Classical computationalism considers the Turing Machine to be a psychologically implausible model of human computation. In this paper, I will first elaborate on Andrew Wells' thesis that the claim of psychological implausibility derives from a wrong interpretation of the TM as originally conceived by Turing. Then, I will show how Turing's original interpretation of the TM could be useful to construct cognitive models of simple phenomena of human computation, such as counting using our fingers or performing arithmetical operations using paper and pencil.
The Turing machine as a cognitive model of human computation
PINNA, SIMONE
2011-01-01
Abstract
Classical computationalism considers the Turing Machine to be a psychologically implausible model of human computation. In this paper, I will first elaborate on Andrew Wells' thesis that the claim of psychological implausibility derives from a wrong interpretation of the TM as originally conceived by Turing. Then, I will show how Turing's original interpretation of the TM could be useful to construct cognitive models of simple phenomena of human computation, such as counting using our fingers or performing arithmetical operations using paper and pencil.
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