This study investigates prosocial behavior in chains of donations using variations of the dictator game. We explore how the possibility of direct and indirect giving influences generosity and welfare. Our results reveal that individuals are more generous when their actions benefit multiple recipients, even indirectly, despite the risks of reduced effectiveness due to intermediaries. Still, the indirect recipient obtains a lower welfare outcome than the direct recipient as the intermediate recipient deliberately withholds part of the dictator's giving, passing on less than expected by the initial donor.
Chains of generosity: the impact of indirect recipients on prosocial behavior and welfare in experimental settings
Corazzini, Luca;Pelligra, Vittorio
2026-01-01
Abstract
This study investigates prosocial behavior in chains of donations using variations of the dictator game. We explore how the possibility of direct and indirect giving influences generosity and welfare. Our results reveal that individuals are more generous when their actions benefit multiple recipients, even indirectly, despite the risks of reduced effectiveness due to intermediaries. Still, the indirect recipient obtains a lower welfare outcome than the direct recipient as the intermediate recipient deliberately withholds part of the dictator's giving, passing on less than expected by the initial donor.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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