Received: 22 February 2023 | Accepted: 14 September 2023

DOI: 10.1111/theo.12496

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Two levels in the feeling of familiarity

Sonia Maria Lisco[1] | **Francesca Ervas**[2,3]

[1]Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Pedagogy and applied Psychology (FISPPA), University of Padova, Padova, Italy

[2]Department of Education, Psychology, Philosophy, University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy

[3]The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS-KNAW), Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Correspondence
Francesca Ervas, Department of Education, Psychology, Philosophy, University of Cagliari, Via Is Mirrionis 1, 09127, Cagliari, Italy.
Email: ervas@unica.it

Funding information
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences; Amsterdam. Francesca Ervas also thanks Fondazione Banco di Sardegna, Grant/Award Number: F72F20000420007; Regione Autonoma Sardegna and the University of Cagliari, Grant/Award Number: RICPRIN_CTC_2019

Abstract

This paper explores the role of phenomenology in the understanding of the cognitive processes of coupling/decoupling, defending the Wittgensteinian idea that phenomenology can play a crucial role as a description of immediate (social) experience. We argue that epistemic feelings can provide a phenomenological description of the development of a subject's everyday experience, tracking the transition from the processes of coupling/decoupling and recoupling with the world. In particular, the feeling of familiarity, whose key features can be considered the core of epistemic feelings, signals a *novelty* in the flow of experience that makes sense and is worthy of remarking on or even articulating. By describing the primary features and sources of the feeling of familiarity, we highlight a conceptual tension related to its sources, which could be based on processing both fluency and discrepancy. We proposed a solution to the conceptual tension by introducing two levels of the feeling of familiarity: epistemic and experiential.

KEYWORDS

coupling/decoupling processes, embodied cognition, epistemic familiarity, epistemic feelings, experiential familiarity, phenomenological stance

1 | THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANCE

When moving to a new house, we might meet our new neighbours and perceive them as having already met somewhere else or that they are familiar old friends, or we might hear a song coming from their house, thus causing us to perceive a familiar and welcoming atmosphere in our new neighbourhood. We might instead perceive the joyful laughter of our partner as unexpectedly new or even look at our well-known face in the mirror and find it completely unfamiliar to the point that we might have difficulty in understanding or retrieving proper words to describe what is going on. In such cases, how do we make sense of what we are immediately feeling?

Can this subjective feeling of (un)familiarity signal a change in our way of experiencing the outside world, our social world, or even ourselves?

In *Philosophical Grammar* (1974: 167), Wittgenstein introduces such an immediate experience as the becoming aware of a difference in how someone appears to him: "Someone meets me in the street and my eyes are drawn to his face; perhaps I ask myself 'who is that?'; suddenly the face begins *to look different in a particular way*, 'it becomes familiar to me'; I smile, go up to him and greet him by name". Wittgenstein uses the word *Aspekt*[1] to refer to the immediate experience of an object that appears to us as different from how it usually appears. The "dawning of an aspect", which is not confined just to visual experience,[2] refers to the phenomenological object, to the appearance of an object in "this and that" specific way in the flow of experience. What is peculiar about the experience of (un)familiarity is that the dawning of the aspect makes that object *different* or even *completely new* for us and worth articulating (Baz, 2000). However, an object might have several aspects that we might want to express and the problem with articulating them via the words *this* or *that* is that they can mean "many different phenomenological objects, the meaning of which cannot be successfully shown to others" (Park, 1998: 168).

Capturing the phenomenology of the aspect-change in our language was a central problem in Wittgenstein's philosophy[3]; the phenomenological language of "this" or "that" or of the varying of *Aspekts* can be meaningful only when mediated by language-games. When we say, "I perceive x", we use our ordinary language to express an immediate experience or, in Wittgenstein's terms, we use the *physical language* that refers to a physical object, such as a body. However, the ordinary physical language is not conceptually suited to represent immediate experience, which concerns sense-data and should instead be expressed in a *phenomenological language*. We use the physical language just because it is simpler than "the ungraspable complexity of the phenomenological description" (Noë, 1994: 11)[4] and because it is the language of the social world we live in, but reducing one language to the other would be one of "the worst philosophical errors" (Noë, 1994: 11).

Indeed, the phenomenological language is the "language of possibilities", because it refers to a range (or a *continuum*) of experiential *possibilities*, whereas physical language refers to discrete entities. In Wittgenstein's view, phenomenology is grammar in the sense that it provides the rules for *meaningful* descriptions of our experience that differ from descriptions about facts. Different from the language of physics, indeed, phenomenology concerns the possibilities of phenomena as we experience them: "While the scientist aims to *explain* phenomena, using hypotheses, that is to say, by reducing them to underlying causes or processes, the phenomenologist abjures all reference to the hypothetical or the contingent, and so renounces any claim to be offering *scientific explanation*" (Noë, 1994: 9). Thus, "as soon as we attribute a physical meaning, the verification mode implicit in our propositions also changes compared with the verification mode we would have applied to phenomenological descriptions" (Montibeller, 2016: 151). One's expression of an aspect is thus not a mere perceptual report, because it is meaningful only when relying on several other linguistic hypotheses and only

[1]In the *Philosophical Grammar* (1974: 167), "to look different in a particular way" is indeed the translation for *ändert sich der Aspekt des Gesichts in bestimmter Weise*.

[2]Wittgenstein provides examples of "aspect-hearing" coming from auditory experience; see Baz, 2015 and Kemp, 2017 for commentary.

[3]We cannot provide an exhaustive introduction to the different meanings of the term *phenomenology* in different philosophical traditions or philosophical vocabulary used to explain the subject's experience. For a recent work on the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein's meaning of phenomenology and the variety of meanings in the phenomenological approaches developed in continental Europe (eg. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), see Kuusela et al., 2018. Moreover, the term *phenomenology* has changed its meaning also in Wittgenstein's philosophy from the *Tractatus* onward; much has been written about the meaning of *Phenomenology* in Wittgenstein's middle and late period (see, e.g., Egidi, 1995; Montibeller, 2016; Park, 1998). Although Wittgenstein's use of the term *phenomenology* does not imply a reference to the Husserlian phenomenology, we agree with interpreters who see in his late production a series of "phenomenological descriptions", which aim at disclosing experiential structures (see, e.g., Zahavi & Overgaard, 2009; Noë, 1994).

[4]Citing Wittgenstein: MS 106, 102-4.

because we are trained to relate the aspects to actual and/or past experienced objects in the world.

Thus, it follows the impossibility of a phenomenological language to describe immediate experience: "All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary, physical language and cannot be used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on their objects". (Wittgenstein, 1975: 57). Because our familiar language is physical, describing the world of sense-data is impossible. But still, that world is primary in the sense that we live in it and express it as we experience and feel it. We have just one ordinary language, which is why we need to make clear when it is applied to the field of immediate experience and phenomenology precisely aims to make clear when and what *makes sense to say* about phenomena in our own familiar language (Noë, 1994). Thus, the feeling of familiarity might represent the phenomenological element that signals a *novelty* in the flow of changing aspects and where the phenomenological language can give up its place to the physical one, to give voice to immediate experience. The feeling of familiarity would say nothing about the cognitive processes underlying our immediate experience but would rather tell us what it *makes sense for us* to say about our immediate experience. We explore this idea in dialogue with contemporary accounts of the feeling of familiarity, which look at the interaction between individuals' comprehension of themselves and of the (social) world from an embodied perspective. In particular, we aim to clarify the role of phenomenology in understanding the (dis)connection of the self to the world by investigating how the feeling of familiarity tracks the coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes.

