During the Seventies many events deeply modify the concept ogf the role of money and Central Banks within the econimic system. In italy, a severe economic crisis and the changing international Macroeconomic context dermine a rapid evolution of the goal and instruments of monetary bas become compulsory previsions, until the Bank of Italy and the Tresury agree on a "divorce" in 1981. The paper aims at reconstructing the scientific debate which preceded that event, in the light of wider macroeconomic debate on the credibility role of monetary authorities and their indipendence from the political power.
Indipendenza della banca centrale e politica monetaria:note sul dibattito intorno al "divorzio" fra Banca d'Italia e Tesoro.
MACIOCCO, CINZIA;
2007-01-01
Abstract
During the Seventies many events deeply modify the concept ogf the role of money and Central Banks within the econimic system. In italy, a severe economic crisis and the changing international Macroeconomic context dermine a rapid evolution of the goal and instruments of monetary bas become compulsory previsions, until the Bank of Italy and the Tresury agree on a "divorce" in 1981. The paper aims at reconstructing the scientific debate which preceded that event, in the light of wider macroeconomic debate on the credibility role of monetary authorities and their indipendence from the political power.
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