Mimesis and Recollection

In this chapter, I contend that a specific type of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), the one found in the Phaedrus (249b1–d3; 249e4–250b1) and the Phaedo (72e1–77a5), is made possible by a metaphysics of μίμησις. This is because recollection is a process of recognising the ideal world’s mnestic traces in the sensible world. I first shed light on some characteristics of meta‐physical μίμησις that are necessary in order to explain how this type of ἀνάμνησις is supported by metaphysical μίμησις (1). Then, I focus on the imperfection of the copies and argue that the deficiency of the sensible world ignites the philosopher’s epistemic desire for the Forms (2). Finally, I identify ἔρως as a privileged bond to the ideal and explain its connection to the philosopher-lover’s extraordinary perception required by this type of ἀνάμνησις (3). In so doing, I respond to the objection against conferring an important epistemic implication, that of recollection, to μίμησις, since μίμησις is illusory. The outcome is an interpretation of ἀνάμνησις as an activity performed by the philosopher-lover who can remember the Forms by seeing their traces in the sensible world because the sensible world is an image of the ideal world.