence, an intermediate operation is absolutely necessary for it (any instrument)⁷⁶⁷. But the intermediate operation of optative and like suffixes is not there merely with regard to the genesis of a cognition [of having been instigated], but also in regard to undertaking [of action] by a human being; this is because it is so understood. Once the meaning which has been conveyed by the optative suffix has been understood, one is seen to undertake the action. Therefore, the intermediate operation of the optative suffix occurs even in that regard (undertaking of action). And that intermediate operation of optative and like suffixes, named ‘*śabdabhāvanā*’, is called injunction. That alone is the instigator.

इह हि लिङादियुक्तेषु वाक्येषु द्वे भावने प्रतीयेते – शब्दभावनाऽर्थभावना चेति॥ तत्रार्थभावना तावद्भात्वर्थातिरिक्तप्रयोजकव्यापारात्मिका दर्शितैवा यो भवनक्रियाकर्तृविषयः प्रयोजकव्यापारः पुरुषस्थो, यत्र भवनक्रियायाः कर्ता स्वर्गादिः कर्मतामापद्यते, सोऽर्थभावनाशब्देनोच्यते। व्याख्यातश्चासौ॥

“In regard to sentences having optative and like suffixes two types of *bhāvanā* are understood – *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*.” Of them, *arthabhāvanā*, to begin with, has already been shown to be of the nature of the activity of the instigator, which is separate from the meaning of the verbal root. That activity of the instigator is referred to by the word *arthabhāvanā*, which resides in a person; whose content is the agent of the action of coming into being; [and] in regard to which *svarga*, etc., the agents of the act of coming into being, are the objects. And that has been explained.

⁷⁶⁶ Although linguistic communication is totally different from the action-factors like eye, etc. because the former is a communicator (*jñāpaka*) and the latter action-factor (*kāraka*), yet just as ocular sense-organ is an instrument in regard to ocular perception, linguistic communication too is the instrument with regard to linguistic cognition.

⁷⁶⁷ Since linguistic communication too is an instrument in regard to the genesis of linguistic communication, it too stands unavoidably in need of an intermediary operation (*vyāpāra*).

यस्तु शब्दगतः प्रयोजकव्यापारो, यत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्तिः साध्यतां प्रतिपद्यते, सा शब्दभावना। तथा ह्युक्तम्

—

अभिधां भावनामाहुरन्यामेव लिङादय इति॥

लिङन्तशब्दश्रवणे हि यथा यज्याद्यवच्छिन्नं स्वव्यापारं पुरुषोऽधिगच्छति, तथा तदनुष्ठाने प्रेरितोऽहम् इत्यपि प्रतिपद्यते। तेनानुष्ठेयार्थप्रतिपादन इव प्रेरणायामपि शब्दस्य सामर्थ्याद् भावनाद्वयप्रतिपादकं लिङादियुक्तं वाक्यमिष्यते। ततः पुरुषव्यापारश्चार्थभावना, शब्दव्यापारश्च शब्दभावनाऽवगम्यते। शब्दव्यापारात्मकत्वाच्च शब्दभावना शब्देनाऽभिधीयते। अनवगता च सती न कार्याङ्गमिति शब्देन साऽभिधीयतेऽपि। तदुक्तम् अभिधत्ते करोति चेति॥

By contrast, the activity of the instigator which pertains to the exhortative suffixes [occurring in the Vedic injunctions], in regard to which the undertaking of action by a human being is understood as something to be accomplished, that is *śabdabhāvanā*. For, it has been said [by Kumārila] –

“The optative and the like suffixes express another [*bhāvanā*], *abhidhābhāvanā*.” (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1)

For, just as a person understands his own activity as specified by sacrifice and the like when he hears a verb ending in an optative suffix, he also understands at that time ‘I am impelled to carry it (the specific activity in the form of sacrifice, etc.) out’. On that ground⁷⁶⁸ since exhortative suffixes have the capacity [to denote] impelling too just as it communicates the thing to be carried out, sentences carrying optative and like [verb-forms], which express the two *bhāvanā*-s, are required. Based on that it is understood that human activity is *arthabhāvanā* and the activity of exhortative suffixes is *śabdabhāvanā*. Being an activity of the exhortative suffixes, ‘*śabdabhāvanā*’ is denoted by exhortative suffixes. Since without being understood [*śabdabhāvanā*] does not become subordinate to the task [of communication of meaning], it (*śabdabhāvanā*) is also denoted by the exhortative suffixes. As it has been said – “[the exhortative suffixes] denote and produce [*śabdabhāvanā*]”.

ननु शब्दभावनाऽपि भावनात्मकत्वादर्थभावनावदंशत्रयमेपक्षत एवेति तदस्या दर्शयितव्यम्। उच्यते – भाव्यांशे तावदस्याः पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरुपनिपतीत्युक्तमेव। पुरुषप्रेरणात्मको हि विधिः शब्दभावनेति तत्साध्या पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरेव तत्र भाव्यतां प्रतिपद्यते। करणांशे तु तस्या नियोज्यविषयसमर्पकपदव्यापारो निविशते। यथा हि यज्यादिना स्वर्गादिर्भाव्यः संपद्यत इत्यर्थभावनायामसौ तत्करणतामवलम्बते, एवमिहापि नियोज्यपुरुषप्रवृत्तिविषयाद्यवगमात् संपद्यत इति तदभिधायकशब्दव्यापारस्तत्र करणतां प्रतिपद्यते। इतिकर्तव्यतांशे त्वर्थवादपदव्यापारोऽस्या अवतिष्ठते। केवलं विधिपदश्रवणे हि सति न तथा

⁷⁶⁸ The ground spoken of here is the person’s understanding of the two things mentioned above.

प्रवर्तयितुमुत्सहन्ते श्रोतारो, यथाऽर्थवादजनितबहुप्रकारकर्मप्राशस्त्यज्ञानपरिपोषितहृदयाः सन्त इत्यर्थवादाः प्रवृत्त्यतिशयहेतवः। तेन तद्व्यापार इतिकर्तव्यतांशमस्याः पूर्यतीति॥

एवं नियोज्यव्यापारो भाव्यो, विषयादिसमर्पकपदव्यापारः करणम्, अर्थवादपदव्यापार इतिकर्तव्यतेति सेयं त्र्यंशा शब्दभावना। सैव च विधिः॥

[Objection:] Well, being of the nature of *bhāvanā*⁷⁶⁹, *śabdabhāvanā* too requires three parts. Thus it (the three parts) has to be shown with regard to this (*śabdabhāvanā*).

[Reply:] In reply it is said – it has been said, to begin with, that a human being's undertaking of action belongs to its (*śabdabhāvanā*'s) 'what is to be brought about'-portion. In so far as *śabdabhāvanā* is injunction, which is of the nature of an impeller of human beings, a human undertaking of action, which is to be accomplished by it, is understood in regard to it (*śabdabhāvanā*) to be the thing to be brought about. The activity of the speech-unit⁷⁷⁰ which expresses the scope in regard to which one is fit to be enjoined enters into its (*śabdabhāvanā*'s) portion dealing with the means. Just as *svarga*, etc. that are to be brought about are accomplished by sacrifice, etc. for which that (sacrifice, etc.) becomes its (*svarga*'s) instrument with regard to *arthabhāvanā*, similarly here (*śabdabhāvanā*) too, since the undertaking of action of the person who is fit to be enjoined is accomplished on understanding the scope, etc., the activity which expresses it (the scope) is understood to be the means. The activity of laudatory words rests in its (*śabdabhāvanā*'s) procedure portion. For, on hearing mere exhortative words, the hearers are not so much instigated, as they are when their hearts are nourished by an understanding, produced by the laudatory statements, of various kinds of excellences of ritual actions. Hence the laudatory statements are the cause of the excess of undertaking of action.

Therefore, the activity of them (laudatory words) fulfills its (*śabdabhāvanā*'s) [expectancy for] procedure part. In this way, the activity of the person to be enjoined is the object to be brought about, the activity of speech-units expressing scope, etc. is the instrument, the activity of laudatory words is the procedure – this is how this *śabdabhāvanā* has the three parts. And it alone is an injunction.

न च विधेर्वाक्यार्थान्त्वयलक्षणो दोष आशङ्कनीय, एकप्रत्ययोपादानलक्षणया प्रत्यासत्त्या तदन्वितत्वावगमात् आहुश्च –

⁷⁶⁹ Being *bhāvanā* means being a productive activity and hence it requires the three things just like *arthabhāvanā* does – that which is to be brought about, that by means of which it is to be brought about and the procedure.

⁷⁷⁰ This ultimately refers to the exhortative suffixes.

विधिभावनयोस्त्वेकप्रत्ययग्राह्यताकृतः।
धात्वर्थात् प्रथमं तावत् संबन्धो व्यवसीयते॥ इति

विधिर्भावनायां पुरुषं नियुङ्क्ते । यथाऽऽह —

स्वव्यापारे हि पुरुषः कर्तृत्वेन नियुज्यते॥ इति

तयोः कथमन्वयः स्यात्?

It is not to be doubted that there arises the defect of non-construal of injunction (*śabdabhāvanā*) into sentence-meaning. (*bhāvanā*). Because it (*śabdabhāvanā*) is understood to be construed [into sentence-meaning] by means of contiguity characterised by being obtainable from a single verbal ending. And [Kumārila] says –

“The relation between injunction (*śabdabhāvanā*) and *bhāvanā* produced by the fact of being understood from a single⁷⁷¹ (optative and like) verbal ending is ascertained, to begin with, before [understanding both the *bhāvanā*-s’ connection with] the meaning of the verbal root.” (Verse no. 79, ŚV_{vā}).

The injunction enjoins a person to *bhāvanā*. As [Kumārila] says –

“With regard to his own activity, a person is enjoined as an agent.” (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 2.1.1)

How could there be a non-connection between them (*śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*)?

ननु च त्वयैवोक्तं धात्वर्थात् पूर्वतरं तद्भावनाया विधेश्च संबन्धोऽवगम्यते। एकपदोपादानेऽपि धात्वर्थस्तावत् प्रकृत्यंशाभिधेयः। विधिभावने तु द्वे अपि प्रत्ययांशेनाभिधीयेते इति। अतश्च स्वच्छैव भावना विधिना स्पृश्यते, न विषयाद्यनुरक्ता। स्वच्छा च न प्रयोगयोग्या भवति। यथा च फलकरणेतिकर्तव्यतांशपरिपूर्तिप्रस्थिता प्रयोगयोग्या, न तां विधिः स्पृष्टवान्। अविधिस्पृष्टेषु च धात्वर्थकारकादिषु किमिति सचेताः पुरुषः प्रवर्तेतेति। उच्यते — यद्यपि विधिरनधिगतधात्वर्थानुरागतया स्वच्छामेव भावनाम् एकाभिधानत्वात् प्रथममात्रामतिः; तथापि तादृशि तस्यां सप्रत्ययप्रवर्तनात्मकनिजस्वरूपनिर्वहणमलभमानो न तावत्येव विरमति, किन्तु परिणीतबालकन्यको वर इव तावद्विलम्बमानः प्रसारितहस्त आस्ते — यावत् सर्वाङ्गसुन्दरी प्रयोगयोग्या भावना भवति। आह च —

यद्यप्यन्यैरसंस्पृष्टां विधिः स्पृशति भावनाम्।
तथाप्यशक्तितो नासौ तन्मात्रे पर्यवस्यति॥

⁷⁷¹ Here the word ‘single’ is to be understood in the sense of ‘same’.

अनुष्ठेये हि विषये विधिः पुंसां प्रवर्तकः।
 अंशत्रयेण चापूर्णा नानुतिष्ठति भावनाम्॥
 तस्मात् प्रकान्तरूपोऽपि विधिस्तावत् प्रतीक्षते।
 यावद्योग्यत्वमापन्ना भावनाऽन्यानपेक्षिणी॥ इति

[Objection:] Well, you only have said that prior to [an understanding of the connection with] the meaning of the verbal root, the relation of *bhāvanā* [which accomplishes] it (the specific action denoted by the verbal root) and the injunction is understood. Despite being obtainable from a single speech-unit (exhortative suffix), the meaning of the verbal root is, to begin with, denoted by the root portion. Both the injunction and *bhāvanā*, by contrast, are denoted by the suffix part. Therefore, sheer *bhāvanā* is touched by the injunction, not [the *bhāvanā*] which is qualified by the scope, etc. But sheer [*bhāvanā*] is unfit for being carried out. And that [*bhāvanā*], set out by the fulfillment of the result, instrument and procedure parts, which is fit to be carried out, has not been touched by the injunction. Does a rational human being act with regard to the meaning of the verbal root, the action-factors, etc. that have not been touched by the injunction?

[Reply by the Bhāṭṭa opponent:] We say – although the injunction, on account of being denoted by a single [exhortative suffix which forms a part of the exhortative verb, and which also denotes *arthabhāvanā*] at first approaches the sheer *bhāvanā* alone, which has not yet been specified by the meaning of the verbal root; yet, since being so it (injunction) does not find that it can, in that (state), execute its own nature of being the instigator of a rational person, it does not cease [to function] with that much only. But, just like the husband, who has married a child girl, it (the injunction) sits with its hands stretched out so long as *bhāvanā* is not perfect in respect of all parts⁷⁷² [and hence] fit for being carried out [by the rational person]. And [Kumārila] says –

Although the injunction touches *bhāvanā* unmixed by others, still, it (injunction) does not cease in that much only, due to lack of capacity [to instigate a rational person]. An injunction instigates a person with regard to the scope which has to be brought about, and devoid of the three parts [a person] does not carry out the *bhāvanā*. Therefore, the injunction, which has already set out⁷⁷³, waits so long as *bhāvanā* becomes fit [to be carried out when its three requirements have been fulfilled and hence it] has no expectation for anything else.” (Verse nos. 55-57, ŚV_{vā-DDS}, pp. 275-277).

सा हि वाक्यान्तरोपात्तमप्यपेक्षते, प्रकरणान्तराधीतमपि वाञ्छति। प्रकृतिवद्भावलभ्यमपि याचते।
 अर्थसामर्थ्यगम्यं प्रमाणमपि स्पृहयतीत्येवंविध एष शब्दप्रमाणमहिमेति॥

⁷⁷² The parts of *bhāvanā* alluded to here are the three requirements of the goal to be accomplished, its means and the procedure.

⁷⁷³ This means the injunction has already been related with sheer *bhāvanā*.

स चायं व्युत्पादनक्रम ईदृशो व्याख्यातृभिरुपदिश्यते – इत्थमस्यान्वयः, इत्थमस्येति। वाक्यार्थः पुनर्भाविनात्माऽवगम्यमान एकयैव बुद्ध्याऽनेकजातिगुणद्रव्यक्रियाद्यङ्गकलापकल्माषिततनुरवगम्यते तादृश्यकैवेयं वाक्याद्वाक्यार्थबुद्धिः। यथाह –

भावनैव हि वाक्यार्थः सर्वत्राख्यातवत्तया।
 अनेकगुणजात्यादिकारकार्थानुरंजिता॥
 एकयैव च बुद्ध्याऽसौ गृह्यते चित्ररूपया।
 पदार्थाहितसंस्कारचित्रपिण्डप्रसूतया॥ इति

Such is the might of linguistic communication that it (*bhāvanā*) expects that which is obtained even from other sentences; desires something which has been mentioned in a different context; seeks also that which is obtainable through actions like the [meaning of the] verbal root; [and] longs for an instrument of knowledge which is obtainable from the capacity of an entity.

Expounders teach the steps of learning [what *bhāvanā* requires] like this – “this is constructed thus, this is [construed] thus”. But sentence-meaning which is understood as being of the nature of *bhāvanā* is understood as something whose body has been made variegated by a bundle of subsidiaries like many generic properties, qualities, substance, action, etc. by means of a single cognition indeed⁷⁷⁴. Such a sentential cognition which is single indeed is what arises from a sentence. As [Kumārila] says –

Bhāvanā alone is sentence-meaning because everywhere are [sentences] endowed with verbs. [*Bhāvanā*] is specified by meanings of action-factors like quality, generic property, etc. And it (*bhāvanā*) is grasped through a single cognition alone, which has a variegated form, [and] which is produced by a variegated collection of subliminal impressions left by the [constituent] word-meanings. (ŚV_{vā}, verses 330cd-331).

एक एवायमतिदीर्घः क्रमविकस्वरः सकलाङ्गपरिपूरितभावनातत्त्वविषयः प्रतिभासः। यथा हि स्थाल्यधिश्रयणात् प्रभृत्या निराकाङ्क्षौदननिष्पत्तेरैकेवेयं पाकक्रिया –

⁷⁷⁴ The cognition is metaphorically called ‘variegated’ (*kalmaṣita*). This is because, in a linguistic which is made up of many word-meanings, it is *bhāvanā* which features as the central element, while others connect with the former as subsidiaries. But even among the word-meanings which form subsidiaries to *bhāvanā* in a linguistic cognition, some express actions (e.g., the meaning of the verbal root), some substances (e.g. curd, rice, etc.), some qualities (e.g., colour of a substance). If separate cognitions for each of these subsidiaries were accepted, then they would not meaningfully connect with *bhāvanā*, the principal element of a linguistic cognition, and hence issues like specification of the scope, means, etc. of *bhāvanā* would not be possible. This absence specification would result in the person’s not being able to undertake the prescribed action, although he has understood that he is instigated. Moreover, if a single variegated sentential cognition is not accepted where all these subsidiaries feature as connected principally with *bhāvanā* and secondarily with each other, it would lead to sentence-splitting.

सलिलावसेकतण्डुलावपनदर्वीविघट्टनास्त्रावणाद्यनेकक्षणसमुदायस्वभावा, तथा प्रथमपदज्ञानात् प्रभृत्यानिराकाङ्क्षवाक्यार्थपरिच्छेदादेकैवेयं शाब्दी प्रमितिः । आह च —

पदात् प्रभृति या चैषा प्रज्ञा ज्ञातुर्विजृम्भते।
पुष्पिता सा पदार्थेषु वाक्यार्थेषु फलिष्यति॥

इति कृतमतिविस्तरेण॥

सोऽयं वाक्यार्थो भावनानामधेयः कर्तृव्यापारः स्वर्गयागादिरर्थो यस्तु व्यापारः प्रैषरूपो लिङादेर्वाच्यः कार्यो वा, तं विधिं सङ्गिरन्ते॥

This very long and gradually expanding cognition has for its ultimate content *bhāvanā* with [its expectations for] all the parts fulfilled. There is but one action of cooking, which starts with the placing of a cooking pan on fire, etc. [and extends] up to the accomplishment of rice, [when] it requires nothing else. [For this reason, the action of cooking] is of the nature of a collection of many [action-] moments such as bedewing, sowing unhusked rice grains, stirring by ladle, emptying water, etc. Likewise, this linguistic knowledge [extends] from the preliminary cognition [of words] up to the determination of sentence-meaning without any further expectation. And [Kumārila] says –

This knowledge of the cogniser which starts budding from the words, etc. blossoms into word-meanings and will bear fruits in [the form of] sentence-meaning. (TV ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.3.30).

Enough of excessive elaboration!

This sentence-meaning is an agential activity called *bhāvanā*; the goal is *svarga*, etc. But that which is the activity of optative and like suffixes having the form of instigation and [which] is denoted and produced [by these suffixes] is what is called the injunction.

तदेतदननुमन्यमाना अन्ये प्रचक्षते — योऽसौ शब्दभावनारख्यः शब्दव्यापारः शब्दस्य कार्योऽभिधेयश्च, तमभिदधतः कुर्वतो वा शब्दस्य व्यापारान्तरमस्ति, न वा?

यदि तावन्नास्ति, तदेष व्यापारान्तरनिरपेक्षस्वव्यापारमिवार्थमपि वदतु, विश्राम्यतु व्यापारकल्पना अस्ति चेदस्य तदभिधाने व्यापारान्तरं, तदाऽनवस्थाप्रतीकारः कश्चिदन्वेषणीयः। न चासौ दूरादपि लभ्यते। भूतपरिस्पन्दव्यतिरिक्तव्यापारनिरासश्च प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणे विस्तरेण कृत इत्यसौ मार्ग इहाप्यनुसरणीयः॥

यश्चासौ व्यापारः क्रियते चाभिधीयते च, स किं पूर्वमभिधीयते, ततः क्रियते? पूर्वं वा क्रियते, पश्चादभिधीयते? युगपदेव वा करणाभिधान इति॥

न तावत् पूर्वमभिधीयते ततः क्रियतेऽनुत्पन्नस्याभिधानानुपपत्तेः। न ह्यजाते पुत्रे नामधेयकरणम्।
अर्थासंस्पर्शी च तथा सति शब्दः स्यात्॥

अत एव न युगपदुभयम्, अनुत्पन्नत्वानपायात् प्रयत्नगौरवप्रसङ्गाच्च। नापि कृत्वाऽभिधानम्,
विरम्यव्यापारासंवेदनात्॥

Others, disapproving this [view that *bhāvanā* is the sentence-meaning] say – is there any other activity of exhortative suffixes with regard to that activity of optative and like suffixes called *śabdabhāvanā* which is produced and denoted by the exhortative suffixes? If, to begin with, there is no [additional activity], then let that [exhortative suffix] alone express the meaning, just as [the exhortative suffix expresses] its own activity [called *śabdabhāvanā*] which does not need another activity [for its expression]. Let postulation of activities rest. If there is an additional activity for its (*śabdabhāvanā*'s) denotation, then a solution for the [fault of] infinite regress should be found out. But it (solution to the problem of infinite regress) is not obtained even from a distance. And a refutation of [*bhāvanā* being] an activity distinct from physical movements has been done in a detailed manner in [the context of dealing with] the definition of instrument of knowledge in general. Hence that course has to be followed here too.

