Research in behavioral economics shows that signing honesty declarations before self-reports reduces systematic misreporting. We investigate if this nudge can help improve anonymous self-reports of sensitive information that cannot be independently verified, when there are strong priors of distortions due to social desirability bias. In four studies involving more than 1400 participants and examining behaviors as diverse as healthy lifestyles, littering, and petty corruption, we find that this nudge has remarkably little effect on survey responses. We conjecture that anonymity may be responsible for the result, as the declarer cannot be held responsible for the inaccuracy of the information provided.

Can Upfront Declarations of Honesty Improve Anonymous Self-Reports of Sensitive Information?

Isoni A.
Primo
;
2019-01-01

Abstract

Research in behavioral economics shows that signing honesty declarations before self-reports reduces systematic misreporting. We investigate if this nudge can help improve anonymous self-reports of sensitive information that cannot be independently verified, when there are strong priors of distortions due to social desirability bias. In four studies involving more than 1400 participants and examining behaviors as diverse as healthy lifestyles, littering, and petty corruption, we find that this nudge has remarkably little effect on survey responses. We conjecture that anonymity may be responsible for the result, as the declarer cannot be held responsible for the inaccuracy of the information provided.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11584/309453
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