



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
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HUMAN IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT

Human identity is constitutively 'historical', as well as cultural and a narrative. History is the quintessence of us, as human beings that live in a certain epoch and within a certain culture. But because of the fact that this formation and configuration of our personal identity is rooted in historical, psychological and *linguistic* (Steiner) mechanisms of representation, then by modifying certain representational axes (i.e., modifying culture, narration, lifestyle practices...) not only may we modify the meaning and representation of our past, but we may act in some way more free from it. This does not represent a denial of the role of the past but an aspect which must be considered and investigated, examining the challenges represented by the realisation of a life which is, on one hand, in a dialectical connection with the past and tradition, and which is, on the other hand, a form of action under a *horizon of expectation* (Koselleck) and a present full of new possibilities (Ricoeur). Referring to Koselleck's research, Ricoeur develops the theme of historical consciousness, interpreting it as the ceaseless dialectics of counterposition between the 'space of experience', which is inevitably rooted into the past, and the 'horizon of expectation', which always addresses the future. A living present culture constitutes the point of convergence between past and future, because in the human being there is this perpetual connection between 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation', between memory and hope. This paper aims to explore the consequences of such a vision for an anthropological philosophy.

Keywords: representation, history, identity, psychology, language

ON RICOEUR'S MEMORY, HISTORY AND FORGETTING

Human identity is constitutively 'historical', as well as cultural and a narrative. Thus, research on historical knowledge directly or indirectly impacts a certain conception of the human being; and, conversely, research on the human being has direct or indirect impact on a research concerning historical knowledge. Ricoeur's theoretical-speculative research offers the example of a productive intertwining connection between philosophical anthropology and history with a significant interdisciplinary, scientific advancement. Referring to Koselleck's research Ricoeur develops the theme of historical consciousness, interpreting it as the ceaseless dialectics of counterposition between the 'space of experience', which is inevitably rooted into the past, and the 'horizon of expectation', which always addresses the future. A living present culture constitutes the point of convergence between past and future, because within the human being there is this perpetual connection between 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation', between memory and hope. The following paragraphs explore the consequences of such a vision for an anthropological philosophy. It is in Ricoeur's mature work that the question of the historical dimension, indeed of the historical reality

of man, finds a full and mature expression along together with an articulated hermeneutical phenomenology of the self. The book *Memory, history, forgetting* not only describes a complex philosophical investigation on historical knowledge, but on the human constitution and condition. It is an exploration both of philosophy of history and historiography as well as of philosophical anthropology. With reference to Ricoeur's general itinerary of research, the work explicitly intends to cover the space between time and narration lived unaccomplished in *Times and Narrative* (1983-1985). This 'empty space' is somehow one with the space of mediation of memory that conceals the enigma of the presence in the mind of an image of past and absent things, that is, the enigma of the presence of absence that summarises all the difficulties inherent in the exercise of the capacity of memory. [1] In this way, a new capacity is created for what Ricoeur has called the *capable human being* (*homme capable*). Explicitly or implicitly, this anthropological question traverses his entire speculative research, and this philosophy of the capable human being constitutes its quintessential expression. From this perspective, it becomes clear that *Memory, History, Forgetting* offers an inspired theoretical treatment with a specific and new point of view. In fact, as Domenico Jervolino clarified this book contains a philosophy of the actual human being who is living *historically*, as a historical being. For Jervolino, Ricoeur's commitment in the work of 2000 is to pass from the grammar of personal identity, which was defined in *Oneself as Another* (1990), to the study of the actual human being living within a specific cultural-historical moment. [2] Due to the comprehensive synthesis realised in *Oneself as Another*, this new configuration reveals a significative retrospective link with Ricoeur's early work on the voluntary and the involuntary. This retrospective link with the *Philosophy of the Will* does not represent a 'simple' renewal but a true re-treatment. As Ricoeur explains, the act of remembering and the power that it puts into operation are situated at the crossroads to the unreal and the effective memory, which is directed towards a vanished reality, the past. All the accumulated difficulties regarding memory culminate in that of the identification of the differential criterion between the unreal, the privileged mental object of the imagination and the type of absence that distinguishes the past remembered from the real imagined. In this regard, the experience of recognition can be considered as the criterion in which the capacity of memory to represent the past is attested. Certainly, the search for memory in the operation of recalling memory is an occasion for all sorts of abuse, contempt, error, disappointment, but the moment of recognition remains the last and irreplaceable criterion of what the philosopher Henri Bergson has very happily called the survival or revival of images of the past. [3] The experience of recognition is constituted as a crucial moment in which the three problems of memory, history and forgetting meet again. In fact, recognition by memory is not only recognition of a past thing but also the recognition of oneself. Here, therefore, emerging in the space of memory, lying once again between time and narration, is personal identity, extended in turn to encompass all forms of communitarian identity. [4] By this way the notion of narrative identity elaborated in the general conclusion of *Time and Narrative 3* is re-found as a dimension connected to the mnemonic experience. *Memory, History, Forgetting* is a book in three parts: the first, develops a phenomenology of memory predominantly following Husserl's descriptive approach; the second, articulates an epistemology of the historical sciences and, finally, the third develops a hermeneutics of the historical condition. If, on the one hand, it is true that these three sections are strongly defined by their respective themes and methods, on the other they do not form three separate books, because there is a common

