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Hamas' statements. A discourse analysis approach

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# Hamas' Statements

A discourse analysis approach

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## Abstract

Hamas, acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, is a political movement that was founded in 1987 and has, since 2007, been in charge of the Gaza Strip. The movement was initially characterised by a language accentuated by tropes of political Islam and, after the Oslo Accords, by a strong rejection of the institutions established by the Accords. Consequently, the movement refused to take part in the elections of the Palestinian Authority. The failure of the Accords in the early 2000s led the movement to take a turn, deciding to participate in the elections. Hamas thus underwent a significant political development, that resulted in changes in rhetoric, ideological representations, and self-representation. The present work aims to study the movements ideological development and communication strategies by the means of Discourse Analysis, with the analysis of the corpora of *bayānāt*, the official statements issued by Hamas and published on their official website.

## Resumen

Hamas, acrónimo de “Movimiento de Resistencia Islámica”, es un movimiento político que se fundó en 1987 y que desde 2007 controla la Franja de Gaza. El movimiento se caracterizó inicialmente por un lenguaje fuertemente marcado por los topoi del Islam político y, después de los Acuerdos de Oslo, por un rechazo radical de las instituciones resultado de los mismos Acuerdos. A raíz de esto, el movimiento se negó a participar en las elecciones de la Autoridad Palestina. La ruptura de los acuerdos hizo que en el 2004 Hamas participara en las elecciones. Por tanto, Hamas experimentó un desarrollo político significativo, que dio lugar a cambios en la retórica, en las representaciones ideológicas y en la autorrepresentación del mismo movimiento. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo investigar el desarrollo ideológico del movimiento y de sus estrategias de comunicación a través del análisis del discurso del corpus de *bayānāt*, es decir, los comunicados oficiales emitidos por Hamas y publicados en su página web oficial.



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## Note on abbreviations and transliterations of Arabic characters

The present work adopts a mixed system of transliterations for the romanization of Arabic terms. Examples, quotations and Arabic terms that have not entered common use in English are integrally transcribed with the scientific system of transcription; proper names of people and organizations are transcribed only the first time, and the following occurrences follow the simplified transcription: for example, Muhammad Abduh occurs in the simplified transcription "Muhammad Abduh" together with its scientific transcription "Muḥammad ʿAbduh" only the first time it is mentioned in the text. Arabic terms that have entered English language are written in the simplified version: for example, is adopted the version "jihad" instead of *ǧihād*. The following scheme reports the symbols used in this work with the corresponding Arabic letter and IPA<sup>1</sup> symbol; only the phonemes with no correspondence in English writing system will be reported.

Arabic Letter	Symbol	IPA
Long vowel: a	ā	a:
Long vowel: u	ū	u:
Long vowel: i	ī	i:
ṭāʾ	ṭ	θ
ǧym	ǧ	dʒ
ḥāʾ	ḥ	ħ
ḫāʾ	ḫ	x
ḍāl	ḍ	ð
šīn	š	ʃ
ṣād	ṣ	s <sup>ʕ</sup>
ḍād	ḍ	d <sup>ʕ</sup>
ṭā	ṭ	t <sup>ʕ</sup>
ẓā	ẓ	z <sup>ʕ</sup>
ʿayn	ʿ	ʕ
ǧayn	ǧ	ɣ
qāf	q	q
hamza	ʾ	ʔ
Alif maqṣūra	ā	a:
Alif maddah	·ā	ʔā

<sup>1</sup>International Phonetic Alphabet



## **Abbreviations**

The following abbreviations may be found in the text:

PLO = Palestine Liberation Organization (political party)

PFLP = Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (political party)

## **Bibliography**

EI2 = H. A. R. Gibb et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam (second edition)*, Leiden, Brill, 1986-2002.

# **PART I: On the research and the object of analysis**



# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 The issue of representation

Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a political Palestinian party that, at present, governs the Gaza Strip. It was founded during the first intifada, in December 1987. Hamas is renown in news outlets for being at the centre of reporting regarding the Palestinian question, especially when it comes to armed conflict of Israeli attacks on the Strip. During the protests of the "March of return", that started in March 2018 and have resulted in the killing of 137 people protesting on the Israeli border as of July 2018<sup>1</sup>, condemned by the United Nations for "disproportioned use of force"<sup>2</sup>. The protest, that started from grass-roots organisations and had long been prepared, had the scope to claim the right of return and the right to better life conditions in the Gaza Strip that, after a straining on the blockade and the increase in the prices of energy and decrease of hours of electricity per day by Israel, versed the Strip in critical conditions. Hamas was blamed for organising the protest, and the victims were called "Hamas' fighters" by Israel. Hamas never took credit for the organisation of the protests<sup>3</sup>, and the people killed were mostly civilians, not necessarily affiliated to a political party. Nonetheless, Hamas remained at the centre of the narration of the event; during the coverage on Gaza

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<sup>1</sup>"Official: 137 Palestinians killed in Gazas Great March of Return", Middle East Monitor, 13/07/2018:

<<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180713-official-137-palestinians-killed-in-gazas-great-marches-of-return/>> (last access: 24/07/2018)

<sup>2</sup>"United Nations Palestinian Rights Committee Condemns Excessive, Disproportionate Use of Force by Israeli Security Forces against Demonstrators at Gaza Fence", 14/05/2018:

<<https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gapa1406.doc.htm>> (last access: 24/07/2018)

<sup>3</sup>"Hamas chief: No alternative to Palestine or right to return", Hamas.ps (English website), 30/03/2018:

< <http://hamas.ps/en/post/1231/hamas-chief-no-alternative-to-palestine-or-right-to-return> > (last access: 24/07/2018)

broadcast in the Italian televised media in June 2018, the reporters never failed to mention that Hamas is listed as a terrorist movement both in United States and in the European Union.

The image of Hamas is frequently associated with an Islamic homogeneous group (faces of Hamas' leader are seldom found in news outlets) that provokes Israel. The example of the March of Return is one of many that are indicative of a representation issue related to Hamas and the Palestinian question, limited to a reading within the supposed action-reaction dynamic between the Movement and Israel. Although the present work does not directly address the representation issue, or the political consequences, it is nevertheless a starting point for the research. The consequences of a biased representation are felt also in the academic discourse which, especially in counter-terrorism literature, adopts a simplified and stereotyped version of Hamas that does not allow for a reasoned analysis or criticism. The Hamas that exists in news discourse is not fully correspondent to the actual Hamas.

## 1.2 Hamas as a research object

Shifting the perspective on Hamas from "terrorist movement", "Islamic movement" or "armed organisation" to Hamas as an object of academic enquiry means abandoning approaches that, being based on pre-existing assumptions on the nature of Islamic and terrorist movements, necessarily impair the analysis and do not provide for useful information in the field of political sciences, politics, or Islamic studies. In order to do this, pre-existing assumptions need to be reset completely in favour of an approach that provides reasoned choices regarding the methodology and the analytical categories.

The present work proposes to provide an analysis of Hamas' ideology by focusing on Hamas' discourse. Thus, it employs a Discourse Studies approach on a portion of Hamas' official communication: the corpus of official statements, or *bayānāt*, that can be read and downloaded from the official website in Arabic (<<https://hamas.ps/ar>>). This perspective frames Hamas as a developing political movement, and is concerned with understanding how and if the official discourse was accordingly modified. Official discourse, in this research, is thus a perspective through which it is possible to understand more about the movement's ideology and discuss it in terms of socio-political context and "discursive context" (other discourses that Hamas accesses and that influence its discourse).

The first objective is thus to learn more about Hamas by adopting a specific point of view, which is provided by the analysis of ideological discourse. In fact, Discourse Studies, a field of research that developed especially after the 1990s (Reisigl and Wodak, 2011), comprise many different methodological approaches,

and include lines of research concerned with the question of power, ideology, discourse and cognition (Chapter 4). They maintain a special focus on the relation between discursive practices and social practices: both discourse and society are considered semiotic spaces, where meaning is built. Norms, values and representations that regulate social life are very often transmitted through discourse and are, at the same time, created, modified and reproduced through discourse. A research based on discourse allows to enquire about ideology in a specific perspective, benefiting from methodological tools that facilitate a systematic analysis of content, form and context. Moreover, it is a mostly unexplored field: so far, the scientific contributions that have provided for a reasoned and thorough analysis of Hamas pertain especially the fields of political sciences and historiography (Chapter 3). This first object aims at contributing specifically on the studies on Hamas. Secondly, Hamas presents some particular features, and its study could contribute to a more general theory of political discourse and ideology. Hamas is a resistance and Islamic movement, and has developed in a particular context, which is Palestine and the occupation of Palestine.

At first Hamas presented the characteristics of a social movement, as it was not a political party and initially refused to enter the institutions; moreover, it is goal-oriented, as it is formed with the specific objective to defeat the Israeli occupation, and not with the expressed intention to govern or run for office. Its organisation and values are also goal-dependant. In 2004 the movement ran for municipal elections and, after a good electoral outcome, also won the 2006 legislative elections, gaining the right to become the first party in the Palestinian Authority (Chapter 2). This shift, or "politicisation", to quote Khaled Hroub [2006], which has been extensively studied by Hamas' scholars, marks the passage to a fully-fledged political party. The context in which this happens is equally relevant for the study: Israel's settler-colonial system, which exerts power on the Palestinian territories by imposing a blockade on Gaza and an occupation and settlement expansion on the West Bank.

Hamas thus follows two "power directions": a horizontal one, where the movements changes in power status within its society, gaining a higher amount of power as governor of Gaza, and a vertical direction, where the dominant power of Israel constrains and conditions the power of Hamas. This means that Hamas also represents a particular case study, where different realisations of power constitute the context of development of the ideology. This allows one to understand if and how these specific conditions influence discourse and the underlying ideological representations, which constraints they impose, or if and in which cases they are not directly relevant. This second research objective thus aims at generalising the results in a general theory of discourse and ideology.

## 1.3 Theoretical framework and methodology

The present research takes into consideration two theoretical frameworks: the research lines on power, ideology and cognition in the field of Discourse Studies, and the research lines on Palestinian politics (Chapter 4).

### 1.3.1 Theoretical framework

The studies on ideology, power and discourse are necessary to obtain an adequate perspective for analysing Hamas' case. Although the present research does not contribute to the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics, it is fundamental to acknowledge the role of cognition acting as an interface to process and produce information (section 4.3). Studies on ideology and discourse assert the fundamental function of identity and social identity in building groups: an in-group, the "Us", if exemplified in deictic terms, whose members feel a sense of commonality and share norms, values and goals, and an out-group, where members of the in-group classify those who are recognised as different, "Them", and their identity is based upon the differences with the out-group (section 4.2, 4.5). As Hamas is considered as a group that will supposedly build a system of in-group and out-group, this theoretical framework is fundamental in approaching the analysis. The ideological structures concerned with in-group and out-group building (section 4.3.1), such as representation of the social actors (Chapter 7), values (Chapter 8), instruments (Chapter 9) and goals (Chapter 10) have been the starting point of the analysis. As the corpus is composed by only one genre, the official statements or *bayānāt*, the theory of genres was also relevant for the analysis (section 4.4). A dedicated chapter (Chapter 6) opens the analytical part of the thesis (Part II).

The theoretical framework pertaining politics is, in this case, focus-oriented. The study of Hamas in political sciences or historiography is often concerned with two lines of research, according to which the representation of the movement changes: counter-terrorism studies, already briefly mentioned, consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation, while other approaches develop the analysis considering Hamas as a resistance movement (Chapter 3). The second system of representation contextualises the analysis in the broader context of Palestinian studies, that can be ascribed to some particular research lines and epistemological problems. Given the specific context of Palestine, some specific tendencies arise in the academic literature: issues of representation and studies on identity. Representation is debated both as representation of Palestine from the outside (section 4.6.2), read as products of a settler-colonial system and a hegemonic discourse, and studies on Palestinian identity. These studies very often count also as a counter-hegemonic discourse, as they tackle issues brought up by hegemonic representations, such as the denial of the Palestinian identity and the practices of cultural appropriation

performed by Israel. This leads to the second theoretical framework addressed in the study: the studies on settler colonialism (section 4.6.1). Most of the recent literature on Palestine refer to settler colonial studies, or assumes Israel to be a settler coloniser, which provides for a particular interpretation on the power dynamics of interest for the present study. In fact, settler colonialism pursues different goals than regular colonialism, as it aims at establishing its presence on the conquered territory as a new national entity, and exploit until elimination the natives. This clearly provides a very specific interpretation of Israel in relation to Palestinians, and needs be taken into consideration throughout the analysis, although Israel is not the object of the analysis.

### **1.3.2 Methodology**

As the research is concerned with the analysis of changes in the movement's ideology and discourse, it needs an adequate methodology and a corpus to track diachronic changes. For this reason, two corpora have been used: a sample corpus, with a selection of statements, to analyse by the means of qualitative methods, and the general corpus with all the statements, where to conduct mainly quantitative analyses (section 5.2). The sample corpus has been selected in order to represent the whole corpus, so it contained statements throughout a period of time of 28 years (from 1988 to 2016). This covers the lifespan of the movement until 2016. The collection of the general corpus also stopped in 2016, although Hamas kept publishing. This was done for two reasons: first of all, the collection of statements could not be continued during the analysis of the statements because, obviously, adding new documents to the corpus while performing the analyses would produce incomparable data; secondly, statements which are too recent are less likely to be analysed in the same depth of those who date back at least a couple of years, because older statements are easier to contextualize under the light of subsequent developments and general historical context, while statements too recent may not benefit from such background information and key of interpretations.

Ideology can be reproduced in discourse by the means of different strategies. For this reason, the linguistic levels analysed are many, starting from a micro-level (local semantics, syntax) to a macro-level (topics, macro-speech acts, superstructures of narration and argumentation, strategies of legitimation). Texts are complex organisation of information, and such organisation reflects cognitive organisation of information, social norms, shared knowledge of the world and shared representations. Thus, different layers of discursive strategies can be found in different linguistic aspects (section 5.4). As previously mentioned, the analysis focused on ideological structures: participants, values, instruments, goals, and the category of genre (section 5.4.1). For each analytical category, a thorough analysis of these levels has been performed, when they proved relevant for an



ideological analysis. A mixed-approach was used depending on each ideological structure. For example, the analysis of participants included an analysis of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008), and the results were discussed for tracing an ideological square for Hamas' representations (Chapter 7). Values, instruments and goals would not benefit by the same approach, because they do not refer to people, if not very broadly; for this reason, a more conceptual approach has been privileged, based on an analysis of frames (Fillmore and Baker, 2010) and a discussion on the semantic level, pertaining possible changes in meaning, connotations, co-occurrences and collocations (Chapters 8, 9, 10). The diachronic analysis was fundamental, and has been performed by dividing the corpus in three decades (1988-1996, 1997-2006, 2007-2016), so that it was possible to calculate frequencies per year or categorise the statements in the sample corpus for the qualitative analysis.

## **1.4 Context**

The role of context (social, historical, political) is fundamental in the present work. Hamas' texts cannot be analysed without placing them in three contexts: Palestine and Palestinian politics, Islamic political movements and their history and Arab politics and history. For this reason, an account of these three axes of contextualisation has been provided (Chapter 2). Hamas is a multi-dimensional movement, and even the most recent texts cannot be analysed solely on the intuitive notion a reader may have on the concepts expressed, such as resistance or nation. Even the most common knowledge terms, in fact, have developed and modified in history, and bring with them a heritage of context-specific representations and interpretations.

The constraints posed on discourse by the context(s) will then be one of the enquired objects of analysis. Palestinian discourse provides shared representations, norms and values that are almost inescapable for Palestinian parties.

## **1.5 Concluding remarks**

Discourse studies, especially those concerned with politics and ideology, still lack a comprehensive review of cases from the Middle East area, and Palestine less than the rest. This work thus proposes to be a contribution in discourse studies by providing a reasoned and contextualised analysis from this specific region, to provide for comparison with similar cases in the existing literature. Moreover, given the nature of the object of analysis and the current state of the art (Chapter 3), the present work aligns with the research lines that consider Hamas as a re-

sistance movement and political movement, and try to explain all the dimensions of its ideology (Islamic, resistance, nationalism) within a broader framework of analysis in order to avoid some recurrent epistemological problems, such as the deterministic attitude of assuming knowledge on Hamas on the ground of being only religious or a terrorist group (section 3.2.2), or "exoticize" the movement as an exceptional phenomenon with no comparability with other movements or parties (section 3.4.1).



## Chapter 2

# HAMAS. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

### 2.1 Introduction to the research topic

Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, has been the party in charge of the Gaza Strip since 2006. It was founded from members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, with the specific purpose to resist the Israeli Occupation. Although widely considered as a jihadi, radical, terrorist movement, for its Islamic inspiration and for its armed wing (the Ezzedin Al Qassam Brigades), Hamas' actions cover a much wider range, starting from charity to local administration.

Hamas started from being a non-institutional nor governmental organisation which gathered people from organisations who shared similar objectives (opposition to Israel, Islam as a model, a political alternative to the PLO) which evolved in terms of structure and objectives to become a fully-fledged political party, after twenty years outside the political arena.

Ascending to a ruling position has posed many challenges to the Movement and, according to Hroub, has contributed to its politicisation, that is to say that it showed a behaviour usually associated with ruling élites more than social movements (Hroub, 2006b,a; Sayigh, 2010).

Hamas issued statements since its very beginning (the first one dates back to 1988, or 1987 according to (Tamimi, 2011) and the Movement,<sup>1</sup> under the form of leaflets distributed to the population for coordinating the demonstrations during

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<sup>1</sup>The question of the first statement issued is controversial. In fact, the movement affirms that the first *bayān* was published in 1987, and they also published it in their website with the title "First statement of foundation", dated 14th December 1987 (< <https://hamas.ps/ar/post/39/>>) many scholars affirm that the first statement dates back to 1988 (Nüsse, 1998), (Baconi, 2018).

the first intifada, the popular uprising that broke out in 1987 against the Israeli occupation.

At present, Hamas is included in the United States Department of State terrorist list <sup>2</sup>, where it was added in 1997, and its presence in the List of Terrorist organisation of the European Union is currently under dispute, as the movement was removed in 2014 by the General Court, and the decision was appealed by the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2015), that was followed by the re-inclusion of the movement in the list in August 2017 (of the European Union, 2017).

## 2.2 Historical context

Hamas was born relatively late in the history of Palestine, and found its discourse entrenched in wider and developing discourses within Arab and Palestinian politics.

When Hamas was founded, the Palestinian political discourse had already undergone several developments. The PLO was approaching negotiations and gradually modifying its own discourse in order to accommodate its political guidelines. According to Badarin (2016), the Palestinian political discourse is constrained by some “rules of formation” that depend mainly on two factors: an historical event, the Nakba, Arabic for “catastrophe” that indicates the day of self-proclamation of Israel, and the search for a solution, which was at first recognised in the armed struggle, then in the engagement in peace negotiations.

### 2.2.1 The Palestinian question

The context in which Hamas was born and developed is that of occupied Palestine. In 1987, both Gaza and the West Bank were still occupied territories following the 1967 war.

The event that dates back further among those mentioned by Hamas’ commemorative statements is Balfour’s declaration. Balfour’s declaration was a letter, signed by the then British Minister of Foreign Affairs Arthur Balfour to publicly express British support to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, after the request of Lord Rothschild, the representative of the Zionist movement in Great Britain, to whom the letter is addressed.

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<sup>2</sup>Department of State list of terrorist foreign organisation:<  
<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>> (last access: 14/07/2018)

November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely, Arthur James Balfour

(Gelvin, 2008, p. 273)

The context is that of the last two decades of existence of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had, since the XIV century, covered most of the areas comprising modern Middle East, the Anatolian peninsula, and North Africa with the exception of approximately modern Morocco. After the XIX century, the empire went through a significant crisis, which was both economic and social, especially as a consequence of reaction measures to European modernisation, colonisation and economy; such reaction is known with the expression "defensive modernisation", a set of measures that aimed at bridging the supposedly "modernisation gap" with Europe and discourage its military expansion. However, although such measures significantly changed pre-existing structures in positive ways (expansion of public education, dismissal of old tax collection systems), it also provoked unintended advantages for Europe, since the Ottoman governors took loans from European banks in order to build railways and ports and invested in textiles and agricultural produce that was requested in Europe (Gelvin, 2008, p. 98). Another important factor was the rise of local nationalist movements that followed the wake of Balkan nationalist movements first and European nationalist movements later.<sup>3</sup>

The arrival of nationalism to the Middle East was favoured by the previously mentioned attempts at modernisation. The *tanzimat*, the reforms implemented in the XIX century in the Ottoman empire, established a more direct intervention of the Empire in people's lives, favoured new economic models and the establishment of the principle of citizenship, which contributed to shape new individual conscience as citizens. Economy changed: in fact, it was less localised

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<sup>3</sup>A more detailed account can be found in Quataert (2000).

and trade spread in the area. The economic bonds that were entertained partially shaped a new conception of territories: merchants of the area corresponding to the Great Syria would trade more easily within the area, rather than with merchants in the territory corresponding to modern Iraq. New social classes emerged, such as the Christian middle class, favoured by the new economic models; however, in some cases, they lamented neglect by the central Empire. The structural changes brought about by the *tanzimat* produces a model similar to that of the nation-state for what concerns institutions and administration and, ultimately, the whole conception of "being Arab" changed: the term, that up until that moment was a derogatory appellation for the Bedouins, was worn with pride by the urban intellectual élites (Gelvin, 2008, pp. 248-253).

Zionism was a nationalist ideology of European origin that sought the creation of a State for the Jews, and conceptualised what was a religious community by the means of national features. It is thus inserted in the context of modern nationalisms. Its ideological father, the Austrian journalist Theodore Herzl, sustained that Europe was not a safe place for the Jewish community, and that a "national home" should be found elsewhere. After considering different options, such as the United States and Argentina, the choice fell on Palestine, on the grounds of religious and historical claims (Gelvin, 2008, p. 257-259).

The name "Palestine" was, at the time, the name of the *sanjaq*, the administrative district (see Deny and Kunt, "Sandjak") of Jerusalem (Khalidi, 2010, p. 151). In XIX, the rise of the Zionist movements, especially in their most extreme views, according to which Palestine should be established as the home of the Jews and their State, was behind the three *aliyot*, the immigration of Jews to Palestine, started in 1882 after the pogroms of zar Alexander III and the rise of the Zionist ideology (Rogan, 2016, p. 275-276).

Britain strongly encouraged the Arab nationalist movements in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1913, they forged an alliance with Ibn ʿAbd as-Saʿud, leader of the newly established confederation that included the clan Saʿud and the descendants of the radical religious preacher al-Wahhab and the sherif <sup>4</sup> Husayn of Mecca, guardian and governor of the city, with whom they entertained a letter exchange (the "Husayn-McMahon correspondence"), informally promising to the sherif the creation of an independent Arab State. However, in 1916, Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Accords (Figure 2.1<sup>5</sup>) with France, dividing the territory in areas under direct control of France and Britain, and areas of indirect control. In 1921, Britain sent its emissary T.E. Lawrence to mediate with the Hashemites that did not accept the new terms, such as the creation of mandates and, most of all, the

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
<sup>4</sup>The "sherif" was a religious and political official position of descendants of Prophet Mohamed's clan of the Hashemites

<sup>5</sup>Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica <<https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement>> (last access: 31/08/2018)

establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine in accordance to the 1917 Balfour declaration (Rogan, 2016, p. 252-253). Palestine was initially established to be under international control, and became a British mandate from 1920 to 1948.

British presence in Palestine was strongly resisted by the local population. Moreover, the Jewish immigration provoked a crisis on the economic and social level. In fact, in order to favour immigration, Jewish immigrants were conceded highest wages and better working conditions than the local population; to prevent over-saturation of the labour market and lower the wages, Arab workers were not hired, and the decision was made to keep the two economies separated (Gelvin, 2008, p. 262). During the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish immigration

Figure 2.1: Map of Middle East after the Sykes-Picot Accords



increased, and the settlers bought large extensions of land from local owners, causing the expulsion and impoverishment of large portions of the local workers, whose economy was mostly rural, which resulted in a worsening of the crisis of exports caused by the first World War (Kanafani, 2015; Gelvin, 2008, p. 264). Given the worries and discontent of the local population, and the problems arising from the massive purchase of lands in Palestine, that caused the displacement of the peasants, the two "White Books" issued in Britain in 1922 and in 1930 regulated limits on Jewish immigration (Rogan, 2016, pp. 276-277). Movements of independence against France and Britain were already flourishing in the whole Middle East area. In 1933, the *shaykh* Ezzedine Qassam, who had emigrated from Syria a few years before after fighting the French, began to organise a group of armed resistance to the British soldiers. This was contrary to the strategy of the nationalist Palestinian leaders, persuaded by the possibility to resolve the issue with the British pacifically and diplomatically (Khalidi, 2010; Rogan, 2016, p. 280-281). In 1935 he was killed during an attack on British soldiers. A first popular uprising erupted after his funeral, and the support for the nationalist Palestinian leaders was at the lowest. They re-organised in the High Arabic Committee that, despite organised strikes and attacks, maintained the politics of "trust" in the good will of the British.

In 1936 a strong revolt broke out. In 1937, the Peel Commission issued a proposal for sharing the land between Arabs and Jews; however, it did not take into consideration the actual distribution of Palestinian villages and proposed, although some of them fell within the Jewish part, that they should be evacuated and the



population displaced to the Arab part. Moreover, the Arab part would not have become an independent Palestinian state, but an annex of Transjordan under King Abdallah. This ignited again the protests in Palestine. However, the British army increased its military presence, sending massive back-up from Europe, and the revolt was finally repressed in 1939 (Rogan, 2016, p. 285-287).

The 1939 the third "White Book", that imposed limits on the Jewish immigration and theorised a Palestinian state with an Arab majority, was rejected by both the Jewish settlers and the Palestinians; however, it remained the reference for the British policies on the issue (Gelvin, 2008, p. 267).

In 1940, the Irgun and the Stern Band, two Zionist radical militias, reacted to the White Book by targeting the British with terrorist attacks. In 1947, Britain declared that it would terminate the mandate and leave Palestine; a commission, the UNSCOP, was appointed to find a solution for the post-mandate situation (Rogan, 2016, p. 345-350).

The United Nations, in 1947, issued Resolution 181 according to which Palestine should be partitioned (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1947). The partitioned entitled the Jewish approximately 51% of the territory; Jerusalem was established to remain under international control (Figure 2.2<sup>6</sup>).

The resolution was rejected by the Arabs; nonetheless, on 14th May 1948, Britain terminated its mandate and retreated from Palestine and the Jewish armed militias began the conquest and expulsion of the Palestinians from their houses, expanding, by the end of the first war, a territory more extended than that initially indicated in Resolution 181. Transjordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, as members of the recently founded Arab League (1945), immediately joined the war. However, the armies were not prepared to confront the Israeli army, and by the end of the year Israel had expanded to cover 78% of the

Figure 2.2: Map of the partition plan according to Resolution 181



<sup>6</sup>Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

<<https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Resolution-181>> (last access: 01/08/2018)

territory, while the Gaza Strip was put under Egyptian control, and the West Bank under Transjordan control (Rogan, 2016, p. 373-374).

The Nakba ("disaster"), as the day of 15th May 1948 is called in Arabic, was a strong rupture point. The declaration of the new-born State of Israel coincided with practices of expulsion and dispossession, during which Palestinians were expelled from their homes and became refugees, first in nearby Palestinian villages and, as the expansion proceeded, into camps outside Palestine. Moreover, those who fled their properties lost them on the grounds of Israeli law which established that vacant properties rightfully fell under Israeli ownership (Gelvin, 2008, p. 341). This is the root of the "return" issue, and the right to return for Palestinian refugees to return to Palestine; although the right of return has been established by resolution 242 (1967), it was not granted by Israel and became one of the discussed issues of negotiations.

Israel established dedicated agencies for the promotion of Jewish identity on the territory. From a rhetorical point of view, Israel claimed that it had populated a vacant area, and denied any real substantiation of Palestinian identity as a nation or even as a presence of relevance (Said, 2015). Other practices included the change of local toponymy into Hebrew toponymy (Suleiman, 2004), and the creation of parks with non-local vegetation were Palestinian villages had been destroyed (Sibilio, 2013).

The years between 1948 and 1967 are considered by some scholars as an elipsis for what concerns the development of Palestinian political and resistance movements (Khalidi, 2010); according to (Badarin, 2016), they were instead the years of political organisation before the first instances of resistance. In 1965, Fatah (from the Arabic *fath*, "conquest") was founded, a resistance movement of secular socialist inspiration. In 1964, Fatah joined other movements in the "Palestinian Liberation organisation" (PLO), a political and resistance front. The 1960s were the years of the *fidā'in*, the fighters that confronted the Israeli Occupation with armed resistance. The figure of the resistance fighter, the *fidā'i*, soon became a mythical and inspirational figure, and the identity reference for Palestinians, especially in refugee camps outside Palestine (Sayigh, 1977).

The Six Day War, however, marked another critical phase. The Arab coalition lost the war, and Egypt and Jordan ended up losing their Palestinian annexes and significant portions of their original territory.

Thus, the Arab neighbours started to focus on winning back their territories, at the expense of the hope of liberation of the Palestinians (Gelvin, 2008, p. 343). This marked the declining phase of Arab nationalism: the Egyptian President Nasser was not prepared to engage in a conflict with Israel, having part of his army in Yemen, and this defeat hardly hit his power. After the war, Resolutions 242 and 338 were issued (Security Council of the United Nations, 1967; Security Council of United Nations, 1973), that requested the return of the refugees

and the liberation of the land; however, the terms of the resolutions left enough space for interpretation that Israel never respected them, asserting that they did not specify the extent of the territory to be liberated (Hourani, 2013, pp. 311-315). Starting from the 1970s, the Palestinian resistance started to adopt a more locally oriented framework of nationalism: it was the passage from the pan-Arabic nationalism, *qawmiyya*, to local nationalism, *waṭaniyya* (Badarin, 2016). Moreover, neighbouring Arab states, although maintaining in their rhetoric a strong support of the Palestinian cause, started to show signs of intolerance with regards to the Palestinian refugees.

Cross-border fights were conducted by the *fidāʾīn* in Jordan and Lebanon, which resulted in Israeli invasions in both countries. In Jordan, after the PLO fought the battle of Karameh in 1970, the rising influence of the PLO was interpreted as a threat to the Hashemite monarchy, and the tensions erupted in open conflict in September 1970.

Other factors contributed to the weakening of the resistance: in the same year, the Egyptian President Nasser, who had supported the Palestinian cause, died. In the meantime, the PLO had moved to Beirut, after being expelled from Jordan (Gelvin, 2008, p. 350). In the following years other Arab neighbouring countries, such as Jordan (former Transjordan), signed the peace with Israel. This was an additional blow to the Palestinian cause, that underwent a progressive diplomatic isolation.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 was regarded as a success by Arab countries, because it showed that Syria and Egypt had successfully reorganised militarily and, although Israel could count on the American support and a stronger army, they could still count on the Soviet support and shift the war's fate by manipulating the oil market: Saudi Arabia, in fact, imposed an embargo on the United States and the Netherlands, considered the closest allies of Israel and, after the war, multiplied the prices to 300% (Hourani, 2013, pp. 417-418).

The Lebanese civil war, that erupted in 1975 and initially involved the Christians and the Muslims, subsequently involved the Palestinian population, that fought on the side of the Muslims. Israel intervened and invaded Lebanon in 1982, putting Beirut under siege. In 1985 started the "war of the camps", when the Shia party Amal, together with the Maronite Christian militias, attacked and besieged the Palestinians camps, accused to hide the fighters that they considered the real cause of Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In 1982, the Beirut Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila had been raided and the population had been massacred by the Maronite Christian militias under the protection of Israel. Israel bombed the Burj al Shamali camp near Tyre, with a toll of 95 casualties. Moreover, three Palestinian camps ceased to exist (Sayigh, 1977).

When Syria intervened in the war, occupying Lebanon as the designed "mediator" to contain the conflict, the PLO was expelled, left its Lebanese office and moved to Tunis.

The 1970s and 1980s signalled a fundamental transition for Palestinian and Arab politics in general. New Palestinian parties were born, such as the socialist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (1969) and its separated branch Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These parties were strongly critical towards the PLO politics, and maintained a firmer position with regard to mediation and means of resistance. As the PLO actions of armed resistance were starting to fade, the PFLP continued with actions of armed fight outside Palestine, in order to maintain Palestine on the attention level of the world (Sawayd, 2008).

The Likud party won the 1977 elections in Israel, and this marked a change in Israeli politics in favour of Islamic parties, with the hope to weaken the Palestinian resistance further. For this reason, the Muslim Brotherhood was granted some space of action, because it was a rival of Fatah (Robinson, 2004a, p. 124). In 1979, the Iranian *shah* was toppled by the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the first ever successful Islamic revolution in the area gave origin to the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran. This pushed the growth of Islamic movements, which saw the revolution as the proof of the success of the Islamic way. The same year, the new Egyptian president Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, which was another blow to the Palestinian resistance. Thus, the 1980s were characterised by the rise of Islamic parties and movements, which favoured the foundation of Hamas in 1987; however, the most important event for the foundation and rise of Hamas remains the first intifada, that broke out in 1987.

### **2.2.2 The Nakba as historical trauma**

The tragic event of the Nakba constitutes a trope in Hamas' discourse and in Palestinian discourse in general. According to (Badarin, 2016), the Nakba led to a significant change in space and time perceptions: the flight of the refugees to Lebanon and Jordan meant the birth of an inside/outside Palestinian community, and the counter-measures that followed were planned as provisional, as it was not possible, at the time, to foresee that the Israeli Occupation would still exist after 70 years. As a consequence, the first approach to the Occupation was that of temporary decisions rather than a long-term strategy of liberation.

Nakba's anniversary is commemorated every year in official statements of Hamas. However, the Nakba has a relevance that extends beyond the immediate impact on political discourse. The word "*nakba*", Arabic for "catastrophe", indicates the start of the invasion of Palestine and the self-proclamation of Israel as a state. For the Palestinians it meant being subjected to armed attacks, expulsions and dispossession of their belongings and of their land. This event has become a trope in

Palestinian discourse in all its environments, as it is associated with the beginning of Palestinian condition of sufferance.

This representation is meaningful: in fact, it configures the Palestinian historical narration as revolving around a trauma, and provides for some more general considerations based on identity representation. The notion of "historical trauma" is relevant for this kind of discussion. "Historical trauma" is the object of psychiatric research regarding the effects of PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) as being transmitted down generations after a strong trauma endured by the group (Brave Heart et al., 2011; Kirmayer et al., 2014) has been developed after the psycho-analytical notion of trauma, and is defined as:

Cumulative emotional and psychological wounding across generations, including the lifespan, which emanates from massive group trauma

(Brave Heart et al., 2011, p. 283)

Such studies connect the long-term effects of collective trauma to present situations of psychological and psychiatric sufferance, such as a high incidence of drugs and alcohol addiction among youth. The challenging conditions of life in Indian American reserves, where most of the research was conducted, are certainly among the first causes of distress. The harsh conditions of life are the direct consequence of the intentional marginalisation of the group perpetrated by colonisers. Moreover, the studies report the incidence of "transmitted" PTSD through generations: the individuals that suffered from the disorder first-hand, such as the natives who were obliged to give up their language and culture in board schools, transmitted the state of sufferance to their children. For these reasons, the historical trauma became a central topic in the endogenous historical narratives of native Americans.

Although this digression accounts for a different group and a different geographical space and time, these studies prove a psychiatric reality of collective trauma and another reading of its presence in the narrative. In the case of Palestine, the intellectual debate on massive collective trauma investigated the role of collective memory in shaping and consolidating identity, started from public debate on the Shoah, as the founding trauma of the Israeli society (Sibilio, 2013, pp. 35-37). The Nakba is thus charged with a rich symbolic capital. Being the starting point of the Palestinian catastrophe, it is frequently used in analogies; other catastrophic events are compared to it, for example the 6th June war is frequently called the "second Nakba" in Hamas' statements. In fact, the disaster of the war recalled that of 1948, and the same analogy could be found in other publications at the time: the contributors of the literary magazine *al-Adāb* referred to it as "Nakba of June" (Sibilio, 2013, p. 108). The Nakba thus became a temporal reference of particular significance in political discourse and beyond. The claims about the

land, for example, shift between the "1967 territories", which the PLO claimed, and the 1948 territories, as in the whole historic Palestine, as Hamas and the PFLP claimed. It also caused a new kind of identity, that of the refugee, who waits until his/her return to the homeland. The calls to the Palestinians "inside and outside" is recurrent, and is present also in Hamas' statements. In general, for what concerns social practices, remembering the Nakba is achieved also by organising dedicated activities for children and adults in refugee camps, and demonstrations, and it is a wide explored topic in Palestinian literature. In conclusion, the Nakba does not only change a socio-political context, but constitutes the fundamental traumatic event whose consequences still impact the lives of Palestinians on a practical and psychological plane.

### 2.2.3 Islamic roots

#### Islamic reformism

The Muslim Brotherhood is the most widespread Islamic movement in the world. It has offices in many different countries, and finances several Islamic foundations.

The Brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1927, but was illegal in Egypt for most of its history, as it was put in direct political competition with the nationalist and military rule. After an attempted assassination to Nasser's life in the 1960s, many Muslim Brothers were arrested and executed. The context which saw the emergence of the Brotherhood is that of a development of modern Islamic reformism in the latter part of the XIX century, with al-Afghani (*al-Afġānī*) and Muhammad Abduh (*Muḥammad ʿAbduh*)<sup>7</sup>. This "Islamic awakening" brought a significant change in the history of Islamic thought, as a new bond between religious precepts and society was forged under very specific historical conditions. With al-Afghani's travels as a representative of the Sultan all over the imperial territories, the foundations were laid for creating a new kind of identity that would put together all the peoples in the Ottoman Empire: that of an Islamic Empire, constituted by Muslim people, and governed by a Muslim Sultan.

The building of identity based on confessional affiliation had been, for centuries, one of the pillars of societies within the Ottoman Empire, as shows the fact that the figure of the Sultan was honoured through the Friday prayer; however, the Empire aimed at building a stronger bond among all the peoples living in the Empire, together with other important changes also on an administrative level, such as the reforms (*tanzimat*) and the issue of the first Constitution (*Kânûn-ı Esâsî*) (Khalidi, 2010; Fouad Allam, 1999).

Afghani's action laid the foundations of "panislamism", that is to say the ideology according to which Muslims were part of a supranational and sovra-ethnic

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<sup>7</sup>To read more on the subject, see (Keddie and Sayyid, 1972) and (Kerr, 1966)

community, the Islamic *umma*. This community, however, was also a political entity, which essentially was the main intellectual innovation.

Al Afghani founded a journal, *The firmest bond* (*al-urwā al-wuṭqā*), the scholar Muhammad Abduh. Abduh, an al-Azhar<sup>8</sup> graduate, who was appointed great Mufti of Egypt in 1899, had also been Afghani's student. He considered Islam as the most effective framework to apply to society. According to Abduh, society could benefit from applying Islamic principles in any aspect of life in order to improve make society, and theological interpretation was accompanied by a reflection on society. The compatibility between reason and faith was at the core of his proposal: Islam should tackle modernity by embracing it and incorporating it in a positivistic perspective.

Abduh's student, Rashid Rida (*Rašīd Riḍā*), acknowledged as the founder of the "Salafiyya", the intellectual movement of those who considered valid only the Islam practised by the first community of Muhammad, disregarded doctrinal innovations, the *bid'a*, as harmful, thus condemning every form of Westernization. The return to original sources, the Sunna, was fundamental. The historical model he proposed was that of VII century Medina and the first community of the Prophet and the four Caliphs. This bond between a "pure" form of Islam and organisation of society constitutes the framework in which the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1927. The Brotherhood constitute the first attempt at realising a political version of Islam, where religious principles are meant to pervade and inspire all aspects of life. Moreover, the idea of reviving the declined caliphate of the Ottoman Empire was really strong.

The discourse within the then Islamic reformist intellectual community was dealing with a highly debated issue: whether Islamisation of society would be better achieved through political and military revolution, or through a slow cultural and social work, the *tabliḡ ad-da'wa*. Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood, adhering to the Indian Islamist perspective, was inclined to accept the latter perspective (Allam et al., 1999), although he integrated the slow Islamisation and reform with the building of a military apparatus and infiltration in the Egyptian military forces (Mishal and Sela, 2000, p. 29). This issue, as will be shown further, is directly relevant for the foundation of Hamas.

The Brotherhood later assumed the connotation of a proper political party. Its field of action extended to education, charity, social assistance and religious predication. However, as long as al-Banna was alive, the movement did not pursue specific political goals.

After al-Banna's death in 1945, the movement underwent a political and ideological evolution under the guidance of Sayyid Qutb, whose views are mostly adherent to the "revolutionary" approach. Dismissed from his position as coun-

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<sup>8</sup>al-Azhar is the prestigious Islamic university in Cairo

sellor for Cultural Affairs for the Egyptian government after the publication of a series of critical articles called "*the America I saw*" (*Amrīkan allatī raʾaytu*), he introduced some significant ideological innovations. The experience in the United States pushed him towards a more radical position against capitalism, "Western" costumes and also communism (Manduchi, 2009). When he returned to Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and, in his following publications, proposed a revised version of jihad and *ḡāhiliyya*. In Qutb, the jihad could be extended to every place dominated by *ḡāhiliyya*, which, in his elaboration, was a state in which society was governed by corrupted and unlawful governors, such as the Arab secular governors that were contemporary to Qutb (Allam et al., 1999). Jihad was not only the individual spiritual effort, but every Muslim was supposed to be a *muḡāhid*, a fighter on the way of jihad, in a global jihad that should be fought also on *dār al-ʾIslām*, the "land of Islam", wherever Islam was not instituted as a way of life and *ṣarīʿa*, the Islamic law, implemented (Manduchi, 2009, p. 98-99).

The Brotherhood arrived to Palestine in 1946. Despite maintaining ties with the homeland, it soon developed independent features. The question of Palestine in itself challenged the theoretical framework it brought about, and the debate between "revolution" and "reform" through *daʿwa* was imported in Palestine and applied to the Occupation situation. As the Brotherhood was first inclined to adhere to the *daʿwa* strategy, it was soon targeted by harsh criticism on its being passive or even collaborationist (Mishal and Sela, 2000).

This is consistent with the views of many Islamist movements, where the relation between Islam and political sphere is more complicated than a mere application of religious principles in a secular environment. As power is given by God, Islamic principles may work as common sense and good ways to live without necessarily involving religious practices or conversions; moreover, for the same reason, the rulers power is limited as, when he fails to apply such principles, the people have the right to overturn him (Hourani, 1983).

### **A branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine**

Hamas was founded by the most prominent members of the *Muḡammaʿ al-ʾislāmiyya*, an Islamic institution founded by *shaykh* Ahmad Yasin (*Aḥmad Yasīn*) in Gaza in 1973. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine is thus important in understanding the thought of Hamas and its inspiration. The affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood is still acknowledged and was explicitly stated in the 1988 Charter:

**Example 1** *Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-ʾislāmiyya ḡanāḥ min ʾaḡnaḥa al-ʾiḥwān al-muslimīn bi-Falastīn wa ḥarakat al-ʾiḥwān al-muslimīn tanzīm ʿalamī, wa hiya kubrā al-ḥarakāt al-ʾislāmiyya fī al-ʿaṣir al-*



*ḥadīṭ, wa tamtāz bi-l-faham al-ʿamīq, wa al-taṣawwur ad-daḡīq wa aš-šumūliyya at-tāma li-kull al-mafāhīm al-islāmiyya fī šatā maḡallāt al-ḥayā, fī at-taṣawwur wa al-i-tiqād, fī as-siyāsa wa al-iqtisād, fī al-tarbiyya wa al-iḡtimāʿ, fī al-qadāʿ wa al-ḥakam, fī ad-daʿwa wa at-taʿlīm, fī al-fann wa al-ʿilām, fī al-ḡīb wa aš-šahāda wa fī bāqī maḡallāt al-ḥayā.*

(*Ḥamās, 1988*)

**Article 2:** the Islamic Resistance Movement is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood movement is an international organisation. It is one of today's largest Islamic movements. It professes a comprehensive understanding and precise conceptualization of the Islamic precepts in all aspects of life: concept and belief, politics and economics, education and social service, jurisdiction and law, exhortation and training, communication and arts, the seen and unseen, and the rest of life's ways.

[ (Translation to English in (Maqdsi, 1993)) ]

In the following interview of 2001, Abu Marzuq<sup>9</sup> specifies how the relationship between Hamas and the thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood is to be interpreted:

Hamas' roots are the Muslim Brotherhood, even if developing the struggle in a national direction expanded Hamas in an extended movement that welcomes whoever considers the Palestinian question in its national and religious foundations, overcoming the limited group of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, some time ago the Muslim Brothers in the Gaza strip counted approximately one thousand members, while now Hamas' activists are tens, hundreds of thousands. (...) It cannot be said that all Hamas supporters are Muslim Brothers. The two movements do not coincide. It is true that Hamas was born within the Muslim Brotherhood, but many other Palestinians joined Hamas afterwards. (...)

The Muslim Brothers essentially dedicate to political and social activities, while Hamas also engages in military and resistance activities, and the social program is a parallel to the military program. Even the name of the Movement indicates our resistance activity. (...)

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<sup>9</sup>Musa Abu Marzuq (1951) was chief of Hamas' political office in 1992 and a long-time member of the movement.

Ours is a resistance movement, and not an educational movement, nor a movement that intends to impose a specific program to the people. Now we found ourselves to fight for the liberation and the struggle is inspired, supported by and connected to the creed of the people, but in the end, we are a liberation movement that engages in the struggle to confront the occupant. When the fight is over, everyone will be able to choose a program or express their opinion, starting from any ideological base, old or new. In this moment, the highest interests lie in the Palestinian people and resistance to the Occupation. Our situation compels us to put ideological and opinion differences aside.

(Salemi, 2001, pp. 170-175).

In Palestine, the Brotherhood formed two separate branches: one in Gaza and one in the West Bank. The former was more active in military activities and closer to the Egyptian group and the latter converged with the Jordanian branches. However, when it was outlawed by President Nasser in 1954, the Brotherhood lost its grasp on Gaza and led to a more independent and militant movement (Roy, 2003; Hroub, 2006b).

After the 1967, many different events led the Brotherhood to a gradual growth in power and means. After Fatah was founded, the nationalist and secular fighters, the *fidā'in*, emerged with their military operations against the occupation. In the meanwhile, the Muslim Brothers chose to follow a different path, and dedicated its efforts to the building of mosques and to the foundation and financing of Islamic institutions.

The Palestine question was of the utmost importance for the Brotherhood, and its branch in Palestine was subjected to the same theoretical issue that strained the Egyptian home: whether to act immediately through military means (the "revolutionary" pole) or wait for a slow Islamisation of society starting from the roots (the "reformist" pole). Among these, in 1977 *shaykh* Ahmad Yasin, which would have become one of the founders of Hamas and the "spiritual father" of the Movement, adhered to the revolutionary pole, and founded two military branches: the *al Mağd* and *al muğahidīn* in 1983.

The growing confidence of the movement was aided by events of international weight, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the rise of the Shia para-military and political movement Hezbollah (*Ḥizb Allah*). Moreover, the expulsion of PLO from Lebanon was interpreted as a sign of decline (Roy, 2003, pp. 23-24). Finally, one of the other factors that favoured the growth in popularity of the Brotherhood was the favourable gap opened, for a limited time, by Sadat in the 1980s, as in the preceding decades they had suffered the subjugation of secular governments that made them illegal (Hroub, 2006b, pp. 26-28).

The Iranian revolution generated a strong encouragement, showing that Islamic forces could defeat such a strong figure as the *shah*. In 1979 Fathi Shiqāqī (Fathī aš-Šiqāqī), a member of the Brotherhood in Egypt, published *Khomeini: the Islamic Alternative* (*al-Ḥumaynī: al-ḥall al-islāmī wa-l-badīl*), where he praised Khomeini and al-Banna as symbol of the Islamic revolution, thus proving that the revolution was the only conceivable alternative to the PLO nationalism, that had achieved nothing of the sort. Shiqāqī, who was a supporter of the "revolutionary" approach (Mishal and Sela, 2000, p. 32), founded the *Islamic Jihad* (*al-Ġihād al-ʿIslāmī*) in the early 1980s, an Islamic Movement that put forward the idea of active military resistance and a joint jihad together with the Shia militias as the sole means of fighting the Occupation. The foundation of Hamas in 1987 resulted, in fact, from a change in perspective on the role of Islamic movements and their potential, which would be well extended from the charitable work that characterized and still characterizes them (Kepel, 2003, 200-202). The Islamic Jihad is considered by Hamas as a sister association, and many of their statements were signed together with the Islamic Jihad. Another occupation of Muslim territories was ongoing: that of Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. On this occasion, the eminent Islamic scholar and Muslim Brother of Palestinian origin Abdullah Azzam (ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām), argued that occupied Muslim territories required defensive jihad to be liberated and that it fell under the normative category of *fard ʿayn*, an individual obligation, and as such it involved every individual Muslim in the community. His most important doctrinal contribution was not only to consider jihad as an individual duty, but to invest it with a political and actual meaning, in a way so powerful that he was able to mobilise masses of Muslims worldwide to fight and finance the Afghanistan's jihad against the Soviet Occupation. Azzam's jihad was not concerned with the struggle against a state of things, which was consistent with Qutb's *ḡāhiliyya* theories, but focused on a territory, giving the concept of *ard*, "earth", "territory", the utmost importance. His idea of starting the struggle in Afghanistan pursued the final goal of establishing a cross-national Islamic state where Islam and Muslims would not be threatened<sup>10</sup>. His murder, occurred in 1989 in a blast, was remembered in statement n. 81 of 26/11/1989<sup>11</sup>. In fact, he was a strong supporter of Hamas "politically, financially and logistically from his base in Pakistan, as a side project to his Afghan activities", and was also sent a copy of the Charter to be reviewed before publishing (Hegghammer, 2013, p. 377). According to his wife's testimony, as collected by Hegghamer (Hegghammer, 2013, p. 378), he was involved in the training of the first Qassam Brigades. Moreover, his involvement as a *fidāʿi* and the circulation of his books in the 1980s made him a very well-known figure in the Territories even before Hamas was born.

<sup>10</sup>For an introduction to the subject, see (Hegghammer, 2008) and (Hegghammer, 2013))

<sup>11</sup>See <<http://hamas.ps/ar/post/81.htm>> (last access: 01/08/2018)

Azzam considered Palestine one of the most important Muslim lands that needed to be liberated from foreign occupation by the means of jihad. He identified as occupied Muslim lands Afghanistan, Palestine, Philippines, Kashmir, Lebanon, Ciad, Eritrea (ʿAzzām, 1984). Azzam himself had written an essay on the Islamic Movement : *Hamas: roots of its history and of the Charter (Ḥamās: ḡīdār at-tārīq wa al-mīṭāq)* (ʿAzzām, 1989). With the outbreak of the Intifada, the Mujamma leaders found themselves in an emergency situation, where the youth of the resistance movements were taking the lead in the uprisings. They thus chose to shift to a more revolutionary approach, and founded Hamas (Mishal and Sela, 2000).

## 2.3 History of Hamas

### 2.3.1 Foundation of the movement

Hamas was founded on the 14th December 1987 by some prominent representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine: Ahmad Yasin, Abdul Aziz ar-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Shamʿah, Isa an-Nashar, Abdul Fattah Dukhan, Ibrahim al-Yazuri (Tamimi, 2011, p. 10). All the founders were previously involved in activism against the Israeli Occupation. After the outbreak of the first Intifada, on 9th December 1987, they organised in a new movement which was meant to take part and coordinate the uprisings: the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas (which can be translated as "fervour"), but is also the acronym of *ḥarakat muqāwama al-islāmiyya*, "Islamic resistance movement".

The context of Hamas' foundation is therefore strictly tied to the resistance to the Israeli Occupation, as is also explicitly stated in this extract from the "About" section of their website:

Hamas is a national Palestinian movement that works with the rest of the Palestinian people and with all national and Islamic factions and bodies and people of conscience all over the world on resisting the Israeli occupation as well as liberating the Palestinian land, Jerusalem, and Islamic and Christian holy places, securing the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland and establishing a sovereign Palestinian State. Hamas is involved in serving the Palestinian people wherever they exist and in every aspect, so that they remain steadfast in their efforts to confront the occupation. Hamas sought to alleviate Palestinian suffering in all possible and effective ways with an ultimate goal to bring an end to the prolonged occupation on historical Palestine.

[ "About us" section, Hamas Official website:< <http://hamas.ps/en/page/2.htm>> (last access: 02/08/2018) ]

### **2.3.2 Context of the first Intifada and Islamist movements in Palestine**

The circumstances that led to the foundation of the movement are to be interpreted on different levels: the situation in Gaza, the actions of the OLP and Fatah as a ruling party, and the role of Islamist movements in the occupied Palestine up to 1987.

After 1967, the population in Gaza and the West Bank had undergone significant changes of their economic, demographic and social balance as a consequence of the Israeli occupation. Although some initial advantage came from the termination of the Egyptian control, such as the possibility to commute to Israeli territories to work and visit relatives, this had also resulted in the rise of a new exploited commuting working class that, although being needed by the Israeli economy, was subjected to high rates of control and humiliating conditions. In fact, Israel, as an occupying force, opened its borders to Palestinian workers but, at the same time, took possession of land and water conducts (Nüsse, 1998; Tamimi, 2011, p. 11-12).

The workforce which would otherwise be dedicated to agriculture, as it was a strong economic sector before the occupation, became dependant on low-paying jobs which were precarious and even resorted to required commuting on a daily basis. Moreover, Palestinians had to abide by a taxation system which made accumulation of capital extremely difficult, and limited any economic activity to a mere means of survival. This, in addition to an increase in demography and strict control from Israel, which frequently resorted to curfews, arrests and violence, favoured an increasing sense of oppression but also of a class of wage labourers which shared some common features: they were young, precarious, in constant contact with Israeli society, with which they would compare their condition. Moreover, Israel pursued a strategy aimed at erasing Palestinian culture and sense of identity by managing, for example, to make UNRWA schools adopt Jordanian or Egyptian curricula instead of creating specific Palestinian ones (Nüsse, 1998, pp. 17-20). In 1977, the Likud party was elected in Israel, which had an extremist view on the question of Israeli border and the "birth right" of Jew to live in a Jewish state in Palestine (Tamimi, 2011, p. 12). Other conditions, paradoxically offered by the Occupation, favoured an exchange of ideas among Palestinians, as a direct consequence of the new work mobility situation. This contributed to the strength of the spontaneous uprisings which would start at the end of 1987 and would become known as "intifada", which is Arabic for "uprising" (Rogan, 2016). On 8th December 1987, an Israeli army truck in Gaza hit two minivans, resulting in four victims and seven wounded, all Palestinian commuting workers. The population started to protest and, when the protests were violently repressed by the Israeli soldiers, spontaneous uprisings spread all over the Occupied territories.

The protest was suddenly deemed as non-violent, as the "weapon" in use was the toss of stones, and never involved firearms. The Intifada would continue until 1993, and the political leaders of the time took credit for it and tried to control of the uprisings as soon as they broke out, although they actually were grass-roots uprising. Its real driving force seemed to be the *šabāb*, the young commuting workers who suffered the most by the harsh living conditions imposed by Israel.

The first actions of the protest were concerned with mobilisation and organisation. The protests leaders then organised into the United National Command, that included affiliates of the then PLO parties but did not include the leaders, and organised in an autonomous way. The National Command started distributing leaflets to organise the protests, and clashed directly with the new-born movement Hamas.

The Unified Command, despite including members from the local branches of the PLO, constituted, for the first time, an organisation that acted without previously consulting Arafat and the other leaders in exile (Rogan, 2016). However, the third leaflet of the UNC was authorised officially by Fatah, as Arafat then sent Khalil al-Wazir, one of his highest-rank commanders, to coordinate action in the West Bank.

According to Rogan, the first clash between Hamas and the Unified Command happened in August 1988, when the UNC expressed its disapproval for a general strike call on Hamas part in a leaflet dated 18th August (statement n. 58). The leaflet did indeed organise the strike, but also reiterated the jihad as the only means of struggle and the movement's sceptical position on the negotiations. This would be a constant in the following releases, up to present, as will be shown in the selected corpus. However, this is not the first call to strike, as calls to strike are already present in previous statements. The other reasons for conflict, as referred by Rogan, deals with differences on how to tackle the Occupation, as Hamas would not accept, at the time, solutions considered by the PLO such as the two-state solution.

On 15th November 1988 Arafat addressed the Palestinian National Council in order to declare the independence of a State of Palestine that would acknowledge the 1947 partition plan and the UN resolutions 242 of 1967, which called for immediate withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and for the implementation of peace processes, and resolution 338 (Security Council of United Nations, 1973) of 1973, which called for immediate application for resolution 242 (Security Council of the United Nations, 1967) .

Israel reacted with a curfew and restrictive measures, and the Israeli prime minister Ytzkha Shamir, former chief of the Band Stern Zionist militia, regarded Arafat's address as misleading propaganda.

The first year of Intifada, and first year of Hamas life, is then fundamental for the definition of its core principles and main themes. The relation to Fatah, the Oc-

cupation, and its self-representation are established in this period. This comes in addition to the background from which the Movement is born, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. However, it would develop an identity and system of thought more complex than the simple sum of these elements, which are nevertheless fundamental for a thorough study.

### **2.3.3 The first years of Hamas' consolidation: the role of Islamic foundations and charities**

Another important concern for Hamas was to establish its centrality as a movement that truly represented the Palestinians. In fact, Fatah had tried to take over the uprisings and re-establish its leadership within the Occupied Territories, while Hamas was working at the grassroots of society creating institutions that would take care of education, health and other sectors concerned with basic needs that were not taken care of by Fatah (Roy, 2012).

Islamic institutions are not directly founded by Hamas, but they are affiliated to the movement on the grounds of different factors: their head is a Hamas member or sympathiser, for example, or they are financed by the movement.

Hamas' engagement in the social sector is a continuation of Yasin's work after he founded the Islamic Centre in Gaza in 1973, together with the campaign for building mosques and other Islamic institutions prompted by the Muslim Brothers in the aftermath of the 1967 war.

Hamas soon acquired a political nuance and inspiration not only for its social engagement, but also for a scope of action which included self-determination within an Islamic framework. Moreover, the new-born movement attracted people from different backgrounds, including those educated abroad or those who were not part of other Islamic movements. According to Roy (Roy, 2003, p. 27) this, together with the immediate need to confront strong political competitors, is what prompted in Hamas the nationalist inspiration.

