This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery.
In questo saggio vengono esaminate e messe a confronto le idee di Mario Jori e di Frederick Schauer in tema di formalismo giuridico. Pur essendo state elaborate l’una indipendentemente dall’altra, presentano notevoli somiglianze, perché entrambe usano la nozione di norma o regola come punto focale per chiarire la nozione di formalismo giuridico, e perché entrambe difendono quest’ultimo dalle critiche usualmente rivolte ad esso. L’autrice ritiene che l’esame delle idee dei due autori possa contribuire a chiarire (e criticare) la controversa nozione di defeasibility delle norme giuridiche e possa altresì, in via generale, contribuire a ridimensionare, dal punto di vista teorico-giuridico, le novità del diritto degli odierni Stati costituzionali, oltre che a comprenderne meglio i meccanismi di funzionamento.
Il formalismo giuridico: un confronto tra Jori e Schauer
Pintore, Anna
2017-01-01
Abstract
This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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