The present chapter aims to illustrate what kind of logic is implied and demanded by gestures in light of peirce's thought and his understanding of logic as semiotics. by relying on recent studies,The first part-"meaningful gestures"-provides a minimal definition of the gesture from a pragmatist perspective. given such a characterization,The second part-"gestures in logic"-focuses on the role and relevance of gestures in the proposition according to peirce's logical analysis, Which he developed after his research on the logic of relatives. finally, The third part-"for a logic of gestures"-investigates what kind of logic gestures require and express. as peirce emphasized,Logic is semiotically characterized and should not be based on (indo-european) linguistic bias. similarly,Gestures should not be conceived of as embodiments of abstract judgments but the other way around. gestures come first and allow us to understand better the very structure of reasoning'Which-in peirce's perspective-is not founded on the classical equation relationship (a = b) but rather on the copula of inclusion or implication.
Between Saying and Doing: What Logic for Gestures?
Brioschi, Maria Regina
2024-01-01
Abstract
The present chapter aims to illustrate what kind of logic is implied and demanded by gestures in light of peirce's thought and his understanding of logic as semiotics. by relying on recent studies,The first part-"meaningful gestures"-provides a minimal definition of the gesture from a pragmatist perspective. given such a characterization,The second part-"gestures in logic"-focuses on the role and relevance of gestures in the proposition according to peirce's logical analysis, Which he developed after his research on the logic of relatives. finally, The third part-"for a logic of gestures"-investigates what kind of logic gestures require and express. as peirce emphasized,Logic is semiotically characterized and should not be based on (indo-european) linguistic bias. similarly,Gestures should not be conceived of as embodiments of abstract judgments but the other way around. gestures come first and allow us to understand better the very structure of reasoning'Which-in peirce's perspective-is not founded on the classical equation relationship (a = b) but rather on the copula of inclusion or implication.I metadati presenti in IRIS UNICA sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono protetti da diritto d'autore, salvo diversa indicazione.