The beginning of the 1990s was underscored by some core events that defined, even before Oslo, some of Hamas' signature standpoints and representations. This was also a period of significant change for the Palestinian politics: the return of Arafat in the occupied territories, after leaving his headquarters in Tunisia, and the growing consolidation of Hamas in Gaza marked the shift from a diaspora-based leadership to a leadership entrenched in the Territories (Singh, 2012, p. 3).

### **2.3.4 The Gulf War**

The Gulf war was the occasion in which Hamas' significantly shadowed the PLO leadership. The occasion came from the debate on Saddam Hussein's invasion of

Kuwait in 1990. The Quincy Agreement <sup>12</sup>, which granted military protection to the Saudi Arabia from the United States (Kepel, 2004), prompted Saudi Arabia to request the presence of the United States in order to confront Saddam Hussein.

Such presence was not accepted as easily by other political sides in the area. As much as Saddam's action was condemned as illegitimate, the presence of the U.S. military was perceived as an illegal occupation, which did not have Iraqi or Kuwait's people best interests at heart. Saddam Hussein pulled a rhetoric of oppression of the United States against his people and made a comparison with the occupation of Palestine by declaring that he would have retreated from Kuwait if Israel had retreated from Palestine (Nüsse, 1998, 111). This rhetorical move partially lifted his position of responsibility and Arafat, in order to strengthen his opposition to the American presence, went explicitly against the alliance and the United States, thus losing their support (Kepel, 2004). On the other hand, Hamas condemned it without fully supporting Saddam, and obtained the support and funding which Gulf states used to provide to Fatah (Roy, 2012).

The massive casualties provoked by the alliance between the West and the Gulf States, managed to successfully stir the attention from the Kuwait situation to the West-Gulf coalition. As Kuwait was a strong financial supporter of Islamic parties, backing of Saddam Hussein should have been avoided; however, he also proved a strong opponent to Israel and the Western incursion. Hamas, after a long hesitation, declared its condemnation of both the Western actions and the invasion of Kuwait, which was advised to be solved solely on Arabic-Islamic involvement (Nüsse, 1998, 111-113).

The question was thus brought into a more general framework where Muslim peoples were persecuted and oppressed by Western powers together with their allies, which matched the Islamists' more general worldview, and provided the opportunity to take a blow at secular governments which supported the United States, such as Egypt's Mubarak, Syria's Hafez al-Asad whom had joined the Western Alliance and, of course, Saddam Hussein. In this interpretation, Kuwait and Iraqi people were supposed to join forces in order to repeal the foreign invasion.

Hamas' position proved successful in the aftermath of the events, and strengthened the movement's consensus. However, as Palestinians in Kuwait were, during the invasion, seen with an eye of suspect, Hamas' representatives in the country finally had to leave it, and moved their offices to Jordan. When the war ended, many of them were arrested for collecting weapons during the war and the chief of the foreign office, Musa Abu Marzuq, was denied entrance to Jordan after a

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<sup>12</sup>The Quincy Accords, named after the ship Quincy on which in 1945 convened the President of the United States, Roosevelt, and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabia granted the oil production of Aramco to United States in exchange for military protection.



brief stay in the United States (Tamimi, 2011, p. 73-75). In 1992, the PLO and Jordan acknowledged Hamas that, in order to reach a structure more similar to that of the PLO, founded the Political Office, with Marzuq at its head (Tamimi, 2011, p. 75).

In conclusion, the situation originated many of the tropes in Hamas' rhetoric, together with generalisation regarding their representation of politics. Moreover, it was considered a winning move over Fatah and the Arab governments which they regarded as traitors of both the Islamic and Arab *umma*. It caused the first of many transfers that impacted its foreign offices along with its development of diplomatic lines.

### **2.3.5 Peace Processes**

Peace processes are a fundamental issue in Hamas' discourse and politics. The movement decided not to take part in many of them starting from 1991, when the Peace Conference in Madrid was held. Many of the compromises made by the PLO were considered acts of surrender and renunciation of the due rights of the Palestinians. Some important items in the proposal concerned the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Occupied Territories and the right to return of Palestinian refugees. Such requests were partially addressed by U.N. resolution of 242 (1967) (Security Council of the United Nations, 1967), but were never actually met.

The Conference was opened on 30th October 1991, after the joint initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union. The intention was to open a process of peace talks based upon U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, that would ultimately lead to the creation of a Palestinian state after an interim period of 5-year-autonomy and governance on Palestinian territory, and the withdrawal of the occupant forces. As Israel imposed restrictions on how the Palestinian delegation should be formed, the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was granted double the number of delegates compared to other delegations (28 instead of 14). Moreover, it was established that no delegate could be an active member of the PLO.

Although the Conference ended with some approximate guidelines for the interim government, no concrete results were achieved, other than bringing both factions to the table. While the Palestinian delegates recognised the resolutions and the two-state solution (of Palestine Studies, 2010), the Movement was persuaded that the Western powers and their intrusion were untrustworthy. It also regarded the Palestinian participation as an act of surrender to less than dignifying conditions for the Palestinian people, that were renouncing to their land and to the right of return.

From a more general perspective, the possibility of negotiating with Israel was considered risky under the light of earlier events, including the fact that Israel was not abiding by any of the previous international resolutions.

In general, it is not fair to say that Hamas categorically rejected all dialogue. It is said that Yassin talked about *hudna* many times, and az-Zahar tried to propose conditions for a truce in 1988, including the proposal of an accord.

### 2.3.6 The Oslo Accords

Most studies on Hamas seem to consider the Oslo Accords as one of the most important events in its history. The Accords indeed are a recurrent topic in the statements and are considered one of the most disgraceful acts of Fatah.

In January 1993 Norway organised a meeting between two Israeli academics (Hirschfeld, Beilin) and the treasurer of the PLO, Ahmad Qurie. The meeting resulted in a document that imposed the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and from an enclave around Jericho, and the subsequent creation of an interim institution, the Palestinian Authority, a coalition of Palestinian parties that would be in charge of the territory administration for five years (Rogan, 2016). The Oslo Accords were signed in Washington in September 1992. The PLO representatives were asked to recognise the right of existence to Israel, and the *Letter of mutual recognition* was signed by both parties.

Transitional measures were to be carried out within a period of five years (Article I) (General Assembly Security Council, 1993). Moreover, the Accords established the creation of a Palestinian force that should act in coordination with the Israeli security forces (Article XIII, 3).

This is a key event in Palestine's politics, especially for the mixed reactions that it provoked. The Accords were blamed, especially by Hamas, for failing to address many core issues in the Palestinian question, such as the right of return for the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the control over Palestinian borders, and the dismantling of the Israeli settlements build intensively in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Hroub, 2006b, p. iv). This explained also the refusal of Hamas to participate in elections, as they were held within an institution created at Oslo. According to Hilal (Hilal, 2015, p. 1), since the Accords were based on a representation of the Palestinian people limited to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and claim the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338 which do not explicitly mention a "Palestinian people", they became the cause for the following three major changes in Palestine:

- The emergence of a political discourse that evicts Palestinians from history and geography and denies them a national identity.
- The escalation of collective repression, and settler-colonization.
- The shift towards local Palestinian politics and the splintering of Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG), and, mostly likely, in other Palestinian communities.

In fact, the creation of a Palestinian Authority archived the efforts for building a Palestinian nation and, at the same time, provided Israel with a counterpart to coordinate security operations and ultimately failed to comply to Palestinians' initial requests.

Moreover, the Accords are recognised as the starting point of a neo-liberal direction for Palestinian politics. In fact, the Palestinian Basic Law implemented free market, and the NGOs that flourished after the Accords reproduced free-market and neo-liberal dynamics (Hilal, 2015, p. 5). Representations derived from neo-liberal discourse affected how following negotiations were conducted (Badarin, 2016).

### **2.3.7 The suicide operations**

Hamas performed its first suicide attack in 1994, after the massacre of the Ibrahimi mosque in February 1994, when 27 people lost their lives at the hand of the Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein, who opened fire on the people during the Friday prayer.

The question of suicide attacks is extremely controversial for Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, Islamic law imposes strict constraints on the acts of war and the act of suicide is, nevertheless, a sin against God. The issue was disputed officially when, after an anti-terrorism summit in Cairo in 1997, the Palestinian Authority requested condemnation of the suicide attacks, while Hamas requested *fatwas* sanctioning them as lawful (statement 827). The petition was refused by many Sunni religious authorities, especially of Wahhabi affiliation; on the other hand, *shaykh* Tantawi, the great *shaykh* of al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, and *shaykh* al-Qaradawi, expressed their favourable opinion on the issue, on the grounds of "overriding necessity" (*iḍtirār*) (Kepel, 2008, pp. 90-91).

The suicide attacks occurred in waves, stopping first in 1997 than in 2004, when the movement decided to run for the municipal elections. Hamas was persuaded, until the early 2000s, of the particular effectiveness of suicide bombings as a deterrent for Israel. In 2001 Hamas started the "10 bombers" campaign, when it announced the infiltration of ten bombers in Israel, in order to breed fear in the population; however, only five of the promised attacks were carried out (Baconi, 2018, p. 44-45). When Hamas decided to run for elections, in 2004, stopped the suicide attacks.

The 1994 attacks, together with the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in exchange for Palestinian prisoners that same year, was the cause of a rise in tension with the hosting country Jordan that, in July 1994, had signed the "Washington Declaration", the peace treaty with Israel (Tamimi, 2011, pp. 80-82).

### 2.3.8 The elections

By 2000, on the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Oslo Accords were terminated. The five-year transition period had not led to an independent Palestinian nation, Israel had not ceased to build settlements on the occupied territories, and continued to deny the right to return as well as other requests advanced by the Palestinian side (Gelvin, 2008, p. 350). In 2004, the Movement ran in the municipal elections, and obtained positive results; for this reason, they decided to run also for the legislative elections.

The movement prepared for elections in different ways. First of all, the armed attacks were abruptly interrupted (Baconi, 2018; Gunning, 2007), although they were considered successful in the following 2005 Israeli retreat. Moreover, Hamas presented candidates which were not necessarily members of the Movement nor Muslims, and a percentage of women candidates, which were all professionals or held a Ph.D.; moreover, micro-credit activities and campaigns against the honour killing were supported by the movement (Gunning, 2007, pp. 168-169). Although religion was involved for providing a highly significant symbolic and cultural capital, the campaign choices made by Hamas indicate an attempt at working on their image and appear as a movement for people from all walks of life. This was confirmed by the documents issued subsequently, such as the program for the "Change and Reform" electoral list that, although bearing a name of Islamic inspiration, showed a change of language towards a more institutional register and an attention to domestic issues (Gunning, 2007; Hroub, 2006a). In 2005, Israel retreated from Gaza, and Hamas interpreted the retreat as a confirmation of the effectiveness of its resistance methods. In the same year, the Palestinian factions gathered in Cairo and signed the "Cairo Declaration", sustaining the common objectives of terminating the Occupation and creating a Palestinian State on the pre-1967 borders. This was the official first step of Hamas into the political arena, an in the implicit acceptance of the 1967 borders (Baconi, 2018, p. 82). Their victory, in January 2006, was largely unexpected. At this time, some of their political positions changed. The refusal to acknowledge Israel's existence, as stated in the founding Charter, transformed into a request to form an independent State and withdraw the Occupation (Hroub, 2006b,a). These changes in its views were hardly noticed as, despite the electoral victory, Hamas still experienced difficulty in being acknowledged as an interlocutor in the international scene. A possible cause may be its involvement in armed acts of resistance and for praising those performed by other against the Occupation, an attitude that has been interpreted as sufficient to categorise it as a terrorist movement. The victory was not accepted by Israel, many foreign countries, nor the Palestinian Authority. The Bush administration in the US pressed the Authority not to accept the outcome of the elections (Baconi, 2018, p. 135); after some attempts at reaching a national agreement,

a civil war between the Authority and Hamas broke out in 2007 and ended in 2008, when the Authority maintained the West Bank and Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. Although many reconciliation attempts were made (2008, 2011, 2014, 2017), this subdivision still holds to the present day. As a punitive measure, a blockade, the continues to present day, was imposed on Gaza.

The years of Hamas' government are therefore marked by the difficulties of the economic crisis caused by the Gaza blockade, which also involves the control of energy and water from Israel. The Strip built an economy around the tunnels as they were a passage for the exchange of food, medicine and other types of goods (Baconi, 2018). Although Hamas worked on its image and on stopping the Salafist cells, and never imposed *sharia*, its governance has been accused of inconsistently maintaining the promised plurality and to exercise pressure on political dissent, especially concerning the representatives of Fatah (Baconi, 2018, p. 139) (Sayigh, 2010).

Although Israeli incursions in Gaza had never really stopped, despite the many ceasefires (of Palestine Studies, 2009), the years of government by Hamas were also marked by the three major Gaza wars of 2008, 2012, 2014.

The first war was in 2008, when Israel conducted the operation "Cast Lead" renamed by the Qassam Brigades "The Battle of the Criterion", or commonly known as the first war on Gaza. The war resulted in severe casualties, especially for the use of white phosphorous on civilians. Nonetheless, after Israel retreated, Hamas called it a victory.

### **2.3.9 The Arab uprisings and their aftermath**

Although Palestine was not directly interested in the Arab uprisings, they signalled an important shift in its politics.

When the first presidential elections were held in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won. The same happened in Tunisia with the Islamic party an-Nahda, and, in Hamas' hope, the rising Islamic movements in Syria would follow a similar faith (Baconi, 2018). Hamas dedicated many statements of support to the people of the uprisings, showing solidarity and encouragement. Nonetheless, the movement became distant from the Syrian ally Bashar al-Asad, showing support for the popular revolts and finally leaving their office in Damascus in 2011, to establish an office in Doha, the capital of the new ally, Qatar. Hamas had had its office in Syria ever since its expulsion from Jordan in the early 2000s (Baconi, 2018, p. 174). The office remained in Doha until 2017, when the movement left. This was the moment for a change of alliances for Hamas, that became closer to Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, the Sunni bloc, and took distance from Syria and its allies, Iran and Hezbollah, the Shia bloc, along with the Gulf State that contrasted Saudi Arabia and the Emirates (Baconi, 2018, p. 185-186). This cost the movement

the loss of Iranian financial support, which was redirected to the other Islamic Palestinian movement "Islamic Jihad". However, when the events of the Syrian war took a very different path from Egypt and from Tunisia, the movement found itself in a moment of diplomatic weakness severely aggravated by the situation in Gaza which, after the blockade imposed by Israel in 2008, and the building of the separation wall in 2002, resulted in desperate economic and social conditions.

The situation was aggravated by the following two wars on Gaza. In 2012, Israel attacked Gaza during the second war, or the "Pillar of Clouds" operation. In 2014, right after Hamas started to negotiate for a national reconciliation, Israel attacked again with the third war on Gaza, called "Battle of the Eaten Straw" by the Qassam Brigades and "Operation Protective Edge" by Israel, which resulted in 2251 Palestinians casualties, 1462 of them civilians, and 67 Israelis, six of them civilians (of the United Nations, 2015, p. 6).

In 2017, the Movement left its office in Doha and the elections for the chief of the political bureau were held, so that Ismail Haniye (*Isma'īl Haniyya*) succeeded to Khaled Meshal. In Beirut, in 2017, Hamas held talks with Iran about a possible reconciliation. Moreover, a critical event took place: Hamas issued a new charter, the "Document of General Principles and Policies ", that formalised the changes that the Movement had done, through the years, regarding its position on a variety of issues, such as final acceptance of the 1967 borders and the official separation from the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas, 2017).

## 2.4 Hamas' communication

Hamas' press releases go back almost thirty years, since its foundation. At present, the Movement communicates through an official website created in 2010, where they collect their press releases, statements, biographies of members and of the *shuhadā'* (the martyrs). It also includes a selection of documents in .pdf format, such as dissertations, articles, essays. They also communicate through a news channel, al Aqsa TV <sup>13</sup> and a newspaper, Falasteen <sup>14</sup>. The website presents a high rate of cross references among its sections. In fact, the News section (which dates back to 2015) contains references or provides hypertext links to the Releases or Statement section, when the article itself does not contain the whole release or statement. All communications are mixed and not differentiated in terms of content or style. In fact, statements are differentiated from releases only for making explicit an attribution to someone, usually a spokesperson of Hamas.

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<sup>13</sup>At: < <http://aqsatv.ps> > (last access: 27/08/2018).

<sup>14</sup>At: < <http://www.felesteen.ps> > (last access: 27/08/2018).

Figure 2.3: Cover image of Hamas' website in English, 18/06/2018



Figure 2.4: Cover image of Hamas' website in Arabic, 18/06/2018



## 2.4.1 English and Arabic

There are two versions of the website: one in English, and one in Arabic. The two versions diverge in graphics and contents. The Qassam Brigades have their own website ( <https://www.qassam.ps>), which also have a version in English, albeit with different contents and graphic.

The English version of the website is clearly meant for an "external" public<sup>15</sup>: the section "Myths&Facts", for example, is not present in the Arabic website, as many more section with explicative content, such as the section "Palestine", with subsections called "Nakba", "Ethnic Cleansing", "Jerusalem", "Refugees", and the mentioned "Myths&Facts". Overall, the English version contains a somehow "lighter" version compared with the Arabic website: at the time of writing, June 2018, the background pictures of the websites differ greatly (figures 2.3, 2.4).


<sup>15</sup>For further information on Hamas' use of English and Arabic in their official website, see the work of Salemi (2001)

## 2.4.2 Media communication

Hamas holds a Twitter account,<sup>16</sup> a Facebook page<sup>17</sup> (which I was not able to access, due to public restrictions), a smartphone application<sup>18</sup>. The homepage of the website also includes links to the English website<sup>19</sup> and the Twitter account in Hebrew<sup>20</sup>. The links to the Facebook, Instagram and YouTube accounts result broken, so it is not clear if they have been shut down or they have a restricted access. Moreover, all the versions of the website includes a "Contacts" section, where the public can contact the movement directly through email or by compiling the dedicated form<sup>21</sup> (Figure 2.5).

This shows an interest in communication on different levels and by the means of different channels, especially by through social media channels in multiple languages. In fact, there are many indicators of Hamas' attention to how its image is perceived by external actors (a good example are the statements of clarification, where Hamas clarifies or confutes declarations concerning the movement) and by public opinion. Especially after 2004, when the movement ran in in municipal elections, Hamas very often changed its measures or decisions whenever they were deemed unpopular (Gunning, 2007, p. 155-157). On the other hand, they sometimes decided to maintain behaviours that did not score more than 20%-30% of support, such as the armed attacks against civilians in the mid-1990s (Gunning, 2007, p. 158).

Figure 2.5: Contact form in Hamas' English website



Home Palestine Hamas News Occupation Opinion Galleries Contact

Contact Hamas

It gives us great pleasure to receive your notes, comments and questions related to Hamas, and we will be keen on responding to your queries in time.

Name

Email

Send

<sup>16</sup>See <<https://twitter.com/hamasinfo>> (last access: 02/08/2018)

<sup>17</sup><<https://www.facebook.com/hamaasps2>

<sup>18</sup><<http://app.hamasp.ps>> (last access: 02/08/2018)

<sup>19</sup><<http://hamas.ps/en/>> (last access: 02/08/2018)

<sup>20</sup><<https://twitter.com/hamashebrew>> (last access: 02/08/2018)

<sup>21</sup><<http://hamas.ps/en/contact>> (last access: 02/08/2018)





# Chapter 3

## STATE OF THE ART

### 3.1 Introduction

Up to date, the research on Hamas has been approached mainly by historians and political analysts.

It is necessary to distinguish two very different approaches to the study of the Movement: Hamas as a resistance movement and a political party, or Hamas as a "terrorist" group. In fact, by following one or the other, we have very different accounts on its development, its objectives and, as a consequence, its ways of building a message through discourse. This methodological problem is acknowledged also among historians and experts of the movement; Khaled Hroub, for example, explicitly distances himself from the latter approach.

The present chapter will present an overview of the current research lines adopted on the subject of the research, intended on Hamas as a movement and on categories akin to the *bayānāt*, such as "official statements" or press releases, in the field of Discourse Studies. Moreover, an overview of current research lines on the genre of "press releases" will also be provided.

### 3.2 Studies in socio-political field

#### 3.2.1 Hamas as a resistance movement

Hamas, in the eyes of many Westerners, [...] has always been reduced to a mere terrorist group whose only function is and has been to aimlessly kill Israelis. On the ground in their own country, Hamas has been seen by many Palestinians as a deeply entrenched socio-political and popular force. In Palestinian eyes Hamas had been managing to chart parallel and harmonious paths of both military confrontation against the Israeli occupation, and grass-

roots social work, religious and ideological mobilisation and PR networking with other states and movements.

(Hroub, 2006a)

The quote summarizes the general trend of studies in socio-political and historical fields of study, that qualify as "counter-discourses" to simplified (and often biased) representations of Hamas, usually concerned with the counter-terrorism field. For this reason, these studies usually generalize findings in broader theoretical frameworks (ex. social movement theory, settler colonialism studies) and explicitly address and contest the epistemological problems derived from said simplifications. Starting from Khaled Hroub, his approach is mainly historical and concerned with the analysis of documents. Hroub identifies a change in Hamas' political views directly connected to the victorious outcome of the 2006 elections. Running for election was, in itself, a significant turn in their politics, as it presupposed an implicit acceptance of the institutions created by the Oslo Accords, whom the movement had been refusing since 1993.

Hroub considers all aspects related to the evolution from a social (resistance) movement to a political party in charge of government, thus using broad categories of analysis that permit such an extensive treatment of the subject. For example, he conducted an analysis on the documents they issued after the electoral victory, and found some interesting variations related with their self-image. The major concern was to portray liberal and democratic values, supported by involving Christians candidates, and leaving the religious side of the movement on a more abstract and inspirational level (Hroub, 2006b,a). However, according to (Sayigh, 2010), the years following the election results saw a renovated manifestation of the Islamic affiliation, and the persistence in proposing a discourse on armed resistance and martyrdom. This is another recurrent element of interest in studies on Hamas, and its presence in Hamas' rhetoric is important.

A similar approach is adopted by Gilles Kepel (Kepel, 2003) who, despite being more focused on the religious element, makes an accurate account of the space the notion of jihad is given in Hamas' politics and ideology without portraying it as a religious or terrorist movement. Kepel includes Hamas in his wider research on Islamist movements, and adopts a comparative approach where the Islamist movements from different ideological strains and regions are discussed in their ideological and historical evolution. Most of his work is concerned with al Qaeda and, in one of his most renowned works, *Al Qaida dans le texte* (Kepel et al., 2008), he collects a selection of texts from different members of al Qaida. Nonetheless, Kepel is capable to effectively explain the points of difference and commonality among the movement, with an effective socio-historical contextualization and doctrinal dissertation.

Azzam Tamimi's work (Tamimi, 2011) focuses on ideological aspect under historical perspectives.

His research is a good instrument for acquiring a deeper knowledge of the Movement's historical path, and on some particular issues, such as Meshal's question in Jordan. Azzam Tamimi's work is based on collection of documents and interviews directly from the members of the movement. In his work, it is possible to find explanations of the doctrinal aspects of the movement's ideology, and how to interpret them. The author is also part of the political bureau of the movement.

The work of Nüsse (Nüsse, 1998) is similar in its approach to the movement, which is essentially thematic. Nüsse, in fact, proposes a review on Hamas' ideology by analysing their views on a variety of themes, such as Fatah, Israel, and Zionism. Her work is based essentially on a document review, mainly taken from the journal *Falastin al-muslima*, currently out of publication, and some of the statements that, most of the time, were published on the same journal. Nonetheless, Nüsse's work has a journalistic approach, and does not employ particular kinds of research approaches or methodology, but aims at providing a jargon-free type of work. A similar approach can be found in Paola Caridi's work (Caridi, 2009).

Hamas' ideology is at the centre of the study of Singh (2012), that considers Palestinian's warfare as "heroic warfare":

Heroic warfare can be said to be characteristic of existential wars that are fuelled by ideology. As such, unlike post-heroic war, both religion and nationalism can serve as powerful mobilisers for heroic warfare. Moreover, given that heroic wars are rooted in values it would not be misplaced to suggest that those that engage in these wars tend to be intolerant of opposing ideologies and metanarratives.

(Singh, 2012, p. 535)

In this case, the presence of both nationalistic and religious ideologies are considered as the causes of an "existential war", which entails values of courage, sacrifice, mythization of the "hero fighter". This approach collocates ideology at the centre of analysis not only for obtaining new information regarding Hamas' ideology, as most of the current work, but also for drawing generalizations on a broader theory of warfare representation under specific contexts and conditions. The ideology as "ideology of resistance" is made explicit in Sadiki (2010, p. 2), where Hamas is compared to Hezbollah, to a certain length, for being a "movement of *muqāwama* (resistance) ideology", and presented as counter-argument to those scholars comparing the two movements on the grounds of poorly-defined conceptions of radicalization.

The latest contribution to studies on Hamas has been published in May 2018, and is a comprehensive history of the movement. Although this is an historical account, the author, Tareq Baconi, pays particular attention to the question of language and discourse (Baconi, 2018). This work follows a diachronic line, and differentiates from the others for following a temporal sequence rather than a thematic organization. Most of the previous works, in fact, are organized in analyses of some relational aspects of Hamas, such as "Hamas and the Jews" (Hroub, 2006b; Nüsse, 1998), or the suicide attacks and the concept of martyrdom (Hroub, 2006b; Nüsse, 1998; Tamimi, 2011; Kepel, 2003). On the other hand, Baconi provides for a comprehensive reference tool on the history of the movement, with the aim to have it accepted as a "legitimate object of research" in academia. Another fundamental aspect of Hamas has been dealt with by Sarah Roy (Roy, 2012) in her research on Hamas' grass-roots organizations and charities, which has been a key activity for the development of the movement. This approach is more sociological, and remain a fundamental work for receiving information of a not so frequently dealt aspect of the subject of the study.

Other studies that need to be mentioned for what concern Hamas are certainly (Mishal and Sela, 2000) and Beverly Milton-Edwards (Milton-Edwards, 2005, 2008). Mishal and Sela (2000) maintain a more critical view of the movement, focusing on the military and the violence, and making use of the expression "terrorist attacks" in relation to Hamas' suicide attacks, which is unusual in the existing historical literature on Hamas.

Mullin (2010) analyses the discourse of Peace processes. However, most of the work is concerned with the reason why Hamas would be excluded from them most of the time. She adopts a perspective regarding the "de-exoticization" of the movement: taking the movement out of the analytical approaches that locks it in the category of Islamist, as a self-explanatory and independent category. Nonetheless, the article remains finally focused on external representations of Hamas, rather than being concerned with producing new information to learn about Hamas *per se*.

Robinson (2004a) theorizes Hamas as a social movement. He provides a list of features that new social movement theories propose for identifying social movements, and concludes that Hamas is included in the category. However, this approach does not account for changes in the history of the movement, especially those that make Hamas a political party more than a social movement.

### **3.2.2 Hamas as a terrorist group**

The opposite approach, which frames Hamas solely on the grounds of being an Islamist or terrorist movement, presents many methodological problems. The extensive attention on only this aspect leaves many relevant aspects undisclosed.

For example, in (Erez et al., 2011) and (Mozes and Weimann, 2010), we see that the findings on the movement's communication strategies are limited to the very general and undetermined category labelled as terrorist groups; such notion is not defined through its works but treated as common knowledge:

It is common knowledge that terrorists in general, and Salafist or Jihadist ideologues in particular most prominent among them being alQaida, make extensive use of the Internet. The Internet also enables direct observation of what Jihadists say and do, providing a window into the full range of Jihadist activities.

(Erez et al., 2011, p. iv)

Then, they includes Hamas:

(...) and official sites of a number of Islamic extremist or terrorist organizations including Hamas, alMuhajiroun, the Taliban, Soldiers of Shareeah, and others

(Erez et al., 2011, p. iv)

In this case, the religious inspiration and the use of weaponry are enough to make them fall under the same categories of the aforementioned groups, regardless of the difference in objectives, historical background and political views. The label terrorist, in fact, is more evaluative than descriptive, while jihadi armed group results effective in a connotation of the group by the means of its actions and core values.

The Movement shows a certain amount of interest in being recognized as religious; however, this cannot be considered its defining feature, and adopting such an approach would be a methodological mistake.

This kind of studies seems rooted in the most recent tendency to prejudicially associates Islam and terrorism, that have consolidated especially after September 11, and a rise in interest in counter-terrorism (Baker-Beall, 2013; Berger and Behr, 2009; Bhatia, 2009; Hernández, 2006; Jackson, 2007). The current conception of "radical Islamism" is a product of recent discourses on securitization (Sadiki, 2010, p. 7) and of the binary knowledge that needs a "barbarian other" and, at the same time, assumes the reality of oppositions such as "religion/democratic or modern state", or the association of pairs such as "democracy/secularism" (Sadiki, 2010, p. 3)

(Mullin, 2010) explains that much of this attitude results from an *exoticization* of the movement that, observed through the rationalist and "modern" lens, becomes an "exotic" and "old" mixture of politics and religion, hardly understandable for the modern Westerner. This also falls under the "exclusivity" mentioned by (Mandaville, 2013) with regard to terrorism as an Islamic peculiarity.

The framework of Critical Discourse Studies on Terrorism, which is a recent addition to the field of discourse studies, tackles this problem. The approach adopted by this field of study is, in fact, to challenge the bias of current discourses and their analytical categories, such as "religious terrorism" (Gunning and Jackson, 2011) and "religion" that, assumed in their Euro-centric conception, define a representation of the political sphere as void from religion, which is only intended as pertaining to the individual and private sphere, with no connection with social and political life (Gunning, 2007, p. 10). In his analysis on Hamas' ideology within the Critical Studies on Terrorism, Dunning discusses the opportunity to employ categories such as "secular" and "religious" as a dichotomy, as it may be a bias in the analysis of the subject (Dunning, 2015). In fact, this would explain a widespread surprised attitude, among some scholars, such as Nüsse, at finding the movement's behaviour as "pragmatic" at some point, as a violation of a prior expectation that could be, in fact, be biased in principle.

### **3.3 Studies on press releases and official statements**

The collected corpus will be constituted of statements by Hamas, all retrievable on their website since 1987. Press releases are documents emitted directly from Hamas, where the movement can express its views or call in a place, the official website, where it is possible to communicate in the more extensive and unrestricted manner. According to Levin (Levin, 2002), press releases cover an important and specific function in social movements, as they are the means of communication with the public. The very first phase of the movement is consistent with the description of social movement, especially in its organization and modality of action. The main aim of official statements or press releases for social movements is to mobilize masses and acquire consensus, so they must be manufactured in a way that let their message be as widespread as possible; moreover, it is also their only means to express their position with regards to events that are beyond the control of social movements (Levin, 2002, p. 3). Thus, they serve specific purposes that are tied to the nature of social movements or non-governmental movement. In 2006, Hamas shifted from this position and attained a ruling position, so we might expect that this has played a role in their communication needs. Moreover, many of their releases are calls to uprisings and to the intifada or other resistance acts, which is consistent with Levin's results.

So far, the research has evolved from considering the text as a research objective to focusing on the media production process to taking into account all the factors that contextualize press releases in media discourse, including in its methodology the ethnographic research (Sleurs and Jacobs, 2005).

One of the main research lines on press releases is defining if they might constitute an autonomous textual genre. (Lassen, 2006), for example, argues that press releases can cover a variety of functions since they pursue different objectives in relation to the context of production and who produces them (charity group, a business, a social movement), so they cannot be considered a textual genre. On the other hand, other scholars identify features that are characteristic, as they are placed in an early place of the chain of news production and they have a specific addressee, which is constituted by journalists and not the general public.

Being built in order to be reported, they are oriented to other texts, so intertextuality definitely plays an important role, thus has been one of the lines of research on defining press releases as an independent genre. Moreover, other common traits are identified, such as the need to portray a positive self-image (Levin, 2002; Lassen, 2006; Sleurs and Jacobs, 2005). Many of these studies have been led on commercial press releases; however, what they observed is useful and consistent with Hamas press releases. It should be acknowledged that they do display their own characteristics, which are consequences of the specific rhetoric objectives pursued. For this reason, the study will not focus on a matching them with other findings on the subject of press releases, but it should be acknowledged that these studies provide a review of the contextual (and co-textual) constraints that might be influential.

## **3.4 Epistemological problems**

### **3.4.1 Exclusivity**

The generalization as a jihadi or terrorist movement, to which Hamas has been subjected, resulted in its marginalization on the international scene and also on the academic literature, as many scholars limited their research by taking into consideration only this aspect. Moreover, as the most part of Islamist parties, their texts have usually been dealt with by political analysts and not linguists. This exclusivity to which supposedly jihadi and terrorist movements are related puts several constraints on researching them from other perspectives, as those on social movements and political parties. As they are not recognized as such, all the aspects related to their socio-political developments are subsequently ignored and fail to improve the academic discussion on the subject (Bhatia, 2009; Hroub, 2006b; Jackson, 2007).

Therefore, an extensive research is needed to consider the many different dimensions of Hamas and imply an appropriate methodology and theoretical framework that can account for the politicization mentioned by Hroub [2006]. One of the bias of a terrorism-oriented research is failing to recognize the socio-historical



context-specific constraints and enquire on the groups discourse without a critical eye, which is selective in respects to jihadi content and ignores every other kind of content.

### **3.4.2 Arab and Islamist political discourses**

Critical Discourse analysis has an extensive history of analysing political discourse and power inequalities especially regarding to Europe and Americas (see Chapter on "State of the Art"). This may be also said of other linguists who investigated extensively political discourse, that precedes the current field of Critical Discourse studies, such as George Lakoff (Lakoff, 1995, 2004). Naturally, many further works might be mentioned. However, Arab or/and Islamist political discourse does not seem to have encountered the same amount of attention yet. Some existing work that might be mentioned, in this respect, are (Al-Sharoufi, 2006) and (Mullin, 2010).

# Chapter 4

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 4.1 Analysing official political discourse and understanding power relations

Every kind of text which includes a political content can be considered as part of political discourse (van Dijk, 1997); Hamas' statements, being the official channel of communication of the movement to the people and to the media, can certainly be ascribed to this category. This also means that, given the history of Hamas, their elaboration is concerned with power dynamics.

As van Dijk points out, social power is concerned with relations between social groups, institutions or organizations (van Dijk, 2008b, p. 65); power is in the hands of whoever is in control. This means that the person, movement, institution in charge is recognized as such because it can make decisions on different levels: a teacher in a classroom, an officer on the battlefield, a minister on education policies, and so on. Control is also measured on the degree of access to means of communication, such as the media. Power shows a strong bond with the realm of politics: politics could, in fact, be interpreted as

[...] a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist [...]. On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty, and the like.

(Chilton, 2004, p. 3)

Chilton considers both actions of control and resistance as related to power and politics, which particularly applies to the case of Hamas that, in fact, exercises both. At the same time (and according to context), Chilton recognizes the role social interaction aimed at problem solving of some kind. In fact, central to political language are what Chilton calls the "strategic functions of political

texts", which can briefly be summarized as coercion and resistance, legitimation and delegitimation, representation and misrepresentation (Chilton, 2011, pp. 311-312). In fact, a privileged access to means of communication or public discourse makes it possible to act on a cognitive level, by manipulating and manufacturing mental models of the recipients (van Dijk, 2008a). Such models may regard ideas on contexts, events, or representation of self or other political actors. Power is enacted through discourse as a form of social interaction, which changes accordingly to the form of power imposed and the source of power; by and large, the most common way to perpetuate it is through persuasion, selection of information and legitimation (of power, attitudes, actions) (van Dijk, 2008a)

Discourse analysis has, since the beginning, been concerned with analysing and demystifying power dynamics within discourse (Meier, 2015). Its initial critical approach was thus to be intended in this particular direction, and most of the objects of analysis deal with neo-liberal discourse (Fairclough, 2003), racist discourse (van Dijk, 1984, 1988a; Reisigl and Wodak, 2011, 1999; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), media discourse (Cotter, 2001; Jacobs et al., 2008; Sissons, 2012; Machin and Van Leeuwen, 2007; van Dijk, 1988b), political discourse (van Dijk, 1997).

More recent tendencies of research have shifted towards the study of non-dominant discourses, such as militant and resistance discourse (Morrissey, 2004; Noor, 2003; Ismail, 2018), social movements discourse (Habermas, 1981; Levin, 2002; Poletta and Jasper, 2001; van Dijk, 2016).

Hamas, being at the same time under the constraints of Israel as a settler-colonial power and a party in government, trespasses both situations.

The findings that a study on Hamas could provide can primarily contribute to the studies on discourse in relation to power and ideology, intended in both ways (dominant and dominated discourse)(van Dijk, 2006a).

Such relation cannot be understood without considering the relation between verbal and social practices (van Dijk, 2006a; Fairclough, 1998), where meaning built through discourse shapes social understanding and behaviour, and vice-versa; nor can be complete without considering the cognitive level of discourse producing and understanding and of social experience and knowledge, tackled by the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk, 2016). For this reason, the theoretical frameworks within Discourse studies and Critical Discourse studies, with a particular focus on the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk, 2016), are considered the most adapt for the present subject of research.

## 4.2 Critical (and non-critical) Discourse Studies

### 4.2.1 General overview

Critical Discourse studies aim at inquiring the interaction between discourse and social practices, in particular they focus on disclosing the underlying ideologies and, for most part of their history, on understanding how power inequalities are practised and reproduced (Meier, 2015; van Dijk, 2006a) and dismantling them (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 7). The adjective critical is an indication of the researcher's modality of research, that reserves a special attention on how inequality is developed and reproduced in a society or group (Cassany and Castellà, 2010), and is also indicative of his/her "critical" attitude towards dominant powers and their strategies (Meier, 2015). However, when the object of study is not a dominant or manipulative power, as in the case of research on anti-racist discourse, the adjective "critical" becomes unnecessary.

Discourse studies are not a methodology but identify an attitude towards the objects of study; the methodology employed may vary accordingly, and an interdisciplinary approach is also very often the most convenient strategy for conducting the analysis. In fact, the analysis cannot be limited to specific linguistic features: the overall goals of the discourse studies approach requires a wider perspective that includes elements of the context of production and reception of the text, historical context, social practices and norms, shared knowledge and cognitive representations. Study of discourse is inevitably tied to the study of society.

In fact, there is no mere direct correlation between the use of a linguistic device, such as nominalization, and a particular attitude; for this reason, a qualitative methodology is usually preferred, and the connection between discourse and social context needs to be constantly interpreted.

### 4.2.2 Approaches to discourse studies

The field of Discourse Studies is characterised by different approaches applied to different methodologies; the present paragraph will offer a brief overview of the most common approaches, and the most relevant for the present study.

Diachronic change in discourse is dealt with in Wodak's discourse historical approach, where historical context and social change is considered as a background for the ways "particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change" (Wodak, 2006, p. 64). Wodak connects the social dimension and change to discursive strategies that can be identified by the means of different linguistic realizations, such as argumentative strategies and study of *topoi* (Iedema and Wodak, 2004, 176-177), or macro-strategies, such as constructive strategies, strate-

gies of perpetuation and legitimation, strategies of transformation, and destructive strategies (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 92-93).

The work of van Leeuwen on social semiotics has extended from the analysis of texts to multi-modal analysis, in an attempt to cover the integrated systems of text and image that can occur in different types of communication and discourses (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001). His work on social actors and action is of particular interest for the present work, because he provides categories of analysis that maintain their focus on social semantic categories rather than on linguistic structures, that are analysed only in relation to context and social semantic categories (Van Leeuwen, 2008).

Fairclough sees sociology as a preferential field to study ideology (Fairclough, 2003, p. 10). Fairclough's approach thus interprets discourse related categories in sociological terms: semiosis as a social activity constitutes genres, semiosis within the performance of social positions orientate styles, and networks of related social practices constitutes the orders of discourse (Fairclough, 2006, pp. 123, 124). The order of discourse is an overarching category that comprises genres, discourses, styles, types of activities (Fairclough, 1998, p. 104). Fairclough's approach is problem-oriented, meaning that the research should be shaped around a "problem with a semiotic aspect" (Fairclough, 2006, p. 129) and identifies in the "orders of discourse", a concept he draws from Foucault, the privileged field of analysis for social and discourse change (Fairclough, 1998, p. 219).

Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, which will be explained more extensively in section 4.3, introduces cognition in the analytical framework. Cognitive processes are the necessary interface between discourse and social practices, because all the contents of discourse (and also experience) are elaborated on the base of individual mental models and shared forms of social cognition (van Dijk, 2006b, 2016).

### **4.2.3 Discourse and society**

The relationship between discourse and society lies at the core of discourse analysis. In fact, a reciprocal relation is recognized between the two levels, as discourse is a place of meaning building that influences action in the real world, and social practices are, in turn, consolidated and reproduced within discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, pp. 5-6).

The interplay between social practices and discourse emerges in different ways. Social conventions are responsible for the organization of categories above textual level, such as the "orders of discourse" (Fairclough, 2003). They also partially explain the categorization in non-literary genres, as the "allowable" content largely depends on the norms and social expectations related to a social event (Bhatia, 1993a).

With this respect, an important role is attributed to knowledge, as it is mainly conveyed by discourse and provides for shared representations that work within the level of mental models and interpretation of experience (van Dijk, 2016, p. 161). "Social knowledge" can be defined as a set of "confirmed" beliefs within an epistemic community, that regards them as truth, and is applied in the construction of the individual mental models (van Dijk, 2016, p. 144).

Cognition is, finally, the "interface" through which social and discursive structures mediate their interaction: social cognition, in fact, includes all the shared instances of beliefs related with attitudes and ideologies that constitute a wider or smaller group within the epistemic community (van Dijk, 2016, 2006b, pp. 130, 131) (see section 4.3.2).

## **4.3 Ideology and the socio-cognitive approach**

### **4.3.1 Ideology**

Ideology, in discourse studies, is intended as a system of "socially shared beliefs" shared by a restricted group within an epistemic community (van Dijk, 2016, pp. 144-145), that are *axiomatic* in controlling and defining other kinds of socially shared beliefs and the membership criteria of the group, and are the fundamental socio-cognitive interface between group's social structures and their discourses and practices (van Dijk, 2006b, pp. 116-117). An ideological system of beliefs, in fact, can orientate the group's values, attitudes, interpretations and representations of self and others. For example, domination is usually associated with an underlying ideology. To maintain and exert control, it is necessary to maintain cohesion among the reference groups (citizens, professionals of a category, militants, etc.) which can be functionally performed by an ideological system. This means that ideology is necessary in maintaining and consolidating a system of power. On the other hand, ideology should not be identified as necessarily related to hegemony or domination: resistance and opposition groups present underlying ideologies as well.

Van Dijk recognizes to ideology the cognitive function to provide coherence to a system of beliefs, so that they can function together. A ruling group is usually successful in making its ideology the most widespread, because it has a privileged access (and maybe control of) to means of communication or influential actors, thus accessing multiple channels to spread its beliefs and representations. Forms of hegemony and domination are so reproduced through discourse; when this process is particularly successful, the ideological representations start to "feel natural" and not be recognized as such, but rather as a natural order or common sense, and people do not challenge them (Reisigl and Wodak, 1999, p. 8). By

controlling the dominant discourses, ruling classes (or symbolic elites) are capable to influence attitudes, topics, amount and types of information and organize knowledge in a way that influences mental models (context and situation models) and reproduces opinions, attitudes, ideologies (van Dijk, 2008a). What is fundamental in a group to exist is cohesion, and ideology works in this direction; for this reason, its reproduction is fundamental. This happens because power has a privileged access to discourse.

### **4.3.2 Cognition**

Cognition includes the mental processes involved in comprehending, storing, interpreting and producing information, ideas, beliefs, so it places itself between discursive and social practices; for this reason, cognition and society work as a context of discourse. This system comprises three main cognitive structures: memory, mental models and social cognition.

Mental models are at the core of this process of mediation. Mental models are individual, although they are shaped (and shape) social knowledge and social cognition; they store and process information from long term memory, and are stored in episodic memory. Context models, or pragmatic models, are personal mental representations of context, and contain pragmatic information on elements of the communicative situation in order to adapt the discourse accordingly as "adequate" (van Dijk, 2016, p. 143); semantic models are concerned with meaning and are personal mental representations on events, things, people, and concepts, and they orientate interpretation of meaning (van Dijk, 2016, p. 142-143).

Ideologies and attitudes pertain the level of social cognition. Attitudes may be influenced by mental models and ideologies: for example, a racist ideology would define an attitude of opposition to immigration. Ideology is built strongly on identity polarization, where the identification of the members of the group is fundamental in terms of belonging (national, ethnic, cultural, or other categories), common goals, common interests, values and norms. This is realized by defining a Us (in-group) in opposition to a Them (out-group), who do not share our common characteristics / values / goals.

This is well described by the model of ideological square, where positive actions / attributes of the in-group are discursively emphasized, and those of the out-group are minimized; negative actions and attributes are, of course, emphasized in the out-group and minimized in the in-group (van Dijk, 2006b, 2016). Polarization, group identity, activities, norms, values and interests can all be found as variably realized ideological structures within discourse (van Dijk, 2016, p. 149-150).

### 4.3.3 Micro and macro levels

The analysis of texts is characterized by a macro-to-micro approach. Texts present different levels of analysis: the linguistic structures proper, that pertain form (syntax, phonology), local meaning (lexicon, manifestation, precision, granularity, level, modality, evidentiality, local coherence and disclaimers (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 125), local and global content organization of topics in macro-propositions at a local level and the "collective" meaning of the text, or the semantic macro-structure, which can approximately be defined as "the main topic" (van Dijk, 1980) or, in cognitive terms, as the proposition which is neither presupposed nor entailed by any other proposition in the text (van Dijk, 1973). Pragmatic macrostructures can also be identified as the global "action" performed by the text, that might be summarized in a macro-speech act (van Dijk, 1977). The other level of analysis includes an analysis of genres and its structures, as well of rhetoric devices. Superstructures, such as argumentation and narrative, may occur within or across texts, occur separately and/or together, very often in relation to specific genres; strategies, such as legitimation, may also be identified. All these categories pertain mainly to text organization, and are based on the cognitive notion according to which information need to be organized in a certain way and succession. Clearly, study of text organization in these terms presupposes that external constraints, such as social norms and genre conventions, are taken into consideration.

Knowledge management, management of information in the text, is another fundamental level of analysis. It can emerge in different ways, for example through the analysis of entailments, presupposition, and strategies for presenting information as new or given. This may correspond, obviously, to ideological or manipulative purposes, and it is the duty of the analyst to determine if it is the case.

The basics of ideology, meaning the notions on values, goals, and identity of the group members, are thus rooted in cognitive processes. This means that a cognitive approach is necessary to tackle the subject of ideology.

## 4.4 Genre-oriented approaches

Many research lines within Discourse Analyses focused on specific textual genres. It is relevant for the present work, because the corpus includes only the category of the *bayānāt*, the "official statements", of Hamas. The possibility to actually define them as a single genre will be discussed in the dedicated chapter in Part II.

The studies on press releases as a genre, for example, provide for some interesting perspective on genre definition and categories (provided that they can be described as a genre: see (Lassen, 2006)). First of all, an ethnographic perspective is very frequently privileged, in order to achieve a more comprehensive



understanding of the context of text production (Sleurs and Jacobs, 2005). Moreover, a special focus is placed on the context of production and fruition, because it is found to explain some defining features of the press releases, such as pre-formulation and entextualization, very often in a comparative perspective with the process of news production (Jacobs, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2008; Morton, 1986; Maat, 2008).

Bhatia (Bhatia, 1993a, p. 13) defines genre as a "communicative event", highly constrained by a communicative purpose, shared norms and representation of a discourse community that result in a set of conventions that the text is supposed to follow.

Bhatia (Bhatia, 1993a, 2017), in his approach to non-literary and professional genres, remains critical of the Critical Discourse Studies approach. He emphasizes the necessity to implement research on interdiscursivity that, he reckons, has been neglected by critical discourse analysis, although it is the real field of interaction between social practice and discourse. Bhatia defines interdiscursivity as

Appropriation of generic resources, contextual in nature, focusing on specific relationship between and across discursive and professional practices as well as professional structures

(Bhatia, 2017, p. 5). Interdiscursivity for genre analysis is relevant because it entails "mixing, embedding and bending generic norms (not discursive, but cultural and social norms relative to a specific context)" (Bhatia, 1993a, p. 35). Moreover, Bhatia recognizes a cognitive rationale in the text structure of each genre (Bhatia, 1993a). This means that the different discourses and genres have a two-way relationship in shaping each other. As explained in section 4.2.2, Fairclough shares the view about the way genres are shaped, that puts in relation semiosis and social conventions; a similar interest is shown in both interdiscursivity and intertextuality, although he gives particular emphasis to the notion of intertextuality (Fairclough, 1998). Interdiscursivity can differently be defined as

Constitutive property of a discourse to be in a multiform relation with other discourses and to find itself with them within inter-discourse.

(P.C., 2002).

The analytical categories of interdiscursivity and intertextuality appear relevant for the present analysis, because Hamas' discourse draws heavily from other discourses, such as Palestinian resistance and political discourse and negotiations discourse; moreover, the *bayānāt* include a high variety of sub-genres, that will be analysed for the present work.

## 4.5 Studies on Palestinian politics and discourse

A research on Hamas need to take into consideration the current frameworks related both to Hamas as a movement and to the Palestinian question.

Studies on Palestine and Palestinian political discourse usually propose a perspective that revolves around two epistemological problems: the issues of representation and the issue of settler colonialism. Clearly, the two fields are interrelated: as settler colonialism make use of a discriminatory and racist discourse to impose and establish its power, the issue of Palestinian representation and self-representation acquires necessary strategic relevance. The following paragraphs will deal first with political theories that emerge in current literature regarding the study of Hamas and the study of Palestinian political discourse in general.

### 4.5.1 Theoretical approaches in the study of Hamas

Scholars who treated Hamas as a subject of research within historical, social or political fields of study referred essentially to theoretical frameworks regarding the study of social movements and democratisation processes. Many current approaches to Hamas adopt the perspective of social movement theories, and assume the nature of Hamas as a social movement (Gunning and Jackson, 2011; Singh, 2012) or try to demonstrate it (Robinson, 2004b) or, by and large, as a non-state actor (Baconi, 2018; Hroub, 2006b; Roy, 2012; Tamimi, 2011). The latter approach does not adopt any specific political theory regarding the condition of non-state actors, although such condition is the starting point for interpreting the movement's history and political action. Gunning (2007) assumes the nature of Hamas as a social movement; nonetheless, he offers an extensive theory of democratisation processes to explain the role of Hamas in Palestinian politics and the movement's development. He adopts Rueschemeyer's explanation of democratisation, which considers it as:

[...] A function of the changing balance of power between classes, the state and civil society, and that is particularly likely to occur when capitalist development has led to the weakening of the land-owning class, and the emergence of a working class with a capacity of self-organisation

(Gunning, 2007, p. 243)

Gunning's conclusions are that, in a context where the constraints of Occupation have favoured the development of para-state civil society organizations and cross class alliances, and the middle class has grown as consequence of the new order after the Oslo Accords (Gunning, 2007, p. 247-248), Hamas actively contributed to the process of democratisation by promoting

[...] political mobilisation and organisational potential of those segments of society which are most likely to push for democracy, and that by operating an autonomous force in opposition to the ruling constitution, it has helped to sustain a counter-hegemonic space and limit the power of the ruling coalition.

(Gunning, 2007, p. 252)

Robinson (2004a) considers, following Social Movement Theory, groups and mobilizing structure as subject of analysis. He analyses Hamas by the means of the following three variables: how changes in political opportunity impact on collective actions, mobilising structures, and cultural framing (Robinson, 2004a, p. 116). His conclusions are aimed at contributing to a general theory of social movements but also to refute generalisations and Orientalist approaches to the study of the movement (Robinson, 2004a, p. 135-136), which collocates it the wider trend of academic discourse on Hamas as a "counter-discourse" (see section 3.2.1).

#### **4.5.2 Settler Colonialism Framework**

The theoretical framework of settler colonialism, formalized by (Veracini, 2006) and (Veracini, 1999) with regard to the Palestinian question, employs a post-colonial perspective on the analysis of the Palestinian situation which is concerned with defining and explaining the form of colonialism employed by Israel. The Israeli model therefore falls under the category of settler colonialism, a particular type of colonialism in which the dominant power subjugates a population with both the purpose to exploit it and extinguish it in the end (Veracini, 2006). In fact, it differentiates from "classical" types of colonialism in purposes and modalities, especially concerning the reproduction of the model and the attitude towards the natives:

The successful settler colonies tame a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity. (...) Colonialism reproduces itself, and the freedom and equality of the colonised is forever postponed; settler colonialism, by contrast, extinguishes itself. Settler colonialism justifies its operation on the basis of the expectation of its future demise. Colonialism and settler colonialism are not merely different, they are in some way antithetical formations (again, this is not to say that these antithetical formations do not intertwine in practice: they remain compatible, and the settler colonial polities routinely operate colonially and settler colonially at once).

(Veracini, 2011, p. 3,4)

Settler colonialism aims at building a new society and overriding the existing one; for this reason, it is structured accordingly. Theodore Herzl, theorist of the Zionist movement, explicitly declared: "If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct" (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The settler also aims at building a "new" national identity of the dominated territory: Zionism, in fact, rejected its European roots (for example, the choice on Israel national language was oriented to re-create a spoken Hebrew, which had remained a dead language for centuries, rather than adopt Yiddish) (Wolfe, 2006, p. 390).

The settler colonial paradigm is substantiated by the practices employed by Zionism to establish itself as a nation in Palestine and progressively subjugating, dispossessing and displacing the existing population, practices that are recognized as ethnic cleansing (Pappe, 2011), marginalization from the labour market (Fernandez, 2017, p. 34), creation of a new national narrative by the means of appropriation of native cultural practices and denial of their identity (Wolfe, 2006; Said, 2003; Sibilio, 2013).

The framework of settler colonialism is currently very often resorted to by scholars in the field of Palestinian studies, and trespasses many different disciplinary approaches and frameworks.

### **Studies on Palestinian identity**

The studies on Palestinian identity have, so far, followed three main goals: challenging the common tropes, such as the negation of a Palestinian identity before the Nakba or a total denial of its existence (Khalidi, 2010; Said, 2015), and how the Palestinian identity is represented and narrated (Khalidi, 2010; Sanbar, 2005; Sayigh, 1977), and understanding how the Palestinian identity is represented in a context of diaspora (Hanafi, 2010; Hanafi, 2010; Sayigh, 1977; Perez, 2012).

(Khalidi, 2010, p. 193-194) challenges the myth of the non-existent of Palestinian identity before the Nakba by providing a detailed history of its continuity, which can be traced through the stratifications:

1. Before the First World War: this was the era of nationalism and pan-nationalisms. The urban elites were expanding and the middle class was rising; Palestinian identity would overlap with Ottoman identity and Arab identity. These representations of identity would, in turn, overlap with loyalties of sectarian and familiar nature.
2. Years of the British mandate: the concept of Palestinian identity got stronger under the perspective of opposing the presence of the British and the rising presence of Zionism. There was an increase in the alphabetization and education levels and the educational system contributed to build a unitary sense of identity.

3. After 1948, the Nakba: the trauma of dispossession, displacement and occupation is an element of rupture with the preceding history and a new factor of identity cohesion.

Khalidi is concerned with explaining the origins of modern Palestinian resistance discourse, that he traces back to the pre-1948 movements of resistance, which already contained symbols and representations that resurfaced in the resistance after 1967. His way of tracing a continuity thus is not limited to register an historical presence on a given territory, but takes into consideration the production and reproduction of a symbolic heritage.

Elias Sanbar (Sanbar, 2005, p. 12-15) challenges a notion of identity based on a "point zero" in time, where a population would supposedly be legitimized by being the first to inhabit the territory:

Then it happened that my people and I (almost a million and half in 1948, more than 9 million at present day) were the victims of this postulate of an immutable and still identity. Haven't we suffered a negation of our existence, founded on a supposed priority in time and place, and sustained by those who had replaced us in time and place? (...) And so started to flourish imaginative theories on a Palestinian identity and culture that dated back to Canaanites that, as everybody knows, were there before the Jews!

Sanbar bases his approach upon the study of overlapping "identity figures", where different identity "flows" coexist in a given moment in history. This is a non-monolithic vision of identity, which is concerned with reaching a more comprehensive framework for studying and representing Palestinian identity.

Another factor that put these authors in common is the extreme importance given to socio-historical context, which remains a fundamental aspect for averting the use of improper analytical categories.

## **4.6 Theoretical approach in the present study**

The present study maintains a focus on cognitive structures pertaining the construction of the in-group and the out-group, in order to understand how their ideological representations developed and how such changes (when present) are connected to the context of the movement, especially regarding their "power" status. The discursive ideological structures dealt with are:

- Representations pertaining participants
- Values

- Instruments
- Goal

The last level of analysis follows a different path, as it starts by text organization and categorization, to which is recognized a cognitive structure (Bhatia, 1993a; Frow, 2006) by the means of genre analysis, to draw conclusions on the role of topics, superstructures, strategies and other macro-level elements of analysis in the general ideological representations.



# Chapter 5

## METHODOLOGY

### 5.1 Summary

The present study aims at providing a contribution within the discourse analysis framework, with a special focus on the dynamics pertaining power and ideology. For this reason, the study will be conducted following primarily a qualitative methodology on a sample corpus, with the supports of quantitative data collected on the total corpus and on the sample corpus.

The qualitative analysis is inductive, as it starts from data in order to produce a final hypothesis, while the quantitative part was deductive, since it aimed at testing some of the assumptions developed during the qualitative analysis.

An analysis on a sample of 12 press releases was preliminary performed in order to refine the research objectives and relevant analytical categories.

### 5.2 The corpora

#### 5.2.1 General and selected corpus

The research has been conducted on a "general corpus", which comprises the total population of the statements, and a "selected corpus", that includes a representative sample of the general corpus, and can be consulted in the Appendix at the end of the present work.

The corpus has been retrieved by Hamas' official website in Arabic <sup>1</sup>, and each statement has been downloaded in text format, classified for number of statements, date, topics and word count. The Arabic section has been chosen because is the preferential language of communication of the Movement and because the statements in Arabic cover the whole span of time needed. The website also includes

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<sup>1</sup>< <http://hamas.ps/ar/>> (last access: 02/08/2018)



an English localization, but the press releases are not translated but written only for the English part; moreover, they start from year 2015, as some of other extensive sections of the website, as the News section.