In the first part of this paper, we question the role of phenomenology in a comprehensive explanation of (de)coupling processes, adopting the Wittgensteinian perspective on the kind of description we need to make sense of in our immediate experience. We argue that epistemic feelings can provide us with crucial information about ourselves and our relationship with the world through a phenomenological description, tracking the transition from the processes of coupling/decoupling and recoupling with the world. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the feeling of familiarity because its main features can be considered the core of epistemic feelings. In describing its peculiar traits, we highlight a conceptual tension related to its sources. We propose a solution to the conceptual tension by introducing two levels of the feeling of familiarity: *epistemic* and *experiential*. We finally describe the normative function of the interplay between epistemic and experiential familiarity, further defending the phenomenological stance in the overall explanation of the subject's connection to the world.

1.1 | The problem of (de)coupling processes

In recent decades, the ideas developed within the framework of embodied cognition have deeply influenced the understanding of the mind and its relationship with the world (Shapiro, 2011; Varela et al., 1991),[4] with the role of feelings in shaping how we experience and know the world and the others being reconsidered (see e.g. Barrett & Bar, 2009). The world of sense-data we live in shapes or, in the case of enactivism (Chemero, 2009; Gallagher, 2017),[5] even constitutes the cognitive processes at the point that there is no real point of return to Cartesian dualistic models of the mind. Even most recent theoretical positions originating from classical cognitivism (Fodor, 2001)[6] revised some of its main computational tenets on language production and understanding to avoid a detached knowledge of the world or a solipsistic viewpoint on the

[4]Nowadays, the adjective *embodied* refers just to one feature of a wider approach to cognition, known as *4E* (embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended) cognition. See Newen et al., 2018 for an overview of the main themes.
[5]For a short introduction to the variety of enactivist approaches, see Ward et al., 2017.
[6]See the introduction to Haugeland, 1978, for an overview of the main conceptual issues and challenges of classical cognitivism.

social world and finally grounding human high-level cognitive processing on embodied (multimodal) experience (see, e.g., Barsalou, 2008).

However, even the most radical form of enactivism needs to face the problem of the very same relationship in disguise. Now, the problem is posed in different terms and is better known as the "cognitive gap" between immediate experience and more advanced and abstract forms of cognition. In De Jaegher and Froese (2009): 439), the problem is now "to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition". Enactivism, which includes a variety of approaches, has been considered a new paradigm for cognitive science that no longer conceives cognition as a computation on abstract symbols but rather as a process of *making sense* of the (social) world via a *dynamic interaction* of the agents with their environment. In the view of Cuffari and colleagues (2015), "languaging", that is, the specific way language plays a role in making sense of the world, is a higher form of participatory sense-making that comes from the dynamic interaction of coupling with the environment.[7] An inactive approach to languaging, as "a way that human organisms monitor, evaluate, regulate and organize their existence", relates it "to self-produced identities and to the regulation of coupling with environmental domains that support those identities" (Cuffari et al., 2015: 1092).

However, De Bruin and colleagues (De Bruin & de Haan, 2012; De Bruin & Kastner, 2012) have recently claimed that, overemphasising the role of phenomenology, enactivism does not pay enough attention to the importance of the cognitive processes of decoupling in providing a full account of high-level (social) cognition. De Bruin and colleagues think that the processes of coupling and decoupling are needed for basic and more advanced forms of cognition. De Bruin and De Haan (2012) make a distinction between the processes of coupling and decoupling in *social* cognition, embracing less radical forms of enactivism, which gives much importance to the notion of narrative practice (Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Hutto, 2008). Cuffari and colleagues (2015: 1094) criticised their view, pointing out that "such an account is unavoidably a return to a disembodied, computational-functionalist model of cognition".

The point De Bruin and colleagues want to raise is rather whether enactivism can provide "a story about how offline (i.e., decoupled) social cognition is grounded in and emerges from online (i.e., coupled) interaction" (De Bruin & Kastner, 2012: 547). In particular, they question *the appeal to phenomenology* to provide such a story, as accused to be "incapable of supporting weighty theses" (Goldman, 2006: 249) on most advanced cognitive processes, such as mind-reading. Enactivists would indeed use phenomenological arguments to underpin the idea that, in social cognition, online interaction is primary to offline interaction because it is the default way we make sense of our social world in co-constructing others' understanding (see, e.g., Gallagher, 2005). Reformulating "the simple phenomenological argument" (Gallagher, 2007: 65), the default and pervasive mode is the online interaction because it is tacit; what is experienced in online interaction is not phenomenologically relevant to understand what is really going on at a sub-personal level. In their dynamic embodied cognition model, De Bruin and Kastner (2012) reject "the simple phenomenological argument" by pointing out that offline processing is instead as necessary as the default mode, because the agent continuously needs to internally represent what is missing from the environment, especially in the case of social cognition and, in particular, mind-reading, where she cannot have access to others' mental states. Moreover, the agent needs to control her actions in the world, suppressing online processing or simply putting them on standby so she can think of or plan a different course of action. A wider and more comprehensive notion of coupled

[7]In their paper, the authors define *languaging* as an adaptive social sense-making and as an activity that "emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings" (Cuffari et al., 2015: 1089).

interaction is therefore needed to explain the dynamic flow of coupling/decoupling and recoupling processes in (social) cognition (De Bruin & de Haan, 2012).

Against Cuffari and colleagues' criticism (2015), we defend the importance of decoupling processes and the idea that they never entail a complete disconnection to reality, nor do they lead to a disembodied experience of the world. The dynamic representation of our relationship with the world rather provides an understanding of the different *levels* of embodiment. In particular, for the aims of this paper, the process of decoupling leads to processes of recoupling with the world, permitting the subject to acquire *a new personal way of interacting* with it. From this point of view, decoupling is fundamental to understand human creativity (Baird et al., 2012), such as in dishabituation, multiple-goal configurations, or autobiographical planning (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2013). However, *pace* De Bruin and colleagues, we cannot eliminate the role of phenomenology together with the simple phenomenological argument in explaining the dynamic representation of our relationship with the (social) world. This might indeed call to mind classic versions of disembodied computationalism; as Van Gelder (2000): 257), "Computationalists have, by and large, gone on illegitimately to assume a general license to ignore phenomenological data of any kind whenever it is convenient to do so" and they evaluate their models "only by whether they match the measured performance data, and not by whether they make any sense in terms of our own observations of our experience".