theoretical and speculative essential line of research comprised by the question of the representation of the past. [5] In fact, the phenomenon of representation variously but essentially refers to or has to do first, with functions of memory, the mechanism of brain and perception, psychology and knowing processes; second, with historiography, historical knowledge, culture and language; and, finally, with self-representation, existential experience, narrative identity, cultural identity. The question as posed assumes a radicality in that Ricoeur elects to investigate. In it emerges the enigma of an image, of an *eikon* (to speak with Plato and Aristotle), which seems to be given as the presence of an absent thing, marked with the sign of the antecedence. [6] Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory begins with the eidetic of memory by investigating the *object* of memory, rather than from its *subject*. Thus, the egological approach is in some way subordinated to the objectual approach of phenomenology, which probes the field of memory by drawing a sort of reversed analytical arc from the object to the subject. In accordance with this re-polarisation, the phenomenology of memory has to follow a movement structured around two consequent questions: 'Of *what* are there memories?' and 'Whose memory is it?' [7] The question 'Who?' is the point of arrival, as to say that by the work of memory and remembering one 'remembers' or 'has conscience' of himself or herself. The movement is, then, from a particular memory to a reflected or (auto)-reflexive memory. The step to this last reflective phase is delayed by a significant splitting of the first question between a cognitive and a pragmatic level of problematisation. It introduces the question 'How?' between the 'What?' and the 'Who?', that is, to focus the question of memory as the question of its *exercise*. And with this question of the exercised memory, psychoanalysis comes into play, because in it the distinction between cognitive and pragmatic functioning of memory is solved into a kind of re-conjunction. In fact, Ricoeur recognises in the work of remembrance (*remémoration*) the same veritative process that Henri Bergson recognised and defined as 'effort of memory' (*effort de mémoire*), [8] and Freud 'work of remembering' (*Erinnerungsarbeit*). However, these terms are inherent to the field of practice, therefore they need that the discourse opens itself to the practical field of the uses and abuses of memory. This is the object of the second chapter, 'The Exercise of Memory: Uses and Abuses', whose second paragraph thematises Freud's distinction between work of memory and work of mourning.

FROM REPRESENTATION TO LANGUAGE

Ricoeur's reference to Freud is significant in all of his work, and even in his philosophical anthropology of the capable human being, it has an effective centrality. Thus, Ricoeur's return to Freud in the pages of *Memory, History, Forgetting* it is certainly not incidental. Among the many elements of interest and significance, there is the question of representation, a nodal point both in psychoanalysis' metapsychology and in methodological and speculative research on historical knowledge and anthropology. [9] It is useful to examine it on this occasion in particular to show the bridge function between historical and cultural dimensions, and between psychological and linguistic dimensions in human experience. The question of representation as treated in Freud's metapsychology has not found a complete clarification within dynamic psychology. The same is true within the domain of historiography and philosophy of history where the deeper understanding of representational mechanisms and functioning may play a tremendous role at different theoretical-speculative levels. But to achieve this goal, this examination must go beyond *stricto sensu* epistemological