Is that activity, which is produced and denoted [by exhortative suffixes], first denoted, then produced, or first produced and denoted thereafter, or is it produced and denoted simultaneously? It is not, to begin with, first denoted and then produced; because, it is not correct that something which has not yet come into being is denoted. For, no one names his son who is not born as yet. In that case, language would not touch a real referent. For that very reason, both (denotation and production of *śabdabhāvanā*) is not [possible] simultaneously. This is because, the fact of [*śabdabhāvanā*'s having] not been produced is not still done away with⁷⁷⁵, and [also] because it leads to the undesirable consequence of excess of efforts [on the part of the exhortative suffix]. Nor even is [*śabdabhāvanā*] denoted after having been produced [by the exhortative suffix], because [no speech unit] is seen to engage into [further] activity once it has ceased [to function].

अपि चायं तपस्वी लिङादिः प्रत्ययः सत्यपि गोवृन्दारकत्वे कथममुमतिबृहन्तं भारं वक्ष्यति? कर्तारं च तत्संख्यां चाख्यास्यति? भावनामभिधास्यते? शब्दभावनां च करिष्यति? तां च वदिष्यति? इति दुर्वहोऽयं भारः॥

Moreover, how should these poor optative and like suffixes, despite being the strongest bull, bear that great load – [for how will the optative and like suffixes] denote the agent and its number, and will denote *bhāvanā*, and will produce *śabdabhāvanā* and will denote it (*śabdabhāvanā*)? Hence this load is unbearable.

⁷⁷⁵ This is because, even if *śabdabhāvanā* were produced and denoted at the same time, still the fact remains that it is not produced prior to denotation.

कश्चायं शब्दभावनानामधेयस्य विधेर्वाक्यार्थे भावनायामन्वय इति वक्तव्यम्॥

ननूक्त एव एकप्रत्ययाभिधेयत्वलक्षणः संबन्ध इति — न ब्रूम आभिधानिकः संबन्धो नोक्त इति। किन्तु पुरुषव्यापारात्मिकाया अर्थभावनायाः प्रधानत्वेन वाक्यार्थत्वात्, तदपेक्ष्यमाणफलकरणेतिकर्तव्यतांशपूरणेन स्वर्गकामादिपदान्तराभिधेयोऽर्थः समन्वेति, गुणत्वेना शब्दव्यापारस्तु तदपेक्षितमन्यतममपि नांशं पूरयितुमलमिति तत्र न गुणतामवलम्बते। न च द्वयोः प्रधानयोः घटः पट इतिवद्वा, पचति पठतीतिवद्वा संबन्ध उपलभ्यते॥

And it has to be said as to what⁷⁷⁶ is this syntactical connection of the injunction (*śabdabhāvanā*) with *bhāvanā*, the sentence-meaning.

[Reply by Bhāṭṭa:] Well, it has in fact been said that the relation [between *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*] is characterised by being the referent of a single (same) [exhortative] suffix.

[Opponent:] We don't say that a denotative relation has not been said. But because *arthabhāvanā* which is of the nature of human activity is the principal [element of a linguistic cognition], for which it is the sentence-meaning, the meanings expressed by other phrases like 'one who desires *svarga*', etc. connect [with *arthabhāvanā*] as its subordinates by way of fulfilling the need of it (*arthabhāvanā*) for the parts concerning the result, the means and the procedure. But the activity of exhortative words (*śabdabhāvanā*) is not capable of fulfilling any of the requirements of it (*arthabhāvanā*); hence [*śabdabhāvanā*] is not a subsidiary with regard to it (*arthabhāvanā*). And it is not the case that two principal elements like either "a jar, a piece of cloth", or like "he cooks, he recites" connect [with each other].

अथार्थभावना शब्दभावनाख्यविधेर्विषयसमर्पणेन गुणतामवलम्बते; विधिस्तरि वाक्यार्थः, न भावना, तस्या अप्राधान्यात्। अतो भावनाद्वयं प्रत्ययार्थ इति न हृदयंगममेतत्॥

एकाभिधानाभिधेयत्वं च न भावनयोरन्योन्यसमन्वये कारणम्; अक्षाः पादा माषा इत्यादावदर्शनात्॥

[Proposal by the Bhāṭṭa opponent:] [What] if *arthabhāvanā* becomes the subsidiary of the injunction known as *śabdabhāvanā* on account of presenting the object [to be accomplished by *śabdabhāvanā*]?

[Opponent:] The injunction would, then be the sentence-meaning, not *bhāvanā*, since it [*bhāvanā*] would not be the principal [element of a linguistic cognition]. Hence, it is not

⁷⁷⁶ What is sought here is a specification of the nature of the relation that obtains between *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā* within a linguistic cognition, where *arthabhāvanā* is the principal element. In other words, the question is ultimately about the nature of the specific role that is played by *śabdabhāvanā* in regard to *arthabhāvanā*, by virtue of which the former can connect as a subsidiary with *arthabhāvanā*.

agreeable that the meaning of the [exhortative] suffix is the two *bhāvanā*-s. Being denoted by the same exhortative suffix cannot indeed be the basis for [*śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*'s] mutual connection. Because [such connection] is not seen [among the multiple meanings of each of the following words,] *akṣa*, *pāda*, *māṣa*, etc.

किंच कस्यानुरोधेन द्वे भावने प्रत्ययवाच्ये इष्येते — उच्यते — लिङादिशब्दश्रवणे सति कार्ये च, प्रेरणायां च बुद्धिरुत्पद्यत इति॥

यद्येवं एक एव तादृशोऽसौ लिङर्थो भवतु। तदेकत्वाच्च न परस्परसमन्वयः चिन्तयिष्यते। न च प्रत्ययेऽप्यतिभार आरोपयिष्यते॥

[Opponent:] What is more, on what basis should the two *bhāvanā*-s be desired to be the meaning of the [exhortative] suffix?

[Bhāṭṭa:] On hearing exhortative suffixes, no two cognitions arise⁷⁷⁷ with regard to something that is to be done, and impelling.

[Opponent:] If it is like this, then let the meaning of the exhortative suffix be such a single thing; and on account of its (the meaning of the exhortative suffix) being one, the mutual connection [of *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*] will not have to be deliberated upon. Nor even a great load will be put on the exhortative suffix.

नन्वेकस्यापि लिङर्थस्य यदि शब्दः कार्यत्वं, प्रेरणां च ब्रवीति, ततस्तदवस्थ एवातिभारः। कश्चासावेकः कार्यात्मा, प्रेरणात्मा च तस्यार्थः? उच्यते — यो लिङादिप्रत्ययादवगम्यते, यमभिवदतो न तस्यातिभारो, यत्र न तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रमाणान्तरं क्रमते, स नियोगो नामा वाक्यार्थः। तथा हि — वृद्धव्यवहारतः शब्दानामर्थे व्युत्पत्तिरित्यत्र तावदविवाद एव। व्यवहारे च वाक्यार्थे वाक्यस्य व्युत्पत्तिर्वाक्येन सर्वत्र व्यवहारात्। तत्र यजेतेत्यादितिङन्तपदयुक्तेषु पदान्तराणामर्थस्तावदास्ताम्। आख्यातार्थे ह्यवगते तदानुगुण्येनासौ स्थास्यति। आख्यातस्य च यजेतेत्येवमादेरर्थः परीक्ष्यमाणः प्रेरणात्मक एवावतिष्ठते; यतः पदान्तरसन्निधाने सत्यपि न प्रेरणाबुद्धिरुपजायते। आख्यातपदश्रवणे च सति सा जायते। तस्मात् तस्यैव प्रेरणात्मकोऽर्थः। तत्रापि तु जुहोत्यादिधात्वन्तरोपजननापायपर्यालोचनया धातोस्तत्प्रतीतौ व्यभिचारात्, प्रत्ययस्य चाव्यभिचारात् तस्यैव सोऽर्थ इति गम्यते॥

⁷⁷⁷ I have followed the reading of the *editio princeps* (NM_{EP-1}, p. 346) here which is as follows: *na dvir utpadyate matih*. This reading makes better sense here. This is because what the Bhāṭṭa opponent wants to argue here is that two different cognitions having something to be done and impelling as their individual contents do not arise. Rather, he highlights the phenomenology of the cognition, which on account of its unitary form, accommodates both these as its content. Hence it should be held, according to the Bhāṭṭa opponent here, that it is the exhortative suffix, on hearing which such a unitary cognition arises, expresses both *śabdabhāvanā* and *arthabhāvanā*.

[Objection:] Well, if a single meaning of the exhortative suffix is conveyed by linguistic communication to be that which is to be done and that which is the impeller, then [the charge of] overload remains as it was. What is that one meaning of it (the exhortative suffix) which is of the nature of something to be done and that of an impeller?

[Reply:] In reply it is said – that which is understood out of the exhortative suffixes; that in conveying which there is no overload for it (the exhortative suffix); that in regard to which no other instrument of knowledge than it (linguistic communication) applies, is sentence-meaning which is called commandment. That is to say – there is indeed agreement on the meaning of words being learned from the usage of linguistically conditioned elders. And in regard to usage, sentence-meaning is learned from a sentence. This is because usage takes place by means of sentence everywhere. Let the [deliberations on the] meaning of other words in [sentences] having speech-units with finite verbal endings like ‘(one) should sacrifice’ (*yajeta*) be on hold. For, once the meaning of the verbal ending is understood, (the meaning of other words) will be in accordance with it (the meaning of the verbal ending). The meaning of the verbal ending as in ‘(one should) sacrifice’ which is being examined settles down as being of the nature of an impeller indeed. This is because, an awareness of instigation is not produced even when there is proximity with other words, and it arises upon hearing the [exhortative] verbal ending. Therefore, the meaning of being an impeller pertains to it (the exhortative suffix) indeed. With regard to that too, that meaning is understood as belonging to it (the exhortative suffix). This is because on considering the occurrence and departure of other verbal roots as in ‘one offers oblation’, etc. [it is found that] the understanding of it (being an impeller) deviates, and it does not deviate with regard to the suffix.

कः पुनरसावर्थः? यस्मिन् सति नियुक्तोऽहमत्रेति प्रतिपद्यते पुरुषः, सोऽसावर्थः। स एव विधिरित्युच्यते। विधौ हि लिङादिप्रत्ययं स्मरति पाणिनिर्न धात्वर्थे यागादौ, न कर्तृव्यापारे भावनायाम्। विधिश्च नाम प्रेरणात्मक एव। अत एव वर्तमानापदेशिकाख्यातजनितप्रतीतिविलक्षणेयं प्रतीतिर्यजेतेति। अत्र हि प्रैषप्रैष्ययोः संबन्धोऽवगम्यते। अन्य एवायं क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धात् प्रैषप्रैष्यसंबन्धः॥

But what is that meaning? It is that meaning, which being there a person understands, ‘I am instigated in regard to this’. That indeed is called injunction. Pāṇini teaches optative and like suffixes with regard to [the meaning of] injunction, [but] not with regard to sacrifice, etc., that are the meanings of verbal roots [and] not with regard to *bhāvanā*, the activity of the agent. An injunction is indeed of the nature of an impeller. Therefore, this understanding [ensuing from the hearing of exhortative verb-forms like] ‘one should sacrifice’ is distinct from the understanding produced by indicative verb forms. For, in this regard, one understands the relation of the instigator and the instigated. This instigator-instigated relation is indeed different from the action-action-factor relation.

ननु यजेतेति क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धोऽवगम्यते। न ब्रूमो नावगम्यत इति; किन्तु प्रैषप्रैष्यलक्षणोऽपि संबन्धः प्रथममवगम्यते। प्रेषितो हि क्रियां कर्तुमुद्यच्छतीति॥

ननु क्रियासंबन्धितयैवासौ प्रेष्यते यजतां भवान् इति। सत्यं — क्रियासंबन्धितयैव प्रेष्यते। प्रेष्यते तु सः। प्रेष्यते चेदयमन्यस्तर्हि संबन्धः। क्रियासंबन्धात्तूभयसंबन्धितामस्य राजगवीक्षीरवद् अवगमिष्यामः। यथा गौ राज्ञा च संबध्यते, क्षीरेण च — या राजसंबन्धिनी, सा क्षीरसंबन्धिनी, या क्षीरसंबन्धिनी; सा राजसंबन्धिनीति। एवमिहापि पुरुषः प्रेषितेन च संभन्स्यते, क्रियया चा यः प्रेष्यते स करोति; अथ यः करोति, प्रेष्यते स इति॥

ननु नेदमुभयं भवति — प्रेषोऽपि क्रियैवा प्रवर्तनं हि कुर्वन् प्रवर्तयतीत्युच्यते। सोऽयं क्रियासम्बन्ध एव भवति। न ततोऽन्यः प्रेषप्रैष्यसंबन्ध इति स्यादेतदेवं, यदि वाय्वादिवत् प्रवर्तने कर्ता लिङादिः स्यात्। प्रेरितोऽहमत्रेति तु ज्ञानजनकत्वं विधेः प्रवर्तकत्वम्। स एष प्रवर्तनं ज्ञापयति, न करोतीत्यन्य एवायं क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धात् प्रेषप्रैष्यसंबन्धः॥

ननु ज्ञानमपि क्रियैवा तत्करणे च पुनरपि स एवायं क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धः। मैवं — कारकज्ञापकयोर्भेदस्य सुप्रसिद्धत्वात्। इह च योऽयं यागपुरुषयोः क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धस्ततोऽन्यं प्रेषप्रैष्यसंबन्धमुपदर्शयितुं प्रवृत्ताः स्मः। स ततो विलक्षणः प्रदर्शित एव। वैलक्षणेऽपि तस्य यथाकथंचित् नाम क्रियमाणं न वारयामः॥

भवत्वयमन्यः प्रेषप्रैष्यसंबन्धः। स तु प्रथममवगम्यत इत्येष कुतो निश्चयः? उक्तमत्र — प्रेषितोऽहम् इति हि विदित्वा क्रियायां प्रवर्तते। आचार्यचोदितः करोमीति हि दृश्यते। यजेतेति श्रुते नियुक्तोऽहम् इति प्रथममवगच्छति। ततो यजते। तेनायमाद्यः संबन्धः। पाश्चात्त्यस्तु क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धः। तद् योऽयं लिङर्थः प्रथममवगम्यते, प्रेषो नाम, सा प्रेरणा, स नियोगः, स वाक्यार्थः॥

[Objection:] It is the action-agent relation which is understood in “[one] should sacrifice.”

[Reply:] We do not say that [the action-agent] relation is not understood; but the relation characterised by the instigator and the instigated is also understood at first. For, it is he who has been instigated, who undertakes an action.

[Objection:] Well, in “You, sir, should sacrifice” he (the person) is instigated in terms of his relation with the action only.

[Reply:] True; [the person] is instigated in terms of his relation with the action indeed. But he is instigated. If he is instigated, then this relation [of the instigator and the instigated] is different [from the action-agent relation]. But because of [the person’s] relation with the action we shall understand this [person] to be connected with both [action and the instigation] just like ‘the milk of the royal cow’. Just as a cow is related to a king and milk — that [cow] which is related to the king is related to milk, [and] that [cow] which is related to milk is related to the king; likewise, here too, the person is related to the instigation and the action. It is he, who is instigated, who acts; [and] it is he who acts, who is instigated.

[Objection:] Well, both these things do not happen. Instigation too is action indeed. For, [an instigator] is said to ‘instigate’ [someone] on account of producing instigation. And that is a relation with action only; [but] not the instigator-instigated relation, which is different from it (the action-agent relation).

[Reply:] It would have been so if like wind, etc., optative and like [suffixes] were the agent with regard to instigation. However, the injunction’s (the exhortative suffixes’) being the instigator consists in [its] producing the awareness, “I am instigated in regard to this”. This (the injunction) communicates instigation, [but] does not produce it. Hence, this instigator-instigated relation is different from the action-agent relation.

[Objection:] Well, awareness too is an action. And in producing that (awareness) it is the action-agent relation which is again [obtained and not the instigator-instigated relation].

[Reply:] It should not be so, because the distinction between a communicator and an action-factor is very well established. Here, we have set out to show that the instigator-instigated relation, which obtains between the [act of] sacrifice and the person [who performs it], is different from the action-agent relation. [And] it (the instigator-instigated relation) has indeed been shown to be distinct from that (the action-agent relation). Despite the utter distinction, if it (the instigator-instigated relation) is being named in some way whatsoever, we do not oppose [it].

[Objection:] Let this instigator-instigated relation be different [from the action-agent relation]. But whence is it is ascertained that that it is cognised at first?

[Reply:] It has already been said in this regard [that] it is [so] because one undertakes an action after understanding ‘I am instigated’. For, it is seen [from such usages as] “Being instigated by the teacher I do [it]”. On hearing “[one] should sacrifice”, [the person] at first understands “I am enjoined”. Then [he] sacrifices. On that score it is the primary relation. But the action-agent relation is the latter one. Thus, it is this meaning of the optative [suffix] called instigation which is first understood; that is instigation, that is commandment, that is sentence-meaning.

ननु विधाविव निमन्त्रणादिषु लिङ्लोटावपि स्मर्येते एव। सत्यं – ते तु प्रेरणायाम् एवौपाधिका अवान्तरभेदाः। समहीनज्यायोविषय एव प्रयोगोपाधिनिबन्धन एष प्रेषणाध्येषणादिभेदव्यवहारः। प्रेषणा तु सर्वत्रानुस्यूताऽवगम्यते। तदुक्तं – प्रवर्तकत्वं तु शब्दार्थः, सर्वत्रापरित्यागाद् इति। स चायं लिङादीनामर्थः प्रैषो णिजर्थविलक्षणः प्रतीयते॥

[Objection:] Well, [the meaning of] the optative and the imperative [suffixes] too is indeed taught [by Pāṇini] to be unavoidable invitation⁷⁷⁸, etc. just as [it is taught to be] commandment.

[Reply:] True; but they are just internal distinctions, based on external conditioners, of impelling only. This use of the distinctions like inducement, formal request, etc. is based on the external conditions of application [of the exhortative suffixes] in regard to peers, inferiors and superiors. However, instigation is understood to be uninterruptedly present everywhere (in order, request, unavoidable invitation, etc.). Hence it has been said [by Prabhākara in Br̥ 1.1.25] – “Being an instigator is the meaning of the word (exhortative suffix) because [that meaning] is maintained everywhere.” That meaning of the optative and like [suffixes, which is] instigation is understood to be different from the meaning of the causative suffix.

ननु प्रयोजकव्यापारे णिञ् विधीयते। प्रयोजकव्यापारश्च प्रैषः। प्रैषे च लोडादयो विधीयन्त इति णिजर्थ एव लोडर्थः। तथा च कुरु, कुर्विति यो ब्रूते, स कारयतीत्युच्यते। न – प्रतीतिभेदात्। अन्या हि करोतु कुर्याद् इति प्रतीतिरन्या च करोति कारयतीति प्रतीतिः। प्रयोजकव्यापारो हि णिजर्थो ज्ञापकव्यापारस्तु लिडर्थः। प्रवृत्तक्रियाविषयश्च प्रयोजकव्यापारो णिजर्थ इहतु तद्विपरीतः। तत्र हि कार्यं पश्यतः प्रवर्तनम्, इह तु प्रवर्तितस्य कार्यदर्शनम् इति महान् भेदः॥ तत्र यथा कुर्वन्तं कारयति, तथैवेहापि प्रैषः प्रवर्तमानं प्रेरयति, नाप्रवर्तमानं स्थावरमिति। न हि वनस्पतिरुच्यते यजस्वेति। न – स्थावरादेरयोग्यत्वात्। ब्राह्मणादिस्तु यः प्रेर्यतेऽसावप्रवृत्तक्रिय एव। न हि यजमान एव यजेतेति चोद्यते, किन्त्वप्रवृत्तक्रिय एवेति सर्वथा णिजर्थाद्विलक्षणो लिडर्थः॥

[Objection:] Well, the causative [suffix] is taught [by Pāṇini] in regard to the activity of the inducing agent. And the activity of the inducing agent is instigation. Since imperative and like [suffixes] are taught [by Pāṇini] in regard to instigation, it is the meaning of the causative suffix only, which is the meaning of the imperative suffix. And he, who says ‘do [it], do [it]’, is said to make [someone] do [something].

[Reply:] [The meaning of the causative suffix is] not [the same as that of the imperative suffix] because of distinction in the awareness [ensuing from ‘do’ and ‘makes do’]. For, the awareness [ensuing from] ‘[he must] do’, ‘[he] should do’ is different; and the awareness [ensuing from] ‘[he] does’, ‘[he] makes him do’ is different. For, the activity of the inducing agent is the meaning of the causative suffix; but the activity of the communicating agent is the meaning of the optative suffix. The operation of the inducing agent which is the meaning of the causative suffix has for its content an action which has already been undertaken; but in this case (optative suffix) it is opposite to it. The big

⁷⁷⁸ I translate *nimantraṇa* as unavoidable invitation, since if such an invitation is ignored, it leads to religious demerit. An instance of it cited in the *Nyāsa* commentary on *Kāśīkā* ad Aṣṭ 3.3.161 is the invitation of the maternal grandson to eat at his maternal grandfather’s post-funeral ceremony (*śrāddha*).

difference [between these two] is this: there (in case of the causative suffix) a person who understands what is to be done is induced, but here (in case of the optative and like suffixes) a person who has already been instigated understands what is to be done.

[Objection:] There (in case of the causative suffix) it is the person who is already doing [something] is made to do [that thing]. Likewise, here (in case of optative suffix) too, the instigator instigates [someone, who is] already instigated, not [an] inanimate [object]. For, it is not said to a tree “[you] should sacrifice”.

[Reply:] [It is] not [so], because inanimate objects lack the fitness [to be instigated to do something]. As for a brāhmaṇa, etc., by contrast, who are instigated, he does not indeed undertake the action [before being instigated]. For, a person who is already sacrificing is not impelled as “You, Sir, should sacrifice”, but it is someone who has not already undertaken [the] act [of sacrifice] only [who is impelled by means of the injunction, “You, Sir, should sacrifice”]. Hence the meaning of the optative suffix is by all means different from the meaning of the causative suffix.