The general corpus includes 857201 words and 1847 statements. The selected corpus is composed of 27142 words for 58 statements, collected in a span of time from 1987 to 2016, in order to cover the lifetime of the Movement, and was selected according to the guidelines mentioned in the following paragraph.

### **5.2.2 Sample and corpus selection guidelines**

The phase of corpus downloading and inventory together with the preliminary analysis on a sample allowed for a definition of the collecting criteria for the selected corpus.

The selected corpus has not been collected randomly, but tries to include a reasonably proportional representation of the general corpus, and to follow the principles of representativeness, the extent to which a sample clues the full range of variability in a population (Biber, 1993).

In the present work, the corpus is already pre-defined as a set of official political and public communication, so no sub-division in this sense are needed. The balance required by the principle of representativeness has nonetheless been respected by employing internal criteria in selecting the statements, in this case reproducing the distribution of sub-genres within the general corpus.

Within the general corpus, in fact, have been identified five sub-genres, among other generic statements. The selected corpus contains samples from each sub-genre, in proportion with the distribution present in the general corpus.

The other internal criterion refers to the diachronic distribution: the statements have been selected to allow for a diachronic analysis, so they cover the period from 1988 to 2016. Years 2017 and 2018 have not been included in the analysis because it would be difficult to perform a proper interpretation based on historical and contextual facts, that are hard to retrieve for facts happened with such a close temporal proximity. The sample corpus has been divided into three decades: 1988-1996, 1997-2006, 2007-2016. The analysis is diachronic because the focus of the research is on the changes, especially ideological changes, underwent by the movement. The division in decades is merely conventional, and serves the purpose to track the diachronic changes in discourse. As the three decades do not correspond to specific historical phases, posterior to the analysis changes were re-contextualized according to the historical context, and interpreted accordingly if such a connection was present.

Nonetheless, the function of the selected corpus is primarily to be subjected to qualitative analysis, whose findings are then tested on the general corpus, in order to verify, first of all, if the selected corpus is really representative and, secondly,

to confirm or confute qualitative analysis results and obtain relevant data for a diachronic analysis.

Table 5.1: Selected corpus: distribution of sub-genres

Sub-genre	Number of statements	Number of words	Years
Letters	5	3248	1989, 1991, 1996, 1997, 2004, 2008
Memoranda	4	3560	1997 (2), 2003, 2008 (2)
Commemorative Statements	12	5229	1996 (2), 1997, 2001, 2004 (2), 2005 (2), 2009, 2014, 2016(2)
Obituaries	6	2340	2002, 2003 (2), 2004 (2), 2012
Calls to mobilization	5	1584	1991, 2004, 2011, 2014, 2015
Other	26	11201	1988-2016

### 5.3 Results of the preliminary research

Prior to a precise definition of objectives for the present research proposal, a qualitative analysis has been led on 12 texts from 1992 to 2016. They have been chosen according to two criteria:

1. Time span: The sample was supposed to cover the early existence of Hamas until the present day;
2. Topics: Texts in which ideological actions could be detected in connection to their political position, as interactions with other political actors or defence of the movement position toward specific topics.

The preliminary analysis on the samples resulted in a relevant presence of argumentative structures to prove standpoints on actions of the Movement or in support

of its opinion on specific events and persons or institutions. A major argumentative strategy seems to conform to the definition of the *ad hominem fallacy*, which regards the defence of a standpoint on the grounds of derogation of the other party by attacking his/her reliability (van Eemeren and Gootendorst, 2004). This overlaps with legitimation structures, where it could be identified as an abuse of the authoritative personal legitimation (or de-legitimation) (Van Leeuwen, 2007).

The preliminary analysis also led to the identification of some sub-genres, already noticed during the phase of corpus-building and compiling of the inventory of statements, and to have a first impression of the ideological structures pertaining values, goals, instruments and modalities of representation of the in-group and the out-group.

## 5.4 Qualitative analysis

The choice of a qualitative method of analysis is consistent with Discourse Studies approaches, as they aim at making a connection between different dimensions of the same phenomenon, needed to understand how discourse can be related to social and cognitive spheres (Reisigl and Wodak, 2011; van Dijk, 1997). However, Discourse Studies do not provide a formal methodological approach. The common goal is to disclose ideology behind the building of texts and discourses, but this purpose can be served and enriched by different approaches; moreover, the multi-disciplinary dimension in which Discourse Studies are framed could not possibly co-exist with a pre-established methodology.

For this reason, for the present work were established analytical categories that are relevant for the study of discourse and ideology and have been applied different analytical methods according to each analytical category.

**Contextualizing the analytical categories** The findings resulting from the mixed methodological approach were interpreted in relation to the specific context of use, for example the specific occasion in which each statement was published, historical moment, relevant historical background, and, when needed, explanations on based on principles of Islamic law.

In fact, even the most "intuitive" and apparently common-knowledge categories such as "nationalism" and "resistance" were analysed and interpreted in the context of the actual historical conceptualization of such categories within the Arab, Islamic and Palestinian context, taking into consideration the obvious relations entertained by these spheres outside their specific context.

For this reason, a qualitative approach needs to include the knowledge provided by area historical and sociological studies and Islamic studies are fundamental in

order to correctly define the analytical categories and produce an adequate interpretation.

### **5.4.1 Analytical categories**

The focus of the analysis are the discursive ideological structures of identity, values, goals, instruments. The last analytical chapter, on the other hand, deals with genres and sub-genres, in order to identify and discuss more global textual strategies, structures and constraints in relation to ideology.

### **5.4.2 Methodological Approaches**

**Systemic Functional Grammar** Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday, 1976) is a functional approach to grammar that Halliday developed in order to explain grammatical structures in terms of meaning and connection to the real world. Halliday identifies three macro functions of language: experiential (references to the real world), interpersonal (references to the relation of the participants), and textual (reference to text-organization). Experiential metafunction distinguishes linguistic constituents in participants (agent, senser, sayers, carrier, behavior, existent), the relative "actions" performed (or undergone), or "processes" (respectively: material, mental, verbal, relational, behavioural, existential processes), and information about the context, encoded in the "circumstances" (temporal, spatial etc.). More recent studies have criticised the approach for not providing an exhaustive and clear system of classification for processes, and being limited at the grammatical rather, regardless of the claims of semantic exhaustiveness; this has been considered in the present work, and Systemic Functional Grammar has thus been used as a primary instrument of analysis in order to provide a first classification of participants (Chapter 6) to underlie some surface phenomena, that have been furtherly verified and analysed by the means of Social Actors analysis.

**Social Actors analysis** The analysis of social actors and social action proposes a more comprehensive approach that starts from socio-semantic categories and subsequently analyses the relative linguistic realizations (Van Leeuwen, 2008). This means that, for example, instead of looking for the linguistic realizations of *agentivity*, the attention should be focused of the socio-semantic category of "agency". This allows for trespassing the limits of syntax and morphology, and obtain more significant findings for a discussion on social cognition. In fact, it allows to understand how the representations work and where does they place focus for each actor. In this way, it is evident how ideology work: which groups are marginalized, which characteristics are underscored, if they are represented

as passive or active, if they are represented as individuals or "backgrounded" as a generic category. Clearly, also in this case, a modality of representation does not intrinsically correspond to an ideological structure, and the interpretations should always be contextualized.

Van Leeuwen identifies also some strategies of representation of social action. In this case, the main distinction is between material action (normal action in the actual world) and semiotic action (actions concerned with meaning building). However, social action undergoes dynamics very similar to those reserved to social actors: actions can be activated or passivated, objectivized or descriptivized, and so on.

**Frame Analysis** The analysis of frames by Fillmore (Fillmore and Baker, 2010) collocates within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics (second cognitive revolution). The basic principles of the cognitive framework are a confutation of universal grammar principle, and the proposal of explanations rooted in psychology and cognition. For example, the semantic and cognitive representation coincide, because meaning is encyclopaedic: all the knowledge evoked by a word is part of its meaning (Croft, 2004, p. 78) According to cognitivists, meaning is "embodied", which means that it is rooted in the experience of the real world and in the mind. Knowledge is cognitively structured in *experiential domains*. This means that the meaning of concept presupposes many portions of knowledge that are evoked by referring to it. The concept, or the *profile*, thus entails a *frame* to understand it: the profile "arc", for example, is profiled by the frame "circle" (Croft, 2004, pp. 78-79). A concept can profile different frames at once, thus relying on a system of frames or a domain. A frame can profile more than one concept and is, in this sense, called a domain. Frames have been used in the present work to understand the semantic conceptualizations behind some ideological discursive structures, such as values and instruments. In order to have a comparable list of frames, was used the frame list employed by the FrameNet Project of the University of Berkeley<sup>2</sup>, which includes a list of frames with the related frame element. For example, the "Revolution" frame, which was underlie by the instrument of "resistance", has as core elements an Agent (who performs the revolution), a Current Leadership (to be overthrown), and a Current Order.

**Analysis of metaphor** The use of studies on the metaphor (Lakoff, 2004, 1995; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003) is marginal in the present work; nonetheless, they have been mentioned when some relevant metaphors have been found in the texts. Lakoff's theory of metaphor is rooted in the idea that metaphors are not only a realm of literature, but are the visible linguistic results of cognitive processes.

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<sup>2</sup>Website: < <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/about> > (last access: 01/08/2018)

Metaphors explain one concept in terms of another, which means that, conceptually, they are an intersection between two domains. A very similar discourse is made on metonymy which is, on the other hand, based on the selection of an alternative element from the same domain. Metaphors can be found in everyday language: metaphors such as "Life is a road" are evident from everyday expressions such as "to meet an obstacle" (in figurative sense), "to reach a goal" etc. On a grammatical level, metaphors are found in spatial conceptualizations of temporal meaning (for example, same prepositions for spatial and temporal purposes). As metaphors involve two domains, we speak of a source domain, that is used to explain, and a target domain, that is represented by the means of the source domain: "Argument is a war", "argument" is the target domain, and "war" is the source domain.

### **5.4.3 Levels of textual analysis**

The previously defined methodological approaches have been applied on different levels. It has been followed a micro to macro approach, where the analysis started from structures related to local meaning then escalated to higher levels (topics, speech acts and macro-speech acts, strategies and superstructures, genres).

Local meaning builds up to global meaning, and this perspective will allow for understanding how does the movement use texts to perform actions, which topics are privileged, and how this builds up to general representations conveyed by the texts.

**Local structures and local meaning** The analysis of local meaning concerns the range of sentence and, at most, macro-proposition meaning. This means that, when relevant, morphological and syntactic structures are included in the analysis, along with semantic choices (for example, "positive" or "negative" terms) (van Dijk, 2006b). Local structures can provide different kinds of data on ideological structures, such as data on information management concerned with focus, new and given information (building which kind of knowledge is considered common ground and which one is considered as new and to be argued), selective action on representations.

Management of local meaning can be performed by the use of lexical selection, presuppositions, entailments, implicitness. In this case, information can be retrieved on representation of social actors and actions (Van Leeuwen, 2008), shared knowledge management, and, in the case of the present work, gain a more comprehensive knowledge on the semantic conceptualizations behind the ideological structures analysed.

In fact, semantic choices at this level may work on the mental models of the recipients, that are evoked as interpretative framework to evaluate what is presented as new information; for this reason, given information is less likely to be put under discussion by the recipient, who shares some expectations on the texts with its producer.

Local meaning has also been analysed in terms of co-text with respect to discursive realization of the ideological structures. In fact, a repeated co-occurrence of a reference term with other words or expression, or recurrent systems of collocations, can contribute to the overall conceptualization that is built around that term.

For this reason, the semantic analysis was performed taking into consideration co-occurrences and collocations, and focusing on the following phenomena:

- **Change of meaning:** Resemantization, extension/narrowing of meaning: phenomena concerned with general changes of meaning, through time, in relation to the same linguistic form;
- **Conceptual and associative meaning:** the analysis focuses on the degree to which some term have or have assumed, in their reception and use, a more associative-affective meaning (ex. words such as "democracy", perceived more as evaluative than descriptive) or a conceptual (informative, descriptive) meaning, and how this affects their understanding and political use (Leech, 1974);
- **Local management of information:** phenomena such as presupposition, implications, entailments. These phenomena, in fact, allow for understanding how knowledge is managed within the text: which kind of information is considered (or presented as) acquired, relevant, and how it builds up to general representations of the context.

**Rhetorical structures** Rhetorical devices are considered relevant for the present analysis. Metaphor and metonymy are one of the discussed rhetorical devices, especially for their cognitive repercussions (Lakoff, 2004, 1995; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). Other kinds of rhetorical figures will be taken into consideration, such as ellipses and personification.

**Topics and macro-structures** A first phase in the analysis of the texts was aimed at understanding the main topics treated. The notion of macro-proposition was useful in sectioning the text in topics. This is consistent with a cognitive-oriented approach, as information is stored and produced in restricted blocks in

short-term memory (van Dijk, 1995), and is also useful for understanding and categorize each text.

The overall meaning of each text, which can be synthetically ascribed to the semantic macro-structure, or its function, ascribable to a pragmatic macro-structure or macro-speech act, will be discussed together with the analysis of genres and sub-genres, in order to discuss them within the context of the whole production.

**Genres** The analysis of genre was the only one approaching the research topic from a reverse orientation: not from ideological structure to linguistic realization and discussion, but from a linguistic item to discussion of ideological structures and organization. Main references for the analysis of genre are Bhatia (Bhatia, 1993a, 2017), Fairclough (Fairclough, 1998) and Frow (Frow, 2006). These approaches, in fact, discuss the conventions and norms behind each text in the context of social norms and positioning, and in reference to social building of meaning. This analysis trespasses all the levels of analysis previously mentioned.

**Argumentation: pragma-dialectal approach** The use of some approaches specific on particular structures (or superstructures) of the texts have been included and, for the nature of many texts, this has entailed the inclusion of studies on argumentation. Argumentation structures were found frequently in connection to legitimation purposes of the image of the movement connected to the social context or the historical moment; thus, it addresses core elements of ideological discourse, as representation of participants, representation of the group in its identity and goals. Therefore, its analysis can adopt a perspective other than practical, aimed at disclosing the ideological dynamics beneath. It is, in fact, a very complex device that can be performed in different ways within a text and might be described as a structure which is broader than the single proposition and comparable to that of a narrative schemata, in being extensible up to the whole text (van Dijk, 1992, p. 244). Argumentation structures aim at persuading of a particular opinion or to perform a particular action.

The pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst proposes a pragmatic analysis concerned with interpreting the functions of argumentation as a way to refute or justify a standpoint. This is framed within other pragmatic categories, such as Grice's cooperation principles and speech acts.

The peculiarity of this approach is not only to apply a pragmatic perspective, but also to consider the interactional element as a distinctive feature. In fact, if argumentation is conceived of as a divergence of opinions, it is possible to identify opponents (even in monological structures) and to consider agreement between them as a possible scope, following an ideal model of "critical discussion".



**Legitimation** Legitimation is a strategy through which someone's position, power, opinion are considered legitimate to be followed or obeyed. It can be simplified as a way to answer a why question, as why something should be done in a certain way or someone should be listened to, (van Dijk, 1998; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Van Leeuwen, 2007). Legitimation and argumentation follow similar patterns, that can overlay in different ways; as Reyes (Reyes, 2011, pp. 786, 783) points out, argumentation enacts legitimation, but it is also true that arguments might need to be legitimized. Moreover, it is inevitable in political discourse, because it is characterized by a persuasive nature (Reyes, 2011, pp. 783-784). Legitimation is also interaction-oriented, as it pursues the approval of someone, usually member of the in-group.

Van Leeuwen provides for a good model of legitimation devices, which recognizes four categories: *Authority*, *Evaluation*, *Rationalization*, *Mythopoiesis*. Authority explains any kind of legitimacy given for personal characteristics (recognized expertise, social status, role) or impersonal sources of authority (laws, regulations, tradition, conformity).

*Evaluation* is built on a category usually too abstract to be challenged, that of good against evil, thus according to moral or ethical parameters. In discourse the good versus evil evaluation is seldom referred to through such explicit terms, and similar categories such as "healthy", "normal", "natural" are used in the place of good. Analogy falls under this category: comparisons, according to van Leeuwen, frequently pursue a legitimation purposes. *Naturalization*, another subcategory of evaluative legitimation, is a way to confer legitimacy without any further need of argumentation, as things as always been this way, and natural order substitutes morality. A kind of naturalization is present also in another legitimation strategy, *Theoretical Rationalization*, concerned with natural order of things, with the only difference that the validity of such natural order is made explicit by the means of specific structures, as definitions and explanations (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Finally, *Mythopoiesis* is concerned with storytelling, where texts such as moral tales, cautionary tales and anecdotes are used to legitimize or de-legitimize a position or behaviour.

It emerges that legitimation strategies draw from beliefs on what is right/good (values) and what is true (knowledge). This is consistent with van Dijk's interpretation of ideologies as a support to legitimation, since they provide "the foundation of judgement and action, and hence also the basis for group-related legitimation according to different categories (van Dijk, 1998, p. 257).

According to Wodak and van Leeuwen (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), forms of legitimation imply a representation of meaning. As representation is a re-contextualization of social practices, transformation becomes an integrated process of legitimation. This might come in many different forms, as in deletion, rearrangement, substitution, addition.

Delegitimation is also significant in finding ideological dynamics in discourse. In fact, most operations of delegitimation are oriented at destroying the foundations of a group, whether they are specific goals, values or claims of an identity (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 258-259). Delegitimation can address many objectives, as discourses themselves, but most of the times it is oriented at participants (derogation of out-group), which emphasizes the importance of group's identity building; but, sometimes, it can also address discourses.

## 5.5 Quantitative Analysis

The present work is mainly concerned with qualitative linguistic methods of analysis. Nonetheless, quantitative methods have been employed in order to verify some of the qualitative findings on the general corpus.


The quantitative analysis was performed to quantify frequencies of single terms, of co-occurrences and of collocates within the corpus. In some cases, the frequencies of two terms was studied in comparison, because the qualitative analysis showed that they shared the almost same space on ideological and semantic level, and a study of occurrences through time would allow for associating the difference in use to specific historical contexts and changes (see study on jihad and *muqāwama* in the chapter "Instruments").

The frequencies have been analysed in both a diachronic and synchronic perspective. When studied in a diachronic perspective, they were analysed on the selected corpus divided in three decades and on the general corpus, still divided in three decades, in order to identify relevant changes in time. When the same search was performed on both the selected and the general corpus, it showed the same frequency, showing that the selected corpus is really representative of the general corpus.

The measures taken in a synchronic perspective were performed on the general corpus and the selected corpus on a total number of occurrences, without tracing any change through the decades.

The results of the frequency analysis have been presented in terms of "n. occurrences per 100000 words". This choice has been made because presenting absolute numbers was problematic: the production of statements during the years is not homogeneous, thus a higher frequency of a term in a given year could be just the outcome of a major production (see figure 5.1). For this reason, a relative measure has been preferred, proportioned on a number order comparable to the total words of the general corpus, in order to have not too small a number to present in the results and use in the graphs.

Figure 5.1: Publication of Hamas' statements: total words per year



## 5.6 Computer-mediated analysis

The quantitative analysis has made use of some software and computer tools.

### 5.6.1 Text Analysis software

The management of the corpora and the analysis of collocations and co-occurrences has been performed with AntConc, a freeware for text analysis and concordance (<http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/>). The software has been used for proving extremely adapt to manage Arabic language.

### 5.6.2 Electronic sheets

Electronic sheets were another tool of analysis, as output data from AntConc, that come in text format, could easily be converted into computable data. This has been used to calculate the frequencies and easily manage inventories, converted into computable data from text files and searched and sorted by the use of filters.

Electronic sheets software were also used in order to produce the graphs present in the study.

### 5.6.3 Bash tool line commands

Bash tool line commands have proved to be a very handful and fast tool to manage high quantities of data and texts. Bash tool line commands can be run directly on the Terminal, and do not require any software installation. They were used to create inventories, by joining lists of statements containing relevant data (such as date, summary, number of statement) with automatically produced lists containing other statements features, such as word count.

Moreover, through command line tools it was possible to access information that AntConc could not include in its outputs. The output of AntConc only includes information about the name of the file and the data, for example the frequency of co-occurrences. Therefore, it does not include in the results contextual information that could be useful in the analysis, such as the date, the topic, and the total number of words, which is useful to calculate the relative frequency (see section 5.5). These information are, nevertheless, present on the list of statements compiled partially manually (number of statement, date, topic) and partially through automatization (total number of words).

Command Line Tools allow for performing a series of operation needed by the analysis. First of all, they allow a quick recall of data in the general list of statement or to create sub lists concerning the selected corpus and the division in decades. Moreover, with the aid of Command Line Tools, AntConc outputs can be crossed with the lists, obtaining text files such as the following:

**Example 2** *Example of output with bash line command tools and designed scripts: Frequency of "Occupation"*

*Columns, separated by “;”:* Number of statement, number of occurrences of the term searched, date of the statement, total word count

```
51;1;07/04/1988;502
55;3;13/05/1988;441
56;1;15/04/1988;433
58;1;18/08/1988;1159
59;1;19/07/1988;715
61;0;11/08/1988;459
62;1;25/11/1988;994
```

The example shows a document which include a combination of information: the output of a general search on the occurrences of the word *ihtilāl* ("Occupation") was combined with the data in the list, obtaining a document where it is possible to know how many times the word "occupation" has been said in each statement, when, and how many words that statement had. When these data are entered in an electronic sheet program, they allow for more comprehensive calculations, such as the occurrence per year, the frequency per 100000 words, or the production of a graphic with the general frequency of "occupation" per year.

The following example shows how the general list of statements was compiled. This list includes all statements from the general corpus, and provides information

for: number of the statement, date, total word count, summary. It has been compiled to quickly recall information, including content information, on the statements during the research, or recall them through key words.

### **Example 3 *Example of list:***

*Columns, separated by “;”:* Number of statement; date of the statement; total word count; brief summary of the statement’s contents.

51; 07/04/1988; 502; first release. First Intifada, peace processes.

55; 13/05/1988; 441; Nakba commemoration: the duties of Muslims, the Ramadan, commemoration of the Six Days War and of the 1948 Nakba, appeal to continue the struggle.

56; 15/04/1988; 433; On Palestinian prisoners. Israel is Nazi. Economic boycott and strikes.

58; 18/08/1988; 1159; Jihad as the only instrument of struggle, Palestine as an historical place of struggle, refusal of negotiations. Strikes on 22 August.

59; 19/07/1988; 715; The crimes of the Zionists, such as impeding religious practices. Aid al-Adha celebration.

61; 11/08/1988; 459; Appeal to resist to the Zionist who closed the entrance to al Aqsa mosque.

## **5.7 Note on the numerical annotation of the statements**

The examples that, throughout the present work, quote extracts from the statements, are quoted in the following way: [n. of statement, date]. The "number of the statement", however, does not coincide with the sequence in which they were published, but the number correspondent to their "file" on the website: statement 58 is not the 58th statement to be published, but is the fourth statement in order of upload and can also be found at the address < <https://hamas.ps/ar/post/58.htm>>. This choice was made for two reasons: although sometimes the statements are numbered (they can be entitled "statement n. 21", for example), the enumeration is not systematic; moreover, they have been uploaded mostly in a diachronic order, but not always: two sequential statements may have been published in different

years. However, the number found on the URL has the advantage to easily reach the original webpage, and the text file downloaded to build the corpus.



## **Part II: Analysis**





# Chapter 6

## GENRES

### 6.1 The *bayān*

Hamas's statements collected in the present study can be found under the section of the website called *bayanāt*. The *bayān* in Arabic designates approximately any kind of declaration of statement, or official statements and bulletins of governments; to define the sub-categories of the *bayān* adjectives are needed, so the "press release" is the *bayān ṣuḥufī*, the *bayān muštarik* is the joint statement, and so on. Hamas, sometimes, uses these etiquettes to define the nature of each statement; among those mentioned before, Hamas uses:

- *bayān ʿaḡil*, the urgent statement;
- *bayān intiḥābī*, the electoral statement;
- *bayān tawḍīḥī*, the clarification statement <sup>1</sup>;
- *bayān hām*, important statement;
- *bayān tahnʿiya*, congratulating statement;
- *bayān taʿazī*, condolences statement;
- *bayān ʿaskarī*, military bulletin;
- *bayān ḡamāhīrī*, collective statement.

The first *bayānāt* issued by Hamas were leaflets distributed during the first Intifada, calling for popular mobilization; they were issued simultaneously with

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<sup>1</sup>This expression is actually a tautology: in fact, *bayān* originally means "clarification", "showing", "explaining".

those of the Unified National Command, an organization that was founded by local activists affiliated to political parties of the PLO, without consulting the leadership, to coordinate the operations during the Intifada. The two movements broke definitely in August 1988, when Hamas issued a statement (n. 58) promoting the idea of jihad as the foundation of the resistance (see Rogan, 2016, pp.598-600) and (Nüsse, 1998, p. 22). This means that, at the beginning, they performed the function to communicate among participants to the uprisings and to inform, as regular bulletins, the population. However, the corpus shows a very early division in a variety of sub-genres, that has been maintained up to present day. Clearly, as the movement gained visibility and especially after it was elected at the legislative elections, the *bayānāt* lost the primary function of coordinating activities, becoming the official means of communication of the movement. The category of *bayān* can thus be approximately translated as "statement" or "official statement".

As a consequence, one of the research problems is to understand if they can be understood as a single genre, and identify the characteristics of this genre.

Present literature on genre analysis, although varying in providing a definition of genre, identifies some basic common assumptions. Genre is generally understood as a communicative event oriented at a specific communicative purpose (Bhatia, 1993b, p. 13) connoted by a certain degree of conventions regarding its linguistic composition and content (Fairclough, 1998; Lassen, 2006; Bhatia, 1993b), that maintains a direct two-direction relationship with social norms and practices in regulating them and be regulated by them (Bhatia, 1993b, 2009). Genres are acknowledged as such by members of the communicative community on the base of a wider knowledge regarding both textual conventions and social norms (Lassen, 2006); textual conventions are not significant *per se*, but become salient pertaining genre definition according to the context of production and fruition of the text (Frow, 2006, p. 9). Lassen [2006] joins the discussion on communicative purpose by proposing the category of "rhetorical objectives" internal and external to text: respectively, the goals that can be inferred by the text (for example, *making an announcement* or *contest a claim*) and the goals to be achieved on a real-life plane (gaining support, attract investors etc.) (Lassen, 2006, pp. 525-526); moreover, Fairclough recognizes to genre the status of privileged "observatory" for social change, because its conventions are determined by social practice (Fairclough, 1998, pp. 125-126). However, genres do not only represent social action: they are a mediation between text and social action, and typify it according to the speaker's construal of types; they "are at once shaped by a type of situation and it turn shape the rhetorical actions that are performed in response to it" (Frow, 2006, p. 14). Context provides for a strong defining environment with regards to genres: more than formal structures, or the occurrence of given styles and genres, it is the context of the communicative event that determines the genre. In fact, a parliamentary debate is defined by the fact that

takes place in parliament, is performed by specific social actors (van Dijk, 2009, p. 20); thus, genres can be understood as "types of communicative and discursive practice in specific communicative situations, prototypically (but seldom exclusively) associated with some global meaning aspects (preferred or typical topics) and formal aspects (a preferred register)" (van Dijk, 2009, p. 20).

These definitions privilege a communicative approach to genre, and correlate it with communicative and social activities, context and discourse types rather than with formal descriptions. (Charaudeau et al., 2002).

For what concerns the communicative purpose, it seems that most of Hamas' statements adheres to the original meaning of the Arabic word *bayān*: clarification. In fact, many of them are concerned with correcting someone else's declaration or express a position concerning something or someone. On the other hand, a consistent part of Hamas' statements is concerned with narrating shared pieces of knowledge and representations, without giving any new piece of information. This serves a consolidation of the core ideological structures of the movement, because it reiterates meaning and representation that favours Hamas' perspective and appeal to the common ground with its in-group. More specifically, the statements can be ascribed to macro-speech acts (van Dijk, 1977, p. 107-108), mainly of two types: directives (mobilizations, requests) and expressives (expressing the movement's opinion, solidarity, condolences, express condemnation of actors or actions). However, in the present corpus the purposes vary in the identified sub-genres. In fact, requests can occur in almost all sub-genres, except for the obituaries; condolences are much more conventionalized, being essentially expressive. The genre of press releases might be the closest to a description of the *bayānāt*. Press releases, in fact, include content that is intended for publication or distribution through the media (Sissons, 2012); this determines that structure and the style, including the type of content and its formulation (Levin, 2002) and instances of pre-formulation and *entextualization*, which means that the text is built appositely for being extracted with the less changes possible (Sleurs and Jacobs, 2005).

Most of this characteristics are consistent with Hamas' statements: they are in fact clearly pre-formulated and intended for a vast audience, although the ratified and intended recipient is very often the people and not necessarily media outlets; moreover, they often separate and introduce the actual body of the statement by other "residual parts", such as an introduction and (sometimes) a conclusion, as if the body of the statement is the one to be taken into consideration (or published). The first part introduces the topic and concludes with the sentence "The movement Hamas states as follows", which precedes the actual body of the statement:

**Example 4** *Ta·līqan ʿalā al-i·tidā·alladī ʿāla kanīsa al-Bašāra fī madīnat al-Nāšira, ḥaytu qāma ʿalāta min al-mutaṭarrafīn al-yahūd bi-iqtihām al-kanīsa wa-l-qawā mufarqi·āt dāḥilihā, ʿarraḥa mašdar mas·uūl fī ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya (Ḥamās) bi-mā yaḥī:*

*Ba·da ʿayām qalīla ʿalā ad·dīkrā as-sanawiyya li-mağzara al-ḥarm al-ʾIbrāhīmī aš-šahyūniyya al-baš·a fī madīnat Ḥalīl al-raḥman, qām ʿaddad min al-mutaṭarrafīn aš-šahāina bi-irtikāb ḡarīma ḡadīda, min ḥilāl ʾilqā·mufarqi·āt ḥāraqa dāḥil kanīsa al-Bašāra fī madīna al-nāšira, allatī ta·addu min ʾaham al-ʾamākin al-muqaddasa li-l-masīḥīn fī al-ʿālam, mā ʾadā ʾilā ḥudūt ʾaḍrār mādiyya ḡasīma wa ḥāla da·r bayna al-ḥāḍarīn dāḥilihā.*

*ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat Ḥamās ʾid nudīn al-i·tidā·al-ʾāim alladī ʿāla ʾaḥd muqaddasāt ša·binā al-falašīnī, wa al-masīḥīn fī al-ʿālam, fa·innā nuḥammil sulṭāt al-iḥtilāl aš-šahyūnī al-mas·uūliyya kāmila ʿan ḥadā al-i·tidā, sīman wa ʾan ḡunūdihi kānū širkā·fī al-ḡarīma min ḥilāl qiyāmihim bi-ḥimāiyya al-mu·tadīn ʿalā al-kanīsa wa ta·amīn ʾiḥrāḡihim minhā, wa al-i·tidā·alā ʾabnā·ša·binā alladīn habbū min al-madīna wa maḥīṭihā li-l-difā·an al-kanīsa.*

[ n. 1029, 30/03/2006 ]

Concerning the attack on the Church of the Annunciation in the city of Nazareth, when three Jewish extremists assaulted the church and ignited explosives inside it, **the official source of the movement Hamas declared as follows:**

After a few days from the anniversary of the brutal Zionist massacre on the Ibrahimī mosque in the city of al Khalil<sup>2</sup>, some Zionist extremists committed a new crime, by bringing explosives inside the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth, which figures among the most important sanctuaries in the world for Christians, that caused physical damage and panic among the attendants.

We, the movement Hamas, condemn the evil attack on one of the sanctuaries of our Palestinian people and of the Christians in the whole world, and we charge the whole responsibility to the Zionist authorities that, with their soldiers, were accomplices in the crime, by protecting the assailants and helping them get out of the church, and attacking our people who rose in the city and its outskirts to defend the church. (...)

The previous example, which follows a very standard structure for Hamas' press releases, shows how the second macro-proposition is introduced and how it

<sup>2</sup>Arabic name of Hebron.

rephrases part of the content of the introduction, as if the introduction was not part of the statement.

Lassen concludes, in his work on press releases, that they cannot be described as a single *genre* with scientific rigour, because they vary in such a degree in rhetorical objectives, staging and linguistic behaviour that they should rather be defined as a *media channel* which contains a variety of genres (Lassen, 2006, p. 527) This description fits the *bayānāt*; however, the conceptual understanding of the category of *bayān* in Arabic language, which has been described at the beginning of this chapter, and their context of production, which is the same irrespectively of the sub-genre, would allow to recognize them a pertaining to same genre of the other texts present in the corpus. In the case of the *bayānāt*, the common characteristic concerns the source (an official source) and the nature of the statement with regards to the communicative purpose of the source (being the official channel of communication and become public), which are all traits related to the context of production. Moreover, the fact that the source is collective seems, in the case of Hamas, to impose a genre discrimination: the same section of the website, in fact, has a *taṣriḥāt* section.

*Taṣriḥāt* can be translated (more appropriately) as "statements"; the only difference with the *bayānāt* is that the *taṣriḥāt* are attributed to a single person, and not signed by the movement or by one of its offices. The style, topics and organization do not differ substantially.

The present chapter will thus deal with the use of genre and sub-genres in Hamas' discourse, with a particular attention on the relation between sub-genres and realization of ideological structures; moreover, will be discussed some relevant features that emerged as recurrent, such as argumentation structures and legitimation strategies.

## 6.2 Sub-genres in Hamas' corpus

Among the totality of the *bayānāt*, it is possible to identify five sub-genres which differ mainly in structures and topics, with different degrees of conventionalisation:

1. Letters
2. Memoranda
3. Commemorative statements
4. Obituaries
5. Calls to mobilization

**Letters and memoranda** differ one from the other only for the occasion and the recipient. First of all, they are declared as respectively *risāla* and *mudākara* ("letter" and "memorandum") in the title; for the rest, they follow the conventional structure of a letter, with a heading, opening, body of the letter, closure. Their style, topics and register vary according to the recipient and the context. Especially according to the recipient, there is a significant variation of information management and register.

**Commemorative statements** are dedicated to the commemoration of important events in Palestinian history. They are introduced by a title which reads "on the occasion of the (...) anniversary of (...)"; there are no particular textual restrictions. They can include requests, and usually provide for a comparison with the present situation. However, they still present a low degree of rigidity in structure.

**Obituaries** Obituaries announce the departure of martyrs or well renowned personalities. They are usually highly structured, and present the same formulas and religious register. When the departed is a notable figure, they may extend to provide more information on him/her.

**Mobilization statements** are concerned with the organization of demonstrations, strikes, boycott. These statements contain a list of appointments with details on time and place, and are usually introduced by the description of some facts or a reflection on the actual situation that makes the mobilizations necessary. This corresponds to the original function of the statements, the directive speech acts. With the exception of the introductory part, usually dedicated at the explanation of the reasons for the mobilization, they follow the same organization and maintain similar expressions.

These five sub-genres do not cover the totality of the statements. The rest of the statements vary in their composition, topics, goal and are left out of this section because they do not pertain to such recognizable categories.

### 6.3 Letters

The letters constitute a very small portion of the general corpus, with 21 entries in total. They have been classified "letters" because each letter is explicitly labelled "*risāla*", "letter", in the heading, and follows the structural conventions of a letter, with indications of the recipient, the opening, the body of the letter, and closing formulas.

Structurally, the letters resemble the memoranda, although they are not necessarily addressed to international actors or associations but to more generic recipients, such as the Afghan people (n.80, 06/04/1989) or the Palestinian people (n. 648, 07/03/1996), close political actors such as the Palestinian Authority (n. 843, 11/05/1997), or to specific persons, such as the director of al Jazeera (n. 1320, 15/02/2008). In some other cases, both the recipient, the structure and content are the same as the memoranda, with the label "letter" in the heading being the only difference (n. 691, 22/05/2004, for example, addressed to the Arab League that gathered in Tunis). Regarding the contents, it very often contains requests of support to express a position towards a situation.

The genre of "letter" imposes some specific constraints, such as the presence of at least two participants (at least a recipient/ratified interlocutor must be present) and some structural conventions such as opening and closure. Each letter delivers a "main message", which can be categorized in terms of a macro-speech act of the letter, but also develops further topics at local level. The content is structured in order to provide support for the successful acceptance of the message, which would be the external rhetorical objective.

As most of the letters contain requests, which aim at obtaining a specific action, some superstructures and devices can be found, especially regarding argumentation, legitimation, and, to a smaller degree, narrative. Moreover, the analysis revealed the presence of pragmatic strategies, such as positive face preservation strategies after an FTA (Face Threatening Act) in statement 1320 (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

### **6.3.1 The sub-corpus**

The sub-corpus includes five letters, which cover the span of time from 1989 to 2008. The total number of letters in the corpus is 21, the last one being published in 2008.



Table 6.1: Subcorpus: Letters

Name	Recipient	Content	Context
n. 80, 06/04/1989	The Afghan People	Expression of Support against the Soviet Union	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
n. 648, 07/03/1996	The Palestinian People	Expression of support for the resistance; condemnation of Israeli propaganda	Hamas' suicide bombings
n. 843, 11/05/1997	The Palestinian Authority	Opinion on Oslo and modalities of resistance	The Road Map
n. 691, 22/05/2004	The Arab League	Request not to support the Road Map	Peace Processes
n. 1320, 16/02/2008	Director of channel al Jazeera	Opinion on inadequate report of Haniye's statements	News coverage

### 6.3.2 Requests as macro-speech acts

The main goal pursued in each letter is to advance a request, or multiple requests, to obtain support for Hamas' stances on a variety of topics (n. 648, n. 843, n. 691). Thus, the macro-speech act contained in each letter is usually a directive. In statement 80, on the other hand, the movement expresses its position regarding the Afghan people and its situation, thus performing an expressive speech act. The last one, statement 1320, is another expressive speech with an embedded request.

The directives are formalized as invitations. This is very common every time Hamas advances a request, and the invitation usually precedes a numbered list:

**Example 5** *Tāniyatan: ʾinnanā nad-ū ḡāmi-ata ad-duwal al-ʿarabiyati wa bāqī ad-duwal al-ʿarabiyati wa-l-ʾislāmiyatī wa-l-muḡtamaʿatī ad-dawliyy, wa kull al-munazzamāt wa-l-hayʿā ad-dawla ilā taḥammul masʾūliyyātiha wa-l-qiyām bi-dawriha wa-l-musāriʿati li-waḍi ḥadda li-l-ḥamla aṣ-ṣahyūniyya al-histiriyya ḍidda abnaʿšaʿbinā*

[ n. 648, 07/03/1996 ]

Second: **We invite** the Arab League and the other Arabic and Islamic countries, the international associations and every international or-

ganization or agency to bear their responsibilities, play their role and immediately put an end to the Zionist hysterical campaign against our people

**Example 6** *Hāmisan: tadā·ū Hamās ġamāhīr ša·binā aṣ·šāmida*

[ n. 648, 07/03/1996 ]

Fifth: **Hamas invites** our resistant people [...]

**Example 7** *Fa ·innanā nad·ukum ilā mā yulā: [...]*

[ n. 691, 22/05/2004 ]

We therefore **invite you** to what follows: [...]

The formulation can either be included in the numbered list (examples 5, 6) or in the "bridge" (example 7).

### 6.3.3 Politeness

Hamas' attitude towards its interlocutors changes in force, according to their identity and the content of the text. The requests are never expressed strongly or directly, or under the form of orders, but always softened by indirect structures, as shown in the above paragraph. Stronger requests correspond to more indirect and less face-threatening structures.

In the case of the letter to the director of al Jazeera, for example, the accusation of not covering in an adequate way Haniye's press conference is redressed by shifting the blame to a more reprehensible actor, in this case the channel al Arabiya, which did not cover Haniye at all:

**Example 8** *Min ġaha ·uhrā, fa·in al-qanāa al-·Arabiyya taġāhalat al-mu·atamar al-·uḥuḥfī taġāhulan tāman, sawā·fī našrātihā al-·aḥbāriyya, ·aw fī šariṭ al-·aḥbār. ·innā nu·amil minkum mu·aliġa al-·amar, wa al-istidrāk ·alā ḍalika ḥilāl al-našrāt al-·aḥbāriyya al-muqbila.*

[ n. 1320, 16/02/2008 ]

On the other hand, the channel al-Arabiyya totally ignored the press conference, both in their news broadcast and in their news section.  
(...) We hope that you fix the matter soon and remember that during the next news broadcast.

Hamas' reaction is also minimized: they do not show anger, but feel surprised:

**Example 9** *Wa fawğ'anā 'an "al-Ġazīra mubāšīr" qaṭ'at naqalahā li-l-mu'atamar fī muntaşīfihi, bi-ḥaytu tawaqqa'nā 'an yakūn hunāk ḥadaṭ 'āḥar, 'aw 'aktar 'ahmiyya dafa'al-qanā li-qaṭ'naqalahā, lakin al-mufāğ'a kānat 'annahu laysa hunāka ḥadaṭ 'āḥar, wa 'annahā ik-tafat bi-'arad 'i-lān li-l-barāmiğ al-manawī 'arḍuhā li-hadā al-yawm*

[ n. 1320, 16/02/2008 ]

We were surprised that "Al Jazeera Live" cut its coverage of the conference in half, making us thinking that something else had happened, or that something more important had forced the channel to interrupt the coverage, but what was surprising was that nothing else had happened, and they just announced the following programs.

In the above examples, the directive speech act, which asks for an action in return, is expressed in a very indirect and polite way, by the means of a showing a feeling such as surprise, more neutral than rage or deception, which apparently shifts the balance of the action on Hamas and minimizes the accusation and the subsequent request to fix the coverage.

### 6.3.4 Argumentation

The main aim of each text is supported by the whole structure of text, which provides for reasons to accomplish the requests according to the following scheme:

1. Introduction: Usually informative content on the general context of Palestine or on a specific event; sometimes, it can be evaluative and not add knowledge about the topic. It is developed as directly addressed to the recipient, and uses second person pronouns and vocatives. It may be rich in emotional vocabulary and rhetorical figures.

2. Bridge: usually a sentence which introduces the request(s) or considerations. It is usually a statement with a verbal process (we declare/we invite).
3. Numbered list with request/declarations. It is less subjective, and usually starts with nominalized actions that are requested. It might provide local argumentation for each point.
4. Conclusion. It may resort again to direct speech to ratified interlocutors, and add considerations, or summarise the requests.

Thus, the letters usually are organised in a structure built to persuade and to favour argumentation. An exception is made in statement n. 691 (22/05/2004), where the first macro-proposition is introduced by "Starting from" and a list of concepts follows before the bridge:

**Example 10** *Inṭilāqan min: Huṭrati al-mašra'i aṣ-ṣahyūniyy [...], as-siyāsiyyati al-'amrikiyyati [...] fašali mašru'i at-tasawwiyyati [...] inṭilāqan min kulli mā sabaqa [...]*

[ n. 691, 22/05/2004 ]

*(introduction):* Starting from: the danger of the Zionist project [...], the persistence of the American politics [...], the failure of the peace process [...], *(Bridge):* Starting from all of the above [...]

The argumentative move is the delineation of the context in which the argumentation becomes reasonable. In this case, it consolidates some tropes of Hamas' discourse, such as the political action of Zionists and Americans and the peace processes. The kinds of legitimation that emerge are:

1. Rationalization: actions are rationalized as necessary for reaching a goal;
2. Collective authorization: usually, authority from a multitude, to assess that something is true or right;
3. Impersonal authorization: authority of international organizations and the law;
4. Moral Evaluation: discourse on legality and human rights;
5. Mythopoiesis: evidence provided by a narration of historical events regarding Palestine.

(Van Leeuwen, 2007). The most common means of legitimation are certainly Moral Evaluation and Authorization. In fact, Israel is commonly represented as criminal, terrorist, and in breach of international pacts, which evokes the frame of legality versus criminality at a lower level and good versus evil at a more general and abstract level. This is connected to "impersonal authorization legitimation" when international laws and human rights are concerned. As such, international help is demanded because of the existence of laws that determine that the current situation is illegal.

Mythopoesis occurs when Hamas recounts recent history to show how, as in the above example, previous measures have failed or to remind the past actions of the Occupation and the violence and abuses suffered by Palestinians since 1917, the year of the Balfour declaration, the starting point of Hamas' historical narration. The main "storyline" is related to an ongoing battle against the occupier, characterized for being long-lasting (temporal references) and brutal. The opposition heroes versus enemies recalls, obviously, the moral evaluation "good versus evil" which is deduced every time the "storyline" is mentioned.

Narration on current events or more specific events is also present, but occurs with less frequency.

The following example constitutes another example of narration. The events are not explicitly put in a temporal context, as recipients are expected to know them and know when they took place. However, those events, which happened in the past, are related to the present context:

**Example 11** *Şiyāğa istrātiğiyya ʿarabiyya ġadīda taḥud bi-ʿayn al-iṭibāri taqwīm at-tağriba as-sābiqa, wa qirāʿatu-l-marḥala ar-rāhina*

[ n. 691, 22/05/2004 ]

[we invite you to] define a new Arabic strategy which take into consideration the precedent experience and interpret the **current events**

This places all the elements of the context within a "temporal grid", where experiences are ordered according to a temporal sequence (Mischler, 2006, p. 31); this narrative serves a global evaluation of the context (Labov and Waletzky, 1997, pp. 3, 28-29), where the chain events are considered as evidence for their points, but they evaluate them as evidence of a dangerous state of events and of the uselessness of instruments different from resistance and invite the recipients to acknowledge such evaluation.

### 6.3.5 Informative and pseudo-informative Content

The information contained in the introduction is not always really informative, although being presented as such, but contains notions which are supposedly already shared by the recipient. This "pseudo-informative" content can therefore be assumed to work for the benefit of the main function (macro-speech act) of the text by reinforcing the notions that are considered relevant for legitimizing the requests.

Such content shows some recurring features, such as including tropes of Hamas' discourse (resistance, sufferance of Palestinians) or being incorporated in focus and subordinated clauses, which is where given information is usually included. In statement 648, for example, the introduction is composed a macro-proposition which address a message to Palestinian people regarding their sacrifices and the oppression imposed by the Occupation. The macro-proposition emphasizes the temporal factor, the duration of the sacrifices endured by the Palestinians ("decades"), and its relevance for history ("the most brutal (...) battle known in history"), and also praises to the recipient. The content can be expected to be already included in the knowledge of Palestinians, therefore they have another purpose, which is to reinforce the concepts and introduce the main part of the text.

#### Example 12 *Bi-ism Allāh ar-raḥman ar-raḥīm*

*Risāla min ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya "Ḥamās" ilā aš-ša'b al-falaṣṭīnī al-muṣābir*

*Ša'bunā aš-šāmid aš-šābir. lā yumtalik kā'in man kāna fī hadā al-ālam, at-taṭāul alā tadḥiyyātika al-aẓīma, aw almas bi-sağal ṣafḥāt ġihādika al-mubārak al-bīdā didda al-iḥtilāl aš-ṣahyūnī aẓ-zālam ḥilāl al-uqūd aṭ-ṭawīla al-marīra, fa-anta waḥduka alladī qaddamat wa lā tazāl al-tadḥiyyāt tullū al-tadḥiyyāt wa aš-šuhadā tullū aš-šuhadā fī ma'rakatika al-mustamarra didda al-iḥtilāl. Wa anta waḥdika alladī tašaddarat li-muwāğiha a-tā wa abša anwaz-alam wa al-ğatrasa wa al-waḥšiyya allatī arifahā at-tārīḥ, yawm rafat lūwā al-ğihād wa al-muqāwama didda iğtiṣāb al-arḍ wa al-muqaddasāt wa didda al-i-tidā al-ḥayā wa al-ḥuriyya wa al-karāma, wa yawm wa ağaha wa yuwāğiha abnā uka al-awafī bi-ağasādihim al-azlā raṣāš al-iḥtilāl, wa ḥiṣārāt al-tağwī wa marārāt al-i-tiqāl wa at-taḍīb wa at-tašrīd.*

[ n. 648, 07/03/1996 ]

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful  
 Letter from the Islamic resistance movement Hamas to the patient  
 Palestinian people  
 Patient and steadfast people... There is no one in this world as insolent  
 against your great sacrifices, or that violates the pages of the sacred  
 and pure jihad against the oppressive Zionist Occupation for the past  
 decades, and you alone continue to face sacrifice after sacrifice, mar-  
 tyr after martyr, in your continuing conflict with the Occupation. And  
 you alone were at the head of one of the most brutal, oppressive, ar-  
 rogant, and beastly battles known in history; one day you raised the  
 banner of jihad and resistance against the violation of the land and  
 the sacred sites and the attacks against life, freedom and dignity, one  
 day your children challenged with their bare bodies the bullets of the  
 Occupation, the blockade, the starvation, the arrests, the torture and  
 the expulsion from their homes.

The function of the pseudo-informative content serves the external rhetorical objective, as it lies the foundations on which the letter will be acceptable, by reiterating well known knowledge about the context and the role of the recipient. In facts, it praises Palestinians for their sense of sacrifice against the force and duration of the Occupation, and in so doing Hamas also consolidates the basic values and instruments of the in-group.

## 6.4 Memoranda

The whole corpus counts only five memoranda, and they have been issued on the occasion of particular events such as summits of leaders of Arab states or their ministers. They are addressed to a specific group or person of political relevance, and the appropriate honorific titles are used. The memoranda are official communications where some requests are advanced to the recipients of the message. Such requests concern important political issues, such as the national reconciliation pact and lifting the siege from Gaza. The international actors are thus directly involved in internal

Figure 6.1: Memorandum to the President of the Red Cross, 27/07/2003



matters, and attributed a certain amount of responsibility. They can be included within the category of diplomatic communication, as their recipient are always specific personalities or institutions, such as the Arabic League or the president of the Red Cross. They are structured as formal letters. In fact, conventional features of letters are respected in the structure, such as the opening with specific and recurring formulas and closures.

The memoranda are structured to convey a request to political actors on behalf of the movement. Their communicative intention is thus best conveyed by the use of argumentation, being persuasion their final goal.

The argumentative strategies employed usually develop after a representation of reality regarding the Palestinian question. However, the elements involved in the argumentation may vary, especially in the most recent ones. Some recurrent elements are references to the context of Israeli occupation and the state knowledge which is supposedly owned on its regards. Other argumentative moves regard more specific situations and requests. The amount of informative content at this level is proportional to what the movement thinks is already known by its recipients.

#### 6.4.1 Requests

What is requested by Hamas is usually expressed in both "positive" and "negative" terms (respectively, perform or avoid an action). They ask the international community to support their cause, a specific stance or to avoid "naturalization" (*taswiyya*) with the enemy. In general, what is being requested is support, or "spiritual and material support". For a complete review of memoranda with topics and details on the advanced requests, see Table 6.2.

As the recipient is usually an entity external to the in-group (or included for the occasion), the self-image of the movement is represented through strategies of legitimation, because a clean image is necessary for obtaining credibility and avail the requests. In statement 1297, concerned with the national reconciliation, the movement addresses some critics which are not reported on the text, but whose existence is presupposed by the following:

**Example 13** *Laysa maqbūlan waḍ'īštirāṭ siyāsiyya ḡadīda min 'ayy ṭarf, fa-mā ittafaqnā 'alayhi falastīniyya min barnāmiḡ wa muḡaddadāt siyāsiyya fī waṭīqa al-waṭān li-'ām 2006 [...], li-dālīka narfuḍ man turid ḡa-la al-muṣāliḡa 'alā qā'ida taḡrīm al-muqāwama wa silāiḡa*

[ n. 1297, 26/11/2008 ]



Table 6.2: List of *Memoranda*, with recipients and requests

Statements	Date	Recipient	Request
827	22/03/1997	Islamic conference	Material and spiritual support against the settlement of Jebel Abu Ghanim
615	29/07/2003	Red Cross President	Push Israel to release the political prisoners
1260	25/03/2008	Damascus Arab Summit	Support for Gaza during Israeli attacks
1297	26/11/2008	Arab leaders in Cairo summit	Proposal lines for reconciliation with Fatah

Any new condition of political stipulation is not acceptable from any part, as we agreed from the program and politically defined in the document of the 2006 National Pact [...], therefore **we refuse whoever wants to criminalize the Reconciliation on the basis of a criminalization of the resistance and its weapons**

Self-legitimation is tied to arguing in favour of the Reconciliation, and the source of legitimation is drawn from international treaties. In this way, who depicts Hamas as terrorist or threatens its military apparatus is represented as an obstacle to the Reconciliation. Moreover, the recipients are sometimes included in the in-group and involved in the context, by the means of the first-person plural applied to terms such as "our community", or emphasizing how Arab actors are interested by the same issues as Palestinians:

**Example 14** *ʾIn qaḍiyyat al-ʾasrā wa al-muʾtaqalīn al-falaṣṭīnīn wa al-ʾarab fī suḡūn al-iḥtlāl aṣ-ṣahyūnī tamarr fī marḥala ḥaraḡa haḍīhi al-ʾayām, ḥaytu tuwāṣil ḥukūmat al-ʾadū taʾnatuhā wa tarfuḍ al-ʾifrāḡ ʾan ḡamīʾ-al-ʾasrā al-falaṣṭīnīn wa al-ʾarab fī suḡūnhā, raḡm al-mubādara allatī qaddamathā faṣāʾil al-muqāwama fī Falasṭīn bi-taʾlīq al-ʾamliyyāt al-ʾaskariyya šarṭ al-ʾifrāḡ ʾan ḡamīʾ-al-ʾasrā wa al-rahāʾin fī suḡūn al-iḥtlāl aṣ-ṣahyūnī.*

[ n. 615, 29/07/2003 ]

The question of the **Palestinian and Arab prisoners** in the Occupation jails has reached a severe phase during these days, where the government of the enemy has continued to obstruct it and refuse to release all the **Palestinian and Arab prisoners** from its jails, despite the proposal advanced by the resistance factions in Palestine regarding the military operations by proposing the release of all the prisoners and hostages in the prisons of the Zionist Occupation.

The example shows an instance of positive representation regarding the actions undertaken by Hamas to find a diplomatic solution ("despite the proposal advanced by the resistance factions") which shows how an intervention from the outside is necessary. Moreover, it shows the problem as being not only Palestinian, but also Arab ("Palestinian and Arab prisoners").

For what concerns the emergence of ideological structures in connection to persuasive strategies, it can be observed that the values of legality and rights is very common a productive, maybe to appeal to common ground with international organizations or countries.

#### 6.4.2 Informative content

The example above (statement 615) is the introduction to the memorandum for the summit in Cairo. As it is easily noticed, the introduction contains information on the context and is not "pseudo-informative" content (see 6.3.5), but actual informative content, embedded in a balance of derogative structures for the out-group and positive representations of Hamas to avail the requests that will follow. Informative content is presented with more or less details according to the degree of knowledge expected to be held by the recipient that, in the case of memoranda, is usual an external actor. This is sometimes addressed directly, with expressions such as "it is not hidden from you that" ( statement n. 1260) or when it is implied that many facts are kept hidden by Israel (statement n. 615).

This orientates the representations and the kind of information provided; for example, the fact that Palestinians are a victim, which is clearly usually implied, in memoranda is made explicit:

**Example 15** *Ša·bunā al-falaṣṭīnī huwa aḍ-ḍaḥiyya wa huwa alladī yu·ānī ḡarrā·al-iḥitlāl wa al·adwan munḍu ·uqūd ṭawīla, wa mā dāmat kull al-ḡuhūd as-siyāsiyya wa al-mufāwāḍāt wa al-mubādarāt wa muḥāwalāt al-taswiyya lam tanḡaḥ.*

[ n. 1260, 25/03/2008 ]

**It is our Palestinian people who is the victim and who has been suffering** the acts of the Occupation and the aggressions for a long time, and all the political efforts, the negotiation, the initiatives and the attempts to normalization [with Israel] never succeeded.

The image is reinforced by a derogation of the Occupation that points out the temporal extension of the abuses and the failure of measures alternative to the resistance.

## **6.5 Commemorative statements**

Anniversaries are a very rich and productive topic in Hamas' press releases. We count 167 statements dedicated to the commemoration of a specific event. The most important are celebrated every year. In this category we include holidays (religious holidays), events related to the history of Hamas (foundation, important battles) and of Palestine (Balfour declaration), and commemoration of some relevant figures (*shaykh* Yassin, Abdallah Azzam, etc.). The vast majority is, in fact, dedicated to events of significance for Palestinians starting from Balfour declaration in 1917.

These statements are characterized by a title which informs on the occasion that is being commemorated and are usually addressed to the Palestinian people. The topics and organization of the texts are not conventionalized and may vary significantly, so it can be said that they are recognized as pertaining to the category not by structural conventions nor style or register, but on the ground of topics. Moreover, they are characterized by re-establishing and consolidating typical ideological structures, such as values, goals and instruments, without necessarily add new information and by having a temporal reference as focus, because it is the anniversary the introductory point to each topic dealt with in the statements. The speech acts they include can be directive, assertive or expressive.

### **6.5.1 Anniversaries and collective memory**

As a genre, texts with commemorative content are not conventionalized for register, form, nor lexicon. They are recognized as such for their topic and context of production and fruition, as they depend on representations on history and identity, and social practices such as public manifestations, rituals, and traditions. The strong symbolical value of collective memory is connected to knowledge about the fact and expected behaviour (for example, celebrating or mourning). According to Ben-Aaron (2005), the narration of anniversaries allows enough space of variation and evaluation that, if performed by institutions or newspapers, read-

ers are not only told how to behave, but how to feel with regards to the event. As commemorative texts are not rigidly normed, in fact, strategies such as appraisal, that might influence the perception of the commemorative event and the commemorated event, find a fertile terrain for being extensively applied.

Commemoration of anniversaries is an act that is inserted in a wider context of social practices. The first practice to be signalled is the ritualization of the commemoration, as most of the anniversaries might be accompanied by public manifestations or other activities connected to the anniversary. The anniversary of the Nakba, for example, can be the occasion for demonstrations (see the 2018 "March of Return") or for more private activities, which can vary according to the location. In refugee camps outside Palestine, for example, it is possible to assist to activities organized for children, where they play with the colours of the Palestinian flags and listen to stories on the people that fled Palestine in 1948, or are shown maps; or, as I could observe in Lebanon in May 2017<sup>3</sup>, women and children cook typical food and erect tents to reminisce how the camp looked like in 1948, and celebrate Palestinian heritage. Since the focus of the present work is on political discourse, Khalili (2004) needs to be mentioned when she registers a difference between practices of commemoration of the leadership and people's practices of commemoration. Although her work is concentrated on refugee camps, it is significant to notice that, according to her findings, the political leadership pursued a goal of national unification at the expense of the memory of villages and local narratives which was, on the other hand, preserved in the commemorative practices of Lebanese refugee camps. This sheds some light on the practice of historical commemoration, because it clarifies the divergence between the leadership and the people and the direction taken by political aims.

