Translation and Linguistic Injustice in Analytic Philosophy

The paper considers the problem of ‘linguistic injustice’ in analytic philosophy, refers to the marginalisation of certain languages in philosophical discourse, potentially excluding some linguistic and cultural groups from participation. The paper aims to show that, to overcome this problem, analytic philosophy might start to benefit more fully from translation as a method, by engaging with the linguistic, cultural and cognitive resources of different languages. First, the paper defines linguistic injustice, and it examines whether and why it is a problem in contemporary analytic philosophy. It specifically investigates the relevance of linguistic injustice to the philosophy of translation, particularly within analytic philosophy. Second, the paper argues that translation has always been central to analytic philosophy, as it is its method of inquiry. The ‘language problem’ is rooted in how translation has been defined in the history of analytic philosophy, especially following the ‘translation turn’ with Quine and Davidson, who addressed the challenge of equivalence in translation. Finally, the paper considers contemporary challenges in analytic philosophy that make linguistic injustice a central issue for the philosophy of translation. It argues for a renewed focus on translation to address this problem, also emphasising its fundamental role in ensuring inclusivity in philosophical discourse.