आह — भवत्वयं विलक्षणोऽर्थः। स तु प्रमाणान्तरावगम्यश्चेत्, तदुपदर्शयताम् अयमसावेवंरूप इति। प्रमाणान्तरानवगम्यश्चेत्, कथं शब्दैकगोचरे तत्र संबन्धव्युत्पत्तिः। उच्यते — शब्दैकगोचरस्तु नियोगो व्युत्पत्तिश्च तत्र सूपपादैव । यो हि यजेत दद्याज् जुहुयाद् इति लिङादिभ्यो विधिः प्रतीयते, कथमसौ लिङादीनामगम्य इष्येत? व्युत्पत्तिश्चास्य व्यवहरादवकल्पते। गच्छाधीष्वेति शृण्वन् वृद्धश्चेष्टमानो दृश्यते। चेष्टा च स्वात्मनि प्रवर्तिकाऽवगमपूर्विका दृष्टा। प्रत्यक्षदृष्टे चाम्रादौ सुखसाधनतयाऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवगते, तदनुस्मरणात् प्रवर्तमानः कस्मिंश्चिदात्माकूते समुपजाते सति भौतिकं व्यापारमारभते। स चात्मधर्म आत्मेव स्वसंवेद्यः॥

[Objection:] Let this meaning be different. But if it is fit to be cognised by some other instrument of knowledge, then it should be shown as – this is that, which has such a form. If it is not fit to be cognised by some other instrument of knowledge, then how is [the exhortative suffix’s] in regard to it (commandment), which is grasped only by language, learned?

[Reply:] Commandment is known from linguistic communication only; and a learning of [the exhortative suffix’s relation] in regard to it (commandment) can indeed be well explained⁷⁷⁹. How could the injunction which is understood out of optative and like [suffixes] in ‘one should sacrifice’, ‘one should offer sacrificial donations’, ‘one should offer oblations’, be accepted as not being knowable from optative and like [suffixes]? [One’s] learning [of such a meaning] is considered to originate from ordinary language usage. A properly conditioned speaker is seen to act on hearing [such exhortative verb-

⁷⁷⁹ These two assertions by the Prābhākara opponent seem to be the reasons for the claim that denotation of *niyoga* or commandment does not put a great load on the exhortative suffixes.

forms as] ‘You must go’, ‘You must recite’, etc. Activity is seen to presuppose an understanding of instigation in one’s own self. Mangoes, etc. which are known through perception, are understood through concomitant presence and concomitant absence as the means of pleasure. Due to remembrance of it (that mangoes, etc. are means of pleasure), he, who makes efforts, begins acting physically once a certain volition of one’s own has arisen. And that property of the self is self-revealing just like the self.

अहंप्रत्यगम्यो ह्यात्मा; नासौ परस्मै दर्शयितुं शक्यते। न च न चर्चयितुं शक्यते। एतावता नानुभूयत इति न शक्यते वक्तुम्। परोऽपि ह्येनमहंप्रत्ययेनानुभवत्येवा। तथाऽयमपि भौतिकव्यापारहेतुरात्माकूतविशेषो न प्रमाणान्तरवेद्यो भवति। न च न वेद्यते, तत्संवेदने सति चेष्टाया दृष्टत्वात्। तस्मात्परमपि गच्छाधीष्वेति शब्दश्रवणे सति चेष्टापन्नं दृष्ट्वा तस्यापि तादृक्प्रेरणावगमोऽनुमीयते। स च शब्दान्तरश्रवणे सत्यप्यदृश्यमानो, लिडादिश्रवणे च सति दृश्यमानस्तदर्थ एवेत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवगम्यत इतीयतीयं व्युत्पत्तिः॥

For, the self is known from the ‘I’-awareness; it is not capable of being shown to others, but not incapable of being reflected upon. From this much, it cannot be said, that (the self) is not experienced. For, others too indeed experience this (self) through the ‘I’-awareness. Similarly, this specific volition too, which is the cause of physical activity, is not known from other instruments of knowledge. And it is not the case that [it] is not known, because activity has been seen [to occur] once it (the specific volition) has been experienced. Therefore, on watching another [person] act upon hearing words like ‘go’, ‘recite’, etc. a similar understanding of impelling is inferred. That (understanding of impelling) is not seen even when other words (indicative verbs) are heard, and seen when optative and the like are heard; [therefore,] it is the meaning of them (optative and like suffixes). This is understood through concomitant presence and concomitant absence and it is this much what is learned [regarding the denotative relation obtaining between the exhortative suffixes and instigation].

तदेतदात्मप्रत्यक्षम्। लिडादिश्रवणे सति प्रेरणावगतिर्भवति, प्रथमश्रुताच्च लिडादेरसौ न भवति। न च प्रमाणान्तरेण सोऽर्थो दर्शयितुं शक्यते, कुर्याद् इत्यस्यार्थः कुर्यादित्यनेनैव प्रतिपाद्यते, न प्रकारान्तरेणेत्येवं व्युत्पत्तौ संभवन्त्यामपि यैरगृहीतसस्बन्ध एव लिडादिः स्वरूपसामर्थ्येनैव प्रेरक इष्यते, तेऽत्यन्तभीरव इत्युपेक्षणीयाः॥

It is self-revealing. One understands impelling on hearing optative and like [suffixes] and it (understanding of impelling) does not follow from the optative and like [suffixes] heard for the first time. And, such a meaning (instigation) cannot be shown through some other instrument of knowledge. The meaning of ‘[one] should do’ is arrived at through ‘[one]

should do' only, [but] not in any other way⁷⁸⁰. Even when acquisition [of instigation as the denoted meaning of exhortative suffixes] is thus possible, those who consider that optative and like [suffixes] should instigate by virtue of the capacity of their [sheer] verbal form without indeed their denotative relation with instigation having been grasped, are extremely timid [and hence] fit to be ignored.

ननु यदि लिङादिव्यतिरेकेण नान्यतो नियोगोऽवगम्यते, कथमसौ नियोगशब्दात् प्रतीयते? कथं वा नियोशब्दस्य नाम्नोऽप्यर्थः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरः स्यात्?

अयि साधो न नियोगो निपूर्वेण युजिना घञन्तेन बोधयितुं शक्यते। व्यवहारमात्रमेतत्स्वरूपमाख्यातुमाश्रीयते; यथा तु यजेतेत्येवमादिभ्यः शब्देभ्यः सोऽवगम्यते, तथा नान्यत इत्यत एव न प्रमाणान्तरगोचरो धर्म इत्याहुः॥

लिङर्थो हि नियोगो वाक्यार्थः। स एव धर्मः। स च न प्रमाणान्तरगम्य इति॥

[Objection:] Well, if commandment is not understood from anything other than the optative and like [suffixes], how is it understood from the word 'niyoga'? Or, how should the meaning of the nominal stem *niyoga* be knowable from other instruments of knowledge?

[Reply:] O wise one! Commandment is not made known by [the word 'niyoga', which is formed by] adding the *ghañ* suffix to the verbal root *yuj-*, which is prefixed by *ni*. It is mere usage, which is resorted to for mentioning (commandment's) own verbal form⁷⁸¹. But, the way it (commandment) is understood from such [words] as '[one] should sacrifice', [it is] not [understood] similarly from other [words or sources]. For this reason indeed is religious duty (*dharma*) (*niyoga* or commandment) said to be unknowable from other instruments of knowledge. For, commandment, which is the meaning of optative [and like suffixes] is sentence-meaning. That alone is religious duty (*dharma*). And that is not knowable from other instruments of knowledge.

ननु लिङर्थः प्रेरणात्मकोऽयं व्याख्यातः कार्यात्मा चायमनुष्ठेयो धर्मः। स एव च वाक्यार्थो युक्तः। कार्येऽर्थे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमिति हि मीमांसकाः। तस्मात् पुनरपि भाट्टपक्षवद् द्वयमापतति — प्रेरकश्च

⁷⁸⁰ What is at stake here is learning of instigation as the meaning of exhortative suffixes for the first time without the help of any other instrument of knowledge like perception.

⁷⁸¹ Regarding the word *svarūpa* used here in Vyākaraṇa's technical sense of the verbal form used for a concept, without it itself referring to the characteristics of that concept, see the entries, *svarūpagrahaṇa*, *svarūpayogyatā* and *svarūpavidhi* in Abhyankar (1961:409-410). I am grateful to Dr. Elisa Freschi for kindly pointing this out.

विधिः, कार्यरूपश्चानुष्ठेयोऽर्थ इति। सुखैधितो निरनुसन्धान इवायुष्मानेवं व्यवहरति। न ह्यन्यः प्रेरकोऽन्यश्चानुष्ठेय इत्युक्तम्। नियोग एव प्रेरको नियोग एव चानुष्ठेयः॥

कथं द्वैरूप्यमस्य शब्दो वदतीति चेन्, मैवं — प्रेरकत्वमेव शब्दार्थ आर्थं तु कार्यत्वम्। यतो विधिरेवानुष्ठेयतयाऽवगम्यत आचार्याज्ञां करोमि राजाज्ञां करोमीति॥

किमर्थं तर्हि विषयानुष्ठानमिति चेन् — न ह्याज्ञा घटादिवत् स्वरूपेण कर्तुं शक्याऽपि तु विषयद्वारकं तत्संपादनम्। कमण्डुलं बिभृहीत्याचार्येणाज्ञप्तः कमण्डुलं भृत्वाऽऽचार्याज्ञां कृतां मन्यते। कटकं गच्छेति राज्ञाऽऽप्तः कटकं गत्वा राजाज्ञां कृतां मन्यते। सोऽयं नियोग एवानुष्ठेयः॥

ननु राजाज्ञया करोमीत्यपि व्यपदेशो दृश्यते। स चाननुष्ठेयामेवाज्ञां दर्शयति। मैवं — तत्राप्याज्ञैवानुष्ठेया। प्रेषाणाभिप्रायेण तृतीयानिर्देश इत्येवं केचित्॥

अन्ये तु शाब्दं कार्यत्वं नियोगस्य प्रेरकत्वं त्वर्थादित्याचक्षते॥

अनुष्ठेयता हि तस्य निजं रूपम्। स्वसिद्धये स तु नियोज्यं नियुंजानः प्रेरक इत्युच्यते। तदिदं कार्यत्वम् अपरित्यक्तप्रेरकभावमस्यावम्यते। प्रेरकत्वं चापरित्यक्तकार्यभावमित्यन्यतरदत्र शाब्दं रूपम्, अन्यतरच्चार्थं रूपमिति न भाट्टैरिवास्माभिः प्रत्यये गुरुर्भार आरोपितः॥

[Objection:] Well, this meaning of the optative [and like suffixes called *niyoga*] which has been explained as being of the nature of impelling is what is to be done; [and] that, which is fit to be performed, is religious duty. And it is logical that it (commandment) alone is the sentence-meaning. For, according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, the Veda [as an instrument of knowledge] is valid with regard to something which is to be done. Therefore, once again, just as on the Bhāṭṭa view, two things undesirably follow: an injunction is the impeller, and it, having the form of something to be done, is what is to be performed.

[Reply:] O long-living one! You, Sir, speak like someone who has been brought up with [excessive] comfort, and lacks enquiry. For, it has been said that the impeller and that which is to be performed are not different [things]. The commandment alone is the impeller, and the commandment alone is that which is to be performed.

[Objection:] How does the speech-unit (the exhortative suffix) speak of its (commandment's) dual form?

[Reply:] It should not be so. Being an instigator alone is what is directly conveyed by the speech-unit (exhortative suffix); [but] being something to be done is implied. [This is] because an injunction alone is understood as that which is to be performed as in – ‘I carry out the order of the teacher’, ‘I carry out the order of the king.’

[Objection:] Then, why is it that the scope⁷⁸² is performed?

[Reply:] This is because an order in itself cannot be accomplished unlike a jar, etc., but its accomplishment takes places through the [accomplishment] of the scope. ‘Hold the water-pot’ – on being so ordered by the teacher, one thinks the teacher’s order to be have been done upon holding the water-pot. On being ordered by the king – “Go to the royal camp” – one considers the royal order to have been accomplished upon going to the royal capital. That commandment alone is what is to be performed.

[Objection:] Such statements as ‘I do by the order⁷⁸³ of the king’ are also seen. And that shows the order as something which is not to be performed.

[Reply:] It should not be so. There too, the order alone is what is to be performed. It is with an intention of [conveying] the instrument of instigation that the third case-marker is mentioned. Such is the view of some.

Others say that the commandment’s being something to be done is what is directly conveyed by the speech-unit (the exhortative suffix), but [its] being an impeller is implied. Its being something to be performed is its own form. But it is called an ‘impeller’ in so far as it enjoins a person fit for enjoinder for the sake of its own accomplishment. Thus, its being something to be done is understood as something unbereft of its character of being an impeller. And its being an impeller is [understood] as something unbereft of its being something to be done. Hence, since one of them (either its being something to be done or its being an impeller) has a linguistic nature, and the other an implied nature, we, unlike the Bhāttas, have not imposed a great load on the [exhortative] suffix.

स चायं नियोगः प्रतीयमानो यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यनुबन्धद्वयावच्छिन्नः प्रतीयते। यज्यादिनास्य विषयानुबन्धो धातुनोच्यते। स्वर्गकाम इत्यधिकारानुबन्धः पदान्तरेणार्प्यते। तत्र च स्वर्गकामस्यैवाधिकारो निर्वहति। यदि भावार्थस्य स्वर्गं प्रति साधनत्वमवगम्यते; एवं तर्हि स्वर्गकामेनवासौ कृतो भवतीति स्वर्गकामपदान्वये प्राक्तन एव मार्गोऽनुमन्तव्यो, न पुनः स्वर्गादिफलप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं विधेः प्रवर्तकत्वम् अस्वातन्त्र्यप्रसङ्गात्। न हीदृशं शास्त्रस्य दैन्यं यत् फलं विना पुंसः प्रवर्तयितुं न शक्नोतीति। अन्यथा यावज्जीवं यजेतेत्यादावप्रवर्तकं शास्त्रं स्यात्॥

⁷⁸² Scope here refers to the specific action denoted by the verbal root in regard to which one makes efforts directly, and which also serves to specify the boundary of the commandment.

⁷⁸³ The present usage which registers the use of the instrumental case with regard to the king’s order is cited by the opponent as a counter-example in order to invalidate the Prābhākara claim that it is *niyoga* which is something to be accomplished. By contrast, the Prābhākara says consistent with his basic thesis that *niyoga* is what instigates and also what is to be done, that the use of the instrumental case does not in any way put to rest his claim that *niyoga* is what is to be done, but rather reaffirms his parallel claim of *niyoga* being that which instigates a person for its accomplishment and hence the instrument of instigation.

That very commandment, which is being cognised, as in “One desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice”, is understood as delimited by two correlates. By the verbal root, *yaj-* and the like, its scope-correlate is denoted. By a different word – ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ – the eligibility-correlate is communicated. And in regard to that (the scope), it is only the one who desires *svarga*, who is eligible. If the meaning of the verbal root were known to be the means in regard to *svarga*, then in this way that (the sacrifice) would be done only by one who is desirous of *svarga* [as the result of the sacrifice]; hence in regard to the syntactic connection of the word ‘one desirous of *svarga*’ one had to infer the previous (Bhāṭṭa) way [of construing the phrase, ‘*svargakāma*’]. But an injunction does not instigate by showing results like *svarga*, etc., because of the undesirable consequence of [the injunction’s] loss of independence [as an instigator]. For, the sacred text is not such poor that it could not instigate men [to undertake an act] without [showing] the result [accruing therefrom]. Otherwise, the sacred text would not be the instigator in such cases as ‘one should sacrifice as long as one lives’, etc.

किं यावज्जीवम् इत्यादिचोदनाः फलशून्या एव? ओमित्युच्यते। न हि विधिः फलमाकाङ्क्षति, अपि तु नियोज्यं, विषयं च – कस्य नियोगः कुत्र नियोग – इति। ते एते उभे अप्याकाङ्क्षे परिपूर्णौ। तत्र जीवतो नियोगो यागे च नियोग इति। अतः परं फलकल्पनं पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवं भवति, न शास्त्रीयम्। कामाधिकारे तु नियोज्यतैवान्यथा स्वर्गकामस्य नोपपद्यत इति स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वमभ्युपगतम्, न पुनर्विधेः फलार्थत्वात्। अत एव न तत्र वैधी प्रवृत्तिर्लिप्सयैव प्रवृत्तत्वात्। आह च तस्य लिप्साऽर्थलक्षणेति। साध्यसाधनभावप्रतिपादनपर्यवसितो हि तत्र विधिव्यापारो, न प्रयोगपर्यवसित इति॥

[Clarificatory question to the Prābhākara:] Are such injunctions as “As long as one lives [one should sacrifice]”, etc. devoid of results?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] We say, ‘yes’. For, the injunction does not expect a result, but the person to be enjoined and the scope – [as represented respectively by the questions:] whose enjoinder [is it?] [and] in regard to what is the enjoinder? Both these expectations are fulfilled with regard to that (the injunction), [namely] – it is the enjoinder of someone who is alive, and the enjoinder is with regard to [the act of] sacrifice. Any postulation of result hereafter has its origin in the human intellect, [and] not in the sacred texts. But in case of elective rituals, a *svarga*-desiring person’s being a person fit to be enjoined cannot be otherwise explained; hence, *svarga* is postulated to be the thing to be accomplished, but not because the injunction expects the result. And [in this regard, Jaimini] says – “its desire is characterised by [one’s own] purpose” (MīSū 4.1.2). The function of the injunction culminates there in the communication of the means-end relationship, and not [unlike the injunctions for the fixed rituals] in [instigating the person to the] performance [of the prescribed act].

अत एव श्येनादेरधर्मत्वम्। तत्र ह्यभिचरन्निति शत्रा शत्रुं वैदिकेनोपायेन जिघांसुरधिकारी दर्शितस्तस्या। न तत्र शास्त्रं प्रवर्तकम्। जानात्येवासौ मयैतत् कर्तव्यम्, उपायं तु न वेदेत्येवम्। उपायमात्रमस्योपदिश्यते

श्येनः। श्येनं कुर्विति तु न विधिः प्रभवति, जिघांसाया एव तत्र प्रवर्तकत्वात्। अतः श्यनादेरधर्मत्वात् तद्व्युदासार्थपदोपादानं चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्म इति॥

कामाधिकारेषु हीतिकर्तव्यतांशे शास्त्रीया प्रवृत्तिः। यथोक्तं — क्रत्वर्थो हि शास्त्रादवगम्यत इति। भावार्थमात्रस्य हि करणत्वमवगतम्। इतिकर्तव्यतांशस्तु न करणत्वावगतिवेलायामुपनिपतित इति तत्र लिप्साया अभावात् शास्त्रमेव प्रवर्तकम्।

This is why Śyena and the like are contrary-to-religious duty. The *śatr* suffix in ‘intent upon bewitchment’ (*abhicaran*) has shown a person desirous of killing the enemy by Vedic means to be the eligible performer of that (the Śyena sacrifice). In regard to that (bewitchment) it is not the sacred text which is the instigator. It is like this this – “he (who is intent upon bewitchment) knows indeed: ‘It is to be done by me’, but [he] does not know the means.”⁷⁸⁴ Śyena is taught only as the means for this [man]” (ŚāBhā 6.2.14). ‘Do the Śyena’ – this is not how the injunction appears, because it is the desire to kill which is the instigator there (in regard to killing). Thus, Śyena and the like being contrary-to-religious duties, it is in order to exclude them [from *dharma* or religious duties] that the word ‘beneficial’ (*artha*) has been included [in the *sūtra*,] – “Religious duty is something beneficial that is known [only] from the Vedic injunctions (MīSū 1.1.2).”

In case of elective rites, one is prompted by the sacred text in regard to the procedural part. As has been said [by Śābara] – “That which is for the sake of the ritual is known from the sacred text.” (ŚāBhā 4.1.2) For, it is only the meaning of the verbal root which has been understood to be the means. The procedural part does not feature at the time of understanding the means. Hence, due to the absence of desire in regard to that (the procedural part), it is the sacred text which instigates [one to perform the procedural actions].

अत एव अग्नीषोमीयहिंसाया नाधर्मत्वम्। न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानीति निषेधः सामान्यशास्त्रम्। सामान्यशास्त्रं च विशेषशास्त्रक्रोडीकृतविषयपरिहारेण प्रवर्तत इत्यग्नीषोमीयहिंसायाः शास्त्रीयत्वान् न निषेधविधिरनर्थतां बोधयेदिति॥

For this only, is the killing in Agnīṣomīya [animal sacrifice] and the like is not a contrary-to-religious duty. The prohibition, ‘One should not kill living beings’ is a general statement of the sacred text. And a general statement of the sacred text operates by abandoning the scope that has been taken into its fold by a specific statement of the sacred text. Therefore, since the Agnīṣomīya killing is [prescribed by a specific statement of the] sacred text, the prohibitory injunction would not communicate the maleficence [of the Agnīṣomīya animal-killing].

⁷⁸⁴ Cf. ŚāBhā ad MīSū 6.2.14.