In our view, phenomenology is not the proper language to explain what *really* happens at a sub-personal level, and it has no presumption of exhaustive explanatory power. Nevertheless, it can *describe* crucial aspects of the complex phenomenon of (social) cognition. From this point of view, phenomenology can be considered "the grammar of the descriptions" of those cognitive facts on which we build theories. Of course, as Wittgenstein remarked on phenomenology, "explaining is more than describing. But any explanation contains a description" (Wittgenstein, 1997, 1:5). After all, when defending a phenomenological approach to direct social perception, enactivists did not necessarily mean to propose *an alternative* to the other accounts: "Our social understanding comes in many shapes and forms, and we need multiple complementary accounts to cover the variety of abilities, skills and strategies that we draw on and employ to understand and make sense of others" (Zahavi, 2011: 556). Moreover, a comprehensive account of the relationship with a world shared with others should not just "address the question of detached belief-ascription. It should consider the whole range of mental states, including sensations and emotions" (Zahavi, 2011: 552). De Bruin and Kastner (2012) focus on the development of the false belief understanding, whereas we will focus on epistemic feelings. In our proposal, epistemic feelings represent *the phenomenological element* that can highlight the fundamental role of phenomenology in tracking the passages between coupling/decoupling and recoupling processes.

1.2 | Why (epistemic) feelings matter

Feelings can be considered phenomenological descriptions not just of one's inner (mental) states but also of one's relationship with the world. Feelings are two-sided representational experiences, being both bodily feelings and feeling-towards (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Goldie, 2002). As bodily feelings, they are experiences of an *internal* condition of the subject's body, caused by bodily (including neural) reactions. As feeling-towards, they are directed towards an *external* object in the world. Feelings can thus directly connect the subject's internal immediate experience with the external world, because they "can be studied as processes of feedback between cognitive and metacognitive states, which are consciously represented by the subject" (Arfini, 2019: 55). Moreover, our feelings are usually expressed in our behaviour, which is also visible to other people, thus also directly connecting us to the social world. As Wittgenstein

noted, we can significantly say that someone is hiding her feelings (ter Hark, 1990), precisely because they can be usually "seen" by others and expressed in the ordinary language we learn to talk about not only our internal mental states but also others' mental states (Overgaard, 2005).

Ratcliffe (2005: 45) provides an interesting account of feelings where their two-sided nature is part of the same *space of experiential possibility*. Feelings are indeed "ways of finding oneself in a world" as "presupposed spaces of experiential possibility, which shape the various ways in which things can be experienced". In our view, this is the reason they can be considered *the* phenomenological element in the dynamic interaction of a subject with the world. Indeed, whereas belief ascription uses the physical language of propositions that can be true or false of the world, feelings belong to the phenomenological language of *sense possibilities* (Noë, 1994). In the Wittgensteinian perspective introduced above, "in phenomenology it is always a matter of possibility, i.e., of sense, not of truth and falsity" (Wittgenstein, 1979: 62). Even though feelings cannot "speak" the physical language that provides an epistemic access to truth and falsity, we hypothesise that they can nevertheless show us specific experiential possibilities, tracking the ways we experience the world. Feelings can indeed provide an immediate description of our changing relationship with the world and signal the dawning of aspects that *make sense to say* about our experience.

However, even though phenomenological descriptions provided by feelings are not a matter "of truth and falsity" and say nothing on what is *really* happening in our mind,[8] this does not mean that they cannot have an epistemic value. Philosophical interest has been growing recently in "noetic" or "epistemic" feelings, which are triggered by an external object or situation but directed towards an internal epistemic state. Epistemic feelings are indeed spontaneously emerging phenomenal experiences concerning the subject's own mental capacities and processes (De Sousa, 2008; Dokic, 2012). They function as metacognitive-embodied means to cope with the uncertainty of the mind (Proust, 2008). As part of the so-called fringe of consciousness (James, 1890), that is, those "vague feelings that provide contextual information about conscious materials that are in the focus of attention" (Reber et al., 2004: 47), epistemic feelings provide the subject with useful implicit knowledge that might influence or even guide the subjects' behaviour.

Epistemic feelings are the results of two main kinds of appraisal of one's cognitive hitch at the sub-personal level along different dimensions. One dimension of appraisal is the *familiarity* versus *novelty* of the stimulus. Especially when we question our familiar ways of experiencing objects and/or actions, epistemic feelings might indeed provide an implicit evaluation of the *disfluency* of the cognitive process. Another dimension of appraisal is the *coping potential*, that is, having the cognitive resources and abilities to manage a demand, which depends on the first dimension: When a stimulus is novel (not already processed), the coping potential is automatically evaluated as low, but it might be precisely the way we become curious and interested to better understand or (re)connect with the stimulus (see Silvia, 2012 for a psychological approach, and Schütz & Luckmann, 1973 for a phenomenological approach).

With their embodied nature, epistemic feelings can immediately display specific experiential possibilities of being coupled with the world because they are context-dependent. With regard to their being epistemic, epistemic feelings can track the internal subjective states and cognitive processes in place when decoupling with the world. Regarding their twofold nature, epistemic feelings might signal a change in the agent's experiential possibilities via certain subjective marks: a feeling of incongruence or even an irritation when decoupled and a feeling of ease or even relief and pleasure when recoupled with the (social) world (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Dokic, 2012; James, 1890). The former would urge the agent to search for further information and/or a new course of action to solve the incongruence and recouple with the world, possibly

[8]For instance, many studies regarding the metacognitive role of the epistemic feelings highlighted a mismatch between them and the related mental states (see, e.g., Hertzog et al., 2010).

attaining the latter. The phenomenological aspects of epistemic feelings can thus be fundamental to track the transition from states in which the subject is coupled and states in which she is decoupled, as well as her (re)coupling with the world in a (re)newed personal space of experiential possibilities.

2 | FAMILIARITY AS THE CORE OF EPISTEMIC FEELINGS

Epistemic feelings are differentiated from one another, and they all play a peculiar role in monitoring the development of a subject's experiential process. However, in this section, we aim to show the extent to which they could all arise from a central, basic core related to the *feeling of familiarity* without levelling out their specific role and the result they point to. For explanatory reasons, we do not wish to trace this origin for all epistemic sentiments or provide an exhaustive explanation of their common origin.[9] Instead, we want to suggest a common root that characterises the most discussed epistemic feelings, as the ones pinpointed by Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian (2014).[10]

One of the most analysed feelings is the *feeling of knowing* ("fok"), which is "a feeling concerning the possibility of retrieving information from memory, independent of whether the information in question is true or false, justified or unjustified" (Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014: 99). It is usually related to the *tip of the tongue state* ("tot"), which occurs immediately after a failure in recalling an information from memory, although the subject feels bound to the immediacy of the answer (Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2011). In the definition of the *fok* itself, we can identify one of its sources in the relation of sameness to past experience, which emerges together with a recalling mechanism connected to traces of memory relying on *familiar* tracks. Moreover, when experiencing both the *fok* and the *tot*, the subject responds to an immediate and automatic stimulus related to a certain degree of cognitive fluency. This is a feeling the subject undergoes *before* she retrieves the information she needs; thus, it is related to a specific spatial and temporal context, represented by the *exact moment* before the information is received. This moment presents some relevant aspects that elicit specific possibilities and opens the subject to a horizon of possible actions.

Strongly connected to the *feeling of knowing*, the *feeling of confidence* is a state a subject undergoes when she is convinced about something, even if erroneously. An example: Karen is convinced that she took her passport before going out because she previously saw it in the hotel room. Once at the airport, she realises that she forgot it (Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014: 98–99). The feeling of confidence is based on routinised experiences, which could often rely on false memory traces and cause automatic bodily responsiveness. In this case, the relation of sameness to past experience could be fallacious, eliciting an illusionary perception of fluency related to a context in which the correlation between expectations and fulfilment is internalised. Subjects tend to feel overconfident about their memory tracks, which is why the relation between the *feeling of confidence* and the feeling of familiarity could be misleading.