In fact, historical narration can very often be used to legitimize an identity group category, such as ethnic or religious (Eriksen, 1993, pp. 68,69)<sup>4</sup>. It narrates the very origin of the group and legitimises its cohesion and possible reasons of conflict with other groups.

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<sup>3</sup>Personal observation during fieldwork in Burj el Shamali and El Buss refugee camps in Tyre, Lebanon.

<sup>4</sup>See also (Herzfeld, 2006) and (Barth, 1969) on the same topic.

Israeli narrative tried to challenge the very existence of a Palestinian identity and people and promote the historically false notion that it was a people-free land when the immigration of Jews and Zionists had started (Said, 2015). Israel itself insisted on historical validation for its presence on the Palestinian territories, recurring to biblical justifications and managing to impose its identity by imposing its language, narration, and modification of the territory. For this reason, historical narration in Palestine discourse performs a role that goes beyond self-definition, but incorporates a

Table 6.3: Anniversaries per category

Categories	Number of statements
History of Palestine (Balfour Declaration, Nakba, Nakhsa, Sabra and Shatila, Deir Yassin)	62
Hamas' Foundation	29
National holidays (Labour day, Prisoner week, Yum al Ard)	16
Israeli attacks (Arson of al Aqsa, Ibrahimi Mosque massacre)	16
First and Second Intifada	14
Death of important people	12
Important battles	10
Religious holidays	8

reaction to a dominant narrative. In table 6.3, it emerges that key events in Palestinian history are considered starting from 1917, the year of the Balfour declaration. The historical episodes which are being remembered every year, such as the Balfour declaration and the Nakba, are clearly related to Zionist prevarication over Palestinians. This establishes a starting point of the narration and a continuity pattern, where the events remembered in the anniversary statements refer to the Zionist invasion and occupation. Thus, the historical "point zero" is not so much connected to the origin of the Palestinian people but to historical events connected to the trauma of the Zionism. This fact differentiates it from representations of identity based on historical validation of the origin and continuity of a specific group based on ethnicity or nationalist ideology (Reisigl and Wodak, 1999, p. 158). The sub-corpus includes six statements ( Table 6.4).

### 6.5.2 Commemorative statements as instrument of ideological consolidation

Much of the information contained in the statements is not introduced by any kind of clarification, and the events commemorated are thus considered to be already part of the recipient's knowledge. The specific fragments and episodes recalled usually serve more an ideological than an informative purpose. For example, the

Table 6.4: Subcorpus: Anniversaries

Statement	Date	Occasion
675	26/11/1996	Month of the martyrs
756	21/08/1997	29th anniversary of al Aqsa fire
661	21/08/2004	35th anniversary of al Aqsa fire
869	16/03/2005	Anniversary of Yassin's martyrdom
962	11/11/2005	Anniversary of Arafat's death
1797	31/12/2014	50th anniversary of the foundation of Fatah

narration of past events highlights how the Palestinians have always endured oppression and have always faced it with strength. Part of this position is supported by celebrating the sacrifice of martyrs and the institution of a dedicated holiday.

Each anniversary serves the purpose to develop a particular theme, other than remember the specific occasion to which the anniversary is dedicated. Such themes usually revolve around the in-group, which is referred to a stable frequency of approximately 56% of total ideological items. The historical references seem thus a chance to consolidate and reproduce in-group cohesion.

As we have seen so far, ideological structures and self-representation may very often serve argumentation and legitimation; in commemorative statements, on the other hand, it may very often happen that these structures are consolidated and legitimized by the facts contextually evoked.

For example, the celebration of the victory in the "Battle of the Criterion" against Operation Cast Lead is the proof that the instrument of resistance is the right one:

**Example 16** *Bayān dīkrā ʿan intiṣār maʿarakat al-Furqān.*

*ʿIn maʿarakat al-Furqān ġassadat fīnā rūḥ al-taḍḥīyya, wa al-fidāʿ, wa aš-šahāda, wa al-ʿiṣrār ʿalā nīl al-ḥuriyya wa al-istiqlāl wa ʿiqāmat ad-dawla al-falaṣṭīniyya wa ʿāṣīmatihā al-Quds baʿda ʿan manna Allāh ʿalā al-muqāwama bi-l-ṣumūd ʿamām al-ʿadwān al-ġāšim, wa ḥaqqaqat intiṣāran tāriḥīā fī maʿarakat al-Furqān bi-iltifāf šaʿbinā ḥawla muqāwamatihī fī malḥma buṭūliyya qall nazārihā, wa saġġala ʿuṣṭūra aṣ-ṣumūd wa al-muqāwama.*

[ n. 1398, 26/12/2009 ]

Statement on the anniversary of the victory of the Battle of the Criterion

The Battle of the Criterion established in us the spirit of sacrifice, *fdā*, martyrdom, and the determination to achieve freedom, independence, establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, after God favoured the resistance and its steadfastness against the tyrannical aggression, and realized the victory of the Battle of the Criterion for our people and their resistance in an heroic battle like no other, and established the a legend of steadfastness and resistance.

The commemoration of the Battle of the Criterion becomes the occasion to reinforce the positive and cohesive force of the movement's most typical values, goals and instruments, all mentioned within the introductory macro-proposition (reported in the example).

Commemorative statements propose content on events which are supposedly already known by the recipient, as the information is not so much concerned with details on the events as with providing interpretations and readings of such events, which reproduce inevitably the ideological basis of the movement. This would be consistent with the discursive *perpetuation and justification strategies* (De Cillia et al., 1999, pp. 160-161).

Moreover, remembering past events can also serve the purpose to re-state and legitimize positions and attitudes:

**Example 17** *ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat "Ḥamās" wa baʿda talāta ʾaʿwām min Oūslū bitnā ʾaktr ʾimānan bi-ḍurūrat taḡmīʿ al-quwā al-falaṣṭīniyya wa al-ʿarabiyya wa al-ʾislāmiyya fī barnāmiġ muwāġaha šaāmil maʿa al-iḥtilāl wa mašrūʿhu aš-ṣahyūnī takūn al-muqāwama aš-šaʿbiyya al-musliḥa raʿs al-ḥarba fīhi, wa faṣāʿil al-muqāwama al-falaṣṭīniyya fī miḥwarihi al-fāʿil.*

[ n. 621, 16/09/1996 ]

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, after three years from Oslo, have more faith in the necessity of gathering the Palestinian, Arabic and Islamic forces in a program of total confrontation to the Occupation and its Zionist project, where the main weapon is the popular resistance, and the factions of the Palestinian resistance are in an active dialogue.

The example is taken from statement 621, published in occasion of the Oslo Accords' third anniversary. The statement explains how they were a despicable choice of Fatah and Arafat, how they failed and the necessity not to continue on that path. The statement is thus also an argumentative text, as Hamas' attitude towards the Oslo accords is explained and supports the conclusion exposed in the macro-proposition reported in the example.

### **Self-celebration**

Hamas' representation of itself can be deduced by many elements that emerge from the analysis of the anniversaries. Hamas' main achievements are, clearly, remembered and celebrated every year: the foundation and the intifada, together, represent the most productive categories. Moreover, the two events are associated: this is very important, because Hamas attributes to itself the outbreak of the first intifada, and this fact constitutes a narrative which legitimises its claims on resistance and liberation.

Another form of legitimation emerges from the selection of anniversaries: the commemoration of battles. In fact, especially after 2008, some emblematic battles with the Israeli army were included within the set of events worthy of being remembered every year. Among them, the "Battle of the Criterion", that corresponds to the "Cast Lead Operation", is deemed as the greatest of their victories and, naturally, remembered with a highest frequency.

Ideological influences and role models are also inferred by the selection of topics. This level is more deeply rooted within Hamas' ideological specificity, which distinguishes it from other Palestinian resistance movements or political parties.

In fact, personalities such as Abdullah Azzam and Ezzedine Qassam are clearly indicative of a particular ideological framework concerned with Islamic representations and references to the first Palestinian revolts as a model.

**Example 18** *Al-ḥudūd taṣrīn t̄ānī yaḥmil maʿahu kalman ḥall dakriyyāt istiṣhād al-ḥabṭāl miṭla aš-šayḥ ʿAzz ad-dīn al-Qassām wa aš-šayḥ Farḥān as-Saʿadī wa aš-šayḥ ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām.*

[ n. 675, 27/11/1996 ]



And the events of November carry with them the wounds of the memory of the martyrdom of heroes the likes of *shaykh* Ezzedine Qassam, *shaykh* Farhan Sa'adi <sup>5</sup> and *shaykh* Abdallah Azzam.

### **Moving the boundaries of the ingroup. Fatah as enemy and friend**

The in-group is, as always, composed by Hamas and the Palestinian people, with occasional extension to other Arabic and Islamic countries and Fatah. While Fatah is usually regarded as a member of the out-group and a rival, it may, according to context, be praised and treated as an in-group member (although the same categories reserved for the "core" in-group do not apply for Fatah).

For what concerns the role of genres in this variation of attitude, the 50th anniversary of Fatah's foundation becomes the occasion to find common ground with the movement by the means of the value of unity and the instrument of armed resistance:

**Example 19** *Fi ḥarakati at-tahrīri al-waṭanī al-falaṣṭīnī Fath bi-l-tahaniyati fi a-ikrā al-ḥamsīn li-inṭilāqatiha ka-ḥarakatu taḥarruri waṭanī i-tamadat al-muqāwwamati al-musallihati li-tahrīri falaṣṭīn kull falaṣṭīn*

[ n. 1797, 31/12/2014 ]

[we present] our felicitations to the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine "Fatah" in the 50th anniversary of their foundation as a **movement of national liberation that supported the armed resistance to free Palestine, all Palestine**

Similarly, on the occasion of the first anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death, Hamas issued a statement where it mourned the departed leader and, at the same time, asked for a more thorough murder investigation by the Palestinian authority. In the statement, Hamas acknowledges his position by the use of the honorific title "president" (while, usually, he would be simply called "Mister Arafat" in other statements) and celebrates him as a supporter of many common values and goals:

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<sup>5</sup>Shaykh Farhan Sa'adi (1856-1937) fought with Ezzedine Qassam in mandatory Palestine against the British and Jews settlers; his attack of a bus with two other companions was said to be the first act of the Arab great revolt

**Example 20** *Bi-sabbab ṣiṣrar ar-ra'is aš-šahīd ʿalā at-tamassuk bi-l-awābit wa-l-waḥda al-waṭaniyya, wa-l-ḥifāz ʿalā al-muqaddasāt, wa-l-ṣiṣrār ʿalā ḥuq al-ʿawda.*

[ n. 962, 11/11/2005 ]

[The murder was perpetrated] because of the determination of the **martyr president** to maintain stability and **national unity**, and defend the **sacred sites**, and on the **right to return**

In the cases illustrated by the previous two examples, the commemorative statements become an occasion to emphasize positive aspects of the rival Fatah, on the grounds of celebrating special events. The case of the anniversary of Arafat's departure, nonetheless, is once again a consolidation of ideological structures. Moreover, it becomes the starting point for the request to the Authority to shed light on the circumstances of his death, thus performing a function other than commemorating and praising.

## 6.6 Obituaries

### 6.6.1 Obituaries in text and practice

Obituaries are texts, usually very brief, that publicly announce the departure of someone. As death is very often a taboo topic, it is easy to find, also in Arabic obituaries, euphemizing strategies, such as metaphors and religious and legal register (Al-Kharabsheh, 2011, p. 33). In the case of Palestine, obituaries are inscribed in a wider frame of culture and social practice, very often strongly connected to the context of resistance, celebration of sacrifice and consolidation of the feeling of national belonging. However, obituaries do not appear only as published obituaries. In order to interpret this category, it is fundamental to understand the role they portray in everyday life, in order to get a deeper understanding of their evocative force.

Announcements of death, in fact, and commemorative posters of the deceased can normally be found all over the walls of towns and the houses of the family and relatives. They have the martyr in the foreground, and the background can bear a variety of symbols, including symbols of resistance and political symbols. According to the studies performed by Allen, martyrs are a high symbolic capital, and they involve the whole population besides the adherence to any particular party; moreover, the practice of funerals is usually highly participated by the whole community, including people who do not usually get personally involved

in the resistance but find in the funerary ritual a space of contribution and a feeling of involvement (Allen, 2000, p. 108). In this context, political parties would claim the adherence of the deceased to their party, even when this was probably not the case (Allen, 2000, p. 116). On one side, the cult of the martyr is a cohesive practice, whose force is visible in the dedication of association, sport teams, and other organizations to martyrs, or the fact that the martyr posters remain in towns and they became familiar faces to the inhabitants; on the other hand, the practice is also perceived as something that has become a habit, and has partially lost its symbolic force to routine (Allen, 2000, p. 113-114).

The obituaries constitute the most structured type of Hamas' statements. They always follow the formula "Hamas offers its condolences to..." which introduce the name of the deceased, age, sometimes town of origin, and circumstances of death.

Table 6.5: Sub-corpus of Hamas' obituaries

Statements	Date	Name of the deceased
n. 81	26/11/1989	<i>shaykh</i> Abdullah Azzam
n. 480	22/07/2002	Salah Shehade (Commander of Qassam Brigades)
n. 535	08/03/2003	Ibrahim Muqaddam (Islamic scholar)
n. 684	22/03/2004	<i>shaykh</i> Ahmed Yassin (Hamas founder)
n. 836	17/04/2004	Abdel Aziz Rantisi (Hamas founder)
n. 1405	13/03/2009	Hassan Huwaydy (Muslim brotherhood member)
n. 1531	16/11/2012	All the victims of the Operation Pillar of Defense

**Example 21** *Tanʿā Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya (Ḥamās) ilā ḡamāhīr šaʿbinā al-falastīnī, wa ḡamāhīr ʿummatinā al-ʿarabiyya wa al-islāmiyya*

*faḍīla al-duktūr/ Ḥasan Hūwaydī (ʿAbū Muḥammad)*

*Nāʿib al-murašid al-ʿām li-ḡamāʿa al-Iḥwān al-Muslimīn*

*alladī tuwafāh Allāh sabḥānuhu wa taʿālā ṣabāḥ al-yawm (al-ḡumʿa) 16 rabīʿ-al-ʿawwal 1430h al-muwāfiq 13 ʿĀdār (Mārs) 2009 M., ʿan ʿamar tunāhiz ar-rābiʿa wa al-tamānīn ʿāman, qaḍā ḡallahā fī ḥidmat al-daʿwa al-islāmiyya wa qaḍāyā al-ʿumma, wa fī muqaddamatihā al-qaḍiyya al-falastīniyya.*

[ n. 1405, 13/03/2009 (generic corpus) ]

The Islamic Movement Hamas offers its condolences to the masses of our Palestinian people, and the masses of our Arabic and Islamic umma for:

Doctor Hasan Huwaidy (Abu Muhammad)  
Candidate to the Council with Muslim Brotherhood

Who was taken by God today (Friday), the 4th of al Awwal of 1430 H. and 13 Adhar (March) 2009 M., at the age of 84, at the service of the Islamic *da'wa*<sup>6</sup> and the issues of the *umma*, first of all the Palestinian question.

Obituaries frequently include religious formulas and lexicon. Most of them are dedicated to martyrs, either common people or well-known figures:

**Example 22** *Tanṣīḥ Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya (Ḥamās) fī falasṭīn ḥilā al-ālam al-ʿarabī wa al-islāmī al-ʿulāma al-dāʿiyya al-muḡāhid al-duktūr ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām alladī qaḍā šahīdā huwa wa filḍatā kabadah b-ʿamliyya iḡtiyāl mudabbira fī madīnat Bīšāwar al-bākistāniyya yawm al-ḡumʿa 24 nūfimbir 1989.*

*Wa laʿin kāna istiṣhād aš-šayḥ al-muḡāhid qarīban min ʿarḍ al-ḡihād fī Afḡānistān al-muslima wa laysa ʿalā ʿarḍ al-ʿasrā fī Falasṭīn allatī ʿahbbahā wa ḡāhada li-taḥrīrihā ḥayna tayassara ʿamar al-ḡihād.*

[ n. 81, 26/11/1989 ]

The Islamic Movement Hamas in Palestine offers its condolences to the Islamic and Arabic world for the missionary scholar, *mujahid*, doctor Abdallah Azzam, who became a martyr in a planned assassination in the city of Peshawar, in Pakistan, on Friday 24 November 1989.

The *shaykh mujahid* was indeed martyred close to land of jihad in the Muslim Afghanistan, and not in Palestine, the land of Ascension, that he loved<sup>7</sup> and for whose liberation he fought the jihad.

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<sup>6</sup>The *da'wa* is the set of practices that aim at establishing a society on Islamic values. The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have an office devoted to *da'wa*

<sup>7</sup>Abdullah Azzam was actually Palestinian.

Table 6.6: Sub-corpus of Hamas' calls to mobilization

Statement	Data	Context
n. 92	21/04/1991	The Gulf War and the American-Israeli alliance
n. 728	25/10/2004	Operation "Days of Penitence"
n. 1294	08/12/2011	Closure of al Aqsa to Palestinians
n. 1776	11/07/2014	Israeli ascending aggressions in Gaza
n. 3945	22/10/2015	Friday of rage

The last example is taken by the announcement of the departure of Abdullah Azzam, whose figure and relevance for Hamas has already been dealt with extensively in previous chapters. The statement follows the usual scheme, and highlights the connections of Azzam with the Palestinian question. Also, the references to the land (Afghanistan and Palestine) are replete with religious symbolism. Azzam is referred to as "martyr", besides the other honorific religious titles (*šayḥ*, *muğāhid*, *alāma*). Most of the obituaries, in fact, are devoted to martyrs, and this means that a sub-genre of the corpus is dedicated to a figure of high symbolic relevance, as it evokes the values of sacrifice, martyrdom, and the instrument of resistance, thus crossing the most important ideological structures of the movement.

What characterized the genre is, in this case, the topic, the structure, the formulas and the presence of religious register. However, as explained at the beginning of this section, obituaries in Hamas' statements than need to be contextualized with a more complex and ritualistic practice, whose meaning is central for the feeling of involvement in the community and the cause but is, at the same time, under significant change.

## 6.7 Calls to mobilization

The organization of resistance action is usually recognizable in statements, hereby identified as "mobilizations", that follow a standard structure. The mobilizations are usually called against the Occupation and include strikes and demonstrations. They are composed by an introductory part, which can vary significantly in topics, style and structure, but usually introduces the reason for mobilizing; and a second part, more structured, which calls for specific actions. There can be found also some degree of repeated formulas, such as calls for the "Friday of rage" (protests organized after the Friday prayer is finished) especially after 2000. As previously explained, calls to mobilization are the "original" type of statement, as it was the purpose of the leaflets, the original *bayānāt*, distributed to the population during the first intifada.

The macro-speech act is thus a defining feature of this sub-genre, as a directive is necessarily implied, although the means through which it is performed may change. The means of legitimation, for example, changed with time: the first statements showed more insistence on Islamic values and goals, such as winning back Muslim Palestine, and addressing the message to Muslims; this tendency quickly faded, and gave way to civil moral and legal values.

**Example 23** *Yā ša·bunā al-muslim:*

5 *Falaṣṭīn kāmila ġayr manqūša huq li-l-muslimīn ‘abr al-‘aġyāl fī-l-mādī wa al-ḥādar wa al-mustaqbal wa laysat li-l-falaṣṭīnīn faqaṭ ‘aw li-l-‘arab waḥdihim wa lā yaḥuq li-ġīl min al-falaṣṭīnīn ‘aw siwāhim ‘an yatanāzal ‘an haḍha al-‘arḍ al-maġbūla bi-dimā‘aš-šuhadā’.*

6 *ad-dawla al-falaṣṭīniyya layst kalima tuqāl fī ḥuṭba siyaāsiyya ‘aw našrat tuza‘aw manāšib taqassum, ‘innamā hiya tamran ġihād ṭawīl wa taḍḥiyyāt lā ḥudūd laḥā.*

7 *Yawm al-‘aḥad 21/8/1988 M. dīkrā ḥaraq ‘ilayhi li-l-masġid al-‘Aqṣā al-mubāarak wa minbar Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn al-‘Ayyūbī sanat 1969, fa-l-yakun haḍā al-yawm ‘idrābā šāmīlā.*

[ n. 58, 18/08/1988 ]

Our **Muslim** people:

(...) 5. The whole of Palestine, without any reduction, has been a **right of the Muslims**<sup>8</sup> through the generations in the past, present and future, and not only of the Palestinians or the Arabs, and it is not right for any generation of Palestinians or anyone else to give away this land soaked in the blood of martyrs.

6. The Palestinian state is not just a word limited to the political discourse, the press or for officials, but it is the **fruit of a long jihad** and infinite sacrifices.

7. On Sunday, 21/08/1988, the day of the anniversary of the fire of al Aqsa and the *minbar* of Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi in 1969, so may this be a day of **total strike**.

<sup>8</sup>"A land of the Muslim" might be interpreted as a paraphrases for *waqf*, the "Islamic endowment", according to which lands appointed as *waqf* did not have an owner and could not be sold or bought, but were taken care of by Islamic charities or organizations. In Hamas' 1988 Charter, Palestine is called *waqf* explicitly; however, this notion was very soon discarded, and disappeared from the 2017 Charter.

The strike is motivated by a long statement which includes much of Hamas' view at the time and, in the excerpt, it is evident how the argumentative moves are based on mentioning anniversaries, past events, and moral principles ("it is not right for any generation of Palestinians or anyone else to give away this land soaked in the blood of martyrs."). The invitation to join the strike is included in a numbered list, which is typical of this kind of statements.

Calls to mobilization are very often embedded in larger statements, and may be included in statements that could be categorized under other kinds of genres. However, there are only "pure" calls to mobilization:

**Example 24** *Tad·ū ḥarakat Ḥamās ḡamāhīr ša·bunā fī aḍ-ḍifa al-ḡarbiyya wa madīnat al-Quds wa al-·arāḍī al-muḥtalla ·ām al- 48 ·ilā habba ḡamāhīriyya ·ārima yawm ḡad al-ḡum·a taḍāmunan ma·a Ḡaza wa wafā·li-dimā·aš-šuhadā·alladīn nazafū fī kull al-mudun al-falaṣṭīniyya wa da·man lil-muqāwama al-falaṣṭīniyya wa rafadan li-kull al-mu·amarāt ·līhā.*

[ n. 1776, 11/07/2014 ]

The movement Hamas calls the masses of our people in the West Bank, in the city of Jerusalem in the territories occupied in 1948 to a tremendous popular uprising tomorrow, Friday, in solidarity with Gaza for the death, the blood of the martyrs spilled in every Palestinian city, in support of the Palestinian resistance and in refusal of the conspiracies against it.

The excerpt in the example includes all the body of the statement. It is much more synthetic, and only concerned with the context around the mobilizations. It is interesting to note that this is explicitly labelled by Hamas as "press release", although many other similar statements are not.

## 6.8 Concluding remarks

### 6.8.1 Defining features of sub-genres

The analysis showed the statements pursue two main communicative purposes: expressing feelings and opinions and advancing requests. The organization of each statement is partially conditioned by the sub-genre and the communicative purpose. Requests are usually very indirect, modulated by the verb "to invite", and the recipient may influence the register and the degree of indirectness.

The sub-genre usually orientates the topics and the internal organization; commemoration of anniversaries and obituaries are the most topic-bound. However, commemoration of anniversaries, after the title, are relatively free in terms of structural organization, while the obituaries are more rigid in their organization and style. However, commemoration statements follow a typical pattern, where the anniversary become the starting point of deeper reflections, used to produce a comparison with the present situation. In this way, the anniversary not always consolidate the in-groups perspective, but helps building a narrative structure that concerns the Palestinian question and offers an interpretative grid of the present events and a legitimation for present action.

The mobilizations, on the other hand, are highly structured and highly bound to specific topics. However, they might be found embedded in statements ascribed to other sub-genres.

It seems that identifying the sub-genres requires appealing to a variety of criteria, and that some of this criteria may be more relevant in some cases and less relevant in other. Moreover, the types of sub-genres presented are justified by the ideological structures and their reproduction a consolidation: for example, commemoration statements consolidate the narrative and the values, and legitimize goals and instruments, while obituaries consolidate the value of sacrifice and martyrdom.

In conclusion, Hamas organizes its texts according to different criteria, although this results in recognizable sub-genres. The variables are: text organization (obituaries, letters, memoranda, commemorative statements, calls to mobilization), topics or topic category (commemorative statements, obituaries), macro-speech acts (calls to mobilization, obituaries, memoranda). However, it can be said that social activities connected to each sub-genres are the actual criteria for sub-division:

- Letters: direct interaction with an addressee;
- Memoranda: advancing requests to institutions, political leaders within institutional contexts;
- Commemorative statements: sharing the memory of an event;
- Obituaries: announcing a death and express condolences;
- Calls to mobilization: organizing strikes, demonstrations etc.

The communicative purpose determines the structure of each statement, and it changes within the sub-genres; also, the degree of constraints on structure and content may vary accordingly, being the obituaries the more topic and structure bound, and the commemorative statements the less conventionalized.



## 6.8.2 Argumentation and legitimation

Many of the statements were concerned with expressing a position or advancing requests. These actions (expressive and directive macro-speech acts) are subsequently supported by argumentative structures that have shown approximately a standard structure.

According to (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1994, 15) and the pragma-dialectic approach, argumentation structures entail the presence of a disagreeing party with regards to the defended standpoint. In Hamas' case, such disagreeing party is not necessarily made explicit, but lies in the background, with the exception of the statements dedicated to clarification, denial or challenge to someone's declarations. In fact, when Hamas argues in favour of its own requests, provides a standpoint and propositions to support it (arguments), which consists in only the opening stage (establishing the point of discussion) and the argumentation stage (presenting arguments in support of the standpoint, in order to resolve the difference), according to van Eemeren: the confrontation stage (establishing a difference between two viewpoints) and the concluding stage (determination how and if the difference was resolved). The ideal model of critical discussion seems incomplete in missing the dialectal part, where the two parties engage in find an agreement on the acceptability of the different standpoints (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, 57-58). However, especially when the argumentation is performed as a monologue, a great deal of information regarding the underlying the ideal model of critical discussion is "cancelled" within the discourse, and left unsaid (van Eemeren, 2015, pp. 3-4).

The solution to the missing phases is found in context: the recipients of Hamas' message know that, for example, if Hamas asserts the primacy of armed resistance and the failure of negotiations is indeed interacting indirectly with Fatah, Fatah's supporters, or international brokers of the negotiations such as the United States, who all are the implicit disagreeing party. There is no need to make this explicit, because the context of negotiations is part of shared knowledge. So, the first stage identified by van Eemeren, the confrontation stage (establishing the difference), and the last, the concluding stage (establishing the result of discussion) are context-dependent and left unsaid.

Moreover, the genre of the *bayān*, despite its significant degree of variability, is characterized by the fact that the recipient is usually the public, which has the following consequences:

1. Regardless of the linguistic devices used to address the different "disagreeing parties", such as vocatives, second person pronouns and verbs, direct speech, the disagreeing party is almost never the real recipient;

2. The external rhetorical objective is persuasion of the real recipient, so the discourse is built accordingly;
3. There is never a real "concluding stage", as there is no real interaction: when the "other" is kept in the background, all that remains is Hamas' voice and its standpoint;
4. The *bayān* usually contains the expression of an official position on a matter. This means that, when Hamas expresses its standpoints in these kinds of texts, it has already been "resolved" as it is published, and not in development or open to changes, nor represent personal opinions or a provisional stance;
5. Nonetheless, many times, the disagreeing voice is included and quoted, when Hamas wants to answer directly (examples: accuses of terrorism). However, this only happens with regard to specific events, and there is no substantial change in the usual means of argumentation.

The starting point of Hamas' substantiation of its directives (requests, calls to mobilization), constatives and expressives (opinions on a given issue) is usually the general context of the Palestinian situation, where the focus may vary from pointing out the abusiveness of the Occupation or the sufferance endured by the people. This is usually structured as given information, although it may already be in the "knowledge repertoire" of the recipient and, in this case, function as an appeal based on common ground or praise (ex. when the qualities of the people against their harsh conditions are emphasized), and in this case the content is pseudo-informative (section 6.3.5). When the recipients are external actors, the content shifts towards a more informative function; moreover, in this case, are pointed out some representations that would be redundant when the recipient is within the in-group (ex. "It is the Palestinian people who is the victim").

Evidence for Hamas' standpoints is very often based on past events, such as the ongoing failure of the negotiations or the continuing attacks from the Occupation. With this respect, the commemorative statements play a significant part, as they codify in a sub-genre the practice of reinforcing the representations of the Palestinian context and of the Occupation with the knowledge of the historical events that led to the present situation.

Previous chapters have already tackled different instances of legitimation, especially in connection to the discursive use of ideological structures. However, it can be added that the reinforcement of past narrative representations by the means of commemorative statements is also functional to self-legitimation in relation to Hamas' instruments: for example, the yearly celebration of victories on the battlefield reinforces the representation of Hamas' ways as the best and most successful, and a confirmation of the effectiveness of armed resistance.

Moreover, the kinds of legitimation strategies employed may "give away" the identity of the implicit "disagreeing parties" in the argumentation processes: while legitimation based on moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 97) , for example, is viable for a wide public, legitimation based on laws, especially international laws ("impersonal authorization", (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 96)) might be more specifically addressed to external actors, that do not automatically acknowledge the seriousness of Israeli actions and may consider Hamas as a terrorist movement.

Superstructures such as argumentation, and strategies such as legitimation, despite crossing all topics and genres in the corpus, behave accordingly to the context of production and sub-genre.

# Chapter 7

## PARTICIPANTS

### 7.1 Categories and methods of analysis

The criteria employed in identifying participants is the semantic category of [+animated]: for these reason, every kind of “animated” item (individuals, groups of people) has been regarded as participant, and categorized as in-group or out-group if pertinent. The category has been extended to “metaphoric” animatedness: for this reason, items such as “Egypt”, “the (Palestinian) Authority”, even though respectively related to the categories of countries and institution, are frequently personalized and treated in discourse as acting individuals; in these case, although being [- animated] in their conceptual meaning, they are regarded as participants. The methods of analysis that have been selected try to tackle the criteria of composition of groups and on which terms they are differentiated in in-group and out-groups; for this reason, a first level of analysis has been transitivity analysis, because it allows to verify any difference in term of nature of the action, agentivity, and role. On a second phase, the participants have been analysed as "social actors" by the means of van Leeuwen’s socio-semantic categories (Van Leeuwen, 2008), in order to gain a deeper understanding of the strategies of representation of the actors and the actions in connection to ideological categories.

In conclusion, the findings have been discussed to define how the ideological square is realized (van Dijk, 2006a), the relationship between dominant and dominated discourse, and some remarks on the specificities of Arabic language in social action analytical categories.

## 7.2 Composition of in-group and out-group

### 7.2.1 In-group

The in-group includes, as fixed participants, the “self” ( Hamas ) and the Palestinian people. These two participants are stable and entrenched within a system of representation which does not vary consistently. Organizations are another type of very frequent participant. Fatah and the PLO ( Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine ) frequently shift in and out of the in-group, according to the relationship the two movements hold at the time of publication of each statement. The Qassam Brigades, which account as organization, are internal to Hamas and, unsurprisingly, account as the only other organization which is stable within the in-group.

Institutions, as previously anticipated, are usually metaphorically represented as people and might perform actions, such as taking decisions or carry out attacks. The Palestinian Authority, as an institution which resulted from the Oslo Accords, is rarely counted among the in-group; however, this can occasionally occur when the Palestinian unity is evoked ( showing an entrenchment between participant representations and the category of values ).

The participants may be divided in three different categories regarding grouping or sub-grouping: sub-groups of the Palestinian people, which are usually harmless citizens ( “they hit women, children and elders” ; the martyrs ) and the fighters ( *muğahidūn*, *fidā'īn*, martyrs, prisoners ) and over-arching groups where the Palestinian people is included, such as “the Arabic and Islamic Umma”, “the Muslims”, “the Muslims and the Christians of Palestine”. In fact, the over-arching groups which contain Hamas and the Palestinian people are multiple and overlapping. The “Arab” and national identity is evoked by the reference to the *umma* and references to the Arab peoples and countries throughout the statements. The common identity background based on national loyalty produces, as we shall see, expectations on such participants; however, overall, it can be said that such identity is bond to the idea of communality between Arab peoples as a nation. The words “people” and “country”, even though both refer to Arab participants, are connoted differently; while “people” is most frequently used when Hamas maintains a positive attitude towards the Arab/national participant ( “our brothers, the people of Egypt” ), the word “countries” is used more frequently where there is the need to perform derogation.

The other over-arching category is religion, and Muslims constitute the widest category. In fact, both the name “Muslim” and the adjective “Muslim” are extensively used to refer to the in-group. This is hardly surprising, as Hamas defines itself an Islamic movement; however, the use of the term will vary in its semantic collocations and in frequency over time. The other participants, Christians, are

a sub-group of Palestinians and connoted positively as a kin-group of Muslims. The references to Christians come early on in the statements, as the first occurrence of the word occurs in statement 72 of 27/10/1989; however, the frequency augments significantly starting from 2011 (24 occurrences from 1989 to 2010, 51 from 2011 to 2016, from 1,14/year to 8,5/year). Christians are regarded as victims of the same enemy, especially regarding operations of *judaization* of sacred sites: all those operations intended at violating other religions' sacred buildings and territory in order to build synagogues or other Jewish structures or activities. This practice is currently blamed on the Israeli state, especially concerning al Aqsa mosque and its surroundings. For the last ten years, the adjective "Christian" designates, together with Muslim, sub-groups of the Palestinian people.

Another particular type of participant are the figures of authority. Hamas does not personalize power in its discourse, therefore the space given to its political leaders is minimal, unless something relevant happens and it is needed to mention them or quote them. However, historical figures of the resistance or religious authorities cover a significant portion of discourse. Figures such as Ezzedine Qassam, Abdullah Azzam and *shaykh* Yassin constitute the role models of the movement, as they embody its *values*, share their goals and act on the same instruments of the Movement. Their story also contribute to the narrative dimension, which is traced statement by statement, and is structured on the chronological sequence of struggles and other historical events of relevance in history of Arab and Palestinian struggle starting from 1917.

### 7.2.2 Out-group

The role of the out-group is dominant in Hamas' discourse. The out-group includes, very similarly to the in-group, some "fixed" participants and some "mobile" participants. Israel is, very obviously, a fixed participant, as are its allies, such as the United States. The Palestinian Authority, as an Oslo and rival institution, is very often derogated; its leading political party, Fatah, gets in and out of the out-group with a certain ease. While the opposition to Israel is naturalized and out of discussion, the relationship with Fatah is more complex, because it is the direct competitor within the Palestinian political scene and a rival party but, at the same time, a part of the Palestinian people and resistance. This results in derogation strategies consistently different with respect to those addressed to Israel, that recall a different system of values and representations.

When participants external to the Palestinian context are regarded as out-group, the strategies of derogation may change and vary from straightforward to subtle according to the specific political moment. Arab countries, for example, constitute a special participant whose position is expected to be in the in-group, for "kinship" reasons (see section on "Unity" in chapter 8) but, most of the times, act as hostile

entities or even enemies. In this case, derogation strategies may vary from calling them back to responsibility to openly accuse them, or simply exclude them as participants.

The representation of the out-group underlies a complex system of group affiliation, values, and social constraints internal and external to Palestine which define how such relationships should be tackled, to what extent openly hostile verbal behaviour is accepted, and which lines cannot be crossed; moreover, it is also symptomatic of the political confidence of the movement in that specific moment, and its self-perception.

## **7.3 Analysis of transitivity**

### **7.3.1 In-group**

The notion of "participant" may be ambiguous in this context. In fact, while during the present work the term indicates "participants" belonging to the ideological constructs of in-group and out-group, at the same time it designates a notion in Systemic-Functional Grammar (SFG). Participants in SFG are semantic categories which, together with circumstances and processes, constitute the semantic configuration onto which experience can be mapped; participants are the elements "inherently involved" in the action, the most central element of representation of experience, which is called "process" in experiential metafunction. Participants' classes may change according to the process they are related to: material processes have "actor" and "goal" as participants, mental processes have "senser" and "phenomenon", verbal processes have "sayer" and "receiver", and so on (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, 120-122). For this reason, to avoid disambiguation, participants in SFG sense will be referred to directly for their class, as in "actor", "goal" etc. The complete analysis of transitivity can be consulted on Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3.

The transitivity analysis of (ideological) participants allowed for identifying clearly the in-group as constituted by an "inner" and stable group of participants which recur in every text: Hamas and the Palestinian people. The processes in which they are involved are approximately the same.

The general tendencies do not seem to change significantly, as the material processes and verbal processes seem to be the most frequent in the corpus regarding representation of the self (Hamas) and the closest participants (the people, the martyrs, the mujahidun, the Arab and Islamic *umma*). It emerges that Hamas is frequently a senser or a sayer, and refers to itself in third person. In fact, it usually makes requests, expresses its opinion, clarifies, or condemns. It has a high degree of agentivity (it is frequently a subject and an "active" participant of the

Table 7.1: Transitivity analysis of the most recurrent in-group participants: 1988-1996

Participant	Actor	Goal	Senser	Identifying	Identifier	Sayer	Receiver	Circumst.
<b>Hamas</b>	1	2	9	1	0	10	0	0
<b>The people</b>	5	3	3	3	13	0	16	10
<b>The <i>mu-jahidun</i></b>	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1
<b><i>The Fida'i</i></b>	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>The martyrs</b>	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>The Qassam Brigades</b>	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Foreign people</b>	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0
<b>Umma</b>	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	2
<b>The victims</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>The Palestinian, Arabic and Islamic forces</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>The prisoners</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>The Muslims</b>	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>



Table 7.2: Transitivity analysis of the most recurrent in-group participants: 1997-2006

Participant	Actor	Goal	Senser	Identifying	Identifier	Sayer	Receiver	Circumst.
<b>Hamas</b>	3	1	9	2	0	32	0	6
<b>People</b>	3	10	2	0	2	1	5	5
<b>Arabic and Islamic countries</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Arabic umma</b>	1	3	0	0	0	0	7	1
<b>umma</b>	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
<b>Qassam Brigades</b>	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
<b>Palestinian factions</b>	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>citizens</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>martyrs</b>	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	4
<b>mujahidun</b>	0	6	0	0	3	0	1	4
<b>prisoners</b>	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	1
<b>women, children and elders</b>	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Muslims</b>	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Christians</b>	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>24</b>

Table 7.3: Transitivity analysis of the most recurrent in-group participants: 2007-2016

Participant	Actor	Goal	Senser	Identifying	Identifier	Sayer	Receiver	Circumst.
<b>Hamas</b>	6	2	6	1	1	25	1	0
<b>People</b>	13	22	2	2	3	0	20	16
<b>Arabic countries</b>	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	3
<b>Arabic and Islamic countries</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
<b>Umma</b>	0	3	5	1	3	1	7	0
<b>Qassam Brigades</b>	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1
<b>Palestinian factions</b>	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
<b>citizens</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Martyrs</b>	1	2	0	1	0	0	3	1
<b>mujahidun</b>	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	3
<b>prisoners</b>	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
<b>women, children and elders</b>	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	2
<b>Muslims</b>	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Christians</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>believers</b>	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>

process) but in verbal or mental processes, so it rarely represents itself performing real action on the field:

**Example 25** *Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya Ḥamās taʿlan mā yalī*

[n.58, 18/08/1988]

The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas **announces** [ verbal process] what follows: [...]

**Example 26** *Ḥamās lā tansā li-ahl al-Kuwayt wa lā li-ahl al-ḥalīǧ ʿāman uqūfihim ilā ǧānib aš-šaʿab al-falaṣṭīnī*

[n.136, 12/11/1991]

Hamas **does not forget** [ mental process] the people of Kuwait or, generally, the Gulf for their position in support of the Palestinian people.

The people, on the other hand, cover passive roles, especially regarding the interaction with Hamas, where they are the usual addressee of their messages; in fact, they frequently appear as a vocatives. The category of "the people" might occur as "the Palestinian people", "the Muslim Palestinian people", "the people of al-Khalil": whether they refer to a portion of Palestinian population, they are regarded, nonetheless, as "the people", *aš-šaʿab*. Palestinian people, when not referred to as such, are divided in subgroups regarding fighters and victims. In general, this category is frequently realized as a goal in material processes or as a circumstance; the actions it is subjected to are performed by the enemy (material processes) or by Hamas (promises, communications, etc.).

**Example 27** *Innana fī-l-muqāwama al-islāmiyya Ḥamās nalmis ʿanna hunāka siyāsa taḍlīl tumāras dīdda abnā-šaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī*

[n. 724, 15/06/1996]

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, perceive that a policy of deception is being enacted **against our Palestinian people** [circumstance]

**Example 28 (...)** *Kull al-munaẓamāt wa-l-ha'iyāt ad-dawliyya ilā taḥammul mas'ūliyyātiha wa-l-qiyām bi-dawriha wa-l-musāri'a li-wad'ḥadd li-l-ḥamla aṣ-ṣahyūniyya al-hīstiriyya **ḍidda abnā' ṣa'binā***

[n. 648, 07/03/1996]

[We invite] all the international organizations and committees to take their responsibilities, perform their role and rush to put a limit to the Zionist hysterical campaign **against our people** [circumstance]

**Example 29** *Inna Ḥarakat Ḥamās id̄ tataqaddam min 'ahālī madinat-al-Ḥalīl aṣ-ṣāmida bi'ahar at-ta'āzī fa 'innaha tu'āhid ṣa'abunā 'alā at-ta'r li-dimā' aṣ-ṣuhadā' al-'abrār wa muwāṣila darb al-ḡihād wa-l-tahrīr.*

[396,27/02/1994]

We, the Movement Hamas, present our warmest condolences to the people of the steadfast town of al-Khalil and **we promise our people** [receiver] to avenge the blood of the pious martyrs and continue on the path of jihad.

Another frequent use of "people" is as a post-modifier in a possessive structure ("construct state", or the synthetic possessive structure in Arabic) in order to attribute to it other meanings important for the movement; these structures are usually functional to legitimation, as the will of the people is considered a source of legitimation. In this sense, people are represented as an entity having that will (attribute) and, under the perspective of grammatical metaphor (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014), a *senser* ("the people want") or a carrier in a relational circumstantial process (the people have the will, the people have the rights):

**Example 30** *Wa inğāz ḥuqūq ša·binā at-ṭābita fi arḍihi wa muqad-  
dasātihi.*

[812, 28/02/1997]

And accomplish **the rights of our people** [ *post-modifier in goal  
grammatical metaphor for carrier*]

For further discussion on this aspect, see the sections related to *Values, Instru-  
ments, Goals*.

For what concerns the “core” of the in-group, Hamas and the people, the tran-  
sitivity analysis on participant does not register a particular change in time, as the  
roles covered maintain consistency: Hamas’ main role remains that of *sayer* or  
*senser*, while *the people* remains mostly a passive participant, a *receiver* and *goal*  
first of all. From this emerges that the main function of the texts is to communi-  
cate with the people. The instances Hamas result as a *sayer* correspond with the  
instances of “the people” as *receiver* only in the first and third decade, meaning  
that the movement started addressing its messages to other addressees the mid  
1990s; this new recipient is not totally included in the in-group, but is mostly con-  
stituted by international institutions or foreign countries which are not included  
in the *umma* category. However, *the people* become, once again, the privileged  
addressee around the time of elections.

Regarding the concept of community to which the in-group is affiliated, a  
change in references can be registered. The term *umma* is the most common des-  
ignator of the concept of community, if compared to other community-affiliated  
words such as “countries” or “peoples”. The term *umma* is charged with a positive  
connotation, given its religious origin. Hamas’ positive attitude towards the *umma*  
is evident in the texts: its most frequent collocation, in fact, is with the first person  
plural suffix pronoun *nā*, “our” (example 31): *our umma*, by which Hamas include  
itself in the community referred to as such (example 33), and is portrayed always  
together with positive adjectives and evaluations. The word *duwal*, “countries”,  
may be charged both positively or negatively: in fact, it is used also when Hamas  
condemns actions made by Arab or other countries, while *umma* never is. The  
expression *Arabic and Islamic umma* correspond to another very frequent collo-  
cation in the texts (example 32). This extends the in-group’s identity and Pales-  
tinian identity as also Muslim and Arab, but not in an exclusive way: Christians  
and other believers can be comprehended in the Arabic part, for example. This  
integrates the component of local nationalism (the *waṭan* with the feeling of be-  
longing to a broader community, which is Arab and also Muslim. Although such  
identities might easily be categorized as “pan-Arab”, or pan-nationalist *qawmiyya*,  
and pan-Islamic, I would not use such terms light-heartedly: Hamas does not ex-  
plicitly sympathise for the historical outputs of pan-arabism, such as Nasserism,

nor ever pursued the goal of an Islamic state, as originally conceived by Islamic Reformists and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, such components are explicitly recognized when they define Palestine as “Arab and Muslim” while, at the same time, taking distance with their historical modes of realization. The post-modifier "Arab" is, on the other hand, exclusive when occurring alone together with “country” or *umma*; in fact, this indicates a sub-group of the extended group.

**Example 31** *Wa hādā huwa aṭ-ṭarīq al-wāḥid wa-l-aqṣar li-nīl al-ḥuqūq wa inḡāz al-maṣālīh, wa taḥqīq kull ma taṭlaʿ ilayhi ummatinā min ʿaman wa istiqrār wa tanmiyya wa izdihār, wa-l-ḥifāz ʿalā al-ʿazza wa-l-karāma wa-l-hība wa-l-makāna al-muḥtarama bayna ʿumām al-ʿālam.*

[n. 691, 22/05/2004]

This is the only and shortest way to to obtain rights, implement reconciliation, realize all the security, stability, prosperity and development that **our umma** [ senser] aspires to, together with the preservation of the honour, dignity, respect, and honourable position among the countries of the world.

**Example 32** *Nadʿū ḡamahīr ummatina al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-ʿislamiyya ʿilā muwāṣila daʿam ṣaʿbinā*

[n. 1175, 3/06/2007]

We invite the masses of **our Islamic and Arabic umma** [ receiver] to continue their support to our people

**Example 33** *Hādā aḍ-ḍikrā al-ʿalīma allati tafdaḥ zayf ma yusamma bi-l-ḥadāra al-ḡarbiyya wa ma yusamma bi-l-muḡtamaʿad-dawlī allādī yazḥar al-mubādʿa al-ʿinsāniyya wa yaḥft al-ʿunṣuriyya wa-l-ḡadar wa-l-ḡalam li-ʿummatina wa ṣaʿbinā*

[ n. 6352, 02/11/2016 ]

This painful anniversary is what discloses the counterfeit of the so-called Western civilization and the so-called international community, which shows [respect for] human principles and hides racism, treachery and oppression **on our umma and our people** [ circumstance]

The other discussed category is the anticipated subdivision in fighters and victims. In this case, the transitivity analysis does not highlight any aspect of interest; *martyrs*, given their semantic property of being both active or passive in martyrdom (the word “martyr“, in fact, refers to who dies as the casualty of an attack or dies while fighting); when subject to the related verb *istašhada*, “be martyred” (note: the verb is active, not passive, in Arabic), “martyr” has the properties to qualify as an actor in a material process and a medium in an ergative process (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 336). When the focus is on the innocence and helplessness of the victims of Israeli aggressions, Hamas frequently refer to them as being “women, children and elders” or “innocents” or “civilians”. In this case, as expected, the occurrences can almost always be categorized as *goals* in material processes.

### 7.3.2 Out-group

The transitivity analysis of the out-group shows very different criteria of representation. While, as section 7.3 showed, the in-group is mainly involved in verbal and mental processes, the out-group representations are more focused with material with the actions performed. This is realized in two ways: out-group participants may be actors or nominalized actions are attributed to them in possessive structures (“the massacres of the Occupation”). While the same happened with the in-group, the attributed nominalized actions were seldom detailed in their nature: they were general and “container” actions, such as resistance and struggle, which are label that may imply many possible realizations; on the other hand, actions attributed to the out-group are nominalized material processes such as “killings”, “massacres”, “invasion”, “violations”, or nominalized actions where the evaluation of the speaker appears evident, such as “crimes”, “infracton”.

Israel is not very often called by its name. In the general corpus, the word occurs 417 times (45 occurrences per 100000 words) against the 3561 occurrences of “Occupation” (415.6 occurrence per 100000 words). The most frequent way to refer to the enemy is by referring to its actions, especially the act to occupy Palestinian land: “Occupation”, *iḥtilāl*, is certainly the preferred term of reference. As a nominalized action, it drives the attention to the illegality of the action (the land is occupied), and its permanence in time (occupation is not a temporary state, but a problematic and tragic condition). Clearly, this is a selection among many

other possibilities: words such as "colonization" and "settlements", which define specific types of land occupation, are nonetheless used, but do not occur with the same frequency.

"Occupation" may occur alone or in fixed pairs modified by the adjective "Zionist", the noun government (936 occurrences), or as modifier of the nouns "authorities", "prisons" and "forces" (Table 7.4). The adjective Zionist refers to the ideology of Zionism and to its radical strain that claimed the "natural right" of Hebrews to have a homeland in Palestine and led to the first incursions into Palestine. "Zionist" can modify "entity", "enemy" or "terrorism". When referring to elements other than the State, it co-occurs with army and soldiers (Table 7.5).

Table 7.4: Left and Right Co-Occurrences of "Occupation" in the general corpus

Left co-occurrences		
Rank	Occurrences	Cluster
1	880	The Zionist Occupation
2	135	The Occupation from
3	90	The Occupation in
4	67	The Occupation
5	62	The Occupation on
6	56	To the Zionist Occupation
7	55	The Occupation from
8	50	The Occupation against
9	48	The tyrannical Occupation
10	46	The Israeli Occupation
Right co-occurrences		
1	262	The prisons of the Occupation
2	238	The forces of the Occupation
3	175	Against the Occupation
4	170	With the Occupation
5	151	The Authorities of the Occupation
6	108	The crimes of the Occupation
7	104	The resistance of the Occupation
8	98	The soldiers of the Occupation
9	83	The army of the Occupation
10	78	To confront the Occupation

In the selected corpus, "Occupation" seems to occur mainly as a circumstance, then as an actor and a goal (table 7.6).



Table 7.5: Left and Right Co-Occurrences of "Zionist" in the general corpus

Left Occurrences		
Rank	Occurrences	Cluster
1	880	The Zionist Occupation
2	795	The Zionist enemy
3	387	The Zionist entity
4	141	The Zionist aggression
5	71	To the Zionist entity
6	70	To the Zionist enemy
7	67	The Zionist project
8	59	The Zionist terrorism
9	56	To the Zionist
10	47	Our Zionist enemy

Table 7.6: Transitivity roles of "Occupation" during the three decades

Transitivity role	1987 - 1996	1997 - 2006	2007 - 2016	Total
[actor]		9	4	13
[beholder]			1	1
[carrier]	1	1		
[circumstance]	12	14	27	57
[goal]		8	4	12
[phenomenon]			2	2
[receiver]			3	3
[target]			3	3

The circumstantial use of the out-group referent may be "proper", meaning that the participant does function solely as an element embedded in a temporal or spatial circumstance:

**Example 34** *Min aš-ša'b al-falaṣṭīnī al-muntaḥid fī waġh al-iḥṭilāl al-ġāšim* ʾilā ʾiḥwāninā al-muġāhidīn al-ʾaḥrār alladīn ṭahharū bi-dimāʾihim al-zakiyya ʾarḍ ʾAfgānistān al-muslima min danas al-mulḥidīn.

[ n. 80, 07/04/1989 ]

**From the Palestinian people rising against the face of the tyrannical Occupation** to our brothers, the free *mujahidīn* that spilled their

innocent blood to purify the Muslim land of Afghanistan from the profanation of the infidels.

However, in other cases, the circumstance embed a noun phrase where an actor or goal is put in relation with a nominalized material process by the means of a possessive structure:

**Example 35** *ʾIn ʿadūnā aṣ-ṣahyūnī al-ġādir, alladī ittaḥaḍa min ʾirāqat al-dimā ʾšaʿāran lahu, wa banā kiyānihi al-ʿunṣurī ʿalā ġamāġim ad-ḍaḥāyā min al-ʾatfāl wa an-nisāʾ wa aṣ-ṣuyūḥ min ʾabnāʾ ʾšaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī al-wāqīʾ **taḥta nīr al-iḥtilāl**, lā yaftaʾ yuʾakid ʾan uġūdihi murtabiḥ bi-l-istimrār fī al-ʿadwān wa al-ʾirhāb*

[ n. 187, 28/05/1992 ]

Our treacherous Zionist enemy, who made of bloodsheds its distinguishing mark, and built its racist self on the bones of children, women and elders that were its victims among our Palestinian people that stands on its feet **under the yoke of the Occupation**, does not stop reaffirming its presence by continuing with its terrorist aggressions.

The example shows how the people is put "under the yoke of the Occupation" embedded in a circumstance that explains the context in which Palestinians stand on their feet. The "yoke" is clearly a metaphor, a symbol of the oppression; nonetheless, this implies that the Occupation is exercising this oppression, thus making it an "implicit" actor. On the other hand, the agentivity and agency of Israel is made explicit at the beginning of the extract: "Zionist enemy" is the actor of: "building its self, creating a distinguishing mark", which can be ascribed to semiotic action (Van Leeuwen, 2008), thus concerned with creating meaning, but are metaphorically expressed as material processes ("make", "build"). The principal action is actually an interpretation: aggressions, which are concrete actions, are read as a declaration of existence (a verbal process).

**Example 36** *Wa anta waḥduka alladī taṣaddarat li-muwāġaha ʾaʿtā wa ʾabṣaʾ anuʿa az-zalam wa al-ġaṭrasa wa al-waḥṣiyya allatī ʿarafuhā at-tārīḥ, yawm rafaʿat luwāʾ al-ġihād wa al-muqāwama ḍidda iġtiṣāb al-ʾarḍ wa al-muqaddasāt wa ḍidda al-iʿtidāʾ ʿalā al-ḥayā wa al-ḥurriyya wa al-karāma, wa yawm wāġh wa yuwāġiha ʾabnāʾ uka al-ʾawfiāʾ bi-ʾaġsādihim al-ʿazlāʾ **raṣāṣ al-iḥtilāl**.*

[ n. 621, 16/09/1996 ]

And you [the Palestinian people] are at the head of the confrontation with the most brutal kinds of injustice, violation, and bestiality known in history, and the day that you raised the banner of jihad and resistance against the violation of the land and the sacred sites and against the attacks on life, freedom and dignity, and one day your children will confront, with their faithful and unarmed bodies, **the bullets of the Occupation.**

The previous example uses a metonymy, since the action of "shooting" is referred to by the outcome of the action, the bullets. The action is therefore evoked but, nonetheless, remains an active action of aggression and a material process.

The action of the enemy is also depicted as threatening the core values of the group and of all humanity, and the innocence of the in-group ("unarmed bodies", "children, women and elders") is put in contrast with the animal ("brutal", "bestiality") and aggressive nature of the enemy.

When the Occupation, or a related entity ("the Authorities of the Occupation"), are actors, they perform actions which are connoted negatively and pertain the field of crimes and violent actions:

**Example 37** *Bi-ḍaw' aḥḍar 'amrīkī, wa ṣamt 'arabī wa 'islāmī wa duwalī, 'aqdamat sultāt al-iḥtilāl aṣ-ṣahyūnī 'alā irtikāb ḡarīma ḡadīda tadāf 'ilā saḡal al-ḡarā'im al-baṣ'a allatī irtakabatihā ḥilāl 'akṭar min niṣf qarn bi-ḥuq 'abnā'ša'binā al-falaṣṭīnī, ḥaytu qāmat at-tā'irāt al- "F16" al-'amrīkiyya aṣ-ṣan'a bi-qaṣf binā'iyya sukuniyya fī ḥayy ad-Daraḡ bi-madīnat Ġaza al-bāsila*

[ n. 480, 23/07/2002 ]

With the green light from America, and under the Arabic, Islamic and international silence, **the Zionist authorities committed a new crime** that adds to the list of brutal crimes committed during more than half a century with regard to our people, when American F16 airplanes bombed a inhabited area in the Daraj neighborhood in the fearless city of Gaza.

In the example emerge also the kinds of spatial and temporal circumstances which contextualize the action. In fact, it is very frequent for Hamas to recall the general context of the Israeli occupation by putting emphasis on its duration ("more than half a century"), the high frequency of the actions ("adds to the list of crimes", "new crime") and the places in which they occur as personalized and an

embodiment of the values of the in-group ("the fearless Gaza"). This is another very common feature of Hamas' discourse, which adds to the contextual knowledge of the situation and provides for a frame of interpretation of the events.

The actions themselves are very often objectivized (Van Leeuwen, 2008) and treated as participants:

**Example 38** *ʾIn al-ḥamla al-hīstiriyya al-ṣahyūniyya allatī tuwāṣil al-qamʿa wa at-tankīl bi-ḥuq al-ʾabrāʾ min ābnāʾ ṣaʿbinā, takšuf min ḡadīd ʿan al-waḡh al-qabīḥ li-l-iḥtilāl wa ʿan ʾirhāb ad-dawla alladī tumārisuhu ḥukūmat al-madʿū Šimʿūn Bīrīz ʿabr taḡrī ʿṣaʿbinā kull ʾanuwāʿ al-ʿaqāb al-ḡamāʿī min ḥilāl al-ḥiṣār at-taḡwīʿī aš-šāmil wa aṭ-ṭūq al-ʾamanī wa iʿtiqāl al-mʾiyāt, wa tadmīr manāzil ʾusar aš-šuhadāʾ, wa iʿtiqāl wa taʿdīb dūḥim, wa mudāhamat al-muʾassasāt al-taʿlīmiyya wa al-ḥayriyya wa al-iḡtimāʿiyya wa istimrār aḍ-ḍaḡaṭ ʿalā ṣultat al-ḥakm aḍ-dātī.*

[ n. 621, 16/09/1996 ]

**The hysterical Zionist campaign, that continues the repression and the punishment of our people, reveals once again the horrible face of the Occupation** and its State terrorism that the government of Shimon Peres, that is choking our people with every kind of collective punishment during the blockade, resulting in absolute starvation, in the security circle and the hundreds of arrests, the destruction of the houses of the families of the prisoners, the arrest and torture of their relatives, the raids into charities, and the continuous pressure on the self-governed Authority <sup>1</sup>.