or gnoseological research: it needs in fact to cross a pragmatic theory of mind strictly connected with scientific research on the effective mechanism involved during the process of representation. Thus, to consider Freud's theorisation is equally important in a hermeneutical philosophy applied to anthropology and history in order to open a new interdisciplinary way within a problematic and vast field of problematisation full of productive elements, key-concepts and essential explanations. For Ricoeur, the function of representation constitutes a problematic theoretical and epistemological node in Freud's psychoanalysis, actually it is its Achilles' heel. But it is a weak point paradoxically full of productive and strong implications for the epistemology of the human and social sciences. It has the potential of paradigmatic value, because its fragility mirrors a mixed epistemological nature that can function as a valid model for the human-social sciences, and for the sciences like history in which the historians must work managing real objects and verbal contents, facts and narrations, documents and testimonies and the like. And something similar has happened in psychoanalysis, too, when the psychoanalyst has to apply his or her interpretative therapy on the basis of both a concrete psychology and verbal free expressions, between human psychology and subjective case history and between an emotional-energetic dynamism and a hermeneutic-communicative dialectical relation. Actually, the historical problematic of the 'reality of the past' parallels the psychoanalytic dilemma of the 'psychic reality': What kind of realities are the past and the psychic? What kind of connection exists between a real and a psychic object? What is a 'psychic' object? Freud's investigation on this node is articulated in several phases and with moments of profound rethinking. He considered and studied the theme in different moments: in the *Project of a Psychology* (1895), in the *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), in the metapsychological essay *The Unconscious* (1915), and in other minor works. The conceptual network directly or indirectly unfolded within Freud's research framework on the question of representation is significantly rich and dense. Among these notions, the concept of *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* emerges for its theoretical significance and novelty. Translated as 'the representative of the representation', 'psychical representative' or 'ideational representative', it is used by Freud in his two metapsychological papers 'Die Verdrängung' and 'Das Unbewusste' (both of 1915) in which he defines the relationship and close connection of psychism and semantic dimension, in parallel with the relationship of drive and representation. Freud's theory leaves here a large margin of interpretative possibilities. And this explains why authors like Ricoeur have been able to efficiently and productively co-create notions such as 'semantics of desire' [10] by having them interacting under a phenomenological and hermeneutical process. The *drive* or *instinct* would be the pure vectoriality aimed at the discharge, in the sense of Husserl's idea of the pre-intentional; and the *desire* would constitute its semantic-psychic reception, expression and remodulation at the level of the psychic life. Desire would therefore follow the line-orientation of the instinctive impulse; it would follow the instinctive line but as semantically covered, that is, substantiated with a *motivation*, and not simply (biologically) *determined*. However, within the phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective, the concept of representation remains not uniformly subsumed when compared among different interpretations. Husserl, for example, interprets the whole unconscious as the sphere of the pre-intentional in the sense of the 'affective matter', establishing a close, unclarified link between the pre-intentional and the intentional sphere of consciousness... Beyond this theoretical-philosophical interpretation, Freud's theoretical works explicitly underlined