Sticking to the hotel room example, the *feeling of error* (vs. *rightness*) could be seen as the result of an overconfident attitude. It "can be defined as the subjective experience that something went wrong during the execution of a mental action" (Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014: 100-102). The authors define it as a groundless feeling that points at the subject's mental process. Although it could often appear as inexplicable, the relation between the feeling of error and the one of familiarity is difficult to overlook. Instead of being groundless, it could rather be based on a familiar background the agent owns to orientate her everyday experience. The mismatch between what a subject is experiencing and her memory-based

[9]For example, we are not considering the so-called "vicious" epistemic emotions discussed by Morton (2014).
[10]For this reason and for explanatory bounds, we will focus only on a small group of feelings.

expectations gives rise to a *feeling of error* that could also be defined in terms of *disfluency grasping*. In this case, the relation of sameness to previous experiences acts negatively and helps detect, in a given context, the *incongruence* between expectations and their fulfilment. In contrast, the *feeling of rightness*, described as "the subjective experience that the execution of a mental action was successful" (Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014: 102. See also: Mangan, 2001; Thompson, 2009), emerges when the cognitive expectations based on the traces of previous experiences and the result of the mental act match – or are going to match – and thus, the presupposed familiarity of the process is fulfilled.

The *feeling of competence* is usually described as an autonomous epistemic feeling, too, but it could be connected to the feeling of familiarity. The feeling of competence is described as "the feeling that one is able to carry out a given mental action" (Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014: 102; see also Bjork 1999), which seems to rely on traces of previous tasks performed by the subject, which determine a certain degree of fluency in the course of experience. As a matter of fact, in a given context with particular expectations, the feeling of competence could not arise without the subject having a determinate degree of familiarity or at least a sense of familiarity (also an illusionary one) as a touchstone to refer to.

In different epistemic feelings, which provide feedback during everyday experience, a certain degree of familiarity is required for the subject to encounter her environment and actively interact with it. In particular, as observed in the previous examples, the feeling of familiarity can be said to characterise the genesis and development of other epistemic feelings in as much as they seem to rely on the same sources, which will be described in the next section.

2.1 | Sources of the feeling of familiarity: A conceptual tension

In showing the role of epistemic feelings while tracking the turning points in the processes of (de)coupling and recoupling, we focus in particular on the feeling of *familiarity*. Despite all the difficulties related to its univocal definition, we maintain that this feeling has a specific role because of several reasons. The first one, as we previously highlighted, pertains to the *familiar core* we can identify in the phenomenological description of other epistemic feelings. It seems, indeed, that apparently different phenomenal experiences find their origin in the same peculiar sources of the feeling of familiarity. Another reason concerns the background of our investigation, which inquires the description of a shared intersubjective experiential dimension. In this perspective, familiarity constitutes one of the core elements characterising a specific homeworld (*Heimwelt*), that is, an intersubjective dimension with peculiar cultural and historical traits (Husserl, 1973: 225–226; Husserl, 2008: 61–64; 160; 463) in the orientated framework of the *lifeworld*. Therefore, familiarity represents a necessary condition not only for establishing intersubjective relations but also for the individual experience of the surrounding environment (Fuchs, 2015) because it has to do with the way a subject perceives her bodily relations with space and deals with everyday situations (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973: 139).

However, the relationship between the feeling of familiarity and familiar experiences is not trivial. As a matter of fact, experiencing something as familiar does not imply, as Wittgenstein points out in *The Blue and Brown Books* (1969), that one necessarily *feels* familiar with that object. He writes, "Do we have a feeling of familiarity whenever we look at familiar objects? Or do we usually have it? When do we actually have it?" (1969: 88). Moreover, giving a unique account of *the* feeling of familiarity seems impossible. Because our experience is intrinsically complex, how can we be aware of *the single* aspect that gives rise to *that particular* feeling (in case of face recognition: was it the eye, the mouth, a specific glance)? Furthermore, do we *feel* familiar in the same way when something *looks* familiar to us and when something *strikes* us as familiar (Lyon, 1996: 89)? And how can we describe

the difference, if there is one, between the feelings of familiarity triggered by various familiar experiences?

Following contemporary accounts, the feeling of familiarity seems to come essentially from three main sources: (a) a (perceived) relation of sameness to past experiences,[11] (b) the *(dis) fluency* of the experiential flow the subject is undergoing,[12] and (c) a specific context. We observe them separately for explanatory purposes, considering that they can act at the same time and mutually influence each other. Based on (a), the feeling of familiarity is generally defined as the sense of having prior experience, regardless of whether one actually has it (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). Accordingly, *experiencing something as familiar* seems to be based on the resonance of activated traces in our memory to connect the actual process a subject is undergoing with something that has already been experienced or is perceived as already experienced. Facing new situations, we are thus able to control them by drawing on relevant aspects of the world acquired after a process of *sedimentation*, gleaning familiar traces from the "province of memory" (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973: 144). Thus, different degrees of familiarity depend "on the extent to which the inner and outer horizons of the experiences which enter into the stock of knowledge have been explicated" (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973: 140).

The process of seeking familiar traces in new experiences leads us to (b), according to which the feeling of familiarity arises in accordance with the ease of a specific cognitive process. In this view, familiarity as an epistemic feeling plays a normative self-monitoring role in pointing out the subject's processing fluency during the experiential course. Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2000) highlight the correlation between the feeling of familiarity and fluency in their study, where they aim to describe the connection between positive or negative moods and the way people engage in cognitive processes. Specifically, assigning a task that involves the recognition of a specific message, they show that the feeling of familiarity enhances non-analytic, top-down processes, which are "quick, implacable and not necessarily under conscious control" (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000: 5). According to them, the reason behind the correlation between familiarity and top-down processes lies in the idea of familiarity as a source of positive mood – a positiveness, however, that does not necessarily need to be consciously experienced. In comparison, unfamiliar situations would enhance bottom-up, cognitively demanding processes. These results suggest that the more a subject feels familiar with her surrounding environment, the more her experience is perceived as fluent, implying that she will be both emotionally and cognitively discharged "from the tension and distresses that come with unknown horizons" (Caminada, 2014: 200).

However, when lingering on the meaning of this emotional detachment, a conceptual tension arises. According to Lyon, for example, postulating an intermediate and distinctive feeling of familiarity is not needed, because he reduces it to "an amalgam of the quality of facilitated perception characteristic of familiar stimuli" (1996: 94). Following his argument, we could only speak of *perceptual familiarity*, because "when we perceive a familiar entity, the nature of the perception is different from what it would be were the entity unfamiliar. There is no accompanying, unique feeling or sensation, but rather a distinctive type of perception" (Lyon, 1996: 94). In his account, if the expectations are fulfilled in the flow of experience, then we do not feel anything; we just keep on going with the flow, without any kind of physical or mental entity informing us about it. This idea challenges the relatedness between familiarity and fluency, dismissing the role of the feeling of familiarity *tout court*.

Moreover, the relationship between familiarity and fluency can be approached in another way, based on the so-called "discrepancy's attribution hypothesis" (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). The authors argue that a distinctive feeling of familiarity emerges only when the perceptual fluency of an experience is broken and the subject perceives incongruity or discrepancy.