The example shows how a group of actions, which are subsequently specified, can be nominalized ("campaign") and personified, making it an actor ("reveals the face") and qualifying it by mental state adjectives ("hysterical"). The actions are very often described in details, as happens here: generic labels such as "crimes", "oppression", "violence" are often detailed as murder, destruction of the houses, arrests and other specific descriptors. Moreover, the "hysterical" adjective shows another very common trait attribute to Israel, which is "irrationality". Although Israel's actions are very often described as pre-meditated, the actor is very often described as emotional and irrational; these traits are in stark contrast with the way the movement defines its in-group, which is depicted in more "intellectual" actions, concerned with verbal expression and thinking. Israel, on the other

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<sup>1</sup>The Palestinian Authority

hand, emerges as less rational and human-like, with its irrational, bestial and brutal moves.

The enemy's actions are also used very often as an anaphoric reference. In the same text, if introduced by a deplorable action committed by Israel, the following references are performed not by referring to Israel, but to "the massacre", "the heinous crime", and whichever terms of reference is chosen. This maintains the attention to the actions and its weight and depiction.

For what concerns internal rivals, the analysis has focused on Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.

Table 7.7: Transitivity roles of "Authority" in the selected corpus during the three decades

Transitivity role	1987-1996	1997-2006	2007-2016	Total
actor	1	4	2	7
carrier	5	3		8
circumstance		1	3	4
goal	1		1	
receiver	2		2	
senser	1			1

The tables show that the Authority is represented as "active" and agentive in its actions and is very often concerned with material processes; when verbal processes are concerned it very often is the receiver, not the target: this is obvious, as Hamas interacts with the Authority, while does not address Israel directly, but condemns and denounces it.

## 7.4 Participants as social actors

The transitivity analysis showed a neat polarization in transitivity terms between the in-group and the out-group: the in-group shows a low degree of agentivity, while the out-group references are mainly actions and the actors frequently occur as "actors" in material processes. How is this interpreted in terms of social action? Van Leeuwen (Van Leeuwen, 2008) proposes to analyse the representation of social actors in discourse by the means of socio-semantic categories. This means that the analysis is not limited at one-way correspondences from linguistic structure to social category (es. passive means lack of agentivity), but rather follows a top-down approach where a socio-semantic category, such as *generalization* or *agency* is inferred by the means of a variety of linguistic realizations (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 23-24). In the following paragraphs, it will be shown how the socio-semantic categories apply to the in-group and the out-group in Hamas' representation and which function they absolve.

Table 7.8: Left and right "Authority" clusters in the general corpus

Left co-occurrences		
Rank	Frequency	Cluster
1	512	The Palestinian Authority
2	389	The Authority government
3	386	The Authority of self-government
4	72	The Authority in
5	72	The Authority of Arafat
6	52	The Palestinian Authority to
7	47	The Authority to
8	41	To the Palestinian Authority
9	33	The Authority from
10	32	The Authority on
Right co-occurrences		
1	84	The prisons of the Authority
2	76	We invite the Authority
3	76	This Authority
4	67	The president of the Authority
5	58	On the Authority
6	57	In the Authority
7	46	The security of the Authority
8	40	We ask the Authority
9	33	In the Authority
10	29	The security body of Authority

### 7.4.1 In-group

As the transitivity analysis already showed, the **role allocation** of the participants is homogeneous: although they frequently cover the function of subjects, they are subjects in mental and verbal processes, which somehow de-emphasize the degree of action and agentivity in their action: they perform mainly **semiotic action** (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 59-60). Moreover, when they are attributed some actions, they are nominalized and put in relation to them as a possessed item ("the people's *resistance/struggle*"). The action, nominalized, is **objectivized**, which is a form of **deactivation** of the action (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 63-63).

This means that the favourite means of representation of the in-group is not the action, but the voice. Their force lies in expressing will, opinion, emotions. When the sayer or the senser is the people, it is a chorus that authorizes some actions or

decisions of Hamas; Hamas itself represents itself asking, requesting, expressing, feeling.

The people, when is not a subject, frequently cover the same (passive) role: that of receiver in verbal processes. In fact, the people are the ratified addressee of most of the statements, and also the **beneficiary** of most of the movement's actions. This is another form of legitimation: while the first was based on popular demand, this one is based on achieving a purpose.

The people, presented as a homogeneous mass, or as one entity, is represented as **indifferentiated**: this is very important, because Hamas frequently voices its own values and opinions through the one choral voice of the people.

**Example 39** *Nad·ūkum ·ilā al-uqūf siyāsiyan wa mādiyān wa ma·nawīyyan - ·ilā ḡānib ša·binā al-falastīnī wa muqāwamatihī al-mašrū·a fī muwāḡihat al-·adwān aš-šahyūnī al-waḡšī ·lā qitā·Ġaza wa aḍ-ḍifa al-ḡarbiyya, bikull ·aškālihi min qatal wa iḡtiyāl wa i·tiqāl wa iḡtiyāḡ wa tadmīr.*

[ n. 1260, 25/03/2008 ]

We invite you [Arab leaders] to stand **by the Palestinian people** - politically, materially and spiritually - **and their legitimate resistance** against the brutal Zionist aggressions on the Gaza strip and the West Bank, [which come under] any form of fight, murder, arrests, invasion and destruction.

Example 39 shows some of these aspects. "People" are, in the example, a circumstance and a possessor (which is, in transitivity terms, carrier in a relational process) of the item "resistance". De-activation thus appears because the social actor covers a non-agentive function, that of circumstance, so it provides information on the context of the action, by which is just indirectly touched and the action it may actually perform, which is "to resist", is in its turn de-activated and objectified through nominalization, and put in relation to the people only by the means of a possessive relation, which has no specifications in terms of time, person, etc.; moreover, it is also a beneficiary of someone's action which is, in this case, intervention of the Arab leaders.

For what concerns the degrees of distinction that allow for the definition of the in-group, the most frequent strategies are **specification** in terms of groups: sub-groups of the people (*mujahidun*, victims, prisoners) or outside actors, mainly peoples from other countries or other countries; the superordinate category which comprises most of this actors is, naturally, the *umma*. Thus, actors are usually grouped by the means of descriptive categories such as their nation of origin

(Palestinian, Egyptian, etc.), which falls under the category of **individualization**, or as a summary of the actions they perform (*mujahidun*), which is **functionalization**.

**Example 40** *Nuṭammin waḥdat ʿabnā ʿšaʿbinā muslimīn wa masīḥīn fī muwāḡahatihi.*

[ n. 1029, 30/03/2006 ]

We highly praise our Muslim and Christian people in their confrontation [with Israel].

The previous extract is a good example of one type of collectivization based on the category of religion. Although the "unmarked" category is "the people", the subcategories can at times be recalled. The extract belongs to a statement issued after an Israeli family was arrested for igniting fireworks and gas canisters inside the Church of Annunciation in Nazareth.<sup>2</sup> Resorting to sub-categories serves the function of expressing solidarity to a particular segment of the population and, in this case, emphasize the relation of parity and unity between Muslims and Christians. Christians, intended in an extended sense, are associated (Van Leeuwen, 2008) to the Palestinian people by being both victims of the same oppressor and sharing owners of the same sanctuaries:

**Example 41** *ʿInnanā fī ḥarakat Ḥamās ʿid nudīn al-iʿtidā Alif al-ʿāṭim alladī tāla ʿahad muqaddasāt ʿšaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī, wa al-masīḥīn fī al-ʿalam, fa-ʿinnanā nuḥammil sultāt al-iḥtilāl aṣ-ṣahiyūnī al-masʿuūliyya kāmila ʿan haḏā al-iʿtidā*

[ n. 1029, 30/03/2006 ]

We, the Hamas movement, condemn the sinful attack that hit one of the sacred sites **of our Palestinian people and of the Christians all over the world**, and we hold the Authority of the Zionist Occupation responsible for this attack.

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<sup>2</sup>“WEST BANK: Christians demonstrate against Nazareth church attack”, Reuters, 05/03/2006. URL: <<https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/870042>> (last access: 06/08/2018).



Thus, association emphasizes the action of the out-group which results in the creation of solidarity bonds between its victims. Groups above the classification as "Palestinian people" are still put in relations as macro-groups and encompasses the types of identity and relations that are considered relevant for constituting groups.

The relation to other Arabs or other Muslims is represented as a family bond. This means that relations are built preferably on a national and religious base. However, the two categories are frequently associated in two ways: juxtaposition, where the elements are just associated by the means of a list, or as adjectives modifying a single noun which defines the type of group that is being referred to, which might be the *umma*, realized as "Arabic and Islamic umma" (see tabs 7.1, 7.2, 7.3), countries, peoples. The type of group mentioned implies a certain kind of attitude: while *umma* and *peoples* are often accompanied by a positive attitude, *countries* is much less clearly connoted, and may be either referred to positively as a *sister country*, where the metaphor of family is a vehicle to express proximity and connote a positive attitude, or be condemned and represented as the actor of a negative action, and, in the case of Western countries, be defined an ally of Israel. *Umma*, "the community", which is a normally positive term, is very frequently modified as "Arab and Islamic Umma". In principle, the term is a religious construct, since it refers to the first Islamic community; it shares the root of *mother* and *nation*, thus defines a community precedent to State entities.

**Example 42** *Tu·akid Ḥamās ·alā ·an aš-ša·b al-falasṭīnī ḡaz· lā yataḡiz· min al-·umma al-·arabiyya wa al-·islāmiyya wa lakinnahā tarfuḍ at-·tabī·iyya li-·ay ḡaha wa tatamassk bi-istiqlāliyya al-·qarār al-falasṭīnī fī ḍuw· ihtirām mutabādil ma·a kull al-·aṭrāf.*

[ n. 6539, 14/12/2016 ]

Hamas assures that **the Palestinian people is an inalienable part of the Arabic and Islamic *umma*** but it refuses to be a subordinate and maintains its independence in Palestinian decision making, with mutual respect from every part.

In the example taken from statement 6539, issued on the 29th anniversary of the Movement, the relationship between Palestinians and the *umma* is made explicit; however, it actually introduces a dissociation claim on Hamas' part, that reaffirms its independence in certain contexts. So, no claim on the movement's part should be interpreted as an attempt to dissociate from the *umma*; on the other hand, this

unbreakable affiliation entails responsibilities on the part of the *umma*'s members with regards to providing support for the Palestinian cause:

**Example 43** *Nuṭālib ḡamāhīr al-ʿumma al-ʿarabiyya wa al-ʿislāmiyya wa am-naḥab wa al-muṭaqqifīn wa al-ʿulamāʾ wa al-qiyādāt al-mīdāniyya bi-ʿan yahbū li-naṣrat aš-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī wa taʿzīz ṣumūdihi wa al-uqūf ʿilā ḡānibihi wa ʿan yufaddihū ḡarāʿim al-iḥtilāl aṣ-ṣahyūnī*

[ n. 1339, 28/12/2008 ]

We ask to the masses of the **Arab and Islamic *umma*, to the élites, the intellectuals, the civil leaders** to rise for the victory of the Palestinian people, add force to its steadfastness, stand by its side and expose the crimes of the Zionist Occupation.

In the example taken from statement 1339, issued during the Operation Cast Lead, the *umma* group can be broken down into different layers of society:

**Example 44** *Fa-min ḥuq hadā aš-šaʿb al-muṣābir ʿan yudāfi ʿan nafsihi wa ʿan ʿarḍihi wa muqaddasātihi bimā yastaṭīʿ wa ḥuquhu ʿalā al-ʿumma zuʿamāʾ wa ḥukūmāt wa šuʿūban - ʿan tuqif maʿahu*

[ n. 1260, 25/03/2008 ]

It is the right of the patient people to defend themselves, their land and the sacred sites in every way it can, and it is their right to be supported by **the *umma* - the leaders, the governments, and the peoples**

The group is hereby split in its components, where the population is divided into leading positions ("leaders and governments") and normal citizens ("people"). So, "power positions" emerge as another criterium of group differentiation or aggregation, together with nationality and religion. In this case, it addresses directly its immediate recipients, as the statement is the Memorandum for the Damascus Arab Summit of 2008. The subgroups are defined for their function which, in this case, should be realized in supporting Palestine.

The wider groups are, as well as "the people", usually de-activated and receivers' of Hamas' messages of circumstantialised (Van Leeuwen, 2008); however, as well as the people, they can be the object of Hamas' defence against other actors:

**Example 45** *Wa nad·ū al-·ašqā·fī Mišr tashīl murūrihā ·ilā Ġaza al-muḥāšira allatī yu·ānī ·atfāluhā wa šuyūḥuhā min naqš al-duwā· wa al-ḡadā· fa-naḥnu fī al-muqāwama kunnā wa mā zalnā ḥaṭṭan difā·iyyan ·an al-·umma fī muwāḡiha al-mašrū·aš-šahyiūnī, wa nataṭalla· li-·an takūn Mišr wa al-·Arab ·amaqan istrātīḡiyan li-ša·binā al-falašṭīnī aš-šāmid wa al-murābiṭ.*

[ n. 1398, 26/12/2009 ]

We invite **our brothers and sisters in Egypt** to facilitate the passage to the besieged Gaza, where our children and elders suffer from deprivation of medicines and food. Thus we, during this resistance, will always **defend the umma** against the Zionist project, and we are looking forward for **Egypt and the Arabs** to employ a common strategy **for our resistant Palestinian people**

The previous example shows how one of the elements of the group can be "extracted": although all Arabs are usually included in the *umma*, Egypt here is associated to it but not included in it.

In 2008, Egypt had closed the Rafah passage, also in attempt to weaken Hamas' leadership and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; since the siege on Gaza had recently begun, this started provoking a crisis in the Strip. In January 2008, the external leadership of Hamas held a summit in Damascus in order to reiterate its adherence to resistance and its methods (Baconi, 2018, pp. 145-146). Thus, Egypt here is an antagonist; nonetheless, is still regarded as a "family member" ("the brothers and sisters of Egypt"). Hamas does not explicitly challenge Arab states very often and, usually, derogation strategies in this direction are softened or made indirect. In the case of Egypt, the bond with the Egyptian people is highlighted, as some kind of disclaimer against the possibility of showing an anti-Arab image; however, its actions are depicted in their gravity, by making explicit who is suffering from Egypt's decisions: "children and elders" are individualized and collectivized, as general sections of population who are the weakest and in need of protection and supply. The choice of resistance is described as a defence of the whole *umma*, and not just the Palestinians: Hamas extends the scope of its action to the overarching group that, nonetheless, is also the recipient of this particular statements. This way of defining participants appeals to the values of unity, especially Arab unity (see chapter 8) to protect the derogation against Egypt and, at the same time, accept resistance as a legitimate method.

The alternative to defining the superordinate group is "States", *duwal*, which is not a religiously marked. The term *dawla*, which now correspond to the modern notion of "nation state", comes from the root (d, w, l) which defines the semantic field of "turning" and, in the specific case, refers to the alternation of power.

**Example 46** *Kamā tad-ū ḥarakat "Ḥamās" ad-duwal al-ʿarabiyya wa al-islāmiyya ʿilā ʿadam taqdīm at-tʿayyīd ʿaw ad-daʿam ʿaw al-ḡatāʿli-ḥadīhi al-ḥarb al-maʿlana didda ʿAfḡānistān ʿaw ʿay balad ʿarabī ʿaw ʿislāmī, fa-ḥadīhi al-ḥarb laysat fī maṣlahat ʿummatinā bal diddahā.*

[ n. 319, 18/09/2001 ]

The movement Hamas invites **the Arabic and Islamic countries** to avoid any kind of support to this abominable war against Afghanistan or any **Arab or Islamic state, because this war will not fix our umma but rather disrupt it.**

Statement 319 was published a week after the attack on the Twin towers. The statement, after a condemnation of the attacks, is aimed at persuading fellow Arab countries not to join the American alliance in the "war on terror". In this case, the two superordinate groups are "split" by using different references ("Arab countries" and "our *umma*"). *Umma* is also possessivized, put in relation by the means of a possessive pronoun, with the speaker, while this does not happen with "countries": this shows the mostly "affective" connotation endowed with the word *umma*, not present in *duwal*.

All previous examples are instances of categorization. For what concerns **nominat**ion (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 40-41), the representation of in-group does not recur to this strategy very often. Common people are sometimes nominated and referred to as individuals and by their proper name, but this happens only when they become martyrs:

**Example 47** *Yā ḡamāhīr šaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī al-muḡāhid:*

*tan-t̄ ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya "Ḥamās" bi-kull ḥuzn wa ʿasaf šahīdihā al-baṭālīn:*

*al-šahīd/ Maḥmūd Fārūq al-Būrṇū*

*wa-l-šahīd/ Muḥammad Ḥiḡāzī*

*alladīn qutilā ʿalā ʿaydī ʿaḡhaza al-ʿaman al-falaṣṭīniyya al-yawm fī sāḡa mīdān Falasṭīn bi-Ġaza.*

[ n. 446, 07/10/2002 (*general corpus*) ]

Masses of our fighting [*mujahid*] Palestinian people: The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas sadly offers its condolences for the two

heroic martyrs: martyr Mahmud Faruq al-Burnu and martyr Muhammad Hijazi who were killed today, in Palestine square in Gaza, by the security forces <sup>3</sup>

## 7.4.2 Out-group

Also, in this case, the transitivity analysis was useful to define some of the features of social construction of the out-group. Out-group actors are usually represented as participants in material processes, either as actors or goals, or in utterances embedded in noun phrases, especially possessive constructions. It can be said that Israel, referred to as "the Occupation", "the enemy", "the Zionist entity" and other combinations with "Zionist" is activated, although the participants are not always "participants" in processes.

The fact that they very often appear in noun phrases and in circumstances, however, may not be an attempt to de-activate (Van Leeuwen, 2008), but to give it as "known" information, which provides for context for the content that follows. In fact, Israel's actions are considered to be well known, and very often the statements are not intended to inform about them, but to ask for external help or express the movement's position on related issues, such as the missed intervention or support of other countries or international institutions.

The focus of Hamas' representation of Israel lies substantially on its actions. For this reason, *objectivation* is a very common strategy: many references are made to its actions, or its weapons.

**Example 48** *ʾIn ḥarakat Ḥamās ʾiḏ tadʾū Allāh ʾan yarḥam ḡamī-ṣuhadāʾ maḡzarat Ġaza raḥma waāsiʾa wa yastaqbilihim fī ʾalayn, fa-ʾinhā tuʾakid ʾalā ʾan haḏihi al-maḡzara lan tuʾatir ʾalā istimrār al-muqāwama wa al-intifāda ḏidda al-iḥtilāl wa satakūn dimāʾaš-ṣuhadāʾlaʾna ʾalā al-muḥtallīn aš-ṣihāina, bʾiḏan Allāh*

[ n. 480, 23/07/2002 ]

Hamas prays God to have mercy for the **massacred martyrs** in Gaza and may he welcome them in Heaven, and assures that this **massacre** will not affect the continuation of the resistance and the intifada against the Occupation, and the blood of the martyrs will be the damnation of the Zionist occupiers, God willing.

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<sup>3</sup>The security body of the Palestinian Authority.

Table 7.9: "Zionist" co-occurrences regarding actions

Rank	Frequency	Cluster
1	880	The Zionist Occupation
4	141	The Zionist aggression
8	59	The Zionist terrorism
11	41	The Zionist attack
12	40	The Zionist crimes
13	31	The Zionist plans
14	30	The Zionist crime
15	29	The Zionist war
30	16	The Zionist threats
31	16	The Zionist massacres

For what concerns the kind of action attributed to Israel, we find mainly *material actions* (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 59) regarding war, settlements, and the measures imposed on Gaza ("blockade") or on the West Bank ("Occupation"). Table 7.9 shows the clusters that include the actions qualified as "Zionist" in the general corpus; although the table is not comprehensive of all the uses, it provides for good examples of the most recurrent actions. The space for *semiotic action* reserved to Israel, in fact, is limited to threats and, as addressed in many other statements, lying on matters that Hamas has to clarify later in the statements.

Another instance of objectivation is delivered by the metaphor of the "disease". In this case, *cancer* embodies all the other actions which distinguish Israel or other enemies: the act of spreading, being malignant, having death as a consequence of its arrival.

**Example 49** *Naktub ʿilaykum muḥanniʿiyyīn wa muʿāidayīn wa dāʿīn bi-l-ṭabāt wa al-tuwaḥḩiq. Laqad raḩʿatum ruʿuūsanā wa ruūʿus al-muslimīn al-ʿāmilīn fī al-ʿālam qāṭiba bi-ḩihādikum wa ṣabrikum wa ṭabātikum fī waḩh al-sarṭān al-ʿaḩmar ḩattā qaṭaftum ṭamra baḩalākum*

[ n. 80, 07/04/1989 ]

We write to you [the Afghan people] to congratulate you and give you support, wishing you stability and success. You made us lift our heads and the heads of the Muslims, all working for your jihad and

your patience, and your firmness against the **red cancer** until you collect the fruits of your efforts.

**Example 50** *Tatbūt al-uğūd aṣ-ṣahyūnī al-sarṭānī fī ġism ʿummatinā wa fawqa ʿardīnā min ḥilāl taṭbīʿ alāqatihu maʿa al-ʿanzama al-ʿarabiyya.*

[ n. 107, 20/10/1991 ]

**The cancerous Zionist presence has rooted in the body of our *umma***, and on our land, during the naturalization of the relationship with the Arabic regimes.

The first example, from statement 80, refers to the Soviet Union, as it is a letter of solidarity to the Afghans under the Soviet occupation. The expression "red cancer" to refer to communism is found first in Abdullah Azzam's publications (ʿAzzām, 1980), where the Soviet Union is considered a threat to its subjected Muslim populations.

That Israel nor the authority are considered passive participants, despite their grammatical form, is shown also by the fact that they are not *subjected* nor *beneficialized* (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 33):

[...] Subjected social actors are treated as objects in the representation, for instance, as objects of exchange (immigrants taken in in return for the skill or money they bring). Beneficialized social actors form a third party which, positively or negatively, benefits from the action.

As examples in section 7.3.2 show, this is not the case.

The two most common strategies for referring to Israel correspond, nonetheless, to two types of categorization: "Occupation" is, in fact, an instance of *functionalization*, while "Zionist entity" correspond to *identification* (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 42-43) . Functionalization is a system of reference based on the activities performed by the actor referred to. "Zionist entity", on the other hand, is an instance of identification, because it isolates a quality, in this case, the background ideology that led to the founding of Israel. The focus remains on the Israel's actions and ideas that proved disruptive for the Palestinian people.

It should be specified that none of these expressions are an invention of Hamas, nor is the movement the only one to employ them: Israel referred to as "Zionist entity" or "Zionist Occupation" can be heard or read in a wide variety of Arabic news outlets, for example. So, the use is well integrated within a wider use. However, this does not mean that such choice is unavoidable, and meaningless. In fact,

terms of reference for Israel also provide information for the general representation of the Palestinian question.

In a context where the peace processes were contested for putting Palestine and Israel on the same level, as two countries in war rather than an occupier and an occupied, it is rather clear why the focus would be put on the occupant's actions, as this highlights the inequality which was obscured during peace negotiations. Alternative systems of representation are present, but not as frequently. The word "colony" and the noun "colonizers", for example, are also present. The colonization representation became productive in Palestinian discourse in the 70s, when the resistance started to look out for similar contexts; however, it was dropped by the PLO as soon as the peace processes began (Badarin, 2016). In the corpus, "colony" appears 96 times, with an average frequency of 11 occurrences per 100000 words, all concentrated in the first two decades; the third decade, in fact, falls from the average frequency of 19.6 relative to the first two decades, to the frequency of 6 per 100000 words in the third decade; so, the movement adopted the representation along with the other movements who opposed the negotiations, although it never became a dominant representation.

**Example 51** *Raġma kull mā yumārisuhu al-ʿadū min daġaṭ wa min ḥiṣār mustaqūwīyan bi-qawā al-isti-mār fa-lan na-tarif bi-hadā al-kiyān wa lan na-tarif bi-ay ittifāq ya-tarif bi-l-kiyān wa lan nusaġġil ʿalā ʿanfasunā wa lā ʿalā ša-binā ʿannahu tanāzul ʿan darra wāḥida min turābinā al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqaddasātīnā.*

[ n. 6352, 02/11/2016 ]

Despite all the pressure put by the enemy and **the blockade enforced by the colonization forces**, we will not recognize this entity or any agreement that recognizes it and will not sign ourselves nor our people up for the concession of even one bit of our Palestinian land or our sacred sites.

Sub-groups of the out-group are also very often identified in discourse. For example, *soldiers* or *police*, *security forces* are very often condemned for the abuse or brutality of their acts:

**Example 52** *ʿInnanā nastankir mā yata-arrada lahu al-mu-taqalūn al-ʿabāʾl fī suġūn sulṭat Rām Allāh, wa ʿinhu li-man duwāʿī al-ḥuzn*



*aš-šadīd ʿan al-ʿaǧhaza al-ʿamaniyya i-taqalat fī madīnat Nāblus wa ḥidahā ʿakṭar min 200 šāb mundu al-ḥarb ʿalā Ġaza haḍā ʿadā ʿan al-istidʿāt al-yawmiyya li-miʿāt aš-šabāb wa al-fatīyyāt li-l-ʿaǧhaza al-ʿamaniyya wa i-tiqāl kull man yušārik fī al-faʿāliyyāt at-taḍāmuniyya maʿa Ġaza.*

[ n. 1428, 14/01/2009 ]

We condemn the conditions to which the imprisoned heroes are exposed to in the prisons of the Authority of Ramallah, and this because, sadly, the **security services have arrested** more than 200 people in Nablus alone since [the beginning of] the war on Gaza, in addition to the hundreds of young men and women that were summoned **by the security services**, and the arrests of everyone involved in solidarity activities with Gaza.

**Example 53** *Tataḥammal ḥukūmat al-iḥtilāl aš-šahyūnī al-masʿuūliyya al-kāmila ʿan tadāʿiyyāt haḍihi al-ḥarb wa haḍihi al-maḥraqa, fa-lan naqbil ʿalā al-iḥtilāq ʿan nadfa ʿdarība haḍihi al-ḥimāqāt aš-šahyūniyya waḥidnā, bal sayadfa ʿtaman dalika kull muǧtaṣib šahyūnī wa kull ǧundī šahyūnī ʿalā ʿard Falasṭīn wa fī ʿay makān ʿalā ʿarḍinā, wa lan naqbil ʿayḍan ʿan nuʿīš fī dimāʿ wa ʿiṣlāʿ wa qatal wa dimār baynamā yanʿam al-muǧtaṣībūn aš-šihāhīna wa ǧunūd al-iḥtilāl bi-l-ʿaman wa al-ʿamān fa-lan yašʿarū bihi mā lam yašʿar bihi ʿabnāʿunā fī Ġaza.*

[ n. 1339, 28/12/2008 ]

We hold the government of the Zionist Occupation accountable for the instability caused by this war and this holocaust, and we will not absolutely accept to be only ones to pay for the Zionist stupidity, but **every Zionist violator and every Zionist soldier on the land of Palestine and every corner of our land** will pay the full price, nor we will accept to live among the blood, severed limbs, homicide and destruction while **the Zionist violators and the soldiers of the Occupation enjoy security and protection**, a sensation that our children in Gaza never felt and will never feel.

Statement 1428 shows how the sub-group division is realized for the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the target of the condemnation are the *security services*, the body founded with the Oslo Accords which then coordinated "security actions" with Israel. Here, the actor is clearly derogated as a traitor who arrests innocent victims ("young men and women") and high numbers of people, where the emphasis is built by providing a high number for a single place ("200 arrested in Nablus alone"), without the need to provide a thorough account. The Authority performs actions very similar to those of Israel, and is condemned for this reason. Moreover, this happened during the Cast Lead Operation, which made the actions of the Authority appears as even worse, by taking place in a moment of need for the Palestinian population.

The example taken from statement 1339 precedes the former of a couple of weeks, when the Cast Lead Operation had just begun. The level of specification in defining the actors is deeper, thanks to the distributive quantifiers ("every") which allow for focusing on the accountability of each Israeli soldier as an individual, and not as a group, thus increasing the level of responsibility. They are identified for adherence to the Zionist ideology first, then for being "violators" and "soldiers" and for being located in Palestine, which means that they are carrying out the attacks at the time of the statement. While "soldier" is a *functional* representation, *violation* is both functional and a form of *appraisal*, which takes places when social actors are "referred to in terms which evaluate them as good or bad, as loved or hated, as admired or pitied" (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 45). In this case, "violation" (the word *muğtaşib* can be translated both as violator or rapist) clearly shows a focus on the moral and legal reprehensibility of Israel, who is emphasized as an offender. "Violation" and "soldier" are falsely associated: they are textually juxtaposed as different participant, although they clearly refer to different qualities pertaining to the same individual / group, which might serve strategy of emphasis on the negative qualities, as "violation" is not just the adjective of a noun but a noun itself. The focus is again shifted on the actions committed by Israel during the war: although not explicitly, the vivid image of "blood, severed limbs, homicide and destruction" is a consequence of Israel attack on Gaza.

Appraisal is thus realized by providing the following representations of Israel: criminal offender, irrational and violent individual, oppressor. The figure of the oppressor has been extensively dealt with, with the term "Occupation"; all the references to the blockade imposed on Gaza and limitations to freedom of movement and basic rights add to this representation. In this case, on the linguistic level we have such acts nominalized and very frequently mentioned. The category of "criminal offender", as said beforehand, is related to the breaches of both morals and the law, intended as international law, U.N. resolutions, and so on. First of all, "criminal" occurs as both a noun and an adjective to qualify Israel and its actions:

**Example 54** *Istikmālan li-ḡarīmatihā al-baš'a wa maḡāziriḡā al-nāziyya, tuwāsil qawāt al-iḡtilāl ḡamlat iṡtiqālāt wāsi'a ṡāt al-ālāf min ṡabnāṡšaṡbinā al-muḡāhid aṡ-ṡāmid, wa raṡaṡat fī al-āwna al-ṡaḡīr wa tīrat al-iṡtiqālāt li-tatal- kuwādr al-qiyāda al-siyāsiyya li-ṡšaṡb al-falaṡṡīnī, wa kānat ṡāḡir ḡarāṡimihā iṡtiqāl al-ṡaḡ al-muḡāhid al-qā'id ḡamāl aṡ-ṡawīl ṡaḡad ar-rumūz wa al-qāda al-siyāṡīn li-ḡarkat ḡamās*

[ n. 416, 17/04/2002 ]

In order to complete its **brutal crimes and Nazi massacres**, the Occupation forces continued with a wide campaign of arrests that involved thousands of our *mujahid* and steadfast people, and was started at the last moment and in order to hit the political cadres of the Palestinian people, **and one of its last crimes** was the arrest of the brother *mujahid* leader Jamal at-Tawil, one of the symbols of the political leadership of the Hamas movement.

The example taken from statement 416 shows some of the figures frequently brought up when representing Israel: the violent criminal ("brutal crimes"), the historical metaphor of Nazism ("Nazi massacres"), the strategic planner ("and was started at the last moment and in order to hit the political cadres of the Palestinian people"), the abuse of power (the arrest of Hamas' leadership cadres). What Israel does is intentional and planned, although it remains an irrational and violent being, on the same level of beasts or, in this case, the example of utmost violence, oppression and evil: Nazism. Recurring to Nazism, other than providing a strong comparison in recent history, addresses and incorporates the rhetoric of the enemy, that very often addresses the topics of anti-Semitism and the holocaust. Thus, this might be both an incorporation of the enemy's discourse and, at the same time, a way to address a "different public": the other historical metaphor frequently used in Islamist discourse, and often by Hamas itself, is that of the Crusades, which is more concerned with the Middle East and used to recall a clash with Western civilization. In this case, the metaphor is displaced and addressed to a more "internationally recognized", not Middle East-specific, event. Moreover, it associates the indiscriminate "massacres" and "crimes" of Israel to those of Nazis.

Another very frequent term of appraisal is the adjective "terrorist". This might also be an incorporation of the out-groups' discourse, as Hamas is notably reported by Israel as being a "terrorist movement", and such representation was used during negotiations to prevent its participation; when Israel strikes, it adopts the "retaliation" discourse, legitimizing its military actions as reactions to attacks attributed to Hamas. Also, Fatah, very early in the history of the movement, referred to them as terrorists. Hamas is very aware of this representation, and sometimes answers directly with dedicated statements:

**Example 55** *Biyān/ 1 - sibtimbir - 1994*

*bismi-llāh ar-raḥman ar-raḥīm.*

*Ḥawla taṣrīḥāt ‘Arafāt wa allatī ‘idāna fīhā ‘amliyyat ar-Ramla wa uṣafahā bi-l-‘irhāb, ṣaraḥ maṣdar mas’uūl fī ḥarkat al-muqāwama al-‘islāmiyya (Ḥamās) bimā yalī: ‘In at-taṣrīḥāt al-‘aḥīra li-‘Arafāt wa allatī ‘idān fīhā ‘amliyyat ar-Ramla wa uṣafahā bi-l-‘irhāb, tu‘akid min ḡadīd ‘alā ‘an ‘Arafaāt qad rahan naṣsihi li-l-‘adū aṣ-ṣahyūnī, wa annahu wa sulṭatihi al-hazīla muḡarrad ‘adāa bi-yad al-iḥtilāl, tudāfi‘an maṣāliḥihi wa ta‘mal ‘alā ḥimāyatihi. ‘In ḥarakat Ḥamās ‘id tudīn ‘Arafāt wa taṣrīḥātahu ḥaḍiḥi, fa‘inhā tu‘akid ‘an muqāwama ṣa‘binā li-l-‘adū al-muḥtill satastamirr wa tatawāṣal mā dām al-iḥtlāl mawḡūdan, wa ān muwāqif al-mustaslimīn lan tu‘attir ‘alā masīrat al-ḡihād wa al-muqāwama.*

[ n. 358, 01/09/1994 ]

Statement - 1 September 1994

In the name of God, the most Gracious, the most Merciful.

On Arafat's declarations where he condemns the Ramla operations and describes them as "terrorism", a spokesperson from the movement Hamas states as follows:

The last declarations of Arafat where he condemns the Ramla operations and describes them as "terrorism", proves once again that Arafat has sold himself to the Zionist enemy, and he and his Authority are nothing but a tool in the Occupation's hands, used to defend and preserve their interests.

The Hamas movement condemns Arafat and these declarations, and assures that the resistance of the people to the enemy will continue until the complete demise of the Occupation, and that on the path of jihad and resistance we will not surrender.

The argumentation strategies that emerge in this statement will not be analysed in depth now; however, it can be said that the defence from the accusation of "terrorism" does not address Hamas' actions in any way: there is no clarification, minimization, legitimation strategy whatsoever. In fact, the argumentation is construed by diverting attention to what Arafat is doing and interpreting the accusation of terrorism as a proof of familiarity with the enemy. It is an *ad hominem* fallacy, where the argumentation is built upon destroying the credibility of the arguer (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992).

In 2001, a similar accusation made by Arafat is dealt with as follows:

**Example 56** *ʾIn ḥarmān aš-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī min ḥuq al-difāʿ ʿn al-nafsi wa waṣf ḍalika bi-l-ʾirhāb alladī kāna yaǧib ʾan waṣf bihi al-iḥtilāl muḥālīf li-kull al-qawānīn wa al-ʾi-rāf allatī ʾaṭat aš-šaʿb ḥuq al-difāʿ ʿan an-nafs.*

[ n. 351, 17/12/2001 ]

It is a right to defend the Holy Sites of the Palestinian people, and that is described as "terrorism", when it should be the Occupation to be recognized as a transgressor of all the laws and grant the Palestinians the right to defend themselves.

The last examples show that the argumentation strategy for contrasting the terrorism accusation is still associated with a strategy of the Occupation and, moreover, is negotiated as something that is true for the Occupation. It is defined what "terrorism", in this case, stands for, which is some kind of abusive breach of laws ("when it should be the Occupation to be recognized as a transgressor of all the laws"), which is committed by Israel but not recognized as such. Moreover, Hamas contrasts the accusation with the right to self-defence which is, conversely, perfectly legitimate. When Hamas uses "terrorism" against Israel, it can be used to qualify it, its actions and, very frequently, its people (table 7.10).

Table 7.10: Clusters of "Terrorism" in the general corpus

Rank	Frequency	Cluster
1	59	The Zionist terrorism
2	57	The terrorist Rabin
3	32	The terrorist Sharon
4	17	The terrorist that
5	16	The terrorist Peres
6	14	The terrorist Netanyahu
7	14	and the Zionsit terrorism
8	12	The terrorist against
9	10	The terrorism of the Zionism
10	9	State terrorism

**Example 57** *[...] Daʿam ḥaqīqī li-ṣumūd šaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqāwamatihī, wa mušārikatihī ʾaḇāʿ al-difāʿ ʿan nafsihi wa ʾummatihī fī muwāǧiha*

*ġarā'im Šārūn wa mumārasātihi al-irhābiyya al-mutaṣā'ida, wa al-radd 'alā tilka al-ġarā'im bi-mazīd min al-da'am wa al-ta'ayyd al-mādī wa al-ma'nawī wa as-siyāsī wa al-ġamāhīrī.*

[ n. 691, 22/05/2004 ]

[We ask for] a real support for the steadfastness of our people and their resistance, and participate in the burden of defending itself and its *umma* against **the crimes of Sharon and his increasingly terrorist practices** and react to those crimes with an increasing material, moral, political and social support.

In the example taken from statement 691, terrorism is once again associated with criminal acts, contrasted with the right to self-defence and attributed to a person in particular.

In this regard it can be observed that, with respect to the in-group, the out-group makes a major use of *personalization* in identifying social actors. Specific persons are more often addressed when belonging to the out-group than not. Hamas rarely personalizes its image or its actions, and references to groups and collectivity are widespread. On the other hand, Israeli presidents or Palestinian Authority leaders are very frequently addressed directly, or referred to specifically.

One last observation will be dedicated to the treatment of fellow Arab leaders, when they enter the out-group. Clearly, the diplomatic ties need special attention. Arabic countries are very frequently recognized as part of the shared community of the "Arab and Islamic *umma*"; nonetheless, the movement very often contrasted and was contrasted by fellow Arab leaders, countries, and other prominent figures. Egypt makes a good example: its power on the Rafah passage, and its changing governments from hostile, to benevolent with the Muslim Brother Mohammed Morsi, then hostile again with the military government of al-Sisi made the relationship really complex. Nonetheless, Egypt brokered many encounters between Hamas and Fatah and, in 2017, brokered also the last attempt at national reconciliation. Egypt is very often regarded as a sister country, at least in discourse, despite the 2013 coup and the frequent closures of the Rafah passage.

**Example 58** *ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya Ḥamās ʾid nuʿbir ʿan rafaḍinā li-ḥadā al-qarār al-bāṭil li-nadʿū ʾabnāʾ šaʿbinā wa ʾabnāʾ Miṣr al-ʿaẓīma wa ʾabnāʾ al-ʾumma al-ʿarabiyya wa al-ʾislāmiyya wa aḥrār al-ʿālam li-l-uqūf fī waġh ḥaḍihi al-qarārāt al-latī tastahdīf darb al-qadīyya al-falaṣṭīniyya wa muḥārība al-muqāwama, wa tatasāwraq maʿa al-ʾistrātiġiyya aṣ-ṣahyū- ʾamrīkiyya fī al-mintaqa.*

[ n. 1781, 04/03/2014 ]

We, the movement Hamas, express our refusal towards this absurd decision, **so we invite our people and the great Egypt's people, the people of the Islamic and Arabic *umma***, and the free world to stand up against these decisions that target the Palestinian question and challenge the resistance, and are coordinated with the Zionist-American strategy in the region.

Egypt is not addressed in harsh terms, nor is addressed directly: it is the *action*, the decision, to be judged as "absurd" and which is tackled. Egypt is regarded as "great", and the *umma* is mentioned to provide the common ground with Egypt and its people, which is to be preserved. This derogation strategy, similar to what has been shown in example 45, is very indirect and the potential "face threatening act" is redressed by differentiating among the people and the acts, minimizing their accountability and calling for common ground (Brown and Levinson, 1987, pp. 68-69, 103-104) through the "safe" category of "people" and "Arab people". The context of the statement is Egypt's decision to close all Hamas offices in Egypt, along with the decision to declare it a terrorist movement (Baconi, 2018). Clearly, the decision was taken by the government and it was intentional; nonetheless, the statement seems to shift the accountability to Israel and America alone. This coincides also with a period of relative instability for the movement, which had lost the Muslim Brotherhood support in Egypt and many of its previous allies.

Speaking of which, the final discussion will be dedicated with the relationship with Syria. Syria, along with Iran, had been an historical ally of Hamas. When it had to leave Jordan's office, it moved its foreign office to Damascus, and benefited for a long time of protection and funding (Baconi, 2018; Tamimi, 2011). However, in 2011 the movement decided to support the rebellions, in the hope that in Syria Islamist parties would take the power along with their affiliates in other Arabic countries in revolt, such as Tunisia and Egypt (Baconi, 2018).

Statements between 2011 and 2012, however, tackle the issue by making massive use of another strategy of representation of social actors: *suppression* and *backgrounding* (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 28-29) . In fact, nor the Syrian government nor Assad are nominated in most of the statements. The topics dealt with in the statements regarding Syria are the bombshells and the attacks to the Syrian people and the Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus; however, in these statements only appears an expression of solidarity and support, and passive sentences avoid exposition of who is behind the violent acts; objectivation is, in these cases, a way to produce an indirect and not threatening reference to the agent. In the following example, the bombshell of Yarmuk is not attributed to anyone in particular but to "MIG" aircrafts:

**Example 59** *Ḥawla qaṣf muḥaym al-Yarmūk li-lāğ-iin al-falasṭīnīn bi-Dimašq bi-t-ṭīrān al-ḥarbī "al-Mīğ": [...]*  
*ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat Ḥamās ʾid nuʾakid ʾidānatanā aš-šadīda li-mā yataʾarraḍ lahu aš-šaʿb as-sūrī min ʿadwān mutawāṣil, fa-ʾinnanā nudīn bi-šadda istimrār taʾarruḍ al-muḥaymāt al-falasṭīniyya fī Sūriya li-l-istihdāf wa al-ʿadwān wa al-qaṣf, wa ʾidānatanā aš-šadīda li-istihdāf muḥaym al-Yarmūk al-yawm bi-t-ṭīrān al-ḥarbī, mimmā ʾadā ʾilā suqūṭ ʿadd kabīr min aš-šuhadāʾ wa al-ğaraḥā.*

[ n. 1504, 16/12/2012 ]

For what concerns the bombshell of the Palestinian refugee camp Yarmuk, near Damascus, with MIG war aircrafts: [...]

We, the movement Hamas, confirm our strong condemnation of the continuous aggressions that the Syrian people are exposed to, and we strongly condemn that the Palestinians camps in Syria are still the target of the aggressions and bombs, and we condemn the today's targeting of the Yarmuk camp with war aircrafts that resulted in a high number of martyrs and injured people.

The suppression can, sometimes, be applied to actions. In statement 1498 (03/10/2012), Hamas defend the then leader of the political office Khaled Meshal from a "mediatic attack" on the part of the official Syrian channels, but the nature of the attack is not specified:

**Example 60** *ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat Ḥamās nuʾbir ʿan al-ʾasaf aš-šadīd li-mā ʾawraduhu al-talfazyūn as-sūrī ar-rasmī min huğūm wa šatāʾim ʿalā al-ʾaḥ Ḥālīd Mišʿal raʾīs al-Ḥaraka wa ʿalā al-ḥaraka nafsihā.*  
*ʾIn ḥarakat Ḥamās al-multasiqa biš-šaʿbihā wa muqāwamatihi wa ḥuqūqihi ʾid tanʾaā bi-nafsihā ʿan al-duḥūl fī ʾaiyya mahātarāt ʾislāmiyya, fa-ʾinhā satabqā maʿa ʾummatihā al-ʿarabiyya wa al-ʾislāmiyya, wa taṭallaʿāt šuʿūbihā fī al-ḥuriyya wa al-karāma wa al-dīmuqrāṭiyya.*

[ n. 1498 03/10/2012 ]

We, the movement Hamas, express our profound disappointment for the attacks and insults on brother Khaled Meshal, president of the movement, broadcast on the Syrian State Tv, that hit also the movement itself.

The movement Hamas is devoted to its people, its resistance and their



rights, it refuses to be involved in mediatic quarrels, and it remains with our Arabic and Islamic *umma* and in the endeavour towards freedom, dignity and democracy for the peoples.

The statements answers to the accusation, aired on Syrian State television, to Khaled Meshal to be an "ungrateful child" for supporting the uprisings against Bashar al-Assad while Damascus had welcomed him when he was sent away from Jordan <sup>4</sup> and of neglecting the due attention to the Palestinian people, because of its alliance with Egypt and Turkey.

## 7.5 Concluding remarks

The analysis on in-group and out-group provided for information useful in order to better define ideological categories such as the ideological square, and understand how it works within the specific context of a movement which is at the same time a government party and a party under Occupation. The analysis also showed which elements of Hamas' context proved relevant for the shaping of its representations, such as the constraints entailed by the affiliation to over-arching categories ("Arab and Islamic *umma*") and the nature of such relationship, as it had been shaped in history. The relevance of context is of the utmost importance, especially historical and social context, also when dealing with apparently commonly known notions, such as nation and nationalism.

The relationship with the other members of the in-group is built on stable and safe categories, such as "people" and "*umma*", which are brought up in legitimation, argumentation, or redressing of face threatening acts; such words are connoted positively, and their semantic perception is more concerned with their affective-associative meaning than conceptual meaning (Leech, 1974). The same can be said for negative terms used in derogation, such as Nazi and terrorism, which effectively pursue negative appraisal; in the case of terrorism, Hamas provides its own interpretation of the term as something relating to breaking the laws and being abusive, thus building on the meaning of a word which is currently a general and wide category mostly used to derogate rather than to describe or denote in detail any given act or phenomenon. The analysis also stimulated some reflections on the dynamics of discourse of the dominating powers in relation to the discourse of the dominated, and on the peculiarities of Arabic language in dealing with the analytical categories employed.

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<sup>4</sup>"Transcript of Editorial on Syrian TV State", New York Times, 2 October 2012, (Barnard and Mourtada, 2012)

### 7.5.1 The ideological square

The analysis showed how the ideological square (van Dijk, 2006a) is performed (table 7.11).

Table 7.11: Ideological Square: Hamas' discourse

	<b>Us</b>	<b>Them</b>
<b>Emphasis on:</b>	§Semiotic action: expression of opinion, condemn, praise... §Character qualities connected to values; §Social actors reference based on groups rather than individuals; §Passivation; §Extension, in time and space, of the abuses suffered; §Common values and goals; §Moral consistence of the Palestinian cause.	§Material action: war, violence, abuses, aggressions, colonization and settlements; §Semiotic action: threats and lies, ideology; §Accountability of individuals, such as political leaders; §Qualities: irrationality, aggressiveness, intentionality, brutality ( <i>Israel</i> ); lack of responsibility, traitors, not safeguarding unity ( <i>Authority</i> ); §Qualities of actions: frequency, extension in time and space, modality, consequences, victims; §Moral and legal accountability.
<b>Minimization on:</b>	§Action in general; §Differences among political loyalties in the people; §accusations moved by external actors (international organizations, media, Arabic countries).	§Explicit reference to actors or actions ( <i>Arabic countries</i> ) and accountability in actions; §Semiotic action; §Motives; §Casualties in war.

It seems that the first criteria for polarization of the two groups pertains the difference between *semiotic action* and *material action*, in relation to respectively *passivation* and *activation*; as already mentioned earlier in this chapter, this serves the purpose to focus the attention of the abuses and violence of Israel and the Authority, in a context where normally they control the dominant narrative worldwide and, in addition to this, Hamas is not recognized as a legitimate counterpart in international politics, at least by Western actors and most Arab actors. This might

also be consistent with another, more subtle polarization: human and less than human. Israel, in fact, is depicted with animalesque traits which revolve around various degrees of violence and irrationality. In this sense, the opposition is built with the in-group who performs mainly mental and verbal actions and shows itself, then, more as "speaking" and "thinking" rather than acting, thus privileging passive but more exclusively human capabilities. Moreover, Israel's words are rarely reported, unless they constitute lies or threats, maintaining in this way the control on what is being said and who says it within the representation provided by Hamas.

The same does not happen when the "enemy" is an Arab/Islamic actor or country; in fact, as recognized in terms of kinship, it is not designated as irrational and animalesque. Very often the critics are minimized by, for example, maintaining the family metaphor and address them as "brothers/sisters", or representing the offence as something not totally intentional or permanent. In the case of Syria, this was taken to the extreme of omitting references to the actor and its actions, by the means of suppression and backgrounding in combination with passivization and objectivation.

### **7.5.2 Dominant and dominated discourse**

The last section leads to another observation. Israel's words are not reported, and the dominant voice is that of Hamas, very often voiced through its people; however, in real life, it is very clear that Israel dominates at least the Western narrative, and benefits from a higher power and means. In (Suleiman, 2004) is addressed the issue of "incorporation of discourse", as the author recognizes in terms such as "concessions" used for the retreat of Israel from Gaza in 2005 a controversial practice: Israel's occupation of Gaza was an abuse and was illegal, which means it was not a concession at all. Nonetheless, in Palestinian discourse the reference became widespread, taken directly from the peace processes discourse. Who is in power usually dominates discourse as well, and it is very common that its representation would permeated the dominated discourse. On the other hand, the dominant power can sometimes incorporate and modify the representations of the oppressed.

In the case of Hamas, we have observed that some tropes of Israeli discourse are used extensively by the movement. The use of "Nazi" and "terrorist" as derogative moves are an example of this practice. Although Hamas is now in power, it remains subaltern to Israel's domination and its attempts at dominating the occupant's rhetoric remain mostly unheard. In fact, although metaphors such as the Nazi metaphor would theoretically appeal more to, for example, a Westerner, than more local metaphors like the Crusades, Hamas' way of representing the events does not exits its limited range. The same can be said for the "terrorist" represen-

tation, which is hard for the movement to get rid of, and which remains a strong image in the Western media and political scene. This shows very clearly how a given rhetorical strategy does not guarantee alone the same success of those who employ the same in a context of power and political convenience.

### **7.5.3 A note on language-specific variables**

Van Leeuwens' reflections are, as the author himself declare, based on an analysis of the representation of social actors "in English Discourse" (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 23). Although its analytic categories work perfectly for the present analysis, some remarks need to be made. Arabic language includes some stylistic norms and syntactic possibilities that encourage the use the nominalized verb, the *maṣḍar* or "verbal noun", substantially more than would occur in English. For this reason, when dealing with categories such as *objectivation*, where nominalizations are recognized as a preferred linguistic device, its weight should be re-balanced taking into consideration that nominalized verbs might very likely occur more often than verbs in Arabic. For this reason, nominalization remains less marked in Arabic than in English. A way to tackle the issue is to identify or features that would make the nominalization relevant: frequency, for example, might be a possibility, whether the term is often repeated in combination with a participant or another ideological category. In the case of the present study, recurrent nominalized actions were taken into consideration and analysed.

Another possibility of analysis is how the nominalization was performed: different degrees of generalization and specification may, in fact, be realized ("resistance" is a very generic term, while "campaign of arrests" is more specific on the actions performed), and this might be of relevance for an ideological analysis.

In conclusion, the way to interpret the relationship between analytical categories and linguistic structures might need to be renegotiated step by step during the analysis.



# Chapter 8

## VALUES

### 8.1 Introduction

Values are a type of belief that a group share to orientate evaluation in opinions and attitudes (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 11). Values are the object of studies in different fields; in philosophy, value theory is conceptualized as an interdisciplinary object, that encompasses different fields of philosophy, and is concerned with "evaluation", or, more specifically, as a branch of moral philosophy concerned with varieties of goodness (Stanford University. and Center for the Study of Language and Information (U.S.) (1997).)

Value theory is also a branch of social psychology, especially in its elaboration by Milton Rokeach. Rokeach, starting from a study on racism in the United States, that primarily showed how discriminatory behaviour on race may, in a context where racism is not institutionalized, be curbed by common ground on values and beliefs, even in highly discriminatory subjects (Rokeach, 1966). The study showed the importance of beliefs in social behaviour, and their value in predicting how the subjects would act. Moreover, it also showed how beliefs were highly underestimated in current perception, and how discrimination based on race would be realized only under social constraints (Rokeach, 1966, p. 171). This led to following studies trying to inquire the nature of beliefs in connection to identity; values are thus defined as "enduring prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs that a specific mode of conduct (instrumental value) or end state of existence (terminal value) is preferred to another mode of conduct or end state (Rokeach, 1973)" (Mayton et al., 1994, p. 3-4). Rokeach developed a system of measurement, the "Rokeach Value Survey", that he employed as a system of research on a research on values in the United States, " that would provide information both about value stability and change at macro and micro levels". The research was based on a set of 18 conceptions of "desirable", that he distinguishes into "termi-

nal values", or "goals", and "instrumental values", that together orientate attitudes and behaviours towards a variety of issues (Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 776). The research also led to important conclusions about change and stability in the system of values: change is prompted by feelings self-dissatisfaction caused by a belief system that may have been disproved or found ineffective, while value stability is motivated by feelings of self-satisfaction produced by the individual's belief system that has been confirmed in some way (Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 782).

A universalistic approach is found in (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987), that tries to find an "a priori" conceptual mapping of human values that is organized in terms of priorities concerned with compatible or incompatible goals.

According to (Rohan, 2000), values are defined as "a stable meaning-producing superordinate cognitive structure" (Rohan, 2000, p. 257), which places them within the cognitive dimension and emphasizes their organizational function of knowledge and experience. For the purpose of the present work, the selection of the possible "candidates" for values is based on the different uses of such constructs within the text, allowing for a reasonable degree of overlap among the categories. In fact, the same concept can occur both as value or instrument. For example, *ṣumūd* and *muqāwama* (respectively "steadfastness" and "resistance") might both be considered "values", because they orientate desired behaviour (ie. forms of resistance to the Occupant are preferred to surrender or collaborationism), but also "instruments", as they operate as hypernyms of different realizations of resistance (armed resistance, demonstrations, boycott, as well as individual-improving acts, such as education of children, in the case of *ṣumūd*). However, they are treated differently in the text, as *ṣumūd* is usually a quality of participants (frequently an adjective or "possessed" element in possessive synthetic structures) while *muqāwama* is frequently metaphorized as a road ("the trail of resistance"), nominalized and used as participant in transitivity (actor, carrier), and explicitly associated to an outcome (liberation of Palestine; "resistance is the only way to liberate Palestine"). For this reason, and for the sake of the analysis, the two terms will be differently categorized.

Terms categorized as "values" constitute a comprehensive category of abstract conceptualizations regarding desired behaviour, such as spirit of sacrifice and steadfastness, determination, faith, but also character qualities, such as strength of will, capability to make choices, and so on. Values are usually related to participants and their behaviour, in order to praise them ("steadfast" is used as a positive adjective) or legitimize their actions. Analysis of values shows what Hamas considers, in a specific moment, to be the most desirable attitude or behaviour.

In the present case, the terms and expressions that have been regarded as "values" share the property of orienting the participants' attitudes towards the out-group and the in-group. In the first case, values validate as positive the acts of

resistance to Israel and the perseverance in this resistance, and they are worded in terms of mental abilities and qualities (determination, will, steadfastness, firmness, opposition, sacrifice). In the second case, values orientate towards group cohesion, such as the value of "unity" and "nation".

As we shall see further on, values are linguistically encoded mainly as nouns and adjectives.

## 8.2 Values. Methodology of research

The study on the sample corpus resulted in slight changes in the configuration of the system of values, and a more marked change in the system of instruments which can be interpreted as connected to political changes of the movement. The system of *Values* draws heavily from pre-existing conceptualizations in Palestinian discourse and Palestinian political discourse. The analysis was performed with a special focus on semantic changes. First of all, all value-related words and expressions were annotated in the sample corpus, in order to provide for a general diachronic distribution. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the dynamics behind semantic change, a narrow selection of the core values and instruments was analysed further within the methodological framework of Frame Analysis (Fillmore and Baker, 2010) considered as an adequate instrument for inquiring how these core concepts have been profiled and which meaning associations have been added to them through time, if such associations remained stable, and how to such meanings are conceptualized.

### 8.2.1 Struggle related values: *ṣumūd*, *ṣabr*, martyrdom

#### *Ṣumūd*

*Ṣumūd*, usually translated as *steadfastness*, is a term whose meaning is historically situated and whose presence has been a constant in Palestinian discourse (Rijke and van Teeffelen, 2014). In the sample corpus, it occurs 19 times as the adjective *ṣāmīd* and 30 as the noun *ṣumūd*. In the general corpus, the proportions are similar: 285 occurrences of the adjectival form, 775 occurrences of the noun form; this makes it one of the most recurrent terms in the corpus, with a frequency of 123.7 per 100000 words. The word appears without significant changes through the decades. *Ṣumūd* is a concept which became productive in Palestinian discourse on resistance especially beginning from the Sixties. Such kind of resistance can be realized in different ways, either active and armed resistance or personal acts of resilience, such as studying, not giving up, being active in advocacy or associations. It qualifies as a core value not only in Hamas' discourse, but



also in everyday discourses of the Palestinians within the Territories and the diaspora and their narrative, and became "[one of the] generative concepts for sharing countless but unique stories of daily struggle across the many borders imposed on Palestinians" (Rijke and van Teeffelen, 2014, p. 95). Thus, this term encompasses a wide range of meanings which include resistance in different forms, such as civil society engagement.

