New Trends in Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology: An Overview

The seven papers included in this special issue of Argumenta might be ideally divided into two parts. On the one hand, this issue collects four contributions dealing with some important topics in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of language: the modularity of mind (the connections between the “pragmatic” module and epistemic vigilance mechanisms), the problem of perception and its link with action (the alleged anti-representational character of enactivism), the nature of phenomenal content (the plausibility of naïve realism in explaining the phenomenology of veridical visual experience), and the alleged irreducibility of consciousness (the claim that anti-physicalist intuitions are just a by-product of certain epistemological features of phenomenal concepts). On the other hand, there are three more contributions discussing some relevant themes in Logic and Epistemology: the actuality of the ancient Master Argument (its consistency and relationship with contemporary tense logic), the problem of evidence (the kind of evidence, psychological or non-psychological, intuitions actually provide), and that of counterevidence (the possibility that undermining defeaters, contrary to overriding defeaters, require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic reasoning).