ननु श्येनेऽपि शास्त्रीया प्रवृत्तिः। प्रवर्तकत्वं हि विधेः स्वरूपं प्रमाणान्तरविलक्षणम्। नान्वयव्यतिरेकवत्साध्यसाधनप्रतीतिमात्रपर्यन्तो हि विधिव्यापारो भवितुमर्हतीति सर्वत्र विधेः प्रयोक्तृत्वानपायात्। एवमेव चेयं प्रवृत्तिः श्येनेन यजेतेति॥

उच्यते — प्रवर्तितोऽहम् इति ज्ञानजननं विधेः प्रेरकत्वम्। तत् सत्यं सर्वत्र तुल्यं करणे च श्येने, इतिकर्तव्यतायाम् अग्नीषोमीये। बाह्ये तु प्रवृत्तिलक्षणे भौतिके व्यापारे यत्र लिप्सादि प्रकारान्तरमस्ति, तत्र भवन्त्यपि विधेः प्रयोक्तृशक्तिरुदास्ते, पशुपुरोडाशप्रयाजवत्। तत्रोदासीने विधौ निषेधशास्त्रमवतरति न हिंस्याद् इति॥

यदि तु सर्वत्रैव प्रयोक्तृशक्तिरुदासीना [-रनुदासीना] भवेत्, तदा ज्योतिष्टोमान्न विशिष्येत श्येनः; शास्त्रीयायां प्रवृत्तावग्नीषोमीय इव निषेधशास्त्रस्यानवकाशात्॥

ज्योतिष्टोमेऽनुल्लङ्घितनिषेधोऽधिकारी, स्वर्गस्यानिषिद्धत्वात्। श्येने तु हिंसायाः प्रतिषिद्धत्वाद् उत्क्रान्तनिषेधोऽधिकारीति चेन् — मैवम् — अधिकारिदशायामपि भवन्मते विधेः प्रयोक्तृत्वानपायान् न निषेधशास्त्रमवकाशं लभत इति श्येनेऽपि नावधीरितनिषेधोऽधिकारी स्यात्॥

ननु न विधिः फले प्रयोज्यं प्रेरयति फलं कुर्विति। कर्मणि त्वेनं प्रवर्तयति यजस्वेति। तेनाधिकारिदशायामप्रतिहतो निषेधशास्त्रावकाशः। आयुष्मन् अस्मत्पक्षमेवाश्रितोऽसि। फले चेन्न प्रवर्तयति विधिः पुरुषं, फलार्थित्वादेवैनमुपाये प्रवर्तमानं तत्रापि न प्रेरयेत्। उपायानभिज्ञस्य तु उपायमेव दर्शयेत्। यावदप्राप्तं हि विधेर्विषयः। तदुक्तं — जानात्येवासौ मयैतत् कर्तव्यम्, उपायं तु न वेदेति। प्रतीतिरपीयमीदृश्यभिचरन् यजेतेति। यदि त्वं शास्त्रीयेनोपायेन वैरिणं हन्तुमुद्यतः, श्येनेन जहि, श्येनस्तवोपाय इत्यर्थः। तदलमतिप्रसङ्गेन।

कामाधिकारेषु तावन् न फलाकाङ्क्षी विधिः। फलं त्वधिकारे हेतुरिति स्थितम्॥

[Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] Well, in case of the Śyena too, one's motivation [to undertake the action] is due to the [instigation of] the sacred text. For, being an instigator is the real nature of an injunction, which is different from other instruments of knowledge. Since, unlike concomitant presence and concomitant absence, the operation of an injunction cannot end merely with being the instrument⁷⁸⁵ of cognising the means-end relationship, because the power of the injunction is not lost anywhere. Similar indeed is this undertaking [which is prompted by the Vedic sacred text in the form of the injunction] 'one should sacrifice with the Śyena'.

⁷⁸⁵ The *ktin* suffix attached to the verbal root, *i-* prefixed by *prati*, is used in the instrumental sense. Hence *pratiiti* here does not refer to the act of cognition, but the instrument of cognition.

[Reply:] In reply it is said – an injunction’s instigation consists in generating the cognition, ‘I am instigated’. True, that it is the same in case of Śyena, the instrument, and Agnīṣomīya, the procedure. But in cases of external physical actions [such as eating, etc.], characterised by undertaking, where other forms [of instigators like] desire, etc., are available, even though the instigating power of an injunction may be present, it is inoperative, just as in case of the main ritual of ‘*paśupuroḍāśa*’. In that situation, the injunction being inoperative, the prohibitory injunction, “one should not kill”, comes into force. If the instigating power of injunction were active in all cases, then Śyena would not be different from the Jyotiṣṭoma. The motivation [to undertake the Śyena sacrifice] being due to [instigation by] the sacred text, the prohibitory injunction (“One should not kill living beings”) would not, just as in Agnīṣomīya, have scope for operation.

[Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] In case of Jyotiṣṭoma, the eligible performer has not transgressed the prohibition, since *svarga* is [a result which is] not prohibited. But in case of Śyena, since killing is prohibited, the eligible performer is one who has already transgressed the prohibition.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It is not so. Since on your view, the instigating power of injunction is not lost even at the time of eligibility (at the time when the injunction merely communicates the eligible performer), the prohibitory injunction does not acquire scope of operation; thus, in case of the Śyena too, the eligible performer is one who has not disregarded the prohibition.

[Objection by the Bhāṭṭa:] It is not the case that the injunction impels the person regarding the result [like] – ‘do the result’. But it instigates him in regard to the act [of sacrifice] – ‘sacrifice!’ Therefore, the scope for operation of the prohibitory statement of the sacred text remains unobstructed [even] at the time of eligibility.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] O long-living one! You are ending up using our view only! If the injunctions do not instigate a person regarding the result, then let it not instigate him with regard to the means too, where, on account of being the seeker of the result indeed, he is. Let it (the injunction) rather show only the means to someone who is ignorant of the means; for, the content of an injunction is something unobtained. Thus, it has been said [by Śabara] – “he indeed knows ‘I have to do this’; but he does not know the means.” (ŚāBhā 6.2.14). The understanding also is of this kind: ‘one intent upon bewitchment should sacrifice.’ This amounts to saying: ‘If you are intent upon killing the enemy through the means provided by the sacred texts, then sacrifice with the Śyena; the Śyena is your means.’ No need for further discussion on this incidental point.

It is established that in case of the elective rituals, the injunction indeed does not need the result; the result is but the basis of eligibility.

प्रतिषेधाधिकारेऽपि प्रत्यवायो न कल्पते।

निषेध्याद्विषयादेव लब्धत्वादधिकारिणः॥
 तत्रासौ कल्प्यमानोऽपि नरकादिफलोदयः।
 अवैधत्वं प्रपद्येत न ह्याकाङ्क्षेदृशी विधेः॥
 विधेरपेक्षे द्वे एव नियोज्यविषयौ प्रति।
 तत्पूरणेन तृप्तस्तु न वाञ्छति ततोऽधिकम्॥
 नियोज्यस्तावदेतावान् क्रुद्धोऽरिहननोद्यतः।
 विषयस्तन्निवृत्तिश्च नियोगो यत्र गम्यते॥

In case of prohibitions too, religious demerit is not postulated because the person to whom [the prohibition applies] is known from the prohibited act itself. Even if the production of consequences like *naraka* is postulated in regard to that (prohibitions), it (such consequence) would not be understood [directly] out of the [prohibitory] injunction, since the [prohibitory] injunction has no such expectation [for the consequence]. The [prohibitory] injunction expects only two things – the person to whom the prohibition applies⁷⁸⁶ and the scope. Once those [expectations] have been fulfilled, [the prohibition] is satisfied and does not expect anything more. The person to whom the prohibition applies is this much – an angry man, who is ready to kill the enemy, and the scope is abstention from it (killing) – it is with regard to this (abstention from killing) that the commandment is understood.

ननु एतावन्न विबुध्यामहे निषेधविधः को विषय इति। भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया प्रतीयेतेति स्थिते नञर्थस्तावत् पूर्वापरीभूतत्वाभावान् न विधेर्विषयोऽनन्विताभिधानाच्चा न हि नञोऽनन्तरं लिङविभक्तिः श्रूयतेऽपि तु हन्तेः। हननमपि न विधेर्विषयस्तस्य धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गान्, नञ्प्रयोगस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसक्तेः। हनने च पुरुषस्य स्वतः प्रवृत्तेश्च। नञ्विशिष्टोऽपि न हन्त्यर्थोऽस्य विषयस्तयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावाभावात्॥

युक्तं दध्ना जुहोतीति होमे दध्यनुरक्तता।
 हन्तेः स्वरूपनाशात् न नञर्थानुरक्तता॥

पुरुषप्रयत्नोऽपि न केवलो विधेर्विषयः, स्वतस्सिद्धत्वात्। नापि नञर्थानुरक्तः, कुत्रापि नञर्थस्य विशेषणत्वानुपपत्तेः॥

⁷⁸⁶ Here the word *niyojya* has been used, just it has been used earlier in the context of positive injunctions, interchangeably with *adhikārin*. Since like *adhikārin* a person cannot be enjoined by a prohibition in the same way as he is enjoined by a positive injunction, I have retained the translation of *adhikārin* in the context of the prohibition as ‘the person to whom the prohibition applies’ even for the word *niyojya* in the context of prohibition.

Well, we do not understand so far what is the content of the prohibitory injunction. This being established that “Action is understood from such ritual-words which signify actions” (MiSū 2.1.1), the meaning of the negative particle is not the content of the injunction. This is because, [that what the negative particle means] is not of a sequential nature and also because it is denoted in a syntactically unconnected manner. For, the exhortative suffix is not heard (mentioned) after the negative particle, but after the verbal root ‘*han*’ [meaning ‘to kill’]. Killing too is not the content of the [prohibitory] injunction, because [if it were so, then] there would be the undesirable consequence of its (killing’s) becoming religious duty, and hence the application of the negative particle would be useless. A further reason is that human beings have a natural inclination to killing. Nor even the meaning of the verbal root, ‘*han*’, as qualified by the [meaning of the] negative particle can be its (the prohibitory injunction’s) content, because the relation of qualifier and qualified does not obtain between them.

In case of [the injunction,] “one offers oblation with curd”, the qualification of oblation by curd is reasonable; but since [on being qualified by the meaning of the negative particle] the very nature of the verbal root, ‘*han*’ [meaning, ‘to kill’] would be destroyed, its qualification by the negative particle is not correct.

The human effort by itself is also not the content of the injunction, because it is established on its own (independently of the injunction). Nor even is [such a human effort conducive to killing as] qualified by the meaning of the negative particle [can be the content of the command], because nowhere can the negative particle’s meaning’s being the qualifier be justified.

अथायमब्राह्मणादिन्यायेन हन्तौ पर्युदस्ते भावार्थान्तरे नियोगः कल्प्यते — न हन्याद् इति कोऽर्थः? अन्यत् किमपि कुर्यादिति; तर्हि किं तद् भावान्तरमिति न विचारयितुं शक्यम्। यत्किंचिदिति चेन् — न — तस्य स्वतस्सिद्धत्वेन विध्यनर्हत्वात्। अवश्यं जीवन् पुमान् किंचित् करोति, पठति, गच्छति, भुङ्क्ते च॥

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] Now, based on the principle of ‘non-brāhmaṇa’, the verbal root, ‘*han*’, having been excluded, the enjoinder should be postulated with regard to some other verbal root.

[Question to the Prābhākara:] What is the meaning of [the sentence] ‘one should not kill’?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [It means –] do anything else.

[Question to the Prābhākara:] Then, what that other action is cannot be deliberated upon.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [What] if it is something whatsoever?

[Reply to the Prābhākara:] No; for, it (doing something whatsoever) being established on its own is not fit to become [the scope of] the injunction. A living human being certainly does something – he recites, he goes and he eats.

अथ विषयांशं परिहृत्य प्रमाणांशे नञ् निविशते, सा हि प्रवर्तमानं पुमांसं रुणद्धि, यद्धन्यात् तन्नेति – तदप्यनुपपन्नम् – अन्विताभिधानेन विधिविभक्तेर्हन्तिनाऽवरुद्धत्वात्। प्रेरणशक्तिस्वभावो विधिः स्थितः। यस्तु निषेधात्मा नञ् पार्श्वे स्थितस्तत्र न विधिः संक्रामति। संक्रान्तावपि नञश्च संबन्धे सति विधेः स्वरूपनाशोऽवगम्यते। स्वभावो ह्येष नञो, यदयं येन येन संबध्यते तस्य तस्याभावं बोधयतीति। अतो विधिसंबन्धे नञ् इष्यमाणे एतावान् वाक्यार्थोऽवतिष्ठते हननविधिर्नास्तीति। ततश्च हननस्य विधित्वं च स्यात्॥

[Proposal by Prābhākara:] What if abandoning the scope-part, the negative particle [may be said to] enter the part consisting of the instrument of knowledge (the exhortative suffix)? For, a person who has already undertaken [killing] is blocked by it – ‘you should not kill what [you want to kill].’

[Refutation by Bhāṭṭa:] That too is not coherent; because the [scope for any further syntactical connection of the exhortative] suffix has already been blocked by [the verbal root,] ‘han’, on account of denotation of the connected. The exhortative suffix is established as that which naturally possesses the power to instigate. The exhortative suffix does not pass on to the negative particle, which is of the nature of negation, situated beside. Even if it passes on, then due to a connection with the negative particle it is [rather] the destruction of the [exhortative suffix’s] real nature (that of being an instigator) which is understood. For, such is the nature of the negative particle that it expresses the absence of everything it connects to. Therefore, if a connection of the exhortative suffix to the negative particle is desired, then the sentence-meaning boils down to this much – “there is no injunction about killing”. And from that one has to accept that killing is prescribed by the injunction.

अत्रोच्यते – दध्ना जुहोतीति होमस्य वचनान्तरचोदितत्वाद् विधिविभक्तिशक्तिरूपपदं संक्रामतीति यथा वर्णितम्, एवमिहापि हनने स्वतः प्रवृत्तत्वेन विधिवैफल्यान् नञश्च श्रूयमाणस्यानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गाद् विधायिका शक्तिर्नञर्थमेव स्पृशतीति किं नेष्यते?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] In this regard it is said – since [the act of] oblation in [the injunction,] “one should offer oblation with curd” (MaiSa 4.7.7) has already been prescribed by a different statement (a separate injunction, ‘agnihotram juhōti’ – “one should offer the Agnihotra oblation”), the power of the exhortative suffix approaches the adjoining word. Just as this has been described, likewise here too (the prohibition, ‘na hanyāt’) there would be superfluity of the injunction owing to the fact that one undertakes the action (killing) on his own. And there would be the undesirable consequence of the uselessness of the negative particle that is heard. As a result, why should [you] not accept

that the power of instigation [of the exhortative suffix] touches the meaning of the negative particle only?

ननूक्तमत्र भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दा इति। तत्र दध्यनुरक्तो होम एव विधीयत इति फलतो दधि विहितं भवति, न प्रमाणतः। इह तु नञस्तदुपमर्दस्वभावत्वान् [न] संसर्गो दध्यादेरिव कल्पते॥

[Objection:] Well, in this regard it has already been that “[It is from] ritual-words which express activity [that action is understood]”. There (in case of the injunction, *dadhnā juhōti*) it is indeed the oblation as qualified by curd which is prescribed. Hence, it is in essence that curd is prescribed and not based on the instrument of knowledge. But here unlike [in the case of] curd, etc., a connection of the [meaning of the] negative particle with anything is not postulated on account of the destructive nature of it (the negative particle).

मैवं — निवृत्तिमेव कुर्वन् विशेषणीभवति। सेयं नञुपहिते हन्तौ श्रुते हनननिवृत्तिर्गम्यते। यथा सिद्धरूपदध्यनुप्रवेशेऽपि न होमस्य साध्यमानाऽवस्था निवर्तते, तथा नञनुविद्धहन्त्यर्थावगतौ न पूर्वापरीभावबुद्धिर्निवर्तते। न ह्यब्राह्मणवन् न हन्याद् इति सिद्धरूपबुद्धिः। सोऽयं हनननिवृत्तिरूपः पूर्वापरीभूतोऽर्थो विधिविषयो भवति॥

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It should not be not so. It is on account of effecting dissuasion that it (the negative particle) becomes a qualifier. When the verbal root, ‘han’, conditioned by the negative particle is heard, dissuasion from killing is understood. Just as with the entry of the curd which is by nature something already accomplished, the oblation’s state of being something to be accomplished does not cease, similarly, when the meaning of the verbal root, ‘han’, mixed with [the meaning of] the negative particle is understood, the cognition of sequence [with regard to the verbal root *han*] does not cease. For, unlike [the principle of] ‘non-brāhmaṇa’ the cognition in ‘one should not kill’ does not have the form of [something already] accomplished. It is that [meaning of the verbal root, *han*, conditioned by the negative particle and as] having the form of abstention from killing [and] a sequential nature, that becomes the scope of the [prohibitory] injunction.

अथवा विभक्त्यर्थेन नञ् संभन्तस्यति। शुद्धस्य लिङादेरर्थः प्रवर्तको, नञुपहितस्य तस्यार्थो निवर्तक इति शब्दशक्तिरेवैषा वाऽपर्यनुयोज्येति॥

यत्तु साक्षान् नञोऽनन्तरं विधिविभक्तिर्नोत्पद्यते, तत् तस्याधातुत्वाद् धातोः परे तिङादयः प्रत्यया भवन्ति, नान्यस्मादिति। योग्यतया तु नञर्थेन तस्य संबन्धः। न च तत्रायमर्थोऽवतिष्ठते हननविधिर्नास्तीति। किन्तु नञुपहितो विधिरौदासीन्ये पुरुषं नियुङ्क्ते। तदवच्छेदकश्च हन्तिरन्यथा सर्वक्रियौदासीन्यं प्रतीयेतेत्यलमतिविमर्देन। निषेधविधेरपि सिद्धोऽनुबन्धद्वययोगः॥

Alternatively, the negative particle connects with the meaning of the [exhortative] suffix. The meaning of the pure (unqualified) optative and like suffixes is an instigator, and that

of it conditioned by the negative particle is dissuader. This is the capacity of speech indeed; who is to be complained in this regard?

As for [the complaint that] the exhortative suffix does not occur directly after the negative particle is due to its (the negative suffix's) not being a verbal root; [for,] it is after a verbal root, and not something else that the finite verbal endings and like suffixes⁷⁸⁷ occur. But its (the exhortative suffix's) connection with the meaning of the negative particle is based on semantic fitness. And in that case, the meaning does not settle down as 'there is no injunction about killing'. Rather the exhortative suffix as conditioned by the negative particle enjoins a person to indifference and the meaning of the verbal root, *han*, becomes the delimiter of it (indifference). Otherwise, indifference would be understood in regard to all actions. No need for destroying [the opponent's objections] too much. [Thus,] the connection of even the prohibitory injunction with the two correlates (scope and eligibility) is established.

एवं नियोगव्यापारे समाप्ते फलकल्पना।
नृबुद्धिप्रभवैव स्याद् अतः सापेक्षता भवेत्॥
कथं नरो निवर्तेत प्रत्यवायभयाद्विना।
मा निवर्तिष्ट विधिना तावदुक्तं निवर्तनम्॥
प्रवृद्धतररागान्धः प्रत्यवायेऽपि कल्पिते।
न निवर्तेत इत्येवं किं विधेरप्रमाणता॥
फलं भवतु मा वा भूत् पुरुषोऽपि प्रवर्तताम्।
मा प्रवर्तिष्ट वा स्वे तु नास्त्यर्थे खण्डना विधेः॥

The operation of the commandment having thus ended, postulation of a consequence would have its origin in the human intellect only [and] from this there would be dependence [of the prohibitory injunction on other instruments of knowledge like perception, etc.].

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] Why should a human being abstain [from killing etc. given that] there is no fear for religious demerit?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] May he not abstain; [but] the injunction has communicated [dissuasion]. Does the injunction become unauthoritative if [the person] does not abstain on account of being blinded by excessive desire even when religious demerit has been postulated? May the consequence occur or may it not; may a person undertake [to abide by the prohibition] or not, there is no repudiation [of the authoritativeness] of the [prohibitory] injunction with regard to its own purpose [of communicating dissuasion].

⁷⁸⁷ By the word 'ādi' here are probably meant the primary (*kr̥t*) suffixes, like *tavya*, *anīyar*, *kelimar*, *yat*, *ṇyat*, etc.

प्रवर्तनावगमजनने हि विधिव्यापार इत्यसकृदुक्तम्। तत्र चास्य न किञ्चिद्वैकल्यम्॥

It has been said more than once that [any] injunction operates for producing an understanding of instigation. In that regard, it does not fail to the least.

ननु विधेः फलापेक्षा नास्ति चेत्, किं तर्ह्यश्रूयमाणफलेषु विश्वजिदादिषु स्वर्गादिफलं कल्प्यते? अनभिज्ञो देवानांप्रियो। न तत्र विधेः फलापेक्षा। न च फलं तत्र कल्प्यते। किन्त्वश्रूयमाणत्वादधिकारानुबन्धस्य, निरधिकारस्य च विधेर्विधित्वानिर्वाहाद् अधिकारानुबन्धः कल्प्यते। तत्र सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् स्वर्गकामश्चोदनाशेषभावेन नियोज्यः कल्प्यते। न चेयं पौरुषी कल्पना, श्रुत्येकदेशः स इति हि तद्विदः। तदियमधिकारानुबन्धकल्पना, न फलकल्पनेति सोऽयमनुबन्धद्वयावच्छिन्नो नियोगो वाक्यार्थः॥

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] Well, if there be no expectation by the injunction of a result, then why are results like *svarga* postulated in cases such as the Viśvajit and the like, where no result is being heard?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] [You are an] unexperienced fool! There is no expectation by the injunction of a result in that regard. No result is postulated there. But since the eligibility-correlate is unheard there and an injunction devoid of the eligibility [- correlate] does not accomplish its being an injunction, it is the eligibility-correlate that is postulated. Because of being non-specific to everyone, a person desirous of *svarga* as [the person] fit to be enjoined is postulated as a supplement to the injunction. And this is not human imagination since [those] adept in it (in the real nature of an injunction) [say that] it is but a part of a Vedic statement (MīSū 4.3.11).⁷⁸⁸

Thus, this a postulation of the eligibility-correlate and not a postulation of result. Hence it is this very commandment qualified by the two correlates that is the sentence-meaning.

वाक्यार्थत्वं चास्य प्रधानत्वात्। अन्यो हि यज्यादिरर्थोऽवगम्यमानस्तदनुप्रवेशेन प्रतीयत इति गुणो भवति। नियोगस्तु स्वमहिमाक्षिप्तदृष्टोपकारानेकक्रियाकारककलापोपबृंहितस्वरूपः प्रतीयत इति प्राधान्यमवलम्बते। कार्यं चेत् प्रधानमुच्यते नियोग एव कार्यम्। फलं चेत् प्रधानमुपच्यते, तदपि न सिद्धम्, अपि तु साध्यम्। साध्यत्वं चास्य नियोगाधीनमिति नियोग एव प्रधानम्। पुरुषस्तु नियोज्यमानत्वाद् अप्रधानमिति॥

And its (commandment's) being the sentence-meaning is due to its being the principal [element]. Other meanings like that of the verbal root, *yaj*, etc. that are cognised become subordinate on account of entering into (connecting with) it (commandment). A

⁷⁸⁸ What is at stake here is the following: it is a *śrutārthāpatī* and the postulated clause about the *svargakāma* has Vedic status. For *śrutārthāpatī*, see Bijelwan (1973) and for the examination of *śrutārthāpatī* by Jayanta in NM, see Graheli (2020).

commandment is cognised as but having a nature amplified by a group of many an actions and action-factors. [Such a group of many an actions and action-factors,] which renders visible assistance [to the injunction], is implied by its (the commandment's) own capacity. Hence it (the commandment) is the principal element.