As an adjective, it is usually applied to single persons or to the Palestinian people; the noun *ṣumūd* appears frequently in combination with other ideological structures, mainly values and instruments, connected to the struggle, such as *resistance* and *sacrifice*:

**Example 61** *Ġaza tawāṣala ṣumūdaha wa muqāwamataha al-bāsila*

[n. 1428, 14/01/2009]

Gaza persisted in her **steadfastness and brave resistance**

**Example 62** *ʿAbdaʿat ḡamāhīr al-falasṭīnī fī ṣumūdiha wa buṭūlatiha wa taḍḥiyātiha*

[n. 1776, 27/08/2014]

Our Palestinian masses have renovated their **steadfastness, heroism and spirit of sacrifice**

**Example 63** *ʿIn ḡanūb Lubnān aṣ-ṣāmid yataʿarraḍ mundu ʿadda ʿayām li-ʿadwān ṣahyūnī wāsiʿ an-niṭāq*

[n. 187, 28/05/1992]

The **steadfast** south of Lebanon has been facing, for some days, an extensive Zionist aggression

The most frequent clusters of co-occurrence are "*ṣumūd* and resistance", "*ṣumūd* and firmness", "*ṣāmid* and patient", "*ṣumūd* of the people", "*ṣumūd* and victory". This distribution does not change much through time, and the use and representation of *ṣumūd* remains stable and focused on the context of Palestinian struggle. An analysis of collocations shows that the words which most frequently occurs within its range are "our people", "Palestinian", "resistance", "Gaza", "masses", "aggressions":

Table 8.1: Collocations relative to *ṣumūd* and *ṣāmid*

Rank	Frequency	Frequency L	Frequency R	Collocate
2	15	11	4	In
3	13	6	7	On
4	11	7	4	From
5	10	6	4	Palestinian
6	9	4	5	The resistance
7	6	2	4	Towards
8	5	4	1	Gaza
9	5	3	2	The people ( <i>ṣaʿab</i> )
10	4	0	4	And the resistance
11	4	2	2	Our people ( <i>ahlunā</i> )

*Ṣumūd* is thus, in this case, one facet of the general idea of "struggle". However, its use by Hamas might be considered a narrowing of its general meaning, as the term is commonly used in a wider sense. Similarly to other ideological items, it is often associated with the actions of *continuing*, *insisting*, *strengthening*, *choosing*: the term profiles a matrix of frames (Fillmore and Baker, 2010) concerned not only with rebellion and resistance, but also with processes of public decisioning on one side and the necessity to continue it on the other side, which implicates that it is conceived of as a process that someone (the Israelis) is trying to terminate.

**Example 64** *ʾIn ṭarīqunā ila al-Quds aš-šarīf lā tazāl ṭawīla, wa ʾin maʿarakatunā maʿa al-iḥtilāl la-istirdād ḥuqūqanā wa ʾarḍanā wa karāmatanā li-ittizāl mustamarra wa ʾin ʿaddatunā li-istkmāl ḥadihi aṭ-ṭarīq wa taḥqīq ʾahdāfinā al-waṭanyya wa-l-zaḥar bi-l-intiṣār al-muʿazar ʿalā ʿadwān al-muḡarrim, hiya al-mazīd min al-aymān wa-ṣ-ṣabr wa-ṣ-ṣumūd wa-l-mazīd min aš-šuhadāʾ wa-l-tadḥyāt*

[n. 648, 7/03/1996]

Jerusalem is still a long way to go, and our fight with the Occupation to claim our rights, our land, our dignity continues. Our promise to follow this way and realize our national goals and victory over our criminal enemy, **is to increase** faith, patience (*ṣabr*) and **steadfastness** and to increase martyrdom and sacrifice

**Example 65** *Tamāniya sanawāt hiya ʿamr al-ḥisār al-ḡāʿir al-mafrūd ʿala qiṭāʿ Ġaza, lākinnaha raḡm qasāwatiha wa ʿalamiha wa istimrāriha lam taffat min ʿaḍudiya ṣaʿbina fi Ġaza aṣ-ṣābira, wa lam tukassir min ʿirāda ṣumūdihi wa niḍālihi*

[n. 648, 7/03/1996]

Eight years have passed since the unjust blockade was imposed on Gaza, but despite its harshness, pain and duration, it did not weaken the strength of our people in the patient Gaza, and did not break **its will for steadfastness and struggle**

### ***Ṣabr***

The term *ṣabr*, "patience", shares part of its meaning with *ṣumūd*, as it designates also "persistence" and "steadfastness", although it implicates a religious connotation. In the Quran, it is narrated that the Prophet Muhammad was invited to "be patient" like the "Apostles of God", and whoever qualifies as patient against difficulties is promised reward in the afterlife without condition; it is also a required quality for practising minor jihad, that is to say the struggle against threats to Muslim communities, in which case is better translated as "endurance" rather than "patience" (Wensinck, 1995, 685-686).

In the texts, the term is very often the attribute of the word "people". It occurs as noun and adjective with the same frequency both in the sample corpus (13 as adjective, 15 as noun) and in the general corpus (339 as adjective, 374 as noun, with a total average frequency of 83.2 occurrences per 100000 words). As a noun, in a similar way to *ṣumūd*, it is associated with other terms referring to the revolutionary ideology. The most recurrent clusters are: *patient Palestinians, patient people, faith and patience, jihad and patience, steadfast and patient*.

**Example 66** *Waqafa al-iḥtilāl wa waqafa al-ʿadwān wa ḥimāyat al-atfāl wa-l-nisāʾ wa abnāʾ šaʿbinā, fa-min ḥuq hādā aš-šaʿb al-muṣābir ʿan yudāfi ʿan nafsihi wa ʿan ʿardihi wa muqassasātihi bimā yastaṭiʿ.*

[n. 1260, 25/03/2008]

(...) to put an end to Occupation, stop the attacks and protect children, women and our people, so it is the right of our **patient people** to defend themselves, their land and their sacred sites in every possible way.

**Example 67** *Fī mustahal šahr Ramaḍān al-ʿaẓīm ʿām 1409 H., šahr al-ḡihād wa-l-ṣabr, šahr al-futuḥāt wa al-naṣr, wa min Falasṭīn at-ṭāhira, ʿarḍ al-isrāʾ wa-l-maʿrāḡ.*

[n. 80, 07/04/1989]

At the beginning of the month of Ramadan of 1409 H., **the month of jihad and patience**, the month of conquests, victory, and from the pure land of Palestine, the land of the Ascension.

In this last example, *ṣabr* is elevated as a characteristic of the sacred month of Ramadan, thus making explicit its religious relevance and prestige.

## Martyrdom

The notion of martyrdom is central to Hamas' ideology. The term comes from the root (*š, h, d*), which pertains the semantic field of "observing" and, in the third verbal form *šāhada*, from which the term is derived, means "to bear witness". Martyrs are those who die during the struggle, regardless of the kind of involvement in the event that leads to their death: either they are fighters, soldiers, "martyrs of the struggle" (*šuhadaʾ al-maʿraka*, (Kohlberg)) or civilian casualties, they are still called martyrs. News outlets in the Arabic world regularly use the term to refer to casualties. Similarly, Hamas refers to people that died as casualty and people that died fighting as "martyrs".

For what concerns its religious conceptualization, the word appears in the Quran referring to those "slain in the way of God". The religious tradition developed the figure as follows:

A large body of traditions describes the bliss awaiting the martyr. All his sins will be forgiven; he will be protected from the torments of the grave; a crown of glory will be placed on his head; he will be married to seventy-two houris and his intercession will be accepted for up to seventy of his relations. When the martyrs behold the delights awaiting them, they will ask to be brought back to life and killed again; but this is one request which even they will be denied. (...) According to some traditions, the spirits of the martyrs will ascend directly to Paradise, there to reside in the crowns of green birds near God's throne. During the Resurrection these spirits will be returned to the martyr's earthly bodies and the martyrs will then be given their abode in Paradise

(Kohlberg, p. 204)

It is also used as epithet for figures who emerged for particular merits, such as Ahmad Yassin, and, when he died (only in this case), Yasser Arafat (statement n. 962, 11/11/2005).

**Example 68** *Raḥm Allāh aš-šayḥ al-qā'id aš-šahīd 'Aḥmad Yāsīn wa ihwānihi.*

[n. 684, 22/03/2004]

May God's mercy be upon the **martyr** chief Ahmad Yassin and his brothers.

**Example 69** *'Innanā fi ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-'islāmiyya Ḥamās fi dīkrā as-sanawiyya li-iḡtiyāl ar-rā'is Yāsir 'Arafāt nu'akid (...) bi-'anna sabab ḥisār ar-rā'is 'Arafāt wa iḡtiyālihi lāḥiqa tumma bi-sabab iṣrār ar-rā'is aš-šahīd 'ala at-tamassuk bi-l-ṭawābit bi-l-waḥda al-waṭaniyya.*

[n. 962, 11/11/2005]

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, in the first anniversary of the assassination of the president Yasser Arafat, declare [...] that the reason for the siege on the president Yasser Arafat and his murder followed the determination of the **martyr president** to hold on stability and national unity.

The term *istišhād*, or "search for martyrdom", was used in the early 1980s to refer also to suicide operations, which took place first in Iran during the Iraq invasion, then in Lebanon, committed by Hezbollah against the Israeli occupation (Hillenbrand and Leccese, 2016, pp. 280-282). Thus, the possibility to consider suicide operations as "martyrdom" was born in Shiite environments. The act of suicide is not permitted in Islam, and the idea of suicide operations as martyrdom is extremely controversial. Hamas performed its first suicide operation in April 1994, following the Hebron Mosque massacre in February 1994, when Baruch Goldstein, a follower of the extremist Jewish Orthodox movement Kach, opened fire on the people gathered for the Friday prayer killing 29. Such attacks are framed by Hamas as "martyrdom operations", *ʿamliyāt istišhadiyya*. The debate has interested religious scholar especially from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. While most of them openly condemned suicide operations as forbidden in Islam, other scholars availed them as legitimate acts of sacrifice performed by the *muğahidūn*, in contexts of self-defence where canonical ways of fighting are not sufficient (Tamimi, 2011, pp. 180-183). Thus, martyrdom as suicide operation constitute a recent innovation with respects to Islamic tradition and is strongly connected to recent Islamic movements. Nonetheless it requires some form of doctrinal legitimation, which depends on the values of sacrifice and jihad.

The statements which announce the death of martyrs follow a standard structure, have already been treated in the chapter dedicated to genres (chapter 6).

As a value, can be found both the occurrences for "martyrdom" and "seek of martyrdom", respectively *šahāda* and *istišhād*, with a significant majority for the first one (722 in general corpus, 22 in sample corpus) with respect to the second one (167 in general corpus, 8 in sample corpus). *Istišhād* is also frequently used in the closing formula "to Jihad... victory or martyrdom", thus binding the concept to the struggle contextualized as jihad, with the only outcomes of martyrdom or victory. Such formula occurs often as closure of the statements, especially when the topics dealt with regard fighting on the field. *Šahāda* occurs frequently in association which sacrifice and other means of struggle:

**Example 70** *ʿIn maʿrakat al-Furqān ġassadat fīnā rūḥ at-taḍḥiyya, al-fidāʿ, wa-š-šahāda, wa-l-išrār.*

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

The Battle of the Criterion reinforced in us **the spirit of sacrifice, fidaʿ, martyrdom, and determination.**

**Example 71** *Fī tašrīn at-tānī min kull ʿām yaḥtill aš-šuhadā waḡha al-ʾaḥdāt wa taṭfūn bi-tʾaliq fawq dākira ašaʿb al-Falasṭīnī al-mutaqilla bi-t-tawārīḡ wa-l-aḥdāt tašrīn at-tānī yaḥmal maʿahu kullamā ḡall dakriyāt istišhād al-ʾabṭāl miṭla aš-šayḡ ʿAzz ad-Dīn al-Qassām wa šayḡ Furḡān as-Saʿadī wa šayḡ ʿAbdallāḡ ʿAzzām, wa abnāʾihim (...) wa ʾaḡarīn miman sārū ʿala darab al-ḡihād wa-š-šahāda dafāʿan ʿan karāmat al-umma wa ḡuqūqiha as-salība.*

[n. 675, 27/11/1996]

Every year, in November, **martyrs** take the stage and shine within the memory of the Palestinian people, burdened by the dates and anniversaries of November, which are recalled with the memory of the **martyrs** or heroes such as *šaykh* Ezzedine Qassam, *šaykh* Furhan as-Saʿadī, *šaykh* Abdallah Azzam, their sons (...) and others among those who **followed the path of jihad and martyrdom defending the dignity of the umma and its rights.**

Table 8.2: Martyrdom: collocations

Rank	Frequency	Frequency L	Frequency R	Collocate
1	14	14	0	or
2	12	12	0	victory
3	12	12	0	jihad
4	17	10	7	shaykh
5	9	9	0	and he
6	15	9	6	and
7	14	7	7	the chief

As shown in the table, occurrences of **martyr** are very often associated with victory, jihad, and prominent figures (such as *shaykh*). References to "martyrdom operations" occur twice in the sample corpus:

**Example 72** *Taʿlan bi-uḡūḡ ʾan al-ḡiyuḡāfiyya lan taḡadd min našāṭiha al-ḡihādiyya al-muqāwim, wa ʾan muqāwamatihā bi-kāfa ʾādawātihā al-ḡihādiyya wa ʿala rʾasiha al-ʾamliyāt al-istišhādiyya satatawāṣal bi-īḡan Allāḡ, wa sayazull kull šaḡṣ aw muwaḡṣaḡyūnī hadfan mubāširan li-muḡāhidīnā.*

[n. 535, 08/03/2003]

[Hammas] states clearly that geography will not pose a limit to its acts of jihad and resistance, and that its resistance [is made] with all the instruments of jihad, especially **the martyrdom operations** which will continue if God allows it, and every Zionist place and person will remain a target of our *muğahidun*

**Example 73** *Wa ʿin yaftaḥū kull al-ḥyārāt ʿamāmuhum bimā fihā wa ɗarb āl-amaq ṣ-ṣaḥyūnī ḥatta yadfaḥadā al-muḥtill aṣ-ṣaḥyūnī wa ḥukūmatihi al-muğarrim ṭaman ġirāʿimihim ġālyā.*

[n. 1339, 28/12/2008]

[We ask to the Palestinian factions] to open to every option in front of them, such as the **martyrdom operations** and hitting the Zionists deeply to make them pay the price of their Occupation and their criminal government.

Martyrdom operations, thus, include all acts of military nature and are framed within the discourse of jihad. Clearly, no mentions of "suicide" are ever present, and the only connection with the idea of immolation is the word "sacrifice". This kind of representation seeks legitimacy on a religious level, by presenting martyrdom as sacrifice, battle martyrdom, and within the specific context of resistance. There is no further level of specification about the nature of the operations, as they are understood to be any kind of armed struggle. Hamas' armed struggle is referred to frequently by alternative uses of the word "operation": heroic operations (61 occurrences in general corpus), resistance operations (22), jihadi operations (19).

### **Sacrifice**

The notion of sacrifice is clearly connected to how martyrdom is conceptualized, both in Hamas' perception and in doctrinal representation of martyrdom (see 8.2.1). Sacrifices are made by the people seeking freedom and liberation and showing resilience against harsh conditions of life. In fact, the word frequently appears associated to other values or within the metaphor of "road" towards liberation:



**Example 74** *ʿIn maʿarakat al-Furqān ġassadat finā rūḥ at-taḍḥya, wa-l-fidāʿ, wa-š-šahāda, wa-l-ʿiṣrār.*

[n. 1339, 28/12/2008]

The Battle of the Criterion reinforced in us the spirit of **sacrifice**, *fiḍaʿ*, martyrdom, determination

**Example 75** *ʿIn ṭarīqunā ʿilā al-Quds aš-šarīf lā tazāl ṭawīla, wa ʿin maʿrakatunā maʿa al-iḥtilāl li-istirdād ḥuqūqanā wa ʿarḍanā wa karāmatanā lā tazāl mustamarra wa ʿin ʿaddatunā li-istkmāl ḥaḍihi aṭ-ṭarīq wa taḥqīq ʿahdāfanā al-waṭaniyya wa-l-zaḡfar bi-l-intiṣār al-mʿuazar ʿalā ʿadūwanan al-muḡarrim hiya al-mazīd min al-ʿimān wa-ṣ-ṣabr wa-ṣ-ṣmūd wa-l-mazīd min aš-šuhadāʿ **wa-t-taḍḥiyāt.***

[n. 648, 07/03/1996]

Our way to Jerusalem is still long, and our struggle against the Occupation to claim our rights, our land and our dignity continues, we promise to carry on this road, realize our national goals and win over our criminal enemy, with more faith, *ṣabr*, *ṣmūd*, more martyrdom and **sacrifices**.

Table 8.3: *Sacrifice*: clusters

Rank	Frequency	Range	Cluster
1	2	2	To prepare for sacrifices
2	1	1	the most magnificent sacrifices
3	1	1	heroism and sacrifice
4	1	1	the martyrs and the sacrifice
5	1	1	the martyrs, the sacrifice
6	1	1	ṣmūd and sacrifices
7	1	1	with their offers and sacrifices
8	1	1	following the sacrifices
9	1	1	despite the sacrifices
10	1	1	the spirit of sacrifice

Sacrifice thus lies at the core of the other struggle related values, and it is represented in a very similar way. The previous examples show how it is frequently associated to *ṣabr* and *ṣmūd* and other resistance related values.

Table 8.4: *Sacrifice*: Collocates

Rank	Frequency	Frequency L	Frequency R	Collocate
1	7	2	5	from
2	6	2	4	in
3	4	2	2	on
4	4	1	3	following
5	4	3	1	resistance
6	4	2	2	the martyrs
7	2	2	0	and its sacred sites
8	2	2	0	and its
9	2	2	0	will not stop
10	2	2	0	its offer

### 8.2.2 Character-related values: determination, dignity, courage

The other set of values which emerge in Hamas' discourse pertains the sphere of moral strength and character. They frequently qualify animated entities, preferably the Palestinian people, the actors involved in resistance (martyrs), personified places (Gaza).

Such values praise bravery and determination and are necessary for carrying out the resistance and deal with the harsh conditions imposed on the population while maintaining honour and dignity.

#### Determination

Being determined, insistent, firm is a frequently evoked quality in Hamas' statements. Such quality is related mainly with the act of pursuing the final objectives, which the people or the movement should not let go of (examples 77, 78). Such value emerges from a variety of terms and expressions which are all connected with having a strong will and not surrendering:

**Example 76** *Fa'irādatunā 'aṣlab min al-ḥadīd.*

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

and our will is harder than iron.

**Example 77** *ʾI ṣrāran ʿalā muwāṣila ṭarīq al-ḡihād ḥtta tahrīr waṭninā al-maḡṣūb bi-ʾi dan Allāh.*

[n. 147,16/12/1990]

[we are] **insisting on continuing on the path of jihad** until liberation of our extorted land, God permitting.

**Example 78** *ṣumūdan wa ṭabātan wa muwāṣila li-nahḡ al-ḡihād wal-muqāwama.*

962;11/11/2005

[being] steadfast, **firm**, and continuing on the path of jihad and resistance.

**Example 79** *fa-ʾi rhāb aṣ-ṣahāyna ʾaktar haṣāša min ʾan yukassir ʾirādat ṣaʿb yamūt wāqifan.*

n. 756, 21/08/1997

the Zionist terrorism is too fragile to **break the will** of a people who die standing on their feet.

The examples show how the idea of being firm and determined is expressed by the metaphor of the "will" as an object whose material is particularly resistant (iron, for example) and unbreakable (examples 76, 79). This idea is also connected to the representation of resisting as standing up to, both figuratively and physically. In fact, the words connected to the concept of "resisting" (*ṣumūd*, *muqāwama*, *murābiṭ*) are all related with the idea of standing up (*qāwama*) and hold still against an obstacle (*rābaṭa*). The other conceptual association of determination is continuity, which usually correspond to practising resistance or pursuing the final goals of the movement, such as liberation of Palestine. In this sense it is frequently inserted in the "path" metaphor.

A first consideration to be drawn is that Hamas built its self-representation on being an alternative to the PLO which was involved in peace processes and, as

a consequence, had to consistently give up most of Palestinian claims on self-determination and rights. The discourse on rights, for example, had been stabilized into fixed formulas about "inalienable rights" (*ḥuqūq al-tābita*, where *tābit*, "inalienable", means also "firm") which were never really dealt with during negotiations, and the claims on return of the lands had been abandoned for having peace in return (Badarin, 2016). In this context, while Hamas employs expressions which are not originated by the movement, the insistence on being determined is consistent with presenting itself as the movement which will not give up its promises (liberation) and methods (armed struggle, jihad, resistance) as the PLO had done.

### Dignity

"Dignity" holds a strong symbolic value within Palestinian discourse. The term occurred, for example, during the recent hunger strike of the Palestinian prisoners in 2017, whose slogan was "Salt and Dignity".

In the PLO charter, the concept of dignity was strictly connected with the possession of land: in this sense, liberating the land meant retrieving honour and dignity (Badarin, 2016). In its research on identity in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Bjawi-levine explains how the concept is taught to children together with the discourse on rights and their empowering effect, and how the children mention dignity when asked "how they perceive themselves", explaining that *karama* means "knowing their own value" (Bjawi-levine, p. 82). The term is used in association with other values such as martyrdom and freedom, goals (liberation) and instrument; it is also frequently incorporated in the "road metaphor":

**Example 80** *Allaḏīna faqadū ḥurryatahum li-yaḥyā aš-ša'b bi-ḥurriya wa-karāma.*

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

Those who lost their freedom so that the Palestinian people could live **in freedom and dignity.**

In the previous example, it appears clear how the concept of dignity is connected with recuperating freedom.

**Example 81** *wa taḥammul al-alam fī sabīl al-karāma*

[n. 5731, 12/07/2016]

And endure pain **on the way to dignity**

**Example 82** *Ṭāriq 'Abu 'Arfa wa 'āḥarīn mi-man sārū 'alā darab al-ḡihād wa aš-šahāda difā'an 'an karāma al-umma wa ḥuqūqiha as-salīb.*

[n. 675, 27/11/1996]

Ṭāriq Abu 'Arfa and the others that **travelled the path of jihad and martyrdom in defence of the dignity of the *umma* and its stolen rights.**

The incorporation within the "road metaphor", shown in the last two examples, is often accompanied by references to freedom and means of resistance; it is also connected to the idea of sacrifice, under the form of resistance to pain. Thus, "dignity" is hereby employed in the sense exposed by (Badarin, 2016).

### **Courage**

Courage could easily be expected to be a praised characteristic within the framework of resistance discourse. Gaza is often described as *bāsila*, "fearless"; the intifada and the resistance are also qualified by the same adjective. In the general corpus, the adjective is found to form frequent clusters (68 total) with "resistance" (18), "intifada" (18), "Gaza" and "Rafa" (14).

**Example 83** *Fī ḥayy ad-Darağ bi-madīnat Ġaza al-bāsila.*

[n. 480, 23/07/2002]

In the Daraj quarter in the **fearless Gaza.**

The word *ṣuğā'*, which also means "courage" appears throughout the corpus but is not systematically found in clusters such as *bāsila*.

### 8.2.3 Justice-related values: rights and legality

Hamas' discourse is permeated with references to rights and justice. Rights are intended as "human rights" as a general category and as the rights recognized by the United Nations regarding the right to return (Security Council of the United Nations, 1967; ?). The recognition of rights will appear in the following chapter on "goals", because it is clearly claimed as one of the goals pursued by the movement; however, respect of rights (human rights, legal rights) can also be understood as a shared normative value that entails recognition of the international laws and treaties. This is strictly connected to the "legality" value, whereas Hamas' presents its own requests and actions as being legitimate on the grounds of being legal.

Secondly, both the topics "rights" and "legality" have been revisited within peace process' discourse: although the references to "inalienable rights" of the Palestinians (right to return, to a nation and to self-determination) were maintained, their meaning would gradually become void, as no real measures were taken and, conversely, the negotiations on the right to return were led by restricting it to a minor number of Palestinians in order not to shock Israeli demographic balance (Badarin, 2016). Therefore, any reference to rights bears with it a luggage of knowledge about historical claims and concessions made during negotiations. The details on rights claimed by Hamas will be further dealt with in the dedicated paragraph in the "Goals" chapter (chapter 10).

#### Rights

In general, references to rights, legality and justice collocate the Palestinian question within a juridical and moral frame of interpretation. Rights are treated as a moral issue (good versus evil) and as an issue of justice (right versus wrong), which correspond to norms of international law (allowed versus prohibited) and institutions such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court.

**Example 84** *Aṣḥāb ḥuq wa qaḍaya ʿādila*

n.1339,28/12/2008

[we are] entitled **to right[s] and to a issue of justice**

**Example 85** *Nu'akkid tamassuknā bi-ḥuqūqnā al-waṭaniyya*

We claim our hold on **our national rights**

The idea of inalienable rights is very common in Hamas' discourse, as can be seen by the frequency of expression "hold on to rights" (Table ??).

Table 8.5: Frequency of "Hold on to rights" expression

Rank	Frequency	Cluster
1	16	Hold on to rights
2	14	Hold on to rights and inalienability
3	10	And hold on to rights
4	8	Hold on to our rights
5	5	Hold on to his rights
6	3	Hold on to rights of our people
7	4	Hold on to our legal rights

Once again, Hamas proposes itself as the alternative by promising that it will not make concessions on the people's rights.

**Example 86** *Innana fi ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya "Ḥamās" nurā fi taḡraba as-sanawāt at-talāt al-māḍiyya iṭbātan wāqi'an li-kull taḥdirāt ar-rāfiḍīn li-Oslo wa nahğ al-istislām wa at-tanāzul 'an al-huqūq.*

[n. 621, 16/09/1996]

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, see in the experience of the past three years a confirmation of the warnings against accepting Oslo and the way of surrender and **concession of the rights**.

In the following examples, resistance and armed resistance are legitimated on a religious level and on a legal level, as being legitimate and allowed in both normative spheres. Thus, resistance is included among the rights claimed for the people and for Hamas. It is legitimated religiously when understood as "small jihad", and is also legitimated legally for the situation of legal breaches committed by Israel, such as imposing the occupation, the blockade on Gaza, not respecting U.N. resolutions, and building illegal settlements.

**Example 87** *Al-muqāwama hiya aṭ-ṭarīq al-wāḥid li taḥrīr Falasṭīn wa ‘alā ra’siha al-muqāwama al-musallaha, fa-hiya huq šar‘atihi aš-šarā’i ‘as-samāwiyya wa-l-arḍiyya, wa la taḥrīr bidūn muqāwama.*

[n. 6539, 14/12/2016]

Resistance is the only way to liberate Palestine, especially armed resistance, and it is **a right granted by divine and earthly laws, and there is no liberation without resistance.**

**Example 88** *At-ta’akīd ‘alā huq wa mašrū’iyya al-ḡihād al-falasṭīnī.*

[n. 827, 22/03/1997]

[We] claim the right and legality of the Palestinian jihad

## Justice

As previously anticipated, the Palestinian question is also presented within the frame of moral justice and legal justice; it should be supported for both a moral question and for compliance with laws.

**Example 89** *Innana fi ḥaraka Ḥamās nuṭammīn al-mawāqif wa-l-ḥaṭwāt al-mašrafa li-l-ra’is Muḥammad Morsi wa-l-ḥukūma al-miṣriyya tiḡah al-‘adwān aš-šahyūnī ‘alā qiṭā’ Ġaza wa allatī ta’bir ‘an ašāla ašša’b al-miṣrī wa dawrihi al-mutaqaddim fī difā’ an ša’binā al-falasṭīnī wa qadayatihi al-‘ādila.*

[n. 1566, 16/11/2012]

We, the movement Hamas, praise the honourable position and the steps [taken] by the President Muhammad Morsi and the Egyptian government towards the Zionist attack on the Gaza strip, which are an expression of the authenticity of the Egyptian people and its prominent role in defending our Palestinian people **and its question of justice.**



## Legality and legitimacy

Hamas' claims and actions are often qualified by the adjective *šarī*, which means both "legal" and legitimate". The adjective shares the same root with *šarīya*, which is commonly intended as "Islamic law", but is better defined as "the rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal from the Kur'an and hadith" (Calder, p. 321). Such norms were primarily defined after the death of Muhammad, to fill the normative void left by his departure, and proposed by Islamic scholars who studied the Quran and the *hadith*, the tradition of stories regarding Muhammad and his life (Hillenbrand and Leccese, 2016, p. 118).

It is a comprehensive system, which regards all aspects of life, and not only religious ones. Within the extended Omayyad Empire, secular laws were promulgated to coexist with the *šarī'a*: the *qānūn*. In modern times, *qānūn* designates laws promulgated by the State, and is used in opposition to *šarī'a* (Lewis, 2005, pp. 131-132); in fact, it can now be found in common use in expressions such as "law draft" or "electoral law". After the XIX century and the transformations undergone by Islamic thought during in the intellectual current of Islamic Reformism, the term extended semantically to include the general idea of "a constitutive element in a demand for loyalty, unity, and commitment; it represents an ideal (unreal) governmental system. With this pattern of connotation, it permeates the ideological statements of the Muslim Brothers and of more recent fundamentalist groups" (Calder, p. 325).

The word "legal/legitimate" translated as *šarī* is thus extensively used in a broad sense, and should not necessarily interpreted as a reference to Islam, although it may, according to use, express compliance to religion and/or national or international laws.

Frequently, in fact, Hamas builds legitimation on "divine and earthly laws". Moreover, there is no significant difference in the use of *qānūn* and *šarī'a*, as the terms recur with almost the same frequency (around 30 occurrences per 100000 words), although in very different contexts. In the first ten years, the terms seems used mainly for referring to the non-legality of the Oslo Accords; throughout the sample corpus, and especially regarding the last twenty years, the term occurs mainly in combination with "jihad" or "resistance".

**Example 90** *Ila ġānib ša'binā al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqāwamatihī al-mašrū'a.*

[n. 1260, 25/03/2008]

By the side of our Palestinian people and its **legitimate resistance**.

The word *qānūn* is also used referring to national laws:

**Example 91** *Fī waqt allādi tuqaddim fihī ḥaraka muqāwama al-islāmiya Ḥamās mubādarātaha bi-ta'liq 'amliyāt al-muqāwama li-mudda talāt ašhar ḥarsan minha 'alā al-mašlaḥa al-waṭaniyya al-'aliyya fi-l-ḥifāz 'ala waḥadina al-waṭaniyya, taqūm 'anāšīr al-waqā'ī mutasallihīn bi-ḡiyāb al-qānūn, 'aw 'āmilīn bi-l-qā'ida as-sā'ida 'annahum hum al-qānūn, 'aw annahum fawq al-qānūn bi-a'tidā'ihim al-lātim 'ala al-muḡahid Muḥammad as-Samrī.*

[n. 611, 11/07/2003]

In a time when Hamas is presenting its initiatives regarding the resistance operations for a period of three months, out of desire for the National Reconciliation to preserve our national unity, the armed Security Officers <sup>1</sup> practice the absence of the **law**, or they act on the basis of the principle that they **are the law, or they are above the law** in their evil aggression of the *mujahid* Muhammad Samri.

Law, in this case State-promulgated law, is also the source of derogation for the Security Officers, whose actions are deemed illegal. The theme of being legal/legitimate is thus very strong either for legitimating the resistance and for de-legitimizing the Palestinian Authority. In the following example, it stands out how the legal rights are divided from the other types of rights, and how they are inalienable because they are derived from law, history, and religion.

**Example 92** *Maṭlūb minna 'an nusqī - marra wāḥida wa ila 'abad - kāmil ḥuqūqna ad-diniyya wa-l-waṭaniyya wa-l-qānūniyya wa at-tāriḥiyya al-mawrūta ḡilan ba'da ḡilan fi arḍina.*

[n. 205, 16/09/1992 *general corpus*]

We are asked to give up - once and for all - all of our **religious, national, legal and historical** rights which we have been transmitted to us generation by generation on our land.

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<sup>1</sup>The Security officers are members of a security body created by the Oslo Accords as the Palestinian security, whose function is to defend the Palestinian Authority institutions and watch over "terrorism" and domestic security; Hamas members were a frequent target of this security body.

The use of *qānūnī*, however, seems to appear consistently starting from the second decade: its frequency increased significantly in 2004, starting from a frequency of 2.14 per 100000 words in the first decade and reaching a frequency of 19.6 in the third decade, especially starting from 2004; on the other hand, *šarī* is stable in its frequency throughout the whole period.

Table 8.6: Frequency of *qānūn* and *širī* divided into three decades

Word	Frequency per 10000 words	Decade
<i>qānūnī</i>	2.14	1988-1996
	8.9	1997-2006
	19.6	2007-2016
<i>šarī</i>	33.5	1988-1996
	25.97	1997-2006
	48.8	2007-2016

This might suggest that the movement paid more attention to the notion of "legal" in its strict sense when approaching elections, declaring that the Oslo Accords were failed (Baconi, 2018, p. 83) and implicitly acting as they were ready for being acknowledged as a political party.

References to *šarī'a*, on the other hand, appear very rarely in the corpus, with a frequency of 1.9 per 100000 words, and its rare occurrences are concentrated between 1989 and 1998 (11 out of 17). Hamas never adopted *šarī'a* as a legal system (Baconi, 2018, p. 139); however, the word appears in some particular contexts. For example, in 1991 they congratulate with Sudan for the "implementation of the *šharī'a* laws":

**Example 93** *Bi-ism aš-ša'b al-Falašṭīn wa qurāha wa muḥayamātiha wa fi aš-šatāt bi-asmā āyāt at-tahānī wa-l-mubāraka lakum bi-i-lānikum taṭbīq aš-šarī'a al-islāmiyya as-samḥa fi baladikum as-Sūdān.*

[n. 135, 13/02/1991, *general corpus*.]

In the name of the people of Palestine in the towns, villages, and refugee camps in Palestine and in the diaspora, we congratulate with you for your announcement about the implementation of the benevolent **Islamic sharia** in your country, Sudan.

During the first years of its existence, the movement maintained a repertoire of lexical items, expressions and imagery which was common within parties and movements of political Sunni Islam of pan-Islamic inspiration. In statement n. 135, the congratulations clearly are built on common ground with Sudan, which extended Islamic laws to all the north of the region after its second civil war. Solidarity letters are very common among Hamas' statement, which very often expresses its position on foreign affairs. Moreover, they extend the feeling of acknowledge the Islamic background, intended in this way, to all of Palestinians, by speaking in their name. In fact, these are the years when the movement still talks about an "Islamic Palestine", a goal which will soon disappear from its discourse.

**Example 94** *Wa Ḥarakat Ḥamās, allatī tastamidd min muʿayn al-ʾIslām al-ḥālīd ruʾataha wa taṣawwurātaha wa taḥtakim fī kull ʾaḥmāliha li-ḥudūd aš-šarīʿa al-ġarāʾtu-āhid ʾummatana al-ʾIslāmiyya wa šaʿbana al-falaṣṭīnī lā al-maī qadiman fī tarīq al-ġihād wa-l-muqāwama ḥatta al-naṣr wa-l-tahrīr al-kāmil bi-ʾiḍān Allāh.*

[n. 770, 20/10/1997, *general corpus*.]

The movement Hamas derives from the glorious Islam its vision and acts **within the range of the honourable Islamic šarīʿa** and promises our Palestinian people to proceed on the path of jihad and resistance until victory and until complete liberation, if God allows it.

In this last example, the references to *šarīʿa* are related to a religious self-representation of the movement, strictly connected to resistance and especially jihad as the privileged form of resistance. It is no coincidence that the topic of statement n. 770 are the declarations of the Imam Tantawi of al-Azhar, the Islamic University in Cairo, about the legitimacy of Hamas' "martyrdom operations", the suicide operations:

**Example 95** *Ġāʾt taṣriḥāt faḍaliyya al-ʾImām al-akbar Muḥammad Saiyd Ṭanṭāwī ʾimām al-ġāmiʿ al-ʾAzhar ḥawla mašrūʿiyya al-ʾamliyyāt al-istišhādiyya ʾidda al-ʾadū aš-šahyūnī.*

[n. 770, 20/10/1997, *general corpus*.]

The great imam Muhammad Saiyd Tantawi, imam of al-Azhar, pronounced himself in favor of the **legitimacy of the martyrdom operations against the Zionist enemy**.

This form of religious approval, although it was not shared unanimously by Islamic scholar, was welcomed as a form of legitimation coming from a prestigious institution such as al-Azhar. Hamas' religious instances of legitimacy, in fact, are not based on the quotations of Quranic verses or the *aḥadīṭ*, as can be observed in the discourse of other Islamic movements: it does not include any kind of theological argumentations, but mostly refers to religious institutions (such as al-Azhar) or religious authorities (such as al-Tantawi or Abdullah Azzam).

The word *kāfir*, intended as those who have not religion, unfaithful, is very commonly used in other instances of political Islam, such as jihadi militant groups, to refer to enemies. In Hamas' statements, however, such representation is not privileged; it recurs only 22 times in the general corpus, and mostly within quotations from the Quran or the *hadhit*.

#### **8.2.4 Nation-related values: *waṭaniyya*, *qawmiyya*, unity, democracy**

##### **Nationalisms: *waṭaniyya*, *qawmiyya***

Hamas has always presented itself as a nationalist movement, in addition to being a resistance and Islamic movement. Historically, Arab politics has seen, since the XIX century, an opposition between two types of pan-nationalisms: pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism.

Hamas' nationalism is a local one: since its beginning, it declares to be focused on Palestine and its issues. However, hints at both kinds of pan-nationalisms are nonetheless present: the movement never sought the creation of an Islamic state, but acknowledges affiliation to the "Islamic and Arabic *umma*" and, during its first years, pursues the liberation of "Islamic Palestine".

Affiliation to other Arabic nations is also recognized: it is explicitly stated and entailed by its requests to other Arabic countries to support Palestine, and its condemnations at them failing to provide effective support. The two Arabic terms *waṭaniyya* and *qawmiyya* refer respectively to (local) *nationalism* and *pan-nationalism* intended as pan-Arabism. The historical moment when Hamas was born is relevant for understanding its role within the different currents. When the PLO was founded, the Palestinian question was still perceived as the symbol of Arabic struggles and the question of all the Arab people: *qawmiyya* was the main frame of reference. In fact, Arabic countries played an important part in the constitution of the PLO in 1964 and its charter, the National (*Qawmiyya*) Palestinian charter, included principles of "nationalism and resistance"; the charter defined Palestinians as "Arabs citizens who used to live normally in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled or remained, and any child of an Arab-Palestinian father before this date, whether outside or inside Palestine, is a Palestinian"; the *qawmiyya* prism also allowed for reading liberation of Palestine as a

chance for both self-determination and reconnection with the Arab nations (Badarin, 2016). Clearly, recognizing the Arab identity of Palestinians is not just a matter of *qawmiyya*: as the division in nation-states in the Middle East was determined by the Sykes Picot accords in 1916 (see chapter 2), with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the way to conceptualize identity before modern Arab states complied with the great empire model: the feeling of belonging was local and loyalties were entrenched within families, clans, local religious communities; the town (or its outskirts, in the case of peasants) would be a more salient reference than the empire itself (Hourani, 2013). The first expressions of Arab nationalism were, in fact, embodied in the rebellions against the Ottoman Empire, which were initially supported by the British who, in the end, shared the territories with France and draw the modern Middle East map. Against the Ottomans first, and the European colonizers later, the Arab claims of independence and self-determination included Palestinians opposition to the British Mandate first and the Israeli occupation later, and Palestine became the symbol of resistance causes in the whole area. Moreover, studies on Palestinian identity highlight the weight of the Israeli occupation and the fact that a Palestinian nation-state was never realized as one of the most important factors of self-definition for Palestinians; clearly, this does not mean that Palestinian identity was created as a result of Israel (references to a land called Palestine date back centuries), but that this particular context is fundamental in identity definition. Layers of identity overlapped through history: family loyalties, religious community loyalties, local community loyalties, but also loyalty to the Arab common cause and the Palestinian cause specifically (Khalidi, 2010, pp. 193-194). In conclusion, a connection to the Arab nation cannot be denied:

There is for the Palestinian an Arab past and a common Near Eastern and Arab future; yet it is now, in the present, that the instability of community and the dangers of its dissolution are enacted"

(Said, 2015, p. 150)

However, the fact that such connections was informed in political language by *qawmiyya* is a matter of political and historical context. In fact, after 1967 the *qawmiyya* perspective started to falter in Palestinian political discourse. The disaster of the Six-Day war, and the subsequent weakening of the Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd el Nasser, stronghold of Arab pan-nationalism, proved fatal for the strength of Arab alliances. Moreover, resistance movements worldwide adopted a world-oriented attitude in recognizing the commonalities between colonization-oppressed people, and Palestinians started to look at situations in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam as similar to their own (Said, 2015, p. 143). Up until 1968, *wataniyya*, the "local" nationalism, was almost never mentioned in Palestinian discourse (Badarin, 2016); however, the decline of the *qawmiyya* perspective gave way to a new

conception of nationalism and identity. In 1967, the Arab National Movement founded by George Habash was disbanded, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was founded at its place; the PLO absorbed the remaining Palestinian institutions and issued a new charter, the "Palestinian National (*Waṭaniyya*) Charter", where nationalism and revolution became the new source of representations for the Palestinian political discourse; in this perspective, liberation of Palestine was a "national/ *waṭanī* duty" for Palestinians and a "*qawmī* duty" for the Arab world, defining in this way a clear distinction between the two worlds (Badarin, 2016). The Palestinian nation (*waṭan falasṭinī*) is intended as the community of all the Palestinians; the "State" entity correspond to the word *dawla*, and will be treated in the chapter on *Goals* (chapter 10). In Hamas' self-presentation on its web-site, the movement defines itself as a *waṭaniyya* movement. Clearly, it was born way after 1967, and the framework of resistance had already shifted to new representations. In the texts, *waṭan* occurs mainly as an adjective. It qualifies objects claimed by the movement (national unity, national rights) and expected behaviours (responsibility):

**Example 96** *Nuʿakid tamassuknā bi-ḥuqūqnā al-waṭaniyya al-kāmila ġayr manqūša wa fi muqaddamatihā ḥuq al-ʿawda.*

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

we declare that we hold on to **all of our national rights** without curtailments, first of all the right to return.

**Example 97** *Kamā tuġaddid al-ḥaraka ad-daʿwa li-ġamāhīr šaʿbinā, [...] yarfaʿalam al-falasṭinī fi kāfa al-faʿaliyyāt, taʿakidan ʿala risālat al-waḥda alwaṭaniyya.*

[n. 3945, 22/10/2015]

As we renovate our invite to all the masses of our people [...] to rise the Palestinian flag during every event, assessing **the mission of the national unity**

**Example 98** *Intilāqan min ḥarṣ ḥarakat Ḥamās ʿala tartīb al-bayt al-falaṣṭīnī wa tarsīḥ mabdan aš-širāka wa taḥammul al-masʿuliyya al-waṭaniyya fi faḍiḥi al-marḥala ad-daḡīqa allatī yaḡtazuha šaʿabunā wa qaḍayatuha al-waṭaniyya, fa-ʿin al-ḥaraka tarā aḍ-ḍurūra wa ah-miyya iḡrāʿal-intiḥabāt al-maḥalliya.*

[n. 5743, 15/07/2015]

Starting from the desire of the movement Hamas to tide up the Palestinian house, consolidate the principle of participation and **bear national responsibilities** in this particular phase, undergone by our people and our **Palestinian question**, the movement sees the necessity and importance of holding local elections. As we renovate our invite to all the masses of our people [...] to rise the Palestinian flag during every event, assessing **the mission of the national unity**.

Nationality, as a value, works as a source of legitimation to avail the movement's claims, such as the claim to have its rights acknowledged, and as a "compass" to orientate decisions. In the last example, holding elections is represented as a matter of national responsibility. Nationalism, especially in the latter years, is thus not only paired with resistance, but also with actions which Hamas considers proper for preserving the current institutions. Statement n. 5743 was issued when the Authority started delaying the local elections, while Hamas insisted to hold them as previously planned.

National unity is better defined as a *goal* of the movement, which have been negotiating national reconciliation with the Authority since its election in 2006. Throughout the corpus, *waṭan* and its derived adjectival forms have a frequency of 276 per 100000 words, which makes it among the most frequent words in the general corpus; its frequency remains stable throughout the whole period (288,3 in the first decade, 237.9 in the second decade, 306 in the third decade). *Qawmiyya*, on the other hand, is very rare: it has an overall frequency of 7 per 100000 words in the whole corpus, whereas most of its occurrences are concentrated after 1997 (0.7 in the first decade, 12.5 in the second, 9.4 in the third).

In the following example, the term is used to condemn Lybia for expelling Palestinians from its land in 1994; this recalls the expected responsibility from other Arab countries and frames the term in the specific context of appealing to common roots:

**Example 99** *Tudayyn ḥarakat Ḥamās al-iḡraʿāt al-Lībiya al-mustamarra fi ṭard wa tarḥīl al-falaṣṭīniīn bi-šakl ḡimāʿī ḥāriḡ al-ʿarāḍī al-Lībiya wa tuʿbir istinkāraha li haḍā al-ḥaṭwa [...] allatī tas-ʿī ar-rawābiṭ al-islāmiyya wa-l-qawmiyya.*

[n. 538, 05/10/1994]



The movement Hamas condemns Lybia's continuous measures towards mass expulsions of Palestinians from its territories and expresses its condemnation for this step which harms the **Islamic and national** bonds.

Responsibility of other Arabic countries is frequently recalled, and is considered a duty, consistently with the principles stated in the *Palestinian Waṭaniyya Charter*:

**Example 100** *Inna taḥrīr Falasṭīn wāḡib Falasṭīnī bi-d-daraḡa al-ʿulā, ilā ḡānīb kawnihi wāḡiban ʿarabiyan wa islāmiyyan bi-ṣiffa ʿamma, wa huwa masʿuliyya insāniyya bi-muqtaḍā al-ʿadāla wa-l-ḥuq.*

[n. 6539, 14/12/2016]

The liberation of Palestine is primarily a Palestinian duty, next an **Arabic and Islamic duty in general**, and is a human responsibility required by justice and rights.

**Example 101** *Fa li-ahlina fi Ġaza ḥuq fi ḍimma ummatina al-ʿarabiya, wa ʿalayha masʿuliya dīniyya wa qawmiyya wa tāriḥiyya wa insāniyya tawḡib al-mubādarāt al-ʿaḡila ila raf-al-ḥisār ʿan qitāʿĠaza.*

[n. 1297, 26/11/2008]

Our people in Gaza have the right to be supported by our Arabic *umma*, and it has the **religious, national, historical, and human** responsibility to urgently perform measures to lift the blockade on the Gaza strip.

## Unity

Keeping the Palestinian people united, also at a political level, is a strong imperative in Hamas' discourse. Unity, as a value, is inherited from both previous political and resistance discourses, and from self-representation instances of Palestinian discourse outside these two environments.

Unity is declined as the feeling of common belonging shared by Palestinian communities within and outside the Palestinian territories, the references to Palestinian unity in resistance as they were present in the resistance discourse well before 1948, and also the attempts at reaching a government of national unity with the Palestinian Authority since Hamas won the elections. Intended as national unity is, nonetheless, a *goal*, and will be treated as such in the dedicated sections. As Badarin (2016) explains,

For several decades, the nodal concepts of *al-wataniyya* and *al-wihda al-arabiyya* (local or territorial nationalism and pan-Arabism, respectively) were in circulation throughout Arab discourse as a source of resistance to the Ottoman reign and provided a grand normative foundation for the Arab awakening (*al-sahwa al-arabiyya*). Palestine has been a touchstone in pan-Arabist discourse. It was located at the heart of the putative Arab unity as typified in the slogan of the time: Arab unity is the road to the liberation of Palestine.

The frequency of the word **unity** remains stable at around 72 per 100000 words. Unity is intended among Palestinians, but also among extended communities, such as the Arab and Islamic communities:

**Example 102** *Tuʾakidu Ḥamās ʿala ʾan aš-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī ǧīzʾlā yataǧazzaʾ min al-ʾumma al-ʿarabiya wa-l-ʾislāmiyya.*

[n. 6539, 14/12/2016]

Hamas declares that the Palestinian people is **an inseparable part of the Islamic and Arabic *umma***

**Example 103** *Tuṭamman waḥda abnāʾ šaʿbinā muslimīn wa masīḥīn*

[n. 1029, 30/03/2006]

The unity of our **Muslim and Christian people** is regarded with value.

The aspiration to unity is attributed also to the people:

**Example 104** *Aš-ša'b al-falaṣṭīnī wa ḥarṣuha ʿala al-waḥda.*

[n. 684, 22/03/2004]

The Palestinian people and their desire for **unity**

Unity is also a fundamental precondition for achieving the goals of resistance:

**Example 105** *Inna al-waḥda rakan min ʾarkān al-nāṣr, wa-l-ḥalāf wa-l-tamazzuq takrīs al hazīma wa-l-istislām.*

[n. 58, 18/08/1988]

**Unity is the cornerstone of victory**, and the destruction for the legitimization of defeat and surrender

Unity is a strong source of legitimacy for judging behaviour. For example, Hamas recalls Palestinian unity whenever it has to legitimize its actions or derogate the Authority's actions:

**Example 106** *Ḥamās tadʿū ila taḡsīd al-waḥda wa-l-ḥiwār wa tuʾakid ʾan ruwāya ad-dāḥiliya kādība turīd ʾitārat al-**fitna***

*Yabdūʾan al-muḥaṭṭat al-istiṣʾalī alladī taqūdhū ḡihāt biʾayniha fī as-sulṭa al-falaṣṭīniyya badaʾat tatakaššaf ḥuyūtaḥu bi-qiyām maḡmuʿa min al-mūtawūrīn min ʿanāsir aš-šurṭa bi-muḥāwala iʿtiqāl al-aḥ Muḥammad ar-Rantīsī, naḡl aš-sahīd al-qāʾid D. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ar-Rantīsī.*

[n. 948, 02/10/2005]

Hamas invites at consolidating the national dialogue and says that domestic reports are lies meant to strive **fitna**

It seems that the eradication plans, that some parts of the Palestinian Authority are carrying out, started to disclose, as police motorbikes

gathered and tried to arrest Muhammad Rantisi, son of the martyr and chief Dr. Abdelaziz Rantisi.<sup>2</sup>

The choice of the word *fitna* is a clear hint at the community intended in a religious sense. Elsewhere, in the texts, the same concept is expressed by simply saying that the Authority's behaviour poses a threat to the unity of the people, national unity and so on. *Fitna* is a term which is marked as religious, and its choice activates a specific framework. In the Quran, it is intended generally as the temptations, sent by God, to test the believer; however, *fitna* is more commonly known as a "fracture" within the Islamic community, usually caused by "a state of rebellion against the divine Law in which the weak always run the risk of being trapped"; moreover, it also evokes an event of great importance in Islamic history: the first wars within the community that, after Muhammad's death, were conducted to choose the leader of the community, the caliph (from the Arabic word *ḥalīfa*, "vicar") and eventually led to the secession of the *šī'a* (Gardet, p. 930).

Its frequency is not even: it appears with a frequency of 37 per 100000 words in the first decade then falls drastically to 18.8 in the second decade and 16.7 in the third; however, as most of the occurrences in the third decade are concentrated in 2007 (33 out of 46), the real frequency should be counted as 3.6 per 100000 words.

This is not a case: 2007 was the year of the civil war with the Palestinian Authority, which followed Hamas' election, and this just means that in this occasion the movement resumed a more epic and religious lexicon to frame the events.

**Example 107** *Ḥamās tastahğin tahdīd ḥarakat Faḥ bi-naql "al-fitna"*

*ila as-sāḥa al-urdūniya*

(...) *Na'am, min al-Urdun, ta'lan Faḥ 'annaha musta'idda li-l-muwāğaha aš-šāmil. Wa minha al-askariyya ma'a abnā'ša'biha, 'amma kayfa yumkin 'an yatimm dālīka, fa-hāda luğz yabdū 'an alḥukūma al-Urduniyya tumlik miftāḥahu 'aw sirrahu? 'innanā fi ḥarakat almuqāwama al-Islāmiyya Ḥamās 'id nudīn bi-šadda ma warada hāda al-bayān, fa-'innanā nuṭālib aš-ša'b al-Urdunī al-abiya bi-qawāhu al-ḥayya, at-taṣadi li-hāda az-zamra al-iğrāmiyya, wa-l-fāsida, wa-l-ḥāqida, al-latī turīd 'an taš'al fitna nā'ima fi al-Urdun, fa-la'ana Allah alladīn yurīdūn 'iqāzaha.*

[n. 1178, 15/01/2007]

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<sup>2</sup>Abdelaziz Rantisi was one of the founding members of Hamas; he died in a bomb shelling in 2004.

Hamas condemns Fatah's threats to move the **fitna** to Jordan

(...) Yes, from Jordan the movement Fatah announced that it is ready to a total confrontation, including an armed [confrontation] with its people; how can it do this, is a mystery that the Jordan government seems to have the key to.

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, strongly condemn this statement, and we ask the Jordan people, proud and strong, to oppose this criminal, corrupted, spiteful group, which wants to ignite a **dormant fitna** in Jordan, and may God condemn whoever tries to awaken it.

The example refers to the deployment of Fatah's Badr Brigade in Jordan, that Fatah wanted to implement with additional 1000 units during the war with Hamas; at the time Jordan, together with Egypt and United States, was training Fatah's soldiers (Farrell, 2006) in their war against Hamas. *Fitna* is the label given to the civil war in Gaza, and is emphasized starting from the title of the statement. It is followed by pointing out how Fatah is not fighting Hamas but his own people, which embodies the meaning of *fitna* as threat for the existence of the community and as a sinful event. Their sins are not just religious: the Badr brigades are described as corrupted and criminal, and diminished by being called "a group" rather than with their name. The power of *fitna* is metaphorically represented as fire (it "ignites").

### Democracy

The concept of democracy is very frequently evoked by Hamas, ever since its beginning. Its use is very similar to other uses in other discourses: its associative affective meaning (Leech, 1974) prevails, and is a very common and generic word to praise (or derogate, when describing someone's action as not democratic); it also constitutes an inescapable value to be mentioned in discourse:

**Example 108** *Tad·ū Ḥamās ʿa·dā ʿal-mağlis al-falaṣṭīniyya alladī rafa·ū ḥamālatahum al-intihābiyya ša·rāt ḥurriyat al-muwāṭin wa dīmuqrāṭiyya al-muğtamʿa ila qawl kalimatahum fi hādīhi al-mumārasāt al-bašʿa.*

[n. 651, 12/03/1996]

Hamas invites the member of the Palestinian Council, who led their electoral campaign under the sign of freedom of the citizens and col-

lective **democracy** to pronounce themselves on these brutal practices.<sup>3</sup>

Its frequency does not variate much through time, as it stays at an average of 16 per 100000 words.

In 2005, the discourse on democracy in Hamas developed around the concept of "democratic process", and the term was therefore declined in terms of electoral process and participation in Palestinian political life, acquiring an institutional meaning:

**Example 109** *Wa nu'amal min al-maktab al-i'lāmī li-wizārat ad-dāhiliyya iltizām al-'amāna wa-l-ḥiyādiyya wa-l-ṣaddāqiyya wa waqafa 'ay taṣrīḥāt tuṭīr al-na'arāt wa-l-fitan, wa nu'akid 'ala ḍurūra tawfīr kull aḏ-zurūf li-'inḡāḥ al-'amliyya ad-dīmuqrāṭiyya dūn tadaḥḥul min 'ay ṭarf*

[n. 895, 09/05/2005]

From the Communication Office we express to the Minister of Internal Affairs our hope that it will ensure loyalty, neutrality, honesty and that it ceases declarations which strive arrogance and division; we are persuaded of the necessity of providing the conditions to **succeed in the democratic process** without any interference from any part

This extract is taken from the presentation of the electoral list of Hamas, the "Change and Reform list", and is the first occurrence of "democratic process" in Hamas' statements. It will be later used to refer to elections and to the establishment of Hamas in government.

### 8.2.5 Religious values

Religion is another fundamental reference for Hamas, as it present itself as an Islamic movement. However, its use of religious references seems different from that of other Islamic movements: there is no theological legitimacy for action, but respect for religious authorities and figures, and very specific concepts such as *fitna* are contextualized in limited uses, such as derogation of a specific party. The


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<sup>3</sup>Persecutions against Hamas, which were led by the Palestinian Authority in coordination with Israel, one of the compromises requested to allow the Palestinian presence during peace negotiations.

religious dimension is important, but is evoked within the resistance framework. Many religion-related concepts have been found in previous paragraphs, as many values as expressed through religious lexicon; for example, references to "divine and earthly laws", although pertaining the realm of "legality" values, intertwines with religion as a recognized source of laws and legitimation. In this paragraph there will be a global review of references to religious laws which do not fall within the categories explained in precedent paragraphs.

First of all, religious references are consistently embedded within the structural organization of the texts. The *basmalah*, the formula "In the Name of God, the most Gracious, the most Merciful", is found at the opening of most statements, very often together with a quotation from the Quran or the *hadhit*. It does not appear in all of the statements but only in 825, and always in openings.

Figure 8.1: Concordance plot: position of the *basmalah* in statements in the first and third decade



Religious register is present in many forms, including from the employment of formulas to the choice of religious lexicon. References to faith, for example, can easily be found:

**Example 110** *Wa lakinna nu·akid ·an·tiqna bi-Allāh ·āliya, wa ·azīmatunā qawiyya wa ·irādatunā lan tukassir wa muqāwamatunā satastamirr ḥimāya li-ša·binā wa raddan ḥadā al-·adwān.*

[n. 1339, 28/12/2008]

And we declare that we have a **strong faith**, our determination is strong and our will not break and our resistance will continue to defend our people and answer to this attack

**Example 111** *Fa-min raḥim al-ʿalam wa-l-ḥiṣār ṣanaʿa hāda aš-šaʿb al-ʿamal wa-l-intiṣār, huwa bi-riḡālihi wa nisāʿihi wa aḫfālihi wa šuyūḥihi yaḫtaḍin turba al-waṭan bi-l-ʿazza wa-l-abāʿ **mutasalliḥa bi-l-ʿazīma wa-l-ʿimān.***

[n. 1762, 27/08/2014]

From pain and from the blockade our people forged hope and victory, with their men, women, children and elders that embraced the land of the nation with honour and rebellion, **armed with determination and faith**

The first example is taken from a statement issued during operation Cast Lead, called Battle of the Criterion by the Qassam Brigades and Hamas, while the second is an extract from a statement issued during operation Protective Edge, called Battle of the Eaten Straw by the Qassam Brigades and Hamas. Faith, in both examples, is mentioned in close connection to resistance to the attacks, intended both as armed resistance on the field and resilience not to succumb to the context of war. In fact, in the second example it is also metaphorically described as a weapon. As the dominant topic in Hamas' discourse is resistance, also religious references are declined in reference to resistance. The names of the last three wars on Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014) were all renamed by the Qassam Brigades with Quranic quotations. The Battle of the Criterion (2008), which was deemed as a victory by Hamas and celebrated in many commemorative statements in the following years, is named after a religious concept, the *furqān*, after which the 25th sura of the Quran is named. The "criterion" comes from the root (*f, r, q*), which is associated with the semantic field of separating: in fact, it indicates the concept of "separation" of good and evil, and the ability to distinguish them; moreover, it was the name of the Badr battle, mentioned in the eighth sura of the Quran (Paret), between Muhammad and the Meccans (Scarcia Amoretti, 1998, pp. 59-60). The battle of the Stones of Shale (2012, Pillar of Defense) and the Eaten Straw (2014, Protective Edge) are both named after the eighth sura, the sura of the Elephant (n. 105), which narrates the defeat of the Christian king Abraha, who allegedly attacked the Kaʿba<sup>4</sup> in 570 A.D. and was attacked by birds throwing him stones; moreover, the elephant he was riding would kneel before the sanctuary, averting the attack (Beeston, 1986, p. 895). The sura is an example of God's protection on the sanctuary, and is of particular significance because the episode happened

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<sup>4</sup>The sanctuary in Mecca which is the destination of the pilgrimage, one of the pillars of Islam; in pre-Islamic times it contained sacred objects from different religions, and was guarded by the clan to which Muhammad was related. Muhammad then destroyed all the sacred objects out of contempt for polytheism with the exception of the Black Stone, a piece of meteorite that is still guarded in the sanctuary.



in the year Muhammad was born. The three names chosen for the battles refer to crucial moments in Islamic history, specifically events recurring during the life of Muhammad, and are thus historical metaphors through which interpret the battles that Hamas was currently fighting: such episodes provides an epic reading for the contingent events, which frames them as battles of good versus evil (Battle of the Criterion) and battles where the Islamic community and/or symbols are threatened. The same happens when Hamas speaks of *fitna* to describe the events of the war with Fatah in 2007 (see section 8.2.4).