[11]We should point out that the reference to past experience can also be an illusionary one. For a detailed description of this false-attribution mechanism, see Whittlesea & Williams, 2000.

[12]As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, the epistemic feeling of familiarity does not always rely on a fluent experiential process. It can also be elicited by the perception of disfluency or incongruity.

Therefore, the feeling of familiarity seems to be connected to the specific context (c) of a perceptual experience, endowed with certain expectations, and not to a decontextualised, particular, and isolated stimulus. According to the results of Whittlesea and Williams (2001), glimpsing the face of your partner on the bus, without expecting it, would elicit a stronger feeling of familiarity than when you meet him or her at home when coming back from work. Although it is the same person we are meeting, specific circumstances may influence our experience.

Thus, the source of familiarity seems to oscillate between silent certainties and scratches on the regular surface of everyday experience, represented by incongruity. In what follows, we argue that reinterpreting the action of the feeling of familiarity may allow convergence between the two approaches. Moreover, we suggest a change of perspective on the problem, focusing on the oscillation between the two poles represented by fluency and discrepancy. We thus offer a dynamical description of the feeling of familiarity on two dimensions: a horizontal one based on a movement between two poles; and a vertical one between two levels, namely, the epistemic level and the experiential level, which will be the object of discussion in the next section. The intensity of this movement tells us to notice something during the regular course of our routinised experience and finally what it might make sense to say about it (Baz, 2000; Noë, 1994).

3 | *FAMILIARITY* ON TWO LEVELS

To provide an overarching view of the tacit dimension of familiar processes of being coupled with the world (the *fluency* pole) and the immediate experience of the decoupling process (the *discrepancy* pole), the role of phenomenology is necessary to describe how the feeling of familiarity acts in the passage from coupling/decoupling to recoupling states.

The feeling of familiarity should be analysed in its complexity. For this reason, we propose a distinction between two levels of familiarity: the *epistemic level* of the feeling of familiarity, which was described in the previous section; and the *experiential* one. Under the label of *experiential level of the feeling of familiarity*, we intend a specific, pre-reflective character that can be found in the familiar core of each epistemic feeling and is strictly related to the way our experience of the world as a meaningful whole is shaped.

Recent contributions on the nature and role of feelings already describe the *feeling of familiarity* from two different perspectives, highlighting its metacognitive function – as an epistemic feeling – and its role as pre-reflective element, shaping the whole experiential background of an agent. The last aspect was Ratcliffe's object of investigation, which aims to define a distinct category of phenomena called *existential feelings* (Ratcliffe, 2005). We recognise the importance of the descriptions proposed by both approaches, but we argue that they are still *partial* in the sense that they offer *two different* accounts of the feeling of familiarity. In particular, although some of the features we are bestowing to the experiential level of the feeling of familiarity are borrowed from Ratcliffe's description, our proposal differs from his approach. Ratcliffe describes *existential feelings* as distinctive, bodily feelings that "constitute the structure of one's relationship with the world as a whole" (Ratcliffe, 2005: 59). Even if we agree with this characterisation, we do not intend to propose a *distinctive feeling*, theorising instead a *level of action* of a more comprehensive feeling of familiarity, which acts *both* at a metacognitive stage *and* at a pre-reflective, structural stage. This peculiarity belongs specifically to the feeling of familiarity *as an epistemic feeling* and as the keystone of other epistemic feelings and not to the wide range of phenomena that are included in Ratcliffe's category of existential feelings.[13] Once pointed

[13]See, for example, the following passage (Ratcliffe, 2005: 52): "But existential feelings are more varied than this. In everyday life, we might feel close to the world, distant from it, part of it, estranged from it, helpless before it, in control of 'things', at one with nature, at one with life, part of a greater whole, part of a machine, slightly lost, overwhelmed, conspicuous or inconspicuous. And the world might feel familiar, unfamiliar, intangible, unreal, threatening, safe, fascinating, empty, imbued with significance, dreamlike, surreal, alien or warming".

out this theoretical difference, we argue that observing these two levels in the very same feeling of familiarity provides us the description of the dynamic development of the subject's coupling and decoupling process without being forced to choose between fluency and discrepancy as a privileged source of familiarity.

3.1 | Experiential level of familiarity

When referring to the *experiential level* of the feeling of familiarity, we mean a relational element playing a structural function. It involves multiple aspects that basically develop on a twofold dimension – the first one pertaining to preconditions and the second one having a resultative nature. These two dimensions cannot be observed separately because they reciprocally affect themselves in their unfolding. In what follows, we describe the several factors that constitute this background orientation, simultaneously pinpointing their role as preconditions and their resultant character at the same time. The elements we are considering have already been the object of our description; now we will develop them in a comprehensive framework that tries to embrace all the problematic aspects.

The first aspect we consider is the realm of *expectations*, which represents the way our experience is supposed to develop in a possible experiential horizon. In classic phenomenology, for example, Husserl underlines that even a new experience should be considered as emerging in a horizon of pre-givenness, situated in the orientated framework of our *lifeworld* (Husserl, 2008: 15; 638; 646; 658; 671; Pugliese, 2009: 373). For this reason, the occurrence of total "emptiness" in the experiential course is impossible because each intentional act must fulfil ("erfüllen") certain expectations. As also Schütz underlines, "new experiences can be determined with the help of a type constituted in prior experience, and this determination holds good in the mastery of the situation" (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973: 191). In turn, expectations play a twofold role in the development of our experience. On the one hand, they represent the condition of possibility determining whether actions can be judged as successful, depending on the way they are fulfilled. On the other hand, expectations are modified during the process of sedimentation because they emerge from routinised experience.

Sedimented structures constitute the second aspect characterising experiential familiarity. In the evolution of the subject's personal history, they build up a meaningful network, which is part of her experiential background (Caminada, 2014: 200). They represent the source of expectations and the core of our *form of life*, intended, among the different interpretations of this concept, as the constellation of linguistic and non-linguistic regularities that a certain community needs to share, to partake in specific intersubjective practices (Wittgenstein, 1980, II: 652, 672; Majetschak, 2019: 91). Sedimented structures shape, therefore, the personal and the collective approach to the environment. They influence the way a subject orientates her actions in the world; thus, they represent a realm of preconditions. However, they result from a reiterative interaction with the world and present a dynamical nature because they are also modified during the development of a subject's personal narrative.

A further element that constitutes the experiential level of familiarity is represented by *habitual sentiments*, which can be described as *general moods* (*Stimmungen*) or *atmospheres*. Wehrle describes them as resulting from residual traces of previous experiences (Wehrle, 2015: 60) and as influencing the perception of our environment. They are "conceptually not dependent on the perception of a specific object, but instead seem to represent a concrete motivational force of perception" (Wehrle, 2015: 62). Hence, they shed a particular light on actual experience, influencing the subject's attention and interest and consequently determining future attentional focuses. Most of the time, they are not conceptualised, as pointed out by Smith (1976: 93). For example, when walking on in the woods during the night, the subject does not conceptualise

"I'm afraid", instead, a *feeling flow* or *feeling tonality,* which is far from being conceptual, influences the approach to the experience she is living. In this example, the subject has a strong and vigilant attentional focus, amplifying her senses and making her perceive every single detail of the environment she is going through. As a matter of fact, the feeling tonality drives our attentional focus on a specific object or its specific aspects, because "the feeling flows in such a way that it gives a stationary object the impressum of having an upward momentum" (Smith, 1976: 100). The action of habitual sentiments develops not only at a personal perceptual level but also intersubjectively (Caminada, 2014).