[Objection to the Prābhākara:] [What] if [we say that] it is 'something to be done' which is the principal element?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] In reply it is said – it is the commandment indeed which is to be done!

[Objection by Jayanta:] [What if we] say that it is the result which is the principal element?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] That (result) too is not accomplished, but something yet to be accomplished. However, its being something to be accomplished is dependent upon the commandment. So, it is the commandment which is the principal element. The person, on account of being someone to be enjoined, is subordinate.

एवं नियोग एव प्रधानत्वात् वाक्यार्थः। स च प्रतीतिभेदपर्यालोचनया चतुरवस्थ उच्यते।
उत्पत्तिविधिर्विनियोगविधिः प्रयोगविधिरधिकारिविधिरिति॥

उत्पत्तिविधिरग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति। अग्निहोत्राख्यकर्मस्वरूपोत्पादव्यतिरेकेणार्थान्तरानवगमात्॥

विनियोगविधिर्दध्ना जुहोतीति। उत्पत्तिविधितः प्रतिपन्ने भावार्थे तत्र दध्यादिगुणविनियोगावगमात्॥

अधिकारिविधिरग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इति। निर्जाते कर्मणि तत्राधिकृतस्य पुंसस्ततोऽवगमात्॥

प्रयोगविधिस्तु यः क्रमपर्यन्तं प्रयोगे पदार्थानवगमयति। अयं चाधिकारविधेरैव व्यापारविशेष इति तदेवास्योदाहरणम् अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इति॥

क्वचिदेकस्मिन्नेव वाक्ये रूपचतुष्टयं विधेरवगम्यते, न तत्र पृथगुदाहरणमपेक्ष्यते। यथैतस्यैव रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमग्निष्टोम साम कृत्वा पशुकामो ह्येतेन यजेतेति॥

In this way, on account of being the principal element, commandment alone is the meaning of a sentence. It is said to have four states based on a review of the distinctions of how it is cognised. [They are:] the injunction of origination, the injunction of application, the injunction of performance [and] the injunction about the eligible performer.

The injunction of origination is, [for instance,] “One should offer the Agnihotra oblation” (TaiSa 1.5.1.9); because no other purpose is understood [out of it] than bringing forth the real nature of the ritual called Agnihotra.

The injunction of application is, [for instance,] “One should offer oblation with curd” (MaiSa 4.7.7); this is because [from it is] learnt the application of subordinate elements

like curd, etc. to the action (oblation) once it has been understood out of the injunction of origination.

The injunction about the eligible performer is, [for instance,] “One desirous of *svarga* should offer the Agnihotra oblation” (MaiSa 6.36); because once the action has been known, one learns who is the eligible performer with regard to it (the action) from that (injunction about eligibility).

But the injunction of performance is that which conveys the steps [involved in a ritual action] up to the sequence. This is but a distinct operation of the injunction of eligibility only; hence that alone – “one desirous of *svarga* should offer the Agnihotra oblation” is its example.

Sometimes in one [Vedic] statement alone the four forms of the injunction are understood; in which case no separate example [for each injunction] is needed. As in – “One desirous of cattle, should sacrifice with this (by means of the Agniṣṭut) after doing (imposing the tune of) the *sāma* hymns called Vāravantīya pertaining to the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, on the [R̥gvedic sacred formulas called] Revatī” (TāBrā 17.7.1).

अन्यान्यपि नियोगस्य रूपाणि व्यापारभेदादवगम्यन्ते। स हि भावार्थसिध्यर्थं तत्समर्थमर्थमाक्षिपतीति तत्प्रयोजक उच्यते। यथा माणवकस्थस्याध्ययनस्याचार्यकरणविधिः॥

क्वचिदन्याक्षिप्ते वस्तुनि लब्धे सति तत्राप्रयोजको विधिर्भवति यथा क्रयनियुक्तैकहायिन्या लाभे सति, न पादपांसुग्रहणार्थम् अन्यामेकहायनीमाक्षिपति विधिरिति। प्रकरणपठितपदार्थपटलपरिग्रहाच्च ग्राहक इति विधिरुच्यते॥

क्वचित् प्रकरणपठितस्यापि तेनागृहीतस्य द्वादशोपसदादेः प्रकरणादुत्कर्षदर्शनात् अत एव नियोगगर्भो विनियोग इत्याचक्षते॥

क्वचिद्विनियोजकश्रुत्यादिप्रमाणविरहेऽपि पञ्चेकत्वाद्युपादानं शेषीकुर्वन्नुपादायक इत्युच्यते। पशुना यजेतेति विभक्त्या हि प्रातिपदिकार्थो विनियुक्तः। तत्स्थं त्वेकत्वम् उक्तमेव, न विनियुक्तम्, एकेनेत्यश्रवणात्। पशुरुपादीयमानो न संख्यारहित उपादातुं शक्यते। श्रुतसंख्यापरित्यागकारणाभावाच्चैकत्वविशिष्टः पशुरुपादीयत इत्युपादानशेषीकृतमेकत्वम्॥

वैकृतस्तु सौर्यादिविधिः प्राकृतमितिकर्तव्याताजातमाकर्षश्चोदक इत्युच्यते। तदिदमेकस्यैव भगवतो लिङ्गस्य प्रयोक्तृशक्तिखचितात्मनः प्रचुरव्यापारवैचित्र्यमुपदर्शितमित्यलमनया महामतिमानसवत्या मीमांसार्थकथया। सोऽयमीदृशो नियोगो वाक्यार्थः॥

Based on the distinction of operations, other forms of the injunction are also understood. Since it implies things that are capable of accomplishing [the action denoted by the] meaning of the verbal root, it is called its ‘instigator’ (*prayojaka*). For example, the

[postulation of] a student’s study of the Vedas by the injunction of accepting a teacher [since without postulating the former the latter is not possible].

Sometimes, when something is obtained through implication by something else, the injunction is non-instigator in regard to it (the thing obtained through implication by another thing). For example, once a one-year-old [calf] has been obtained through the enjoinder for buying [the Soma creeper], the injunction does not imply another one-year-old [calf] for the sake of collecting the dust of [its] hoof.⁷⁸⁹ Since it takes into account all the elements read within the context, the injunction is called the ‘uptaker’⁷⁹⁰ (*grāhaka*).

Sometimes, even if it is read within [its own] context, yet the twelve *upasad*-s⁷⁹¹ etc. are not taken into account [by the injunction, "there are twelve *upasad*-s in the *ahīna* type of Soma ritual" (TāBrā10.3,9)], but taken out of the context [in accordance with the injunction, "there are three *upasad*-s" (TaiSa 6.2.5)]⁷⁹²; for this very reason it is said that application is based on the commandment.

In some cases, despite the absence of direct mention, etc. which [assist] application, [the injunction] includes the singleness pertaining to the animal, etc.; on account of making [the bringing into fold of singleness, etc.] it is called the ‘includer’ (*upādāyaka*). This is because, by means of the [third] case-marker in “one should sacrifice with an animal” (cf. KāṭSa 8.1), it is the meaning of the nominal stem (animal) which has been provided for application. But the singleness in it (in the declined form *paśunā*, ‘by means of an animal’) has only been mentioned, but not provided for application, because [such a word as] “by one” is not heard [in regard to the animal]. The animal which is being included cannot be included without a number. Since there is no reason to abandon the [singular] number that is heard⁷⁹³ [from the third case-marker used in the singular number], the animal, qualified by singleness is included. Hence [this] singleness [pertaining to the animal] is made subordinate [to the prescribed action] on account of inclusion.

Since the statement prescribing the ectype sacrifice of which the sun is the deity (TaiSa 2.3.2; MaiSa 2.2.2) [analogically] attracts the aggregate of procedural actions meant for the archetype [sacrifice, of which Agni is the deity]; hence it (the injunction prescribing the ectype of which the sun is the deity) is called the “enjoinder” (*codaka*). In this manner, the extreme variety of operations of the single venerable meaning of the optative suffix,

⁷⁸⁹ This example forms the core of the discussion found in MīSū 3.1.12. See McCrea (2000), and Yoshimizu (2006).

⁷⁹⁰ I am grateful to Dr. Carmen Spiers of Institut Français de Pondichéry for kindly suggesting this translation.

⁷⁹¹ An *upasad* is a specific kind of oblation. See MīSū 3.3.15.

⁷⁹² See ŚāBhā 3.4.14-16 for the relevant discussion; I owe this reference to Dr. Vinothe Murali of Institut Français de Pondichéry.

⁷⁹³ This singleness is heard but not specifically enjoined. If singleness is enjoined besides the animal, then it would lead to the undesirable consequence of sentence-splitting (*vākyabheda*).

whose self is studded with the instigating power, has been shown. There is no need for further discussion on tale concerning the purpose of Mīmāṃsā, which is endowed with the thoughts of people of great intellect. The commandment which is of this kind is the meaning of a sentence.

तस्य द्वादशलक्षण्यां तत्तद्रूपं प्रकाशितम्।
तन्नेह लिख्यतेऽस्माभिर्ग्रन्थगौरवभीरुभिः॥
दिङ्गात्रं त्वेतदाख्यायि नियोगस्य यथाऽऽगमम्।
अमुष्मन्नपि वाक्यार्थे विवदन्ते मनीषिणः॥

Various forms of it (commandment) have been expressed in the twelve chapters [of Mīmāṃsā]; those are not discussed here by us out of fear for the treatise becoming cumbrous. This is but an outline of commandment that has been presented in accordance with the tradition. Scholars debate even in regard to that (commandment) meaning of the sentence.

लिङ्गादेरवगम्यमानः कार्यरूपः प्रेरणात्मा च वाक्यार्थो नियोग इत्युक्तम्। न चासावेवंरूपोऽपि परिदृश्यमानभावार्थादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽवगम्यते॥

क्रियैव तावत् कार्यात्मा, प्रेरणात्मा फलार्थिता।
प्रतीयते ततोऽन्यस्तु नियोगो नोभयात्मकः॥
नन्वन्य एव क्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धात् प्रेषप्रैष्यसम्बन्धो हि दर्शितः। न युक्तोऽसौ॥
कुर्यादित्यादिशब्देभ्यः क्रियादिव्यतिरेकिणः।
नार्थान्तरस्य संवित्तिः कस्यचित् प्रेरणात्मनः॥

It has been said that commandment, which has the form of something to be done and which is of the nature of an impeller, is what is sentence-meaning. But even being of such a form, that (commandment) is not understood as something different from the meaning of the verbal root, etc. that is cognised.

It is only action which has the nature of something to be done, and being a seeker of result is of the nature of an impeller. No commandment, different from them (action and being a seeker o the result), which has both the natures, is understood.

[Objection:] Well, it has been shown that the instigator-instigated relation is different from the action-agent relation.

[Reply:] It is not correct.

Apart from action, the cognition of no other thing, which has the nature of being an impeller, ensues from expressions such '(one) should do', etc.

किमिदानीं करोति कुर्याद् इत्यादि च तुल्ये एते प्रतिपत्ती? अभिनवमिदं शब्दज्ञत्वमायुष्मतः। न ब्रूमो न भिन्ने एते प्रतिपत्ती इति। करोतीति प्रवृत्तक्रिय उच्यते, वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नश्च। किं त्वसौ प्रैषः ततोऽवगम्यमानोऽपि प्रेरको न भवति, न च कार्य इति ब्रूमः॥

ननु प्रेरकत्वेनैवावगम्यमानः कथं प्रेरको न भवेत्। एतदेवास्य प्रैषत्वं, यत् प्रेरकत्वम्। सत्यं — प्रेरकत्वेनैवासौ गम्यते। न त्वसौ तथा भवति। व्यवहारमात्रमेतद् राजाज्ञया करोमीति। कार्यत्वमप्यस्य प्रक्रियामात्रं राजाज्ञां करोमीति॥

[Objection:] Now, are the cognitions [having the forms] ‘(one) does’ and ‘(one) should do’ of the same kind? This is a new (instance) of the long-living one’s expertise of language!

[Reply:] We don’t say that the cognitions are not of different kinds. By ‘(one) does’, it is he, who has already undertaken an action and is delimited by the present moment, who is referred to. But we say that though from it (such a cognition) instigation is being understood, it (the cognition) does not become the impeller, nor (does it become) something which is to be done.

[Objection:] Well, how can it be so that even after being understood as the impeller, it would not be the impeller? Its instigation is due only to its being the instigator.

[Reply:] True, it is understood as the impeller. But it does not become so (the impeller) [on that score]. It is merely a way of saying things, that ‘I act by the order of the king’. Its being of the nature of something to be done too is just a way putting things, as in ‘I carry out the king’s command’.

आज्ञा हि नाम नैवान्या संपाद्यत्वेन गम्यते।
नानुष्ठातुरियं बुद्धिराज्ञा संपाद्यतामिति॥
एवं हि यस्य कस्यापि प्रवर्तेत स आज्ञया।
न चेह बालोन्मत्तादिवचनात् फलवर्जितात्॥
सत्यपि प्रेरणाज्ञाने प्रवर्तन्ते सचेतसः।
भयं नाशङ्क्यते यस्मात् फलं वाऽपि समीहितम्॥
तथाविधस्य राज्ञोऽपि नाज्ञाऽनुष्ठीयते जनः।
वर्तमानापदेशोऽपि फलं यत्रावगम्यते॥
तत्र प्रवर्तते लोको लिङादिष्वश्रुतेष्वपि।
भवत्यारोग्यसंपत्तिर्भुञ्जानस्य हरीतकीम्॥
तत्कामो भक्षयेच्चेति को विशेषः प्रवर्तने?
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तदेवमनुमन्यते।

प्रेरकत्वं फलस्यैव न नियोगात्मनः पुनः॥

तत्रैतत् स्यात् — लोके भवतु फलार्थित्वात् प्रवर्तनम्, आरिराधयिषते, प्रेरकातिशयानुवर्तने वा तस्य पारम्पर्येण फलहेतुत्वात्। वेदे तु वक्तुरभावात् प्रेरणावगमादेव प्रवृत्तिः॥

उन्मत्तवाक्यादपि लिङादियुक्तात् न प्रेरणावगमो नास्ति? भवन्नपि दोषदर्शनाद् उपेक्ष्यत उन्मत्त एवं प्रलपतीति। वेदे पुनर्यजेतेत्यत्र प्रेरणावगमात् परित्यागकारणाभावात् तत एव प्रवर्तनम्। प्रवर्तनाभावेऽपि न वेदस्याप्रामाण्यं, प्रमाणव्यापारस्य तेन निर्वर्तितत्वादित्युक्तम्॥

No other thing called order is understood as something to be accomplished. [For,] he who executes the order does not understand – ‘the order is to be accomplished’. Because, if it were thus, then [one] would undertake an action being ordered by anyone whosoever. Rational people do not undertake actions out of statements made by a child, an insane person, etc. that lack purpose, even when he cognises impelling. Ordinary people do not carry out the order of such a king, who is not to be feared, or from whom no result is desired. Even with regard to indicative [verbs], where result is understood, on ordinary man undertakes an action, although exhortative suffixes are not heard. What is the difference in impelling between “he who eats the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree regains health” and “one who is desirous of it (regaining health) should eat [the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree]”? By means of concomitant presence and concomitant absence it is this which is understood – that it is only the result which is the instigator, but not the commandment.

Let it be so – in the world, with regard to someone who is to be appeased, or in compliance with the magnanimity of the impeller, let instigation be caused by one’s being the seeker of the result. This is because, they (appeasing someone or complying with the magnanimity of the impeller) are indirect causes of [accomplishing the] result. But since a speaker of the Vedas is absent, one acts in regard to the Vedas (Vedic injunctions) only due to an understanding of impulsion.

[Objection by Jayanta:] It is not the case that there is no understanding of impelling ensuing from an exhortative statement made by an insane person.

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] Even though it (understanding of impelling) is there, it is ignored on account of finding defects [by observing that] “a mad man is talking nonsense.” But in case of the Veda, since there is an understanding of impelling in [the Vedic injunction] “(one) should sacrifice”, and because there is no reason to abandon [that understanding of impelling], activity follows from that (understanding of impelling) only. Even a lack of activity does lead to the invalidity of the Vedas, because it has been remarked that it (the Vedic injunction) has already discharged the function of the instrument of knowledge [which is nothing but the generation of the cognition, “I am instigated”].

उच्यते — वेदेऽपि वक्ताऽस्ति। तदाशयवशेन तत्रापि फलार्थिनां प्रवर्तनमिति संभवदपीदमुत्तरं नाचक्ष्महे, कथान्तरप्रसङ्गात्। किन्त्विदं प्रेषणावगमादेव प्रवृत्तिसिद्धौ स्वर्गकामपदं बादरिवदन्यथा व्याख्यायताम्। अधिकारानुबन्धाभिधाने पुरुषविशेषणमात्रमेतद् भवतु, किं स्वर्गसाध्यत्वकल्पनया। विशेषणत्वमेवान्यथा न निर्वहतीति चेद्, आयातं तर्हि फलस्य साध्यत्वम्। तच्चेत् साध्यत्वेनावगम्यते, तस्यैव सामर्थ्यसिद्धं लोकानुगुणमव्यभिचारि च प्रवर्तकत्वमुत्सृज्य न प्रेरणावगमस्य तद्वक्तुमर्हसीति॥

नियोगादथ निष्पत्तिः फलस्येत्यभिधीयते।

फलं प्रत्यङ्गभूतत्वाद् अवाक्यार्थत्वमापतेत्॥

[Reply Jayanta:] In reply it is said – the Veda too has a speaker. Although such a reply is possible that even in regard to that (Vedic injunctions) a person who desires a result is motivated to act on account of his (the speaker’s) intention, we don’t mention it, since it would lead to some other discussion. But rather we say that if the accomplishment of undertaking of action were due only to an understanding of instigation, then, like Bādari, one should explain the phrase, ‘he who desires *svarga*’ in another way.

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] Let this (phrase), in order to⁷⁹⁴ convey the eligibility-correlate, be the qualifier of the person.

[Reply by Jayanta:] – Of what use is [then] the postulation of *svarga*’s being the object to be accomplished?

[The Prābhākara:] What if it said that [without postulating *svarga* to be the object to be accomplished], its (*svarga*’s) being the qualifier [of the person] is not established?

[Jayanta:] Then what it boils down to is that the result is the object to be accomplished. And if it is understood as the object to be accomplished, then it is improper to assert that an understanding of impelling is the instigator at the expense of the view that it (the result) alone is the instigator. This is because, [the result’s] being the instigator based on its own capacity [to instigate] is undeviating and in compliance with the [way things work in the] ordinary world.

[Objection by Jayanta:] Now if it is said that the accomplishment of the result follows from the commandment, then because of its being subordinate to the result, its (the commandment’s) not being sentence-meaning undesirably follows.

ननु विध्यर्थो न भावार्थवत् फले करणं, येनास्य तदङ्गत्वं स्यात्। आक्षेपकत्वात् तस्य फलार्थत्वमुच्यते। प्रयोक्तृत्वं हि तस्य निजं रूपम्। यद्येवं भावार्थ एव साध्यो भवतु। विध्यर्थस्य तु किमनुष्ठेयत्वमुच्यते?

⁷⁹⁴ The *saptamī vibhakti* found here is to be understood as denoting ‘*nimitta*’ in accordance with the following Kātyāyana’s *Vārttika* on Aṣṭ 2.3.36 – *nimittāt karmayoge*.

सोऽपि भावार्थसिद्ध्या संपद्यते, कृतो मया स्वामिनियोग इति व्यवहारादिति चेद् —

भावार्थात्तर्हि निष्पत्तिर्नियोगस्य फलस्य च।
इत्येकत्र पदग्रामे वाक्यार्थद्वयमापतेत्॥
किंचान्विताभिधानेन विषयत्वावधारणात्।
नियोगस्यैव भावार्थनिष्पाद्यत्वं प्रतीयते॥
स तु भावार्थतः सिद्धः फलाय यदि कल्प्यते।
परार्थत्वादवाक्यार्थो भवेदित्युपवर्णितम्॥
भावार्थस्तु द्वयं कुर्याद् युगपद्वा क्रमेण वा।
युगपन्नास्य सामर्थ्यं समत्वं च द्वयोर्भवेत्॥

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, the meaning of the injunction (commandment) is not the means of [achieving] the result in the same way as the meaning of the verbal root, on account of which it would [undesirably] be subservient [to the result]. Rather, in so far as it implies the result that it (commandment) is said to serve the purpose of the result. For, being an instigator is its own nature.

[Reply by Jayanta:] If it were so, then let the meaning of the verbal root be the object to be accomplished. Why is it said that the meaning of the injunction is that which is to be performed?

[Counter-assertion by the Prābhākara:] What if on the strength of the usage, ‘The master’s command has been done by me’ [it is said] that through the accomplishment of the meaning of the verbal root that (commandment) too is accomplished?

[Reply by Jayanta:]

Then by means of the meaning of the verbal root (the prescribed action) the commandment and the result are accomplished; hence two sentence-meanings [undesirably] would occur with regard to a single cluster of words (a single sentence). Moreover, on account of denotation of the connected, since the scope [of the commandment] is ascertained, it is the commandment alone which would appear to be the object to be accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root. If it (the commandment), [which is already] accomplished [through the prescribed action denoted by the verbal root], is postulated as being for the sake of the result, it (the commandment) would, on account of being for the sake of something else, not be the sentence-meaning – this has already been said. Should the meaning of the verbal root bring produce both [the commandment and the result] simultaneously or in a sequence? There is no capacity of it [for producing them] simultaneously, [and even if it were to produce simultaneously, then] both of them would be equal.

