Metafora e affettività nella malattia mentale: il caso dell'ingiustizia epistemica

Epistemic injustice often emerges in the context of mental illness, where people may be marginalised due to their behaviour and how they communicate their experiences. How can this phenomenon be countered, and how can the resulting epistemic damage be reduced? Can people with mental health conditions be integrated into society, from an epistemic point of view? The paper addresses the definition of epistemic injustice in its two main shapes: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. It then explores if and how language can improve communication about mental illness. In particular, it analyses the use of metaphor as a tool to articulate one’s condition and foster an epistemic bridge with the interlocutor. The cognitive potential of metaphor, and its ability to provide insight into the experience of mental illness, could be the key to making this often unarticulated world more understandable and accessible. Metaphor also allows for affective framing for the reinterpretation of the self and the self in relation to illness in the narrative framework.