that the drive as such, that is as a somatic entity, remains outside of the psychism, even external from an operation of psychic removal at the unconscious level. And this seems to mean that all unconscious dynamism is expressed at the level of the psychic representative of the drive; that is to say that the subconscious in its entirety has to do only with the representation and this would constitute the 'deep matter'. It remains to be determined and deeply explored how to conceive of and understand the connection between representational and affective dimensions; just like it remains to clarify the question of what exactly defines and distinguishes the dialect between an unconscious representation or *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* and a conscious representation. What is interesting is to see how some ideational and not-fully-rational elements intertwine the semantic structure of a conscious representation... Already in his early works of psychopathology, Freud interprets the representation with a new meaning putting it in reference to the emotional sphere and to the content invested by the affection. Affection can detach from the representation that expresses it, which determines it, to be associated with another representation or be converted into a symptom or somatisation. Freud's notion of *unconscious representation* poses various problems, or in any case presents considerable possibilities of semantic-cognitive oscillation, according to a given model of psychic life and especially of unconscious life. It can even change the whole physiognomy of the problematisation: A strongly monistic or reductionist model, that is, of a radically biologic type, for example, 'closes' or 'crushes' the sense of the problem more or less at the same problematic horizon defined by the research of cognitive psychology. Here a hermeneutical conception can indefinitely open the field of understanding: representing can become one with interpreting in the sense of the Heideggerian-Gadamerian ontological and existential circularity. Also interesting are the possible developments of a use of the linguistic approach, both of the hermeneutical linguistics, as in Steiner for example, and of the more radicalised one, as in Lacan. With the latter, representation becomes the supporting axis, the structure of the inner psychic life, that is the foundation of the experiential and cognitive reality; conversely, with Steiner, the notion of representation is more of a 'cultural' value, in how much the language forms the idea and understanding of ourselves, and our world experience in the prevalent sense of the cultural, personal or belonging. We are formed by the language we speak and by the culture in which we are raised. In the Preface to the second edition of the book *After Babel*, Steiner suggests that it is the constructive force of language in the conceptualisation of the world that played a crucial role in the survival of humanity. It is this 'miraculous' ability of grammars to generate alternative realities, hypothetical phrases and, above all, the projections of the future that allowed our species to experience hope. We persist, and persist creatively, thanks to our imperative ability to say 'No' to reality, to fabricate fictions of otherness, of a dreamed or desired or expected diversity where our awareness can find residence. [11] This thesis is definitely full of implications, both for the specific fields of technical hermeneutics, of translatology and linguistics and for other disciplinary fields of potential application, such as cultural anthropology, psychoanalysis and philosophy. According to Steiner we must think that representation is always, first and foremost, a linguistic phenomenon. We must also think that this phenomenon has to do with the knowledge of ourselves and the world, indeed it is the only way of knowing ourselves and the world: a knowledge that is never direct, never real in the sense of a complete correspondence. To represent is to 'see culturally', to cover ourselves with the semantic imaginary, to redefine ourselves and the world with a semantic network. And to know is

to translate representatively, in the sense of translating through the available conceptual network.

BETWEEN SPACE OF EXPERIENCE AND HORIZON OF ATTEMPT

The dialectics between the cultural-linguistic dimension and the process of personal emancipation is present in the different works of Ricoeur. The idea of personal identity as a dialectical process founded in history, acts as an anthropological central element. If this discourse appears more hidden in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, elsewhere it emerges with evidence and demonstrates Ricoeur's sensitivity to a conception that accords with the idea that to become a person is part of a complex emancipatory process with a historical-cultural and experiential basis. [12] The paper 'La crise: un phénomène spécifiquement moderne?' (1988) clearly mirrors this conception. It does not develop a philosophical reflection on the phenomenology of the crisis in itself, but rather it offers a speculative analysis with critical-sociological basis, trying to determine a generalised or generalisable conception of crisis and a diagnosis of the modern crisis. For Ricoeur, to problematise the question of the crisis means to problematise the question of modernity itself. However, it does not represent an easy task, because of three major difficulties that works as obstacles to a complete clarification: first, the difficulty caused by a multiplied use and abuse of the term crisis within the communicative sphere; [13] second, the difficulty of passing from some of certain 'regional' uses of this concept to a more generalised and comprehensive use; and third, the difficulty related to the novelty and obscurity of a current phenomenon that must be examined under a philosophical perspective. Why philosophically? Because the problem crosses and intertwines the dilemmas concerning the *meaning* of the present, the 'spirit' of current times and the current, predominant lifestyle and values. The first step that Ricoeur accomplishes can be defined as a critical-linguistic clarification, and it is justified by the extreme polysemy of the term conflict. The first, major use is related to the medical sphere; the second concerns the psycho-physiological and pedagogical sphere; the third touches on the cosmopolitical sphere. It is by putting in dialectical connection the notion of crisis with the notion of critique that Ricoeur, who follows Koselleck's reasoning, recalls a certain paradoxical effect. Indeed, if on the one hand the work of criticism is considered as a real engine of individual and social emancipation, on the other hand it is precisely the sort of unilateral optimism beyond all criticisms that makes almost impossible for it to recognise its own limits. In philosophy, Koselleck's work represents a significant contribution because it offers the possibility of the passage from the plane of the person to the historical plane, always following the line of temporality. The most important concepts are those of the 'horizon of waiting' and the 'space of experience', which are at the same time generalisable in reference to the crisis and involved in it (as causal elements). The general medical use lies at the heart of the interpretation of the dynamics of the crisis, because though it, current temporality can be considered from the perspective of the 'pathology of the process of temporalisation' in history. [14] To give a 'historical' pronunciation on the present is impossible, according to Ricoeur. Even a sociological analysis is really difficult to develop because a society is never entirely intelligible to itself and also because every evaluation and critique of ideas and values (which constitute, in themselves, a consistent part of the global social fact) always has an ideological anchorage. A philosophical perspective itself, as a particular, as plunged into a specific hermeneutical perspective, is limited. However, there is a moral-practical dimension which, together with a specific