नियोगश्च शब्दैकगोचरत्वान् मा दर्शि; फलं तु स्वर्गपश्चादि तेन सह निष्पद्यमानं किमिति न गृह्यते? क्रमपक्षे पूर्वं वा नियोगः, पश्चात् फलम्। पूर्वं वा फलं पश्चाद्वा विनियोगः सिद्ध्येदिति। यदि पूर्वं नियोगस्तदा नियोगस्यासंपाद्यत्वात् तद्विषयलिप्साया अनुपपत्तेः करणांशोऽपि वैधी प्रवृत्तिस्स्यात्॥

यथा नियोगनिष्पत्तिः प्रयाजादिकृतेन तु
ततः प्रवृत्तिः शास्त्रीया भावार्थोऽपि तथा भवेत्॥

इष्यत एवेति चेन् —

नन्वेवं तस्य लिप्सार्थलक्षणेत्यभ्यधायि यत्
श्येनादीनामधर्मत्वं वर्णितं तद्विरुद्ध्यते॥

And may you not see commandment on account of its being the content of linguistic communication alone. But why could not result like *svarga*, animals, etc. which are produced together with it (commandment) be seen?

[Clarificatory question by Jayanta:] On the sequence view, should commandment first and then the result or first the result and then the commandment be accomplished?

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] [What] if it were commandment [which were to be accomplished] first?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] In that case, [since commandment is not a human end in itself and hence] no desire for it is possible, one would undertake [the performance of] even the instrument (action denoted by the verbal root) due to [the instigation of] injunction.

Just as the accomplishment of commandment takes place through the performance of the fore-sacrifices, etc. [in regard to which one is instigated by the Vedic injunctions alone], so should the instigation with regard to the meaning of the verbal root [which is the instrument of achieving the commandment] be due to (caused by) the sacred texts (injunctions).

[Response of the Prābhākara:] What if [we say that] it is something indeed accepted [by us]?

[Reply by Jayanta:]

Well, in this way, the statement [by Jaimini] about its being a purpose attainable through desire [and] the description of the Śyena and the like as contrary-to-religious duty would be contradicted.

अथ पूर्वं फलसिद्धिः, ततो नियोगसिद्धिः। तर्हि फलस्य तदानीं दर्शनं भवेत्, सिद्धत्वात्॥

न च भावार्थवेलायां पुत्रपश्चादि दृश्यते।
अदृश्यमानमप्येतत् सिद्धमित्यतिविस्मयः॥

[Proposal by the Prābhākara:] Now, [let] the result [be] first accomplished, and the commandment thereafter.

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then the result, on account of being already accomplished, would be visible at that time (at the time of the accomplishment of the commandment).

And [results such as] son, cattle, etc. are not seen at the time of [accomplishment of the action, represented by the] meaning of the verbal root. And it is very surprising that despite being invisible they should be [treated as being already] accomplished!

अतश्च यत् कैश्चिदुच्यते — स्वर्गसिद्धिमवान्तरव्यापारीकृत्य नियोगमेव भावार्थः संपादयतीति — तदप्यपास्तम् — अवान्तरव्यापारस्य ज्वलनादेरिव प्रधानव्यापारात् पूर्वं दर्शनप्रसङ्गादिति॥

Hence the assertion by some [Prābhākaras] that – it is the commandment only that is accomplished by the meaning of the verbal root by making the accomplishment of *svarga* an intermediate activity – is also refuted. For, this would lead to the undesirable consequence of the visibility of the intermediate activity such as burning etc. [in case of cooking of food] before the main activity.

अथोच्यते — स्वर्गकामस्य स्वर्गं साधयितुमुद्यच्छतो यागे नियोगो यः संपाद्यः श्रूयते, स चेत् संपन्नः शब्दवृत्तेन फलमपि संपन्नमेव। आनुभाविकी तु स्वर्गादिसिद्धिः कालान्तरे भविष्यतीति। एतदयुक्तं — सिद्धिद्वयानुपलंभात्। न ह्येका शाब्दी सिद्धिरन्या चानुभाविकी फलसिद्धिः कुतस्त्येति चिन्त्यम्॥

कालान्तरे च भावार्थः क्षणिकत्वान्न विद्यते।

शक्त्यादिरूपं चापूर्वं न भवद्भिरुपेयते॥

भवन्तो ह्यपूर्वशब्देन धर्मशब्देन च नियोगमेवोपचरन्ति । न च नियोगः शक्तिवद् आत्मसंस्कारवद्वा कालान्तरस्थायी भवति। स हि प्रेरणात्मकः, कार्यरूपो वा, नोभयथाऽपि स्थैर्यमवलम्बते॥

[Proposal by Prābhākara:] Now it is being said – the enjoinder of a *svarga*-desiring person, that is of him, who desires to accomplish *svarga*, to sacrifice, is directly understood [from the injunction] as something to be accomplished. If it (enjoinder) is accomplished, the result too is indeed accomplished owing to the functioning of linguistic communication. But the accomplishment of *svarga* etc. at the level of experience will occur later.

[Reply by Jayanta:] This is incorrect, because two kinds of accomplishments are not apprehended. For, there is not something called linguistic accomplishment and another thing called experiential accomplishment. It has to be considered as to whence [would there be two such accomplishments].

Because of [its] being short-lived, the meaning of the verbal root does not continue to be there later. And an 'unseen' which is of the nature of a potency, etc. is not accepted by you.

It is commandment alone which is figuratively referred to by you, Sir, by the word 'unseen' and by the word 'religious duty' (*dharma*). And it is not the case that the commandment continues to stay later like a potency or like subliminal impressions of the self. It does not gain stability in both ways – either as an instigator, or as something to be done.

तत्रैतत् स्यान् — नियोगसिद्धिराक्षिप्तफलसिद्धिर्भवति। विषयाद्यनुबन्धावच्छिन्नो ह्यसावेवानुष्ठेयः। तत्र यथा तेन तेन कारकचक्रेण क्रियाकलापेन विना संपत्तिमलभमानः तत्तदाक्षिपति, तथाऽधिकारानुबन्धबन्ध्योऽपि नासौ संपत्तिमधिगच्छतीति तमप्याक्षिपति। यश्चायमधिकारानुबन्धाक्षेपः, स एवायं फलाक्षेपेण तु विधेः फलाक्षेपितेत्युक्तम्। एतदयुक्तम् —

यो हि येन दिना कामं न सिद्धयेत् स तमाक्षिपेत्।
नियोज्यमात्राक्षेपे तु नियोगो न फलात्मकः॥

नियोज्यश्चण्डालस्पर्शनेनेव स्वर्गकामनोत्पादमात्रेण नियोज्यतां प्रतिपन्न इति कथं नियोज्याक्षेप एव फलाक्षेपः॥

ननु च स्वर्गकामोऽत्र नियोज्यो नान्यथा भवेत्।
यदि स्वर्गस्य संपत्तिं नाधिगच्छेत् स्वकर्मणः॥

नैतदेवम् —

नरेच्छामात्रमेवेदं न शब्दस्त्वयति क्षमः।
नियोज्यः स्वर्गकामो हि भवेज्जीवनवानिवा॥

[Proposal by the Prābhākara opponent:] Let it be so – the accomplishment of the result is implied by the accomplishment of the commandment. For, it (commandment) alone, as qualified by scope-correlate, etc., is fit to be performed. Just as on account of not being accomplished without a collection of specific action-factors, [and] a string of specific activities, it (commandment) implies them, so in the absence of the eligibility-correlate too, it (commandment) is not accomplished and hence it implies that (eligibility) too. It has been mentioned that such an implication of the eligibility-correlate indeed is the implication of the result, but the injunction does not expect any result.

[Reply by Jayanta:] This is incorrect.

For, may that, without which something is not accomplished, be pleasingly implied by it. But commandment does not partake of the nature of being a result if it implies merely the person who is fit to be enjoined.

A person who fit to be enjoined attains the state of being fit to be enjoined merely on account of the production of a desire for *svarga*. This is like touching a *caṇḍāla* [which makes one fit for purificatory acts prescribed by the sacred texts like bathing, etc.]. Thus, how can the implication of the person fit to be enjoined indeed could be the implication of the result?

[Counter-argument by the Prābhākara opponent:]

Well, a person desiring *svarga* does not become the person fit to be enjoined otherwise, if on account of his own action (performing the action prescribed to him by the injunction) he does not accomplish *svarga*.

[Reply by Jayanta:] It is not so.

This is mere human desire; but linguistic communication [in the form of the Vedic injunction] is not capable to this extent [that it would bring about the result]. For, the *svarga*-desiring person would [merely on account of his desire for *svarga*] be the person fit to be enjoined just as the person alive [is the person fit to be enjoined on account of his being alive in case of the injunction, “one should sacrifice as long as one lives”].

ननु लोके काम्यमानस्य साध्यत्वं दृष्टं हरीतकीं भक्षयेदारोग्यकाम इति। तेन वेदेऽपि यजेत स्वर्गकाम इति स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वमवभोत्स्यामहे। साधो लोकेऽपि कथमेतदवगतम् आयुष्मता? नियोज्यसमर्पकपदवाच्यपर्यालोचनेन? विधिवृत्तपरीक्षया वा?

पदार्थस्तावदेतावान्? एवं चातो ह्यसाविति।
इदं तु सिद्ध्यत्येतस्मादिति तस्य न गोचरः॥
विधेरेश स्वभावश्चेदायुष्मन् साधु बुद्ध्यसे।
भाट्टैः किमपराद्धं ते नित्येऽपि फलवादिभिः॥
अधिकार्यनुपादेयविशेषणविशेषितः।
जीवन् वा स्वर्गकामोऽपि समानः काम्यनित्ययो॥
विधिवीर्यप्रभवस्तु द्वयोरपि तथाविधः।
सप्रत्ययप्रेरकतां विधिर्नोपैति निष्फलः॥

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, in the world the thing which is being desired is seen to be [accepted as] the object to be accomplished, as in “one desirous of good health should eat the fruit of the yellow myrobalan tree.” On that score, in case of the Veda too we will understand that *svarga* is the object to be accomplished, as in “one desirous of *svarga* should sacrifice.”

[Reply by Jayanta:] O wise one! How is this even understood by the long-living one even in the world. Is it by reflecting upon the word expressing the person fit to be enjoined? Or by examining the functioning of the injunction?

In the first place, the word-meaning is this much – for, from this, [it is understood that] he is like this. That it (*svarga*) should follow from this (sacrifice), is not its content. If [it is said by you, Prābhākara, that] such is the nature of the injunction, then O long-living one! You understand correctly! [But] how [then] have the Bhāṭṭas, who accept result even in regard to the fixed sacrifices, wronged you? A person who is alive or a person who desires *svarga*, [in so far as he is] specified by an unobtainable qualifier, equally is the eligible performer with regard to fixed and elective rituals [respectively]. The impact of the might of the injunction remains so (equal) also in both the cases. An injunction, as devoid of a result, does not instigate a rational person.

ननु कामनाधिकारे स्वर्गः श्रूयते, नित्याधिकारे त्वसौ न श्रूयते। अश्रूयमाणः कस्यानुरोधेन कल्प्यते? विधिरेवेति ब्रूमः। स्वर्गेण श्रुतेनापि किं करिष्यति, यद्यसौ विधिना नापेक्ष्यते, घृतकुल्या अस्य भवन्तीत्यादिवद् अश्रुतोऽपि चासौ विधिनाऽऽकृष्यत एव। तस्माद् विधिरेवात्र प्रमाणं, न श्रवणाश्रवणे इति काम्यवन्नित्येऽपि फलमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। न वा क्वचिदपीति।

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, *svarga* is heard in case of elective rituals, but it is not heard in case of fixed rituals. Being unheard, on what ground should it be postulated?

[Reply by Jayanta:] We say that it is because of the injunction [that the result should be postulated]. Of what use will be *svarga* even if heard, were it not attracted by the injunction? Even though unheard, it (*svarga*) is indeed attracted by the injunction just as it is the case in “For him [who studies the Ṛgveda] flow streams of clarified butter”⁷⁹⁵. Therefore, it is the injunction which is the basis⁷⁹⁶ [for postulating the result] here, and not [the result’s] being heard and unheard. Thus, a result has to be postulated in case of a fixed ritual too just as [it is done with regard to] an elective ritual, or it should not be postulated anywhere.

प्रतिषेधाधिकारेऽपि विधिवृत्तपरीक्षया।

एवं नरकपातादिफलयोगो न दुर्भणः॥

येन हि दुर्विषहक्लेशद्वेषकलुषितमनसा ब्राह्मणहननं सुखसाधनमिति कर्तव्यमिति गृहीतं, निर्गलरागरसिकेन सुरापानं सुखसाधनमिति गृहीतं, स ततो विधिना वार्येत, यदि तदसुखसाधनमिति

⁷⁹⁵ Cf. ŚaBrā 11.5.6.8.

⁷⁹⁶ I have translated the word ‘*pramāṇa*’ occurring in the original text as ‘basis’ rather than my usual way of rendering it as ‘an instrument of knowledge’, since from the context it appears that the word is used in the sense of the ground on which such a postulation is made, and not a concrete instrument of knowledge which conveys it.

ज्ञाप्यते। तस्मान्नित्येषु प्रत्यवायपरिहार इवोपात्तदुरितक्षय इव वा प्रतिषिध्यमानेषु कर्मसु नरकपातः फलमित्यभ्युपगमनीयम्। इतरथा ह्यर्थानर्थविवेको न सिद्ध्यति॥

एवं च ब्रह्महत्यादेरपि नैवास्त्यधर्मता।
किं पुनः श्येनवज्रादेरित्यर्थग्रहणं वृथा॥
करणांशेऽपि लिप्सातः प्रवृत्तिर्यद्युपेयते।
इतिकतव्यतांशे तु शास्त्राद्यदि तदप्यसत्॥
न हि तत्करणं शुद्धं स्वफलायोपकल्पते।
सेतिकर्तव्यताकं हि करणं करणं विदुः॥

अवान्तरविभाग एवैषः करणेतिकर्तव्यतालक्षणः। सकलाङ्गोबृंहितस्वरूपस्तु भावार्थः काम्यमानोपायतां प्रतिपद्यते, नैकेनाप्यंशेन न्यूनः। अत एव काम्यानां कर्मणां सर्वाङ्गोपसंहारेण प्रयोगमिच्छन्ति। तस्मात् करणवदितिकर्तव्यतायामपि लिप्सात एव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्॥

उभयत्रापि लिप्सातः सति चैवं प्रवर्तने।
अग्नीषोमीयहिंसादेः श्येनादिवदधर्मता॥

यदप्युक्तं — कामाधिकारेषु काम्यमानभावार्थयोरुपायोपेयभावमात्रप्रतिपादनपर्यवसितो विधिव्यापार इति — तदपि न सम्यग् — विधिपुरुषयोर्हि प्रेर्यप्रेरकभावलक्षणः संबन्धः। तत्र यागादयो विषयत्वेन प्रतीयन्ते, नेष्यमाणोपायत्वेना साध्यसाधनमात्रप्रतिपादनपर्यवसितव्यापारस्तु विधिर्विनियोगपर एव स्यात्। ततश्चाप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तकं नाम निजं रूपं जह्यात्॥

In this way, through an examination of the function of the injunction in case of prohibitions too, a connection with consequences such as downfall into *naraka* etc. is not difficult to be asserted.

For, he, who, having a mind tainted by unbearable wrath and hatred, has understood killing of a brāhmaṇa to be the means of achieving pleasure and hence something to be done, [or] he, who being impassioned by unrestrained desires, has understood drinking of liquor to be the means of achieving pleasure, is dissuaded by the [prohibitory] injunction from that (killing of a brāhmaṇa or drinking of liquor), if it is communicated [by the prohibitive injunction] that it (killing a brāhmaṇa or drinking of liquor) is the means of achieving misery. Therefore, just like the avoidance of [future] religious demerit or elimination of accumulated religious demerits in case of fixed rituals, downfall into *naraka* should be postulated as the consequence of [performing] prohibited actions. Otherwise, the discrimination between what is beneficial and what is maleficent is not established.

In this way, [when] killing of a brāhmaṇa, etc. would not be contrary-to-religious duties, whence will Śyena, Vajra and the like be [so]? Thus, the inclusion of the word 'beneficial' [in MīSū 1.1.2] would be redundant. If it is accepted that activity in regard to the

instrument (the action denoted by the verbal root) based on desire [for the result] and that in regard to the procedural actions is due to the sacred texts, that too is incorrect. For, it is not the pure instrument which is capable of producing its own result, because it is the instrument, together with the procedural actions, which is known as the 'instrument'.

This is a superfluous division characterised by instrument and procedural actions. It is the meaning of the verbal root, having its nature amplified by all the accessories (procedural actions) that becomes the means of [achieving] the object of one's desires, but not that which falls short of even a single accessory. It is for this reason only that [people adept in rituals] want all the accessories of elective rituals to be performed. Therefore, just as in case of the instrument, undertaking of the procedural actions too would be instigated only on desire.

And in this way, if activity in regard to both (the means and the procedure) are due to desire, the killing in Agnīṣomīya [animal sacrifice] and the like would [undesirably] be contrary-to-religious duty like Śyena, etc.

As for the assertion that – the activity of the injunction ends with communicating merely the means-end relationship between the meaning of the verbal root and the object of desire – that too is not right; for, the relation between the injunction and the person is that of the instigator and the instigated. In regard to that, sacrifice, etc. are understood as the content, but not as the means of achieving the object which is being desired. If the activity of the injunction ended with communicating just the means-end relationship, then the injunction would only aim at [describing the] application [of the subordinate elements to the principal one]. And for that reason, it would abandon its own nature of being the instigator of someone who is not already instigated.

विधेश्चतुरवस्थत्वं फलतः किल कथ्यते।
प्रेरकत्वं च तद्रूपं सर्वावस्थानुगामि यत्॥
कार्यात्मताऽपि विध्यर्थे प्रेरणाज्ञप्तिपूर्विका।
प्रेर्येणैव सता पुंसा तत्कार्यमवधार्यते॥
लिङादिश्रुतितश्चादौ प्रेरणैव प्रतीयते।
साध्यसाधनसंबन्धबुद्धिस्तद्बुद्धिपूर्विका॥

The four states of the injunction are asserted on the basis of the result. Being an instigator is that nature of its which [invariably] follows it in all the states. The injunction's being of the nature of something to be done presupposes an understanding of impelling. It is on becoming fit for being impelled that a person determines it (the prescribed action) as something to be done. It is only impelling which is first understood from the direct mention of optative and like suffixes; the understanding of the means-end relationship presupposes the understanding of it (impelling).

नन्वेवं काम्येषु विधितः प्रवृत्ताविष्यमाणायाम् अप्रवर्तमानः प्रत्यवेयाद्, विध्यतिक्रमात् — मैवं — स्वर्ग सिषाधयिषोस्तत्राधिकारात्। अन्यस्त्वनधिकृत एव, क्षत्रियादिरिव वैश्यस्तोमे। नासावकुर्वन् प्रत्यवायमर्हति। स्वर्गार्थी तु विधितः प्रवर्तत एव। लिप्सया तु करणांशे प्रवृत्तिरिष्यमाणा क्रत्वर्थमितिकर्तव्यतांशमपि सैव स्पृशेत्॥ क्रतूपकारकामो हि तत्र प्रवर्तत इत्येवं सर्वत्र विधिरुत्सीदेदेवेत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन॥

[Objection by the Prābhākara:] Well, in this way, if undertaking of activity in regard to elective rituals were accepted to be based on the injunction, then a person who is not acting would incur religious demerit because of transgressing the injunction.

[Reply by Jayanta:] It should not be so. This is because it is he, who wants to accomplish *svarga*, who is eligible in regard to it (the elective ritual). Others are indeed not eligible, just as people born in the Kṣatriya caste [are not eligible] with regard to the Vaiśyastoma ritual [for which only people born in the Vaiśya caste are eligible]. It is not the case that the person incurs religious demerit on account of not doing it. The person who seeks *svarga* indeed acts on account of [the instigation caused by] the injunction. If one holds that one undertakes the instrument being prompted by one's desire, then that (desire) alone should touch the procedure part, which is meant for the sake of ritual. A person who desires to assist the ritual would [in that case] act in regard to it (the procedure) and thus the [need for the] injunction will be uprooted everywhere. Enough of digression.

अपि च-

प्रमाणान्तरसंपर्कविकले भवतः कथम्।
नियोगात्मनि वाक्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्व्यवहारतः॥

ननूक्तमाकूतविशेषपूर्विकां चेष्टामात्मनिष्ठां दृष्ट्वा परत्रापि तथाऽनुमानमिति। अयुक्तमिदं — स्वात्मन्यपि प्रेरणावगमनिमित्ताभावात्। न ह्यात्मेव, संविदिव प्रेरणावगमनिमित्ताभावात् प्रेरणा स्वप्रकाशा। प्रेरणासंवित् स्वप्रकाशेति चेत् तदुत्पादे तर्हि निमित्तं तावन् मृग्यम्। न तावच्छब्दस्तदानीं व्युत्पत्त्यभावात्। स्वात्मनि प्रेरणावगमपूर्विकां हि चेष्टामुपलब्धवतस्ते परत्र चेष्टादर्शनात् तदनुमानं सेत्स्यति। तन्निमित्तं लिडादिशब्द इति भोत्स्यते, स पुनर्व्युत्पत्तिकाले स्वात्मन्येव प्रेरणावगमश्चिन्त्यो वर्तते। प्रमाणान्तरात् तदवगम इति चेद् — उत्तिष्ठ, असिद्धं शब्दैकगोचरत्वम्॥

या चेयं पूर्वावधारितसुखसाधनभावे कपित्थादौ स्वात्मनि प्रवृत्तिरुपलब्धा, तत्र प्रेरकत्वेन फलार्थिता निर्जाता, नान्या काचित् प्रेरणा। तदुक्तम् —

स्मरणादभिलाषेण व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते

इति। फलविषया हीच्छा तत्र स्वसंवेद्या॥

अतश्च प्रेरकज्ञानं शब्दादपि परस्य यत्।
कल्प्यतां तत्र प्रेरिका सैव सुन्दरी॥
चपेटापरिहाराय मोदकप्राप्तयेऽपि वा।
प्रवर्तते वटुर्नासौ जुहुधीति नियोगतः॥

कथं तर्ह्येवमाचष्टे आचार्यचोदितोऽहं जुहोमीति? अस्त्वयं व्यपदेशः। आचार्यचोदना तु न तत्र कारणम्; अपि तु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थित्वमेवेत्यतः फलं प्रवर्तकं युक्तम्, अनुभवसाक्षिकत्वात्॥

Moreover,

Given that a connection with any other means of knowledge has been denied to it (commandment), how does, on your view, one, based on usage [of elders], learn [the word-meaning relationship] with regard to sentence-meaning, which is of the nature of commandment?

