The introduction of the risk-sensitive capital Accord, commonly known as Basel II, raised concerns among practitioners about possible increases in the procyclicality of capital charges during downturns. Based on a sample consisting of yearly observations for the period 2007–2012 and related to 76 countries, we test whether—throughout this period of financial distress—banks implementing Basel II reduce corporate lending growth more than banks adopting the first of the Basel Accords. Furthermore, we also test whether Basel II differently affects the growth of corporate loans according to bank size. Our analysis shows that banks, in general, that have complied with Basel II have not apparently reduced the growth of corporate loans. Interestingly, however, we find that the very largest banks decreased corporate lending growth by more than 3 % during the observed period, thus providing evidence of the above mentioned procyclicality issue affecting larger banks.

Did Basel II affect credit growth to corporate borrowers during the crisis?

Danilo V. Mascia
;
2016-01-01

Abstract

The introduction of the risk-sensitive capital Accord, commonly known as Basel II, raised concerns among practitioners about possible increases in the procyclicality of capital charges during downturns. Based on a sample consisting of yearly observations for the period 2007–2012 and related to 76 countries, we test whether—throughout this period of financial distress—banks implementing Basel II reduce corporate lending growth more than banks adopting the first of the Basel Accords. Furthermore, we also test whether Basel II differently affects the growth of corporate loans according to bank size. Our analysis shows that banks, in general, that have complied with Basel II have not apparently reduced the growth of corporate loans. Interestingly, however, we find that the very largest banks decreased corporate lending growth by more than 3 % during the observed period, thus providing evidence of the above mentioned procyclicality issue affecting larger banks.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
MasciaKeaseyVallascas2016.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: versione editoriale
Dimensione 392.71 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
392.71 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11584/229089
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact