Emilio Betti. Dell’oggettività dell’interpretazione

This paper aims to re-examine Betti’s philosophical-theoretical research to grasp its possible updating in the field of human and social sciences and in reference to theories of truth. How to accept Betti’s lesson on interpretation without losing its need for scientific rigor and at the same time bringing it out of a tensional dynamism that is now outdated (natural sciences vs. spiritual sciences, realism vs. idealism etc.) and/or potentially surmountable (hermeneutics vs. pragmatism, representationalism vs. psychologism etc.)? We should think in terms of a mixed model of truth, that is to think of a theory of truth capable of receiving both the idea of the non-intersubjective hermeneutical-cognitive synthesis, of interpreter-objectification, and the idea of the correspondence of representational constructs with respect to objective states, let alone the idea of the inferential value inherent in factual and practical statements in general.