[Reply by the Prābhākara:] It has been said that on seeing activity to be preceded by a specific volition in oneself that one infers similarly in case of others too.

[Objection by Jayanta:] This is incorrect, because there is no basis for understanding impelling even in regard to one's own self. For, [just] because there is no basis for understanding impelling, that impelling [should be accepted] as self-revealing like the self, [and] cognition. If cognition of impelling were to be self-revealing – then, to begin with, one has to find out the cause of its genesis. It is not linguistic communication [which could be the cause], because language acquisition is absent at that time. [For you], who understand that activity is preceded by an understanding of impelling, the inference of it (the understanding of impelling) is established in regard to others seen acting. You say that the basis for it (such an inference) is the optative and like suffixes. But that understanding of impelling in one's own self at the time of language acquisition [for the first time] is to be pondered over. If [you say that] the understanding of it is based on some other means of knowledge, then get up! [your claim that sentence-meaning, which is of the nature of commandment, is] the content of linguistic communication only is not established.

In regard to the effort in one's own self for the fruit of the wood-apple tree and the like, whose being the means of [achieving] pleasure has previously been ascertained. it is one's being the seeker of the result, and nothing else called impelling, that is understood as the instigator. It has therefore been said –

Activity follows from desire on account of recollection [of a thing previously experienced as the means of achieving pleasure]. (PVB 2.4.183)

For, it is the desire for the result that is self-revealing there.

Therefore, in place of a knowledge of the impeller [ensuing] from exhortative suffixes, which is postulated by others, may that beautiful [desire for the result]

alone be postulated as the instigator. It is either to avoid [getting] slapped or for the sake of obtaining sweets that a young student undertakes study; but he does not [do so] due to any commandment such as “you should offer oblation.”

Then why does one say, “I do it being impelled by the teacher”? Let there be such a usage. But impelling by the teacher is not the basis of that, but only a desire for obtaining and avoiding things beneficial and unbeneficial. Therefore, it is but reasonable that the result is the instigator, because it is testified by experience.

येऽप्याहुः – प्रयोक्त्राशयस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं, यतोऽननुविधेयस्य वचनान् न प्रवर्तमानः कश्चिदृश्यते। अनुविधेयस्य पुंसः किञ्चिदब्रुवतोऽपि भ्रूभङ्गादिनाऽऽशयमवगम्य प्रवर्तत इति – एतदप्ययुक्तम् – यतः प्रयोक्त्राशयानुमानेन स्वार्थसंभावनया लोकः प्रवर्तते। न पुनः प्रयोक्तैव प्रीयतामिति। तत्प्रीतिरपि स्वप्रीतिहेतुत्वेनार्थ्यते, न तत्प्रीतित्वेन। बुद्धोऽपि हि नाम सकलसत्त्वहितंप्रतिपन्नः परार्थं स्वप्रयोजनतयैव संपादयति। परार्थसंपादनद्वारकं तु तत्। तस्मात् स्वप्रीतिरेव प्रवर्तिका। प्रयोक्त्राशयस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वे वेदार्थप्रयोक्त्राशयानवधारणाद् अप्रवृत्तिरेव प्राप्नोति। तस्मात् फलमेव प्रवर्तकम्॥

यत्पुनः फलस्य प्रेरकत्वे दूषणमभ्यधायि – सिद्धयसिद्धविकल्पानुपपत्तेरिति – तदप्ययुक्तम् – इच्छाविषयीकृतस्य प्रवर्तकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। असिद्धे कथं कामनेति चेद् – असिद्धत्वादेव। इदानीं च तदसिद्धं ; नैकान्तासिद्धस्वरूपमेव, खपुष्पवत्॥

As for those who say that – it is the intention of the instigating person which is the instigator in so far as no one is seen to be acting on account of the assertion made by someone who must not to be obeyed. [But one] acts by understanding the intention from the contraction or knitting of the eyebrows by a person, who must be obeyed, even when he is not speaking anything.

This too is incorrect. Because, it is on account of the possibility of [getting] one’s purpose [served], [understood] through an inference of the intention of the instigating person that worldly people act, that ordinary people undertake activities on understanding through inference of the intention of the instigating person; but not [because he merely wants that] the instigating person should be pleased. He seeks even his (the instigating person’s) pleasure as the cause of his own pleasure, but not as his pleasure. For, even the Buddha, who is known to have resolved for the well-being of all, accomplishes the ends [desired by] others in so far as it is his own purpose indeed. But [the serving of the Buddha’s own purpose is achieved] by means of accomplishing the purposes of others. Therefore, it is [his] own pleasure only which instigates [even the Buddha]. If the intention of the instigating person is the instigator, then since such an intention is not ascertained with regard to the meaning of the Vedas [which are authorless for the Mīmāṃsakas], what is obtained is a non-undertaking of activity.

The faults that have been said in regard to [our view that] the result is the instigator, on account of not [having] justified [whether the result is] something already accomplished

or not accomplished, are also unfounded. This is because, it is the result as has been made the object of one's desire that has been postulated to be the instigator.

[Objection:] How can one desire something which is unaccomplished?

[Reply:] It is because it is unaccomplished indeed. And it is currently unaccomplished, [but] its nature is not that of something which is absolutely unaccomplished like the sky-flower.

A person desires [to obtain] pleasure or avoid pain; but sky-flower, etc. are not desired by any person.

येऽपि रागादेः प्रवर्तकत्वमभ्युपगतवन्तस्तैरपि कामनाविषयीकृतं फलमेव प्रवर्तकमभ्युपगतम्।
इच्छाविशेषा एव हि रागादयः॥

यदपि श्रेयस्साधकत्वं प्रवर्तकमुच्यते, तदपि न चारुः; सत्यामपि श्रेयस्साधनतायाम् अनर्थित्वेन प्रवृत्त्यभावात्॥

नन्वर्थिनोऽपि नानियतविषया प्रवृत्तिरपितु निर्जातश्रेयस्साधनभावे भावार्थे। तस्मात् तत्साधनतावगमः प्रवर्तकः। सत्यम् – द्वये सत्यपीच्छैव प्रवर्तिका वक्तुं युक्ता, तस्यां सत्यामेव प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्। प्रवृत्तिर्हि नाम प्रयत्नः। प्रयत्नश्चेच्छाकार्यं इति काणादाः। विषयनियमे तु श्रेयस्साधनत्वं कारणं, न प्रवृत्त्युत्पादे॥

किंच भावनावगतं श्रेयस्साधनत्वं प्रवर्तकमिष्यते तैः। तच्च न पृथगभिधातुं युक्तम्। भावनायास्त्रयंशत्वेन तत्स्वरूपावगमसमये एतदंशयोः स्वर्गयागयोः साध्यसाधनभावावगतिसिद्धेः। न चांशद्वयावच्छिन्नस्य व्यापारस्य श्रेयस्साधनत्वं रूपं वक्तुमुचितम्, अनिष्पन्नस्य तस्य ताद्रूप्याभावात्। न ह्यनिष्पन्ने गवि तदेकदेशसास्नादौ गोत्वरूपं सामान्यं निविशते। न चांशत्रयपूरणमन्तरेण भावनाख्यव्यापारनिष्पत्तिरिति॥

सुखे दुःखनिवृत्तौ वा पुंसां भवति कामना।
न पुनर्व्योमपुष्पादि कश्चित् कामयते नरः॥

They, who have postulated passion, etc. to be the instigator, too have accepted indeed the result, which has been made the object of one's desire, to be the instigator. For, passion, etc. are but specific kinds of desire.

As regards the view on which the means of [achieving] something beneficial is said to be the instigator, that too is not agreeable. This is because in the absence of a desire [for the result], there is no motivation [to undertake the prescribed action] even though [the prescribed action] is the means of [achieving] something beneficial.

[Objection:] Well, even when one has desire, one cannot act in regard to an unspecified content, but only with regard to the meaning of verbal root, whose being the means of achieving something beneficial, is known. Therefore, it is an understanding of its being the means for it that is the instigator.

[Reply:] True. Even if there were two things, it is but correct to say that desire alone is the instigator, because only when it (desire for an object) is present that undertaking of activity is seen [to take place]. For, undertaking is effort. And effort is the effect of desire, according to the followers of Kaṇāda. Being the means to achieving something beneficial is the basis of specifying the content, but it does not produce the undertaking of activity.

Moreover, they accept as instigator the means of achieving something beneficial as understood out of *bhāvanā*⁷⁹⁷. But it is not correct [to hold] that it should be denoted separately. For, given that *bhāvanā* has three parts, it is while understanding the real nature of it (*bhāvanā*) that one's understanding of the means-end relationship of its two parts, sacrifice and *svarga*, is accomplished. And it is not correct to say that the activity, which is specified by two parts (instrument and procedure), has the form of being the means to achieve something beneficial. This is because in so far as it (*bhāvanā*) is not yet accomplished it does not have that form. For, it is not the case that when a cow has not yet come into being, the generic property of cowness is seated in a part of it, the dewlap, etc. And the activity called *bhāvanā* is not accomplished without fulfilling [*bhāvanā*'s expectation for] the three parts.

यत्तु लिङादेशशब्दस्य तद्व्यापारस्य वा प्रेरकत्वमुच्यते – तत् प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तम्। विधिरपि स्वमहिम्ना वा प्रेरकः स्यात्, साध्यसाधनभावसंबन्धावबोधनेन वा? स्वमहिम्ना प्रेरकत्वमस्य पूर्वमेव निरस्तम्। साध्यसाधनभावसंबन्धावबोधनपुरस्सरे तु तस्य प्रवर्तकत्वे फलस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वमिदमनक्षरमभिहितं भवति॥

यस्त्वाह प्रेरकत्वं चेत् फलं दर्शयतो विधेः।
प्रत्यक्षादिसमानत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्यं तस्य हीयते॥
स वाच्यः फलशून्यत्वे सुतरामस्वतन्त्रता।
यद्रिक्तमर्थं मूढोऽपि न कश्चिदनुतिष्ठति॥

को हि नाम निष्फलमर्थं प्रेक्षावाननुतिष्ठेत्?

ननु फलेऽपि दर्शिते केचित्तत्र न प्रवर्तन्त एव। किंचातः? कामं मा प्रवर्तिषता न हि कारको विधिरपितु ज्ञापक इत्युक्तम्॥

ननु फलमप्रदर्शयन्नपि ज्ञापयेन् – न ज्ञापयितुमुत्सहते, प्रेक्षावान् हि ज्ञाप्यते, न च फलं विनाऽसौ तथा ज्ञापितो भवतीत्यलं बहुभाषितया॥

⁷⁹⁷ This may be understood as Jayanta's own way of looking at *śreyaḥsādhanatā*, viz. that it cannot be function independently of its role in fulfilling the expectation for the 'means' by *bhāvanā*. Thus, its proper role lies within the tripartite structure of *bhāvanā* and not outside it.

What [you] say, viz. that exhortative word or is activity is the instigator – that has indeed already been countered.

[As for the question] whether the injunction should be the instigator by virtue of its own might, or by means of communicating the means-end relationship, [it is pointed out that] its being the instigator on account of its own might has already refuted. In case its being the instigator is due to its first communicating the means-end relationship, then it is the result alone which will be conveyed as the instigator even without [the employment of] words [for that purpose].

To him, who says, that if the injunction were to instigate by showing the result, then on account of becoming at par with perception, etc. it would lose its independence, it should be said that if it were not for the result, then the injunction would lose its independence even more. For, even a dimwit does not do anything which is devoid of a purpose.

(In that case,) who is that rational person who would do anything which lacks a result?

[Objection:] Even when the result is communicated, some people indeed do not undertake the action.

[Reply:] So what? May they not pleasingly not undertake the action. For, it has already been said that the injunction is not the causal factor of action, but only a communicator.

[Objection:] May [the injunction] communicate [the prescribed action to be the thing to be done] even without showing the result.

[Reply:] It is not able to communicate [like that]; for, it is a rational person to whom it communicates, and it is not the case that without the result he is communicated in that way [as he may undertake the action]. Enough of talking too much!

फलस्यैवेष्यमाणस्य पश्यन् प्रेरकतामतः।
यमर्थमधिकृत्येति सूत्रं व्यधित सूत्रकृत्॥
तस्मात् पुंसः प्रवृत्तौ प्रभवति न विधिर्नापि शब्दो लिङादि
व्यापारोऽप्येतदीयो न हि पटुरभिधा भावनानामधेया।
न श्रेयस्साधनत्वं विधिविषयगतं नापि रागादिरेवं
तेनाख्यत् काम्यमानं फलममलमतिः प्रेरकं सूत्रकारः॥

Therefore, on account of noting that it is the result, which is being desired, which is the instigator, the author of the [Nyāya-]sūtra-s has composed the sūtra, “that object in regard to which...” (NS 1.1.24). Thus, neither the injunction nor the optative and like words, nor even the activity of them (*bhāvanā*) operate in regard to the activity of man; neither, the denotative power called (*śabda-*) *bhāvanā*; nor the property of being the means of something beneficial that pertains to the scope of the injunction, nor even passion, etc. [have the power to instigate]. Thus, on that ground, the author of the sūtra-s, whose knowledge is free from impurities, has said that it is the result, which is being desired, which is the instigator.

आह –

परपक्षान् प्रतिक्षिप्य प्रेरकं कथितं फलम्।
एवं परमतद्विष्टैः वाक्यार्थः स्वयमुच्यताम्॥

उच्यते – यमर्थमधिकृत्य पुरुषः प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम् इति वदता सूत्रकृता फलं प्रवर्तकमिति प्रदर्शितम्। प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाताऽर्थमुपलभ्य तमीप्सति, जिहासति वा। तस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहा प्रवृत्तिरुच्यते। सामर्थ्यं पुनरस्याः फलेनाभिसंबन्ध इति च ब्रुवाणो भाष्यकारोऽपि फलेप्सां प्रवर्तिकां प्रादीदृशदिति तदीयां सरणिमनुसरद्विरस्माभिरपि तथैव तत्कथितम्॥

[The opponent] says –

Having countered the views of others, the result has been asserted to be the instigator. Similarly, it should be said by them who are hostile towards others' views what sentence-meaning is.

[Jayanta:] In reply it is said – by saying, “That in regard to which a person acts is what is the purpose” (NS 1.1.24), the author of the *sūtra* has shown the result to be the instigator. The author of the *bhāṣya* too has shown the desire for the result to be the instigator when he says: “On cognising the object by an instrument of knowledge, this cogniser wants either to obtain it or to avoid it. The striving of his, impelled by the desire to obtain and avoid, is called undertaking. Its success lies in its connection with the result. Thus having followed their path we too have said likewise indeed.

वाक्यार्थस्तु न क्वचिदपि सूत्रकारभाष्यकाराभ्यां सूचित इति कुतः शिक्षित्वा वाक्यार्थस्वरूपं वयमाचक्ष्महे। किमिति ताभ्यामसौ न सूचित इति चेत्, पृथक्प्रस्थाना हीमा विद्याः। प्रमाणविद्या चेयमान्वीक्षकी, न वाक्यार्थविद्येति॥

But sentence-meaning has nowhere been indicated by the author of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*; hence, whence having come to know [of it] do we speak about the real nature of sentence-meaning? If it is asked as to why has it been not indicated by them, [the answer is that] for, these are separate disciplines. This [study of] logic is the science concerning the instruments of knowledge, but not that concerning sentence-meaning.

यद्येवं पदार्थोऽपि कस्मादिह दर्शितो व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थ इति। स्थाने प्रश्नः— स तु शब्दानामर्थासंस्पर्शितां वदन्तं रुदन्तं च शमयितुं शब्दप्रामाण्यसिद्धये सूत्रकृता यत्नः कृतः॥

[Opponent:] If it were like this, why has it been shown [by the author of NS] [what] word-meaning [is]?

This question is justified! Effort [towards ascertaining what word-meaning is] has been made by the author of the *sūtra* for the sake of establishing the validity of verbal

testimony⁷⁹⁸ [as an independent instrument of knowledge] in order to pacify those (the Buddhists) who cry while they say that words do not touch upon [real] objects.

यद्येवं वाक्यार्थमपि बाह्यं वास्तवमन्तरेण शस्त्रस्य प्रमाणता न प्रतिष्ठां लभत इति तत्रापि प्रयत्नः कर्तव्य एव। सत्यं – पदार्थप्रतिपादनयत्नेनैव तु कृतेन तत्र यत्नं कृतं मन्यते सूत्रकारो यदयं पृथक्पदार्थेभ्यो न वाक्यार्थमुपदिशति स्म। तस्मादयमस्याशयः – पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः इति॥

If it were so, then the validity of the sacred texts is not established without [it being established that there is] sentence-meaning, which is external and real; hence in that regard too an effort should be made. True. But the author of the *sūtra* thinks such an effort to have already been made by means of the effort made towards the instruction on word-meaning, for which he did not instruct on sentence-meaning as being different from word-meanings. Therefore, this is the intention of his – word-meaning alone is sentence-meaning.

तत्किममुमेव पक्षम् अनुमोदामहे पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ इति। बाह्यं बुभुः। किंतु नैकः पदार्थो वाक्यार्थोऽनेकस्तु पदार्थो वाक्यार्थः॥

Do we approve of that view that word-meaning alone is sentence-meaning? We say, certainly [so]! But not a single word-meaning is sentence-meaning, but more than one word-meaning is sentence-meaning.

नन्वनेकोऽपि भवन् पदार्थ एवासौ। न च पदार्थो वाक्यार्थो भवितुमर्हति। सामान्ये हि पदं वर्तते, विशेषे वाक्यम्। अन्यच्च सामान्यम्, अन्यो विशेषः। अन्यत्राप्युक्तं – यदत्राधिक्यं स वाक्यार्थ इति। तस्मादन्यः पदार्थोऽन्यश्च वाक्यार्थः। उच्यते – यदेतदुक्तमस्माभिरनेकः पदार्थो वाक्यार्थो न पुनरेक इति तन्न गृहीतमायुष्मता॥

[Objection:] Well, even if it were more than one, still it would be word-meaning only! And it is not the case that word-meaning can be sentence-meaning. For, a word is about a general [meaning], and a sentence is about a specific [meaning]. General and specific [meanings] are different. This has also been said elsewhere – “that which is the additional [element] here is sentence-meaning.” (MaBhā 2.3.46) Therefore, word-meaning and sentence-meaning are different.

[Jayanta:] In reply it is said – what has been asserted by us, that is, “more than one word-meaning is sentence-meaning” has not been understood by the long-living one⁷⁹⁹.

⁷⁹⁸ I have translated *śabdapramāṇa* here as ‘verbal testimony’ instead of ‘linguistic communication’, since it is consistent with the Nyāya view. The translation of *śabdapramāṇa* as ‘linguistic communication’ is in keeping with the Mīmāṃsā view of the impersonal Vedas being an independent instrument of knowledge.

⁷⁹⁹ Here the expression ‘long-living one’ is used for the opponent in order to make fun of him in the sense that he is still young and has a lot of time to learn properly about the issue under discussion.

एतदुक्तं भवति – परस्परसंस्पृष्टपदार्थसमुदायो वाक्यार्थ इति संसर्ग एवाधिक इति यदत्राधिक्यम् इत्युच्यते। न चानाक्षिप्तविशेषत्वेन संसर्ग उपपद्यत इति विशेषो वाक्यार्थ इत्युच्यते। संसर्गस्तु स्वरूपतो न वाक्यार्थोऽपदार्थत्वात्। गौः शुक्ल आनीयताम् इति पदग्रामे संसर्गवादिनः पदस्याश्रवणात्। श्रवणेऽपि सुतरामनन्वयात्। गौः शुक्ल आनीयतां संसर्ग इति कोऽस्यार्थः? तस्मात् संसृष्टो वाक्यार्थो न संसर्गः। तदुक्तं – व्यतिषङ्गतोऽवगतेर्व्यतिषङ्गस्येति। न च तन्तुभिरिव पटो, वीरणैरिव कटस्तदतिरिक्तोऽवयविस्थानीयः पदार्थो निर्वर्त्यमानो वाक्यार्थ उपलभ्यते। जातिगुणक्रियावगमेऽप्यवयविविबुद्धेरभावात्। न च पदार्थावयवी वाक्यार्थः। तेन पृथग्वाक्यार्थ नोपदिष्टवानाचार्यः॥

It amounts to saying the following – since an aggregate of mutually connected word-meanings is sentence-meaning it is [syntactical] connection which is the additional [thing] in regard to which it has been said, “That which is the additional [element] here”. And since a [syntactical] connection is not justified unless it has implied [something] specific, it is said that “sentence-meaning is specific [in nature]”. But [syntactical] connection is not by its own nature the meaning of a sentence; this is because it is not a word-meaning. For, no word expressing the [syntactical] connection is heard in the cluster of words, “Bring a white cow”. And also because even if it (such a word expressing the syntactical connection) were heard, then there would be non-connection even more. What is the meaning of this [sentence] – “Bring the white cow connection”? Therefore, connected [word-meanings constitute] sentence-meaning, but not connection [itself]. It has thus been said – “since connection is understood out of the connected...” (Bṛ ad ŚāBhā ad MīSū 1.1.25). Sentence-meaning is not found to be something taking up the role of the whole [as over and above the constituent parts] that is fit to be brought about by word-meanings [and] which is over and above them, unlike a [piece of] cloth [which is brought about] by threads, [and] a mat [brought about] by grasses. [And also because] even when there [arises] an understanding of a generic property, a quality and an action [from the said sentence], there is an absence of a cognition of a whole [as standing over and above its parts]. On that score, the teacher (the author of NS) has not instructed separately on sentence-meaning.

