La giurisprudenza comunitaria e i negoziati informali preventivi: i triloghi alla prova del giudice

Trilogues are tripartite meetings, that is informal negotiations on legislative proposals between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission aimed at reaching early agreements on new EU legislation. Since their first appearance, trilogues have developed in practice from the need of the two branches of the legislature to manage their interdependence. Such inter-institutional negotiations have now become standard practice for the adoption of EU legislative acts. There is a clear benefit to reaching an early deal. This avoids the legislative proposal going back round the Parliament and Council for a second or even a third reading, which can add years to the decision-making process. However, trilogues are problematic from a democratic perspective: they are secluded; involve a restricted number of participants selected according to unclear criteria; and produce intermediary outcomes that have to be sanctioned by formal decision-making processes. Scholars and professionals have inquired if trilogues weaken the democracy and transparency of the EU law-making procedure and, definitely, of the EU action. Recent EU case-law addresses those critical issues providing for their valuable contribution to the efficiency of the EU law-making process, but even over the sustainable trade-off between their legitimacy and democracy shape over critics’ openness and transparency claims.