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EnglishOn the basis of the distinction between phenomenal and psychological consciousness, I propose a formal framework where we can express and analyze a strong form of Chalmers’ zombie argument. By employing such formal framework, I make clear the kind of problem that this argument poses to anyone who is willing to (i) construct a theory of phenomenal consciousness and (ii) maintain the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness by physics. I then extend such formal framework so as to provide a theory of consciousness in axiomatized form. The explanation of phenomenal consciousness provided by this theory is by no means inconsistent with a physicalist perspective. In fact, once the theory is supplemented with a minimal physicalist assumption, we can prove the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness by physics and, as a consequence, the logical impossibility of zombie worlds. I then conclude that Chalmers’ intuition, according to which phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of any physical theory, is not tenable. Finally, I hint at a possible source of such erroneous perception, that is, not realizing that the hard problem of consciousness is not a problem of scientific explanation but, rather, a philosophical problem of conceptual explication.
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| Titolo: | Zombies cannot be there | |
| Autori: | ||
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2004 | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Abstract: | On the basis of the distinction between phenomenal and psychological consciousness, I propose a formal framework where we can express and analyze a strong form of Chalmers’ zombie argument. By employing such formal framework, I make clear the kind of problem that this argument poses to anyone who is willing to (i) construct a theory of phenomenal consciousness and (ii) maintain the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness by physics. I then extend such formal framework so as to provide a theory of consciousness in axiomatized form. The explanation of phenomenal consciousness provided by this theory is by no means inconsistent with a physicalist perspective. In fact, once the theory is supplemented with a minimal physicalist assumption, we can prove the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness by physics and, as a consequence, the logical impossibility of zombie worlds. I then conclude that Chalmers’ intuition, according to which phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of any physical theory, is not tenable. Finally, I hint at a possible source of such erroneous perception, that is, not realizing that the hard problem of consciousness is not a problem of scientific explanation but, rather, a philosophical problem of conceptual explication. | |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11584/21042 | |
| Tipologia: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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