Another important space of religious representation is that of places defended by Hamas. Palestine represented as the home of sacred places of Islam, the *muqaddasāt*, is very frequent and stable throughout the corpus. However, it is hard to separate this mentions as exclusively religious: Jerusalem, al Aqsa mosque, and other sacred places are recurrent images in all Palestinian resistance discourse and self-representations. In fact, al Aqsa is the theatre of frequent incursions by the Occupation, which claims the place as its own; such incursions are referred to by Hamas as "violations", emphasizing the sacredness of the place; Jerusalem is claimed by Israel as its capital, and was declared as such in May 2018 with the support of the United States, right after their embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Thus, these places are perceived simultaneously as violated symbols of faith and symbols of resistance to the Occupation, and it is hard to say if such levels could exist separately.

On the other hand, the representation of Palestine as an Islamic land, or even state, which appears during the first decade, are not similarly shared. In this phase, references to religion are much more frequent and consistent with Political Islam's and the Muslim brotherhood's vision of a good state as a state where Islamic principles were respected. As a consequence, religious representations are much more present and diversified, and the Palestinian question is explicitly represented as mainly Islamic:

**Example 112** *Aršadnā Allāh ilā sawāʿad-ṣirāṭ fa-ʿanbat bidra al-intifāda al-islāmiyya al-falasṭīniyya allatī hiya fātiḥa ʿahd li-l-ḡihād al-mubārak bi-faʿl ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya Ḥamās min iḥwānikum al-muslimīn bi-bayt al-muqaddas wa aknāfiha, wa qad rassamat ṭarīqaha min al-yawm al-ʿawal "Allāh ḡaytunā wa-l-rasūl qāʿidunā wa-l-Qurʿān dustūrunā wa-l-ḡihād sabīlunā fī sabīl Allāh ʿasmā ʿamāninā".*

[n. 80, 07/04/1989]

God guided us onto the path of equality and grew the seed of the Palestinian Intifada, which opened to the era of the blessed jihad

through the action of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas from your Muslim brothers and their defenders in Jerusalem, and [God] traced the way from day one: "**God is our goal, the Prophet is our guide, the Quran is our constitution, the jihad is our way and death within the trail to God is our highest aspiration**"

**Example 113** *Min ḥilāl ʾimāninā bʾanna qaḍayatuna hiya qaḍaya al-muslimīn al-ḡamīʿ.*

[n. 827, 22/03/1997]

Through our faith, because **our [Palestinian] question is the question of all Muslims**

Moreover, up until 1997, the expression "the land of the Ascension" (*ʿard al-maʿrāḡ wa-l-ʾisrāʿ*) was a very common way to refer to Palestine until 1997 (frequency of 10.34 per 100000 words), with rare occurrences that finish in 2010 (3.2 in the third decade).

**Example 114** *fī mustahal šahr Ramaḍān al-ʿazīm ʿām 1409 H., šahr al-ḡihād wa-l-qaabr: šahr al-futuḡāt wa al-naṣr, wa min falasṡīn aṡ-ṡāhira, ʿard al-isrāʿ wa-l-miʿrāḡ, wa min bayt almuqaddas, balad al-masḡid al-Aqsa al-mubāarak allādī yarzaḡ taḡta ḡalam al-yahūd allādīna ḡaḡab Allāh ʿalayhim wa laʿanahum.*

[n. 80, 07/04/1989]

At the beginning of the great month of Ramadan, year 1409 H., the month of jihad and *ṡabr*, the month of conquests and victory, from the pure Palestine, **the land of Ascension**, from Jerusalem, the country of the blessed Aqsa mosque which suffers under the oppression of the Jews, God's wrath and damnation be upon them

Besides the expression "land of the Ascension", the last example shows how, from the very beginning of the movement, religion provided for meanings and representations through which talk about the oppression and the resistance. References to the idea of an Islamic state also occur in early stages:

**Example 115** *Wa ma dāma Allāh ma-na fa-naḥnu muntaṣirūn wa sa-taqūm dawla al-ʿIslām wa satakūn kalimat allādīna kafarū as-suflā wa kalimat Allāh hiya al-ʿaliyya.*

[n. 76, 21/05/1989]

And God is always with us, therefore we are victorious, and an Islamic State will rise and the word of those who deny God will be the lowest, and the word of God will be the highest

## 8.3 Concluding remarks

### 8.3.1 Function and representation of values

The ideological structure of *values* in Hamas is, as appears clearly, strictly connected to goals and instruments in two ways: to provide for a legitimation on the grounds of common values, and to prescribe which characteristics and behaviours are the most desirable and effective for the achievement of the goals. Linguistically, they present themselves in a variety of forms, of which the preferred one is the adjectival form applied to the participants. This means that the values are also a form of appraisal, and their use is perpetuated and consolidated by encoding them as "permanent qualities" of the in-group participants, such as the "steadfast and patient people", "the faithful *mujahidun*". They also frequently co-occur, showing that they are conceptualized as connected to one another.

Some metaphor recur, such as the "road" metaphor, which is a type of metaphor that encompasses all ideological discursive structures.

### 8.3.2 Stability and change

Values have been examined also in terms of stability and change. The findings show that they are mostly stable, especially concerning the resistance-related values. Moreover, they are usually part of the heritage of other discourses pertaining the Palestinian resistance, politics, and religion. They are oriented to the collectivity, privileging social welfare to individual benefits as final goals.

The transformation into a political and governing party nonetheless appears evident in some phenomena. For example, the nation-related value of "democracy" evolves from a general moral principle to the concept of "democratic process", that entails a more complex conceptualization that includes elections, establishment and organization of proper institutions, respect of the institutions, legality.

The religious values seem to undergo the highest degree of change. Although religious lexicon is consistently present, and religious references tied to Palestine as a sacred land remain stable, a higher frequency of religious values is registered on the first years of the movement. The reference to Palestine as the "land of Ascension", for example, was almost systematic during its first years, but then abruptly decreased in frequency. On the other hand, Palestine as the "land of the sacred sites" remains stable, and terms such as *fitna* appears with high frequency only on specific occasions.

The reference for religious legitimation is, nonetheless, the word of religious authorities. Hamas pays great attention on what is said publicly by religious institutions such as al-Azhar. However, it does not employ a theological framework in its discourse, never legitimating actions on the ground of theological interpretation: Hamas is still a resistance movement, although a religious one, but needs to rely on external sources of legitimation because it does not engage in theological interpretation.

Religious values are, in fact, more an identity marker to distinguish Hamas from other parties or resistance movements than the core of its actions and representations.



# Chapter 9

## INSTRUMENTS

### 9.1 Instruments as an analytical category

For the in-group, the "instruments" are all those actions and tools connected in a cause-effect relation with the category of *goals*, that will be discussed in the following chapter. Hamas is a goal-oriented movement, and its main goals are liberation from the Occupation and an independent state. For this reason, the category of instruments is of particular relevance, and the one where Hamas realizes one of its most evident shifts: the shift from an Islamic-resistance perspective to an uprising-resistance perspective and, finally a resistance-within-institutions perspective.

This particular category is extremely important: in fact, since its foundation, the movement presented itself as the alternative to the PLO that was renouncing resistance, especially armed resistance, by negotiating with Israel and, after Oslo, accepting to coordinate "security operations" with it within the Palestinian Territories. The PLO, in the early 1990s, started talking about a "political solution" as a "realistic" option for the Palestinians during negotiations, creating a new framework of interpretation of "realistic versus unrealistic" where every criticism, reaction and dissociation against the negotiations would be considered "unrealistic" and, when it came to Hamas' activities as a movement refusing Oslo, their acts became punishable, as they were maintaining armed struggle as a strategy (Badarin, 2016; Hroub, 2006b). Hamas' hold on resistance was, as a consequence, consistent with its attitude of utter rejection of the negotiations. Thus, maintaining an explicit discourse on resistance was vital for the movement, and almost monopolized its discourse; it became even prominent, at the expense of other contents, such as defining how they would have organized after the goal of liberation had been reached (Hroub, 2006b, p. 58).

### 9.1.1 Two faces of the same resistance: *muqāwama* and *jihad*

Resistance comes under two principal representations: *muqāwama* and *jihad*. *Muqāwama* is the Arabic word for resistance, and its root (q, w, m) stands for "standing up", in this case "standing up to". The *muqāwama* may include any kind of resistance action, including pacific demonstration, economic boycott, use of weapons.

*Jihad*, on the other hand, is a religious precept. It is a collective religious duty according to Islamic law, and is, in its prevalent meaning, a spiritual effort to be a good Muslim and, in its marginal (but nowadays most renown) meaning, the resistance of the Muslim community against a threat by any means, and under specific restrictions (see section 9.3). However, as will be shown in this chapter, *jihad*, for Hamas, merges with *muqāwama*, and do not retain the theological connotation and innovations that have characterized the most recent use of the term since Islamic reformism.

Thus, resistance is represented by referring to two (overlapping) frames: a "general resistance" frame, represented by the word *muqāwama*, which comprises representations of oppression shared by Arab, Islamic and other oppressed people, whereas it is legitimate to fight the source of oppression as the sole alternative; and the religious frame, where the same instances of resistance and opposition (weapons, strikes, boycott, demonstrations) are called *jihad*, and other Islamic concepts are used to refer to struggle-related elements (such as *hudna* for truce). In this perspective, resistance acts are legitimate because Palestine as an Islamic territory is under immediate threat; in this case, and only in this case, war is allowed; in fact, the "holy war" does not exist in Islam, as such concept pertains the Christian realm.

In the first years relative to the published statements, resistance was rooted in the event of the first Intifada, which maintains a high symbolic value for Hamas and is treated as a "foundational myth": the movement claims the merit for the event (although it was a grass-roots protest), and celebrates its anniversary every year. Besides armed struggle, the movement would invite people to organize in strikes and boycott. General strikes and demonstrations remain, nowadays, a very common means of resistance.

### 9.1.2 Armed resistance and the question of self-image

Field combat was, at first, possible thanks to weapons smuggled through the tunnels with Egypt and some channels from Israel (Hroub, 2006b, 64-65). The first suicide attacks started in 1994 (see sections 8.2.1, and their effectiveness had been, according to Hamas, tested on the field by Hezbollah against the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon in 1982. The suicide attacks were interrupted for the

first time in 1995, then resumed after some months in retaliation for the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, commander of the Qassam Brigades (Hroub, 2006b, p. 67). During the last years of the second Intifada, however, Hamas weakened consistently and, despite the assassinations of its major leaders Ahmad Yassin and Abdelaziz Rantisi and a boasting rhetoric of ready retaliation, the movement did not resume the strategy of suicide attacks with the past strength (Baconi, 2018, pp. 68-70), with the exception of some sporadic attacks in 2004 (Tamimi, 2011). Moreover, talks with other Palestinian factions started in spring 2004, in prevision of the incoming disengagement of Israel from Gaza; the movement, empowered by its performance during the second Intifada, felt ready to engage in politics and, while talks were taking place, put on hold the suicide operations (Baconi, 2018, pp. 72-73).

Hamas considered its strategy of suicide attacks and launch of Qassam rockets awarded by the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation from Gaza in 2005, although Israel maintained control of the Gaza passages and, the following year, imposed a blockade (Baconi, 2018, 65); however, this was sufficient for the movement to change its attitude towards Palestinian institutions forged by the Oslo Accords, by declaring the Oslo Accords failed and deciding that it was time to run for elections. After it was elected, the movement proposed a unification of the armed forces to the other Palestinian parties, that rejected the proposal (Hroub, 2006b, p. 65).

The movement also put an end to suicide attacks and rocket launches after the elections.

In the meantime, as much as holding onto a rhetoric of resistance was fundamental for maintaining the movements' credibility within and outside Palestine, the problem of representation to the outside world presented itself very soon. In the early 90s, Hamas issued *This is what we struggle for*, a document addressed the European diplomatic mission sent to Amman to inquire on the movement's strategies and objective; after September 11 2001, the need to present an alternative representation to the world presented itself with more urgency: the Islamist background of Hamas, its use of armed struggle and suicide attacks was enough for classifying it as a terrorist movement similar to al-Qaeda (Tamimi, 2011, p. 147-149). Popular support for the operations, on the other hand, was variable: deemed at first as a risk for the resistance, support would grow in periods of major weakness for the Palestinian population (Tamimi, 2011, p. 162-163).

In *This is what we struggle for*, resistance is considered as the only possibility of challenging the Occupation. This argumentation is a constant, regardless of the significant political shifts undertaken by the movement through all this time.

Armed struggle is not glorified, but is considered as the only opportunity left after the failure of the peace processes; at the same time, its modality and consequences are not minimized. When "martyrdom operations" or other attacks are carried out against Israel, Hamas, regardless of taking or not responsibility for



armed attacks (actually, during the last years, Hamas was frequently accused of acts really perpetrated by the group "Islamic Jihad"), they do not minimize them, but they praise them and emphasize the heroism and sacrifice. In cases not related to Israel, on the other hand, they strongly condemn use of violence and targeting of civilians (statement n. 319, 18/09/2001, on the Twin Towers attack).

The statements issued during and after the electoral campaign for the 2006 legislative elections incorporate new "instruments" of resistance: elections, institutions, and "democratic process" become an extension of resistance in the political field; in fact, the movement presented its decision to participate to elections as another instance of resistance and an act of responsibility to take back the Authority from the control of Fatah (Baconi, 2018, 83). Before Hamas existed, resistance was the central topic of the PLO discourse, and armed struggle was, very similarly, regarded as the sole option; until 1967, it was part of the general Arab-Israeli war, then, for the Palestinians, the concept started to specifically refer to their struggle (Badarin, 2016). Armed struggle was, after 1967, oriented at a "decisive battle" that would liberate Palestine; however, this idea shifted towards a long-term strategy, given the immediate impossibility to get rid of the Occupation.

It reached the foundation of Palestinian self-representation in those years, when the figure of the *fida'i*, the fighter, became prominent and pervasive: Palestinians refused to perceive themselves as a refugee people and a subjected people, preferring instead the *fida'i* as a representing figure (Badarin, 2016; Sayigh, 1977). With the PLO approaching the form of a political movement, after 1969, the representation of armed struggle as the only option was replaced by considering it as one *among* the possibilities of revolution; this transformation process reached its completeness in the 1980s, when the topic of armed struggle was finally dismissed in favour of a "political solution".

## 9.2 Resistance as *muqāwama*

As explained in the previous paragraph, The concept of resistance in general, and *muqāwama* in particular, is of primary importance within Hamas' discourse, and also Palestinian discourse in general. First of all, the word is included in the movement's name (*ḥarakat muqāwama al-islāmiyya*) and, in both its noun form and adjectival form, *muqāwim*, qualifies as the most frequent word in the whole corpus, with a total frequency of 603 occurrences per 100000 words, which remains stable during the thirty years of the movement's existence. It occurs mainly in its nominalized form, ("resistance" rather than "resistant") and is not frequently used as an adjective or noun for a human being: those who practice resistance, in fact, are rather called *mujahidun*, martyrs, or heroes. The term is used to describe every

instance of resistance against the occupation and to legitimize action (as resistance is legitimate, action undertaken as resistance is also legitimate).

### 9.2.1 Aspects of *muqāwama*

*Muqāwama* is a superordinate category, that can include many different types of action. However, the use Hamas makes of the term allows for identifying some information of how resistance is intended in the movement.

First of all, Hamas considers resistance as *popular* resistance. This was in common with other Palestinian parties in the 1970s, especially the Marxist parties (Badarin, 2016):

**Example 116** *Li-dalika nuʿamal ʿalā yuwaġġah al-lawm ilā aš-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqāwamatihī.*

[n. 1260, 25/03/2008]

For this reason we hope that **the Palestinian people and their resistance** will not be censored.

Resistance is very often represented as something that belongs to the people, as in the previous example. This put the Palestinian people in close relationship to the resistance, as it is "their" resistance, not the movement's or other parties'.

**Example 117** *Kāna šaʿbunā numūdġan li-š-šumūd wa-iḥtīdān al-muqāwama wa taḥammul al-ʿalam fī sabīl al-karāma.*

[n. 5731, 12/07/2016]

**Our people was a model of steadfastness and of embracing resistance**, and bears pain on the path of dignity

**Example 118** *Kamā tuġaddid al-ḥaraka ad-daʿwa li-ġamāhīr šaʿbinā, wa li-kāfat ʿabnāʿfaṣāʿil al-ʿamal al-waṭanī, ʿi lā āl-iktifāʿyarfaʿalam Falasṭīn fī kāfāt al-faʿāliyyāt, taʿakīdan ʿalā risālat al-waḥda al-waṭaniyya, wa tamassuk aš-šaʿbī ḥalf ḥiyār muqāwama al-muḥtill*

[n. 3945, 22/10/2015]

As the movement renovates its invite to the **masses of our people**, and to all the national factions, to rise the Palestinian flag at every occasion, claiming the mission of national unity, **and that the people adhere to their choice of resistance to the occupier**

The previous two examples show how resistance is popular because it is a "choice" of the people, and has been figuratively "embraced" by them. This is another type of relation.

Moreover, resistance is a long-term strategy:

**Example 119** *Wa ʿannahu sayastamirr fī al-intifāda wa-l-muqāwama ʿidda al-ʿadū aṣ-ṣahiyūnī al-ʿirhābī ḥatta zawāl al-iḥtilāl.*

[n. 5731, 12/07/2016]

**[Our people] will continue *intifada* and resistance** to the terrorist Zionist enemy until the removal of the Occupation

Although resistance legitimises actions, it needs, in turn, to be legitimised. The fact that resistance is legitimate is, in fact, very often emphasized:

**Example 120** *Nadʿukum ʿilā-l-ʿuqūf siyāsiyan wa mādiyan wa-maʿnawiyyan ʿilā ḡānib šʿbinā al-falastīnī wa muqāwamatihī al-mašruʿa*

[n. 1260, 25/03/2008]

We invite you to stand **by the side of the Palestinian people and its legitimate resistance** - politically, materially, and spiritually.

The example taken from statement n. 1260 belongs to the memorandum for the Damascus Arab Summit: it is thought for fruition of the Arab leaders, and not just the Palestinians. References to the legitimacy of resistance are, of course, addressed to recipients outside the immediate in-group, that does not need to be convinced of the legitimacy of resistance.

Resistance co-occur very frequently with other struggle-related terms, such as *sumūd* and *jihad* (see Table ??).

Table 9.1: Resistance as *muqāwama*: most common clusters in the general corpus

Rank	Frequency	Cluster
1	3320	Islamic Resistance
2	111	Palestinian resistance
3	104	Resistance to the Occupation
4	66	The Islamic Resistance
5	56	The resistance in
6	49	Resistance and jihad
7	41	Resistance and
8	37	Resistance and <i>ṣumūd</i>
9	34	Resistance until
10	28	The resistance is
11	26	Popular resistance
12	20	The armed resistance

### 9.2.2 *Muqāwama*: a frame analysis

The most common frames which *muqāwama* profiles are: rebellion, process, the action of retaining, reaching a purpose, possession. It is also frequently personified, and treated as such as a participant, or metaphorically represented as a road, which is a very common metaphor applied also to jihad and other instances of resistance. Resistance is personalized as a fighter. Therefore, it can wield weapons, defend its people, and have a good or bad health:

**Example 121** *ʾInna fī maḥarakat Ḥamās (...) bitnā ʿalā ʾimānan bi-ḍurūrat taḡmiʿ al-qawā al-falaṣṭīniyya wa-l-ʿarabiyya wa-l-ʾIslāmiyya fī barnāmiḡ muwāḡiha šāmil maʿa al-iḥtilāl wa mašrūʿhu aṣ-ṣahyūnī takūn al-muqāwama aš-šaʿbiyya al-musallaḥa ras al-ḥarba fīhi.*

[n. 621, 16/09/1996]

We, the Hamas movement, are firmly convinced of the necessity to unite the Palestinian, Arabic and Islamic forces in a program for a full-scale confrontation with Occupation and its Zionist project, and that the **armed popular resistance** be at its head

**Example 122** *Nad'u as-sayid Maḥmūd 'Abbās wa fariq Oslo 'ilā 'i 'ādat al-nazar fī ḥiyārātihim as-siyāsiyya ba'da 'an tabat 'abaṭiyya al-mufāwadāt..., kamā nad'ūhum 'ilā waqafa kāfa 'aškāl at-tansīq al-'amaniyya ma'a al-iḥtilāl wa 'i ṭlāq sirāḥ al-muqāwimīn al-mu'taqalīn fī suḡūn sulṭat Rām Allāh, wa waqaf mulāḥiqa **al-muqāwama wa silāḥahā** allādī huwa muwaḡah 'ilā ṣudūr al-iḥtilāl **difā'an 'an ša 'binā wa muqaddasātīnā.***

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

We invite Mahmud Abbas and the Oslo group to reconsider their political choices after the absurdity of negotiations was established, as we invite them to cease every form of coordination of security with the Occupation and release the fighters (*muqāwimīn*) held in the prisons of the Ramallah Authority<sup>1</sup>, an end the persecution **of the resistance and its military branch**, that aim right at the heart of the Occupation **in defence of our people** and their sacred sites

**Example 123** *Nw'akid li-l'adū aṣ-šhiyūnī 'an **al-muqaāwama bi-ḥyr** wa lan tasamḥ li-'aḥad 'an yadūs 'alā ṭarḥihā.*

[n. 5731, 12/07/2016]

We assure the enemy that **the resistance is fine** and won't allow anyone to **step on her feet**.

**Example 124** *Wa lan yabqā ša'bunā wa qawāha **al-muqāwama maktūfī** al-'ayadī 'amām ḥadīhi as-siyāsa al-muḥādī'a.*

[n. 615, 29/07/2003]

Our people **and the forces of the resistance will not remain with their arms folded** in front of this deceiving policy

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<sup>1</sup>The Palestinian Authority.

The examples show how the resistance is intended respectively as a group of people, an organization ("the resistance and its military branch", statement 1398), emphasizing the human component, and as a human being who has limbs (statements 5731 and 615).

Resistance as an organization of people recurs very frequently. Besides emphasizing the human component, this also adds the feature of pre-planned kind of action:

**Example 125** *At-ta'akīd 'alā huq wa mašrū'iyyat al-ğihād al-falaṣṭīniyya ḍidda al-kiyān ṣ-ṣahyūnī al-muḥtill wa al-ī 'lān 'an da'am barnāmiğ muqāwama al-ī ḥtilāl ḥatta yataḥaqqaq al-istiqlāl al-falaṣṭīniyya kāmīl.*

[n. 827, 22/03/1997]

We declare the right and legitimacy of the Palestinian jihad against the occupying Zionist entity and announce **the support to the program of resistance** to the Occupation in order to realize a complete independence for Palestine

**Example 126** *al-Iḥtilal aṣ-ṣahyūnī tamarr fī marḥala ḥarğa ḥadihi al-ayām, ḥaytu tuwāṣil ḥukūma al-'adū ta'annatuhā wa tarfuḍ al-īfrāğ 'an ġamī'al-'asrā al-falaṣṭīniīn wa-l-'arab fī suğūnhā, rağm al-mubādara allatī qaddamathā faṣā'il al-muqāwama fī Falasṭīn bita'līq al-'amliyyāt al-'askariyya šaraṭa al-īfrāğ 'an ġamī'al-'asrā wa-l-rahā'in fī suğūn al-iḥtilal aṣ-ṣahyūnī*

[n. 615, 29/07/2003]

The Zionist Occupation proceeds in this delicate moment, whereas the government of the enemy continues to be stubborn and refuses to release all the Palestinian and Arab prisoners in its prisons, despite the initiatives undertaken in Palestine by **the factions of the resistance** regarding the military operations that put as a condition the release of all the prisoners and the hostages in the prisons of the Zionist Occupation

At the same time, resistance shares some of the properties of objects, such as being a possession. This is usually another strategy to reinforce the representation of "popular resistance":

**Example 127** *Da'am haqīqī li-ṣumūd ša'binā al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqāwamatihā.*

[n. 691, 22/05/2004]

. A real support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people **and their resistance**

As a possession, it is very frequently described as something that Hamas keeps a firm grasp on. This image is very common, and is not limited to *muqāwama*, but employed also in the case of values and goals, and is an indication of Hamas' will not to betray its promises.

**Example 128** *ʾIn ša'bunā ʿalā yaqīn ʾan mā ʾahaḍ bi-l-quwa lā yastarid ʾilā bi-qawa, wa huwa yutamsik bi-mabdʾa muqāwama al-idhtilal bi-kull al-wasāʾil.*

[n.827, 22/03/1997]

Our people is convinced that what has been taken with force will not be returned but with force, and **adheres to the principles of the resistance** to the Occupation with every possible means

As an instrument proper, resistance occurs in close textual association with its purpose; the purpose may also be metaphorically expressed as a destination, and the resistance as a path leading to the destination.

**Example 129** *Wa sayuwāṣil ḡihāduhu wa muqāwamatuhu wa intifādatuha al-bāsila .. muhimman ṭāl at-ṭarīq wa balaḡat at-taḍḥiyāt .. fa-haḍihi hiya masīrat al-naṣr wa-l-tahrīr.*

[n. 399, 31/07/2001]

And (the people) will continue their jihad, **resistance** and fearless *intifada*... regardless of the length of **the way** and the sacrifices... **and this is the path to victory and liberation**

## 9.3 Resistance as jihad

### 9.3.1 Jihad in context

Jihad is frequently represented as a means to reach the group's goal concerning liberation of Palestine, respect of rights, self-government and statehood. It can occur in different manifestations: in fact, throughout the statements it can be inferred that jihad includes armed struggle, demonstrations, boycott, strikes. In fact, it overlaps with the general concept of "resistance".

The readers of Hamas' statements are expected to already know the term in its variety of meanings, and consequently activate certain *frames* (Fillmore and Baker, 2010) prior to the representation of the word "jihad" within each statement. We can expect them to have knowledge about its conventional meaning and use in religious term: jihad is a kind of religious duty (*fard*, "obligation" in Arabic).

Islamic law differentiates human actions in five normative categories within a scale whose extremes are allowed and prohibited: compulsory acts (*furūd*, recommended acts (*mandūb*), allowed acts (*mubāh*), reprehensible acts (*makrūh*) and prohibited acts (*ḥarām*) (Ventura, 1999, 112-113). In this sense, the frame is that of religious precepts, concerning both the individual and collective behaviour.

The word jihad comes from the root (*ḡ, h, d*), which means "to exert an effort". There are two kinds of jihad: great jihad, which is the "interior" struggle of the Muslim against temptations and difficulties in order to remain a good Muslim, and minor jihad, which is the resistance, including war, undertaken by the Muslim community under threat; it is a defensive act which counts as a *fard kifāya*, a collective duty, that can be carried on by only a part of the community (Tyan). However, the Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam in the 80s (see chapter on Historical context), heavily drawing from previous doctrinal debates on the issue<sup>2</sup> argued that jihad is a *fard 'ayn*, an individual duty (Azzām, 1984), which should be complied by every individual: this was the cause of the massive arrival of foreign *mujahidun* to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union, and the prelude to the jihadi armed movements, such as Al Qaida. This leads to another association evoked by the word jihad: that of contemporary historical events.

On the wake of the Islamic revival during the 80s, prompted by the 1979 Iranian revolution, Islamic movements met with popular favour and many *mujahidun* would go and fight in Afghanistan to defend the "Muslim lands", an event recalled

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<sup>2</sup>In traditional Islamic doctrine, it is agreed upon that jihad becomes an individual duty for towns under siege or population which live close to the invader; or, in the case of a State, whether the sovereign decrees so or a general mobilization takes place (Tyan). Recent anti-colonization movements are an example of adoption of this perspective prior to Abdallah Azzam: the Sudanese Mahdi Abdallah Hasan would incite to jihad against the Italian and British colonizers as a *fard 'ayn* (Campanini, 1995, p. 252)



and celebrated by Hamas itself. In this context, jihad was the struggle against the foreign oppressor and occupier. Similarly, jihadi discourse appropriated the word by declaring jihad to the "Crusaders" which were Israel and its allies: Bin Laden, in 1998, declares jihad to the "Crusaders" occupying the "two holy places", meaning the Islamic sanctuaries, when Saudi Arabia hosted American troops in its military bases to fight the Gulf War in 1991 (Laden, 1996). This subsequently creates analogies between past oppressors of the Muslims and contemporary oppressors of the Muslim through the historical metaphor of the Crusades.

After 11 September 2001, the term's meaning became related to the international political discourse against "Islamic terrorism", as produced by the European Union and the United States. The movement clearly addresses this representation, refusing the "terrorist" label. In fact, the movement never got acquainted with Salafi jihadi movements (such as al-Qaida), and outlawed them as soon as they started governing Gaza in 2007 (Baconi, 2018, p. 139).

Thus, jihad carries a luggage of multiple meanings and associations, which derive from its original religious meaning and its journey through time.

### 9.3.2 Changing representations and jihad

Referring to jihad can be interpreted as an "identity" marker in the panorama of political Palestinian parties when speaking about resistance, as it was used mainly by Hamas. Actually, 1950s and 1960s Palestinian discourse on resistance is remapped onto the frame of jihad: the land is emphasized as being a Muslim land, the figure of the *fidā'i* is overwritten by the *mujahid*, the truce is the Islamic *hudna*, the (political) disagreement and civil war is *fitna*.

Religious representations in Hamas' discourse depend on the centrality of jihad. However, although the movement highly praises scholars and Islamic figures of authority such as Sayyid Qutb (statements n. 1184, 74, 75, 997; chapter on Historical context) and Abdallah Azzam (statements n. 81, 675), it does not necessarily share or reproduce their version of jihad: there is no mention of jihad as a necessary means to restore *dār al-Islām*, the land where Islamic laws and principles are respected, as theorized by Qutb (Campanini, 2008, p. 25), neither there is an aspiration to Azzam's global jihad.

Nonetheless, in its early years the movement shows signs of closeness to Azzam's thought. In the 1988 charter, which was almost never quoted by members of the movement, jihad is mentioned as "individual duty" in article 12:

**Example 130** *Al-waṭan wa al-waṭaniyya min waḡha naẓar Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya bi-Falaṣṭīn: al-māda at-tāniya 'ašara:*

*Al-waṭaniyya min wa ḡha naẓar Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya ḡiz min al-ʿaqīda ad-dīniyya, wa laysa ʿablaḡ fī al-waṭaniyya wa lā ʿa-maq min ʿannahu, ʿidā wa ṭʿa al-ʿadū ʿarḍ al-muslimīn faqad šār ḡihāduhu wa at-taṣḍī lahu fard ʿayn ʿalā kull muslim wa muslima, tahruḡ al-marʿā li-qitalihi bi-ḡayr ʿidan zawḡihā, wa al-ʿabd bi-ḡayr ʿidan saydihī*

[*Mīṭāq* (charter) of the Islamic Resistance Movement, (Ḥamās, 1988); English translation in (Maqdsi, 1993)]

#### **Nation and nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement - Article 12**

Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part and parcel of religious ideology. There is not a higher peak in nationalism or depth in devotion than *Jihad* when an enemy lands on the Muslim territories. Fighting the enemy becomes **the individual obligation of every Muslim man and woman. The woman is allowed to go fight without the permission of her husband and the slave without the permission of his master**

The passage very explicitly connects the notion of jihad to that of nationalism, and explains the latter in terms of the former. The interesting piece of information, however, regards the reference to the "individual duty" and the closing sentences are taken from a longer passage in Azzam's *In defence of the Muslim lands* (ʿAzzām, 1984). In fact, Azzam, who was Palestinian and considered the Palestinian cause as the "primary Islamic cause" (ʿAzzām, 1984; Hegghammer, 2008), had welcomed the foundation of Hamas and published an essay on the history of the movement, *Hamas: historical roots and charter* (ʿAzzām, 1989). The movement and the scholar were in contact, and he was sent the charter for revision before its publication (Hegghammer, 2013, pp. 377-379).

Although the defence of Palestine is frequently described as a duty in Hamas' discourse (by using the word *wāḡib*, not *fard*, although *wāḡib* is an equivalent of *fard*), this specific reference to individual duty disappears very soon. In the 2017 charter, jihad is not mentioned; on the other hand, resistance and liberation of Palestine are the duty to carry on:

#### **Example 131** *Al-muqāwama wa at-tahrīr:*

24 . *ʿIn tahrīr Falastīn wāḡib aš-šaʿb al-Falastīnī bi-šaffa ḡaṣṣa, wa wāḡib al-ʿumma al-ʿarabiyya wa al-islāmiyya bi-šaffa ʿamma, wa*

*huwa ʿaydan masāʿuliyya ʿinsāniyya wafaq muqtaḍiyyāt al-ḥuq wa al-ʿadal. Wa ʿin duwāʿyr al-ʿamal al-Falaṣṭīn sawʿa kānāt waṭaniyya ʿam ʿarabiyya ʿam ʿislāmiyya ʿam ʿinsāniyya hiya duwāʿir mutakāmila mutanāḡima, lā tuʿarid baynihā.*

[A Document of General Policies and Principles, May 2017, ( Hamas, 2017); see (Ḥamās, 2017) for version in Arabic]

Resistance and Liberation:

**24. The liberation of Palestine is the duty of the Palestinian people** in particular and the duty of the Arab and Islamic Ummah in general. It is also a humanitarian obligation as necessitated by the dictates of truth and justice. The agencies working for Palestine, whether national, Arab, Islamic or humanitarian, complement each other and are harmonious and not in conflict with each other.

The notion of "duty" is maintained but re-contextualized in secular terms and by using a synonym, *wāḡib*. The documents issued during the electoral round in 2006 were the product of a clear shift towards a more political and institutional language, which came from the necessity to acquire credibility in international politics (Hroub, 2006a; Baconi, 2018; Nüsse, 1998; Tamimi, 2011). After the 2011 revolts in Arabic countries, Hamas felt, for a short period of time, safe and thriving: Egypt had ousted Mubarak, and an Islamic Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Morsi, had won the elections. However, when Egypt reinstated a military government with al-Sisi, Hamas soon found itself in a weak position (Hroub, 2017, p. 105-107). For this reason, the necessity to offer an image as dissociated as possible from trans-national jihadi movements and to be considered as a legitimate partner in negotiations became primary, and is one of the reasons why the 2017 Document was issued.

### 9.3.3 Jihad in co-text


With the exception of the first seven years of the movement, occurrences of the word jihad do not present significant changes in terms of co-text: they co-occur with roughly the same words, and maintain similar collocations. Moreover, jihad has very similar co-occurrences and collocates to *muqāwama*, showing how the term works as some kind of synonym, although jihad and *muqāwama* frequently co-occur as a pair. The term is a marker of Hamas' Islamic identity, which cannot be explicitly abandoned; however, it can be marginalized by using other strategies. In this case, marginalization seems to be performed on a quantitative level: although jihad is substantially used in the same way, its occurrences decrease during the lifetime of the movement, with a downfall in 2011, and a rise in 2016.

Table 9.2: Clusters of "jihad" during the three decades

Rank	Freq.	Cluster	Years	Freq.	Cluster	Years	Freq.	Cluster	Years
1	3	The jihad in	1987-1996	3	Victory to the jihad	1997-2006	2	the jihad and the resistance	2007-2016
2	2	Jihad until	1987-1996	2	jihad and resistance	1997-2006	2	to jihad is victory	2007-2016
3	1	jihad quote	1987-1996	2	their jihad and resistance	1997-2006	1	to jihad, victory	2007-2016
4	1	the Afghan jihad	1987-1996	2	to jihad is victory	1997-2006	1	the Islamic Jihad	2007-2016
5	1	the Palestinian jihad	1987-1996	1	al jihad	1997-2006	1	The jihad is important	2007-2016
6	1	the abandoned jihad	1987-1996	1	the Palestinian jihad	1997-2006			
7	1	the spoken jihad	1987-1996	1	The jihad and resistance	1997-2006			
8	1	jihad against	1987-1996	1	the jihad is	1997-2006			
9	1	jihad is our way	1987-1996	1	jihadi and resistant	1997-2006			
10	1	jihad to liberate	1987-1996	-	-	-	-	-	-

On the other hand, *muqāwama* remains stable in its frequency. The total frequency of "jihad" within the general corpus is 190 occurrences per 100000 words; during the first decade, it is 260.8, during the second decade is 222.4, during the third 84.9. The decrease is evident, and significant if compared with the rising trends of *muqāwama* (see figure 9.2). In the general corpus, the tendency is towards a decrease of *jihad* and a stability of *muqāwama* (see figures 9.1 and 9.2).

Figure 9.1: Frequency of *jihad* between 1988 and 2016



### 9.3.4 A frame analysis of *jihad*


For this analysis, the word "jihad" has been considered as a lexical unit and the research is aimed at understanding which frames it profiles and if and how they show diachronic variation on the three-decade span.

#### Metaphors and spatial frames

The word *jihad* appears in a recurrent metaphor: the road metaphor, where the target domain is the road, realized as "path, trail, way".

**Example 132** *ʾIn ḥarakat (Ḥamās) ʾid tataqaddam min ʾahalī madīnat al-Ḥalīl aṣ-ṣāmida bi-ʾaḥarr al-taʾāzī fa-ʾinnahā tuʾāhid šaʾbanā ʾalā al-ṭār li-damāʾaš-šuhadāʾ al-ʾabrār wa muwāṣilat darab al-ḡhād wa at-tahrīr.*

Figure 9.2: Frequency of *muqāwama* between 1988 and 2016



[n.396, 27/02/1994]

Hamas offers its warmest condolences to the city of the steadfast el Khalil <sup>3</sup> and promises our people that it will retaliate the blood of the innocent martyrs and **continue on the path of jihad and liberation**

**Example 133** *nuṭalib kāfat al-qawā al-waṭaniyya wal-islāmiyya ʿan taqūm bi-dawrihā fī at-taṣdī li-miṭla hādihī al-ḡarāʿim ḥimāya li-waḥdatinā al-waṭaniyya, wa ṣiyāna li-l-dam al-falastīnī, wa ḥifāzan ʿlā intfādatinā wa masīratinā al-ḡihādiyya.*

[ n. 611, 11/07/2003 ]

We ask to all the Islamic national forces to do their part to confront crimes such as this and defend our national unity, the Palestinian blood, and preserve our Intifada **and our path of jihad.**

<sup>3</sup>Arabic name of the city of Hebron

**Example 134** *Nuğaddid al-‘ahad ‘lā muwāṣila darab al-muqāwama wa-l-ğihād muhimman kānat at-taḍḥiyyaāt li-taṭhīr ‘arḍinā wa muqaddasātinā min rağas al-iḥtilāl wa li-rad ‘adwānihi wa ḥiṣārihi al-‘iğrāmī ‘an ṣa‘binā.*

[n. 6352, 02/11/2016]

We renovate our promise to continue **on the path of resistance and jihad** and to commit sacrifice in order to purify our land and its sacred sites from the atrocities of the Occupation and to respond to its aggressions and its criminal blockade on our people

Another similar realization is the following:

**Example 135** *Lā nansā ‘an naltafit ilā ġihād šu‘ūb ‘ummatinā al-‘islāmiyya li-nīl ḥurriyatihā wa taḥqīq ḥīyarātihi al-mustaqilla.*

[n.181, 25/04/1992]

We do not forget **to turn to the jihad** of the people of our Islamic *umma* to obtain freedom and make their independent choices

In this case, jihad is conceived of as a direction to turn to. The metaphor is recurrent, with slight changes (for example, in the second decade it is frequently accompanied by the word "resistance", as in "the path of jihad and resistance"). The metaphor would be, generally, that "resistance is a journey", to which jihad applies as an instantiation of resistance and, within the metaphor, as the "trail" to travel; this metaphor evokes both the basic frames of space and time.

The jihad, as instrument to liberation and comprehensive category of resistance acts, is thus conceptualized as a space to be covered in order to arrive to destination, which usually coincides with the goals of the in-group, such as liberation of the land, right to return for the refugees, and national unity. It implies also a necessary span of time to reach the destination/goals, which is consistent with the temporal structures employed by the Movement to represent their history and Palestinian history as a long and continuous chain of aggressions starting from 1917 Balfour Declaration, thus in the middle of a constant resistance which is yet to find its end.

The road metaphor is not a particular innovation; the expression *ğihād fī sabīl Allāh*, which can be found in the Quran, specifies the scope of jihad within "the way of God", meaning that it is performed for the cause of God and must abide

by the laws of God. However, the metaphor is here modified, and the resistance in all its forms (jihad and *muqāwama* becomes the road, determining which actions should be undertaken to reach the destination/goal of liberation. Moreover, synonyms to *salīb* are proposed, such as *darab*, *tariq*.

### Other metaphors

Jihad emerges as element in other metaphors, especially during the first 10 years:

**Example 136** *Fī ġamra ġihādinā allādī lā yahdʿa didda al-iḥtilāl aṣ-ṣahyūnī al-ġāšim.*

[n. 181, 25/04/1992]

[ ] **in the flood of our jihad** that will not stop against the tyrannical Zionist Occupation.

**Example 137** *ad-dawla al-falaṣṭīniyya laysat kalima tuqāl fī huṭba sīāsiyya ʿaw naṣrat tawazzaʿaw manāšib taqassum, ʿinnamā hiya tamra ġihād ṭawīl wa taḍḥiyāt lā ḥudūd lahā.*

[n. 58, 18/08/1988]

"Palestinian State" is not a word pronounced in political speeches, in the media or in oaths, **indeed it is the fruit of a long jihad** and infinite sacrifices.

**Example 138** *lam yaḥmud ġadwa al-ġihād didda al-muḥtill al-ġāšim.*

[n. n. 675, 27/11/1996]

**the burning log of jihad** against the tyrannical occupant did not extinguish



Variations are not common in the metaphoric use of jihad; however, as the examples show, it can be metaphorized as an expression of natural and disruptive force, as a creative natural force, or as a burning log, which symbolizes the passion of the fighters and evokes a religious frame (the representation of the "burning log", in fact, is taken from the Quran). While the dominant metaphor connects jihad to space, these metaphors emphasize its nature as a "process".

### **The "process continue" frame as linking frame**

The idea of continuity is pervasive in the conceptualization of jihad. It does not appear only regarding the "road" metaphor, which is often realized as "continue on the road of", but somehow connects the "road" metaphor with other realizations. For example, see the following example:

**Example 139** *Lan yuqif ġihād ša'abinā wa intifādatihi.*

[ n. 480, 23/07/2002 ]

The jihad of our people and its Intifada will not stop

This is another very common expression that can be found in the statements. If interpreted as a "road metaphor", jihad is the entity that walks the path. On the other hand, it can simply be interpreted as an emphasis on the part of meaning that sees jihad as an activity/process. This is present also in the examples of the preceding paragraph: the "flood of jihad" will not stop; the length of the process is emphasized by the adjective "long" which modifies "jihad".

This interpretation implies that someone/something wants to prevent us/the jihad from continuing.

### **Other common frames**

The frame "revolution" is the most recurrent and "prototypical" one. In terms of "frame elements" (Fillmore and Baker, 2010), it can be certainly identified as the core. A connection is then established with other kinds of representations: the goals pursued with the resistance/rebellion are, for example, "destination" in the "journey" metaphor and evoked as frame elements in the "path" frame; the destination/goal can, sometimes, overlap with the instrument/jihad/resistance. In this sense, it activates, at the same time, the frame of "purpose" as a "means" to reach it, which is the part of its meaning most connected with its classification as the ideological structure "instrument".

Jihad is also perceived as something belonging to the people, which is an integrated part of its range of actions and image. In this sense, it is attributed to it as "possessed" in a "possession" frame:

**Example 140** *Yaʿatī fī siyāq al-ḥamla al-mašbūha al-rāmiyya ʿilā balbala al-rʾāī al-ʿām ʿabar tašwīh šūrat al-ḥraka wa ḡihādihā al-buṭūī dīdda al-iḥtilāl.*

[ n. 648, 07/03/1996 ]

And [Israel] leads a suspicious campaign to confuse public opinion by distorting **the image of the movement and its heroic jihad** against the Occupation

As a possessed item, it is also usually protected, where it can be classified as frame element "asset" in the "protecting" frame.

The connection to the people is not performed only by connecting it to jihad by the means of "owner/possessed". In fact, it is frequently described as the result of a decisional process performed by the people:

**Example 141** *Wa taṣ-īṣṣuqāwama wa-l-tawadḥud ʿalā ḥiyār al-ḡihād.*

[ n. 399, 31/07/2001 ]

The intensifying of resistance and the unity around **the choice of jihad**

**Example 142** *ʾIn šaʿbunā qad ḥasam ḥiy=arahu, wa qarrara ʾan al-ḡihād huwa al-sabīl li-taḥrīr al-ʾarḍ wa al-muqadassāt wa istiʿadat al-ḥuqūq.*

[ n. 411, 06/04/2002 ]

Our people has made its choice, and decided that jihad is the way to liberation of the land, of the sacred sites and the restitution of the rights.

In this case, jihad is an alternative between a multiple choice ("choosing" frame), and it is then legitimated on the grounds of having been chosen by the people, rather than for being a religious prescription.

In conclusion, the "core" frames that profile the concept of "jihad" are "revolution", "purpose", "process continue" and "choosing". These frames emphasize only a part of the conventional meaning of jihad, the part of "acts to defend the people" and bypass other original components of its meaning, such as the obligation/religious precept category, and the dominant meaning of "great jihad" as a psychological effort of the believer. These frames frequently overlap, and the "revolution" one is evoked for knowledge of the context of Palestinian struggle rather than for local wording, as it might occur without explicit references to fighting of resisting. The most recurrent metaphor in which it is included is "resistance/jihad is a journey", where jihad is a type of resistance in the source domain and the "trail" in the target domain (road). This path can be full of obstacles that represent the enemy of Hamas/Palestinians/extended in-group, and try to stop them. From a diachronic point of view, there are no significant variations in the distribution of frames; however, a change can be registered in the frequency of the word "jihad", which decreases especially during the last decade (2007-2016).

## 9.4 Politics as instrument of resistance

The relevance of Hamas participating to elections for the Palestinian Authority has already been illustrated. This act, was, represented as an extension of the resistance to the realms of politics (Baconi, 2018). However, this new path required a particular work on the movements' credibility in two directions: credibility from the Palestinian people, who needed not see another party abandoning their claims and dismissing resistance, and credibility from international political actors, that needed to consider the movement as a legitimate counterpart. This explains why the core of resistance discourse and lexicon was maintained, and also why references to jihad were gradually decreased, although not changed in their nature. However, the category of *instruments* (ideological instruments) was certainly enriched. New goals emerge side by side with Palestinian cause and liberation: providing service to the people and re-organizing the institutional asset. As new goals emerge (see the chapter on *Goals*), also new values are introduced (see chapter on *Values*). In the case of *instruments*, for example, elections become necessary for serving the Palestinian cause and the people:

**Example 143** *Inṭilāqan min ḥarṣ ḥarakat Ḥamās ‘alā tartīb al-bayt al-falaṣṭīnī wa tarsīh mabd’a aš-širāka wa taḥammul al-mas’ūliyya*

*al-waṭaniyya fī hadha al-marḥala al-daḡīqa allatī yaḡtaāzihā šaʿbunā wa qaḡayatunā al-waṭaniyya, fa-ʿin al-ḥaraka tarā ḡurūra wa ʿahmiyya ʿiḡrāʿ al-intihābāt al-maḡaliyya fī aḡ-dīfa wa al-qitāʿ.*

[n. 5743, 15/07/2015]

Starting from the desire of the Hamas movement to put order in the Palestinian household, to consolidate to the principle of participation and to take national responsibility in this delicate period for our people and our national question, **the movement sees the necessity and importance of holding local elections in the [West] Bank and in the [Gaza] Strip.**

In the previous example, Hamas introduces the metaphor of the *household* to represent the nation. The metaphor of the household is not new to political discourse, and has been dealt with extensively by Chilton in a comparative analysis between English and Russian (Chilton and Ilyin, 1993); in this analysis, Chilton showed how the embedded cultural representations of the house were transferred to the metaphor, in a variety of functions. In the case of Hamas, the image of the house is a space to take care of and keep in order, which implies a series of actions (the house needs someone to keep in order) and qualities of its caretaker, such as taking responsible decisions for everyone in order to create or maintain "order", which is national "responsibility". Who takes care of the house is rational and responsible, and this new figure emerges next to the *mujahid* who is fearless, steadfast, strong, and a hero.

The participation principle collocates Hamas within the discourse on democracy and social engagement on levels other than straightforward resistance. All of the above are the contents of Hamas' desire, and are found as the theme of the whole sentence: thus, is no new piece of information that Hamas has these desires, but should be common knowledge that they have always been there. In this way, Hamas naturalizes its new image. Moreover, the fact that it is a "delicate period" justifies the importance of holding elections as necessary for the "national cause".

Democracy is, in this phase, not only a general value which serves the purpose to legitimize or de-legitimize actors or actions, but is specified by concepts such as elections, institutions, nation, governance.

**Example 144** *Maʿa at-tʿakīd ʿalā ʿahmiyya al-ʿamaliyya al-dīmuqrāṭiyya al-falaṣṭīniyya min ḡilal- ʿiḡrāʿ al-intihābāt al-rʿiyāsiyya wa at-tašrīʿiyya wa al-maḡlis al-waṭanī al-falaṣṭīnī.*

[n. 5743, 15/07/2015]

We assert the importance of the **Palestinian democratic process through the presidential elections, the legislative elections, and the elections of the Palestinian National Council**

Moreover democracy, just like resistance, is framed as a choice:

**Example 145** *Tatamassak Ḥamās bi-ḥiyār al-tawāfuq wa aš-širāka ma'a kull aṭrāf ša'bihā wa quwāh wa faṣā'ilhi, wa al-ḥiyār al-dīmūqrāṭī alladī yuḥaqqiq al-istiqrār wa al-silm al-muḡtama'ī.*

[n. 6539, 14/12/2016]

Hamas adheres to the choice of agreement and participation with all the sides, forces and factions of its people, and on its **choice of democracy which establishes stability and social well-being**

When the movement announced its participation to the 2005 legislative elections, the choice was argued as the best chance to "serve the people" and because of the "changes undergone by the intifada". The text will be reproduced in its integrity, in order to see how all the old and new representations function together:

Hamas decides to participate to elections for the legislative Palestinian Council

We, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, in desire to consolidate our conduct in service of our Palestinian people in every possible field, safeguard its affairs and interests, protect its rights and properties,

in support of building institutions of Palestinian society on solid foundations, curing every corrupted and unbalanced aspect, and realizing a complete and real national reform, so that our people be able to face the Occupation and the aggressions,

and complying with the desires of our people, and their support to participation with every force and faction in the political life in the Occupied Palestinian territories,

on the basis of the changes undergone by the resistance and the intifada and the sacrifices of our people during the last years,

**the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas decided, after discussions and exhaustive consultations that included many of its institutions, sections and leadership inside and outside, amongst which were the prisoners of the Movement in the prisons of the Zionist Occupation, to participate to the next elections for the legislative Palestinian Council, and**

**that in accordance to the legitimate rights of our people, and to defend the programme of Resistance as a strategic choice until the fallout of the Occupation, God permitting.**

The Islamic Resistance Movement

Hamas - Palestine

Saturday, 2 afar 1426 H. 12 Adhar (March) 2005 M.

[n. 868]

The concepts of serving the people, building institutions, and realize a national reform, which all belong to the "institutions" and "politics" frame, are put first in the list of reasons for their participation to elections, and are, once again, "naturalized" as always been existing in Hamas' wishes. The references to resistance and intifada, however, are still present, right before the announcement, but mentioned under general "changes" which are not really dealt with. Hamas' involvement in institutions and elections comes together with assurances on the movement moral integrity and consistency (references to intifada), but also capability of speaking the language of institutions and democracy (participation, fight to corruption in society, safeguard rights and properties). The strategy of legitimation is performed by mentioning the will of the people and their best interest, which is one of the most recurrent strategies of legitimation performed by Hamas.

## **9.5 Concluding remarks**

The analysis showed that instruments, in Hamas' discourse, are a crucial ideological discursive structure, that identifies for having a limited but productive range (*muqāwama, jihad, politics* in quantitative and qualitative terms).

Instruments emerge as more productive and sensible a category than goals: in fact, significant changes of direction in Hamas discourse are performed on this category.

These changes depend on the movement's need to adjust its self-image by running two different interpretations of reliability: for the people, it needs to appear consistent in not giving up resistance, as the other Palestinian parties had done, thus maintaining a resistance discourse; to external political actors, it needs to show that it is a reliable partner and not a terrorist movement, thus adjusting its religious lexicon and adopting an institutional and political language.



# Chapter 10

## GOALS

### 10.1 Social action as cooperation towards common goals

The realm of politics is goal-oriented: definitions of politics, in fact, put the reaching of goals within the definition of the term (Chilton, 2004). Strategies of persuasion are employed by political leaders to convince the people, or institutional actors, to share a specific goal and organize for its achievement, and this is one of the main functions of political discourse. The action of cooperation is recognized, at micro level (mediation of controversies and interests) or macro level (institutions and higher powers) (Chilton, 2004, p. 4), central to political action:

Let us now see how this ability is intrinsically entwined with what we would intuitively call politics. Humans show a vastly evolved ability to plan for future cooperative group action. Even if some humans are Machiavellian, they can only be Machiavellian if they have common cooperative activity to work on.

(Chilton, 2004, p. 19)

In ideological terms, the in-group shares some final goals, and the other ideological structures are very often shaped on them. Thus, as an ideological structure, it covers a certain importance in interpreting the in-group's structuring of its identity and ideology.

The category of *goals*, in Palestinian discourse, defines an area where political changes and positions can be diagnosed; in fact, while on a very general level the goals remain untouched, the manner in which they are interpreted and filled with content is symptomatic of the political and social changes underwent by each movement or political party.



The goals of Hamas are presented as the goals of all Palestinians. However, in the history of Palestinian political discourse, this category underwent significant changes, along with the changes in the overall representation of the Palestinian question adopted by the PLO,

The present chapter deals with the category of goals in their semantic representation and frequency in a diachronic perspective. The analysis is contextualized in the broader Palestinian discourse on goals.

### **10.1.1 Goals in Palestinian political discourse: from liberation to "political solution"**

The history of Palestinian goals revolves around three main goals: liberation, achieving of rights, and a Palestinian state. Liberation of Palestine from the Zionist presence has, in principle, been the starting point of every party and movement of liberation. Having basic rights acknowledged, such as the right of return for the refugees and the right to self-determination, is the other fundamental goal pursued by every movement of resistance and party. These are the claims brought up ever since 1948. According to Badarin [2017], after the foundation of the Palestinian National Council, the discourse on liberation became indistinguishable from conceptions "imported" by liberal political language, such as "democratic state" and other liberal concepts. Adoption of liberal conceptions of liberty would coincide, at least for what concerns the PLO, with an abandonment of the "colonization" frame of interpretation of the Palestine question. More significant changes were yet to come: Fatah, for example, originally claimed the liberation of Palestine (1967 borders) and recognition of rights; however, when the movement got involved with the peace processes, their claims were heavily downsized. In the case of liberation of Palestine, such goal disappeared completely from their discourse: in fact, the condition Israel imposed for accepting Palestinian delegates in the negotiations were strict and insisted on renouncing armed struggle and Israel's existence.

The Palestinian goals changed along with the representations of the Palestinian question. At first, the Palestinian discourse was informed by the analogy with other situations of occupation and oppression throughout the world; the "colonization" model was as representation of the Palestine question, therefore lexicon about self-determination and liberation from the oppressor was adopted. Liberation was associated with armed resistance and the figure of the *fidai*, the fighter (Badarin, 2016). The model of colonization and occupation was discarded when the negotiations started. Palestine was not represented as a colony anymore, but rather as a "competitor" for land. This was not colonization, but a "political problem": this entailed that the *goal* became finding a *solution* to the problem, rather than claiming liberation from an occupant and colonizer.

The concept of liberation has been in steady decline. Initially it transformed from liberation of the entire Palestine to liberation of any part, until being totally dropped from Palestinian discourse by the mid-1980s. Liberation was replaced with resistance to the Zionist occupation, the aim to resolve the Palestinian issue, to find a just solution for the Palestinian issue, and the right to confront the Zionist occupation (PNC 1983, PNC 1988). Even the replacements came out of the gradual adaptation of previous concepts. For instance, resistance was substituted for words such as termination, liberation, and liquidation, while occupation was substituted for colonialism in political statements. Recently, the notion of liberation infers an attenuated statehood in the West Bank and Gaza and a special arrangement for Jerusalem, with land swaps and without the true return of refugees.

(Badarin, 2016)

"Being realistic" represented a significant epistemological shift: as the new system of values of the PLO, it was the measure to which initiatives and actions should have been evaluated: armed resistance was not realistic, opposing the requests of the Israel and the mediators of the peace processes was not realistic, claiming the right of return of all the refugees was not realistic; in this context, "realistic" became synonym with "in agreement with peace processes", and the key to marginalize and penalize every initiative against them. The negotiations also signed the introduction of neo-liberal discourse in the Palestinian political discourse (Badarin, 2016; Hilal, 2015). In fact, the "market metaphor" was introduced in the peace processes, clearly summarised by the expression "land in exchange for peace": peace and land became exchange goods that could be negotiated, and this also entailed that the negotiators were on the same level, like two merchants or traders would, and not in an unequal relationship of occupier and occupied, or colonizer and colonized (Badarin, 2016).