Habitual sentiments represent the tacit ground of personal and interpersonal experience, but they can in turn change during a subject's personal narrative in terms of the development of her personal experience. *Personal narrative* itself, resulting from the evolution of a personal self during its history and representing the sum of experiences that modifies the way she encounters the world (Dings, 2018), is a precondition for future actions, determining the subject's sense of agency. However, due to its multilayered nature, it is affected by the background orientation constituted by sedimented structures during its progression. All those aspects are finally related to the subject's *bodily responsiveness*, which involves both the relationship a subject has with her own body and her connection with the surrounding environment. During everyday experience, this level of familiarity is required for a person to act in an unreflective and fluent way, as we normally do, and to physically respond to the stimulus coming from the environment in a typical manner. Fuchs defines this automatic responsiveness as one of the necessary conditions for the sharedness of the same lifeworld dimension (Fuchs, 2015).[14] In this work, it represents one of the criteria we unconsciously refer to so we can epistemically evaluate whether a particular experience is fluent or not.

The experiential level of the feeling of familiarity needs a certain degree of sharedness. This sharedness implies the unaware participation in the fluent development of everyday experience without taking distance from it explicitly. Familiarity on the experiential level represents a basic *sense of*, a pre-reflective element that determines the way we interact with the world without intervening in the process. Even though it *tacitly* acts in the development of familiar experiences most of the time, it is nevertheless a feeling in the subtle sense of *affective disposition*. It indeed bears a difference in intensity if compared with familiarity on the epistemic level, but it still *actively* plays a role and varies during a subject's personal and intersubjective experience.

In this section, we pinpointed the elements that constitute what we call *the experiential level* of the feeling of familiarity, namely, the realm of expectations, the result of the process of sedimentation, habitual sentiments, bodily responsiveness, and a certain degree of sharedness. In describing them, we underlined their twofold nature as being both preconditions for the establishment of the experiential level and the result of their mutual interaction. Those elements act at the same time, encompassing the subject's pre-reflective relation to everyday experience as a whole. In what follows, we show the extent to which the feeling of familiarity *acts* on the experiential level together with the epistemic level in tracking the passages during the (de)coupling and recoupling processes.

3.2 | The feeling of familiarity in action

After describing the two levels on which the feeling of familiarity performs its function, we describe the dynamical process of (de)coupling and recoupling, identifying the transitions from one state to the other with the moments in which the feeling of familiarity arises. As already

[14]People with schizophrenia, for example, take distance from their action, responding to the external stimuli in a mediated manner (Fuchs, 2015).

outlined, the epistemic feeling of familiarity can play a normative function in a self-monitoring process related to different experiences of the subject. It detects incongruencies or discrepancies in the expected development of experience and, in so doing, it influences both the subject's sense of agency and her action tendency. In fact, according to Meylan (2014), when experiencing an action as not particularly fluent, the subject does not seem to be able to fulfil it. When the subject experiences a certain degree of inhibition, she interrupts the automatic and unreflective top-down processes usually conducted at the experiential level.

Action inhibition involves a mechanism of distancing and observation of the processes from an external point of view. As Schütz and Luckmann (1973: 191) underline, "The less familiar a total situation is, the greater the attentiveness will be with which one turns to it, so to speak 'on one's own'. (…) If one cannot be routinely oriented in a situation, one must explicate it". This distancing, with the consequent interruption of the action, could be understood in terms of *active decoupling*, which is influenced by the normative self-monitoring function of the feeling of familiarity when detecting a *discrepancy* in the course of experience. In seeking a justification or an explanation for the described process, the subject acquires a personal point of view, establishing her own, new dimension of *familiarity*. This novelty emerges from the action of the epistemic level of the feeling of familiarity on the experiential level, which in turn determines the way the cognitive process is evaluated. In our view, in the development of everyday experience, both levels reciprocally and continuously affect each other, tracing the different moments that characterise the way the subject copes with the environment. Thus, it is one and the same feeling that acts on different levels and with different intensity in the continuous changes involved in the interaction with the world. The establishment of a new familiar dimension, after a moment of distancing or decoupling, could be interpreted in terms of *recoupling*, the result of which is the modification of the experiential level of the feeling of familiarity after its active action on the epistemic one.

The interconnection between the experiential and the epistemic level of the feeling of familiarity could be found in some passages from Husserl, who represents an underestimated source of reflection when talking about the role of feelings. Husserl describes a similar process to the one we sketched out in terms of *Deckung* and *Auflösung der Deckung* throughout the establishment of intersubjective communicative practices (Husserl, 1973: 463). In Husserl's description, while enacting empathy, the subject feels herself tacitly immersed in the experience and judgements of the other up to the moment when the interest in the other agent is renewed. The renewed interest causes *distancing*, involving the creation of a personal point of view and a novel perspective-taking. From a phenomenological point of view, we should consider a further element in relation to the epistemic level of the feeling of familiarity, namely, the role of *interest*. Interest might be defined as a source and motor for further perception (Husserl, 2004: 108–109; Wehrle, 2015: 46), as we previously mentioned in relation to the role of *habitual sentiments* in the constitution of the experiential level of familiarity. As Wehrle points out (Wehrle, 2015: 59, emphasis added), "From such a dynamic perspective one can argue that the *mood or the habitual interest profile* also influences what, in a given moment, is able to affect me, i.e. what is able to 'wake' me because of its *standing out* from the background of my (former) experience".

From this point of view, an interconnection exists between *interest* and *habituality*: Only when exposed to something lying outside the habitualised course of events can the subject perceive a re-activation of her interest, establishing a new experiential background. In this regard, some Husserlian considerations could be useful in relation to the experience of *discrepancy*. In describing the formation of the socio-communicative realm,[15] the experience of discrepancy in the proceeding of mutual understanding influences the network of sedimented structures, adding novel elements to it (Husserl, 1973: 478). This dialectical tension forces the interlocutors

[15]We choose to focus on this example for the following reasons: According to Husserl, the formation of the so-called *Mitteilungsgemeinschaft* represents the precondition for the establishment of a specific *Heimwelt* (for a detailed account, see Szanto, 2016) and for the development of social acts in general. Our aim is to describe the active role of the feeling of familiarity in the proceeding of (social) experience. Thus, we want to highlight its action by using a vivid phenomenological description.

to mutually adjust their interpretational frameworks, enabling new levels of understanding to be established. Understanding requires a certain degree of *familiarity*, which is the reason the epistemic feeling of familiarity is constantly involved in this movement of reciprocal adjustment. It acts mainly on an epistemic level for the evaluation of the cognitive process itself but involves the constitutive elements of the experiential level, which deeply influence the way a subject understands a message.

At this point, an important detail should be underlined once more: The epistemic level of the feeling of familiarity, in its emerging in connection to disfluency and playing its normative function, is always interconnected to the experiential level. Without the role of *expectations* and *sedimentations* and without the feedback of *bodily responsiveness*, it would be impossible for the subject to grasp not only the incongruency of her experience (distancing herself from the experiential process) but also to undertake a new experiential course according to her degree of interest (hence recoupling with the world and acquiring new horizons of possibilities).

