L'onere e la norma: prove di accesso al diritto

The essay proposes a reconsideration of the controversial concept of charge. It focuses on the category which appears more distant from the idea of duty and on its relationship with the legal provision. As a matter of fact, the study of the charge intersects that of the norm and its conceptions, encountering obstacles of different nature. The criticism of a part of the doctrine converge on the absence of legal nature or the absence of autonomy of that figure. The essay, therefore, aims at overcoming such obstacles in order to include the charge among the legal categories. To this end, it compares the figure with the characteristics which the legal provision has or should have according to its different conceptions, as the alternative between norm as command and norm as judgment. The presence or absence of a sanction in the rules establishing charges is another essential point of the subject. The investigation on the presence, absence, consistency of the sanction allows to observe the charge in a more modern perspective, through its comparison with the growing phenomenon of soft law. In this way the modernity of the concept is highlighted, together with its suitability to identify a legislative technique different from that expressed by the imposition of duties and its possible operational implications.

Il saggio propone un riesame della controversa figura dell’onere. L’attenzione si concentra sulla figura che sembra più lontana dall’idea del dovere e sul suo rapporto con la norma giuridica. Lo studio dell’onere, infatti, interseca quello della norma e delle sue concezioni e vi trova ostacoli di diversa natura. Le critiche di una parte della dottrina convergono sull’accusa di non giuridicità o di non autonomia della figura. Il saggio pertanto si impegna a superare gli ostacoli per garantire all’onere un posto tra le nozioni giuridiche. Per farlo lo pone a confronto con i caratteri che la norma giuridica presenta o dovrebbe presentare secondo le sue diverse concezioni, come l’alternativa tra norma come comando e norma come giudizio. La presenza o meno di una sanzione nelle norme che pongono oneri è un altro essenziale punto di snodo del discorso. L’indagine sulla presenza, assenza, consistenza della sanzione consente di collocare l’onere in una più moderna prospettiva, attraverso il suo confronto con il fenomeno in crescita del soft law. In questo modo si pone in evidenza la modernità della figura in questione e la sua idoneità a designare una tecnica legislativa diversa da quella che si esprime con l’imposizione di doveri e le possibili implicazioni operative. The essay proposes a reconsideration of the controversial concept of charge. It focuses on the category which appears more distant from the idea of duty and on its relationship with the legal provision. As a matter of fact, the study of the charge intersects that of the norm and its conceptions, encountering obstacles of different nature. The criticism of a part of the doctrine converge on the absence of legal nature or the absence of autonomy of that figure. The essay, therefore, aims at overcoming such obstacles in order to include the charge among the legal categories. To this end, it compares the figure with the characteristics which the legal provision has or should have according to its different conceptions, as the alternative between norm as command and norm as judgment. The presence or absence of a sanction in the rules establishing charges is another essential point of the subject. The investigation on the presence, absence, consistency of the sanction allows to observe the charge in a more modern perspective, through its comparison with the growing phenomenon of soft law. In this way the modernity of the concept is highlighted, together with its suitability to identify a legislative technique different from that expressed by the imposition of duties and its possible operational implications.