The paper starts from a detailed review of the case law concerning the relevant legal concepts – namely, urban planning instruments and the related appropriate environmental assessment – as well as the various issues involved. This review is supplemented, from time to time, by critical observations, although these remain within the same conventional interpretative framework. The analysis then develops at an advanced level, grounded in dogmatic reasoning and drawing on insights from legal theory and epistemology, with a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it seeks to show how approaching these concepts through a traditional lens has ultimately revealed further limitations inherent in that very doctrinal framework, par ticularly in its specialist outcomes. On the other hand, it aims to enhance the potential of the applicable legal framework, albeit only with regard to certain aspects. This latter objective entails a reconsideration of certain assumptions relating both to the “interest in bringing an action” and to “administrative discretion” (and, correspondingly, to the “merits” of administrative action).
Lo scritto muove da una articolata rassegna giurisprudenziale, sugli istituti di riferimento (piani urbanistici e pertinente valutazione d’incidenza ambientale) nonché sui vari profili coinvolti, corredandola (di volta in volta) con annotazioni di critico confronto, ma pur sempre sul medesimo piano interpretativo, ‘canonico’. Ciò, in vista di una trattazione di livello avanzato (in quanto condotta su base dogmatica, a partire da spunti di teoria della norma ed epistemologici), con duplice intento: per un verso, rivelare come, accostandosi a tali istituti con una sensibilità tradizionale, si è finito col tradire ulteriori limiti (nei propri esiti specialistici) da parte del medesimo ‘formante’; per altro verso, ottimizzare le potenzialità della disciplina di riferimento, sia pur limitatamente ad alcuni aspetti. Obiettivo, quest’ultimo, implicante una ‘rivisitazione’ di certi assunti in punto sia d’‘interesse ad agire’, sia di ‘discrezionalità amministrativa’ (e, corrispondentemente, di ‘merito’).
Azionabilità e sindacabilità delle valutazioni sull'impatto ambientale delle scelte di pianificazione urbanistica. Dal formante giurisprudenziale a un contributo di metodo
paolo cotza
2026-01-01
Abstract
The paper starts from a detailed review of the case law concerning the relevant legal concepts – namely, urban planning instruments and the related appropriate environmental assessment – as well as the various issues involved. This review is supplemented, from time to time, by critical observations, although these remain within the same conventional interpretative framework. The analysis then develops at an advanced level, grounded in dogmatic reasoning and drawing on insights from legal theory and epistemology, with a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it seeks to show how approaching these concepts through a traditional lens has ultimately revealed further limitations inherent in that very doctrinal framework, par ticularly in its specialist outcomes. On the other hand, it aims to enhance the potential of the applicable legal framework, albeit only with regard to certain aspects. This latter objective entails a reconsideration of certain assumptions relating both to the “interest in bringing an action” and to “administrative discretion” (and, correspondingly, to the “merits” of administrative action).I metadati presenti in IRIS UNICA sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono protetti da diritto d'autore, salvo diversa indicazione.



