Il vizio dell'attenzione. Sartre e la malafede come etica della distrazione

Among the best-known themes of Sartrean ethics, bad faith is both a notion often used by those who try to reconstruct a positive morality referred to Sartre, and one of his most criticized ideas. In this paper, we will try to provide an original interpretation of it, relating it in particular to the theme of attention. This reading will allow us to show how, in the discussion of bad faith, some of the author’s assumptions about the features of consciousness operate in an exemplary manner, whose problematic nature will be further investigated. To this end, we will first directly address the fundamental passages in which bad faith is introduced and illustrated in Being and Nothingness, privileging the analyses of some examples provided by Sartre. Subsequently, we will argue how the discussion of this theme turns out to be influenced by the confrontation with two authors, namely Sigmund Freud and René Descartes. In the light of this contrast, we will briefly outline Sartre’s conception of consciousness as “translucent”, suggesting how attention plays an essential role in it. Finally, we will translate these premises into a more widespread interpretation of bad faith, making some critical remarks in conclusion.