Rights were, very similarly, maintained in their form, but renegotiated in their content. The right of return, which was granted by U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 396, was very soon considered "unrealistic" and, during negotiations, its real terms were transformed: from granting the Palestinian refugees the right to go back, it transformed into a negotiation to establish a limited number of Palestinians to enter Israeli territory (Badarin, 2016).

### **10.1.2 Hamas and the question of the borders**

The parties which dissociated from the peace processes, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Islamic Jihad and Hamas maintained, on the other hand, the lexicon of liberation and claimed their rights without concessions. The representation of the

Palestinian question was maintained by the Popular Front as a colonization issue; George Habash explains how, when the small group that founded the "Movement of Arab nationalists" first and then the Marxist "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" would gather to study the past revolutions and the colonization issues, in order to understand Palestine and revolution in this framework (Sawayd, 2008, pp. 11-12). Hamas also represents Israel as a colonizer (see chapter "Participants"), but its most recurrent representation is that of the "Occupation". This entails the complete and non-negotiable liberation of the whole territory, as the occupation is legally and not legitimate both on a moral and legal level. In fact, Hamas for a long time pursued the "liberation of Palestine, from the river (Jordan) to the (Mediterranean) sea", without concessions to Israel. This was included in the first charter, and occurred steadily until recent years. The 2017 charter, in fact, specifies that, although liberation of whole Palestine is still the main goal, Hamas asks for the creation of a state within the 1967 borders:

**Example 146 2 -** *Falaṣṭīn bi-ḥudūdihā min nahar al-ʿUrdun šarqan ʿilā al-baḥr al-Mutawassiṭ ʿarban, wa min rʿas an-Nāqūra šamalan ʿilā ʿUmm al-Rašrāš ʿgunūban waḥda ʿiqlīmiyya lā tataḡazzʿa wa hiya ʿard al-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī wa waṭanihi. Wa ʿin ʿard al-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī wa tašrīdihim ʿarḍihi, wa ʿiqāma kiyān ṣahyūnī ʿalayhā, lā yalḡt ḥuq aš-šaʿb al-falaṣṭīnī fī kāmīl ʿarḍihi wa lā yanšāʿay ḥuq lil-kiyān aš-ṣahyūnī al-ḡāṣib fihā.*

*3- Falaṣṭīn ʿard ʿarabiyya ʿislāmiyya, wa hiya ʿard mubāraka muqaddasa lahā makānatiḥā al-ḥāṣṣa fī qalb kull ʿarabī wa muslim.*

(...)

*20- Lā tunāzil ʿan ʿay ḡizʿmin ʿard Falaṣṭīn, muhimman kānat al-ʿasbāb wa al-zurūf wa aḍ-ḍuḡūṭ, wa muhimman ṭāl al-iḥtlāl. Wa tarfuḍ Ḥamās ʿay badīl ʿan taḥrīr Falaṣṭīn taḥrīran kāmīlā, min nahriḥā ʿilā baḥriḥā.*

*Wa maʿa ḍalika -wa bimā lā yaʿnī ʿiṭlāqan al-iʿtirāf bil-kiyān aš-ṣahyūnī, wa lā at-tanāzul ʿan ʿay min al-ḥuqūq al-falaṣṭīniyya - faʿin Ḥamās taʿtabir ʿan ʿiqāmat dawla falaṣṭīniyya mustaqilla kāmila as-siyāda, wa ʿašimatihā al-Quds, ʿalā ḥuṭūṭ al-rābiʿmin Ḥzīrān/ Yūnū 1967, maʿa ʿawdat al-lāḡʿiṭn wa al-nāziḥīn ʿilā manāzilihim allatī ʿahraḡū minhā, hiya ṣṭḡa tawāfaqiyya wa waṭaniyya muštarika.*

(Ḥamās, 2017)

The Land of Palestine:

2. Palestine, which extends from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and from Ras Al-Naqurah in the north to Umm Al-Rashrash in the south, is an integral territorial unit. It is the land and the home of the Palestinian people. The expulsion and banishment of the Palestinian people from their land and the establishment of the Zionist entity therein do not annul the right of the Palestinian people to their entire land and do not entrench any rights therein for the usurping Zionist entity. 3. Palestine is an Arab Islamic land. It is a blessed sacred land that has a special place in the heart of every Arab and every Muslim. (...)

20. Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded, irrespective of the causes, the circumstances and the pressures and no matter how long the occupation lasts. Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.

*A Document of general principles and policies, (Hamas, 2017)*

The extract shows how the announcement that Hamas will accept a state based on the borders of 4th June 1967, the borders prior to the 1967 war, which would roughly follow the lines of the 1947 Partition plan, is introduced by a disclaimer about the integrity of the movement's intentions in contrast with the notion of accepting a different line, introduced by another mental process, "considers": "Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus". The other part of the disclaimer, "without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights", is left unexplained. Both positions co-exist in the mental space of Hamas, apparently without contradiction. Moreover, the existence of such state is associated to the other fundamental and historical claims regarding the right of return and the recognition of Jerusalem (al-Quds) as the legitimate capital of Palestine, as if the recognition of the state (under these conditions) came together with obtaining such claims.

However, such position did not come as an abrupt move nor was unexpected, but rather consolidated for years. Accepting the 1967 borders is a way to recognize Israel's existence in a non-explicit way. Although members of the movement repeatedly reiterated that they would never do so, in fact, they were pressed to recognize Israel as an unavoidable condition in order to be recognized as legitimate counterparts in negotiations and international affairs. Hamas' weakening after 2012 made the movement more open towards such requests (Baconi, 2018).

## 10.2 Liberation

Liberation of Palestine is the ultimate goal of Hamas and of all Palestinian parties and movements. Negating this goal is a *taboo* move: even when this actually happened, when the PLO got involved with peace processes, great discursive efforts were exerted to make the new goal of "political solution" acceptable. Liberation, *tahrīr*, appears consistently throughout the corpus, almost always referred to Palestine. Liberation is intended as liberation of the land from the oppressor, and the references are, in fact, more frequently to liberation of the land, of Palestine, of "our nation" than "liberation of the people". It implies, in fact, for a certain time, the withdrawal of Israel, who was expected to release the lands it had conquered and occupied in 1948 and 1967.

The word occurs roughly 105 times per 100000 words, without variations in time. Its collocations and co-occurrences do not, similarly, change much (see Table 10.1).

**Example 147** *Lā-badd ʿan yazull ḥiyār al-muqāwama huwa al-ḥiyār al-waḥīd li-tahrīr al-ʿarḍ wa al-muqaddasāt wa ʿawda al-lāğʿiīn. .*

[n. 6403, 16/11/2016]

Resistance must remain **the only choice for liberation of the land, the sacred sites and the return of the refugees**

Liberation legitimises the instruments for reaching it, as they are the "only alternative" (see chapter 9).

**Example 148** *Tataqaddam Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya Ḥamās min al-ʿiḥwa fī Ḥarakat at-Tahrīr al-waṭanī al-falastīnī Faṭḥ bi-t-tahanʿiya fī al-dīkrī al-ḥamsīn li-inṭilāqatihā ka-ḥaraka taḥarrur waṭanī i-tamadat al-muqāwama al-masliḥa li-tahrīr Falasṭīn kull Falasṭīn.*

[n. 1797, 31/12/2014]

Table 10.1: Cluster of *tahrīr*, "liberation", in the selected corpus, per decade

Rank	Freq.	Cluster	Years	Freq.	Cluster	Years	Freq.	Cluster	Years
1	2	Liberation and	1987-1996	2	The liberation of Palestine	1997-2006	2	The Palestinian Liberation	2007-2016
2	2	Liberation of Palestine	1987-1996	2	Liberation of the land	1997-2006	2	Liberation of Palestine	2007-2016
3	2	Liberation of all	1987-1996	1	Liberation and	1997-2006	2	to liberation of Palestine	2007-2016
4	1	Liberation from the accords	1987-1996	1	With the liberation of all	1997-2006	1	The slow liberation	2007-2016
5	1	Complete liberation	1987-1996	1	Liberation of our land	1997-2006	1	The liberation does not	2007-2016
6	1	The liberation failed	1987-1996	1	Liberation of their land	1997-2006	1	The liberation and not	2007-2016
7	1	the liberation of Acca	1987-1996	1	Liberation of Palestine	1997-2006	1	Liberation without	2007-2016
8	1	Total liberation	1987-1996	1	And the liberations, and these	1997-2006	1	And liberate them from	2007-2016
9	1	Liberation of our nation	1987-1996	1	Liberation and independence	1997-2006	1	The liberation and decision	2007-2016

The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas congratulates with the National Movement for the Liberation of Palestine "Fatah" on the 50th anniversary of their foundation as a national movement of liberation which supported armed resistance to liberate Palestine, all Palestine.

Common goals are common ground, and on that basis Hamas is able to congratulate with Fatah for their anniversary; however, although it is 2014, they congratulate with the historical Fatah that shared the goals and objectives that the movement is currently carrying on.

Reiteration of "liberation of Palestine, all Palestine" remains a constant refrain until the most recent years; however, Hamas had started "considering" the 1967 borders years before. They were mentioned in the 1990s document *This is what we struggle for*, addressed to European diplomats in Amman, as the territories "from which Israel should retreat" (Tamimi, 2011). According to Baconi [2018, pp. 46], also in 2001 there were hints that the movement was ready to accept the 1967 borders, as they already made distinctions between attacks in Gaza and West Bank and other occupied territories, thus showing that they were perceived as different objectives. The Cairo Agreement, signed in 2005 with Fatah and the mediation of Egypt, included the acceptance of such borders, which was reiterated in the document presenting the electoral program of the "Change and Reform List". The 1967 borders were acceptable as a transient solution, and were proposed by Hamas as the borders delimiting the retreat of Israel in change for peace, an offer that Israel never accepted (Baconi, 2018, p. 82, 102, 107).

**Example 149** *ʾInnanā fī ḥarakat Ḥamās ʾiḍ nastagrib wa nastahḡin tilka at-taṣrīḡāt, faʾinnanā nuʾakid ʾannanā lam nuwāfiq wa lan nuwāfiq yaūman ʾalā mā ʾisman bi-ḡull ad-dawlatayn wa mawqifunā wāḡiḡ lā labs fīhi bi-tamassukinā bi-ʾarḡinā al-falastīniyya kāmila ḡayr manḡūṣa min al-baḡr ʾilā al-nahr wa raḡḡ al-tanāzul ʾaw al-tafrīt biḡra turāb minhā.. wa ʾan muwafiqatunā ʾalā ʾiqāmat dawla falastīniyya ʾalā ʾarāḡinā al-muḡtalla fī al-ʾām 1967 ḡāʾt fī siyāq at-tawāfuq ʾalā barnāmiḡ waḡanī muṣtarik, maʾa taʾakīdinā ʾalā raḡḡ al-i-tirāf bi-l-kiyān aṣ-ṣahyūnī.*

[n. 1739, 27/01/2013]

We, the movement Hamas, were surprised by those statements [of Abbas' declaring that all the Palestinian parties support the two states solution] and we condemn them; we assure that we never agreed and never will agree to the so-called "two-states solution", our position

is clear, there is no doubt about our adherence to our whole and non-partitioned Palestinian land, from the sea to the river, and [our] refusal to concede or neglect even a seed of our land... our position regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State on our lands **occupied in 1967 came within the context of agreement on a shared national program, and we confirm our refusal to recognize the Zionist entity**

Acceptance of the 1967 is, in the last example, "contained" within disclaimers about Hamas' unchanged position on the matter and the context of "an higher good", which is realized by reaching an agreement of national unity with Fatah. Thus, they never acknowledge a change of political perspective, but present it, in this phase, as some kind of necessary evil. The distance from this position is also made clear by the fact that they do not even attribute it directly to themselves as an object of an opinion verb or a mental process, but externalize it as "our position" and assign it to a specific context which proves coercive on the movement's real beliefs, which are presented as not open to change ("we never agreed and we never will"). However, the page "Myths&Facts" on Hamas English website states as follows:

Myth: Palestine must first recognise Israel "

Facts:

§The PLO representing all Palestinians has already recognized so-called Israel since 1993. Israeli occupation has never reciprocated by recognizing Palestine even though over 148 countries now do.

§Israeli occupation has now moved the goalposts by demanding to be recognized as a Jewish state without explaining what that means. Palestinians in 48 Palestine fear it would mean their removal by force.

§**Hamas has always said it accepts a state at 1967 borders** as part of an agreement, but not without knowing the terms of that agreement.

["Myths&Facts", on Hamas' English version of the official website:  
<<http://hamas.ps/en/page/5>>]

In this case, accepting 1967 is "part of an agreement": this does not attribute them the will to do so, but is not as saying that Hamas "never agreed and never will agree". In fact, the English version naturalizes the acceptance of 1967, although motivated, as permanent and always existent, whereas in the Arabic version what has always been true has been Hamas' will not to accept but liberation of Palestine in its entirety; as much as the textual structure is the same (clarification of a



wrong belief, description of real Hamas' thoughts and their permanence in time as a disclaimer, motivation behind the acceptance of something unwanted), the contents of the structure change significantly.

References to liberation are maintained "aesthetically": the same lexicon and almost formulaic expressions ("all Palestine", "from the river to the sea") resist time, and the position on the topic is represented as permanent and consistent. However, the real contents change, such as the real extent of liberated land and the acceptance of the two-state solutions.

A frame analysis of *tahrīr* reveals how it is consistently represented as not only a purpose, but the result of revolution (frame of "Rebellion") and frequently together with other frames recalled by the *instruments* of resistance, *jihād* and *muqāwama* (see chapter 9): the "road metaphor" and the "Process Continue" frame. This inextricably ties liberation to the strategy of resistance and armed resistance on a conceptual level, as such frames are evoked almost every time with the word:

**Example 150** *Fa-li-tastamirr al-ʿintifāda wa li-nataṣidā li-l-ġāṣibīn wa nuwāḡihhim ḥaytumā kānū ḥattā yutimm tahrīr kull dīra min ʿarḍ al-ʿisrāʿwa al-miʿrāġ. Falasṭīn kull Falasṭīn ʿin šāʿAllāh .*

[n. 58, 18/08/1988]

May the intifada continue and may we resist the usurpers and confront them wherever they are until **the total liberation of every bit of the land of the Ascension. Palestine, all Palestine, God willing.**

**Example 151** *ʿIn šaʿbunā qad ḥasama ḥiyāratahu, wa qarrara ʿan al-ġihād huwa as-sabīl li-tahrīr al-ʿarḍ wa al-muqaddasāt wa istiʿadat al-ḥuqūq.*

[n. 411, 06/04/2002]

Our people has made its choice, and decided that **jihād is the way to the liberation of our land, the sacred sites and for taking back the rights.**

**Example 152** *Al-muqāwama hiya aṭ-ṭarīq al-waḥīd li-tahrīr Falasṭīn wa ‘alā r-rasihā al-muqāwama al-musallaha, fa-hiya huq šaraṭhu.*

[n. 6539, 14/12/2016]

The resistance is the only way to liberate Palestine, especially armed resistance, which is a legitimate right.

Another instrument for reaching liberation is, very frequently, the reaching of short-term national goals, such as national unity (see section 10.5) among the Palestinian political factions:

**Example 153** *‘In ṭarīq al-tahrīr laā bad ‘an yamurr bi-l-waḥda al-waṭaniyya wa ‘in al-waḥda ta-nī aš-širāka wa al-hadaf al-muštariḳ wa al-muwāḡiha al-muštariḳa didd al-‘adū.*

[n. 6352, 02/11/2016]

The way to resistance necessarily passes through **national unity**, and unity means participation and common goals, and a joint confrontation with the enemy .

### 10.3 The right to return

The right to return has been one of the most important goals for Palestinian refugees ever since 1948 operations of expulsion and dispossession. It was recognized by Resolution 194 (11/12/1948) of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

11. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

(General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948)

The failed implementation of the resolution was recalled by resolution 394 of 14/12/1950, which called upon "the governments concerned" to put into effect resolution 194 (of the United Nations, 1950). First of all, right of return is decreed by an institution, the United Nations. Besides its institutional legitimacy, the idea of return has been absorbed and processed within the Palestinian discourse at a deeper level.

It became charged with a high symbolic value, and can be safely regarded as a trope within Palestinian discourse. In refugee camps outside Palestine, for example, children, which now belong to the third or even fourth generation of camp dwellers, thus never saw Palestine nor lived expulsion, learn about the right of return and formalize it in first person and in the future tense: "I am from (Palestinian village of origin of the family), and I will return to Palestine"; it is regarded as one of the rights of children, and is very commonly connected to identity and the suspended temporal representation of life in the camp<sup>1</sup>. Mentioning the right of return in discourse means, thus, not only claiming a legitimate right as established by international law and a well-known international institution, but calls to a very deep feeling within the community. Its place in discourse is almost mandatory, and no political party could ever fail in including it as a goal. However, going back to the history of Palestinian political discourse, it was, at some point, marginalized.

It is mentioned in the "Palestinian *Qawmī* Charter", where the PLO, while still representing the Palestine question as an Arab question, called for the right of return in articles 9 and 26:

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work **for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it**. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 26:

The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle - **to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it** - in all military, political, and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

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<sup>1</sup>This results from the personal observations of the author during fieldwork in Lebanon in 2017, while visiting the Tyr refugee camps of Burj el Shamali and el Buss.

In this case, right of return is not claimed on the grounds of being recognized by U.N., but as an absolute and inalienable right to be conquered by the means of struggle; it is, moreover, connected to the right of self-determination. Badarin shows how later formulations of the concept of Palestinian rights, which would define the discourse on rights for the following years, were drawn from general "nation state" discourse and started to show signs of a very generalized mode of representation:

At the PNC Nineteenth Session, Palestinian rights (*al-huqwq al-falastiniyya*) were articulated in terms of self-determination, right of return, an independent state over the occupied Palestinian territories, Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian occupied land in 1967 including the Arab Jerusalem, and establishing temporary government (PNC 1988). These rights were conceived under the rubric inalienable Palestinian nation rights (*al-huqwq al-falastiniyya al-thabita*, often referred to simply as *al-thawabt*). The means to achieve this list of rights remained unarticulated, however, rendering everything apparently flexible, open ended, and contingent on whatever political realism might offer.

At least since the late 1980s, the PLO was co-opted into the triumphant neoliberal worldview (see PNC 1991). This followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, which for the Palestinian leadership marked a severance with the past. The leaders saw the promise of a new reality in the war on Iraq in 1991, which compelled them to give absolute priority to peace in the Middle East and count on international legality that had become of central importance (Al-Hassan 1992: 31, 36, 39). This wishful new vision imposed itself on a political schema that sought to distance itself from previous frameworks of the struggle (mainly the armed struggle) and to replace them with the framework of political settlement.

(Badarin, 2016)

"Right of return" became a point of discussion during negotiations; then, it became an "international issue" whose responsibility fell in the hands of international institutions: "resolving the refugee issue according to the relevant UN resolutions (PNC 1988)" (Badarin, 2016). Finally, its content was determined in terms of number of Palestinians allowed to enter the Israeli territory "to be implemented in accordance with an agreed annual quota and within an agreed period of time (Doc.3597, Roadmap 2003)" (Badarin, 2016). Thus, in political discourse, the right of return become, finally, emptied of its original meaning and negotiated as a trading good.

In Hamas' discourse, right of return is a constant among the final and long-term goals of the movement. It follows liberation and can, as a consequence, be achieved by the same means that will lead to liberation, such as resistance and (later) participation in politics.

**Example 154** *Sā'ilīn al-mawālī 'an tataḥaqqaq ahdāfahā bi-l-waḥda wa taḥrīr al-'arḍ wa taqrīr al-maṣīr wa 'awda al-lāğ'iīn 'ilā diyārihim allatī hağrū minhā wa taḥrīr al-Quds 'āşma Falasṭīn al-'abadiyya.*

[n. 1797, 31/12/2014]

[We] ask to the leaders [of Fatah] to realize their goals concerning unity, self-determination and return of the refugees to the homes they fled from and liberation of Jerusalem, eternal capital of Palestine.

**Example 155** *Wa kaḍalika fī zall faşal maşārī'al-tasawīyya al-ğāriyya ( Madrīd 'Oslū) 'alā 'inğāz ḥuqūq şa'binā fī al-taḥrīr wa al-ḥuriyya wa al-'awda wa al-siyāda 'alā ārdīnā al-mubāraka.*

[n. 812, 28/02/1997]

(...) under the shadow of the failure of the peace processes (Madrid - Oslo) to implement **our people's rights on liberation, freedom, return and sovereign on our blessed land.**

The example also shows how the right of return is defined as "return of the refugees to their homes". This is the opposite operation with respect to what happened in the discourse of peace processes: while, in that case, the right was objectivized and generalized, therefore mentioned as a general principle without adding any detail on its implementation, in this case it is specified and actors and actions are made explicit. "Right of return", in fact, allows for a wider margin of interpretation regarding how it is going to be achieved, which is exactly what happened during peace processes negotiations throughout the 90s and 2000s. Making it explicit as a sentence, on the other end, does not allow for misunderstanding about the fact that return is intended within the Israeli territory ("to their homes") and for the benefit of current refugees.

In a similar way as other *values* and *instruments*, the goal "right of return" is something that Hamas adheres to and has no intention to relinquish, implying a difference with the PLO:

**Example 156** *Bi-'annanā mutamassikūn bi-ḥuq al-'awda.*

[n. 6352, 02/11/2016]

### We adhere to the right of return

Its inalienability, the concept of *tawwabt*, is maintained by framing it as a sacred right:

**Example 157** *Ḥuq al-ʿawda huq muqaddas ʿalā al-mustawā al-fardī wa al-ġimāʿ wa al-tanāzul ʿanhu ġarīma, wa lā badd ʿan yaʿūd al-lāġʿiyūn ġamīʿihim ʿilā diyārihim allatī šuridū minhā.*

[n. 6352, 02/11/2016]

**The right of return is a sacred right on individual and social level,** and renounce it is a crime. All the refugees must return to their homes, which were taken from them.

For what concerns Hamas' discourse, there is no consistent variation in its representation. However, it should be said that Hamas never engaged in negotiations, and never met the need to propose a plan regarding a specific implementation.

## 10.4 Victory

"Victory" is a long-term goal that will define the end of the struggle. Clearly, it does not say much about concrete actions or political programs; however, the fact that it is defined as a final goal is an indication of the representation of the Palestine question, on the part of Hamas, as a struggle and a war to win. This is a more general representation than that of colonization or occupation, both present (the second more than the former). It evokes general knowledge about war and, in most cases, is associated with jihad and histories regarding Muhammad and the first Muslim community.

The formula "Jihad... victory or martyrdom", which is common in Islamist rhetoric and discourse, and originally a characterization of the Muslim Brotherhood, is often found in closure to Hamas' statements, especially when they talk about Israeli attacks or, in general, armed conflict or resistance. Victory will belong to the Palestinian people; moreover, important battles with Israel are regarded as "historical victories":

**Example 158** *Fī-l-d-dīkrā al-ʿulā li-intiṣār šaʿbinā al-falaṣṭīnī wa muqāwamatihh al-bāsila fī maʿrakat al-furqān ʿalā ʿarḍ Ġaza hāšim,*

*nastaš'ir ma'iyya Allāh.*

On the first anniversary of **the victory of our Palestinian people and their fearless resistance the Battle of the Criterion** on the shattered land of Gaza, we feel the presence of God.

[n. 1398, 26/12/2009]

## 10.5 Short-term goals: national reconciliation

National unity stands on the "outskirts" of three ideological categories: it is regarded as a *goal*, a short-term goal to reach for the good of the people and, at the same time, as a necessary step, an *instrument*, to reach long-term goals; moreover, it is legitimized on the basis of the value of *unity* (see chapter "Values"):

**Example 159** *Kamā tuġaddid al-ḥaraka al-da'wa li-ġamāhīr ša'binā, wa li-kāfat 'abnā'fašā'il al-mal al-waṭanī, 'ilā al-iktifā'bi-rifa'alam Falasṭīn fī kāfa al-fa'al-iyāt, ta'akīdan 'alā risala al-waḥda al-waṭaniyya, wa al-tamāssuk aš-ša'bī ḥalfā ḥiyār muqāwama al-muḥtill.*

[n. 3945, 22/10/2015]

The Movement renovates its invite to the masses of our people, and to all the national factions, to rise the Palestinian flag at every event, asserting the mission of national unity, and the popular demand behind the choice of the resistance to the Occupant.

In the example, national unity is defined as a mission, which makes explicit its nature as a *goal*. Mission, *risāla*, is a strongly evocative word, and positions national unity as something more than a pragmatic governance need, but something towards which the movement will exert all its efforts, something connected to higher purposes and resistance. First attempts to reach national reconciliation, intended as a unity government between Hamas and Fatah, were made through the Cairo Declaration. Then, in 2007 the Mecca Agreement, brokered by Saudi Arabia, which was taken further to the point of reaching an agreement on a cabinet (Baconi, 2018, pp. 125-128); however, it failed, as did the following attempts (2011, 2014, 2017).

Hamas frames national reconciliation as a matter of responsibility towards the people and their goals. The expression "National Unity" (*al-waḥda al-waṭaniyya*) occurs 194 times in the general corpus, starting from 1991, with an average frequency of 22.7 occurrences every 100000 words. Its use increased in the second decade. The expression "National reconciliation" (*muṣāliḥa al-waṭaniyya*), on the other hand, which indicates specifically attempts at building a government of national unity with Fatah, occurs 48 times and only in the third decade, with a frequency of 17 occurrences per 100000 words. It is an innovation, a new expression to describe the attempts at creating a united government, also in countries other than Palestine:

**Example 160** *Fa'innā nu'amil min al-qāda wa al-zu'amā'al-'arab 'an yakṭafū masā'ihim al-ḥamīda wa ḡuhūdihim al-ḥayra li-r'ab aṣ-ṣad'al-'arabī, wa ḥāṣṣa fī al-'Irāq wa Lubnān kamā fī Falasṭīn, wa taḥqīq al-muṣalaha al-waṭaniyya bayna ḡamī'al-furqā', wa ihtwā'al-fitna aṭ-ṭā'ifiyya wa taṭuwīqihā, wa bi-dalika bi-mā yuḥaṣṣin al-'umma 'amāma al-tadaḥulāt al-'aḡnabiyya.*

[n. 1086, 28/03/2007]

We hope that the Arab leaders and chiefs exert all their efforts to repair the Arabic fracture, especially in Iraq, Lebanon as well as Palestine, and realize **national reconciliation** among all the factions, including the sectarian *fitna*, and make the *umma* stronger against foreign intervention.

## 10.6 Concluding remarks

Goals, in political discourse, are a prominent and fundamental category. Their representation in Hamas' discourse is characterized by two elements: significant changes (from 1948 to 1967 borders) and the nature of a "taboo" element, which need an effort discursive strategies to be changed. In the case of Hamas', the strategy is a disclaimer where said change is legitimised as instrumental for a greater good, although the movement has not substantially changed its perspective. It is represented as something not desired by the movement, although been under discussion for years.

Hamas' goals define the organization of the movement, its resources and instruments: in fact, they legitimize their methods and this is consistent with the category of social movements, which are goal-oriented and entail an organizational structure that revolves around those same goals.





## **Part III: Conclusions**



# Chapter 11

## DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

### 11.1 Two dimensions of analysis

The chapters in the analytical section have shown results which can be classified in two categories: representations behind of the ideological structures, and diachronic development of the ideological structures. In this chapter, these two dimensions will be discussed in relation to the most evident phenomena that emerged and the contribution to the theoretical framework of discourse studies and studies on Hamas.

### 11.2 Representations behind the ideological structures

#### 11.2.1 Summary of findings

The chapters dedicated to the analysis showed how ideological structures are interconnected. This is no surprise, and consistent with current studies on ideology. Hamas began as a goal-oriented movement, whose purpose was to liberate Palestine from the Israeli occupation. This entails instruments (Chapter 9) to achieve the purpose and a system of values to evaluate positive attitudes and behaviours (Chapter 8). For what concerns the composition of the in-group and the out-group, which is the primary step of implementation of the ideological system, a polarisation in terms of agentivity separates in-group and out-group.

## 11.2.2 De-agentivation and the semantic opposition human-non human

The study on participants and derogative strategies showed that the opposition human-inhuman seemed to correspond to the apparent de-agentivation of the in-group (Chapter 7). In fact, the in-group is represented as predominantly passive not only to focus on the actions of the enemy and, thus, its responsibilities, but also to affirm the in-group as composed by rational beings more prone to thought and speech than the beastly, irrational and violent enemy. In language, passive or impersonal constructions seem to frequently correspond to strategies of de-responsabilization or de-humanization of the actors. In this case, it is only partially so: the linguistic de-agentivization emphasizes other qualities of the in-group, and builds up to a positive image. Moreover, it is performed only on a linguistic level, since shared knowledge of the reader is expected to contain the information that many of the mentioned actors, such as the *muğāhidūn*, fighting martyrs and arrested militants are engaged in practical and military action. The Israeli enemy is less than human for being irrational and engaged in violent acts, and its verbal actions are represented only when it comes to lies. In fact, the only "rational" actions attributed to Israel are the planning of the occupation and the progressive repression and cancellation of the Palestinian population.

Table 11.1: Relative frequencies on the general corpus

Item	Relative Frequency	Type
People	867,67	Participant
Muqāwama	603,27	Instruments
Occupation	415,69	Participant
Jihad	190,86	Instruments
Ṣāmid-ṣumūd	123,74	Values
Liberation	104,59	Goals
Terrorism	96,77	Participant
Unity	74,48	Values
Fitna	23,46	Values
Law (qānūn)	10,16	Values

with the former. Clearly, a fair deal of interaction (which is not mentioned in the statements) has occurred, since they negotiated truces (mentioned only when Israel broke them) and showed the intention to interact once in office.

The representation of Israel is at the core of Hamas' discourse, and does not present a significant degree of diachronic variation. From its early statements, Hamas refers to Israel as the Occupation, Zionist entity, Zionist Government; similarly, the adjectives used to describe it and the way their actions are reported remain the same through time. This might be explained in two ways. One is the scarcity of dialogue between Israel and Hamas that, conversely to Fatah, never engaged in dialogue

Another central element of Hamas' discourse is resistance (see the following section), which is more consistent with a static representation of Israel than with the variability of representations admitted in the case of other actors, especially Palestinian and Arab actors. Such representations are not an original creation of Hamas, and they are common in Arab political discourse. Israel does indeed perform an occupation on the West Bank, has imposed a blockade on Gaza, and its founders followed the nationalist Zionist ideology, so it is not the point to assess the truth of such descriptions. However, they certainly show where the focus of the discourse lies, and how stable it has been through time. Representation of other members of the out-group that might, for the general conception of Islamic and Arab community, enter in the in-group, are variable and processed in a complex way. For what concerns Fatah or the PLO, they are represented in a multiplicity of ways and in a wide variety of tones. In fact, Hamas sometimes accuse the PLO or Fatah of irresponsibility and sometimes rises to very harsh tones against them; in other occasions, they completely change attitude and celebrate common anniversaries and goals. The cases of Egypt or Syria, although, is treated differently. When Egypt closes the Rafah passage, it is not directly condemned: the action is certainly derogated, but the actors are not. This follows the strategy of "aggregation" (Van Leeuwen, 2008), where the people are separated from the government so that the bond with Egypt can be saved by reasserting the familiar connection that ties Palestinians and Egyptians. In the case of Syria, any negative attitude towards the government was simply omitted by concentrating on the topic of attacks to the Palestinian refugee camps or the Syrian people, expressing solidarity but not mentioning who was the responsible of such attacks.

Some legitimation strategies contribute to build to the "rational/human" self-representation. Acts of resistance, for example, are very often legitimised as "the only possibility", thus not directly represented as a voluntary choice of the movement (although they are frequently regarded as a "choice of the people": however, this just adds distance between the movement and the decisional process), but as a calculated option, where all other alternatives have been excluded after a rational decisional process. An episode told by Gunning (2007) exemplifies this attitude towards rationalisation: the elected representatives in Hamas' list had prohibited a music festival, for creating the danger of "promiscuous situations" while dancing. The representatives had defended the decision not on religious grounds, but by affirming that, as the people had chosen that list, this meant that they had democratically chosen a certain line of behaviour, and would thus be undemocratic to hold a festival against the will of the majority. This episode shows that a political choice rooted in an argumentation about religion and tradition, although it is not possible to know if it was made for political convenience or genuine belief, was not defended with a moral legitimation or an "higher authority" (God) legitimation, but rationalised in democratic terms. This shows an attitude that privileges,

at least more recently, a system of values detached by religious or moral interpretations, and dependent on “external” legitimation, that does not come from God but from the democratic electoral process.

### 11.2.3 The primacy of instruments

Although Hamas is a goal-oriented movement, the category of "instruments" seems to gain a primacy in discourse, even more than that of goals. This is evident, first of all, on a quantitative ground: resistance as *muqāwama* occurs with a relative frequency of 603,27 (occurrence per 100000 words). For a comparison with other frequencies, see Table 11.1. Both *muqāwama* and jihad score high in terms of frequency, although *muqāwama* evidently recur more often. The most frequent references are then dedicated to core participants of in-group and out-group ("people" and "Occupation") and instruments (jihad and *muqāwama*). As shown in chapter 9, jihad and *muqāwama* are linguistically treated in a similar way because they recur in similar expressions, entail the same kind of actions, and underlie the same representations (road metaphor, continuity frame). They are both ascribable to the "ethos of *muqāwama*", intended as ideology of total resistance (Sadiki, 2010). As shown in the same chapter, jihad gradually becomes less represented, showing the shift from a religious to a more institutional and politicised lexicon acknowledged in Hroub (2006a), or the "pragmatic turn" mentioned by other authors (Nüsse, 1998; Gunning, 2007; Baconi, 2018).

Instruments are pervasive: the complex articulation of values that has emerged from the analysis draws heavily upon the discourse of resistance, and is functional to create norms and systems of evaluation of attitudes and behaviour that may benefit resistance. Such values include "heroic" features of character (Singh, 2012), such as sacrifice and courage, and the mythization of the *mujāhid* hero.

The values that emerge are those inherited by a symbolic capital of resistance tradition that dates back to the times of the British mandate, evolved to the celebration of rural life values and the figure of the *fidā'i* that, in Hamas' discourse, is revisited as the *muḡahid*. Nonetheless, despite the lexical selection, Hamas' representation of resistance seems to draw more on Palestinian discourse than on modern political Islam's representations of jihad. Although there are many common points, the local vocation of Hamas wins over its ideological origin. Religious values, in fact, play but a marginal role in discourse, that is limited to religious quotations and concept that show a shift more in register than in the actual application of the Islamic concepts (see the example of *fitna* in section 8.2.4). This does not mean that religious language should be underestimated, because Hamas remains an Islamic movement and because this aspect played an important role in Hamas' elections: not because the electorate was particularly religious but because, nonetheless, the religious lexicon sounded familiar and was associated

to integrity (Gunning, 2007). Nonetheless, the presence of religious lexicon is connected to topics concerning struggle and unity of the people. An exception are obituaries, where the presence of religious references is expected for the nature of the genre. Linguistically, the representations connected to resistance are encoded in the following discursive structures:

- Related lexicon;
- Temporal and spacial representations (see section below);
- Selection of topics: “global topics” are frequently actions of the out-group, commemoration of battles or events related to the Occupation, celebration of events related to resistance such as the intifada; local topics do also very frequently remind of the context that needs resistance, such as the initial macro-propositions that introduce the statements with “in a period in which”, followed by information regarding the context of occupation;
- Semiotic action: pragmatic macro-propositions are concerned with actions related to the position of Hamas as a movement of resistance. In fact, through their statement, they often organise strikes and demonstrations (mobilisation statements, chapter 6), advance requests of help concerning the occupation, or advocate the legitimacy of resistance acts, including armed attacks;
- Generalisation of the movement’s representations of resistance values and instruments to the whole in-group, by the means of aggregating and categorising groups (the people, the Palestinian people) and describe them by the means of the movements’ value system, or consider them as the source of legitimacy for the movement.
- Stability in the representation of Israel as out-group: representations of Israel do not undergo particular changes, are formulaic and repeated. This is also a central element in discourse, and it is referred to as “Occupation”, “Zionist entity”, focusing on the action they perform and the ideology behind them.

Pervasiveness of resistance in discourse does not necessarily correspond to the reality of the movements’ actions. Hamas, being pressured by its public to portray the alternative to Fatah and by the international political actors to tone down its image, essentially maintains a discursive basic structure based on resistance symbols and references, and performs the action of “toning down” by limiting the religious references and introducing new systems of representations, such as the references to democratic processes and to the elections, that marked the entrance



of the movement into the institutional realm. Moreover, in documents other than the statements, this shift is more evident (Hroub, 2006a; Hamas, 2017). In the statements, for example, there is no mention of the fact that rocket launches and suicide attacks were suspended; nonetheless, even though Hamas dismisses accusations of attacks when it is not responsible, it does not miss the occasion to prove its loyalty to resistance also in its armed version, minimising its lack of participation. This might be interpreted as a continuity with the original function of the statements as leaflets intended as communications to the people, or at least the intention to maintain this appearance. On the other hand, statements produced for foreign actors and institutions, such as memoranda, do not fail in using a different tone and vary in the emphasis on discursive structures related to resistance.

#### **11.2.4 Representations of temporal continuity**

Another salient representation pertains time. Hamas' narrative, which draws heavily from Palestinian narrative, emerges clearly from the statements. It does not consist of a typical nationalist narrative, which seeks to legitimise the groups' "roots" and identity by finding a "point zero" in time related to the origin of the group, but the point zero corresponds to the Balfour Declaration (1917) (see Chapter 2), which means that the narrative is built on the events regarding the Palestine question. This is integrated by the inclusion of events regarding important personalities for the movement, such as Ezzedine Qassam and the Muslim Brothers Abdullah Azzam and Sayyid Qutb. However, the narrative does not go back much further, and some of the tropes of other Islamic movements, such as the historical metaphor of Crusades, are not really productive: Hamas' narrative is concerned with Palestine, regardless of its ideological origins.

The Palestinian question is a core element in the in-group's self-representation. However, this concept needs some clarification: simplification of this have led to some misconceptions and biased interpretations<sup>1</sup>, according to which Palestinian identity was created by the Israeli invasion and occupation. Historical context of the area recognised as "Middle East" shows how the current national borders have been traced by France and Britain, without following any pre-existent subdivision or actual community organisation (see Chapter 2); thus, current national identities are a modern product of the super-imposed nation states and they, nonetheless, create a complex system of identity which includes national identity and the heritage of local familiar, sectarian and community loyalties. Palestine followed a similar path without earning a land for building its nation-state and, under the current situation, most of the national sentiment is connected to the context of

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<sup>1</sup>For an exhaustive account of issues concerning Palestinian identity, see (Sanbar, 2005; Khalidi, 2010)

occupation and resistance to the occupation, which produces a strong bond within Palestine and outside.

The temporal representations are not limited to references to common history. When acts of the in-group and the out-group are mentioned, they are related to a chain of events that basically consists in repeated attacks by Israel. This is evident by the recurrent use of expression such as “once again, the Occupation has stricken an attack” or “In a context when the Occupation [...]”, which very often occurs at initial position in propositions and shift the focus on temporal context.

Temporal representations are concerned also with the conception of struggle and achieving of goals. As Hamas was born relatively late relating to the lifespan of the Palestinian discourse, the initial belief that Israel would be rapidly defeated within few years from the Nakba, with the help of the Arabic allies (Badarin, 2016) had long vanished. The struggle engaged by Hamas is a lengthy one, and liberation from Israel is not close. This is reflected in language, especially in the metaphor of the “road” applied to terms of resistance, such as “The long path of jihad”, “on the path of jihad and *muqāwama*”. This metaphor is highly productive and recurrent, and metaphorizes the long time and efforts needed to achieve the goals as a “journey”. This expression might also be built in analogy with “jihad on the path of God”, which means that jihad need be realised according to God’s rules.

### **11.3 Stability and change**

The other dimension of analysis, fundamental for answering the initial research questions, is diachronic change in Hamas’ discourse. As a result of the analysis, the features that seem to remain stable are indicative of the focus that Hamas puts in representations concerning its official communication.

#### **Stable features**

- Representations of Israel;
- Representations of Fatah;
- Representations of the Palestinian people;
- Loyalty to the “Arab and Islamic umma”;
- Positive representations of “peoples” in general;
- Values: unity, sacrifice, martyrdom;

- General primacy of instruments in discourse;
- Instruments: references to *muqāwama*;
- Goals: Liberation of Palestine, right to return, creation of a national home;
- Organisation in sub-genres;
- Legitimation of resistance, including armed resistance;
- Legitimation: resistance as a moral issue and strategic issue (moral legitimation, rational legitimation);
- Function of the statements: mobilisation, requests;
- Attitude: refusal of negotiations and the Oslo accord.

### **Changing features**

- Representation of Arab actors;
- Affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood: it disappears in 2017 “Document of General principles and policies”;
- Participants: “Muslims” as privileged ratified interlocutor becomes rarer with time;
- Islamic lexicon: toned down with time;
- Palestine as Islamic *waqf* (religious endowment) or “Land of ascension”: dismissed around early 1990s;
- The Islamic framing of the Palestinian question becomes minimised with time;
- Goals: borders of Palestine are narrowed from 1948 borders to 1967 borders;
- The references to jihad according to Azzam are dismissed around the early 1990s;
- Instruments: jihad becomes less frequent than *muqāwama* after 2011;
- Values: introduction of “democratic process” frame, with political participation as a value, explained in terms of “responsibility” starting from 2005;

- Sub-genres: introduction of political programme (statement with program for the list “Change and reform”);

The more stable features are those concerned with the core of values, instruments and goals, elements concerned with resistance. Also, core participants of the in-group and out-group are roughly treated in a stable way. The resistance framework in general, that in section 11.2.3 was shown to have a general primacy in a synchronic perspective, has primacy also in a diachronic development. The instances of changes regard the representation of participants, loyalties, and a general toning down of Islamic representations to favour the inclusion of representations affiliated to the realm of secular institutions and politics, especially after the early 2000s. Innovations are realised as variation of stable features: the institutional lexicon and representations run parallel to the resistance representations, as they are legitimised for being functional to resistance and the final goals of the movement. Changes in discourse are connected to changes in political opportunity and in the situation lived by Hamas. The first significant shift, in fact, seems to happen around the period of the Oslo Accords, when the language heavily inherited by political Islam was toned down. The second shift occurs around the second Intifada, when the Oslo Accords are considered overcome and the movement prepares for the electoral run, preparing also for a new self-image through its discourse. Finally, 2011 and 2017 (although 2017 has not been included in the statements) are the final two turning points: 2011, with the Arab uprisings, started a process of political change throughout the Arab world that saw Hamas changing political alliances. This period is marked by a significant decrease in the use of the word “jihad” and by off-record strategies of face threatening acts (Brown and Levinson, 1987) towards Arabic leaders, realised by just omitting them in statements (see the case of Syria) or by on-record strategies based on redressing the offence towards the strong bond among Arab people. The year 2017 is the year of “formalisation” of some of the changes undergone in precedent years: the Document of General Principles and Policies officialise the departure from the Muslim Brotherhood and the (provisional) acceptance of 1967 borders. Such changes had been anticipated for years, in statements and through other channels, but the movement needed to officially declare them on a dedicated and official document. Changes are not always progressive. Some specific events can result in a temporary change: for example, during the war with Fatah in 2007, the word *fitna*, that indicates the fractures in the Islamic community, reached a unusual peak. This shows how religious representations are evoked in particularly significant events, such as the open war with a fellow Palestinian party, that contravenes the value and principle of unity of Palestinian people.

## 11.4 Conclusions

### 11.4.1 The primacy of context

Hamas' ideological system is represented, in discourse, as essentially an ideology of resistance. Resistance had been at the root since the beginning: representations of political Islam were functional to pursue liberation of Palestine and create a national home, initially intended as an Islamic society. Islamic representations had the role to revisit pre-existent representations of Palestinian resistance discourse. The ideology of political Islam inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood was revised because of the Palestinian context and the political developments involved in the Palestinian political scene.

However, the heritage of Palestinian resistance discourse seems to hold strong and stable at the expense of other kinds of representation. The context of occupation clearly plays a central role in determining which kinds of discursive representations take the stage. As it was shown earlier, among ideological structures the most prominent and productive in terms of meaning building and stability is that of instruments, rather than goals. Clearly, a resistance group is not formed only for sharing the same goals, but also for agreeing on the measures to take to achieve the goals. Being oppressed by a dominant power impacts more on discourse and representations than other factors, which disprove academic approaches based on only one of the ideological dimensions of Hamas, such as the religious one.

The context of domestic and international politics is also a strong factor. When Hamas became a governing party in Gaza, it reached the other side of power: that of control. This new dimension emerges in discourses as emphasis on democratic process and electoral process, and concerns many of the innovation in discourse. Nonetheless, it does not prevail, nor is the focus of (official) discourse. The attempt to maintain their political status, which is recognised as one of the goals of political powers, is realised in the following ways:

1. Abiding by the tropes of Palestinian resistance discourse;
2. Abiding by the constraints of belonging to the "Arabic umma";
3. Maintaining the image of the resistance fighter, including during suspension of armed attacks;
4. Changing the function of religious representations: from instruments ("Islam as a way of life", "liberation on the trail of jihad") to a source of analogy;
5. Introducing representations related to institutions and electoral process.

Point 1 refers to the constraints imposed by the Palestinian symbolic and cultural capital. Palestinian national identity is not determined by the Occupation, but is strongly connected to it. Displaced Palestinian communities revive their traditions and the creation of refugee camps, and families and cultural associations transmit the experience of the Nakba and its consequences to younger generations. Palestinian literature also mainly revolves around the themes of occupation, memory, displacement and dispossession. These are socially shared representations whose strength in common perception make them almost inescapable; thus, they are reasonably stronger than any other political or ideological influence. The degree to which a party or a movement would adhere to them because its members have grown up surrounded by them or for political convenience cannot be determined in this work. What emerges is that they are alive and productive in Palestinian discourses of many different kinds. Here, context comes under the form of discursive context, public celebrations and manifestations, family tales and traditions, and many other social practices of reinforcement. Some of these are mirrored in the textual genres employed by Hamas: commemorative statements and obituaries have a counterpart in social behaviour, such as celebrations, commemorative activities, celebration of funerals of martyrs and the hanging of poster commemorating them all over the urban space and in houses.

Point 2 tackles another dimension of identity, which is extended beyond the Palestinian community. The sense of belonging to the “Arabic umma”, and in general to the Arabic communities, has already been dealt with in this work (Chapters 7, 8). In the statements, it emerges in the constant presence of the expression “the Arabic and Islamic umma” but, most prominently, on a pragmatic level. In fact, when dealing with Arabic actors, redressing strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987) are employed to minimise the open confrontation. Thus, Hamas acts by changing alliances as any political actor; however, such changes are minimised in discourse, and the appearance of unity is preserved.

Point 3 is strictly connected to point 1 and to the political context in which Hamas was founded. Credibility of the movement for the sake of its people is built on the idea of internal coherence and differentiation from other parties. Thus, becoming a political party is not a process made explicit in discourse since, for the reasons explained before, it is more important to maintain the original image. In this context, what is usually minimised according to current literature on political discourse, such as violence and involvement in armed acts, is not minimised but emphasised, even when the movement is not involved (but it praises of the actions of others) or when it suspends action and does not announce it. Moreover, in the statements, general representations are predominant with respect to episodes or local interventions: episodes such as the one exposed in section 11.2.2 would never be discussed in official statements, and this is a marginalisation the representation of local events for the benefit of a global focus on Palestine and the

occupation. Nonetheless, violence concerning Palestinian or Arab actors is definitely minimised. When Hamas reports the arrests and abuses committed by Fatah on its members, very often fails to mention that it persecuted Fatah officials and sympathisers when first running office (Gunning, 2007).

Point 4 is concerned with the most evident discursive strategy aimed at changing self-image. Religious language cannot be dismissed altogether, because it evokes a significant dimension of identity of Hamas, because it is the Islamic resistance movement. For this reason, its use has gradually changed its purpose. The representations of the first years, that genuinely present Islam as “the way”, and quotes Azzam and the Muslim Brotherhood on jihad, were gradually decreased and limited and the use of religious representations was limited to ritual contexts (obituaries), formulas (the basmalah at the beginning of statements or quotations from the Quran) and the use of historical metaphors. This latter function is significant: when Hamas renames the battles with Israel after Quranic suras, calls its electoral list “Change and Reform”, or resort to *fitna* to describe its war with Fatah, it actually evokes episodes from the life of Prophet Muhammad or from Quranic narrative that act as a parallel with the reality of events and provide a key of interpretation, according to which Hamas and the Palestinian people are likened to the first Muslim community that clashed with the inhabitants of Mecca. This evokes a familiar and affective image for the reader, and pursues legitimisation and self-image representation.

Finally, point 5 is the shift most clearly recognised as innovation. This kind of innovation is, nonetheless, legitimised by the means of point 1.

Context in different forms (historical background, social sharing and production of meaning, rituals) is thus fundamental for understanding the discursive development of the movement, more than its supposedly determined ideological loyalties. Finally, the last constraint imposed is that of genre. The *bayānāt* are official communications, intended for a wide public, nonetheless they include many different texts and sub-genres that hint at the conception of official communication as a wide field of action, that can also mirror social practices and traditions, and a space which is not necessarily informative or organisational, but welcomes also the function of reproduction of knowledge when it serves the purpose of consolidating shared representations that fit the ideology of Hamas. A good example is that of anniversaries: they are evidently connected to non-discursive social practices regarding the public celebration of anniversaries of events such as the foundation of the movement, or do simply perform the function to inform the historical narration regarding the Palestinian context. They are not necessarily meant for an external public, but rather consolidate Hamas vision for the sake of the Palestinian people. The main function is thus not persuasion, but consolidation of knowledge and representations. In this case, the participants may be included as protagonists of the narrative, and the instruments (resistance) are very often celebrated without

need of legitimation. On the other hand, legitimation is provided by the evidence of past successes (commemoration of battles), or of past failures (commemoration of Oslo Accords), or evidence of actions deliberately meant to subjugate the Palestinians (anniversary of the Balfour declaration). Therefore, anniversaries are strictly connected with the foundations of Hamas ideology, as many of its values, decisions, attitudes are legitimised on the ground of past events and past symbols (celebration of Martyrs', day of the Earth, anniversary of death of figures of excellence). They contextualise ideological structures: resistance is narrated through past successes and celebration of historical figures, goals are narrated as rightful conditions that have been neglected throughout history (freedom and self-determination, right to return) and values become evident on the ground of the former structures. Context not only determines the shape and organisation of genres, sub-genres and ideological structures, but also provides the elements of connection between discursive level and social-practice level. Anniversaries and obituaries, as sub-genres, are deeply entrenched with public manifestations of commemoration and celebration, ritualised as funerals or in the practice of hanging posters of the martyrs in the public and private space. For what concerns ideological structures, they prove evidence and consolidate, with a connection to a mostly visual social practice (poster hanging in public spaces), the value of martyrdom and the instrument of resistance; although this does not appear in the statements, in this case the posters very often expose the affiliation of the martyr to a political party, thus explicitly making the connection between these values and political organisations. Finally, the calls to mobilisation, from the perspective of ideology, have a foundational value, as this was the first type of statement issued and still survives thirty years later without significant variations. Participants are called to action, thus making them escape the usually passive condition in which they appear in other statements. The instrument of resistance is hereby articulated in specific actions, which does not usually happen otherwise, as resistance appears as a generalised container of actions. Other ideological categories may appear as introduction, in order to argue the call to action.

#### **11.4.2 Concluding remarks and future research**

The "strategies of political discourse" mentioned by Chilton (2004) are all present. Representation of others is preponderant, but most of the focus in the statements is on self-representation, strongly constrained by the context of occupation and of inherited resistance discourse. Coercion and resistance are, nevertheless, both present, the latter more than the former, which appears under the form of requests or persuasion to enact some measures. Finally, legitimation and de-legitimation are realised very often, for a variety of reasons (legitimation of armed resistance, legitimation of position against negotiations, legitimation of the choice to run for



elections, de-legitimation of different choices and of the occupation). It has been shown how Hamas was capable of change in its discourse, how it performed such changes and the role played by society and context. Many Hamas' scholars assume its identity as a social movement. At the current state of affairs, it seems that, although Hamas maintains a discourse similar to that of social movements and resistance movements, it has achieved a different position. If social movements are defined as movements born around a specific purpose, Hamas might as well fit the definition, because it was founded against the Occupation and was out of politics (or, to be more precise, out of the official politics of Oslo institutions) for most of its life. Nonetheless, the goal pursued by Hamas is by and large the core goal of all the Palestinian people, thus of all the segments of the reference population, and this collocates the conditions of its creation under a different context than many social movements. Its political behaviour in last years is that of a fully-fledged political party, and not limited to an original goal. The peculiarity of Palestinian context thus seem to create a condition where dynamics of power interact in a way that is predictable to a certain extent (the discursive focus on resistance is not much of a surprise, in an occupation context) but that also results in what could be interpreted as uncommon discursive behaviour on other aspects (not minimising violence in certain contexts). The peculiarity of this case is not adherence to Islamic ideology or a nationalist ideology, but the particular conditions of power interplay produced in the context of occupation and settler colonialism and the subsequent creation of strong shared representations that at least partially remodulate the behaviour of movements, parties and institutions.

This research was conducted around a case study and on a portion of texts, belonging to the same genre. The findings are fit to be compared with other case studies in the same area, or in other channels of Hamas' communication. In fact, to learn more about Palestinian discourse and how it interplays in political discourse could be beneficial to the study of Hamas and in general of other movements in Palestine or the Middle East area. Also, comparing these findings with the study of other channels of communication by Hamas, such as computer-mediated communication on their Twitter account, interviews, and use of images on their website or other spaces of communication. Clearly, the focus should be maintained on the context and on avoiding to fall in easy categorisations and simplifications.

## **Appendix: Selected Corpus**

## First decade: 1988-1996

Statement	Date	Word Count	Summary of content
58	18/08/1988	1159	On jihad as the only method of struggle, on Palestine as historical Islamic site, on rejection of negotiations. Organization of strikes on the 22th August.
80	07/07/1989	935	Letter to express support to the <i>muḡahidūn</i> in Afghanistan.
81	11/26/1989	398	On the death of Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar.
92	21/04/1991	1065	On the Gulf War and the United States.
136	12/11/1991	192	Support to the people of Kuwait during the Gulf War.
147	16/12/1990	582	Against the Israeli waves of arrests and mobilization against them.
181	25/04/1992	286	Expression of support to the Bosnia Herzegovina.
187	28/05/1992	548	On the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.
396	02/27/1994	139	On the massacre of the Ibrahimi mosque.
621	16/09/1996	544	Anniversary of the Oslo agreements.
648	07/03/1996	705	Letter to the Palestinian people.

## Second decade: 1997-2006

Statement	Date	Word Count	Summary of content
319	18/09/2001	851	On the Twin Towers terrorist attack
399	31/07/2001	531	Martyrs in Nablus.
411	06/04/2002	448	To the conference in Cairo, on the massacre of Jenin.
416	17/04/2002	202	Condemnation of the waves of arrests, detention of Jamal Tawil.
480	23/07/2002	388	On the martyrs fell during massacre for bombing F16 in Gaza.
535	08/03/2003	672	Obituary.
611	11/07/2003	416	Obituary.
615	29/07/2003	509	Memorandum to the director of the Red Cross on the issue of administrative detention.
661	21/08/2004	300	Anniversary of the arson of Aqsa, whose responsibility is attributed to the Zionist Occupation and to the Americans.
684	22/03/2004	202	Obituary for <i>shaykh</i> Ahmad Yassin.
689	05/17/2004	238	Expression of support to Gaza during Israeli Operation Rainbow.
691	05/22/2004	841	Open letter of to the summit of Tunis.
705	13/09/2004	276	On the 11th anniversary of the signing, Hamas calls for the cancellation of the Oslo treaties.
725	01/10/2004	248	Condemnation of Sharon for his crimes in Gaza.

728	10/25/2004	216	Mobilizations against the Operations “Days of Penitence”.
812	28/02/1997	508	On the national meeting held in Nablus on 27 February 1997.
827	22/03/1997	1283	Hamas memorandum for the 23rd Islamic conference.
836	17/04/2004	361	Obituary for Rantisi.
868	12/03/2005	214	Announcement on the participation to legislative elections.
869	16/03/2005	175	Commemoration of Ahmad Yasin.
962	11/11/2005	202	First anniversary of the death of Arafat.
1029	30/03/2006	297	Condemnation of the attack on the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth.

## Third decade: 2007-2016

Statement	Date	Word Count	Summary of content
1175	03/06/2007	582	On the upcoming anniversary of the Six Day War.
1320	16/02/2008	213	Letter to the director of channel al Jazeera.
1260	25/03/2008	1004	Memorandum for the summit in Damascus.
1294	08/12/2011	206	Call for mobilisation against the closure of the passages to al Aqsa.
1297	11/26/2008	764	memorandum for the Arab leaders meeting in Cairo.
1339	12/28/2008	1358	Israel launches "Operation Cast Lead".
1428	14/01/2009	469	On Israeli attacks, white phosphorus bombings.
1531	11/16/2012	120	Condemnation of incident that involved the death of children.
1540	12/11/2012	220	Condemnation of Zionist attacks.
1566	11/16/2012	226	Expression of support to Morsi.
1569	11/21/2012	183	On the attacks to Gaza.
1762	27/08/2014	390	Launch of a "victory campaign" in Gaza.
1776	11/07/2014	97	Mobilisations in Gaza ("Operation Defensive Edge").
1797	31/12/2014	113	Congratulations to the PLO on the anniversary of their foundation.
2704	22/06/2015	150	Celebration of the outcome of the UN commission of inquiry into the attacks on Gaza and condemnation of Israel.

5743	15/07/2015	165	On the importance of the outcome of local elections.
1398	26/12/2009	834	First anniversary victory in Gaza, the “Battle of the Criterion”.
3945	10/22/2015	271	Organisation of mobilisation for the “Friday of rage”.
5731	12/07/2016	614	Anniversary of Operation Protective Edge.
6352	02/11/2016	500	Anniversary of Balfour Declarations.
6539	14/12/2016	629	Anniversary of Hamas’ foundation.

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