In this article I replay to some of the criticisms and develop some of the comments made at the Symposium on my book on the regulae iuris. In doing so, I emphasize the influence that the Italian Feminist Thought of the Symbolic has had on my work. In this light, I discuss the definition of the regulae iuris as general principles, a definition that refers to a subjectivist conception of law; I then discuss the “metaphysical” components of this conception, which is based on the deontological implications of being and on the “axiological resources” of the human mind. By implying, for all these reasons, an ethic of “virtue”, the regulae iuris allow us to recover the law as “impersonal”. This is my conclusion, and it also sums up the sense that being a feminist has had in my work. With its typical “infidelity” to all that is patriarchal (and the Law certainly is that, in many respects) and its constitutive search for freedom, my feminism has allowed me to free myself from some of the consolidated constructs of the Law (in particular, its current instrumental and functionalist conceptions, including the de-contructive views of the Critical Legal Studies) and to discover that, once emptied of them, something else become visible: qualities (or differences) of the Law that make it a valid resource available to everyone, in order to negotiating the sense and value of our experience. It is a movement from the inside to the outside, which reminds us that the source of the law is the human being.

La differenza del diritto. Guardare le regole con gli occhi del simbolico. (In replica alle critiche e ai commenti)

Niccolai, Silvia
2025-01-01

Abstract

In this article I replay to some of the criticisms and develop some of the comments made at the Symposium on my book on the regulae iuris. In doing so, I emphasize the influence that the Italian Feminist Thought of the Symbolic has had on my work. In this light, I discuss the definition of the regulae iuris as general principles, a definition that refers to a subjectivist conception of law; I then discuss the “metaphysical” components of this conception, which is based on the deontological implications of being and on the “axiological resources” of the human mind. By implying, for all these reasons, an ethic of “virtue”, the regulae iuris allow us to recover the law as “impersonal”. This is my conclusion, and it also sums up the sense that being a feminist has had in my work. With its typical “infidelity” to all that is patriarchal (and the Law certainly is that, in many respects) and its constitutive search for freedom, my feminism has allowed me to free myself from some of the consolidated constructs of the Law (in particular, its current instrumental and functionalist conceptions, including the de-contructive views of the Critical Legal Studies) and to discover that, once emptied of them, something else become visible: qualities (or differences) of the Law that make it a valid resource available to everyone, in order to negotiating the sense and value of our experience. It is a movement from the inside to the outside, which reminds us that the source of the law is the human being.
2025
Regulae iuris Feminist Thought Legal History Legal Theory Constitutional Law
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11584/442885
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