ननु गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण न संसर्गोऽवकल्पते। न चैकस्मिन् वाक्ये बहूनि प्रधानानि भवन्ति; प्राधान्यमेव हि तथा सति न स्यात्। गुणास्तु बहवो भवन्ति। यदिदमनेकगुणोपरक्तमेकं किञ्चित्प्रधानं, स वाक्यार्थ इति तद्विषयेयमेकस्वभावा बुद्धिः। सत्यम् – तथापि त एव संसृष्टाः पदार्था अवभासन्ते, न तदारब्धः कश्चिदेकः। संसर्गसिद्धिकृतस्तु गुणप्रधानभावोऽभ्युपेयते॥

स च गुणप्रधानभावो न नियतो येनैकमेवेदं प्रधानमिति व्यवस्थाप्येता। क्वचित् कारकं प्रधानम्, क्रिया गुणो द्रव्यस्य चिकीर्षितत्वेनावगमाद् – ब्रीहीन प्रोक्षतीति॥

सिद्धतन्त्रं क्वचित् साध्यं तत्तन्त्रमितरत् क्वचित्।

शब्दप्रयोगतात्पर्यपर्यालोचनया भवेत्॥

[Objection:] Without there being the state of the principal and the subordinate, a [syntactical] connection is not possible. And it is not the case that in a sentence there are many principal [semantic elements]. For, if it were so, then it would cease to be the principal [element]. By contrast, there occur many secondary [semantic elements]. It is something which is specified by many secondary [semantic elements] that is the principal [semantic element]; that is sentence-meaning, and this cognition, which has a unitary nature, has that [principal element] as its content.

[Reply:] True. Still it is those connected word-meanings which appear [in our cognition, and] not some singular thing, which is brought about by them [and is altogether different from the word-meanings]. The state of being principal and secondary is postulated as having been produced by a [syntactical] connection which is already established.

And that state of being principal and secondary is not a fixed thing so as it would be settled that only this is the principal [element]. Sometimes an action-factor is the principal element, [and] the action secondary; this is because a substance is understood as something desired to be done, as in “One sprinkles water on the rice” (ŚaBrā 1.3.1.10).

Through a reflection upon the import of use of words, something which is yet to be accomplished may become dependent upon that which is already accomplished and sometimes the other way round.

तस्माद् गुणप्रधानभावानियमाद् अन्योन्यसंसृष्टः पदार्थसमुदायो वाक्यार्थ इति एतावदेव श्रेयः।
संसर्गाविगमे च सर्ववादिनामविवादः॥

वाक्यार्थं मन्वते येऽपि नियोगं भावनां क्रियाम्।
तैरप्यन्योन्यसंसृष्टः पदार्थग्राम इष्यते॥

Therefore, on account of there being no fixed rule regarding the state of being principal and secondary, it is better [to accept] that a collection of word-meanings [syntactically] connected with each other is sentence-meaning. There is lack of disagreement among all theorists about an understanding of [syntactical] connection.

Even those who think sentence-meaning to be commandment, [or] human activity [or] action, they too accept an aggregate of word-meanings [syntactically] connected with each other.

ननु संसर्गवदन्यव्यवच्छेदोऽपि गम्यते। गौः शुक्ल आनीयताम् इति श्रुते कृष्णाश्वादिव्यवच्छेदप्रतीतिदर्शनात्। सत्यम् – संसर्गपूर्वकस्तु व्यवच्छेदः। शुक्लगुणसंसृष्टो हि गौः कृष्णादिभ्यो व्यवच्छिद्यते। अन्यापोहस्तु न पदार्थ इत्युक्तम्। तस्मान्न भेदो वाक्यार्थः॥

[Objection:] Well! Just like the [syntactical] connection, exclusion from the other is also understood, since upon hearing [the following sentence,] “Bring the white cow”, it is seen

that one has an awareness of the exclusion of [the] black [and other colours], [the] horse [and other animals], etc.

[Reply:] True. But [an understanding of syntactical] connection [logically and chronologically] precedes [the understanding of] exclusion. For, a cow as connected with the quality of white colour is excluded from black and the like. That an exclusion of the other is not word-meaning has already been said. Therefore, distinction cannot be sentence-meaning.

ननु संसर्गोऽपि न शब्दार्थः। सत्यम् – स हि शब्दस्याभिधेयो न भवति, न तु ततो न प्रतीयते। अनभिधेयः कथं प्रतीयत इति चेद् एतदग्रे निर्णेष्यते। व्यवच्छेदे तु न सा गतिः। तस्मात् संसृष्टाः पदार्था वाक्यार्थ इति स्थितम्॥

[Objection:] Well, [syntactical] connection too is not the meaning of words.

[Reply:] True. For, it is not denoted by words, but it is not that it is not cognised.

[Objection:] How is something which is not denoted cognised?

[Reply:] This will be ascertained later. But regarding exclusion, such a way-out is not possible. Therefore [syntactically] connected word-meanings is sentence-meaning – this is what stands.

अथवा गुणीभूतेतरपदार्थानुगृहीत एक एव प्रधानभूतः पदार्थो वाक्यार्थ इत्येकाकारप्रतीतिबलादुपेयताम्। एकस्त्वयमसावर्थ इति न निर्णेतुं शक्यते। यदि त्ववश्यमेकस्य कस्यचिदभिषेककलशो दातव्यस्तत् फलस्यैव दीयताम्। न हि निष्प्रयोजनं किञ्चिद्वाक्यमुच्चर्यते॥

क्वचित् साक्षात्पदोपात्तं क्वचित् प्रकरणागतम्।

क्वचिदालोचनालभ्यं फलं सर्वत्र गम्यते॥

सकलेन च कारककलापेन क्रिया निर्वर्त्यते। क्रियया च फलम्। न तु फलेनान्यत् किमपि निर्वर्त्यत इति प्रधानत्वात् फलमेव वाक्यार्थः॥

Or, let only one principal word-meaning, assisted by other word-meanings that are secondary, be considered as sentence-meaning on the strength of a cognition having a single form. But it cannot be ascertained that this meaning is like this one only. But if the rank of preeminence has to be indeed given to someone, it should be given to the result. For, it is not without a purpose that any sentence whatsoever is uttered.

Result is understood everywhere; sometimes it is obtained directly out of words, sometimes it (result) comes from the context, [and] sometimes it comes through reflection.

It is an action which is brought about by the entire set of action-factors, and through action the result [is brought about]. But through the result nothing else whatsoever is

accomplished. Hence, on account of being the principal [element], the result alone is sentence-meaning.

ननु फलमपि पुरुषार्थमिति पुरुषः प्रधानं स्यान् – नैतदेवं – फलं सुखात्मकत्वात् पुरुषाश्रितं भवति, सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वात्। न चैतावता पुरुषः प्रधानम्। सोऽपि हि फलार्थमेव यतते। भावना तावत् फलनिष्ठ एव व्यापारः। नियोगस्यापि फलं विना न प्रवर्तकत्वमित्युक्तम्। क्रियाया अपि केवलाया वाक्यार्थत्वमपास्तम्॥

तस्मात् फलस्य साध्यत्वात् सर्वत्र तदवर्जनात्।
क्रियादीनां च तादर्थ्यात् तस्य वाक्यार्थतेष्यते॥

[Objection:] Well, the result too is for the sake of the person; hence it is the person who should be the principal [element in sentence-meaning].

[Reply:] It is not so. On account of being of the nature of pleasure, the result is seated in the person. This is because pleasure, etc. are qualities of the self. But on this score the person is not the principal [element]. For, he too strives for the sake of the result indeed. *Bhāvanā*, to begin with, is but an activity which aims at the result only. It has already been said that commandment too is not an instigator without [having accepted] the result. [The thesis upheld by the Kriyāvākyaṛthavādins that] action alone is sentence-meaning has also been refuted.

Therefore, since the result is the thing which is to be accomplished; since it cannot be abandoned anywhere, and since action, etc. serve the purpose of it, it (the result) is to be accepted as the sentence-meaning.

ननु फलस्य स्वर्गादिः निसर्गतः सिद्धरूपत्वात् कारकैस्सह संबन्धो न प्राप्नोति। सिद्धस्य च कः संबन्धः? क्रियागर्भ इति चेत् तर्हि फलमपि कारकाण्यपि क्रियाया संबध्यन्ते, को विशेषः? सत्यम् – परन्तु कारकाणि साधनत्वेन, फलं तु साध्यत्वेन। क्रियाया हि फलं साध्यते। न फलेन क्रियेत्यतः फलस्यैव प्राधान्यमिति सिद्धम्॥

अन्योन्यसंगतिविशेषित एव यस्माद्
वाक्यार्थभावमुपयाति पदार्थपुंजः।
एतच्च चेतसि निधाय ततो न भिन्नं
वाक्यार्थमभ्यधित च कश्चन सूत्रकारः॥
प्राधान्ययोगादथवा फलस्यवाक्यार्थता तत्र सतां हि यत्नः।
प्रयोजनं सूत्रकृता तदेव प्रवर्तकत्वेन किलोपदिष्टम्॥

[Objection:] Well, on account of results like *svarga*, etc. being of the nature of something already accomplished, it (the result) does not obtain a [syntactical] connection with action-

factors. And [even if one were to accept a relation for the sake of argument] what relation could there be for something which is already established?

[Reply:] [Such a relation] is based on the action.

[Objection:] Then both the result and the action-factors are connected to the action; so what is the distinction?

[Reply:] True. But the action-factors [get connected with action] by virtue of their being the means, but the result [gets connected with action] by virtue of being the object to be accomplished. For, it is the result which is brought about by the action, and not the action by the result. From this it is established that it is the result which is the principal [element in sentence-meaning].

Since a collection of word-meanings as specified by mutual connection [among word-meanings] indeed attains the state of being sentence-meaning, keeping this in mind, the author of the *sūtra*-s did not mention sentence-meaning as something different from it (word-meaning). Or, because of a connection with pre-eminence, it is the result which is the sentence-meaning; for, it is in regard to it that rational people⁸⁰⁰ make efforts. [And] that purpose alone has indeed been taught by the author of the *sūtra*-s to be the instigator.

अपरे पुनर्लिङादिशब्दश्रवणे सति समुपजायमानमात्मस्पन्दविशेषम् उद्योगं नाम वाक्यार्थमाचक्षते। तत्स्वरूपं तु वयं न जानीमः, कोऽयमात्मस्पन्दो नामेति। बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारा हि नव आत्मनो गुणा विशेषगुणा भवन्ति, नान्ये। तत्रायमात्मस्पन्दो बुद्धिर्वा स्यात्, प्रयत्नो वा, इच्छाद्वेषयोरन्यतरो वा? अन्ये तु विकल्पयितुमपि न युक्ताः।

[Jayanta:] But others say that a specific movement in the self called ‘exertion’ which arises when one hears the optative and like [suffixes] is sentence-meaning. We don’t know what the nature of it is. What is this thing called movement in the self? The nine qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, religious merit, religious demerit and subliminal impressions, are the special qualities [of the substance called self] and not others. Of them, should movement in the self, be a cognition, or an effort, or one of the other between desire and hatred. Others are not fit even for being treated as alternatives.

तत्र यदि बुद्धिरात्मस्पन्द उच्यते – तर्हि प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थ इत्युक्तं भवति; न नूतनं किञ्चिदुत्प्रेक्षितमेतत्॥

[Proposal by Udyogavākyaarthavādin:] Of them, [what] if cognition is said to be the movement in the self?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then it would amount to saying that intuitive flash (*pratibhā*) is sentence-meaning; this is not a new conjecture (on the part of the Udyogavākyaarthavādin opponent).

⁸⁰⁰ Keeping with Jayanta’s overall view of rational people doing nothing which lacks a purpose, I have translated ‘*sat*’ as ‘rational people’, and not as ‘wise men’.

अथ प्रयत्न आत्मस्पन्दस्तर्हि भावनाया नामान्तरकरणमुद्योग इति॥

[New proposal by Udyogavākyaṛthavādin:] Now [what] if effort is [said to be] the movement in the self?

[Refutation by Jayant:] Then ‘exertion’ would be the other name for *bhāvanā*.

अथ इच्छाद्वेषयोरन्यतरोऽसौ – तर्हि सुखेच्छा, दुःखजिहासा वा वाक्यार्थ इत्यक्षपादपक्ष एवायं, नापूर्वं किञ्चित्॥

[Fresh proposal by Udyogavākyaṛthavādin:] Now, [what] if it (exertion) were one of the other between desire and hatred?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then desire [to obtain] pleasure or desire to avoid pain would be sentence-meaning; hence it would be the view of Akṣapāda (the author of the NS) only, and nothing new whatsoever.

अथापि भाट्टपरिकल्पितो व्यापार आत्मस्पन्दः – सोऽपि भावनैव, नार्थान्तरम्॥

[New proposal by Udyogavākyaṛthavādin:] [What] if again movement in the self were the activity, postulated by the Bhāttas?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] That too would be *bhāvanā* only, and no other thing.

अथानुष्ठेयः प्रेरकः कश्चिदर्थ उद्योगः – स तर्हि नियोग एव। उपसर्गान्यत्वमिदं, न वस्त्वन्यत्॥

[Last proposal by Udyogavākyaṛthavādin:] Now, [what] if ‘exertion’ is something which is to be performed [as well as] the instigator?

[Refutation by Jayanta:] Then it would be commandment only [which is recognised by the Prābhākaras]; the distinction lies in the prefix [in *udyoga* and *niyoga*, but] it is not a different thing.

तस्मादश्रुतपूर्वेण कृतमुद्योगपर्वणा।

स भारतमनुष्याणां गोचरो न तु मादृशाम्॥

Hence, no more of the chapter on ‘exertion’⁸⁰¹, which is [claimed by its proponent as something] hitherto unheard of. It is known only to people who are steeped in knowledge⁸⁰², but not those who are like me.

⁸⁰¹ Jayanta here plays a pun on the word ‘*udyogaparvaṇ*’, which generally refers to a specific part of the *Mahābhārata* and here to the view that *udyoga* is sentence-meaning.

⁸⁰² Here too Jayanta puns on the word ‘*bhāratamanuṣya*’, which generally refers to the people of Bhārata, i.e. India, or people well-versed in the *Mahābhārata*. It may also mean people who are steeped in knowledge (*bhāyām ratah*) Given the present context it is sarcastically used in its etymological sense of people who are steeped in knowledge.

अन्यैस्तु प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थ इष्यते। तत्पक्षस्तु संसर्गनिर्भासज्ञाननिराकरणेन प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्पः॥

प्रतिभा खलु विज्ञानं तच्च शब्देन जन्यते।
न तु शब्दस्य विषयो रूपधीरिव चक्षुषः॥

बाह्यस्य विषयस्याभावात् सैव विषय इति चेन्, न, तस्य समर्थितत्वात्॥

Others, however, hold intuitive flash to be sentence-meaning. That view has previously been rejected by way of refutation of [the Vijñānavādin's theory of sentence-meaning being such a] cognition, which has an appearance of [syntactical] connection.

Intuitive flash is [a] cognition indeed and it is generated by language; but it is not the content of language unlike the cognition of forms [which is the content in regard to] the eye.

[Objection:] Since there is an absence of external objects, let that (*pratibhā*) alone be the content.

[Reply:] No; for, it (the existence of external objects) has already been defended.

योऽपि व्याघ्र आयात इत्युक्ते शूकातरनराधिकरणनानाकारकार्योत्पादः – स बाह्यऽर्थे व्याघ्रागमानादौ प्रतिपन्ने वासनानुसारेण भवन् न प्रतिभामात्रहेतुको भवति। तस्य हि ज्ञायमानोऽर्थः करणम्, न तज्ज्ञानमात्रम्। अर्थस्तदानीं नास्तीति चेद् – विप्रलम्भवाक्यमिदम् असत्यार्थं भविष्यति, न त्वबाह्यविषयं तत्। यथाऽवस्थिते वनितात्मनि बाह्येऽर्थे वासनानुसारेण कुणप इति, कामिनीति, भक्ष्यमिति प्रतिभा भवन्ति, तथा शब्दार्थेऽपि व्याघ्रागमनेऽवगते शूराणामुत्साहः, कातराणां भयमित्यादि कार्यं भवति। न त्वेतावता प्रतिभा शब्दार्थो भवितुमर्हति। तस्माद् वाक्यप्रयोजनत्वेन वा यदि प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थः कथ्यते; कथ्यतां नाम, न त्वसौ शब्दस्याभिधेया। अनभिधेयाऽपि संसर्गवद् वाक्यार्थ इति चेत् तत्राप्युक्तम् – संसृष्टा वाक्यार्थो, न संसर्गः। एवमिहापि प्रतिभावन्तोऽर्था वाक्यार्थो, न प्रतिभेति॥

As for the production of different kinds of reactions [which is seen] in brave and coward men on hearing [the sentence] “a tiger has come”, that happens after having understood an external meaning like the coming of a tiger, etc. according to [the person's] personal dispositions, but not due only to intuition flash. For, it is the object, which is being understood, that is the cause of it (different reactions), and not a mere cognition of it.

[Objection:] The object is not present at that time (while uttering the sentence, “A tiger has come”).

[Reply:] This would, then, be the statement made by a deceiver about an unreal object, but not about a non-external object.

Just as [varying] intuitions such as ‘a stinking corpse’, ‘a wanton woman’, ‘a thing fit to be eaten’ occur according to personal dispositions [in a mendicant monk, an amorous person and a beast respectively] with regard to an external object in the form of a woman,

similarly, once it has been understood what language means in the form of the coming of a tiger, effects such as the exertion of the brave, and fear of the timid, etc. occur. But by this much, intuitive flash cannot be what language conveys. Therefore, if intuitive flash is said to be sentence-meaning in so far as it is the purpose of a sentence, let it be said so, but it (intuitive flash) is not denoted by words.

[Objection:] Just like [syntactical] connection, let [intuitive flash] be the sentence-meaning, although it is not the denoted meaning of any word.

[Reply:] In that regard too it was said that sentence-meaning is syntactically connected [word-meanings, and] not the [syntactical] connection [itself]. In this way, here too, objects, which have been intuited, are sentence-meaning, and not intuitive flash [itself].

शब्दस्य च प्रत्यक्षवद् वर्तमानार्थनिष्ठत्वाभावाद् अनागताद्यर्थाभिधायिनोऽर्थासन्निधानेन प्रतिभापरत्वं यदुच्यते तदप्ययुक्तम् – अनागतादिविषयत्वेऽपि तस्यार्थविषयत्वं प्रसाधितमिति कृतं विस्तरेण॥

[Objection:] Given that unlike perception, language, which conveys objects that are yet to come into being (future objects), etc., are not grounded in present objects, it (language) is said to aim at intuitive flash. This is because [language in those cases] is not in proximity with objects.

[Reply:] That too is incorrect. Even though it (language) has for its content such objects as are yet to come into being, yet it has [real] objects as its content [and not a mere cognition]. Enough of elucidation!

वाक्यार्थः परमार्थ एव तदयं नो कल्पनानिर्मित
स्तद्वानप्युदितः पदस्य विषयस्तेनार्थसंस्पर्शिता॥
अप्रामाण्यमतश्च बाह्यविषयाभावेन यद्वर्ण्यते
तच्छब्दस्य निरस्तमित्यकलुषं प्रामाण्यमस्य स्थितम्॥

Sentence-meaning is ultimate (external) indeed; it is not brought about by imagination. The content of words too is said to be endowed with that (external reality); hence [language indeed] touches [external] objects. Therefore, the invalidity of verbal testimony that is described [by the opponent] on the ground of an absence of an external object, is refuted. [Its] validity remains untainted.

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MD_{III} = *Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini with Śābārabhāṣya and Tantravārttika of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa*. Edited by Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyaṅkara and Gaṇeśa Śāstrī Jośī. Vol. 3. Poona: Ānāndāśramamudraṅālaya. 1980.

MDĀ_{IV} = *Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini with Śābārabhāṣya and Tantravārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa*. Edited by Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyaṅkara and Gaṇeśa Śāstrī Jośī. Vol. 4. Poona: Ānāndāśramamudraṇālaya. 1984.

MDĀ_V = *Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini with Śābārabhāṣya and Tuptīkā [= TṬ] of Kumārilabhaṭṭa*. Edited by paṇḍitas of Ānāndāśrama. Vol. 6. Poona: Ānāndāśramamudraṇālaya. Year not mentioned.

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MDĀ_{VII} = *Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini with Śābārabhāṣya and Tuptīkā of Kumārilabhaṭṭa*. Edited by paṇḍitas of Ānāndāśrama. Vol. 7. Poona: Ānāndāśramamudraṇālaya. 1985.

MDG_{II} = *Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini [= MS] with Vaidyanātha Śāstrī's Sanskrit Commentary Prabhā on Tarkapāda*. Edited by Subba Śāstrī. Vol. 1. Poona: Ānāndāśramamudraṇālaya. 1994.

Mīmāṃsāsūtra (= MīSū)

See MD

Maitrāyaṇīyasamhitā (= MaiSa)

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VP_{Rau} = *Bharṭṛhari's Vākyapadīya*. Edited by Wilhelm Rau. Wiesbaden: Steiner. 1977.

VP_{PP} = *Vākyapadīya of Bharṭṛhari with the Prakṛṇaparakāśa of Helārāja*. Kāṇḍa III, Part II. Critically edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1973.

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ŚaBrā_{III} = *Śatapathabrāhmaṇam with “Ratnadīpikā” Hindi Translation by Pt. Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya*. Vol. 3. New Delhi: The Research Institute of Ancient Scientific Studies. 1970.

Śābarabhāṣya (= ŚāBhā)

See MD

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See YD.

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