I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.
Implicational paradoxes and the meaning of logical constants / PAOLI F. - In: AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 0004-8402. - 85:4(2007), pp. 553-579.
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Titolo: | Implicational paradoxes and the meaning of logical constants |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2007 |
Rivista: | |
Citazione: | Implicational paradoxes and the meaning of logical constants / PAOLI F. - In: AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 0004-8402. - 85:4(2007), pp. 553-579. |
Abstract: | I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11584/22333 |
Tipologia: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |