On Monday, 6 April 2009 at 3:32 a.m. (local time), a moment magnitude 6.3 earthquake with an epicenter located near the city of L’Aquila, in central Italy, killed 308 people, injured 1,500, left 22,000 homeless, and temporarily displaced another 65,000. This study examines a sample of the affected popula- tion and finds that despite the long list of historical earthquakes that struck the region and the swarm of foreshocks occurring up to four months before the main shock of 6 April, the residents of L’Aquila had a rather low earthquake risk perception and an unjustified confidence in the seismic safety of their houses. This low perception of earthquake risk and ignorance of the real struc- tural resistance of buildings appear to have inhibited the individual and collec- tive propensity to develop emergency plans. This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of clear and forthright communication from the emer- gency management authorities about the impossibility of precisely predicting earthquakes and about the risks posed by many of the city’s old buildings.
Perception and communication of seismic risk: The 6 April 2009 l'Aquila earthquake case study.
PUSCEDDU, ANTONIO;
2012-01-01
Abstract
On Monday, 6 April 2009 at 3:32 a.m. (local time), a moment magnitude 6.3 earthquake with an epicenter located near the city of L’Aquila, in central Italy, killed 308 people, injured 1,500, left 22,000 homeless, and temporarily displaced another 65,000. This study examines a sample of the affected popula- tion and finds that despite the long list of historical earthquakes that struck the region and the swarm of foreshocks occurring up to four months before the main shock of 6 April, the residents of L’Aquila had a rather low earthquake risk perception and an unjustified confidence in the seismic safety of their houses. This low perception of earthquake risk and ignorance of the real struc- tural resistance of buildings appear to have inhibited the individual and collec- tive propensity to develop emergency plans. This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of clear and forthright communication from the emer- gency management authorities about the impossibility of precisely predicting earthquakes and about the risks posed by many of the city’s old buildings.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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