Contrasted by many philosophical traditions, after an initial fortune, the weberian concept of Wertfreiheit met a long decay in epistemology. Empirical evidence in scientific disputes depends on a set not value-free of cognitive and non cognitive elements. It’s interesting to read about this issue the Italian philosopher Giulio Preti’s works, that refer to a paradoxical dualism. The vital experience is value-laden, but it gives the spe-cific values of Wertfreiheit and objective truth as features of ours cognitive practices. These Preti’s views provide an original perspective to rethink the concept of scientific objectivity, in considering new questions in epistemological debate
[I paradossi della «Wertfreiheit». Giulio Preti e le fortune epistemologiche dell'ideale weberiano
LECIS, PIER LUIGI
2010-01-01
Abstract
Contrasted by many philosophical traditions, after an initial fortune, the weberian concept of Wertfreiheit met a long decay in epistemology. Empirical evidence in scientific disputes depends on a set not value-free of cognitive and non cognitive elements. It’s interesting to read about this issue the Italian philosopher Giulio Preti’s works, that refer to a paradoxical dualism. The vital experience is value-laden, but it gives the spe-cific values of Wertfreiheit and objective truth as features of ours cognitive practices. These Preti’s views provide an original perspective to rethink the concept of scientific objectivity, in considering new questions in epistemological debateI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.