Ciclo economico e interventi normativi nel meccanismo di selezione dei guidatori in Italia

Lowering the number of injuries and deaths due to traffic accidents represents a priority in both developed and developing countries. While most national governments implemented policies oriented at discouraging risky behaviors in the population of existing drivers, little emphasis has been posed on how individuals select into the pool of drivers. This analysis focuses precisely on the selection mechanism behind the decision to start driving – that is, to earn a driving permit – and, specifically, on the role of economic downturns and policy interventions targeting new drivers. We study the case of Italy during the years 2011-2013, a period characterized by a deep decline in employment opportunities and household spending. Furthermore, in 2011 a reform deeply modified the written driving test and imposed a power-ban on new drivers, who are no longer allowed to drive high- and middle-power cars during the first year of their license. We find a substantial decrease in the number of licenses issued, whose number dropped by 20% between 2011 and 2014. This drop is more pronounced in areas with a higher population, with limited heterogeneity arising when looking at the regions which were hit the most by the crisis. Our findings have important policy implication, as they shed light on the mechanisms through which young people – who represent the group of road users exhibiting the highest mortality rate – select into the pool of drivers.