anthropological conception, substantiates this speculative vision. We find this approach, expressed more fully in Ricoeur's book *Oneself as Another* (1992). It constitutes a philosophical-practical perspective that stands between *emancipation* and *responsibility* on the one side, and between natural-corporal dimension and historical-cultural dimension of personal identity. We are born as individuals, and we become persons through the historical-cultural and experiential process of the daily life.

CONFLICT, CRISIS AND THE HUMAN BEING

'La crise de la conscience historique et l'Europe' is another paper published during the same year. Ricoeur treats the same problem, but from a more circumstantial perspective, and by using more explicitly using the disciplinary support of historical and sociological knowledge. Again, he returns to the categories of 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation': the two poles in perpetual opposition, in a perpetual dialectic with which historical knowledge itself becomes possible, by the effect that the ideal perspective on a possible, utopian, future can directly have given current determinations and actions. And the 'living present' of a culture is, for historical knowledge, the exact place where the exchange between the *espace d'expérience* and the *horizon d'attente* occurs. The living present is the place of initiative, either from the practical point of view or from the point of view of action. Now, the peculiar aspect of European historical consciousness can be known by taking into consideration the particular fact of Europe's life (that is, the specifically European experience space and also its particular way of living and projecting itself into a horizon of waiting). In relation to the first aspect, we have at least two characteristics typical of the spirit of Europe: first, the extraordinary richness and heterogeneity in the combination of traditions and cultures that are the basis of its past; second, the intersection between strongly competing traditions and the spirit of criticism. [15] The crisis is not a contingent accident, nor only a modern disease: it is constitutive of the European conscience. Why? Because of its fragility, which is determined by the cultural and identitarian formation of the European consciousness. However, as Ricoeur explains, fragility and pathology are not far from each other. The crisis of European consciousness is pathological at least in two aspects: (1) in the aspect of memory, by the effect of the paradox of excessive memory on the one hand and a void of memory or forgetfulness on the other; and, (2) in the aspect of the future, that is to say in relation to the horizon of expectation. This double pathology is not without effects on the present, since the present is precisely the 'place' of conjunction between the space of experience and the horizon of waiting. Emptiness of initiative and emptiness in meaning: today's people sense of future has no horizon; today, the experience does not have the support in understanding of historical knowledge. How does a generation without the knowledge of its past productively substantiate a perspective for its future?

CONCLUSION

This paper has essentially focused Ricoeur's book *Memory, History, Forgetting*, revealing its strict and deep connection with an anthropological conception that extends beyond its explicit consideration of the phenomenology of memory, historiography and philosophy of history. In fact, not only it is expressive of a complex philosophical investigation on historical knowledge, but also of the human historical-cultural and existential condition. The work is an examination of both the philosophy of history and historiography as well as of philosophical anthropology, which somehow absorbs

Ricoeur's other minor works and offers a general conception of the human being as a cultural and historical being. Actually, the dialectics between the cultural-linguistic dimension and the process of personal emancipation is present in several different works of Ricoeur. And the idea of personal identity as a dialectical process founded in history, acts as an anthropological central element even in thematising certain methodological and epistemological complex aspects in historical knowledge. This paper has put in parallel the multi-epistemic approaches in psychoanalysis and history by underlining a specific, narrow, parallel between the concept of psychic reality in psychology and the ontology of the past in history. These two disciplinary areas put the function of representation in a similar cardinal role, as something placed between the real and the imaginative, between the objective and the subjective, and between real facts and personal experiences and the like. Ricoeur's sensitivity for a conception in accordance with the idea that to become a person is part of a complex emancipatory process with a historical-cultural and experiential basis emerges with evidence, as to say that history determines and forms the person, as well as the person determines and forms history.

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INFORMATION CULTURE PERSON: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

Modern information technologies keep changing our world and bringing a new quality to it. A new type of culture has emerged – information culture, which reflects the specifics of social relations in a modern society. The paper raises the issue of information culture formation and its impact on the development of personality in the course of information socialization. The paper analyses possible perspectives and consequences of social interaction of people within information culture at the main stages of formation of a personality: identification, individualization and personalization. The authors point out that uncontrolled information socialization is most dangerous, and that already today it leads to dramatic changes in its fundamental attributes: consciousness, communication, action and language. Information culture is becoming the major mechanism of personality and society formation and bringing humanity to the need to choose between Person and Cyberbeing as the future representative of civilization.

Keywords: person, information culture, socialization, cyberbeing.

INTRODUCTION

Higher speeds of data exchange, never-ending information flows, the world of gadgets and networking – this is by far not the complete list of attributes of present-day life. Technologies play more and more a decisive role in life of humans. Information, genetic, scientific, military and other technologies reflect not just the current situation in science, but also outlooks, tendencies of man's development.

Higher rates of life force us to adapt to them, to adjust, change the habitual reality into a new world of information reality. The Internet has become a symbol of the modern world, a tool of recent considerable changes. Information reality and the cyberspace created by it in the World Wide Web keep forming a new quality of perception of man's life and experiences. In this regard Jean Baudrillard said that programmable movement turns traditional space of mutual communication into a desert zone, and a live conversation with a neighbor becomes indirect correspondence with a "virtual double" [1].

In the modern world, it is not only surrounding reality that changes under the influence of information technologies, but also the culture, due to which a person adapts to changes. The newly born information culture allows a realization of social interaction through non-traditional methods.

Hence, one of current issues is formation of personal information culture, upon which personality socialization depends in the modern world. "How will information society develop?" is more a question of philosophy than of technology, as development of society is predetermined by attitudes of public consciousness and maturity of information culture. A person nowadays has to comply with laws of infosphere, develop qualities necessary for effective functioning in this environment.

Studies by modern scientists show that information culture is an essential element of a modern society conditioned by specifics of modern civilization development on the one hand and essential traits of a person on the other hand [2]. The human is an informative and communicative creature. This type of culture reflects human's fundamental quality. Opinions of scientists about the concept of information culture are various. For example, O.V. Ivushkina says: "Information culture represents a subsystem of culture, which is formed as a result of informatization of society and includes the whole diversity of results of human activities in the information sphere of a society" [3]. This approach to definition of information culture was developed within Information Culturology [4] and shows it as a new phenomenon of a modern society generated by informatization and requiring certain internalizing.

There are other opinions. For instance, N.M. Rosenberg is not restricted only by computerization when interpreting the concept of information culture and says that "information culture is the most important component of spiritual culture in the most general sense of this term. The real field of its application is, in fact, much larger" [5, p. 36]. It is difficult to argue with this point of view. Indeed, since the beginning of human history people have been building and enhancing the technology of accumulation and distribution of information (writing, book-printing), forming information culture in general. Hence, information culture is an index of information status of a civilization, where information revolutions are quantum leaps in development of information culture leading to formation of a new civilization.

These approaches to definition of information culture interpret it in a broad sense. However, a narrower aspect is also necessary reflecting the mechanisms of formation of human information culture and reverse impact of this culture on people for understanding of problems connected with transformations in a modern person. Such an aspect of information culture is reflected in a few of our papers [6-9].

Let us give basic provisions that we will build upon in this paper.

1. Information culture represents a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes created in the course of computerized education and training taking place in the information reality.

2. Information culture is characterized by transfer of and exposure to social experience not by traditional methods, but on the basis of interaction of people with subjects and objects of infosphere.

3. Level of development of information culture is a result of information socialization. For detection of problems in formation of information culture, it is