Based on these considerations, we agree with De Bruin and de Haan (2012) that a broader notion of *coupling* is needed, which does not fully rely on direct interactions between embodied systems but instead allows for a continuous process of coupling-decoupling and recoupling. In their proposal, they suggest rethinking enactivism in a *weaker sense* (De Bruin and Haan, 2012: 244) and adopting a notion of coupling as a *functional circle*, according to which "the reaction of an organism to its environment should not be understood as a fixed response but instead depends upon its previous experiences and is constantly being re-patterned through these experiences" (De Buin and Haan, 2012: 245). However, we also argued that, for enactivism to show a fine-grained notion of coupling, the appeal to phenomenology and to the role of *feelings* is crucial.

In fact, a certain degree of *experiential familiarity* is always present in the process of re-patterning, because the subject never goes completely offline and, above all, she still plays an active role in distancing herself from the process' development. Moreover, accepting the two-fold action of the feeling of familiarity would solve the apparent conceptual tension pertaining to the sources of this feeling (processing fluency vs. discrepancy). According to our view, even in fluent experiences, *pace* Lyon[16] (1996), the experiential level of the feeling of familiarity *does play* a role in terms of affective disposition, constantly allowing the subject to share a common lifeworld dimension due to the constitutive elements we described. However, the epistemic level reactivates only in accordance with the perception of *discrepancy* or when interest and attention are renewed. Our two-level account of the feeling of familiarity thus solves the conceptual tension between considering fluency and discrepancy as sources of the feeling, showing that the feeling of familiarity emerges *both* from fluency and discrepancy but on distinct levels. Moreover, in our view, new possibilities of *making sense* of everyday experience emerge in the oscillation between the two levels. As a matter of fact, noticing new aspects and searching for familiar tracks to cope with them create a new space of experiential possibilities, a space we are not able to *explain* but can only describe in terms of *how we feel*.

4 | CONCLUSION

In this paper, we attempted to legitimise the role of phenomenology in describing the processes of (de)coupling and recoupling, as proposed in the *wider* inactive account of De Bruin and de Haan (2012). For this purpose, we adopted a Wittgensteinian perspective on the problem, whose aim is to describe the experiential course of a subject in terms of *what makes sense* for the development of her personal narrative. In doing this, we pinpointed the action of the feeling of familiarity as the phenomenological element capable of tracing the transition from coupling to

[16]As already observed in section 2, Lyon (1996) argues that in fluent, familiar experience, postulating a feeling of familiarity is not necessary at all.

decoupling and recoupling, proposing its overarching account. In particular, we depicted its action on two different levels – the epistemic level and the experiential level – via the Husserlian phenomenological description of the establishment of the socio-communicative realm and solving the conceptual tension related to its (fluency vs. discrepancy) sources. Overall, the feeling of familiarity does not provide a description of the underlying cognitive processes of coupling, decoupling and recoupling, which can be provided by psychological evidence. The feeling of familiarity can instead provide us with a *phenomenological description* of what we experience as meaningful *for us*.

On the one hand, the phenomenological description of how we feel when we experience the feeling of familiarity reveals something that is relevant and makes sense *for* the person and the way she relates to others and to the world. This kind of description cannot claim to be an explanation of what *really* happens and can diverge from the description of what *really* happens at a sub-personal level. However, it does not even have to be reduced to psychological descriptions of cognitive (de)coupling processes, because it provides crucial information about *us* and *our own way* to be in a relationship with the (social) world, which we could not access in another way.

On the other hand, based on a background experiential level, the feeling of familiarity is not (and cannot be) a disembodied experience. It accompanies, modulates, and drives what *really* happens, thereby also providing meaningful feedback for the (de)coupling processes themselves. From this perspective, the epistemic feeling of familiarity that arises in decoupling or distancing processes would never represent a detached and disembodied experience of the (social) world but rather "the place where we expand our experience of the ordinary and the familiar without, as it were, turning our backs on it; the place where we strengthen our bonds with the world by renewing them; and the place where we go beyond habitual ways and established routes without giving up on intelligibility" (Baz, 2000: 99). The feeling of familiarity thus monitors and tracks the cognitive processes of coupling, decoupling and recoupling, signalling to the subject the epistemic attainment of a *meaningful novelty* in her personal way of acting and relating to the world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are very grateful to Rosaria Egidi, Marcello Montibeller, Filippo Sanguettoli, Linas Tranas, and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for all the helpful comments on the first draft of the paper. The authors wish to thank the participants of the Research Seminar at the Center for Subjectivity Research (University of Copenhagen) and the participants to the workshop "Familiarity and Togetherness" (Padova, 8–9 October 2021).

FUNDING INFORMATION

This work was partially written during Sonia Maria Lisco's visiting scholarship granted by MUR at the University of Copenhagen and Francesca Ervas' fellowship supported by the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS-KNAW), Amsterdam. Francesca Ervas also thanks Fondazione Banco di Sardegna (grant n. F72F20000420007) and Regione Autonoma Sardegna and the University of Cagliari (grant n. RICPRIN_CTC_2019) for the financial support.

ORCID

Sonia Maria Lisco https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7500-2420
Francesca Ervas https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8521-0266

REFERENCES

Arango-Muñoz, S. (2013) The nature of epistemic feelings. *Philosophical Psychology*, 27(2), 193–211.

Arango-Muñoz, S. & Michaelian, K. (2014) Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotion: review and introduction to the focus section. *Philosophical Inquiries*, 2(1), 97–122.

Arfini, S. (2019) *Ignorant cognition. A philosophical investigation of the cognitive features of not-knowing*. Cham: Springer.

Baird, B., Smallwood, J., Mrazek, M.D., Kam, J.W.Y., Franklin, M.S. & Schooler, J.W. (2012) Inspired by distraction, mind wandering facilitates creative incubation. *Psychological Science*, 23, 1117–1122.

