We give a negative answer to the question of whether our conviction about the truth of the G ̈odel sentence G involves a theory of truth beyond the deflationary theories. After discussing and dismissing Neil Tennant’s de- flationary account of incompleteness, we show how a new deflationary construal of the incompletability of formal systems can be framed in the setting of Peano Arithmetic augmented to include a constructive version of the ω-rule based on Herbrand’s notion of prototype proof.
A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence G
PULCINI, GABRIELE
In corso di stampa
Abstract
We give a negative answer to the question of whether our conviction about the truth of the G ̈odel sentence G involves a theory of truth beyond the deflationary theories. After discussing and dismissing Neil Tennant’s de- flationary account of incompleteness, we show how a new deflationary construal of the incompletability of formal systems can be framed in the setting of Peano Arithmetic augmented to include a constructive version of the ω-rule based on Herbrand’s notion of prototype proof.
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