Barrett, L.F. & Bar, M. (2009) See it with feeling: affective predictions during object perception. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences*, 364(1521), 1325–1334.
Barsalou, L.W. (2008) Grounded cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59, 617–645.
Baz, A. (2000) What's the point of seeing aspects? *Philosophical Investigations*, 23, 97–121.
Baz, A. (2015) The sound of bedrock: lines of grammar between Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 24(3), 607–628.
Bjork, R. (1999) Assessing our own competence: Heuristics and illusions. in: Daniel G., & Koriat, A (Eds.), *Attention and performance XVII: Cognitiveregulation of performance: Interaction of theory and application*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 435–459.
Caminada, E. (2014) Joining the background: habitual sentiments behind we-intentionality. In: Konzelmann, Z.A. & Schmid, H. (Eds.) *Institutions, emotions, and group agents*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 195–212.
Chemero, A. (2009) *Radical embodied cognitive science*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Cuffari, E.C., Di Paolo, E. & De Jaegher, H. (2015) From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 14(4), 1089–1125.
De Bruin, L. & de Haan, S. (2012) Enactivism & social cognition: in search of the whole story. *Journal of Cognitive Semiotics*, 4(1), 225–250.
De Bruin, L. & Kastner, L. (2012) Dynamic embodied cognition. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 11(4), 541–563.
De Jaegher, H. & Froese, T. (2009) On the role of social interaction in individual agency. *Adaptive Behavior*, 17, 444–460.
De Sousa, R. (2008) Epistemic feelings. In: Brun, G., Doguoglu, U. & Kuenzle, D. (Eds.) *Epistemology and emotions*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Dings, R. (2018) Understanding phenomenological differences in how affordances solicit action. An exploration. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 17(4), 681–699.
Dokic, J. (2012) Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognition. In: Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (Eds.) *The foundations of metacognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 302–321.
Egidi, R. (1995) Wittgenstein between philosophical grammar and psychology. In: Egidi, R. (Ed.) *Wittgenstein: Mind and Language*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 171–184.
Fodor, J.A. (2001) *The mind Doesn't work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Fuchs, T. (2015) Vertrautheit und Vertrauen als Grundlagen der Lebenswelt. *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 2015, 101–117.
Gallagher, S. (2005) *How the body shapes the mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2007) Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In: *Folk psychology re-assessed*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 63–78.
Gallagher, S. (2017) *Enactivist interventions: rethinking the mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. & Hutto, D. (2008) Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice. In: Zlatev, J., Racine, T., Sinha, C. & Itkonen, E. (Eds.) *The shared mind: perspectives on Intersubjectivity*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 17–38.
Garcia-Marques, T. & Mackie, D.M. (2000) The positive feeling of familiarity: mood as an information processing regulation mechanism. In: Bless, H. & Forgas, J.P. (Eds.) *The message within: the role of subjective experience in social cognition and behavior*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, pp. 240–261.
Goldie, P. (2002) Emotion, feelings and intentionality. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 1(1), 235–254.
Goldman, A. (2006) *Simulating minds: the philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haugeland, J. (1978) The critical assessment of cognitivism: a closer look. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 2, 215–260.
Hertzog, C., Dunlosky, J. & Sinclair, S.M. (2010) Episodic feeling-of-knowing resolution derives from the quality of original encoding. *Memory & Cognition*, 38(6), 771–784.
Husserl, E. (1973) Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. In: Kern, I. (Ed.) *Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil: 1928–1935*. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (2004) *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, E. (2008) In: Sowa, R. (Ed.) *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Hutto, D.D. (2008) Limited engagements and narrative extensions. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 16(3), 419–444.
James, W. (1890) *The principles of psychology*. London: Macmillan.
Kemp, G. (2017) Wittgenstein and the inner character of musical experience. In: Hagberg, G.L. (Ed.) *Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 249–280.
Kuusela, O., Omeţită, M. & Uçan, T. (Eds.). (2018) *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology*. London: Routledge.
Lyon, G. (1996) The experience of perceptual familiarity. *Philosophy*, 71(275), 83–100.
Majetschak, S. (2019) *Wittgenstein und die Folgen*. Stuttgart: Metzler.

Mangan, B. (2001) Sensation's ghost: the non-sensory "fringe" of experience. *Psyche*, 7(18), 1–44.
Meylan, A. (2014) Epistemic emotions: a natural kind? Philosophical inquiries, 2(1), 173–190.
Montibeller, M. (2016) The duty of clarity: a persuasion effort. Continuity and physics from Boltzmann to Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*, 39(2), 138–153.
Mooneyham, B.W. & Schooler, J.W. (2013) The costs and benefits of mind-wandering: a review. *Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 67, 11–18.
Morton, A. (2014) Shared knowledge from individual vice: the role of unworthy epistemic emotions. *Philosophical Inquiries*, 2(1), 163–172.
Newen, A., De Bruin, L. & Gallagher, S. (2018) *Oxford handbook of 4E cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Noë, R.A. (1994) Wittgenstein, phenomenology and what it makes sense to say. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 54, 1–42.
Overgaard, S. (2005) Rethinking other minds: Wittgenstein and Lévinas on expression. *Inquiry*, 48(3), 249–274.
Park, B.C. (1998) *Phenomenological aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Proust, J. (2008) Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 108(1), 241–268.
Pugliese, A. (2009) *Unicità e relazione. Intersoggettività, genesi e io puro in Husserl*. Milano: Mimesis.
Ratcliffe, M. (2005) The feeling of being. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 12(8–10), 43–60.
Reber, R., Wurtz, P. & Zimmermann, T.D. (2004) Exploring "fringe" consciousness: the subjective experience of perceptual fluency and its objective bases. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 13(1), 47–60.
Schütz, A. & Luckmann, T. (1973) *The structures of the life-world*, Vol. 1. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Schwartz, B.L. & Metcalfe, J. (2011) Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: retrieval, behavior, and experience. *Memory & Cognition*, 39, 737–749.
Shapiro, L. (2011) *Embodied cognition*. New York: Routledge.
Silvia, P.J. (2012) Human emotions and aesthetic experience: an overview of empirical aesthetics. In: Shimamura, A.P. & Palmer, S.E. (Eds.) *Aesthetic science: connecting minds, brains, and experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 250–275.
Smith, Q. (1976) Husserl and the inner structure of feeling-acts. *Research in Phenomenology*, 6(1), 84–104.
Stawarczyk, D., Cassol, H. & D'Argembeau, A. (2013) Phenomenology of future-oriented mind-wandering episodes. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 4, 425.
Szanto, T. (2016) Husserl on collective intentionality. In: Salice, A. & Schmid, H.B. (Eds.) *The phenomenological approach to social reality*. Cham: Springer, pp. 145–172.
ter Hark, M. (1990) *Beyond the inner and the outer: Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Thompson, V.A. (2009) *Dual-process theories: a metacognitive perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Gelder, T.J. (2000) Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science. In: Petitot, J., Varela, F., Roy, J.-M. & Pachoud, B. (Eds.) *Naturalizing phenomenology: issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 245–265.
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991) *The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ward, D., Silverman, D. & Villalobos, M. (2017) Introduction: the varieties of Enactivism. *Topoi*, 36, 365–375.
Wehrle, M. (2015) "Feelings as the Motor of Perception"? The essential role of interest for intentionality. *Husserl Studies*, 31(1), 45–64.
Whittlesea, B.W. & Williams, L.D. (2000) The source of feelings of familiarity: the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 26(3), 547–565.
Whittlesea, B.W. & Williams, L.D. (2001) The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: I. The heuristic basis of feelings and familiarity. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 27(1), 3–13.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) In: Anscombe, G.E.M. & von Wright, G.H. (Eds.) *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie*, Vol. 1. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. & On Certainty. (1969) *The blue and the Brown books*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1974) In: Rhees, R. (Ed.) trans. Kenny, A.*Philosophical grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1975) In: Rhees, R. (Ed.) trans. Hargreaves R. & White R.*Philosophical remarks*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1979) In: McGuinness, B.F. & Schulte, J. (Eds.) *Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1997) In: Nedo, M. (Ed.) *Wiener Ausgabe*. Wien and New York: Springer.
Zahavi, D. (2011) Empathy and direct social perception: a phenomenological proposal. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, 2, 541–558.
Zahavi, D. & Overgaard, S. (2009) Understanding (other) minds: Wittgenstein's phenomenological contribution. In: Zamuner, E. & Levy, D. (Eds.) *Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments*. London: Routledge, pp. 60–86.

How to cite this article: Lisco, S.M. & Ervas, F. (2023) Two levels in the feeling of familiarity. *Theoria*, 1–17. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12496